THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Sec. 2. Who May File. - The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified
person or entity in the following order:

1. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;

2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or

3. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known

member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on
behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established
herein.

Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court,
or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable
before such court or judge.

When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of
their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred.

Sec. 4. No Docket Fees. - The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket
the petition and act upon it immediately.
Sec. 5. Contents of Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the
following:

1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;

5. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and

6. The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Sec. 6. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice
or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or
person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not
be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.

Sec. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to
issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall
be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.

Sec. 8. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy
on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

Sec. 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall,
among other things, contain the following:
1. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation
the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;

2. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;

3. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act
or omission against the aggrieved party; and

4. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions
that have been or will still be taken:

a. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

b. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
c. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
d. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well
as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
e. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
f. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the
prosecution of the case.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

Sec. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. - All defenses shall be raised in the
return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.

Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:

1. Motion to dismiss;

2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;

3. Dilatory motion for postponement;

4. Motion for a bill of particulars;

5. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
6. Third-party complaint;

7. Reply;

8. Motion to declare respondent in default;

9. Intervention;

10. Memorandum;

11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and

12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

Sec. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the
court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.

Sec. 13. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions
for habeas corpus.

Sec. 14. Interim Reliefs. - Upon filing of the petition or at any time before final judgment,
the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private
institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions
that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection
and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5)
days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. - The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

Sec. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. - Upon verified motion of the
respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or
production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.

A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.
Sec. 16. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to
make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists
a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be
imprisoned or imposed a fine.

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.

Sec. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.

Sec. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition, but
shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.

A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu
proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings.
The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the
lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.

The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list
of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.

Sec. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. - This Rule shall not preclude the filing of
separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall
be available by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the
writ of amparo.

Sec. 23. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a
petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ
of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition
of the reliefs in the petition.

Sec. 24. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.

Sec. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

Sec. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. - This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and
appellate courts.

Sec. 27. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its
publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

SECTION 16 - SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G.
RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38570 May 24, 1988
NARVASA, J.:

The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate
loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.

FACTS: The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by Domingo
Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City. In that action Padua
sought to recover damages for the injuries suffered by his eight-year old daughter,
Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by
Antonio G. Ramos (private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.

Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his
evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct examination in the course of
which reference was made to numerous documents. At the close of his examination, and on
motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled hearing of December 12,1973 was
cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was reset on December 17, 1973. However, the
hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of defendants' counsel,
who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more slated to "take place on
March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings,
it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. Padua's
counsel alleged that he had another hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance.
He asked that the hearing on March 6, 1974 be ordered cancelled. No opposition was filed by
the defendants to the motion. Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiff’s
counsel took the additional step of sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial,
March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day.
This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed
the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case on the ground that
it violates the right to a speedy disposition of cases.

HELD: Yes. Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of
causes. It should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved
with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on
meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of
the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely
exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full
and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause
no substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should
not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and
either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex
parte judgment.

The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel had twice
applied for and been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiff’s counsel had filed a
written motion for postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred,
and this was the very first such motion filed by him; that although the motion for
postponement could have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants,
which was not surprising considering that their counsel had himself already obtained two (2)
postponements; that the ground for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the counsel
had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been
pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to terminate; that
the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings,
leaving the case to proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been
verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under
the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of this
opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and
should be as it is hereby annulled.

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:

The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the
prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.

FACTS: Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery.
Information was filed in December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in
November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in December 1955. It was until February 1958
that action was taken by CA, a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court
for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the
case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted the petitioners to set
aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a new
decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but
nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7
dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his
testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of
the alleged crime and even failed to identify the two accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate
tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of
the case against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May
1965). CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order
being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 1966. Court of Appeals’
defense is that the case was not properly captioned as “People of the Philippines” and without
“Court of Appeals” being made a party to the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right to speedy disposition was violated.

HELD: Yes. Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot
be oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of
time. The Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution
of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation
cases commenced by private individuals. “Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is
entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced”.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be
too much significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to
accord respect to this particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave
abuse of discretion.

Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy.
In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case
then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners
could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as
circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that
should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even
with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting
aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly
premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the
conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine announced with such
emphasis by this Court time and time again.

SECTION 17- RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 7081 September 7,1912
JOHNSON, J.:

The prohibition that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt.

FACTS: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was
gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw
the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was
suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened
and reported it to the police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He
was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have
the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting
from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results
showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired
came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal
knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible
because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s
rights against self-incrimination.

HELD: No. The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation
of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions.
The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent
medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against
him.

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920
MALCOLM, J.:

The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to
the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible

FACTS: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial court, upon
motion of the assistant fiscal, ordered her to submit to physical examination to determine if
she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be
committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the
court.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
HELD: No. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body
of the accused is permissible.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more
to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the
object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to
the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method
which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to
make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But
no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the
accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.

FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE,
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela,respondents.
G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, maybe waived by
any one entitled to invoke it

FACTS: The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given
upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for. The
fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of
the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights
of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,
seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in
General Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony,
but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.

ISSUES: Whether the violates the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination was violated
when he was compelled to write for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting
and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified

HELD: Yes. Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies
that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination,
write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one
in question. Here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons.
In the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants
and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse
to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege. “The
privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived
by any one entitled to invoke it”. The writ of prohibition was granted and it is ordered that
the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF
MANILA, respondents.
Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
SANCHEZ, J.:

To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and
willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness
cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence.
FACTS: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car
together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other
accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent
of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the Fiscal
Grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused
opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness
not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the
judge ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self-incrimination had been
violated to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: Yes. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to
the guilty.

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional

remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by
collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the
accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so
as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the
nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to
failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who
is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant
GR 133025 February 17, 2000
Davide Jr., J.:

The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act.

FACTS: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in
Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel
Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime
Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha,
10-year-old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and
Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime,
too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and
Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter
sprinted towards the road leading to his house.

Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime
followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for
Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies
had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing.
Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-
kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his
son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors
search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime mentioned that
Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of
Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6
meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where
Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question,
"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered
"I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house.

One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement
was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet,
Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the
latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then
rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The
searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass.
When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand
pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts
saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain
Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met
policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde,
saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I
am giving him to you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people
found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any
counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of
rape with homicide.

During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only,
not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for
reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998,
Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

HELD: No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel,
being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination
is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit
to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine
its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
 ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR
GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
FERNANDO, J.:

It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will.

FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of
Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case
for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner
then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty,
at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being
available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They
likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled
to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants
violates the self-incrimination clause.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take
the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with
the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled
to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence. The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt. It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will.
 The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must
be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity
of its citizens.

PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent
G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994
PUNO, J.:

The right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and
protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal
interpretation in favor of the individual.

FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
However, he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges
against him, provided that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal
proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand
Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the
expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American
prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since
Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took
without force and effect. However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information
to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New
York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to
any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the
PCGG.
In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case
where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they
flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG
accepted the information given by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the
RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO cannot nullify the immunity given
to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law
and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify
against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.
 Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by
the PCGG, which under the law has the power to grant immunity.

TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:

1. Transactional Immunity - is broader and the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived
from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

SECTION 18 – RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKERS' UNION (CLO), petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., respondent
G.R. No. L-1668 March 29, 1948
HILADO, J.:

The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment he has a free choice
between entering into it or not with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude
ensuing.

FACTS: On September 26, 1946, Case No. 32-V, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs.
Philippine Refining Company Worker's Union (CLO), was scheduled for hearing before the
Court of Industrial Relations. Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a
temporary settlement of the case before going on the merits of the petition. A series of
conferences with both parties was held by the court, assisted by Atty. Paciano Villavieja of the
Division of Investigation. Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of the case at
that stage of the proceedings, the Court of Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that,
"for the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest of the public," and because the court
might not be able to decide the case promptly, in view of the issues involved, the striking
laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine Refining
Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the management of the
respondent company should accept them beginning that date; and it was so ordered by the
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not said order by the court violates constitutional right against involuntary
servitude

HELD: No. The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by section 19 of its
organic law to enjoin, under the circumstances therein required, a strike or walk out, or to
order the return of the striking workers and to correspondingly enjoin the employer to refrain
from accepting other employees, unless with the express authority of the court, and to permit
the continuation in the service of his employees under the last terms and conditions existing
before the dispute arose, is one of the most important virtues of this capital-labor legislation.
It seems that in this respect our law has achieved an advance not attained by the capital-labor
legislation of other countries. And considering that this progressive is evidently aimed at
preventing in the public interest an undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry,
the general welfare requires that it be upheld and enforced.

It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary

servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went into
effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among
which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and
the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial relations for
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision
by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion,
be promptly decided or settled. ..."(Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of the employee's
entering into such a contract of employment, he has a free choice between entering into it or
not with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus. SEGIFREDO L.

ACLARACION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, HON. HOSE N. LEUTERIO, COLONEL
RUPERTO B. ACLE, Chief of Police, and Lieutenant FRANCISCO CRUZ, Warden,
Makati, Rizal, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39115 May 26, 1975
AQUINO, J.:

Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the
condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for
another, whether he is paid or no

FACTS: Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch

of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to November 21, 1971.
Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims
Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working.

After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court stenographer, the Court of Appeals required
him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by the Gapan court which had
been appealed. He was declared in contempt of court. It was ordered to arrest Aclaracion and
to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of the rule of “no involuntary servitude”

HELD: No. Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes
would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one who is
compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another,
whether he is paid or not. That situation does not obtain in this case.

Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer who

had defied the court's resolution for the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal detention.
The incarceration of the contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct
consequence of his disobedience of a court order.