Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos.

179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list
organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes.
However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the
petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was
substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.

Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as
second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales.

The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of
nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved
the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as follows:

1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva

2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane Borje

The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of

CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as
the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari
assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and

4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law
and after the close of polls.

RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an
election protest nor an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number of votes entitling them to hold
the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions the
ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and
the action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they
sought were different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively to obtain
a favorable judgment.

The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an
administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may
enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit
to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not
less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite
meaning, there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application.
Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of
nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three
instances in which an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee
whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2) when
the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the
general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as
statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand,
extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent
with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted
pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law
prevails.

The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the COMELEC.

Pastor Endencia vs Saturnino David

93 Phil. 699 – Political Law – The Judiciary – Te Legislature – Separation of Powers

Statutory Construction – Who May Interpret Laws

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice
Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to
Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to
be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt
from taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under
the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not be
diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a
diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs
Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have
the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13,
R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it
inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of
his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of
their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of
the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of
the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight
with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may
not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of
later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010

MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of
May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office
of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list
organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives,
and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner
alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to
be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30
pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15
of RA No. 7941.

Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have
entered a general denial pursuant to public respondent’s Rules.2

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,3 dismissed

petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list
organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one
seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on
October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent’s proclamation.

Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No.
7941, public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless
a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector,
which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.

In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15
of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated
August 6, 2009,4 petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.5

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the
application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject
provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC
Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations,
was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007, especially
considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on
December 13, 2007.

In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not
substantiated her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that
he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the
2007 elections.

It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007
elections will expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and
academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical
value.7

The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioner’s
Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2)
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its
counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules8 from the issuance of
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.

To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in
the May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations,9 it was by no measure a
proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall
be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective
parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula
for allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private
respondent’s proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on
the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s challenge goes into private respondent’s
qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.11

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age
requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9
applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application.12

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it
must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth
sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System
Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first
three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this
interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two
months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could
not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.

There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the
third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998,
Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish.13

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual
support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private
respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers
and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section
15 reads:

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his
seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6)
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and
sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral
party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.
Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at
least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi
sermo or speech is the index of intention.14
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the
youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007
elections.

The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in
May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent
itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is
of no moment. A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.

It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a
party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep
the compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly
declared ineligible to hold the same.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and
Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office
as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list organization
CIBAC.

BOLOS V. BOLOS

634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her

marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After
trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision
was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the
RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final
and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in
conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC
declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the
word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are
governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo,
in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:

No, it does not.

RATIO:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March
15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The
Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under
the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the
word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356

FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves
were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she
returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn
out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for
about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to
be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent
and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner
still subsists.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD:

(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no
evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and
further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”
– that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are
mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver
and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He,
however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas
and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the
said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs.
Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal
of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal
maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO
DE LEON, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the resolution,[1] dated February 15, 2000, of the
Court of Appeals[2] dismissing the ordinary appeal of petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity), and resolution[3] dated May 22, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The undisputed facts as found by the appellate court are as follows:

The petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac covered by TCT
No. 163051 with a total area of 50.1171 hectares. The subject property was voluntarily
offered for sale to the government pursuant to RA 6657 at P50,000.00 per hectare. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) made a counter offer of P17,656.20 per hectare, or
a total amount of P884,877.54, but the same was rejected. Another offer was made by
DAR increasing the amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appellees failure
to respond to the new offer made by DAR, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec. 16 (d) of RA
6657. Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to
recompute the value of the subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 1992. Applying the pertinent provisions of the said DAR administrative
order, respondent-appellant arrived at a recomputed land value as follows:

Land Use Area Acquired Value/hectare Total/Land Value

Sugarland 32.4187 P61,758.85 P2,002,141.63

Riceland 16.6984 P28,449.80 P 475,066.14
Idle land 1.0000 P14,523.78 P 14,523.78

or an aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65, which was again rejected by the

petitioners-appellees.

In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac,
which is the designated Special Agrarian Court in the area, petitioners-appellees asked
the court, among others, to fix the just compensation of the subject property.

In due time the court rendered a summary judgment on December 19, 1997 fixing the
compensation of the subject property as follows:
a. P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland;

b. P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland.

Within the time allowed, respondent-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was subsequently denied by the Court.[4]

xxx xxx xxx

On March 17, 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for review of the decision of the Special Agrarian Court. The said petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47005, was assigned to the Special Third (3rd) Division of
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also initiated in the Court of Appeals an appeal of the
same decision of the Special Agrarian Court by filing a notice of appeal. Docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 60365, the said ordinary appeal was assigned to the Fourth (4th)
Division of the Court of Appeals.

On November 6, 1998, the Special Third (3rd) Division of the appellate court, through then
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes[5], rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 47005 a
decision[6], the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The decision dated February 9, 1998 is partially reconsidered. The trial court is ordered to
recompute the compensation based on the selling price of palay at 213.00 per cavan.
Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6% of the compensation so fixed from 1990
until full payment is made by the government.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Thereafter, on February 15, 2000, the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner LBPs ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365), in a resolution dated
February 15, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.[8]

In dismissing the ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) instituted by petitioner LBP,
the appellate court reasoned that the mode of appeal followed by the petitioner was
erroneous considering that Section 60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that appeals from decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed by
LBP was ineffectual and did not stop the running of the period of appeal. Also, the
appellate court took note of the decision rendered by the Special Third (3rd) Division of
the same court involving the same issue and parties, to wit:

All these notwithstanding LBP does not stand to lose anything at all. While it did suffer a
setback in this instant case LBP in one way or the other still we note that it is likewise
victorious in the appeal brought by the DAR (CA-G.R. SP 47005). In a decision rendered
on November 6, 1998 this court ordered the trial court to recompute the compensation
based on the selling price of palay at P213.00 per cavan. Thus to this effect with more
reason that we should deny the appeal even granting the mode of appeal as availed of is
correct to avoid any contradiction of this divisions with that of the other.[9]

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution
dated May 22, 2000.

Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of
Appeals on the following assignment of errors:

IN RULING THAT SECTION 60 OF RA 6657 PROVIDES THE PROPER MODE FOR

THE REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS DESPITE
SECTION 61 OF RA 6657 WHICH EXPRESSLY MANDATES THAT THE RULES OF
COURT SHALL GOVERN THE REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS;

II

IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT SECTION 61 OF RA 6657 PREVAILS OVER SECTION

60 OF RA 6657, INASMUCH AS THE MODE OF APPEAL OF A COURTS DECISION IS
A MATTER OF PROCEDURE WHICH IS COVERED BY THE EXCLUSIVE
RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTION 5(5), ARTICLE
VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE;

III

IN DECLARING THAT THE SUPREME COURT MERELY MADE AN INADVERTENT

MISTAKE IN REVISING SECTION 1, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND
REMOVING THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT FROM THE LIST
OF THOSE APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW;
AND

IV

IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER, DESPITE ITS RULING THAT THE
SUPREME COURT MADE A MISTAKE IN ITS ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS,
RENDERING SUCH DISMISSAL AS HIGHLY UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND
CONTRARY TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. [10]

The case at bar requires an interpretation of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657. The said
provisions provide that:

Section 60. Appeals, - An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian
Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.

Section 61.- Procedure in Review. Review by the Court of appeals or the Supreme Court,
as the case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals,
however, may require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a period of fifteen
(15) days from notice, after which the case is deemed submitted for decision.

Respondent spouses point to Section 60 of RA 6657 to support their view that the mode of
appeal initiated by petitioner LBP was erroneous. On the other hand, petitioner LBP
believes that the mode of appeal it used is permissible under Section 61 of the same law.

What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts,
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just compensation an appeal by
way of a petition for review or an ordinary appeal?

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three
modes of appeal, to wit:

Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.

(b) Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.

Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper
mode of appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of
appeal due to the reference by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the
governing procedure for appeals to the Court of Appeals. This being the case, the
petitioner claims that the procedure for ordinary appealed cases provided for in Section
2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed, that is, a
notice of appeal is required in order to perfect the appeal. According to the petitioner, this
is the proper mode of appeal in the case at bar considering that the appealed decision is
that of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Moreover, Section
1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure[11] (pertaining to appeals by
way of petitions for review to the Court of Appeals of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
and the Court of Tax Appeals), does not include decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
acting as Special Agrarian Courts.

We deny the petition.

A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal
from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases
involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60
of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be
adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.[12]

According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be followed, not Section 60.
The reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an ordinary appeal
requiring a notice of appeal is the proper manner of appealing decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts on just compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.

We do not agree.
First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of
Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of
appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a
general reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for
ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as
the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is
not permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not
relevant to determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from
decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special
Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies
without exclusivity in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the
contention that a petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases
inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the
Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular No.
1-91[13] (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its
non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a
quasi-judicial agency.

What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the
proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by
this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.

Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with
Section 60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions
for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the
Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for
review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to designate the mode by
which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of
Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be
followed for appeals in agrarian cases.

According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should
prevail over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a
contrary interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the underprivileged. (italics
supplied)[14]
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the
adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 60 of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and
can co-exist.

Moreover, the same Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted
by the petitioner states that (r)ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Section 60 is obviously a
special procedure. Contrary to the petitioners contention, it cannot be otherwise merely
because it was formulated by the legislature and not by any special body. As long as the
said section provides for a particular process for the governance of the special court
concerned, the provision is accurately classified as a special procedure. Subject to
constitutional limitations, the statutory enactment of a special procedure cannot be said to
encroach on the power of this Court to formulate rules of procedure for the reason that we
have not yet provided for a particular process specifically governing agrarian courts. In
fact, this Court exercises its constitutional power to promulgate special rules of procedure
by adopting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 declaring a petition for review as the proper
mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases
decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute
dispatch in the determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only
paying the correct amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its
acquisition. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.[15] Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a
petition for review.

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition
for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is
exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd)
Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed
before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.

Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the
reglementary period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the
Special Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the appealed RESOLUTIONS, dated February 15, 2000, and May 22,
2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Sps. Gauvain Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992

FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the
decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private
respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when
respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free patent, however, Pe
then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the
mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such
property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a
complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase.
Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter
erred in its decision re. the five-year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the
doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate
Appellate Court which was applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the foreclosure
sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead applied
retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?

HELD: Yes.
REASONING:
At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still the Monge
case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However, the
respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a decision
in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained the claims of the
petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8
of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court
emphasized that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely
on the Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA
erred in its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set
aside.

People vs Nazario
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a
fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The
years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay
because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus
this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being
ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond
thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing
and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does
not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated
“Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of
non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not
imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.