NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]

FACTS:

The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him
to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:

The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as
null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid
of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

Matibag v. Benipayo 380 SCRA 49

Ponente: Justice Carpio
Topic: Power of Appointment

Facts:
The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Some time after,
President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as Comelec Chairman and Comelec
Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the
respondents for confirmation. However, the commissions did not act on said appointments. Once more,
President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments for the respondents and made them took their
oaths for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their appointments to the Commission for
confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on their appointments. Thus, the
President renewed against the ad interim appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The
Office submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office
anew. In his capacity as Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum addressed to
petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked for a reconsidered of her
reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition herein questioning the validity of the
appointment of the respondents.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary appointment that is
prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
(2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of the ad interim
appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

Held:
(1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution uses the word “effective only until.”
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power
as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court
is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed
and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to
"laws", she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS:

The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by then
President Corazon C. Aquino.
The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution
The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary,
or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those
provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President (may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”)
and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of
article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at least
two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article VII,
Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in
the 1987 Constitution itself.
The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are Section
3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No. L-14279)

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import
goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as
there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the
validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least
2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties
are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take
the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of
notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to
time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show
that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not
treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects
as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil
aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to
the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. PURISIMA- Attrition Act of 2005, R.A. No. 9335

FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees
of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the
President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s
implementing rules.

ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?

HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR.

That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries”
is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees
who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated
since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary
function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC.

However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the
IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN, respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court
upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously
and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering
that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution;

(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates
the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and

(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the
independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

HELD:
1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-
President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec.
4 of the Constitution.

3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph
allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

REASONS:

1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting
by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,”
provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

xxx xxx xxx

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name
of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the requirement that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution which reads: “Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.”

For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the discussions of the
members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter
qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the
residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later
became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioner’s claim
on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-
president, senators, and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—

xxx xxx xxx

18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the
outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections
therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order
the proclamation of winning candidates for President and Vice-President is unconstitutional and
violative of the following provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

Sec. 4.

xxx xxx xxx

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers
of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more
shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and
the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said Section appears to be repugnant
to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority
given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President
and Vice-President.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.”

3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:

Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is
hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments,
Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the
Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of
the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, that
of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the
majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No.
9189 is unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis-à-vis the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1,
which reads “Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.”

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision on the independence of
constitutional commissions. The Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the functions of
the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be
independent from the other departments of the Government.”

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission
may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists,
and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except
those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is
unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

SECTION 8.

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.