Rosales vs Rosales

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter,
her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea
C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of
about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the trial
court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against
the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only
inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him
shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the
final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms our observation. If the legislature intended
to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in
the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887
of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's
son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third
person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the
intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-
in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales
draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the
Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of
the Civil Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom
the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he
had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be
that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did
not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass
upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977

RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO,
FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C.
BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.ñé+.£ªwph!1

RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY.
MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19,
1976, effective on July 12, 1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12,
1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in
the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him,
neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he received was
P18,700.00 per annum.

The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government
Service System.

Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that
there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina
R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age,
all the claimants are of legal age.

According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2)
money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.

From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life
insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants.

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of
which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.

The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over
to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his
retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue
to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s , as
in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 315, 325).

Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for being in accordance with
law, the GSIS determination of the amount of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as
indicated in its letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit:

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of testamentary succession. That
does not mean that the legitime is taken into account only in testamentary succession. The
legitime must also be taken into consideration in legal succession.

There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed
according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The reason is that
sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary
compulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied.

In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate
children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs by giving them their respective time.

The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which is regarded as his share as
a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code).

The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also her share as a legal heir
(Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code).

The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the illegitimate children
in equal shares, as their legitime, Pursuant to the provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate
children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator,
provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free
portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied par., art. 895,
Civil Code).

The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the
surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the
estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case
because here intimate children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child.

In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that
deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime.

So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for
the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children.

Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural
child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of
the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child.

The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory
heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession.

A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their
legitime.
With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are
conjugal properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the or work, or as salary of
the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).