TOPIC: Rule 110 – A. Institution of Criminal Actions
(TMSI), another local manning agency.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and
representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City),
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and
MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La.
Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of
Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition
for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos,
Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are
some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the
respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. 5 The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation6 to secure a license to
operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint
counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s
allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any
counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor
approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City
(docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212)
presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor
reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the
RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents
Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the
opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to
withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to
hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an
omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of
the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied
the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on
whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of
the warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion
to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from
justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the
August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial.16
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s
motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found
probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005
resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and
for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On
October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to
expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek
relief from the RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge
Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited
herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion
for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case
was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D.
Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s
motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for
judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.
It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents
gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a
recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil
voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of
pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case,
and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing
the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for
being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public
prosecutor’s conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated
arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the
motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the
public prosecutor’s conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s
notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the
appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal
the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in
forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioner’s
notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of
the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the
Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC
ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May
10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the
petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to
represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not
the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of
the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their
recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for
reconsideration that followed.
31
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal
of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party
in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the
respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to
seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute
lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the
petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public
prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition
for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of
the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
of the suit."33Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 35 When
the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of a public prosecutor." 37 In appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People,
appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, as represented by the OSG.40
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section
explicitly provides: Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . .
. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the
OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the
CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several
cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of
the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.42
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG.
R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf 39 (as when
there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not
apply in the present case.

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the

dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged
pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This
TOPIC: Rule 110 – B. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18,
1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as
follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay
Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana
plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which
dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage
and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana
plants were planted, cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a
member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified
that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from
an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police
of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3
Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1
Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave
them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest
the cultivator of same."4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from
the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his
nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut.5 PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited
plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his.6 The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed
2.194 kilograms.7 The police took photos of appellant standing beside
the cannabis plants.8 Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. 9 Inspector
Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified
that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic
hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana.10 She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of
which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected
marijuana plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited
drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by
appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot
3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social
Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part of the
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the
occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at
around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his
vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose
identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see
something."14 This unknown person then brought appellant to the place
where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed policemen were present and they
made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to
admit ownership of the plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid
that he admitted owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the
marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis
plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of
him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. 18 The
police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the
way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay
Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge
against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal
logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana,
otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."19 At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the
marijuana plants seized by the police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other
houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100
meters away.21 The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua,
an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him.
The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between
his house and Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His
testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana
plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. 23 Tipay presented
a sketch he made,24 which showed the location of marijuana plants in 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF
relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of DOUBT.
Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor
accompanied him when he made the measurements.26 He further stated III
that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of
the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants. 27 SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A
as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
follows: APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.29

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simply stated, the issues are:
cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced (1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
to death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused. present case lawful?

"SO ORDERED."28 (2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the
accused?
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond
I reasonable doubt?

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS (4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE
THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are
SEARCH. interrelated.

II Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records
show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an
APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable
government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the
records clearly show that there was no search made by the police team,
in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in
question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5)
feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately
spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized
marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The
instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search
under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made
by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen
went to the plantation site merely to make a verification. When they
found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a
search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they
had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the
area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the
said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the
evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and
there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no
search warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 laysdown the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the
search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on
the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the
declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at
least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their
informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in
their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the
excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We
need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and
seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances
are searches allowed without warrants.34 The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we
apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following
elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
 (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located
the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a
warrant.36 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded
the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team
was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.37 Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants.38 Patently, the seized marijuana plants
were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In
sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open
to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not
invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable
searches by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.39 The guarantee refers
to "the right of personal security"40 of the individual. As appellant
correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's
unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise
would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead
to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against
unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office,
within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as
much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of
his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated
plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As
to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot,
as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence
against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It
was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have
admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt.
Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence
against appellant, we must now address the question of whether the
remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony
of the police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of
the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the
following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he
planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any
independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the
time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission
is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is
not admissible if given without any counsel."42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana
plants in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his
right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for
the trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He
submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not
a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership
of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation
had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel
should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him
regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the
presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to
his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana
plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during
investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers
that appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he
admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to
competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached.
Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive for the police
officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was
not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.43 An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 44 The moment the police
try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that
juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing
and in the presence of counsel.45
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished
the police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm,
where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the
police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the
police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer
a general inquiry.46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that
he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think
there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we
are just asking him..."47 In trying to elicit information from appellant,
the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this
point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to
counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed policemen
interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace
officer and three other armed policemen.49 All had been dispatched to
arrest him.50 From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant
had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way,
even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested,
the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the
marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with
respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3)
it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. 51 The records show
that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A
verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the
investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest
and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for
being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it
is also hearsay.52 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may
be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the
accused is the author thereof.54 The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, 55 it must
likewise be credible and competent.56 Competent evidence is "generally
admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of
such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is,
allow it to be introduced at trial."58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative
matter to convict appellant of the offense charged.1âwphi1 These were
the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary
confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other
than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link
appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on
the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against the
accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said
evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for
having been conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The
prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such
urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without
running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches
and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful
search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which
appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only
hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported
confession was made without the assistance of competent and
independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said
confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of
the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal
investigation must have the services of competent and independent
counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to
appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants
relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of
Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."59 To justify
the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that
quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the accused.60 Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana
plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with
constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."62 Nor can the confession obtained during
the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being
inadmissible in evidence against him."63 Without these proffered but
proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining
evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary
to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence
in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or
pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because
the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement
unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 651 filed by
Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and
March 27, 2006 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions
(i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public office and (ii)
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension
order.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local
officials3 of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)4 charging the
petitioner, among others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural
aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and
management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner,
among others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996,
after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-
affidavit.7 In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding
informations with the Sandiganbayan.9 The information for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking
public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official
functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said
[accused], by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of
consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design
and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed
Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said
invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding
other consultants from participating in said
prequalification.10 (Emphases and underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused,11 the
Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to
conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through
counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the
petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with
the OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked13 the
Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to submit his counter-
affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension requested, the
petitioner asked14 the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file his
counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the
petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period.15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to
file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to
declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001,
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the
arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the
criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the
reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his
counter-affidavit.18 The petitioner did not question the denial of his
motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not
guilty in both criminal cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner]
Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous
Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation"
in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.20
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
resolution21 suspending the petitioner pendente lite –
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is
GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of
[the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His
suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only. 22
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his
suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.23 The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion,24 prompting him to file this
certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the
information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the
phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not
to him, but to his co-accused,25 rendering the information fatally
defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his
suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al., 26 he
claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any
order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended."27 For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension
hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual
hearing to settle the "defect" in the information.
THE OSP’S COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the
elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are
specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato at the time material to the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith when he invited only his co-accused private individuals to
participate in the prequalification of consultants for the project
instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation;
and
3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office,
gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused.28
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information, by conveniently failing
to cite the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality"
when the petitioner quoted the "relevant" portions of the information
in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while no actual pre-
suspension hearing was conducted, the events preceding the issuance
of the suspension order already satisfied the purpose of conducting a
pre-suspension hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary
investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the
petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the
acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the
petitioner already moved to quash the information, although
unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to
submit countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.30
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension
hearing renders invalid the suspension order against the
petitioner.
THE COURT’S RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, 31 Section 6, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) 32 requires, inter
alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the
offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary
and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x
and for the court to pronounce judgment."33
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint
or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in
the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner
appears to go beyond the standard of a "person of common
understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information
clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of
the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain
and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this
elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information35 when, in his
reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is
simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the other
averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to
move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is
mandatory,37 the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine "the
validity of the information"38 filed against him, "taking into account the
serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective
public official even before his conviction." 39 The accused public official’s
right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension
order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of
the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against
him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied upon, the Court
required, "by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension," that –
(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an
order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at
a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of
suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the
information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order
of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is
that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down
its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension
in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of
due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which
would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13
of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by
the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear
as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial
court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the
suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the
prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to
determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can
have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity.1âwphi1 That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of
the information by way of a motion to quash.42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused
fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,43 Luciano
likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.44 With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the
absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the
validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered the opposition of
the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as
sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s
motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v.
People,46 where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to
determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against
petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due
process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and
other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement,
when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be
heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension
under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled that
"to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to
the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after
receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii)
filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration.49Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing
– based on the same alleged "defect in the information," 50 which we
have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to
the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that
would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public
official and a strict construction against the State.51 The suspension
required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during his suspension.52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere
preventive measure53 that arises from the legal presumption that
unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that
upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure
whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days, 55 the adequacy
of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the
proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses
of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of
an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses,
however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by
law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the Republic of the Philippines
accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle
enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. 56 In SECOND DIVISION
light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of
preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand
for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of vs.
justice. BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. RESOLUTION

SO ORDERED. DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case
finding accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He
is also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. "AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the
legal rate of 6% per annum :from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.2
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on December
20, 2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received a letter from the
Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of accused-appellant
on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our directive, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections submitted on November 11, 2013, a certified
true copy of the death certificate4 of accused-appellant.
Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired
before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012
or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused-
appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending resolution.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation
wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be
resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused-
appellant’s demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved.1âwphi1 The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only
because it was not immediately informed of his death.
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and
dismiss the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his death.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on August
16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case
against accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on account of accused-
appellant's demise.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: Rule 110 – D. Place Where Action is Instituted That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Republic of the Philippines Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
SUPREME COURT unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath
Manila upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
EN BANC the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum
of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No.
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union
Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
vs. accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2

DECISION The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2)
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
BRION, J.:
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and
Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-
raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed
1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank
Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article
of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the
183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence
63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of
any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury
tribunal or agency.
filed by Tomas.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued
The Antecedents
that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court
(where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity
without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was
no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the
second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by
giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out
perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for
reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City
to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on
the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case
of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue
with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court
reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went
on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which
was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the
proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not
amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try
and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint
itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely
on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the
charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based
on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of
the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false
evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City
also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the
present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition
was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners
contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the
facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court
containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were
made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the
petitioners’ view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment
(which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime
of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the
court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed
that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became
manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where
the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial
courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its
territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis
is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in
the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where
the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other
words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement
under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or
relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint
or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to
execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary
public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a)
he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the
material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of
the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants
pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.14
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article
183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping.
The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose.15(emphasis
ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case
on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding
that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to
have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under
oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath
upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood
was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not
Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit
of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati
City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of
perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati
City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the
Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case
that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or
Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and
Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The
Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert
an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Cañet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long
as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material
to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false
evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of
such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for
the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and
sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where
the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited
the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an
American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material
falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime
is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article
183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180
and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182,
RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of
an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings
cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio
ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of
Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937
American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on
rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging
perjury through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a
false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the
prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal
offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No.
5823 for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he
does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for
not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of
holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the
Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is
reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No.
1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that
the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was
committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was
committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the
place where the false document was presented since the presentation
was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook
on the RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions
of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697
and the present Code. To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of
Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from
art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the
old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law,
passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were
deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of
the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos.
1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony
includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but
our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived
from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false
testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious
proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of
a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false
testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on
perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC
which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person,
who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in
the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or
make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying
under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2)
making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an
oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC –
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit,
not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where
the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of
Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an actual
testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity.
With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time
when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike
the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the
situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit
was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the
Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation
where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate
certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in
the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these
cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest
and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or
materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate
copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer
Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn
in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,"32citing Cañet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion
on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the
considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a
material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to
false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for
the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the
petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Cañet
ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn
statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made
under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did
not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the
Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the
making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion
refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition
for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes
materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place
where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to
various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by
Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule
106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal
actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any
one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place.1âwphi1 This
change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules
of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and
Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the
Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the
execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined
on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires."
The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the
criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is
more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is TOPIC: Rule 111 – A. Civil Liability Arising from the Offense
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her is Deemed Instituted
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
Republic of the Philippines
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
SUPREME COURT
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu
Manila
of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that
is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
FIRST DIVISION
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for
lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
DECISION

SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been

pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals
(CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the
surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient
born with an imperforate anus.1

The antecedents are as follows:

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an

imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall,3 enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation.5Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito
Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).6 During the operation,
Gerald experienced bradycardia,7 and went into a coma.8His coma
lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a
month.10 He could no longer see, hear or move.11
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz
Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila
against the attending physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an
information solely against Dr. Solidum,13alleging: –
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila,
Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia
on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by
his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an
imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation
for anal opening [pull through operation], did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence
as the best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by
failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence
of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called
hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the
brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of
moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997),15 where it was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.
FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto
mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10)
DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and
severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu
Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty
is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their
solidary liability,18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to
the damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr.
Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with
Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of
₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty
is hereby cancelled.19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum,20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to
undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself
testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that the
child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the
child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that
he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn
into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature of the
operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to
hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis
except to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper administration
of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court
elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted
to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do
is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of
and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of
the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by
which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act
complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook
rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the
respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or
disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the case.
People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal
cases. Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need not
offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity
to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal
intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court
is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his
motion on May 7, 2010.22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE
BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.
ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF
THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE
THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS
OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND
NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE
DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO
OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC
AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE
ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%)
PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS
REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
(sic) CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE
LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT
SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF
ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO
EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a)
whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein;
and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the
thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." 24 It is simply "a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge
and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may
justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls
the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some
explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on
the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of
common knowledge."25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie
evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos
v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court said –
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this
doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the
circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a
character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases
presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit
a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or
that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on
the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly
within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons
of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient
has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians
and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in
cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to
find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where
common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would
not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do
is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of
and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of
the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by
which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the
following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the
patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the
wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out
a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of
his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the
influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has
been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases
of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances
of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and
the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if
the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his
peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only
showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the
process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event
outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations,
which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to
explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was
of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the
person injured.29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without
difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering
that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within
the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious
during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered
Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-
through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of
sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians.
Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of
his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of
oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the
process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the
negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists
attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack
of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex,
prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in
Swanson v. Brigham,31 relevant portions of the decision therein being
as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall
Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis.
The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and some
breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was
restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His
inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in
satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having
respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered
and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m.,
the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor that the patient
was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be
administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the
physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to
revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient
died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died
between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden,
acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air passage had
been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He
did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is
not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely
occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by
someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d
909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the
application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d
472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur §
24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is insufficient to establish the
first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The
acute closing of the patient’s air passage and his resultant asphyxiation
took place over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances
it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent.
There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of
mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without
negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an
inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
Court next determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act.33
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure
to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming
the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He
affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report except for an
observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm
center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information
regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child.
He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and
said that based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record
was marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the
administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as
follows was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B – Approximately 1 hour and
45 minutes through the operation, patient was noted to have
bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately
administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the
inhalational agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated
with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was
given. However, the patient did not respond until no cardiac
rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately
told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine
position and CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of
epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage
– still with no cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of
epinephrine was given and after 45 secs, patient’s vital signs
returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted
approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to
proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs throughout
and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min
and RR = 20-22 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the
patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4
when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read
it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on
the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly
note I can’t understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical
abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It only contains
the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under
general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with halothane as
the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the
operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational
agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100% oxygen. It
would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should
be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after
something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was
reduced or shut off.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used
before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes
his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance
that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the
operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature
but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and
Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only a
point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella
whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that she
assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things
that happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that
closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia
record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his
affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time
intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions – the concentration of
halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the
complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The numbers indicated
in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1%
halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his
entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which
is only one percent cannot be summated because halothane is
constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
xxxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC
argued that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage
of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate the non-
guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was
not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the
implications of the change in his testimony. The court observed that Dr.
Vertido had described the condition of the child as hypoxia which is
deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT
Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system
such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of
usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this
condition or syndrome. But why would there be deprivation of oxygen
if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court,
whether oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the
detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable, and they can
only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was
really closely monitored, the event could not have happened.34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence
beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA
were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of
inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of
Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila
Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would
use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this
aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that
the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion
of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting
death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the
complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is
the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’"
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence
each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient
relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting
injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the
patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards
of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient.
Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician
in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are
highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must
provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair
and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent
physician must be determined from expert testimony in most cases;
and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of
care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly
possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that
required of the general practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a
physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it
does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician’s own
knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may
determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite
duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff
and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact,
ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the
testimony of all medical experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on
what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an
anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the Committee
on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists
that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony
mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the
investigation.39 Even then, the report of his Committee was favorable to
Dr. Solidum,40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male
who underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered general
anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time
when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it
down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The
anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of
the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it but despite the
administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the
records show, prompt resuscitative measures were administered and
spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5)
minutes and that oxygen was continuously being administered
throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest, patient suffered
permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the
administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were
all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical
care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of
the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution witness,
but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical
examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following
portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic
Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the
conduction of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane was used as a sole
anesthetic agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned
that after one hour and 45 minutes after the operation, the patient
experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor,
would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the
slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was
a bradycardia of time because is some reason one way or another that
might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a
possibility, we’re talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that
situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about
the slowing of heart rate, now what is the immediate cause of the
slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of
the heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the
vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when you
press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce
bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the
deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also cause
the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if
there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal
thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a … to
counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).
xxxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general
anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications
probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his
interpretation of the anesthesia record and the factors that could have
caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you
kindly read to this Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will
affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane
probably will be contributory to the production of Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court
Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a
doctor but will you kindly look at this and tell me where is 100%, the
word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor, this
Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this
representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0
and if there is, you just call me and even the attention of the Presiding
Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see
there 100% and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we
request also temporarily, because this is just a xerox copy presented by
the fiscal, that the percentage here that the Halothane administered by
Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that this
portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia
record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed
and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that
there are so many factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that
contributed to what you call hypoxia and according to you, when this
Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might lead to this
Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some
or it might be due to operations being conducted by the doctor at the
time when the operation is being done might also contribute to that
hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to
this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this
Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to
some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained
that Gerald’s operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major
operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same
condition.43 He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane
had been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100%
oxygen.44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate
properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert
Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications."45However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together,
did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been
recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that
other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could
not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia,
had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead,
that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side
effects did occur."46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia
has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr.
Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt
of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey:47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is
not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for
the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the
responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of
it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may
properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of
mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability.1âwphi1 But we cannot
now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that
have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases
for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable
doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury
to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the
cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by
Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to
speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for
civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability,
we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and
severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to
that arising from the offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how
the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious
fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been
charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted
capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that
the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express
the following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings.
Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the
outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental
defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule
would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when
subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-
fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital
ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be
a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry
means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, Republic of the Philippines
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in SUPREME COURT
industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was Manila
not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable
and humanitarian work.50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila THIRD DIVISION
was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties G.R. No. 191240 July 30, 2014
during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which vs.
did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.
his being insolvent.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, PERALTA, J.:
2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the
pronouncement on costs of suit. Decision1 dated February 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as
SO ORDERED. respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of
estafa. Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador
were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code in an Information2 which reads:

That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in the City of
Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the amount of US$100,000.00 in
the following manner, to wit: Respondents convinced the complainant
to invest into the remittance business in the name of accused PHILLIP
R. SALVADOR in Hongkong, representing to her that they will
personally take charge of the operations and marketing of the said
business, assuring her with huge profits because of the popularity of
accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing very well that the said
manifestations/representations and fraudulent manifestations were
false and were intended only to exact money from the Complainant, and
by reason of the said false representations made by both accused, the
Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount of
US$100,000.00 as seed money to start the operations of the business
and the said accused, once in the possession of the said amount of
money, misappropriated, misapplied and/or converted the same to
their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
Complainant in the aforementioned amount of US$100,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother Ramon pleaded not
guilty4 to the offense charged.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate
business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. 5 She
met respondent through a common friend in December 2000 and
became close since then. Respondent had told her that his friends,
Jinggoy Estrada and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and
remittance business and that Jinggoy even brought him toHong Kong
and Singapore to promote the former's business.6 Petitioner eventually
met respondent’s brother and manager, Ramon Salvador, to whom she
volunteered to financially help respondent in his bid for the Vice-
Mayoralty race in Mandaluyong.7 It was also in the same meeting that
they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight and remittance
business.8 Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong to see for
herself the viability of such business and Ramon suggested to use
respondent’s name to attract the overseas contract workers.9
In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with respondent
and a certain Virgilio Calubaquib wentto Hong Kong and they
witnessed respondent’s popularity among the Filipino domestic
helpers.10 In April 2001, the same group, with Ramon this time, went to
Bangkok where respondent’s popularity was again shown among the
overseas Filipinos.11 In both instances, respondent promoted their
prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid for all the
travelexpenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket
money for the Hong Kong trip and another US$10,000.00 for the
Bangkok trip.12 Her accountant introduced her to a certain Roy Singun
who is into the freight and money remittance business.13 In August
2001, respondent initiated a trip to Palau, to observe Singun’s business
thereat to which petitioner acceded.14 Petitioner paid for the travel
expenses and even gaverespondent US$20,000.00.15 In October 2001,
she and respondent had a training at Western Union at First World
Center in Makati City.16
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and since she
trusted him very much as heeven acted as a father to her children when
her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance
business. In December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida
G. Bondoc (Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the
Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited
registered on December 27, 2001.17 A Memorandum of Articles of
Incorporation and a Certificate of Incorporation were issued.18 They
also rented an office space in Tsimshatsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong which
they registered as their office address as a requirement for opening a
business in Hong Kong, thus, a Notification of Situation of Registered
Office was also issued.19 She agreed with respondent and Ramon that
any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among
them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing
the business.20
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the
amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation.21 When
petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent
in May 2002 at her mother’s house in Las Piñas City, which was
witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico).22 She
also gave respondent ₱100,000.00 in cash to begiven to Charlie Chau,
who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment for the heart-shaped
earrings she bought from him while she was there. Respondent and
Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002. However, the proposed
business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor
three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the
business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a
bank.23 However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he
used the money to pay for his other obligations. 24 Since then, the
US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell deeply in love
with respondent and was convinced thathe truly loved her and
intended to marry her once there would beno more legal
impediment;25 that she helped in financing respondent’s campaign in
the May 2001 elections.26 As she loved respondent so much, she gave
him monthly allowances amounting to hundreds of thousands of pesos
because he had no work back then.27 She filed the annulment case
against her husband on November 21, 2001 and respondent promised
her marriage.28 She claimed that respondent and Ramon lured her with
sweet words in going into the freight and remittance business, which
never operated despite the money she had given respondent. 29 She
raised the US$100,000.00 by means of selling and pawning her pieces
of diamond jewelry.30
Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent which
made her follow all the advice given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e.,
to save money for her and respondent’s future because after the
annulment, they would get married and to give the capital for the
remittance business in cash so as not to jeopardize her annulment
case.31She did not ask for a receipt for the US$100,000.00 she gave to
respondent as it was for the operational expenses of a business which
will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get
married.32 She further testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not
returned, she still deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 in respondent’s
UCPB bank account33 and also to Ramon’s bank accounts.34 And while
respondent was in the United States in August 2003, she still gave him
US$2,000.00as evidenced by a Prudential Telegraphic Transfer
Application35 dated August 27, 2003.
Petitioner’s mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughter’s testimony
that she was with her and Ramon when they went to Hong Kong in
December 2001 to register the freight and remittance business.36 She
heard Charlie Chau, her daughter's friend, that a part of his office
building will be used for the said remittance business.37 Enrico Tan,
also corroborated her sister's claim that she handed the money to
respondent in his presence.38
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close friends and
eventually fell in love and had an affair.39 They traveled to Hong Kong
and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was among the
Filipino domestic helpers,40 which led her to suggest a remittance
business. Although hesitant, he has friends with such business.41He
denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 whenhe went to Hong
Kong and Bangkok.42 In July 2001, after he came back from the United
States, petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon for a
meeting.43 During the meeting, petitioner brought up the money
remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a study
of it first.44 He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money
remittance business in Pasay City.45 Upon the advise of Roy, respondent
and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau in August
2001.46 He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted
that it was petitioner who paid for the plane tickets. 47 After their Palau
trip, they went into training at Western Union at the First World Center
in Makati City.48 It was only in December 2001 that Ramon, petitioner
and her mother went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he
took care of petitioner’s children here.49 In May 2002, he and Ramon
went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the amount of
US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount
of ₱100,000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as
payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, 50 which
Chau had duly acknowledged.51 He denied Enrico’s testimony that
petitioner gave him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s
house.52 He claimed that no remittance business was started in Hong
Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and money to
operate the same.53 Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never
asked him about the business as she never gave him such amount. 54 In
October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong
Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. 55 He admitted
that he loved petitioner and her children very much as there was a time
when petitioner’s finances were short, he gave her ₱600,000.00 for the
enrollment of her children in very expensive schools.56 It is also not
true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips.57
Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced
petitioner to him.58 He learned of petitioner’s plan of a remittance
business in July 2001 and even told her that they should study it
first.59 He was introduced to Roy Singun who operates a
remittancebusiness in Pasay and who suggested that their group
observehis remittance business in Palau. After their Palau trip,
petitioner decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was
him who suggested to use respondent’s name because of name
recall.60 It was decided thathe would manage the operation in Manila
and respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in
Hong Kong, while petitioner would be in charge of all the business
finances.61 He admitted that he wentto Hong Kong with petitioner and
her mother to register said business and also to buy goods for
petitioner’s boutique.62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau to
offer a part of his office building for the remittance business because
there was no more space to accommodate it.63 He and respondent went
to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine the office recommended by Chau
and the warehouse of Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also offered to
help.64 He then told Chau that the remittance office should be in Central
Park, Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong Kong live
there.65 He concluded that it was impossible for the business to operate
immediately because they had no office, no personnel and no license
permit.66 He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to him
about the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent,67 and that he even
traveled again with petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002, and in
August 2003.68 He denied Enrico’s allegation that he saw him at his
mother’s house as he only saw Enrico for the first time in court.69
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,70 the dispositive
portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofEstafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic) correctional (sic)maximum
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximumas
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency. With respect to accused RAMON
SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. SO
ORDERED.71
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed their
respective pleadings, after which, the case was submitted for decision.
On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the
decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch
202 of the RTC of Las Piñas City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP R.
SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa.72
Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging
that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT
SO THAT EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM
IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO
THE PETITIONER.73
We find no merit in the petition.
To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the consequences of
an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where
the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.75
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted
because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by
appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of the
crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that
all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome
the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the
prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly
and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to
convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or
insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the
contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness
of her submissions.76
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,77 we explained
the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.78
The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of
US$100,000.00 is factual. While we are not a trier of facts, there are
instances, however, when we are called upon to re-examine the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after
considering the records of the case, which of the conflicting findings is
more in accord with law and justice.79 Such is the case before us.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent
US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to
show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of
time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2)
petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could
have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why
the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) petitioner’s
claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt
was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions
with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation ofsomeone
who had been swindled.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.
Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given
to respondent. She testified that from December 2001 to May 2002, she
was raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as the capital for the actual
operation of the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International
Limited in Hong Kong,80 and that she was ableto raise the same in May
2002.81 She did so by selling82 or pawning83 her pieces of diamond
jewelry. However, there was no documentary evidence showing those
transactions within the period mentioned. Upon further questioning on
cross-examination on where she got the money, she then said that she
had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong Kong and
Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and Star Mall. 84 Such
testimony contradicts her claim that she was still raising the money for
5 months and that she was only able to formally raise the money in May
2002.
There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by
petitioner to respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioner in her testimony, both in
the direct and cross examinations, said that the US$100,000.00 given to
respondent was for the actual expenses for setting up the office and the
operation of the business in Hong Kong.85 She claimed that she treated
the freight and remittance business like any of her businesses; 86 that
she, respondent, and the latter’s brother even agreed to divide
whatever profits they would have from the business;87 and that giving
US$100,000.00 to respondent was purely business to her.88 She also
said that she kept records of all her business, such that, if there are no
records, there are no funds entrusted89 . Since petitioner admitted that
giving the money to respondent was for business, there must be some
records ofsuch transaction as what she did in her other businesses.
In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some
documents evidencing the latter's receipt of money for the purpose of
business as this was done in her previous business dealings with
respondent. She had asked respondent to execute a real estate
mortgage on his condominium unit90 for the ₱5 million she loaned him
in August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave respondent an additional
loan of ₱10 million in December 2001, for the latter to redeem the title
to his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to sign an
acknowledgment receipt for the total amount of ₱15 million he got
from her.91 She had done all these despite her testimony that she
trusted respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until the
day he ran away from her in August 2003.92
Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt
from respondent, because the latter told her not to have traces that she
was giving money to him as it might jeopardize her then ongoing
annulment proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would belie
such claim of respondent being cautious of the annulment proceedings.
She declared that when she and her husband separated, respondent
stood as a father to her children.93 Respondent attended school
programs of her children,94 and fetched them from school whenever the
driver was not around.95 In fact, at the time the annulment case was
already pending, petitioner registered the freight and remittance
business under respondent’s name and the local branch office of the
business would be in petitioner's condominium unit in Makati. 96 Also,
when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon to Hong Kong to
register the business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children.
She intimated that it was respondent who was insistent in going to
their house.
September 2004, another case was also filed by petitioner against
respondent and his brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office
in Las Piñas where Enrico had submitted his affidavit. Enrico did not
submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly witnessed the
giving of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he could
just testify for the other case. However, when the other case was
dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him to be a witness in this
case. Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity if he
indeed had personal knowledge of the alleged giving of money to
respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness only after the other
case was dismissed would create doubt as to the veracity of his
testimony.

Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated
₱500,000.00 to respondent's account with United Coconut Planters February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is
Bank (UCPB) in July 2003.97 Also, when respondent was in New York in hereby AFFIRMED.
August 2003, petitioner sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by
telegraphic transfer.98 Petitioner's act ofdepositing money to SO ORDERED.
respondent's account contradicted her claim that there should be no
traces that she was giving money to respondent during the pendency of
the annulment case.

Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's

check in US dollars from the bank orsend the money by bank transfer,
but she did not do so on the claim that there might be traces of the
transaction.99 However, the alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be
given to respondent because of the freight and remittance business;
thus, there is nothing wrong to have a record of the same, specially
since respondent had to account for the valid expense she incurred
with the money.100

The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was

present when petitioner gave respondent the US$100,000.00 did not
help. Enrico testified that when petitioner filed the instant case in
TOPIC: Rule 111 – B. Suspension of Civil Action Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the
separate Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the
Republic of the Philippines Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Lily Lim’s (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20, 2005
Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled
FIRST DIVISION on the above issue in the affirmative:

G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012 Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396),
Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily Lim’s] appeal,
LILY LIM, Petitioner, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against
vs. forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
This Court agrees.3
x-----------------------x
xxxx
G.R. No. 179160
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner,
vs. SO ORDERED.4
LILY LIM, Respondent.
On the other hand, Charlie Co’s (Co) Petition for Review5 assails the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge.
DECISION The elements of litis pendentiaand forum-shopping were not met in this
case.7
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
xxxx
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages, while appealing the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.
judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa? This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a
cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities 9 for
the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and
Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that
the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each
withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six
months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing
Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager,
Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000
bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱ 3.15 million or ₱ 63.00 per
bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to
Lim allegedly at the price of ₱ 64.00 per bag or a total of ₱ 3.2 million. 11
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from
FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of
cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering
10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim
clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once
Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity
of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem
with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was
filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San
Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse of
confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash
money in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags
of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said
Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said
amount of ₱ 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite demands, the accused failed
and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily
Lim in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.12
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her
money amounting to ₱ 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal
interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its
Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence.
The criminal court’s Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is
being charged and prosecuted were not established by the
prosecution’s evidence.
xxxx
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa
for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as above
discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against
the accused for insufficiency of evidence.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of estafa charged against him under the present information for
insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set
this case for the reception of his evidence on the matter on December
11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC
also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004
Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
holding the accused CHARLIE COnot civilly liable to the private
complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has
presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against
her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21,
2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal 21 on the civil aspect of
the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the
civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities,
Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La
Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of
rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
xxxx
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of
cement of ₱ 64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months from the
date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said
agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co ₱ 3.2 Million while Charlie Co
delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing
50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the
assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a six-month period from
date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The Withdrawal
Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23
February 1999. The Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to
Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie
Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily Lim on
February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim
acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted in said
Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the
fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of
cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month
period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly within the
six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities issued by
FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the
remaining bags of cement on account of FR Cement’s unjustified refusal
to honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim
37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her the current
fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the
amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it issued.
xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as
a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/
assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim
that the same were valid and would be honored. They are liable to
make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be
able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to
incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without justice, without
giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty and
good faith, all violative of the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation
of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal
Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR
Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement
despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment
because FR Cement Corporation acquired income through an act or
performance by another or any other means at the expense of another
without just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false assurances that
Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of
cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x Moreover,
Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of
cement, thus they are deemed to have come into possession of money
at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of
Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by
delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with FRCC
to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She
likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for
the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the
cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their
abuse of their rights.23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance
and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case24 and Lim’s
appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No.
85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which
is Co’s liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of
cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and
forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No.
85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s motion
and dismissed Lim’s appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its
Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that
the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and
in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief,
which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. 27 Thus,
the CA Second Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum
shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lim’s motion for reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No.
175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-
112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was
no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two
cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is
based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas
the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a
felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395,
before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila
RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded the
civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA
Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of
litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings
because they do not share the same cause of action.34
The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No.
179160.
Upon Co’s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.38
Kou Co Ping’s arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is
asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal
from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No.
05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right to receive 37,200
bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same,
that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim.
That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal
action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance and
damages – should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to
litigate the same cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and
ex delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are
independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising from
them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going over
the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases
will constitute res judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty
of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lim’s appeal from the trial
court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).42
Lily Lim’s arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set
of facts because they arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to
add, however, that a single act or omission does not always make a
single cause of action.44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender – (1) ex delicto or civil liability
arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising
from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article
2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows
her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum
shopping to pursue them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in
the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on
the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right to be protected against
swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of
cement using the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent
representation because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the
contract, that he could not deliver what he promised. 47 On the other
hand, Lim’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on
contract. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co
received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the
goods that were the subject of the sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s petition.49 In G.R. No.
175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and
for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the
CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the
civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender 51 (1)
civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal
offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,-52 and (2)
independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil
liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the
Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort 53 ). It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the
acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is
inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the
civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense.54 If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior
to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are
suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. 55 The civil
liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from
the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in
Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the
two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without
offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res
judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the
instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an
independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed
instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the
culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent
civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of
the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed
by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the
offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil
action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there
can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly
allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other
sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently
of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the
two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that
they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the
affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual
obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil
complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract
with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of
cement at the rate of ₱ 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment,
Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC
corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal
authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates
written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their
contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the
withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to
pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the
price at ₱ 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal
authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal
authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation
under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim.
From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce
the defendants’ contractual obligations, given that she has already
performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor
their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has
caused her.
would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human
Relations provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising
from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case
involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense
charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law,
are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" 62 from each other.
Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the
prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. No.
175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10,
2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were
committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard
for morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven,
TOPIC: Rule 111 – C. Independent Civil Action
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya
("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed
a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the
motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that
the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently
of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration
in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC"
for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of
dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that
the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been
an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC
declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of
discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one
of them may think and believe that the accident was caused by
the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to
be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the
second party, together with his operator, believing themselves
to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case
for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case
for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the
MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if
the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at
the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case
arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict
but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it
does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that
Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of
dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal.
Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the
order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises
the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed
only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against
Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal5 that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the
order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. 6 Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed
without prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the
matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party
is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is
present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-
shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan
and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is
based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while
the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the
fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the
accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the
accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-
shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985
Rules" for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate
civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended
party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended
party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or
omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case.
These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto,
the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages
for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict
under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal
action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1,
2000 and now provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions."
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted"
with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed
instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently
even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make
a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a
separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the
Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action
"deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option
to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by
reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such
reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal
action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this
Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act
or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil
action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the
civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions
based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could
proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with
the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and
civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule
that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the
criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are
not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil
action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended
1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can
file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could validly
institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the
criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious
prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and
the necessary consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the
Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The
Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or
in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The
Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the
2000 Rules precisely to address the lacunamentioned in Cabaero.
Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the
same provision states that "any cause of action which could have been
the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint)
may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111
mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn
which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the
civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted
with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.
The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have
no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances,
the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same
act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states
that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate
civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is
prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced
to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until
the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party
can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC
of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the
trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial
court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been
recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of
an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides
that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than
this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the
concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal
action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court,
however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the
civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on
December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent."14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in
Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No.
2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: Rule 111 – D. Effect of Death on the Civil Action
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-
appellants.
PARDO, J
The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and
Ernesto C. Rodriguez from the Joint Judgment1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, convicting each of them of estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689, for widescale swindling, and sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to jointly
and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000.00), with interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, starting September 14, 1989, until fully paid,
and to pay ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), as moral damages.
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, in Information against the
two (2) accused estafa,2 as follows:
 That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the
General Manager and Operation Manager which solicit
funds from the general public for investment,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping, one another, by means of deceit and false
pretense, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz
by convincing the latter to invest his money in the
amount of P150,000.00 with a promise return of 800
% profit within 21 days and in the process caused the
issuance of Butuan City Rural [sic] Bank Check No.
158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount of
One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, that upon
presentation of said check to the drawee bank for
payment the same was dishonored and that
notwithstanding repeated demands made on said
accused to pay and/or change the check to cash, they
consistently failed and refused and still fail and refuse
to pay or redeem the check, to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant in the aforestated
amount of P1,200,000.00.3
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court another
information against the two (2) accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, arising from the issuance of the same check.4
On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, 5 Butuan City, where they plead not guilty to both
informations.
The prosecution presented its evidence on January 10, 1991, with
complainant, Ernesto A. Ruiz, and Daphne Parrocho, the
usher/collector of the corporation being managed by accused,
testifying for the prosecution.
On August 12, 1991, the defense presented its only witness, accused
Martin L. Romero.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of
facts, signed only by their respective counsels. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision.
On March 30, 1993, the trail court promulgated a Joint Judgment dated
March 25, 1993. The trial court acquitted the accused in Criminal Case
No. 38066 based on reasonable doubt, but convicted them in Criminal
Case No. 38087and accordingly sentenced each of them, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
renders judgments, finding or declaring —
(a) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C.
Rodriguez innocent on reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. 3806, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22;
(b) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C.
Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. 3808 for estafa under P.D. 1689 for wide
scale [sic] swindling and accordingly sentences them
to suffer life imprisonment (Section 1 P.D. 1689) and
ordered jointly and severally to return to Ernesto A.
Ruiz the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00) with interest thereon at the rate of
Twelve percent (12%) per annum starting from
 September 14, 1989 until fully paid and to pay the
amount Of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral
damages.
In the service of their sentence, the accused pursuant
to R.A. 6127, shall be credited for the preventive
imprisonment they have undergone (PP vs. Ortencio,
38 Phil 941; PP vs. Gabriel, No. L-13750, October 30,
1959, cited in Gregorio's "Fundamentals of Criminal
Law Review", P. 178, Seventh Edition, 1985).8
On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which the trial
court gave due course on April 5, 1993. On March 16, 1994, this Court
ordered the, accused to file their appellants' brief.
Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while the
Solicitor General filed the appellee's brief on March 8, 1996.
During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused
Ernesto Rodriguez died. 9 As a consequence of his death before final
judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished. 10
Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB,
Butuan City. In August, 1989, he came to know the business of Surigao
San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he
interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding
the corporation's investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del
Norte. Romero was the president and general manager of SAIDECOR,
while Rodriguez was the operations manager.
SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing
business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the
public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment
within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors were given
coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital collectible
on the date agreed upon. It stopped operations in September, 1989.
On September 14, 1989, complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to
SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment, accompanied
by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne
Parrocho. After handing over the amount of one hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000.00) to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a
postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the usual
redeemable coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount
in words, but the amount in figures was for P1,200,000.00, as the
return on the investment. Compliant did not notice the discrepancy.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5,
1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the
check return slip issued by the bank. 11 Both accused could not be
located and demand for payment was made only sometime in
November 1989 during the preliminary investigation of this case.
Accused responded that they had no money.
Daphne Parrocho, 12 testified that on September 14, 1989, complainant,
with his friend Jimmy Acebu, approached her to invest the amount of
P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her quota, and therefore,
no longer authorized to receive the amount, she accompanied them to
the office of SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu District, Butuan City. Accused
Ernesto Rodriguez accepted the investment and issued the check
signed by him and Martin Romero.
For their defense, accused Martin Romero13 testified that on September
14, 1989, he issued a check in the amount of P1,2000,000.00
corresponding to the total of the P150,000.00 investment and the
800% return thereon. He claimed that the corporation had a deposit of
fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) at the time of the issuance of
the check and four million pesos (P4,000,000.00) at the time
SAIDDECOR stopped operations. Romero knew these things because he
used to monitor the funds of the corporation with the bank. He was not
aware that the check he issued was dishonored because he never had
the occasion to meet the complainant again after the September 14,
1989 transaction. He only came to know about this when the case was
already filed in court sometime in the second or third week of January
1990.
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an
investment with SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00. However,
they denied that deceit was employed in the transaction. They assigned
as errors: (1) their conviction under P.D. 1689 due to the prosecution's
failure to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the
trial court's failure to consider the joint stipulation of facts in their
favor. 15
There is no merit in this appeal. We sustain accused-appellant's
conviction.
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885, 16 the
elements of estafa are: (1) a check was postdated or issued in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee
thereof. 17 The prosecution has satisfactorily established all these
elements.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated
to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a
breach of legal equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. 18 It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage
over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by
which another is cheated. 19
Deceit is a specific of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false
representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and
misleads another, to his hurt. Deceit excludes the idea of
mistake. 20 There is deceit when one is misled, either by guide or
trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really
false. 21 In this case, there was deception when accused fraudulently
represented to complainant that his investment with the corporation
would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days.
Upon receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a
postdated check. Although accused-appellant contends that sufficient
funds were deposited in the bank when the check was issued, he
presented no officer of the bank to substantiate the contention. The
check was dishonored when presented for payment, and the check
return slip submitted in evidence indicated that it was dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check was dishonored
without any fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the drawer, the
latter's failure to cover the amount within three days after notice
creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud. 22
Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds as
evidenced by the check return slip; (2) complainant notified accused of
the dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the check within
three days. Presumption of deceit remained since accused failed to
prove otherwise. Complainant sustained damage in the amount of
P150,000.00.
Accused-appellant also contends that had the trial court admitted the
Admission and Stipulaion of Facts of November 9, 1992, it would prove
that SAIDECOR had sufficient funds in the bank.
Accused-appellant relies on the fact that there was a discrepancy
between the amount in words and the amount in figures in the check
that was dishonored. The amount in words was P1,000,200.00, while
the amount in figures was P1,200,000.00. It is admitted that the
corporation had in the bank P1,144,760.00 on September 28, 1989, and
P1,124,307.14 on April 2, 1990. The check was presented for payment
on October 5, 1989. The rule in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that
when there is ambiguity in the amount in words and the amount in
figures, it would be the amount in words that would prevail. 23
However, this rule of interpretation finds no application in the case.
The agreement was perfectly clear that at the end of twenty one (21)
days, the investment of P150,000.00 would become P1,200,000.00.
Even if the trial court admitted the stipulation of facts, it would not be
favorable to accused-appellant.
The factual narration in this case established a kind of Ponzi
scheme. 24 This is "an investment swindle in which high profits are
promised from fictitious sources and early investors are paid off with
funds raised from later ones." It is sometimes called a pyramid scheme
because a broader base of gullible investors must support the structure
as time passes.
In the recent case of People vs. Priscilla Balasa, 25 this Court held that a
transaction similar to the case at hand is not an investment strategy but
a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever
increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to
sustain over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever
larger pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to
early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-
man" collects his money from his second or third round of investors
and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily,
these schemes only last weeks, or months at most, just like what
happened in this case.
The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez,
died pending appeal. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs.
Bayotas, 26 the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicted on a source of obligation other than delicit. 27
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only remaining accused-
appellant, Martin L. Romero. The trail court considered the swindling
involved in this case as having been committed by a syndicate 28 and
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment based on the provisions of
Presidential Decree 1689, which increased the penalty for certain
forms of swindling or estafa. 29 However, the prosecution failed to
clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate, as defined under
the law. The penalty of life imprisonment cannot be imposed. What
would be applicable in the present case is the second paragraph of a
Presidential Decree No. 1689, Section 1, which provides that:
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined,
the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the
fraud exceeds 100.000 pesos.
Art. 77 of the Revised Penal Code on complex penalties provides that
"whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed,
applying by analogy the prescribed rules," that is, those in Articles 61
and 76. 30 Hence, where as in this case, the penalty provided by Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 for estafa under Articles 315 and 316
of the Code is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, the minimum
period thereof is twelve (12) year and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years
of reclusion temporal; the medium period is sixteen (16) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and the maximum
period is reclusion perpetua.
one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A.
Ruiz in the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00)
with interest thereon at six (6%)per centrum per annum from
September 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), as exemplary damages, and the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstance has been

alleged or proved. Applying the rules in the Revised Penal Code for
graduating penalties by degreses 31 to determine the proper
period, 32 the penalty for the offense of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) as
amended by P.D. 1689 involving the amount of P150,000.00 is the
medium of the period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is,
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. This penalty,
being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the
therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the
law, shall be the maximum range of the indeterminate sentence. 33The
minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
penalty next lower in degree which isprision mayor.

To enable the complainant to obtain means, diversion or amusements

that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings undergone by him, by
reason of the failure of the accused to return his money, moral damages
are imposed against accused-appellant Martin L. Romero in the amount
of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), 34 To serve as an example for
the public good, exemplary damages are awarded against him in the
amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000. 00). 35

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the

appealed judgment. The Court hereby sentences accused-appellant
Martin Romero to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
TOPIC: Rule 111 – E. Prejudicial Question On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the
Republic of the Philippines pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza
SUPREME COURT L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Manila under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
SECOND DIVISION
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
vs. outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The Decision of the Trial Court
DECISION
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that
CARPIO, J.: the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
The Case The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case
could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the
respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No.
91867.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question
The Antecedent Facts
is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
SO ORDERED.4
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the
Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders
of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the
Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information 7 for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City
on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s
petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and
was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was
filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element
in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide
is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner
was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of
the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for
bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second,
the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case
that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as
the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal
case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Republic of the Philippines
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208587 July 29, 2015

JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.

DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, and SHIRLEY
DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
CECILIA LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP, and PURITA
DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Petitioners, through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 dated August 30, 2012 and its Resolution2 dated July 15,
2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108617. Said rulings nullified the Orders
authorizing the issuance of the assailed warrants of arrest against
respondents for allegedly having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion.

The Facts

During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez

Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD) held on December 29, 2007 at the
Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was
conducted. This event was presided by then company president, and
herein respondent, Cecilia Liclican (Liclican), and attended by her co-
respondents Norma Isip (Isip) and Purita Rodriguez, and by petitioners
Helen Dagdagan (Dagdagan), Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley
Dominguez (Dominguez) as well. Conflict ensued when petitioners
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the
ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed
out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who are the
stockholders in JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their
respective estates to effectively transfer their shares in the company to
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis.3
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the meeting.
But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares
constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded, which
yielded the following result: 4
Officers:
1. Helen D. Dagdagan as President
2. Patrick D. Pacis as Vice-President
3. Kenneth D. Pacis as Secretary
4. Shirley C. Dominguez as Treasurer
After staging the walk-out, respondents, on even date, executed a Board
Resolution certifying that in the stockholders meeting, the following
were elected directors and officers of JMD:5 Board of Directors:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican – Chairman and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip
3. Purita C. Dominguez
4. Tessie C. Dominguez, and
5. Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip as Vice-President
3. Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate Secretary/Treasurer and
4. Oscar Aquino – Financial Consultant Auditor
In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners Dagdagan,
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis, and Dominguez filed a Complaint against
respondents before the Regional Trial Comi of Baguio City (RTC) for
nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs, raffled to Branch 59 of the court. Docketed
as Civil Case No. 6623-R, the case, after a failed mediation, was referred
for appropriate Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the
RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately took hold of
corporate properties, represented themselves to JMD's tenants as the
true and lawful directors of the company, and collected and deposited
rents due the company to its bank account.6
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick
Pacis, executed an Affidavit-Complaint7 dated December 15, 2008
charging respondents Liclican and Isip with qualified theft. Petitioners
alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 3011 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Baguio City, that on January 2, 2008, Liclican and
Isip, without any authority whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the
amount of ₱852,024.19 from the corporation's savings account with the
Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued Check No.
C00024899018 in the amount of ₱200,000, payable to cash, and to be
drawn against JMD's account with Robinson's Savings Bank.9
In a separate complaint,10 docketed as I.S. No. 3118, the corporation
claimed that respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued Equitable-
PCI Bank Check No. 32095311 payable to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr.
for ₱200,000 to be debited from the corporation's account.
After due proceedings, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City,
by Joint Resolution of February 2, 2009, recommended the filing of
informations as follows:12
WHEREFORE, premises considered. the undersigned recommends for
approval the attached Informations for Qualified Theft against
LICLICAN and ISIP in LS. No. 3011 and another against LICLICAN in LS.
No. 3118.
When filed, the informations were eventually raffled to Branch 7 of the
RTC, the same court overseeing the JDR,13presided over by Judge Mona
Lisa V. Tiongson-Tabora (Judge Tiongson-Tabora). The criminal cases
for qualified theft were then docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 29176-R
(based on I.S. No. 3118) and 29175-R (based on I.S. No. 3111).
On March 10, 2009, Judge Tiongson-Tabora issued an Order14 in
Criminal Case No. 29176-R, finding probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Liclican, thus: WHEREFORE. the Information
filed herein is hereby given due course. Let the corresponding warrant
of arrest be issued against the accused. As recommended, the bail is
hereby fixed as Php 80,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
A similar Order,15 also dated March 10, 2009, was issued in Criminal
Case No. 29175-R likewise finding probable cause against respondents
Liclican and Isip, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Information filed herein is hereby given due course.
Let the corresponding warrant of arrest be issued against the accused.
As recommended, the bail is hereby fixed at Php 80,000.00 each.
Considering that the address provided for accused Norma Isip is
Washington, U.S.A., the private complainants are hereby given fifteen (
15) days from receipt hereof to provide the Court with a local address
for the said accused if she may be found in the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, the corresponding warrants were issued for the arrests
of Isip and Liclican.16 In due time, respondents lodged a petition for
certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 108617, to annul and
set aside the two (2) March I 0, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch 7,
anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial
question. According to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing
the complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-
corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch 59.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision, the CA granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders both dated
March 10. 2009 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have
refrained from determining probable cause since she is well aware of
the pendency of the issue on the validity of JMD's elections in Civil Case
No. 6623-R. As the judge overseeing the JDR of the said intra-corporate
dispute, she knew that there was still doubt as to who the rightfully
elected directors of JMD are and, corollarily, who would have the
authority to initiate the criminal proceedings for qualified theft.17
The CA further noted that even as corporate officers, as they claim to
be, petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis cannot file the Complaint-
Affidavit in the exercise of corporate powers without authority from
the board of directors under Sec. 23,18 in relation to Sec. 2519 of the
Corporation Code.20 Any doubt cast on the validity of the board
elections would then necessarily extend to the authority of the officers
to act.
As further held by the CA:
x x x Since there is doubt in the instant case as to the sufficiency of the
authority of a corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have
exercised prudence by holding the criminal cases in abeyance pending
resolution of the intra-corporate dispute which private respondents
themselves instituted.21
Aggrieved, individual petitioners moved for reconsideration, on the
main contention that their election as officers and directors of JMD has
already been sustained by the trial court via its Judgment in Civil Case
No. 6623-R dated May 6, 2011. They likewise claimed that the issue on
whether or not the R TC, Branch 7 committed grave abuse of discretion
is already rendered moot and academic by the judge's inhibition in
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R, and the termination of the
JDR proceedings in Civil Case No. 6623-R. Petitioners' motion, however,
proved futile as the appellate court denied the same in its July 15, 2013
Resolution.22 Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issues
Plainly, the resolution of the extant case depends on whether or not
there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal
proceedings for qualified theft against respondents. In the concrete, the
issues are (i) whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R constituted a
prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R; and (ii) whether or not grave
abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the two assailed March 10,
2009 Orders in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The challenged Orders of the trial court
were issued in grave abuse of discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise
when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
"capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys
the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the
corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.23
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora
acted with grave abuse of discretion when she ordered the arrests of
respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative Juris et de
Jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 24 The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting
decisions,25 and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.26
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-
corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos.
29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the
same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD's meetings, election
and acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention
was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of
officers should rightfully be seated at the company's helm. Without
Civil Case No. 6623-R's resolution, petitioners' authority to commence
and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against
respondents for qualified theft in JMD's behalf remained questionable,
warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil
Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding over its JDR. As correctly held
by the CA:
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said
prejudicial question that should have barred the filing of the criminal
complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason
that a juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in
the main case submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one
for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a
question as to who are the legitimate directors of JMD such that there is
doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for
JMD. (emphasis added)
Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of
issuing the challenged Orders issued by the RTC.
The subsequent resolution of the prejudicial
question did not cure the defect
It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in their motion for
reconsideration filed before the CA, that Civil Case No. 6623-R was
eventually resolved in their favor through a Judgment27 dated May 6,
2011 rendered by the RTC, Branch 59, the dispositive portion of which
reads: WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing disquisitions, the Court
hereby declares that the plaintiffs [petitioners herein] are the duly
elected board of directors and officers of the JM Dominguez Agronomic
Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and hold-over capacity unless here had
already been an election of new officers.
Consequently, all Corporate Acts which the defendants [herein
respondents and one Gerald Cabrera and one Oscar Aquino] have done
and performed and all documents they have executed and issued have
no force and effect.
Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 which defendants have
withdrawn under the account of JM Dominguez Agronomic Company,
Inc. from the Equitable – PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) is the same
subject in CC no. 29175-R entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia Liclican and Norma D.
Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court will no longer dwell on the same.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in bracket added)
This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011, become final and executory, as per
the Notice of Entry of Judgment issued by the same trial
court.28 Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt loomed over petitioners'
actuations has already been dispelled. Petitioners then postulate that
the question on whether or not the challenged Orders were issued in
grave abuse of discretion has already been rendered moot and
academic by the June 6, 2011 ruling and by Judge Tiongson-Tabora's
subsequent inhibition in the criminal proceedings. Consequently, they
argue that their motion for reconsideration should have been granted
by the appellate court.
We are not convinced.
The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the
grave abuse of discretion already committed. The fact remains that
when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10,
2009, the Judg1pent in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered.
Consequently, there was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the
rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not
have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended
the proceedings until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.
To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has
subsequently been cured either by the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-
Tabora's inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the
criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial
question. Such condonation would create a precedent that renders
inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court trying
the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the
aberrant assumption that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case
would benefit the private complainant in the criminal proceedings. To
reiterate, there was no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59 would
rule; thus, no assumption on Civil Case No. 6623-R's resolution can be
made when the challenged Orders were issued. Indeed, had the RTC,
Branch 59 not given credence to petitioners' arguments, it would have
led to an awkward situation wherein much time and effort is wasted by
the RTC, Branch 7 in trying criminal cases it should not have
entertained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that the
nullification of the March 10, 2009 Orders does not, under the
premises.1âwphi1 entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal cases,
but would merely result in the suspension of the proceedings in view of
the prejudicial question. However, given the resolution of the
prejudicial question and Judge Tiongson-Tabora's inhibition, Criminal
Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R may already proceed, and ought to be
re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals' August 30, 2012 Decision and July
15, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 108617 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R are hereby REMANDED to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City to be re-
raffled to one of its branches other than Branch 7.
SO ORDERED.