G.R. No.
201716 January 8, 2013 For four (4) successive regular elections, namely,
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner
Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to
nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the
Second Division, Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the
May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc
affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed
issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case
No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the
three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for
the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both
the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as
mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the
office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election
and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where
Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for
the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC),
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division
issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in the
meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,
Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the
COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo,
herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto7 action before the
RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as
Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No.
8
55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as
municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered
GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v.
COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served
three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-
2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner
in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his
protest and occupied the position of and actually
served as Viga mayor for over a year of the
remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30,
2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month
service constitutes a complete and full service of
Abundo’s second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his
recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010,
the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the first
assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac,
Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second
Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of
Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the
unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who
is declared winner in an election protest is
considered as service for one full term within the
contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied
reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its
equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The
fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the
COMELEC en banc held in essence the following:
first, there was no involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would
be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he
is considered never to have lost title to the
disputed office after he won in his election
protest; and second, what the Constitution
prohibits is for an elective official to be in office
for the same position for more than three
consecutive terms and not to the service of the
term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the
COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following
events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued
an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012
Resolution final and executory. The following
day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an
Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for
Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting
on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day
earlier, issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of
ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the
entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD
Bailiff personally delivered the entire records
of the instant case to, and were duly received
by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its
receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for
Execution through an Order18 of even date.
And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the
same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr.
received the Writ of Execution and served the
same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the
same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a
TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s
July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the
TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio
M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their
oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of
Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely
Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated June
28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO
and/or status quo ante Order. On the same
day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First
Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had
taken their oaths of office the day before—
assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion
(To Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and
Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July
5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by
the Court has become functus officio owing to
the execution of the RTC’s Decision in
Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his
Comment/Opposition with Leave to the
Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that
since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First
Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already
assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante
Order would serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert
the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante
Order (In View of the Unreasonable and
Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that
Abundo was dislodged from his post as
incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be
sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster
despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a
TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it
is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First
Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about
the TRO either before they took their oaths of office
on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the
confluence of events following the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to
show that the TRO––issued as it were to maintain
the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of
Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his
appeal––appears to have been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on
Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by public
respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the
allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared the
arguments in Abundo’s motion for
reconsideration as mere rehash and
reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the
promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Abundo has consecutively served for three
terms despite the fact that he only served the
remaining one year and one month of the
second term as a result of an election
protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere
Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for
reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in
said motion are mere reiterations of what he already
brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC
Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims
otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s
Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in
the MR are elucidations and amplications of the
same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief,
Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo
warranto case since the alleged violation of the
three-term limit has already been rejected by the
COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128
(DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar
ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s
finding on the issue of his qualification to run for
the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo
assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his
MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in
Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive
suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it
involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo
argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be
equated with the case of preventive suspension as
held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued
before that the almost two years which he did not sit
as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues
in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served
three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether
the service of a term less than the full three years
by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an
election protest is considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition
meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise
would have been Abundo’s three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed
to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to
have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a
disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis
Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective
local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional
and statutory provisions, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term
limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus,
has its complicated side. We shall revisit and
analyze the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the
Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the
incumbent elective local official for any length of
time shall NOT, in determining service for three
consecutive terms, be considered an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was
elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated
the observation that the law "does not textually state
that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity
of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-
term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on
Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit
rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot,
following his third consecutive term, seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed to
seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term
but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third
term. An interruption usually occurs when the
official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is
unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall NOT be considered
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was
elected." This qualification was made as a
deterrent against an elective local official
intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by
merely resigning before his or her third term
ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may
be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-
term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on
local officials who were elected and served for three
terms or more, but whose terms or service was
punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their
opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from
any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law,
preventive suspension, declaration of the
defeated candidate as the winner in an election
contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate
as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in
a recall election, removal of the official by
operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and
jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were
considered or not considered as having been
"involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T.
Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on
Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of
"assumption to office by operation of law" on the
three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation
wherein an elective local official fills by succession a
higher local government post permanently left vacant
due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when
the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989,
Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon
the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja.
Capco was then elected and served as mayor for
terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco
expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the
three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the
disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification
can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not
elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that
office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case
of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for
three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. However, in January 2004, or during his
second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed
the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed
his certificate of candidacy again as municipal
councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed
against him based on the three-term limit rule. The
Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office
as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
interruption of his continuity of service as
councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in
local government office is by operation of law
and as such, it is an involuntary severance from
office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to
vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office
as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office
cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the
continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on
Elections40(2002) and the aforementioned case of
Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected
and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms
1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998
elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended,
a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor
in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground
he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit
rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of
Tagarao’s term after the recall election during
which Talaga served as mayor should not be
considered for purposes of applying the three-
term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in
Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the
COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward
Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall
election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been
elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City
for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-
1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-
term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the
same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However,
midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held,
Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification
under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the
recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by
3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an
elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term and,
hence, any subsequent election, like recall election,
is no longer covered x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality
into a city does not constitute an interruption of the
incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court
said so in Latasa v. Commission on
Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio
A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-
1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third
term, Digos was converted into a component city,
with the corresponding cityhood law providing the
holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his
certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001
elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified
to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the
three-term limit rule on the basis of the following
ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily
relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his
office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as
city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner
therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased
from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging
his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of
Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused
the doctrine that the period during which a local
elected official is under preventive suspension
cannot be considered as an interruption of the
continuity of his service. The Court explained why
so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit
rule demands that preventive suspension should not
be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best
indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in
office is the absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-
vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a
more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements
in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999),
Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on
Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and
had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-
1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995
election was protested and was eventually declared
by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on
the ground of failure of elections. On February 27,
1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in
light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it
issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the
remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His
opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had
already served three consecutive terms in the same
post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two
(2) conditions which must concur for the three-term
limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the
foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post
in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of
office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court
stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term, a situation
which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of
office.This Court deviated from the ruling in
Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in
the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and
served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his
supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified
Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost
during the 1998 elections. However, the
COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on
July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-
2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting
to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as
mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of
the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that
he could not be considered as having served as
mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly
elected to the post and merely assumed office as a
"presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument,
the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor
for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the
full term" and hence, should be counted for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the
conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that
Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service
for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was
voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court
noted that the COMELEC decision which declared
Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was
"without practical and legal use and value"
promulgated as it was after the contested term has
expired. The Court further reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only
a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as
his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as
the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary
view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would
mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule -
be considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an
election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and
ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and
Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of
election", and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the
office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an
involuntary severance from office as a result of legal
processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption
of the continuity of service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later
find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v.
Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive
terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In
relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as
mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the
majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for
term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A
petition for quo warranto was later filed against
Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible
to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for
three consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales
averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be
considered against him, for, although he was
proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as
elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and
discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001,
his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of
Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his
point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served
as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and
held that the case of Morales presents a factual
milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease
of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in
Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had
served the three-year term from the start to the end
of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales
exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He
was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in
serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term.
He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of
Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous
years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being
belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term,
cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service
of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued,
be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a
mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the
three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on
Elections,56 the Court would again find the same
Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification
proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty
candidate during the 2007 elections for a term
ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from
his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera,
Morales would argue this time around that the three-
term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his
2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his
favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007
elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court
wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’
involuntary severance from office with respect to the
2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007
up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice
mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short
it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity
of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the
full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis
supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing
jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of
terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an
elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules
on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the
term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the
same position he held prior to his assumption
of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had
an interruption in the continuity of the
official’s service. For, he had become in the
interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to
the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo
and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due
to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service
(Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-
interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office
during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner
for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office,
thus disenabling him from serving what
would otherwise be the unexpired portion
of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The
break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of
the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
 of time, provided the cause is involuntary,
is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election
protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since
he has managed to serve the term from
start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after
the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC
erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served
three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the
constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the
current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments
run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the
present case as the former dealt with
preventive suspension which does not
interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an
elected official can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of the
constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning
of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a
mere portion of the Decision and not on the
unified logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is
the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it
ruled that there was no interruption in the
service of Abundo since what he considered
as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term
occurred before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee
(Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged
invalid was interrupted while that of the
protestant (Abundo) who was eventually
proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at
once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter
that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds
application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled
that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his
victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement
to said office and he was only unable to temporarily
discharge the functions of the office during the
pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with
the effects of an election protest, for which the
rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear
to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the
interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive
suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino,
Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s
case presents a different factual backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases
wherein the individuals subject of disqualification
were candidates who lost in the election protest and
each declared loser during the elections, Abundo
was the winner during the election protest and was
declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post.
Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who
were both unseated toward the end of their
respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who
ousted his opponent and had assumed the
remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s
pronouncements in the past as instructive, and
consider several doctrines established from the 1998
case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of
Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this
Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not
only to abrogate the "monopolization of political
power" and prevent elected officials from breeding
"proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to
"enhance the people’s freedom of choice."61 In the
words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of
power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s
case meritorious and declares that the two-year
period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s
case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the
2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor.
Otherwise how explain his victory in his election
protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the
first requisite for the application of the disqualification
rule based on the three-term limit that the official has
been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of
whether or not Abundo had served for "three
consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically
understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
immediately before the 2010 national and local
elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the
question of whether or not there was an effective
involuntary interruption during the three three-year
periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of
Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary
interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term
2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision
of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed
the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served
the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike
Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it
cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve
fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was
otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of
Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the
"time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one
another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly
elected official has title to and can serve the
functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of
Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected
officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June
30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year
and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8,
2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a
matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the
same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title
to hold such office and the corresponding right to
assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his
declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as
duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or
for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full
term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it
cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo
actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period
during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as
Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary
interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of
the disqualification rule, be considered as one term
for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms
is related to the concepts of interruption of service
and voluntary renunciation of service. The word
interruption means temporary cessation, intermission
or suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or
prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of
1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the
obstruction to the continuance of the service by the
concerned elected official by effectively cutting short
the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the
occupation of the elective office. On the other hand,
the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver
or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to
give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary
renunciation of the office by an elective local official
would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to
the office and to cut short the service of the term the
concerned elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc,
applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of
service which jurisprudence deems an exception to
the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of
the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here,
the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the
assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to
have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he
actively sought entitlement to the office when he
lodged the election protest case. And respondent-
appellant’s victory in the said case is a final
confirmation that he was validly elected for the
mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007.
At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to
which he was validly elected during the pendency of
the election protest, but he never lost title to the said
office.72(Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other
hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by
the public official in a given term is immaterial by
reckoning said service for the term in the application
of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this
formulation—no more than three consecutive
terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence
of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe
to the argument that since respondent Abundo
served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007
"term" should not be considered for purposes of the
application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated
the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to
the term, not the actual length of the service the
public official may render. Therefore, one’s actual
service of term no matter how long or how short is
immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the
theory that the length of the actual service of the
term is immaterial in his case as he was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy
reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend
themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot
simply find its way clear to understand the poll
body’s determination that Abundo was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor during the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the
winner in an election protest grants the local elected
official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the
term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007
term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service rendered by his
opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he
cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-
2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot
be overemphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other
words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—
the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty
office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest.
Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such
declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve
in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to
said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to
respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s
resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court
succinctly defines what temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to office
or at least an effective break from holding office; the
office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on
preventive suspension does not apply to the instant
case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo
merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to
exercise the functions of an elective post. For one,
during the intervening period of almost two years,
reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term,
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to
assume and serve such elective office. For another,
not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot
be said to have lost title to the office since one
cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place,
he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
even if the belated declaration in the election protest
accords him title to the elective office from the start
of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective
office until the election protest was finally resolved in
his favor.
1âwphi 1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two
years, consisting of a break and effective interruption
of his service, until he assumed the office and served
barely over a year of the remaining term. At this
juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of
Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor
Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates
as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not
proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates
in the regularelections. They were proclaimed
winners during the recall elections and clearly were
not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed
incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the
Court deemed their terms as involuntarily
interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private
citizen during the period over which his opponent
was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court
ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s
service because of his subsequent defeat in the
election protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s
term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted
since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004
elections and was able to assume the office and
serve only for a little more than a year after winning
the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as
interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present
case, there is no question that during the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority over the good people
of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was
not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest
period or break in his service because, as earlier
stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it
was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising
such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case
differs from other cases involving the effects of an
election protest because while Abundo was, in the
final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the
one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a
victim of an imperfect election system. While
admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate
to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has
clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would
work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo––
an elected official who was belatedly declared as the
winner and assumed office for only a short period of
the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this
Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the
person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold
the contested public office but held it anyway––We
find more reason to rule in favor of a winning
candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves
title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold
the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed
against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be
committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes
by depriving them of their right to choose their
leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We
bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto
ourselves the right to decide what the people
want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible,
"allow the people to exercise their own sense of
proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail
the power when it overreaches itself."77 For
democracy draws strength from the choice the
people make which is the same choice We are
likewise bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No.
A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43,
dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED
ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Associate Justice
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the
May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered DIOSDADO M.
ARTURO D. BRION
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes Associate Justice
are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of
Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, LUCAS P. MARIANO C. DEL
respectively, and shall revert to their original BERSAMIN CASTILLO
positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, Associate Justice Associate Justice
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
MARTIN S.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
hereby LIFTED. Associate Justice

This Decision is immediately executory. JOSE PORTUGAL JOSE CATRAL

PEREZ MENDOZA
SO ORDERED. Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. BIENVENIDO L. ESTELA M.
Associate Justice REYES PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Chief Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. TERESITA J.
CARPIO LEONARDO-DE Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Associate Justice CASTRO Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Larrazabal. The Resolution disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition to disqualify filed by petitioner Jose C.
Torres against respondent Abelardo M.
Abundo, Sr. is hereby DENIED for LACK OF
MERIT.

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
6
Id. at 76-78, Certificate of Canvass of Votes
1
Rollo, pp. 47-56. Rendered by Presiding and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle and Viga Mayor and Vice-Mayor, dated May 11,
Commissioner Elhs R. Yosoph with 2010.
Commi5'ioner Augusto C. Lagman, dissenting.
Dissenting Opinion, id. at 57-58. 7
Id. at 66-74, Petition dated May 20, 2010.
2
Id. at 40-46, per Commissioner Elias R. 8
Id. at 93-99, per Presiding Judge Lelu P.
Yusoph and concurred in by Chairman Sixto Contreras.
S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. 9
Id. at 99.
Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim.
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609
10

3
Id. at 134. SCRA 234.
4
Id. at 127-133, dated March 10, 2010. 11
Rollo, pp. 55-56.
5
Id. at 61-65, per curiam by Commissioners 12
Id. at 46.
Rene V. Sarmiento (Presiding Commissioner),
Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y.
13
Id. at 347-348, Annex "A" of Abundo’s Most
Extremely Urgent Manifestation with Sixth
(6th) Reiterative Motion to Resolve the
Application for the Immediate Issuance of an
Injunctive Writ Due to Supervening Event,
dated June 22, 2012.
14
Id. at 349, Annex "A-1" of Abundo’s Most
Extremely Urgent Manifestation with Sixth
(6th) Reiterative Motion to Resolve the
Application for the Immediate Issuance of an
Injunctive Writ Due to Supervening Event,
dated June 22, 2012.
15
Id. at 390, Annex "C" of Vega’s
Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July
5, 2012.
16
Filed on June 26, 2012.
17
Rollo, p. 389, Annex "C" of Vega’s
Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July
5, 2012.
18
Id. at 390-391, Annex "D" of Vega’s
Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July
5, 2012.
19
Id. at 392, Annex "E" of Vega’s Manifestation
with Leave to Admit, dated July 5, 2012.
20
Id. at 356-357.
21
Id. at 357.
22
Id. at 462, Panunumpa sa Katungkulan of
Emeterio M. Tarin done on July 4, 2012,
Annex "B" of Abundo’s Most Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July
3, 2012 Temporary Restraining Order into a
Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the
Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression
of Events), dated July 4, 2012.
23
Id. at 367.
24
Id. at 463, 464, Certifications of the OIC,
Provincial Director of the DILG, Annexes "B-1"
and "B-2" of Abundo’s Most Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July
3, 2012 Temporary Restraining Order into a
Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the
Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression
of Events), dated July 4, 2012.
25
Id. at 369-373, dated July 5, 2012.
26
Id. at 374-420, dated July 5, 2012.
27
Id. at 421-437, dated July 9, 2012.
28
Id. at 438-482, dated July 4, 2012.
29
Id. at 639-665 (Vega’s Comment); id. at 668- G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376
40

687, 697-719 (public respondent’s Comment SCRA 90.

and Consolidated Comment, respectively).
41
Socrates, supra note 33.
30
Id. at 25-27.
42
Id.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
31

No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602. G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417
43

SCRA 601.
32
Aldovino Jr., supra note 10.
44
Supra note 10.
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391
33

SCRA 457. 45
Supra note 31.
34
Id. 46
G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354, January 23,
2006, 479 SCRA 473.
G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295
35

SCRA 157. 47
G.R. Nos. 167591 & 170577, May 9, 2007,
523 SCRA 41.
36
G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA
50. G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009, 577
48

SCRA 589.
Section 44, Chapter II "Vacancies and
37

Succession," Title II "Elective Officials," 49

Lonzanida, supra note 31.
Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government
Code of 1991. 50
Supra note 46.

38
Borja, Jr., supra note 35, at 169. 51
Id.

39
Id. 52
Id.
53
Supra note 47.
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JOSE T. CAPCO,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of
the constitutional provision barring elective officials,
with the exception of barangay officials, from serving
more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the
question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the
office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term
limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was
elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988
for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2,
1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11,
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of
three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8,
1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of
three years ending June 30, 1998.[1]
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco
filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner
and declared private respondent Capco disqualified
from running for reelection as mayor of
Pateros.[2]However, on motion of private respondent,
the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor
in the May 11, 1998 elections.[3] The majority stated in
its decision:
In both the
Constitution
and the
Local
Government
Code, the
three-term
limitation
refers to the
term of such office
office for by operation
which the of law and
local official served for
was the
elected. It unexpired
made no term of his
reference to predecessor.
succession Consequentl
to an office y, such
to which he succession
was not into office is
elected. In not counted
the case as one (1)
before the term for
Commission purposes of
, respondent the
Capco was computation
not elected of the three-
to the term
position of limitation
mayor in the under the
January 18, Constitution
1988 local and the
elections. He Local
succeeded to
 Government
Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in
the elections. He received 16,558 votes against
petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside
the resolution, dated May 7, 1998, of he COMELEC
and to seed a declaration that private respondent is
disqualified to serve another term as Mayor of
Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos
service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30,
992 should be considered as service for full one term,
and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two
more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have
served three consecutive terms within the
contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and
43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner
stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar
Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent
became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder
of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that
private respondent became mayor by succession
because the purpose of the constitutional provision in
limiting the number of terms elective local officials
may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political
power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8
of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
 First, to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the
constitutional provision in question. The other policy
is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office
regardless of how the official concerned came to that
office whether by election or by succession by
operation of law would be to disregard one of the
purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background
of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner
Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no
further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such officials be simply barred from running for the
same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term.[4] Monsod
warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom
the people will choose asa result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that
the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples
power.[5]
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the
Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this
Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual
disqualification on those who have served their terms
in accordance with the limits on consecutive service
as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would
be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort
of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who
will already have served their terms from perpetuating
themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves
its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive
service in the case of the President, six years; in the
case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case
of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the
Members of Congress, both from the legislative
districts and from the party list and sectoral
representation, this is now under discussion and later
on the policy concerning local officials will be taken
up by the Committee on Local Governments.The
principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future situations where, as a result of continuous
service and frequent reelections, officials from the
President down to the municipal mayor tend to
develop a proprietary interest in their position and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit
them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent
election. I think that is taken care of because we put a
gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of
these officials. But where we now decide to put these
prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we
want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking
away too much from the people, whereas we should
be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of
their own freedom of choice.[6]
Other commissioners went on record against
perpetually disqualifying elective officials who have
served a certain number of terms as this would deny
the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner
Yusup R. Abubakar asked, why should we arrogate
unto ourselves the right to decide what the people
want?[7]
Commisioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the
same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow
the people to exercise their own sense of proportion
and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when
it overreaches itself.[8]
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: Why
should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after
serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by
practically everybody here that our people are
politically mature? Should we use this assumption
only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may
also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for
politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?[9]
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of
the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term,
derived from the concern about the accumulation of
power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The
second is the idea of election, derived from the
concern that the right of the people to choose those
whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving
by reason of reelection. This is clear from the
following exchange in the Constitutional Commission
concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI 4
and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with
regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before
he can run again?
 MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind
before if the Gentlemen will remember- was: How
long will that period of rest be? Will it be one
election which is three years or one term which is
six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember,
Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that
during the election following the expiration of
the first 12 years, whether such election will be
on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter,
this particular member of the Senate
can run. So it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the
Committees stand.[10]
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative
democracy is that the people should be allowed to
choose whom they please to govern them.[11] To bar
the election of a local official because he has already
served three terms, although the first as a result of
succession by operation of law rather than election,
would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but
textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the
COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by
local officials for three consecutive terms as a result
of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of
office of elective local officials and
bars such official[s] from serving for more than three
consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining
when an elective local official may be deemed to have
served his full term of office, states that voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. The term served must therefore be one for
which [the official concerned] was elected. The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he
is not serving a term for which he was elected because
he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have
fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas
comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members
of the House of Representatives from serving for
more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states
that if one is elected Representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no
matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed.[12]
 This is actually based on the opinion expressed by unexpired term is rightly counted as his first
Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of term.Rather than refute what we believe to be the
Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local
is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds
elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of another confirms the theory.
the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution
portion of the term is already considered one
which provides for succession of the Vice-President to
term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct
the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After
statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator
stating that The President shall not be eligible for any
concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this
reelection, this provision says that No person who has
provision on disqualification, Madam
succeeded as President and has served as such for
President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because
more than four years shall be qualified for election to
we speak of term and if there is a special election, he
the same office at any time.Petitioner contends that,
will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and
considered to have served a full term as mayor if he
two more terms for the Members of the Lower
succeeds to the latters office and serves for the
House.[13]
remainder of the term.
There is a difference, however, between the case
The framers of the Constitution included such a
of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who
Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
simply steps into the Presidency by succession would
resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
be qualified to run for President even if he has
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by
occupied that office for more than four years. The
operation of law.[14] On the other hand, the
absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy.[15] In a
local officials throws in bold relief the difference
real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a
between the two cases. It underscores the
term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the
constitutional intent to cover only the terms of
constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be
office to which one may have been elected for
elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the
purpose of the three-term limit on local elective
officials, disregarding for this purpose service by
automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President
who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that
office for more than four years is ineligible for
election as President. The Vice-President is elected
primarily to succeed the President in the event of the
latters death, permanent disability, removal or
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet,
his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good
graces of the President. In running for Vice-President,
he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For
their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-
President the candidate who they think can fill the
Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence,
service in the presidency for more than four years may
rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under
the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer
of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct
powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the
event of vacancy therein being only one of them. [16] It
cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-
President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency,
that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the
event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of
design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following cases or
situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who
becomes mayor by reason of the death of the
incumbent. Six months before the next election,
he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he
run again for mayor in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served
as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired,
he has not actually served three full terms in all
for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under
Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is
not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if
the term is one for which he was
elected. Since A is only completing the service
of the term for which the deceased and not he
was elected. A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes
an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and,
during his first term, he is twice suspended for
misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term
in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms
successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for
reelection because the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification provisions have not
concurred, namely, that the local official concerned
has been elected three consecutive times and that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first
case, even if the local official is considered to have
served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that
he has not been elected three times. In the second
case, the local official has been elected three
consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who
becomes mayor by succession involves a total
failure of the two conditions to concur for the
purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is
twice elected after that term, is he qualified to
run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of
the mayor in the first term but simply found
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither
had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death ,
of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third
time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality
but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-
mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can
remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for
another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to
be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can
return him to office (even if it is just the third time he
is standing for reelection) if his service of the first
term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the
term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be
in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected
from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on official leave.
SIMON B. G.R. No. 184836
ALDOVINO, JR.,
DANILO B. FALLER PUNO, C J.,
AND FERDINAND N. CARPIO, Is the preventive suspension of an elected
TALABONG, public official an interruption of his term of office for
Petitioners, CORONA,
CARPIO purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
MORALES,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
- versus - LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, Government Code)?
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, The respondent Commission on Elections
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
VILLARAMA, effective interruption because it renders the suspended
COMMISSION ON JR., JJ.
ELECTIONS AND public official unable to provide complete service for
WILFREDO F. Promulgated:
the full term; thus, such term should not be counted
ASILO,
Respondents. December 23, 2009 for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- x

The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set

DECISION
aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
BRION, J.:
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was
elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to
deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or
to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth
term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against
the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution
of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-
term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of
the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
 General Considerations
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider
the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, The present case is not the first before this
2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT Court on the three-term limit provision of the
PETITION raising the following ISSUES: Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive
suspension on the continuity of an elective officials
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected
local official is an interruption of the three-term term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an
limit rule; and
interruption in the term of an elective public official,
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered
involuntary renunciation as contemplated in has been mentioned as an example in Borja v.
Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally,
however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of
deal with preventive suspension, but with the
whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
application of the three-term rule on the term that an
th
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4 term.
elective official acquired by succession.
THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than
threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats
the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes
the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as
a period of time three years during which an official
has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of
Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November
28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes,
as follows:
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed
and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an
office. According to Mechem, the term of office
is the period during which an office may be
held. Upon expiration of the officers term,
unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his
rights, duties and authority as a public officer
must ipso factocease. In the law of public
officers, the most and natural frequent method
by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on
Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as
of right, and fixes the interval after which the several limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the
incumbents shall succeed one another. public office; it expressly states that voluntary
renunciation of office shall not be considered as an
The limitation under this first branch of the interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
provision is expressed in the negative no such official term for which he was elected. This declaration
shall serve for more than three consecutive complements the term limitation mandated by the first
terms. This formulation no more than three branch.
consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact A notable feature of the second branch is that it
indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is
exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is the only actual interruption of service that does not
to the term, not to the service that a public official affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes
may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
term. statement of what does not serve as an interruption of
service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary
The second branch relates to the provisions renunciation, by itself, is not without significance in
express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the determining constitutional intent.

The word renunciation carries the dictionary
meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that
emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of
a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the
second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot
but mean an act that results in cutting short the term,
i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word
voluntary linked together with renunciation signifies
an act of surrender based on the surenderees own
freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to
office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-
term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an
interruption because it is presumed to be purposely
sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission on the term voluntary
renunciation shed further light on the extent of the
term voluntary renunciation:
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the
clarificatory question to the Committee? This
term voluntary renunciation does not appear in
Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in
Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase
all over the Constitution. Could the Committee
please enlighten us exactly what voluntary
renunciation mean? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In
other words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any given time
on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying
that the term voluntary renunciation is more
general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more
embracing.[6]

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides
expansive interpretation of the term voluntary
renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to
close all gaps that an elective official may seize to
defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that
voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and
which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for,
values of less than equal constitutional worth.We
view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation
with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule

as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule.

Other than the above-cited materials,
Harking back to the text of the constitutional
jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts
provision, we note further that Commissioner Davides
within the provisions contemplation, particularly on
view is consistent with the negative formulation of the
the interruption in the continuity of service for the full
first branch of the provision and the inflexible
term that it speaks of.
interpretation that it suggests.

Lonzanida v. Commission on
This examination of the wording of the constitutional
Elections[7] presented the question of whether the
provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
applies if the election of the public official (to be
make term limitation a high priority constitutional

strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the
public official) for his supposedly third term had been
declared invalid in a final and executory
judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the
application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
[Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is
severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v.
COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue
of whether there had been a completed term for
purposes of the three-term limit disqualification.
These cases, however, presented an interesting twist,
as their final judgments in the electoral contest came
after the term of the contested office had expired so
that the elective officials in these cases were never
effectively unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled
to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the
Court concluded that there was nevertheless an
election and service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule based on the following premises:
(1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the
election was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official
assumed and continuously exercised the functions of
the office from the start to the end of the term. The
Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to
the winner in the election protest) would, under the
three-term rule, be considered to have served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant
to a proclamation made in due course after an
election. This factual variation led the Court to rule
differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected
the theory that the official who finally lost the election
contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere
de facto officer.The Court obeserved that Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official fully served in the
same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as
caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the powers
and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled
him to stay on indefinitely.
 Ong and Rivera are important rulings for
purposes of the three-term limitation because of what
they directly imply. Although the election requisite
was not actually present, the Court still gave full
effect to the three-term limitation because of the
constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials
to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court
signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly
interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt
with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of
whether the disqualification applies if the official lost
in the regular election for the supposed third term, but
was elected in a recall election covering that
term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that
the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two
years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also
tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full
terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a
fourth term, he did not participate in the election that
immediately followed his third term. In this election,
the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was
elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings

were initiated against him, leading to the call for a
recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but
Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that
he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to
the recall election and was therefore disqualified to
run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided
in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like
a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution
debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there
would be no further election after three terms, or
whether there would be no immediate
reelection after three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits
is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long
as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit
one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving
the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]
Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented
the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who
had fully served for three consecutive terms could run
as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of
the municipality into a city. During the third term, the

municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood
charter provided that the elective officials of the
municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
exercise their powers and functions until elections
were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled
that the conversion of the municipality into a city did
not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of the
city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was
the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants
were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they
were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal
mayor held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers
of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose
those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to
vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total
of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review
of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-
term limit violation results if a rest period or break in
the service between terms or tenure in a given elective
post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a
private citizen with no title to any elective office for a
few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents lived as private citizens for two
years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these
cases establish that the law contemplates a complete
break from office during which the local elective
official steps down and ceases to exercise power or
interim. The common thread that
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the
elective official vacated the office of councilor and

Seemingly differing from these results is the assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of

case of Montebon v. Commission on law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an

Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal interruption that effectively placed him outside the

councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by ambit of the three-term limit rule.

operation of law. The question posed when he

c. Conclusion Based on Law
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his
and Jurisprudence
assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his
term as councilor that would place him outside the
From all the above, we conclude that the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an
interruption of a term exempting an elective official
interruption had intervened so that he could again run
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no
as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the
elective official must have involuntarily left his office
elective official continued to hold public office and
for a length of time, however short, for an effective
did not become a private citizen during the
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to
be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials
continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held
in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability
or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least
an effective break from holding office; the office
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken
because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office
holders term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be
used once the right to office is lost; without the right
to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition,
Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance
fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his
stay in office to three consecutive terms as an Preventive Suspension and
inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing the Three-Term Limit Rule

voluntary renunciation as an example of a

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
circumvention. The provision should be read in the
context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the Preventive suspension whether under the Local

powers of the elective position. The voluntary Government Code,[17] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is

officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of an interim remedial measure to address the situation

title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary of an official who have been charged administratively

cessation of the exercise of power or authority that or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily

may occur for various reasons, with preventive indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual

suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa guilt or liability.

v. Comelec:[16]
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period
during which the local elective official steps Preventive suspension is imposed under
down from office and ceases to exercise power
or authority over the inhabitants of the the Local Government Code when the evidence of
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense,
there is a possibility that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information
(that requires a finding of probable cause) has been
filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is
imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman,
the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension,
the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in
the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his
office; loss of office is a consequence that only results
upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that
operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives
a premium to the protection of the service rather than
to the interests of the individual office holder. Even
then, protection of the service goes only as far as
a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the
functions of the officials office; the official is
reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a
temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results,
no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension
can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of
all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and
the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension,
however, is not an unlimited power; there are
limitations built into the laws[20] themselves that the
courts can enforce when these limitations are
transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of
discretion is present. In light of this well-defined
parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension,
we should not view preventive suspension from the
extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective
office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an
effective interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are
two vastly different aspects of an elective officials
service in office and they do not overlap. As already
mentioned above, preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being
served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office
without any break. Its companion concept interruption
of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to
office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But
even on this point, they merely run parallel to each
other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its suspended officials continuity in office is the absence
nature, is a temporary incapacity to render of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
service during an unbroken term; in the context of authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term. To allow a preventively suspended elective
official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term close our eyes to this reality and to allow a
Limit Rule constitutional violation through sophistry by equating
the temporary inability to discharge the functions of
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term
office with the interruption of term that the
limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure,
not be considered an interruption that allows an
many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of
elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
them personal and some of them by operation of law
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder
interruption because the suspended official continues
from exercising the functions of his office in the way
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising
that preventive suspension does. A serious extended
the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
illness, inability through force majeure, or the
suspension period. The best indicator of the
 Voluntary Renunciation
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder
from exercising the functions of his office for a time Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by

without forfeiting title to office. Preventive operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on

suspension is no different because it disrupts actual the part of the suspended official, except in the

delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed

such interruption of actual service as the standard to the act that became the basis of the charge against

determine effective interruption of term under the him. From this perspective, preventive suspension

three-term rule raises at least the possibility of does not have the element of voluntariness that

confusion in implementing this rule, given the many voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it

modes and occasions when actual service may be contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to

interrupted in the course of serving a term of office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity

office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of to perform the service that an elective office demands.

the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very

see-sawing determination of what an effective nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it

interruption is. is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the

actual delivery of service, not the title to the
c. Preventive Suspension and
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are,
by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their
respective natures is the more important consideration
of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of
office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall
disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or
loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge
that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense,
recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not
interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of respondent Asilo.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it
granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the Associate Justice
COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty
required by no less than the Constitution and was one
undertaken outside the contemplation of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

we GRANT the petition and
accordingly NULLIFY the assailed
COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo
F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of SR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HAGEDORN, respondents.
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY
(PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA DECISION
Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK CARPIO, J.:
DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim
Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN
JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding The Case
Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S.
BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Before us are consolidated petitions for
Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, certiorari[1] seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued
JR. respondents. by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity)
in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan.

[G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002]

The Antecedents

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then
JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of
Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The
PRA was convened to initiate the recall[2] of Victorino
[G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002] Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed
office as Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. The
members of the PRA designated Mark David M.
Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,
 On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No.
01-02 (Recall Resolution for brevity) which declared its
loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule
the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt
of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC
a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the
COMELEC en banc[3] promulgated a resolution dismissing
for lack of merit Socrates petition. The COMELEC gave
due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the
recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the
calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited
acts in connection with the recall election. The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27,
2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn
(Hagedorn for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for
brevity) and Merly E. Gilo (Gilo for brevity) filed a petition
before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to
disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election
and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30,
2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. (Ollave for brevity)
filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also
seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a
certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition,
docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging
substantially the same facts and involving the same
issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground
that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having
served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for
the same post. Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-
539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002,
the COMELECs First Division[4] dismissed for lack of merit
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared
Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The
COMELEC also reset the recall election from September
7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC
affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to
run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en
banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-
010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates
cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities
attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of
the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA
were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2)
the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves
seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was
exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA
proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the publics constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002
insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7,
2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign
period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from
holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that
a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an
additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the
Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the
date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The
Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates an
additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within
which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving
the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7,
2002 within which to campaign.Thus, the COMELEC
reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the
COMELECs resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and
September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539
declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of
the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in upholding Hagedorns qualification to run
for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional
and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive
term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court
ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any
winning candidate in the recall election until further
orders from the Court.Petitioners were required to post
a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for
leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking
the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and
Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest
number of votes in the recall election with 20,238
votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the
COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and
to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of
the electorate.
 On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates
motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of
Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing
a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot.
Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for
the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130
PRA members and the defective service of notice to
other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found
that
On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the
proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the
convening of the PRA to the members thereof
pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I
and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of
Service for each of the said notices were attached
to the Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes
II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places
particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos
establishing the same were attached to the Petition
and marked as Annex H. The proponents likewise
utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa
PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25
names of provincial elective officials, print and
broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials,
COMELEC city, regional and national officials,
and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City
in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified
that upon a thorough and careful verification of the
 signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x
x the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution. She likewise
certified that not a single member/signatory of the
PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and
authenticity of their signatures.
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan,
Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10
July 2002, stated, upon proper review, all
documents submitted are found in order.
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study
dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following
recommendations:
This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds
the instant Petition sufficient in form and
substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and
that the majority of all members thereof approved
Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.
xxx.
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the
COMELEC on matters within the competence and
expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are
patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,[5] which
also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to PRA
members, we ruled that
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the
notices sent to the PRA members is factual in
nature, and the determination of the same is
therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the
absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies
in the findings, the Court should not disturb the
same. The factual findings of the COMELEC,
based on its own assessments and duly supported
by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the
court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated
attack on the validity of the same.
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to
hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no
authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002
because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new
electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled
on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant
consideration considering that when the PRA members
adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had
not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang
barangay members with no legal disqualification to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the
Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private
respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of
the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative
and counsel who were present during the entire PRA
proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted
to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the
PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly,
attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto
Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all
these public records in the official custody of the
COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis
in Socrates claim that respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the
Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on
September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorns qualification to run for
mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43
(b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election
is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the
term limit of elective local officials, the question asked
was whether there would be no further election after
three terms, or whether there would be no immediate
reelection after three terms. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is
recognized.
MR. ROMULO: We are now ready to discuss the
[6]
two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and
these are Alternative No. I where there is no further
election after a total of three terms and Alternative
No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after
three successive terms. [7]
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports
the following manifestation on the term of elective local
officials:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo
manifested that the Body would proceed to the
consideration of two issues on the term of
Representatives and local officials, namely: 1)
Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total
of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no
immediate reelection after three successive
terms).[8]
The framers of the Constitution used the same no
immediate reelection question in voting for the term limits
of Senators[9] and Representatives of the House.[10]
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long
as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the
third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred
from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the
Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third
term, not any other subsequent election.
 If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied
to any election within the three-year full term following the
three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited
from running in any election within the six-year full term
following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision
on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the
term limit of elective local officials, thus:
No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.[11]
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the
following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is
instructive:
GASCON: I would like to ask a question with
[12]
regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before
he can run again?
DAVIDE: That is correct.
[13]
GASCON: And the question that we left behind
before - if the Gentleman will remember - was:
How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one
election which is three years or one term which is
six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember,
Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that
during the election following the expiration of the
first 12 years, whether such election will be on the
third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a
period of hibernation for six years. That was the
Committees stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would
be three years at the least. (Emphasis supplied)
[14]
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a
Senator can run after only three years[15] following his
completion of two terms. The framers expressly
acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to
the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent
election, during the six-year period following the two term
limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend the
period of rest of an elective official who has reached his
term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall
election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term which ended
on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to
the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in
the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his
three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto
Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for
mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the
Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had
reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a
fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did
not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.[16] Socrates ran
and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001
elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was
Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply
a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in
the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not
because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a
legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms
ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term
from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive
terms as mayor.One cannot stitch together Hagedorns
previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the
recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it
is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity
or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,[17] the Court had occasion
to explain interruption of continuity of service in this
manner:
x x x The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was
out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service
as mayor. The Constitution does not require the
interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The
clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as
long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an
elective local officials continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and
Talaga,[18] a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an
interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office
breaks the continuity of service of an elective local
official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served
two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his
third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to
Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of
May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired
term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30,
2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001
elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for
mayor, petitioned for Talagas disqualification on the
ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive
terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talagas
recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms
so that he was deemed to have already served three
consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga
was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the
period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga
was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service
as mayor. Talagas recall term as mayor was not
consecutive to his previous two terms because of this
interruption, there having been a break of almost two
years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local
official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his
service and prevents his recall term from being stitched
together as a seamless continuation of his previous two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold
that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office
interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his
recall term from being stitched together as a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The
only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is
the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption
occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the
instant case, the interruption happened after the first
three consecutive terms.In both cases, the respondents
were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only
from the date he assumed office after winning the recall
election. Talagas recall term did not retroact to include
the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talagas recall
term was made to so retroact, then he would have been
disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he
would already have served three consecutive terms prior
to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall
term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but
only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in continuity of
service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that
the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for purposes
of counting the consecutiveness of an elective
officials terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not
retroact to include the tenure in office of
Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the
September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is
made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the
recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to
consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three
years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that
he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to
ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive
or successive terms of office which historically and
factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term retroact to
June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails
the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through
popular elections.The concept of term limits is in
derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the
leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be
construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated
in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
Thus, a consideration of the historical background
of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing
the monopolization of political power. Indeed,
they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner
Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no
further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such officials be simply barred from running for
the same position in the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive
term. Monsod warned against prescreening
candidates [from] whom the people will choose as
a result of the proposed absolute disqualification,
considering that the draft constitution contained
provisions recognizing people's
power. (Emphasis supplied)
[19]
A necessary consequence of the interruption of
continuity of service is the start of a new term following
the interruption. An official elected in recall election
serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of
counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the
following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is
[20]
called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected
would have to serve the unexpired portion of the
term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one
term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct
statement, plus one term would disqualify the
Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification,
Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of term, and if
there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for
the Members of the Lower House. [21]
Although the discussion referred to special elections
for Senators and Representatives of the House, the
same principle applies to a recall election of local
officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a SO ORDERED.
recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-
full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should
Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
know that the recall term is in itself one term although
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting
less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he
opinion.
takes by running and winning in the recall election.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run Vitug, J., in the result.
in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of
Puerto Princesa because: separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection
following his three consecutive terms as mayor Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
which ended on June 30, 2001; Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.

2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was

involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to
September 24, 2002 during which time he was a
private citizen; [1]
Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to Procedure with prayers for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining orders.
June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June
30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term [2]
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local
because factually the recall term is not a fourth Government Code of 1991, Chapter 5, Sections 69 to 75.
consecutive term; and [3]
Composed of Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as Chairman with
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B.
fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z.
Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
to choose their leaders.
[4]
With Mehol K. Sadain as Presiding Commissioner and Luzviminda
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra as
154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary Commissioners.
restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, [5]
269 SCRA 380 (1997).
2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate
for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of [6]
Ricardo J. Romulo, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional
September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs. Convention.
ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
ROMEO SUNGA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which seeks to challenge the resolution
issued by the First Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case
No. 01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus
Arsenio A. Latasa, respondent, and the Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due
course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio
A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of
Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the May 14, 2001
elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not
be counted, and if he has been proclaimed winner,
declaring said proclamation null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections
of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term,
the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city,
to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted
on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798
entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos,
Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be
known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of
Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioners
tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However,
under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was
mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of
the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city
mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14,
2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time
for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said
elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny
Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification[1] against petitioner Latasa. Respondent
Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as
mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor
from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his
Answer,[2] arguing that he did not make any false
representation in his certificate of candidacy since he
fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms.
Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from
filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14,
2001elections since this will be the first time that he will
be running for the post of city mayor.
 Both parties submitted their position papers on March
19, 2001.[3]
On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First
Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents
certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a
violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the
1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.[4]
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 4, 2001,[5] which remained unacted upon until
the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001,
private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the
City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or
Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming
Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the
Elections.[6] Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was
still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered
the most number of votes. Consequently, private
respondent Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a
Supplemental Motion[7] which essentially sought the
annulment of petitioners proclamation and the
suspension of its effects.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and
assumed his office as the newly elected mayor
of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the
COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held
in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC[8] that after an elective
official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections,
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his
qualifications. An opposing partys remedies after
proclamation would be to file a petition for quo
warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present
case reveal the fact that its very heart is something which
this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court
notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was
already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he
is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14,
2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy, after the
phrase I am eligible, petitioner inserted a footnote and
indicated:
*
Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor
and now running for the first time as city mayor. [9]
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of
procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of
the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their
operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities
in favor of what is fair and just.[10]
The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision
must not be attenuated by a rigid application of
procedural rules.
 The present case raises a novel issue with respect to
an explicit Constitutional mandate: whether or not
petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the
position of mayor of the newly-created City
of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people
should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern
them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an
exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice
of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
An examination of the historical background of the
subject Constitutional provision reveals that the members
of the Constitutional Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the
people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power. In fact, they rejected a proposal set
forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there
should be no further re-election for local and legislative
officials.[11] The members, instead, adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same
position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term:
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on
this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this
draft Constitution, we are recognizing peoples
power. We have said that now there is a new awareness,
a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at
the same time, we are prescreening candidates among
whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-
member Constitutional Commission has decreed that
those who have served for a period of nine years are
barred from running for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But
there are some people who are very skilled and good at
legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be
Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly
competent and with integrity. They get voted into office
at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for
Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into
pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of
the people. We are talking here only of congressional or
senatorial seats. We want to broaden the peoples choice
but we are making prejudgment today because we
exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect,
putting an additional qualification for office that the
officials must have not have served a total of more than
a number of years in their lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture,
we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the future
participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills
may be only in some areas, but we are saying that they
are going to be barred from running for the same
position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a
statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of
his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in
concern and contact with the people, and here we are
saying that he is going to be barred from the same kind
of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a
very important and momentous decision with respect to
many of our countrymen in the future who may have a
lot more years ahead of them in the service of their
country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do
not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let
us give them this rest period of three years or whatever
it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that
their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree
should not run. But let us not bar them for life after
serving the public for number of years. [12]
The framers of the Constitution, by including this
exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against
the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated
during the deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where,
as a result of continuous service and frequent re-
elections, officials from the President down to the
municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest
in their positions and to accumulate these powers and
perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. x x x [13]
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless
two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms to the same
local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.[14]
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a
municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single
entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local
Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has
already served for three consecutive terms as municipal
mayor.However, he asserts that when Digos was
converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be
construed as vying for the same local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the
Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce
the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land are shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
island. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. [15]
Substantial differences do exist between a
municipality and a city. For one, there is a material
change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality
to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the
people as well.[16] It is precisely for this reason why
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, without the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government
Code, the creation or conversion of a local government
unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability.
Such creation or conversion is based on verified
indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general
rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total
number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be
attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). [17]
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the
City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos ---
The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise
the present territory of the Municipality of Digos,
Davao del Sur Province. The territorial jurisdiction of
the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of
the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further
states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The
present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise
their powers and functions until such a time that a new
election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have
already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court
notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the
City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by
the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the
elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to
exercise their powers and functions until elections were
held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office
of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the executive over his local government unit. In the present
municipality are the same as those in the city. These case, petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected the municipality to a city, continued to hold office as chief
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as
over whom he held power and authority as their chief local government unit, but no substantial change
executive for nine years. occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive
over the inhabitants of Digos.
This Court must distinguish the present case from
previous cases ruled upon this Court involving the same In Lonzanida v. COMELEC,[19] petitioner was elected
Constitutional provision. and served two consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to
1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,[18] the issue therein was
1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
whether a vice-mayor who became the mayor by
mayor. However, his opponent contested his
operation of law and who served the remainder of the
proclamation and filed an election protest before the
mayors term should be considered to have served a term
Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure
in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under
of elections and declared the position of mayor
the Constitution. Private respondent in that case was first
vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner
elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the
acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the May
incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the
1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his certificate
unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more
of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was
terms. This Court therein held that when private
filed on the ground that he had already served three
respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the
consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that
incumbents death and served for the remainder of the
petitioner therein cannot be considered as having been
term, he cannot be construed as having served a full
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
term as contemplated under the subject constitutional
that said petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
provision. The term served must be one for which [the
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
official concerned] was elected.
office.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a
respondent therein, before he assumed the position of
doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998
mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local
elections. Can he then be construed as having
government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and
involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the
duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of
conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court
believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very
instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased
from acting as chief executive of the local government
unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC,[20] this Court was
confronted with the issue of whether or not an
assumption to office through a recall election should be
considered as one term in applying the three-term limit
rule. Private respondent, in that case, was elected and
served for two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran
for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his
opponent. In June 1998, his opponent faced recall
proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000,
private respondent won and served for the unexpired
term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
mayor. This was questioned on the ground that he had
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.This
Court held therein that private respondent cannot be
construed as having been elected and served for three
consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998 elections
was considered by this Court as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years,
private respondent therein lived as a private citizen. The
same, however, cannot be said of petitioner Latasa in the
present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC,[21] the principal
issue was whether or not private respondent Edward M.
Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall
elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992
until 2001 and did not run in the immediately following
regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials
of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the
incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the
ground that he cannot run for the said post during the
recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a
fourth consecutive term. This Court, however, ruled in
favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that the principle
behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent
consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that there
was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the
end of his third term and before the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there
exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local
elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a
private citizen a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years
and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
 This Court reiterates that the framers of the candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
Constitution specifically included an exception to the be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in of the present case.
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as
plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
second highest number of votes to be declared
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
elected. The same merely results in making the winning
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
candidates election a nullity.[23] In the present case,
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent
office as chief executive over the same territorial
Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
Latasa.[24] The second placer is obviously not the choice
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
of the people in that particular election. In any event, a
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred
permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
by it.
created which should be filled by succession.[25]
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No
principle in Labo v. COMELEC,[22] he should be deemed
pronouncement as to costs.
the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of
votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the SO ORDERED.
disqualification of a winning candidate does not
necessarily entitle the candidate with the highest number
of votes to proclamation as the winner of the
elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that
the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of
the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible
FRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295 Petitioner,
Present:
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
PUNO,
Respondents.
QUISUMBING,
x-----------------------------
YNARES-
-----------x
SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, DECISION
- versus - CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, GARCIA, J.:
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, Before the Court are these two separate petitions
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and
GARCIA, JJ.
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and Promulgated: Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. January 23, 2006
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a
x---------------------x
petition for certiorari with petitioner Francis G.
ROMMEL G. ONG,
Petitioner, Ong impugning the COMELEC en
banc resolution[1] dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case
- versus - G.R. No. 163354
No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph
The recourse stemmed from the following
Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the
essential and undisputed factual backdrop:
resolution dated March 31, 2004[2] of the
COMELECs First Division.
Private respondent Joseph Stanley
Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari,
Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed
prohibition and mandamus, with application for
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San
injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong,
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
brother of Francis, seeking, among other things,
elections. Francis was then the incumbent
to stop the COMELEC from enforcing and
mayor.
implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en
banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the
the outcome of the petition in G.R. No.
COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
163295.
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy[3] of Francis. Docketed
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the
as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to
Court ordered the consolidation of these
disqualify was predicated on the three-
petitions.
consecutive term rule, Francis having, according
to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed
office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998
elections saw both Alegre and Francis
opposing each other for the office of mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the
latter being subsequently proclaimed by
COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed
as Election Case No. 6850before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it,
the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected
mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,[4]albeit the
decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when
Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to
cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the
May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the
COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a
resolution[5] dismissing the said petition of
Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now
before us analogous to those obtaining in the
sample situations addressed by the Highest
Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the
requisites for the application of the three term
rule is not present. Francis Ong might have
indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to
1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The
mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001
cannot be considered his because he was not
duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet,
 Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his
election for the 1998 term when it held, in its On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued,
decision that Stanley Alegre was the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution[6] reversing the
in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. This
disposition had become final after the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs First
[COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by
Ong, the case having become moot and Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis as
academic.
disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente,
xxx xxx xxx Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b)
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court ordering the deletion of Francis name from the
pronounced in the Lonzanida case and
applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not official list of candidates; and (c) directing the
be considered as having served as mayor from
1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to concerned board of election inspectors not to
the post; he merely assumed office as a
presumptive winner; which presumption was count the votes cast in his favor.
later overturned when [the RTC] decided with
finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections. The following day, May 8, Francis received
(Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).
a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7,

Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek

reconsideration, contending, in the main, that the assistance of his political party, the

there was a misapplication of the three-term Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately

rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs. nominated his older brother, Rommel

Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra. Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At

about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is
past the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then
transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10
elections, Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong
brothers, addressed a letter[7] to Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cario and
Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he
appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on
Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels certificate of
candidacy, the name Rommel Ong be included in the
official certified list of candidates for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was
granted by the PES Carino.
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8] to then
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking
clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by
the PES Cario. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano
issued a Memorandum under date May 10,
2004[9] addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario, ordering
her to implement the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7,
2004.[10] Said Memorandum partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig
[Director IV, Law Department], which he quote
your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the
certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied
due course. In the Resolution of the Commission
En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis
Ong was denied due course," and elaborated
further that:
"x x x there is an existing
policy of the Commission not to
include the name of a substitute
candidate in the certified list of
candidates unless the substitution
is approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is
recommended that 1) the
substitute certificate of candidacy
of Rommel Ong Gan Ong,
should be denied due course; and
 2) the election officer be directed for the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines
to delete his name from the list of Norte.[12]
candidates."

The above position of the Commission

was in line with the pronouncement of Supreme On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the
Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617)
which states: Court a petition for certiorari, presently docketed

"There can no valid as G.R. No. 163295. His brother Rommels

substitution where a candidate is
excluded not only by petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a
disqualification but also by
denial and cancellation of his
week after.
certificate of candidacy."

In view thereof, you are hereby directed In our en banc resolution dated June 1,
to faithfully implement the said Resolution of
the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048
2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No.
promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the 163354 were consolidated.[13]
original; words in bracket added].

4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC

Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an issued an order dismissing private respondent
order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes
cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest Alegres Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
with that Board.[11]
Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of being moot and academic.[14]
Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate
 The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en
banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring
petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections and consequently ordering the
deletion of his name from the official list of
candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall
be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied due course to Rommels certificate of
candidacy in the same mayoralty election as
substitute for his brother Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges
on the question of whether or not petitioner
Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service
for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the
question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on
the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while
he indeed assumed office and discharged the
duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three
consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-
elect in the May 1998 election was contested and
eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of
Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001.
Pressing the point, petitioner argues,
citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec[15], that
proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and one assuming office on
the strength of a protested proclamation does so
as a presumptive winner and subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
a Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code
restates the same rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for
more than three consecutive years in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.[16]
With the view we take of the case, the of the municipality of San Vicente. The
disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus question that begs to be addressed,
effectively barring petitioner Francis from therefore, is whether or not Franciss
running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines assumption of office as Mayor of San
Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998
be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong to June 30, 2001, may be considered as
having been duly elected mayor of that one full term service in the context of the
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the consecutive three-term limit rule.
May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-
We hold that such assumption of office
June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30,
constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term,
2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
and should be counted as a full term served in
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed
albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis
by the constitutional and statutory
ran for mayor of the same municipality in the
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials
May 1998 elections and actually served the
from being elected and serving for more than
1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
three consecutive term for the same position.
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte start to finish of the term, should legally be
ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850,[17] that it taken as service for a full term in contemplation
was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in the of the three-term rule.
1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However,
contrary view is not hard to discern. Such
that disposition, it must be stressed, was without
contrary view would mean that Alegre would
practical and legal use and value, having been
under the three-term rule - be considered as
promulgated after the term of the contested
having served a term by virtue of a veritably
office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
that he was only a presumptive winner in the
another actually served such term pursuant to a
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
proclamation made in due course after an
under protest did not make him less than a duly
election.
elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
seek refuge from the Courts ruling in, Lonzanida
coupled by his assumption of office and his
vs. Comelec,[18] citing Borja vs.
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida
was elected and served for two consecutive
terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior
to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again
for the same position in the May 1995 elections,
won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
However, his opponent contested his
proclamation and filed an election protest before
the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated
January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of
elections and declared the position vacant. The
COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner
Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the
post. Lonzanida assumed the office and
performed his duties up to March 1998 only.
Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition
to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed
and was eventually granted. There, the Court
held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court
pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be
deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998
term because he was ordered to vacate [and in
fact vacated] his post before the expiration of
the term.
The difference between the case at bench
and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one,
in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election
was declared a nullity for the stated reason
of failure of election, and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-
elect was nullified, followed by an order for him
to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal
processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election
factor does not obtain in the present case. But
more importantly, here, there was actually no
interruption or break in the continuity of Francis
service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike
Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during
the term in question; he never ceased
discharging his duties and responsibilities as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the
entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC en
banc when it disqualified Francis from running in
the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty
post of San Vicente and denying due course to
his certificate of candidacy by force of the
constitutional and statutory provisions regarding
the three-term limit rule for any local elective
official cannot be sustained. What the
COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004
assailed Resolution commends itself for
concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-
Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in
the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant
petition will be erroneous because the factual
milieu in those cases is different from the one
obtaining here. Explicitly, the three-term limit
was not made applicable in the cases
of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an
 interruption in the continuity of service of the
three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong
would have served continuously for three
consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full
term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply
discounted on the basis that he was not duly
elected thereto on account of void proclamation
because it would have iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality as it
rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated
loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket
added; emphasis in the original)
Given the foregoing consideration, the question
of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he
issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering
the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004
COMELEC en banc resolution even before its
finality[20] is now of little moment and need not
detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R.
No. 163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No.
163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the
COMELEC's act of not including his name as a
substitute candidate in the official list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it
were, existing COMELEC policy[21] provides for
the non-inclusion of the name of substitute
candidates in the certified list of candidates
pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding
in Miranda vs. Abaya,[22] that a candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not
given due course cannot be substituted by
another belonging to the same political party as
that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether
or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of
the same party who had been disqualified for
any cause, this does not include those cases
where the certificate of candidacy of the person
to be substituted had been denied due course
and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. While the law enumerated the
occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case
where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid
substitution for the latter case, much in the same
way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate
of candidacy is denied due course and/or
cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of
the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have
so easily and conveniently included those
persons whose certificates of candidacy have
been denied due course and/or cancelled under
the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there
demonstrably cannot be any possible
substitution of a person whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
course.
In any event, with the hard reality that the May
10, 2004 elections were already pass, Rommel
Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot
and academic.

A person without a valid certificate of

candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in WHEREFORE, the instant petitions
much the same way as any person who has not are DISMISSED and the assailed en
filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the
by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate
at all. COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.

xxx xxx xxx

After having considered the importance Costs against petitioners.

of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily
understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13,
1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled SO ORDERED.
certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this
principle to the case at bar and considering that
Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal
 CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-
SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
Associate Justice GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Chief Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. CONCHITA CARPIO

RENATO C. CORONA
REYNATO S. PUNO QUISUMBING MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-
NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the

Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
 MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E.
IBARRA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B.
ROMAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra,
seeking to set aside the resolution of the
Commission on Elections, dated August 15, 2001,
in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of
Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for
allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution, which provides that: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrar y
The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to
DISMISS the petition.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted
to dismiss the petition. He contended that as
revealed by the records of the Constitutional
Commission, the Constitution envisions a
continuous and an uninterrupted service for three
full terms before the proscription applies.
Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term
should not be counted or used as a basis for the
disqualification whether served prior (as in this
case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to
the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J.
joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground
that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.);
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4,
2002, a term during which succession to a local
elective office takes place or a recall election is
held should not be counted in determining whether
an elective local official has served more than three
consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution
does not prohibit elective local officials from
serving for more than three consecutive terms
because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term
limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so
long as such interruptions are not due to the
voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994
to June 30, 1995, during which respondent
Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan
by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should
not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent
had previously served as governor of Bataan for
only two consecutive terms (1995–1998 and 1998–
2001), his election on that day was actually only
his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to
dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term
should not be considered as one full term, because
a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short
the elected official’s service to less than nine years
and shortchange his constituents. The desire to
prevent monopoly of political power should be
balanced against the need to uphold the voters’
obvious preference who, in the present case, is
Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to
affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in
a democracy the people should, as much as legally
possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by
them in credible elections. He concluded that, in
election cases, when two conflicting legal positions
are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the people’s
overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to
dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the
constitutional provision that the disqualification
applies only if the terms are consecutive and the
service is full and continuous. Hence, service for
less than a term, except only in case of voluntary
renunciation, should not count to disqualify an
elective local official from running for the same
position. This case is different from Socrates,
where the full three consecutive terms had been
continuously served so that disqualification had
clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with
whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred, holds
the view that the recall term served by respondent
Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to
June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term.
Since he thereafter served for two consecutive
terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001,
his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his
fourth term and contravenes Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant
the petition and to declare respondent’s election on
May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also
dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held
that a recall term constitutes one term and that to
totally ignore a recall term in determining the
three-term limit would allow local officials to serve
for more than nine consecutive years contrary to
the manifest intent of the framers of the
Constitution. He contended that respondent
Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from
the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS
DISMISSED.
THE SEPARATE OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES ARE
HERETO ATTACHED AS PART OF THIS RESOLUTION.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners would seek the disqualification of respondent
Leonardo B. Roman on the ground of his having
transgressed the three-term limit under Section 8,
Article X, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code),
providing, respectively, that —
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected." 1
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. — (a) The term of office of all
local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this
Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June
30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law,
except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That
all local officials first elected during the local elections
immediately following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
"(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected." 2
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of
Governor of Bataan province a number of times;
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
TERMS MANNER OF ASSUMPTION
a) 1986–1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan
by former President Corazon
Aquino and served up to 1988.
b) 1988–1992 Elected Governor and served up to
1992.
c) 1994–1995 Elected Governor during the
RECALL election in 1993, assumed
office on 28 June 1994 and served
up to 1995.
d) 1995–1998 Elected Governor and served up to
1998.
e) 1998–2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
3
On 22 February 2001, private respondent Roman again
filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the
14th May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001,
Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
The focal issue presented before the Court in the instant
petition would revolve on the question of whether or not
private respondent Roman exceeded the three-term
limit for elective local officials, expressed in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, when
he again ran for the position of Governor in the
14th May 2001 elections, having occupied and
served in that position following the 1993 recall
elections, as well as the 1995 and 1998 regular
elections, immediately prior to the 2001 elections.
In fine, should respondent’s incumbency to the post of
Governor following the recall elections be included in
determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by
law?
In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply,
two conditions must concur, i.e., (1) that the elective
local official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government
position, and (2) that he has served three
consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed
to be an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he is elected. The constitutional
provision does not appear to be all that imprecise for and
in its application. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution
is explicit that the "term of office of elective local officials
. . . shall be three years" which phrase is forthwith
followed by its mandate that "no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms," and that"
(v)oluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he (is)
elected." The law evidently contemplates a continuous
full three-year term before the proscription can apply.
The Constitutional Commission, in its deliberations,
referred to a full nine (9) years of service for each
elective local government official in the application of the
prohibition, envisioning at the same time a continuous
and uninterrupted period of nine years by providing for
only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily
gives up the office.
Thus, we read from the records —
"MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I think the vote on continuous service
of nine years for the Members of the House of
Representatives or the lifetime limitation of three terms
has a very serious implication. The interpretation of
Commissioner Davide in the case of the Members of the
House is that they are allowed three consecutive terms.
They can hibernate for one term and can have another
three terms.
"The interpretation of Commissioner Garcia is that the
limitation of three terms is a lifetime limitation. This is a
very important distinction for the future; and perhaps,
this should be discussed or at least we can think about it
a little longer, rather than vote on it immediately.
"MR. ROMULO.
I withdraw the motion, Madam President. We can handle
this after lunch.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Can we have the proposals now, so that when we
resume, we are ready to vote on these?
"MR. ROMULO.
Madam President, in essence, is it the Davide
interpretation or is it the Garcia interpretation?
"Madam President, if it is the Davide interpretation . . .
"THE PRESIDENT. "THE PRESIDENT.

May we state that the interpretation of Commissioner I would just like to have the proposals now so that during
Davide or whatever proposal Commissioner Davide will lunch break, at least we can think about them, although I
say now is the proposal of the Committee on the suppose we will have some indigestion in the process.
Legislative as part of its committee report? May we now have the proposal we are going to speak
about or vote on when we resume the session?
"MR. DAVIDE.
"MR. ROMULO.
Yes.
Yes, the Garcia interpretation. Madam President.
"MR. ROMULO.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Yes, Madam President.
We ask Commissioner Garcia to please state his
"MR. DAVIDE. interpretation.

We want a vote on that particular issue so the "MR. GARCIA.

Committee can now finalize the substitute proposal in the
draft. I propose that the local officials be reelected twice and
that they be prohibited from running again after a total
"MR. GUINGONA. term of nine years in public service for the same office.

Madam President, as manifested by Commissioner "THE PRESIDENT.

Monsod, this is a very important question. Maybe we
could allow one speaker to explain very briefly each side How about the Congressmen?
of the issue.
"MR. GARCIA.
"THE PRESIDENT.
This is both for the Representatives and the local
Can we have those speeches after lunch? officials.

"MR. GUINGONA. "THE PRESIDENT.

Yes, Madam President. All right, for both Representatives and the local officials.
"MR. ROMULO.
I think the same question can be raised as to Senators.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Senators have one reelection.
"MR. RODRIGO.
Before we take our lunch break, may I ask Commissioner
Garcia a question on his proposal.
"Let us say, a mayor has served for nine years, can he,
after that, run as governor?
"MR. GARCIA.
He can run for other offices if he wishes.
"MR. RODRIGO.
As long as it is another office.
"THE PRESIDENT.
May we have the other proposal.
"MR. ROMULO.
Commissioner Davide would like to be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
"MR. DAVIDE.
The other proposal, Madam President, is: These officials
who can seek two reelections can serve for a total term
of nine years, after that, they cannot seek another
reelection. They should rest for one term or more, but it
will not bar them from running again after the lapse of
the term following the expiration of the nine-year period.
"x x x.
"MR. ROMULO.
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated
on the blackboard, and these are Alternative No. 1 where
there is no further election after a total of three terms
and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate
reelection after three successive terms.
"The proponents are now ready to explain briefly. I ask
that Commissioner Garcia be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Garcia is recognized to speak on
Alternative No. 1.
"MR. GARCIA.
I would like to advocate the proposition that no further
election for local and legislative officials be allowed after
a total of three terms or nine years. I have four reasons
why I would like to advocate this proposal, which are as
follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political power; (2)
to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so that no one is
indispensable in running the affairs of the country; and
(4) to create a reserve of statesmen both in the national
and local levels. May I explain briefly these four reasons.
"x x x.
"Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure
that new ideas and new approaches will be welcome.
Public office will no longer be a preserve of conservatism
and tradition. At the same time, we will create a reserve
of statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since
we will not deprive the community of the wealth of
experience and advice that could come from those who
have served for nine years in public office.
"x x x.
"MR. REGALADO.
May I just ask Commissioner Garcia for a clarification.
Under Alternative No. 1, which says: ‘No further election
after a total of three terms,’ the three terms referred to
here need not have been served consecutively?
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is correct, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
In other words, whether there were interruptions,
whether the interruption took over a span of 20 or 25
years, as long as he has been in that office for a total of
nine years, he is banned from running for the same
office.
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is right, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
Thank you.
"MR. ROMULO.
I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
"MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier
and I asked to speak because in this draft Constitution,
we are recognizing people’s power. We have said that
now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a
new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are
prescreening candidates among whom they will choose.
We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional
Commission has decreed that those who have served for
a period of nine years are barred from running for the
same position.
"x x x.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Thank you, Madam President.
"I think the issue is on Alternative No. 1 which is: ‘no
further election after a total of three terms.’ I will just
put into action what we have approved this morning
which is Scheme No. II, providing for a term of three
years for the Members of the Lower House of Congress
and a term of three years also for the local officials, from
governor down. We also approved this morning the
alternative that the Members of the Lower House shall
have only two reelections, meaning, one basic election
plus two reelections will give them three terms in the
House; that the local officials shall have two reelections,
meaning, one basic election plus two reelections or three
terms. Let us compare that now to the number of years
in accordance with Scheme No. II. Under Scheme No. II,
the Members of the Lower House and the local officials
shall serve for the firm term of not three years but five
years so that we can synchronize elections after that for
every three years. So the Representatives have already a
term of five years on the first term, and another of six
years. So they will serve for eleven years before they will
be disqualified under that first issue. I understand that
the three terms mentioned there are only for nine years.
It is not so if we follow what we approved this morning.
"In the case of the Senators, we approved that there is
one reelection. Under Scheme No. II, the Senators will
have a term of five years for the first election, and one
reelection for a term of six years, which will give them a
total term of eleven years.
"Where does Alternative No. 1 stand now? May I ask the
proponent where it stands now? Is it for nine years or for
two reelections as we approved this morning? May I ask
the proponent of Alternative No. 1, Madam President.
"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry but I think there are two different questions
here: for the term of office of the Senators, it is a
maximum of 12 years; for the Representatives, it is a
maximum of nine years.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
What happens now to what we approved this morning?
We approved Scheme No. II which provides a term of
five years for the Representatives.
"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry again, but for the first election, the term of
office will have to be fixed by the Commission on
Elections simply for adjustment purposes because of the
current term of the President, for synchronization and for
transitory purposes. But once it is regularized, it will be
different.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Is it a total of nine years?
"MR. GARCIA.
Yes, it is still a total of nine years.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Excluding those who were first elected under Scheme No.
II?
"MR. GARCIA.
Proper adjustments will have to be made for the first
election.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Who will make the proper adjustments?
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commission on Elections will make the proper
adjustments.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
And what proper adjustments can it do?
"MR. GARCIA.
To make sure that the term is not more than nine years,
if possible and if not, we can give them a term of more
or less one or two years, depending on how it can be
adjusted.
"x x x.
"MR. ABUBAKAR.
So if the people find that their Representative is
competent, we must have confidence in them because
they know their Representative has demonstrated his
competence by action, because he lives with them. Why
should we defy the wishes of the people of that district?
Let one Gentleman answer me and it be on record that
he is against my position. As I said, the voice of the
people is the voice of God. We should not dictate what
the people want. Why should we arrogate unto ourselves
the right of that district or that province to choose its
leaders and limit their total number of years of service to
only nine years?
"I would not speak for Batangas nor speak for Laguna,
because their people have the right to choose their own
Representatives for a term that they think is appropriate.
We cannot speak for Sulu or even for Cotabato because
the situation is different. Maybe we will have more
leaders or maybe we will have only one of our faith and
our confidence. Why limit his total number of years of
service to nine years?" 4 (Emphasis provided)
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent
elective local official merely serves the balance of the
latter’s term of office; it is not a full three-year term. It
also goes without saying that an incumbent elective local
official against whom a recall election is initiated and who
nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as
being a continuing term of office and not as a break in
reckoning his three consecutive terms. 5 In Lonzanida v.
Commission on Elections, 6 this Court has held: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph
". . . The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service." 7
If involuntary severance from the service which
results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish
his term of office because of his ouster through
valid recall proceedings negates "one term" for
purposes of applying the three-term limit, as so
intimated in Lonzanida, it stands to reason that the
balance of the term assumed by the newly elected
local official in a recall election should not also be
held to be one term in reckoning the three-term
limit. In both situations, neither the elective local official
who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local
official who only assumes the balance of the term of the
ousted local official following the recall election could be
considered to have served a full three-year term set by
the Constitution.
This view is not inconsistent, but indeed in line, with the
conclusion ultimately reached in Socrates v. Commission
on Elections, 8 where the Court has considered
Hagedorn, following his three full terms of nine years,
still qualified to run in a recall election conducted about a
year and a half after the most recent regular local
elections. A recall election term then, not being a full
three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a basis
for disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent
to the nine-year full three-term limit.
This same issue has been passed and ruled upon by the
Commission on Elections no less than five times. 9
Consistently, it has held that the term of a newcomer in
recall elections cannot be counted as a full term and may
not thus be included in counting the three-term limit
prescribed under the law. The Commission on Elections,
with its fact-finding facilities, its familiarity with political
realities, and its peculiar expertise in dealing with
election controversies, should be in a good vantage point
to resolve issues of this nature. Concededly, no ready
made formulae are always extant to address occasional
complex issues, allowing time and experience to merely
evolve and ultimately provide acceptable solutions. In
the administration of election laws, it would be unsound
by an excessive zeal to remove from the Commission on
Elections the initiative it takes on such questions which,
in fact, by legal mandate properly belong to it. 10
Nor should it be ignored that the law here involved is a
limitation on the right of suffrage not only on the
candidate for office but also, and most importantly, on
the electorate. Respondent Roman has won the election
to the post of Governor of Bataan with a comfortable
margin against his closest opponent. Where a candidate
appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on
the candidate’s eligibility, even only as a practical
matter, must be so resolved as to respect and carry out,
not defeat, the paramount will of the electorate. While
the Constitution would attempt to prevent the
monopolization of political power, indeed a wise rule, the
precept of preserving the freedom of choice of the people
on who shall rightfully hold the reins of government for
them is no less than fundamental in looking at its
overriding intent.
chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ib rary
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the instant petition on
the foregoing theses.
MENDOZA, J.:
 LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
ROBERTO L. DIZON, G.R. No. 182088
Petitioner, BRION, and
Present:
PERALTA, JJ.
PUNO, C.J.,*

QUISUMBING,**

YNARES-SANTIAGO,***
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
CARPIO,
and MARINO P. MORALES,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Respondents. January 30, 2009
CORONA,
x---------------------------------------------
CARPIO MORALES, --------x
- versus - AZCUNA,****

TINGA,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,
CARPIO, J.:
NACHURA,
The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
present petition seeks the reversal of the Resolution
dated 27 July 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division which dismissed the
petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Marino P.
Morales (Morales) certificate of candidacy, as well as
the Resolution dated 14 February 2008 of the
COMELEC En Banc which denied Roberto L. Dizons
(Dizon) motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The COMELEC Second Division stated the facts as
follows:
Roberto L. Dizon, hereinafter referred to as
petitioner, is a resident and taxpayer of the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino
P. Morales, hereinafter referred to as
respondent, is the incumbent Mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as
the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga
during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections
and has fully served the same. Respondent filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007
again for the same position and same
municipality.
Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer
eligible and qualified to run for the same
position for the May 14, 2007 elections under
Section 43 of the Local Government Code of
1991. Under the said provision, no local elective
official is allowed to serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms for the same position.
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he is
still eligible and qualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat,z Pampanga
because he was not elected for the said
position in the 1998 elections. He avers that the
Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-
058, entitled Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera III and
Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor Marino
 P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City declaring
Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 1998 elections.
Respondent alleges that his term should be
reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed
as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent
further asserts that his election in 2004 is only
for his second term. Hence, the three term rule
provided under the Local Government Code is
not applicable to him.
Respondent further argues that the grounds
stated in the instant petition are not covered
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent further contend [sic] that even if it
is covered under the aforementioned provision,
the instant petition failed to allege any material
misrepresentation in the respondents Certificate
of Candidacy.[1]
The Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division
In its Resolution dated 27 July 2007, the COMELEC
Second Division took judicial notice of this Courts
ruling in the consolidated cases of Atty. Venancio Q.
Rivera III v. COMELEC and Marino Boking Morales in
G.R. No. 167591 and Anthony Dee v. COMELEC and
Marino Boking Morales in G.R. No. 170577
(Rivera case) promulgated on 9 May 2007. The
pertinent portions of the COMELEC Second Divisions
ruling read as follows:
Respondent was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998. There was
no interruption of his second term from 1998 to
2001. He was able to exercise the powers and
enjoy the position of a mayor as caretaker of the
office or a de facto officer until June 30, 2001
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in an
electoral protest case. He was again elected as
mayor from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003 [sic].
It is worthy to emphasize that the Supreme
Court ruled that respondent has violated the
three-term limit under Section 43 of the Local
Government Code. Respondent was
considered not a candidate in the 2004
Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Hence, his failure to qualify for the
2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run
 again for the same position in the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections.
The
Bancs Resolution read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES to DENY the instant Petition to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or
Petition for the Disqualification of Marino P.
Morales for lack of merit.[2]
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division.
pertinent portions of the COMELEC En
Respondents certificate of candidacy for the
May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections was cancelled pursuant to the above-
mentioned Supreme Court decision which was
promulgated on May 9, 2007. As a result,
respondent was not only disqualified but was
also not considered a candidate in the May 2004
elections.
Another factor which is worth mentioning is the
fact that respondent has relinquished the
disputed position on May 16, 2007. The vice-
mayor elect then took his oath and has assumed
office as mayor of Mabalacat on May 17, 2007
until the term ended on June 30, 2007. For
failure to serve for the full term, such
involuntary interruption in his term of office
should be considered a gap which renders the
three-term limit inapplicable.
The three-term limit does not apply whenever
there is an involuntary break. The Constitution
does not require that the interruption or hiatus to
be a full term of three years. What the law
requires is for an interruption, break or a rest
period from a candidates term of office for any
length of time. The Supreme Court in the case
of Latasa v. Comelec ruled:
 Indeed, the law contemplates a
rest period during which the local The Issues
elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial Dizon submits that the factual findings made in
jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit. the Rivera case should still be applied in the present

In sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in

case because Morales had, except for one month and
the instant case for lack of the two 14 days, served the full term of 2004-2007. Morales
conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly-
elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 assumption of the mayoralty position on 1 July 2007
to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he makes the 2007-2010 term Morales fifth term in
was not even considered a candidate thereat;
and 2) respondent has failed to serve the entire office. Dizon raises the following grounds before this
duration of the term of office because he has
already relinquished the disputed office on May Court:
16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to
the end of his supposed term.

xxx 1. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the instant Motion for
Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT. The
Resolution of the Commission Second Division
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[3]
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENT MORALES DID
NOT VIOLATE THE THREE-YEAR TERM LIMIT
WHEN HE RAN AND WON AS MAYOR OF
MABALACAT, PAMPANGA DURING THE MAY
14, 2007 ELECTION.
 2. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
The present case covers a situation wherein we have
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED previously ruled that Morales had been elected to
THAT DUE TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS
the same office and had served three consecutive
RULING IN THE AFORESAID CONSOLIDATED
CASES, RESPONDENT MORALES FOURTH terms, and wherein we disqualified and removed
TERM IS CONSIDERED A GAP IN THE Morales during his fourth term. Dizon claims that
LATTERS SERVICE WHEN HE FILED HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE 2007 Morales is currently serving his fifth term as mayor. Is
ELECTIONS. the 2007-2010 term really Morales fifth term?

3. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE The Effect of our Ruling in the Rivera Case
FOURTH TERM OF MORALES WAS
INTERRUPTED WHEN HE RELINQUISHED HIS
POSITION FOR ONE MONTH AND 14 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTION.[4]
In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this
Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We
cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30
December 2003. This cancellation disqualified
Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
The Ruling of the Court elections. The votes cast for Morales were
considered stray votes. The dispositive portion in
the Rivera case reads:
The petition has no merit.
 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591
is GRANTED. Respondent Morales Certificate
of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is
cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office
of the Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-
mayor elect of the said municipality in the May
10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall
serve as such for the remaining duration of the
term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition
in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being
moot.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code restated
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution as
follows:
No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
For purposes of determining the resulting
disqualification brought about by the three-term
limit, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times.[6] There should be a
concurrence of two conditions for the application of
the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.[7]
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was
elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive
terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30
June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July
2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from
his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of
the three-term limit. Although the trial court
previously ruled that Morales proclamation for the
1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption
of the continuity of Morales service with respect to
the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling
was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the
expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales
involuntary severance from office with respect to the
2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.[8] Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007
up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice
mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how
short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales
continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
2007-2010: Morales Fifth Term?
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth
term in office. Dizon asserts that even after receipt of
our decision on 10 May 2007, Morales waited for the
election to be held on 14 May 2007 to ensure his
victory for a fifth term.[9]
We concede that Morales occupied the position of
mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July
1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1
July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May
2007. However, because of his disqualification,
Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the
2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the
position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the
term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of
Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot
be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May
2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July
2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales
first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Dizon alleges that Morales was able to serve his
fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. x x
x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-
term limit with impunity by the sheer length of
litigation and profit from it even more by raising the
technicalities arising therefrom.[10] To this, we quote
our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving
the election protest between petitioner and his
then opponent Alvez which took roughly about
three years and resultantly extended the
petitioners incumbency in an office to which he
was not lawfully elected. We note that such
delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There
 is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay
was due to any political maneuvering on his part
to prolong his stay in office. Moreover,
protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse
to move for the early resolution of the election
protest while it was pending before the regional ANTONIO T. CARPIO
trial court or to file a motion for the execution of
the regional trial courts decision declaring the Associate Justice
position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-
mayor to assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which
is not here shown to have been intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in WE CONCUR:
office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be
elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral
election.[11]

(On official leave)

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the
REYNATO S. PUNO
petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the
Chief Justice
Commission on Elections En Banc dated 14 February
2008 as well as the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections Second Division dated 27 July 2007.

SO ORDERED. (On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice (On official leave)
Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- RENATO C. CORONA

MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-
NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. ANTONIO EDUARDO B.

VELASCO, JR. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 Associate Justice before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
ARTURO D. BRION Acting Chief Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

*
On official leave.
**
Acting Chief Justice.
***
On official leave.
****
On official leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[2]
Id. at 43.
[3]
Id. at 53-54.
CERTIFICATION [4]
[5]
Id. at 17.
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167591, 9 May 2007,
523 SCRA 41, 59.
[6]
See Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 356 Phil. 467 (1998).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the [7]
See Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625 (1999).
[8]
Id. at 638.
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the [9]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
above Decision had been reached in consultation [10]
Id. at 21.
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales
vs. ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat,
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004
MORALES, Respondents. to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January 5,
2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
x---------------------------------------------x
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and
G.R. No. 170577 May 9, 2007 Normandick De Guzman, petitioners, filed with the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections
ANTHONY D. DEE, Petitioner, (COMELEC) a petition to cancel respondent
vs. Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" that he was elected and had served three
MORALES, Respondents. previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated
DECISION Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: as the Local Government Code.
For our resolution are two consolidated petitions for In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
dated March 14, 2005 and November 8, 2005 of the (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third
COMELEC En Banc. term), but he served the second term from July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the
G.R. No. 167591 office" or as a "de facto officer" because of the
following reasons:
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY.
NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC and a. He was not validly elected for the second
MARINO "BOKING" MORALES term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial
 Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its
Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election
Protest Case (EPC) No. 98-131. The Decision
became final and executory on August 6,
2001; and
b. He was preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from
January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Resolution finding respondent Morales
disqualified to run for the position of municipal mayor
on the ground that he had already served three (3)
consecutive terms. Accordingly, his Certificate of
Candidacy was cancelled. On May 7, 2004, he filed
with the COMELEC En Banc a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 14, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued
a Resolution granting respondent Morales’ motion for
reconsideration and setting aside that of the Second
Division. The COMELEC En Banc held that since the
Decision in EPC No. 98-131 of the RTC, Branch 57,
Angeles City declared respondent Morales’
proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the
Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat is that of a de facto
officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, his continuous
service for three consecutive terms has been
severed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 170577
ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and MARIO "BOKING" MORALES
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was
proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat for
the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor,
filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Angeles City a petition
for quo warranto against the said respondent.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Morales, having
served as mayor for three consecutive terms, is
ineligible to run for another term or fourth term. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11503.
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the
following defenses:
a. He was not validly elected for the term 1998
to 2001 since the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles
City declared in its Decision that his
proclamation as mayor of Mabalacat was void.
Petitioner Dee was then proclaimed the duly
elected mayor; and
b. He was preventively suspended for six
months by the Ombudsman, during the same
term in an anti-graft case, an interruption in the
 continuity of his service as municipal mayor of
Mabalacat.1
In its Decision dated November 22, 2004, the RTC
dismissed petitioner Dee’s petition for quo warranto
on the ground that respondent Morales did not serve
the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat, but petitioner Dee in the May
1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001, thus:
Respondent, Marino Morales, was not the duly
elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the May
1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001 because
although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, had assumed office and discharged the
duties of mayor, his close rival, the herein petitioner,
Anthony D. Dee, was declared the duly elected
Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the Decision
promulgated on April 2, 2001 in Election Protest EPC
No. 98-131 filed by Anthony Dee against herein
respondent, Marino Morales, and decided by RTC,
Br. 57, Angeles City. x x x.
Petitioner Dee interposed an appeal to the
COMELEC First Division, alleging that respondent
Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he
ran for re-election (fourth time) as mayor in the 2004
elections. Consequently, his proclamation as such
should be set aside. In a Resolution dated July 29,
2005 the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal. It held that
respondent Morales cannot be deemed to have
served as mayor of Mabalacat during the term 1998
to 2001 because his proclamation was declared void
by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City. He only
served as a caretaker, thus, his service during that
term should not be counted.
On August 12, 2005, petitioner Dee filed with the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration. In
a Resolution dated November 8, 2005, the
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the questioned
Resolution of the Second Division.
Hence, petitioner Dee’s instant petition for certiorari.
Both cases may be decided based on the same facts
and issues.
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected
to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following consecutive terms:
a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE. –
Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held
that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his
fourth because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he
served, may not be counted since his
proclamation was declared void by the RTC,
Branch 57 of Angeles City.
Respondent Morales is wrong. This Court, through
Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia, resolved the same
issue in Ong v. Alegre2 with identical facts, thus:
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both
Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office
of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the
latter being subsequently proclaimed by the
COMELEC winner in the contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as
Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC
declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that
1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out
only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served
the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elected for the municipality of San Vicente.
xxx
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on
the question of whether or not petitioner Francis’
assumption of office as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to
2001 should be considered as full service for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the
affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand,
disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed
office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San
Vicente for three consecutive terms, his
proclamation as mayor-elected in the May 1998
election was contested and eventually nullified
per the Decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point,
petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, that
a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and one assuming office on the
strength of a protested proclamation does so as a
presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome
of the election protest.
xxx
For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying
requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner
Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May
2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30,
1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in
full. The herein controversy revolves around the
1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no
quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs
to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001,
may be considered as one full term service in the
context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full
term," and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive terms for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled
in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was
Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally
elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without
practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested
office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention
that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998
mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected
mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary
view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would
mean that Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge
from the Court’s ruling in Lonzanida v. Comelec,
citing Borja v. Comelec. In Lonzanida, petitioner
Lonzanida was elected and served for two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then
ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
However, his opponent contested his proclamation
and filed an election protest before the RTC of
Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 8,
1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and
declared the position vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded
to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed
the office and performed his duties up to March 1998
only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and
was eventually granted. There, the Court held that
Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election,
and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoralty term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly
observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have
served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was
ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his post
before the expiration of the term."
The difference between the case at bench and
Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of
election," and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the
office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being
an involuntary severance from office as a result of
legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does
not obtain in the present case. But more importantly,
here, there was actually no interruption or break in
the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the
1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was
never unseated during the term in question; he never
ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the
entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above,
Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of
the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in
the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC
of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July
4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the
term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the
three-term limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is
no reason why this ruling should not also apply to
respondent Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, respondent Morales invoked not only
Lonzanida v. COMELEC,3 but also Borja, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections4 which is likewise
inapplicable. The facts in Borja are:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco was elected vice-
mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1998 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death
of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he
was reelected mayor for another term of three years
ending June 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative
to the May 11, 1998 elections, Petitioner Benjamin
U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the
latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after
that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner
and declared private respondent Capco disqualified
from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.
However, on motion of private respondent, the
COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. x x x
This Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office
of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not
be regarded as a "term" under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160
(the Local Government Code). He held the position
from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period
of less than three years. Moreover, he was not
elected to that position.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,5 this Court ruled
that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall
election for the remaining term is not the "term"
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code). As the Court observed,
there was a "break" in the service of private
respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a
"private citizen" for a time before running for mayor
in the recall elections.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001.
He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding
the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre,6 such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in
serving the full term.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be
more clear and explicit –
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. x x x
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term.
He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of
Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
In Latasa v. Comelec,7 the Court explained the
reason for the maximum term limit, thus:
The framers of the Constitution, by including this
exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas
Ople stated during the deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations
where, as a result of continuous service and frequent
re-elections, officials from the President down to the
municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary
interest in their positions and to accumulate these
powers and prerequisites that permit them to stay on
indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of
their families in a subsequent election. x x x
xxx
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there
exists a rest period or a break in the service of local
elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was
a private citizen a few months before the next
mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and
Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as
private citizens for two years and fifteen months
respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the
Constitution specifically included an exception to the
people’s freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie
for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed
another three consecutive term as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought
to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by
it.
This is the very situation in the instant case.
Respondent Morales maintains that he served his
second term (1998 to 2001) only as a "caretaker of
the office" or as a "de facto officer." Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose
defeated when an official serves in the same position
for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker"
or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and
enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables
him "to stay on indefinitely".
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from
the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
G.R. No. 167591 –
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003
should be cancelled. The effect of the cancellation of
a Certificate of Candidacy is provided under Sections
6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, thus:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
in relation to Section 211 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides:
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In
the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot
shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear
and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of
election inspectors shall observe the following rules,
bearing in mind that the object of the election is to
obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
xxx
19. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a
certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for
an office for which he did not present himself shall be
considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate
the whole ballot.
xxx
In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can
not be considered a candidate in the May 2004
elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.
G.R. No. 170577 –
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the
instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.
Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the question now is
whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who
shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to
2007 term.
In Labo v. Comelec,8 this Court has ruled that a
second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a
substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
xxx
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a
candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended
for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be
considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of
Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide,
without any intention to misapply their franchise, and
in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be
disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority
voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602
votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger
number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner This Decision is immediately executory.
Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio
City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111). SO ORDERED.

xxx ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice
As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a
permanent vacancy in the contested office has WE CONCUR:
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-
mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the

Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. –
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-
mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is

GRANTED. Respondent Morales’ Certificate of
Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In
view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor in
Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the
said municipality in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections is hereby declared
mayor and shall serve as such for the remaining
duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.
The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for
being moot.
NICASIO BOLOS, JR., G.R. No. 184082
Petitioner, PERALTA, J.:
Present:

PUNO, C.J., This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the

QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Rules of Court, alleging that the Commission on
CARPIO, Elections (COMELEC) committed grave abuse of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
- versus - CARPIO-MORALES, in issuing the Resolutions promulgated on March 4,
TINGA, 2008 and August 7, 2008 holding that petitioner
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., Nicasio Bolos, Jr. is disqualified as a candidate for
NACHURA, the position
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Boh
BRION,* and
PERALTA, JJ. ol in the October 29,

THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE,
Respondents. March 17, 2009
x------------------------------------
--------------x
DECISION
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections
on the ground that he has served the three-term limit
provided in the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The facts are as follows:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the
to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay ground that he had already served the three-term limit.
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the
held in 1994, 1997 and 2002. same position in accordance withSection 8, Article X
of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong 7160.
Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for
Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and Cinconiegue contended that petitioners
won. He assumed office as Municipal relinquishment of the position of Punong
Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part,
Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang as it could be presumed that it was his personal
Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. decision to run as municipal councilor in the May
Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added
Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang his post as Punong Barangay.
Kabataan Elections.
Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the In his Answer, petitioner admitted that he was
incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for Dauis, Bohol in the last three consecutive elections of
1994, 1997 and 2002. However, he countered that in The issue before the COMELEC was whether or not
the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he petitioners election, assumption and discharge of the
ran and won as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. functions of the Office of Sangguniang
By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member can be considered as voluntary
Bayan member, his remaining term of office renunciation of his office as Punong
as Punong Barangay, which would have ended in Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol which
2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election will render unbroken the continuity of his service
and assumption of office as Sangguniang as Punong Barangay for the full term of office, that is,
Bayan member was by operation of law; hence, it from 2004 to 2007. If it is considered a voluntary
must be considered as an involuntary interruption in renunciation, petitioner will be deemed to have served
the continuity of his last term of service. three consecutive terms and shall be disqualified to
run for the same position in the October 29,
Pursuant to Section 10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2007 elections. But if it is considered as an involuntar
8297 dated September 6, 2007, the petition was heard y
by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bohol. Upon renunciation, petitioners service is deemed to have
completion of the proceedings, the evidence, records been interrupted; hence, he is not barred from running
of the case, and the Hearing Officers action on the for another term.
matter were endorsed to and received by the In a Resolution[1] dated March 4, 2008, the First
Commission on November 21, 2007. Division of the COMELEC ruled that petitioners
relinquishment of the office of Punong
Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence
Hence, this petition for certiorari raising this
of his assumption of office as Sangguniang lone issue:
Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was
a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
Barangay. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
reads: EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the IN DISQUALIFYING [PETITIONER] AS A
Commission (First Division) GRANTS the CANDIDATE FOR PUNONG BARANGAY
petition. Respondent NICASIO BOLOS, JR., IN THE OCTOBER 29, 2007 BARANGAY
having already served as Punong Barangay of AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for three ELECTIONS AND, SUBSEQUENTLY,
consecutive terms is ANNULLING HIS PROCLAMATION.[4]
hereby DISQUALIFIED from being a
candidate for the same office in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and SK Elections. Considering
that respondent had already been proclaimed, The main issue is whether or not there was
said proclamation is hereby ANNULLED.
Succession to said office shall be governed by voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
the provisions of Section 44 of the Local
Barangay by petitioner when he assumed office
Government Code.[2]
as Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have
fully served his third term as Punong Barangay,
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was warranting his disqualification from running for the
denied by the COMELEC en banc in a same position in the October 29,
[3]
Resolution dated August 7, 2008. 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
 Petitioner contends that he is qualified to run
for the position of Punong Barangay in the October
29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections
since he did not serve continuously three consecutive
terms. He admits that in the 1994, 1997 and
2002 Barangay elections, he was elected as Punong
Barangay for three consecutive terms.Nonetheless,
while serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he
ran as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won.
On July 1, 2004, he assumed office and, consequently,
left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law.
He averred that he served the full term as member of
the Sangguniang Bayan until June
2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. Hence, the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
disqualifying him as a candidate
for Punong Barangay since he did not complete his
third term by operation of law.
The argument does not persuade.
The three-term limit for elective local officials
is contained in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years,
and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
David v. Commission on
[5]
Elections elucidates that the Constitution did not
30,
expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term
of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to
the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
The discussions in the Constitutional Commission
showed that the term of office of barangay officials
would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more
precisely, [a]s provided for in the Local Government
Code.[6] Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code provides that barangay officials are covered by
the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof
states that the term of office of barangay officials
shall be five (5) years. The cited provisions read, thus:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve
for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members
of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five
(5) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the
sangguniang kabataan members who were
elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve
until the next regular election of barangay
officials.
[8]
Socrates v. Commission on Elections
the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two
parts:
x x x The first part provides that an elective
local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states
that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form
a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive
term. [9]
In Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections,[10] the Court stated that the second part of
held that
the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent
of the framers of theConstitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punon
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the g Barangay.
peoples choice and grant their elected official full The COMELEC correctly held:
service of a term. The Court held that two conditions
It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.s
for the application of the disqualification must relinquishment of the office of Punong
Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a
concur: (1) that the official concerned has been consequence of his assumption to office as
elected for three consecutive terms in the same Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol,
on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
As conceded even by him, respondent
consecutive terms.[11] (petitioner herein) had already completed two
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was consecutive terms of office when he ran for a
third term in the Barangay Elections
elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive of 2002. When he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan
terms, satisfying the first condition for
of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10,
disqualification. 2004 [elections], he was not deemed
resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his
What is to be determined is whether petitioner pursuit of his election as municipal councilor
is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his point out to an intent and readiness to give up
his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the
position as Punong Barangay during his third term higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of
when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
Bayan member and assumed said office. campaigned and exhorted the municipal
electorate to vote for him as such and then after
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there being elected and proclaimed, return to his
former position. He knew that his election as
was voluntary
municipal councilor would entail abandonment
 of the position he held, and he intended to
forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is affected. Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a
voluntary.[12] term that expresses the manner in which rights, and
sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term mere application to the particular transaction of the
as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang established rules of law, without the act or
Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the cooperation of the party himself.[14]
position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus,
voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong An interruption in the service of a term of office,
Barangay which the Court deems as a by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v.
voluntary renunciation of said office. Commission on Elections.[15] The respondent therein,
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr.,was elected and served three
assumed the position consecutive terms as Municipal Councilor of
of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Pu Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
nong Barangay by 2007. However, during his second term, he succeeded as
operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-
third term as Punong Barangay. Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No.
The term operation of law is defined by the 7160.[16] Potenciosos assumption of office as Vice-Mayor
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia[13] as a term describing was considered an involuntary severance from his office
the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his
effect of a legal rule without any act of the person second term of service.[17] The Court held that it could not
be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law.[18] Hence,
Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for municipal
councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Further, in Borja, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,[19] respondent therein, Jose T. Capco, Jr.,
was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending on June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became Mayor,
by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and
served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to
1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 election. Capcos disqualification was sought on
the ground that he would have already served as
Mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998;
hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another
term. The Court declared that the term limit for
elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve the
same elective position.[20] The Court held that Capco
was qualified to run again as mayor in the next
election because he was not elected to the office of
mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law.[21] Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the
service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor.[22] The vice-mayors assumption of the
mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design.[23] Hence, his service
in that office should not be counted in the application
of any term limit.[24]
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or
succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He
instead relinquished his office as Punong
Barangay during his third term when he won and
assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary
renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
WE CONCUR:

In fine, the COMELEC did not commit grave

REYNATO S. PUNO
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Chief Justice
jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated March 4,
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO
2008 and August 7, 2008, disqualifying petitioner
YNARES-SANTIAGO
from being a candidate for Punong Barangay in the Associate Justice Associate Justice
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
COMELEC Resolutions dated March 4,
2008 and August 7, 2008 are
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
 before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-
NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO

EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 186616VICENTE B. QUE, JR., AURELIO A. ABAD, and
Petitioner, BILUAN, DANILO R. GATCHALIAN,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
LOURDES R. DEL MUNDO, EMMA O.
Present:
CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON, TANY V.
- versus - CATACUTAN, AND CONCEPCION P. JAO,
PUNO, C.J.,
Respondents.
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, CARPIO,
RENATO F. BORBON, LEVVINO CHING, CORONA,*
CARLOS C. FLORENTINO, RUBEN G.
BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO, MARIO M. CARPIO MORALES,
CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M. CALMA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
MANUEL A. RAYOS, WILMA L. CHUA,
EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M. VELASCO, JR.,I**
LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N. ALCAPA, NACHURA,
JOSE H. SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES, Promulgated:
NIDA R. PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO, ARTURO T. BRION,
MANABAT, RICARDO O. LIZARONDO,
LETICIA C. MATURAN, RODRIGO A. PERALTA,***
ALAYAN, LEONILO N. MIRANDA, November 20, 2009
BERSAMIN,
DESEDERIO O. MONREAL, FRANCISCO x ---------------------------------------------------------------------
M. BAHIA, NESTOR R. FORONDA, DEL CASTILLO,
------------------ x
 DECISION No barangay elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of
BRION, J.:
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was
elected.
We resolve in this Decision the constitutional
challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the
The RTC granted the petition and declared the
following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic
challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The
Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for
present petition, filed by the Commission on
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC
Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended,
decision.[1]
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991):

THE ANTECEDENTS
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials
after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3)
years. Before the October 29, 2007
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (
SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of The RTC agreed with the respondents
several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the contention that the challenged
RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit
constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, for barangay officials under the following reasoning:
based on the following arguments:
When the Local Government Code of 1991
took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent
I. The term limit therewith, a different term was ordained. Here, this
Court agrees with the position of the petitioners
of Barangay officials should be applied
that Section 43 of the Code specifically
prospectively and not retroactively. exempted barangay elective officials from the
coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule
considering that the provision applicable to
these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly
II. Implementation of
separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and
paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to
would be a violation of the equal qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards
protection of the law. to (sic) all local elective officials
except barangay officials. Had the intention of the
framers of the Code is (sic) to
include barangay elective officials, then no
III. Barangay officials have excepting proviso should have been expressly made
in paragraph (a) thereof or, by implication, the
always been apolitical.
contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated
ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).
xxxx
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the
constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials
from the three (3) term limits (sic) which are
otherwise applicable to other elected public officials
from the Members of the House of Representatives
down to the members of
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the
Congress whether the three (3) term limit should be
applied by enacting a law for the purpose.
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524
merely increased the term of office
of barangay elective officials from three (3) years to
five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it
can be noted that no consecutive term limit for the
election of barangay elective officials was fixed
therein.
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival
of the consecutive term limit for the election
of barangay elective officials after the Local
Government Code took effect. Under the assailed
provision of this Act, the term of office
of barangay elective officials reverted back to three
(3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the
legislators expressly declared that
no barangayelective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. The petitioners are very clear that they are
not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the
three (3) consecutive term limit rule for the election
of barangay elective officials to the same
position. The particular provision the
constitutionality of which is under attack is that
portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3)
consecutive term limit of barangay elective officials
beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.
xxx
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a
mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code. As discussed above, Section
43(c) of the Local Government Code does not
provide for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. Such specific
provision of the Code has in fact amended the
previous enactments (R.A. 6653 and R.A. 6679)
providing for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. But, such specific
provision of the Local Government Code was
 amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to the
previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits
of barangay elective officials. [3]
In declaring this retroactive application
unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:
By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to
the 1994 barangay elections, Congress has violated
not only the principle of prospective application of
statutes but also the equal protection clause of the
Constitution inasmuch as the barangay elective
officials were singled out that their consecutive
term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is
no rhyme or reason why the consecutive limit for
these barangay officials shall be counted
retroactively while the consecutive limit for other
local and national elective officials are counted
prospectively. For if the purpose of Congress is [sic]
to classify elective barangay officials as belonging to
the same class of public officers whose term of
office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms,
then to discriminate them by applying the proviso
retroactively violates the constitutionally enshrined
principle of equal protection of the laws.
Although the Constitution grants Congress the
power to determine such successive term limit
of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the
authority granted shall not otherwise transgress
other constitutional and statutory privileges.
This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the
respondent that the legislature clearly intended
that the provision of RA No. 9164 be made effective
in 1994 and that such provision is valid and
constitutional. If we allow such premise, then the
term of office for those officials elected in the
1997 barangay elections should have ended in year
2000 and not year 2002 considering that RA No.
9164 provides for a three-year term
of barangay elective officials. The amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered
nugatory in view of such retroactive application.This
is absurd and illusory.
True, no person has a vested right to a public office,
the same not being property within the
contemplation of constitutional
guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the
petition would show that the petitioners are not
claiming vested right to their office but their right to
be voted upon by the electorate without being
burdened by the assailed provision of the law that,
in effect, rendered them ineligible to run for their
incumbent positions. Such right to run for office and
be voted for by the electorate is the right being
sought to be protected by assailing the otherwise
unconstitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the
petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one
subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x x x
The challenged laws title is AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
THE
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KA
BATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT
7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. x x x x
xxxx
To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act
on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term
limits posed a serious constitutional breach,
particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic]
that every bill must embrace only one subject to be
expressed in the title thereof.
x x x the Court is of the view that the
affected barangay officials were not sufficiently
given notice that they were already disqualified by a
new act, when under the previous enactments no
such restrictions were imposed.
Even if this Court would apply the usual test in
determining the sufficiency of the title of the bill,
the challenged law would still be insufficient for
how can a retroactivity of the term limits be
germane to the synchronization of an election x x x
x.[4]
The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but
the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition on a pure question of law.
 The Petition
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law
is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an
amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal
law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto
law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC,
has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA
No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not
penal in character may be applied retroactively when
expressly so provided and when it does not impair
vested rights. As there is no vested right to public
office, much less to an elective post, there can be no
valid objection to the alleged retroactive application
of RA No. 9164.
The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs
invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the
wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that the RTC
has no right to inquire into under the constitutional
separation of powers principle. The COMELEC lastly
argues that there is no violation of the one subject-
one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164
are related; the assailed provision is actually
embraced within the title of the law.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally
erred when it declared the challenged proviso
unconstitutional.
Preliminary Considerations
 We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter,
to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of
the barangay political system as outlined by this
Court in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:
As a unit of government,
the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines. The word barangay is derived from
the Malay balangay, a boat which transported them
(the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from Juan de
Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian
Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled
by a dato who exercised absolute powers of
government. While the Spaniards kept
the barangay as the basic structure of government,
they stripped the dato or rajah of his
powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally
in the governor general and locally in
the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde
mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much
later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was
elected by the local citizens possessing
property. The position degenerated from a title of
honor to that of a mere government
employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no
matter how low, accepted the post.
After the Americans colonized
the Philippines, the barangays became known as
barrios. For some time, the laws governing barrio
governments were found in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were
granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA
2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal
corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA
3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were
declared or renamed barangays -- a reversion really
to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD
No. 557. Their basic organization and functions
under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as
the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the
titles of the officials were changed
to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barang
ay secretary and barangay treasurer.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222, a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay
Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding
officer and members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first
elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six
years which began on June 7, 1982.
 The Local Government Code of 1983 also
fixed the term of office of local elective officials at
six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of
the barangay were the punongbarangay, six
elective sangguniang barangay members,
the kabataang barangay chairman,
a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code,
reiterated that barangay officials shall hold office
for six years, and stated that their election was to
be held on the second Monday of May nineteen
hundred and eighty eight and on the same day
every six years thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]
The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended
constitutional recognition to barangays under Article
X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of the
territorial and political subdivisions of the country,
supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article X,
which provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on
Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to
legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term of
office of barangayofficials, but also to the application
of the three-term limit. The following deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission are particularly
instructive on this point:
MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question,
Madam
 President. What Davide and
will be the term of accepted by the
the office Committee?
of barangay official
s as provided for?
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does
this prohibition to
MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by serve for more
law. than three
consecutive terms
apply
MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local to barangay official
Government Code? s?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting

that we had on the
terms of office did
not include
xxxxxxxxx
the barangay offici
als because it was
then the stand of
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other the Chairman of
comment? Is there the Committee on
any objection to Local Governments
this proposed new that the term
section as of barangay official
submitted by s must be
Commissioner determined by
 law. So it is now for
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
the law to
determine whether the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas
the restriction on
Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second Monday of May
the number of
reelections will be 1988 was reset to the second Monday of November
included in the 1988 and every five years thereafter by RA No.
Local Government
Code. 6653.[8] Section 2 of RA No. 6653 changed the term of
office of barangay officials and introduced a term
limitation as follows:
MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to
decide.

SEC. 2. The term of office

MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the
of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from
the first day of January following their
election. Provided, however, That no kagawad
shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive
terms. [Emphasis supplied]

record.[6] [Emphasis

supplied.]

Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653,

the punong barangay was to be chosen by
seven kagawads from among themselves, and they in
 There shall be held a regular election
turn, were to be elected at large by
of barangay officials on the second Monday of May
the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years
thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years
under Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of
which shall begin on the first day of June following
confidence by an absolute majority vote of the election and until their successors shall have
the Sangguniang Barangay, embodied in a resolution been elected and qualified: Provided, That
no barangay official shall serve for more than
that shall necessarily include three (3) consecutive terms.
the punong barangays successor.

The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan

and shall be conducted in an expeditious and
The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the inexpensive manner.

second Monday of November 1988 was postponed

yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA No. 6679 whose
pertinent provision states: Significantly, the manner of election of the punong
barangay was changed

SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials Section 5 of the law provided that while the
set on the second Monday of November 1988 by
Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby postponed and
seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered
reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains
which shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and
the highest number of votes shall be the punong
ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.
barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a
 considered as an interruption in the continuity of
drawing of lots under the supervision of the service for the full term for which the elective
Commission on Elections. official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of office

of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three
More than two (2) years after the (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangayofficials on the second
1989 barangay elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC) Monday of May 1994.
introduced the following changes in the law:

SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. --
x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong
the qualified voters therein. barangay, seven (7) sangguniang
barangay members, the sangguniang
kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and
SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term a barangay treasurer.
of office of all local elective officials elected
after the effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or
such date as may be provided for by law, except xxxxxxxxx
that of elective barangay officials: Provided,
That all local officials first elected during the
local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang
until noon of June 30, 1992. barangay, the legislative body of the barangay,
shall be composed of the punong barangay as
(b) No local elective official shall serve presiding officer, and the seven (7)
for more than three (3) consecutive terms in regular sanguniang barangay members elected at
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
 large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as
the reckoning point for the application of the three-
members. [Emphasis supplied.]
term limit, was introduced. Yet another change was
introduced three years after or on July 25, 2005
when RA No. 9340 extended the term of the then
incumbent barangay officials due to expire at noon
This law started the direct and separate
of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164 to noon of
election of the punong barangay by the qualified
November 30, 2007. The three-year term limitation
voters in the barangay and not by the seven
provision survived all these changes.
(7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]

Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No.

8524 changed the three-year term of office Congress
Plenary Power
of barangay officials under Section 43 of the LGC to
to
five (5) years. On March 19, 2002, RA No.
9164 introduced the following significant changes: (1) Legislate Term
the term of office of barangay officials was again Limits for
Barangay
fixed at three years on the reasoning that
Officials and
the barangayofficials should not serve a longer term
Judicial Power
than their supervisors;[10] and (2) the challenged
proviso, which states that the 1994 election shall be
 the authority to determine the term duration
and limition of barangay officials under the
In passing upon the issues posed to us, we
Constitution, we consider it established that
clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.
whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these
matters are political questions beyond the pale of
As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to
of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided
authority under the Constitution to determine by under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to
legislation not only the duration of the term the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to
of barangay officials, but also the application to them the Constitution.[12]
of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably
exercised this authority when it enacted no less than
Political questions refer to those questions
six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
Through all these statutory changes, Congress which full discretionary authority has been
had determined at its discretion both the length of delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the term of office of barangay officials and their term the government; it is concerned with issues
limitation. Given the textually demonstrable dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of particular measure.[13] These questions, previously
impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired
into under the limited window provided by Section 1,
Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment
Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this
despite the political question doctrine, although the
constitutional development, and we quote:
window provided us is narrow; the challenge must
show grave abuse of discretion to justify our
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has intervention.
narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route,
to determine whether or not there has been a grave courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
any provision of the Constitution. This requires the
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal
judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the
standards provided by the Constitution, not on the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal
part of any branch or instrumentality of one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
constitutionality.[15] These are the hurdles that those
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of challenging the constitutional validity of a law must
the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called
overcome.
political thicket. xxxx
 it set the 1994 barangayelections as a reckoning
point in the application of the three-term limit.
The present case, as framed by the
respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of
grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed
The respondents argued that the term limit,
relate strictly to compliance with constitutional
although present in the previous laws, was not in RA
standards. It is from this prism that we shall
No. 7160 when it amended all
therefore resolve this case.
previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-
introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed
The into law on March 19, 2002) and was applied
Retroactive retroactively when it made the term limitation
Application effective from the 1994 barangay elections. As the
Issue appealed ruling quoted above shows, the RTC fully
agreed with the respondents position.

a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration

The respondents first objection to the
challenged provisos constitutionality is its purported
retroactive application of the three-term limit when
Our first point of disagreement with the
respondents and with the RTC is on their position
that a retroactive application of the term limitation
was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading
shows that no retroactive application was made
because the three-term limit has been there all limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC
along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. analysis of this issue.
6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the
continued under the LGC and can still be found in
LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several
the current law. We find this obvious from a reading
chapters dealing with a wide range of subject
of the historical development of the law.
matters, all relating to local elective officials, as
follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b.
Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II), c. Disciplinary
The first law that provided a term limitation
Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II
for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it
likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation
imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six
(Chapter III).
months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988),
changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-
consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of
These Title II provisions are intended to apply
the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in
to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is
the congressional intent to provide a term
clearly provided. A contrary application is provided
limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC
with respect to the length of the term of office under
followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it
Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective
provided, as originally worded, for a three-term
officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose
length of term is specifically provided by Section
43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to Either perspective, both of which speak of the
a general rule, the three-term limit under Section same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal
43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all import of Section 43 in the context in which it is
local elective officials who must perforce found in Title II of the LGC.
include barangay officials.

To be sure, it may be argued, as the

An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and
(b) and (c) separately from one another as (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective
independently standing and self-contained officials (other than barangayofficials); and
provisions, except to the extent that they expressly paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials,
relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term
term of local elective officials, limitation for barangay officials indicates the
except barangay officials whose term of office is legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from
separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by the application of the three-term limit. This reading,
its express terms, relates to all local elective officials however, is flawed for two reasons.
without any exception. Thus, the term limitation
applies to all local elective officials without any
exclusion or qualification. First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to
the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the
plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly
refers to local elective officials, except
elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section
43(b) refers to all local elective officials without
exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages
therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the
same kind as the other. Their separate topics
additionally strengthen their distinction; Section
43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b)
refers to the three-term limit. These differences
alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be
read together as one organic whole in the way the
RTC suggested. Significantly, these same distinctions
apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed
because of its total disregard of the historical
background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we
painstakingly outlined above.
From a historical perspective of the law, the
inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute
necessity to clarify the length of term
of barangay officials. Recall that under RA No. 6679,
the term of office of barangay officials was five (5)
years. The real concern was how Section 43 would
interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical
statement on the length of the term of office
of barangay officials, a general three-year term for all
local elective officials under Section 43(a), standing
alone, may not readily and completely erase doubts
on the intended abrogation of the 5-year term
for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus,
Congress added Section 43(c) which provided a
categorical three-year term for these officials. History
tells us, of course, that the unequivocal provision of
Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what is
the exact term of office of barangay officials was still
brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the
President of the Liga ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We
fully resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec. REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is
the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that the
Honorable Lobregat be recognized.

Section 43(c) should therefore be understood

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The
in this context and not in the sense that it intended Honorable Lobregat is recognized.
to provide the complete rule for the election
of barangay officials, so that in the absence of any
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr.
term limitation proviso under this subsection, no Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just
term limitation applies to barangay officials. That
Congress had the LGCs three-term limit in mind when
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman
it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following from Zamboanga City.
deliberations in the House of Representatives
(House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later became
REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. Speaker,
RA No. 9164: the term of office. It says in Section 4, The term of
office of all Barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
MARCH 5, 2002: shall be three years. Then it says,
No Barangay elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority
Leader.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the
committee that the first term should be reckoned
from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local
Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first
election is to be reckoned on, would be May 8,
1994, as far as the Barangay election is concerned.
REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an
election in 1994.
REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And
there will be an election this year
REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.
REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
xxx xxx
REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The
Honorable Sumulong is recognized.
REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my
Chairman, I would like to address the question of
Congressman Lobregat.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please
proceed.
REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year
consecutive term limits of Barangay Captains that
is not provided for in the Constitution and that is
why the election prior to 1991 during the
enactment of the Local Government Code is not
counted because it is not in the Constitution but in
the Local Government Code where the three
consecutive term limits has been placed. [Emphasis
supplied.]

which led to the following exchanges in the House
Committee on Amendments:
March 6, 2002
COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to
committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair
recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after
the word position, substitute the period (.) and add
the following: PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE
TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE
1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended
Section 4 now reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of
office of all barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective local official
shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position COLON (:) PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE
RECKONED FROM THE
1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise
that the LGC imposed a three-term limit
for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso is
its way of addressing any confusion that may arise
from the numerous changes in the law.
 Separately from the above reason, the
constitutional challenge must fail for a more
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity
challenged proviso has been there all along and
objection does not involve a violation of any
does not simply retroact the application of the
constitutional standard.
three-term limit to the barangayelections of 1994.
Congress merely integrated the past statutory
changes into a seamless whole by coming up with
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not
the challenged proviso.
of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil
Code,[16] not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
With this conclusion, the respondents
effect unless the contrary is provided. The application
constitutional challenge to the proviso based on
of the Civil Code is of course self-explanatory laws
retroactivity must fail.
enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that
they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code
b. No Involvement of Any established a statutory norm, not a constitutional
standard.
Constitutional Standard

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws

can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws
retroactive application will impair vested
rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested
in an individual and a subsequent law effectively
takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested
right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones
that may be considered protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never
raised due process as an issue. But even assuming
that they did, the respondents themselves concede
that there is no vested right to public office.[17] As the
COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no
vested right to an elective post in view of the
uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.
Aware of this legal reality, the respondents
theorized instead that they had a right to be voted
upon by the electorate without being burdened by a
law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run
for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed
with this contention.
We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no
such right under the Constitution; if at all, this
claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of
vested right to a public office. What the Constitution
clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe
the qualifications for elective local posts;[18] thus, the
question of eligibility for an elective local post is a
matter for Congress, not for the courts, to
decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue
in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections[19] where
we ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a
property right within the meaning of the Constitution
is a mere statutory right conferred by
law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:

Congress exercises the power to prescribe
the qualifications for SK membership. One who is
no longer qualified because of an amendment in
the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who
qualify as SK members can contest, based on a
statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK
membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
membership is not a property right protected by
the Constitution because it is a mere statutory
right conferred by law. Congress may amend at
any time the law to change or even withdraw the
statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a
public trust. No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of
holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to
come under the due process of law
prohibition, it would be necessary
to consider an office a property. It
is, however, well settled x x x that a
public office is not property within
the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law,
but is a public trust or agency. x x x
The basic idea of the government x
x x is that of a popular
representative government, the
officers being mere agents and not
rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to
an office, but where every officer
accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the
office as a trust for the people he
represents.
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold
public office, should realize from the very start that
no one has a proprietary right to public office. While
the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of
a local government legislative council, the law does
not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even
a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
councils. The constitutional principle of a public
office as a public trust precludes any proprietary
claim to public office. Even the State policy directing
equal access to opportunities for public service
cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to
 SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-
not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a
officio public offices.
mere statutory norm.

Moreover, while the State policy is to

encourage the youths involvement in public affairs,
this policy refers to those who belong to the class of The Equal Protection Clause Issue
people defined as the youth. Congress has the
power to define who are the youth qualified to join
the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those
The equal protection guarantee under the
who do not qualify because they are past the age
group defined as the youth cannot insist on being Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III,
part of the youth. In government service, once an
which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the
employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he
cannot invoke any property right to cling to his equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality
office. In the same manner, since petitioners are guaranteed under this clause is equality under the
now past the maximum age for membership in the
SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to same conditions and among persons similarly
their SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.] situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are different from one
To recapitulate, we find no merit in the
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related
respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the
to the objective of the law; when things or persons are
challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive
different in facts or circumstances, they may be
application to barangayofficials of the three-term
treated differently in law.[20]
limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued
what had been there before; and (2) the
constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was
 Appreciation of how the constitutional equality From another perspective, we see no reason to
provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion apply the equal protection clause as a standard
that no basis exists in the present case for an equal because the challenged proviso did not result in any
protection challenge.The law can differential treatment between barangay officials and
treat barangay officials differently from other local all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds
elective officials because the Constitution itself from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the
provides a significant distinction between these challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive
elective officials with respect to length of term and application.
term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution Violation of the Constitutional
provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for
One Subject- One Title Rule
local elective officials, it left the length of term and
the application of the three-term limit or any form of
term limitation for determination by Congress through
Every bill passed by the Congress shall
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as
the title thereof. Farias v. Executive
well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
Secretary[21] provides the reasons for this
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist
constitutional requirement and the test for its
under these conditions.
application, as follows:
 The proscription is aimed against the evils
of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely
calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions
relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive
a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of
that object. Mere details need not
be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act.
xxxx
x x x This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject.
xxxx
x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the
constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law
 of matters which have not received the notice,
necessary. Closely related with length of term is term
action and study of the legislators and the public.
limitation which defines the total number of terms
for which a barangay official may run for and hold

We find, under these settled parameters, that the office.This natural linkage demonstrates that term

challenged proviso does not violate the one subject- limitation is not foreign to the general subject

one title rule. expressed in the title of the law.

First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing Second, the congressional debates we cited

for above show that the legislators and the public they

Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang represent were fully informed of the purposes,

Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term

amended, otherwise known as the Local Government limitation therefore received the notice,

Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matter consideration, and action from both the legislators

the amendment of the LGC to synchronize and the public.

the barangay and SK elections and for other

purposes. To achieve synchronization of
Finally, to require the inclusion of term
the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of
limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the
the varying lengths of the terms of office
title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by
of barangay officials and SK officials is
law; this is not what the constitutional requirement
contemplates. (On official leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Associate Justice Associate Justice
we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the
constitutionality of the challenged proviso under
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NA
Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. Associate Justice Associate Justice
9164. Costs against the respondents.

(On official leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO
SO ORDERED. Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice (On official leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
DIOSDADO M. PERAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARA
 ***
Associate Justice Associate Justice [1] On official leave.
Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the RTC Decision was penned
by Judge Eleonor Kwong.
[2]
The respondents herein: Conrado Cruz, Santiago P. Go, Renato F.
Borbon, Levvino Ching, Carlos C. Florentino, Ruben G. Ballega, Loida
Alcedo, Mario M. Cajucom, Emmanuel M. Calma, Manuel A. Rayos,
Wilma L. Chua, Eufemio S. Alfonso, Jesus M. Lacanilao, Bonifacio N.
Alcapa, Jose H. Silverio, Rodrigo Develles, Nida R. Paunan, Mariano B.
Estuye, Jr., Rafael C. Arevalo, Arturo T. Manabat, Ricardo O. Lizarondo,
CERTIFICATION Leticia C. Maturan, Rodrigo A. Alayan, Leonilo N. Miranda, Desederio O.
Monreal, Francisco M. Bahia, Nestor R. Foronda, Vicente B. Que, Jr.,
Aurelio A. Biluan, Danilo R. Gatchalian, Lourdes R. del Mundo, Emma O.
Calzado, Felimon de Leon, Tany V. Catacutan, and Concepcion P. Jao.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the [3]
Rollo, pp. 46-56
[4]
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions [5]
Ibid.
337 Phil. 534 (1997); penned by Associate Justice, later Chief Justice,
in the above Decision were reached in consultation Artemio V. Panganiban (retired).
before the case was assigned to the writer of the [6]
Underscoring supplied; cited in David v. Comelec, supra.
[7]
opinion of the Court. Omnibus Election Code.
[8]
Section 1, R.A. No. 6653.
[9]
See David v. COMELEC, supra note 5.
[10]
See the Deliberations in the Senate, cited in the respondents Petition for
Declaratory Relief; rollo, pp. 66-67.
[11]
See Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L ed 2d 663, 686 (1962),
REYNATO S. as cited in Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1 (2001).
PUNO [12]
Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009) holds:
Chief Justice

*
On official leave.
**
On official leave.