1
CIV PRO COMPILATION
RUBY SHELTER vs FORMARAN
Petitioner: Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Devt
Corporation
Respondents: Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III, Romeo Y.
Tan. Roberto Obiedo and Atty. Tomas Reyes
Citation: GR No. 175914
Date of Promulgation: February 10, 2009
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
 Ruby Shelter: obtained a loan from Respondents,
Romeo Tan and Roberto Obiedo
- PhP 95, 700, 620
- Such loan was secured by REM over 5 parcels of
land, all located inTriangulo, Naga City
 When Petitioner was unable to pay when the loan
became due and demandable, Tan and Obiendo
agreed to an extension of the same
- MOA: Ruby Shelter was given until Dec. 31, 2005
to settle its indebtedness, and condones with
interests, penalties and surcharges accruing from
October 1, 2004 to Dec. 31, 2005, which
amounted to PhP 74, 678,647
 MOA
- Required Ruby Shelter to execute simultaneously
with the MOA, by way of Dacion en Pago, Deeds
of Absolute Sale in favor of Tan and Obiedo,
covering the same parcels of land
- Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated
January 2, 2006 and state that Ruby Shelter sold
to Tan and Obiedo the parcels of land
- Ruby Shelter: could choose to pay off its
indebtedness with individual or all five parcels of
land; or it could redeem said properties by paying
Tan and Obiedo the following prices for the same,
inclusive of interests and penalties
 In the event that Ruby Builder is able to redeem
any of the aforementioned parcels of land,
- The DoS covering such property shall be nullified
and have no force and effect
- Tan and Obiedo shall return the owner’s duplicate
of the corresponding TCT
- Execution of Deed of Discharge of Mortage
 However, if Ruby Builder is unable to redeem the
parcels of land within the specified period,
- Tan and Obiedo could already present the DoS to
the RD for them to acquire the properties in their
names
 MOA
- Further provided that should Ruby Builders
contest, judicially or otherwise any act, transaction
or event related to or necessarily connected with
the said MOA and the DoS involving the 5 parcels
of land, it would pa Tan and Obiedo 10Million as
liquidated damages and attorney’s’ fees
- Ruby Builders would likewise pay Tan and Obiedo
the condoned interest, surcharges and penalties
- Should a contest arise from the MOA, Mr. Ruben
Sia (President of Ruby Builders), personally
assumes jointly and severally with Ruby Builders
the latter’s monetary obligation to Tan and Obiedo
 Atty. Tomas Reyes: Notary Public who notarized the
MOA dated March 17, 2005
 Pursuant to the MOA, Ruby Builders through Sia
executed separated DoS over the 5 parcels of land in
favor of Tan and Obiedo
- On the blank spaces provided for said Deeds,
somebody wrote January 3, 2006 as the date of
their execution
- Deeds were notarized by Atty. Reyes
 Without payment having made by Ruby Builders
on Dec. 31, 2005, Tan and Obiedo presented the
DoS to RD
- They were able to secure TCTs in their names
 March 6, 2006: Ruby Builders filed a Complaint
against Tan, Obiedo and Reyes for declaration of
nullity of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctiom and/or
TRO
- Upon filing, Ruby Builders paid PhP 13, 644.25
for docket fees and legal fees
- OCC: considered the action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and computed the fee due
thereon according to Rule 141, Sec. 7(b)(1)
 Tan: the only one who filed an Answer; had a
counterclaim
- filed an Omnibus Motion contending that the
present action involved real properties in which
the docket fees shoul be computed in accordance
with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004.
- Alleged that Since petitioner did not pay the
appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-
0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC
to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the
correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; and should petitioner fail to do so, to
deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner for the
annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for
having been executed in contravention of the law
or of the Memorandum of Agreement as pactum
commisorium.
 RTC: granted Tan’s Omnibus Motion, and held that
Tan and Ruby Builders must pay docket fees in
accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court
 Ruby Builders: moved for the partial reconsideration
of the 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC, arguing that
Civil Case No. 2006-0030 was principally for the
annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and, as
such, incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner

submitted that the RTC erred in applying Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
petitioners first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil
Case No. 2006-0030.
 RTC: refused to reconsider its Order
 RTC Clerk, April 19, 2006: computed, upon the
request of counsel for the petitioner, the additional
docket fees petitioner must pay for in Civil Case No.
2006-0030 as directed in the afore-mentioned RTC
Orders. Per the computation of the RTC Clerk of
Court, after excluding the amount petitioner previously
paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still pay the
amount of P720,392.60 as docket fees
 Ruby Builders: had not yet conceded, and it filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
- denied
ISSUES:
1. W/N Ruby Builders should be made to pay
additional docket fees?
HELD: YES.
Relevant to the present controversy are the following
provisions under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC[30] and Supreme Court
Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004[31]:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY
counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an
estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention,
if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS,
PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF
WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEYS FEES, LITIGATIO
NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property
in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER
IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE
VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION
OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN
LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]
If the action involves both a money claim and relief
pertaining to property, then THE fees will be charged on
both the amounts claimed and value of property based on
the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated
2
2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS,
PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE which will
3. All other actions not involving property
[Table of fees omitted.]
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases
involving real property depend on the fair market
value of the same: the higher the value of the real
property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast,
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of
docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the
correct amount of docket fees, it is necessary to determine
the true nature of its Complaint. The dictum adhered to in
this jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading
or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.[32]
However, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the
true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take into
account significant facts and circumstances beyond the
Complaint of petitioner, facts and circumstances which
petitioner failed to state in its Complaint but were
disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a
quo.
Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint in Civil
Case No. 2006-0030 is primarily for the annulment of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the allegations and
reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the
impression that the titles to the subject real properties still
rest with petitioner; and that the interest of respondents
Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of
Absolute Sale sought to be annulled.
What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that
respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the
Memorandum of Agreement, which clearly provided for
the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on
the TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the
name of petitioner. After respondents Tan and Obiedo had
the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on 3 January 2006
and presented the same to Register of Deeds for Naga
City on 8 March 2006, they were already issued TCTs
over the real properties in question, in their own names.
Respondents Tan and Obiedo have also acquired
possession of the said properties, enabling them, by
petitioners own admission, to demolish the improvements
thereon.
It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept mum about the
afore-mentioned facts and circumstances when they had
already taken place before it filed its Complaint before the
RTC on 16 March 2006. Petitioner never expressed
surprise when such facts and circumstances were

established before the RTC, nor moved to amend its
Complaint accordingly. Even though the Memorandum of
Agreement was supposed to have long been registered on
its TCTs over the five parcels of land, petitioner did not
pray for the removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In
the same vein, although petitioner alleged that
respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took physical
possession of the subject real properties, petitioner did not
seek the restoration of such possession to itself. And
despite learning that respondents Tan and Obiedo already
secured TCTs over the subject properties in their names,
petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said titles. The
only logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner is
reluctant to bring to the attention of the Court certain facts
and circumstances, keeping its Complaint safely worded,
so as to institute only an action for annulment of Deeds of
Absolute Sale. Petitioner deliberately avoided raising
issues on the title and possession of the real properties
that may lead the Court to classify its case as a real
action.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to
conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in
its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to
be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the
recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of
the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and
Obiedo.
A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an
action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.[33]
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its
amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific
paragraph governing the assessment of the docket
fees for real action, to wit:
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or
if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
Considering that respondents complaint is a real action,
the Rule requires that the assessed value of the property,
or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
It is also important to note that, with the amendments
introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became
effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to
the basis for computation of docket fees for real actions
was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
amended, provides that in cases involving real property,
the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation
STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR
3
CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF
THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x shall be the basis for
the computation of the docket fees. Would such an
amendment have an impact on Gochan, Siapno, and
Serrano? The Court rules in the negative.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The
docket fees for a real action would still be determined in
accordance with the value of the real property involved
therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on
the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the
fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the
Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence
thereof, the stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action
instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery
of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action
necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for
which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error in affirming
the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional
docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
The Court does not give much credence to the allegation
of petitioner that if the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
allowed to stand and not rectified, it would result in grave
injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the
prohibitive amount assessed against it. It is a sweeping
assertion which lacks evidentiary support. Undeniably,
before the Court can conclude that the amount of docket
fees is indeed prohibitive for a party, it would have to look
into the financial capacity of said party. It baffles this Court
that herein petitioner, having the capacity to enter into
multi-million transactions, now stalls at paying
P720,392.60 additional docket fees so it could champion
before the courts its rights over the disputed real
properties. Moreover, even though the Court exempts
individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants, from paying
docket fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a
corporate entity.
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs SECURITY BANK
Petitioner: Do-All Metal Industries, SPS. Domingo and
Lely Kung Lim
Respondents: Security Bank, Titolaido Payongayong,
Evylene Sison. Phil Industrial Security Agency Corp and
Gil Silos
Citation: GR No. 176339
Date of Promulgation: January 10, 2011
Ponente: Abad

FACTS:
 Dragon Lady Industries: owned by SPS Lim
- 1996 to 1997: they took out loans from Security
Bank amounting to PhP 92, 454. 776. 45
- Unable to pay the loans on time, they assigned
some of their real properties to the bank to secure
the same, including a building and the lot on
which the property stands, located at Santolan,
Pasig City
 1998: Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims
through the Do-All Metal Industries, primarily for
business although the Lims were to use part of the
property as their residence.
- DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease
contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30,
2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-
terminate the lease. The contract also provided
that, should the Bank decide to sell the property,
DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
 Dec. 3, 1999: before the lease was up, the bank gave
notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on
Dec. 31, 1999
 Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI
tried to negotiate with the bank the terms of its
purchase
- DMI offered to pay 8M for the property, but such
offer was rejected, suggesting 15M instead
- DMI made a second offer of 10M, but the bank
still refused
 While the negotiations were on going, the Lims
claimed that they continued to use the property in their
business. But the Bank posted at the place private
security guards from Philippine Industrial Security
Agency (PISA).
- The Lims also claimed that on several occasions
in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank
representatives Titolaido Payongayong and
Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the
place and barred the Lims as well as DMI’s
employees from entering the property.
- One of the guards even pointed his gun at one
employee and shots were fired.
- Because of this, DMI was unable to close several
projects and contracts with prospective clients.
Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to
retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and
personal items left at the property.
 Lims: Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of TRO or Preliminary Injunction
 Bank: filed its Answer
 DMI and Lims: Supplemental Complainy, alleging
that the Bank urreptitiously took such properties,
resulting in additional actual damages to them of over
₱27 million.
 RTC: in favor of DMI (di ko na nilagay ibang nangyari
ha)
 Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision,
questioning among other things the RTC’s authority to
4
grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the
filing fees on their supplemental complaint.
 RTC denied the motion.
 On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank,
reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaims.
 DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration
but the CA denied the same, hence this petition
ISSUES:
1. W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint
against the Bank considering their failure to
pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages
they claim in it?
HELD:
YES.
One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues
that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their
supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.
But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the
filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC
acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the
moment they filed their original complaint
accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on
the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims did
not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had
over the case.6
Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under
their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the
RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint
even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since
such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment
award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that
payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were
incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has
discretion to fix the amount of the award.8 None of
these circumstances obtain in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the
beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought
against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the
same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to
pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their
omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said
that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had
not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is
like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due
on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.9 The rules
do not require the court to make special assessments in
cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank
brought up the question of their failure to pay additional
filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made
no effort to make at least a late payment before the case
could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that
the prescription of their action had not then set it in.
Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous
failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently,
the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the
issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the
RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication
is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its
objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the
case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the
additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.
Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the
payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions
are embodied in its rules.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had
the burden of proving that the movable properties in
question had remained in the premises and that the bank
was responsible for their loss. The only evidence offered
to prove the loss was Domingo Lim’s testimony and some
undated and unsigned inventories. These were self-
serving and uncorroborated.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition and REINSTATES with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case
68184. The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank
Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo
and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts:
₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱100,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of
₱27,974,564.00.
(YUNG CASE NA ‘TO, COPY-PASTED AS IS YUNG
FACTS SA ORIGINAL TEXTS. SOBRANG AYOS AT
SUMMARIZED NA KASO SO DI KO NA PINAIKSI LALO)
DEE vs HARVEST ALL
Petitioner: Jonathan Dee
Respondents: Harvest All Invested Limited ( consolidated
case ‘to, main parties lang nilagay ko)
Citation: GR No. 224834
5
Date of Promulgation: March 15, 2017
Ponente: Perlas Bernabe
FACTS:
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited,
Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy
S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own
capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua
acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors.5 As
per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting
(ASM) is held every June 15.6 However, in a Special
Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the
afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over
Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board
Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM
pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering
(SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion
which was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed
on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated
May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange,
such postponement was made "to give the stockholders of
[Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting,
after taking into consideration their subscription to the
[SRO] of [Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to
file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)8 involving an intra-corporate controversy
against Alliance, and its other Board members, namely,
George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See,
Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M.
Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board).
In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally claimed
that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO
cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by
the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015
ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting
rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings.9 Thus,
Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015
indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the
Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the
SR0.10 The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest
All, et al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which
they paid accordingly.11 Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed
an Amended Complaint:12 (a) deleting its prayer to
declare null and void the Board Resolution dated February
17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that
the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and
carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the
holding of the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.'s failure to
pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should
have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on
the SRO which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest
All, et al. did not mention such capital infusion in their

prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the measly
sum of ₱8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest All, et al.
maintained that they paid the correct filing fees,
considering that the subject of their complaint is the
holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid
value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out
that they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of
Court and had no intention to defraud the government
ISSUE:
1. W/N Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing
fees for their complaint, as the same should
have been based on the Pl Billion value of the
SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid
insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act
was made in good faith and without any intent
to defraud the government.
HELD:
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the
petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct
filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be
based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus,
essentially holding that such complaint was capable of
pecuniary estimation - both the RTC and the CA heavily
relied on the
Court's pronouncement in Lu. In Lu, the Court mentioned
that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004
which introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, it seemed that "an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation" and
that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated."28
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that
Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed out29 that the
foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter
dictum.
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case
involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein,
i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct docket fees
were paid.30 Despite such pronouncement, the Court still
went on to say that had the complaint therein been filed
during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would
have ruled otherwise because the amendments brought
about by the same "seem to imply that there can be no
case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated,"31 viz.:
6
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20,
2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for
insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate
controversies, the fees prescribed under Section 7 (a)
shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of
Section 7 thereof was omitted from the reference. Said
paragraph refers to docket fees for filing "[a]ctions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and
"all other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to
paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation, the
value of which is always the basis for computing the
applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to
imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot
be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate
books.
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find
refuge in the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of
Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint
was filed on August 14, 2000 during which time
Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable
provision. Even the Amended Complaint was filed on
March 31, 2003 during which time the applicable rule
expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be
the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-
corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an
intra-corporate controversy where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated, such as an action
for inspection of corporate books. The immediate
illustration shows that no mistake can even be
attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment
of the docket fees.32 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation" and
that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated" are clearly non-determinative of the
antecedents involved in that case and, hence, cannot be
controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it
adjudicates similar cases upon the principle of stare
decisis. As it is evident, these passages in Lu only
constitute an opinion delivered by the Court as a "by the
way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the
complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-
04-SC, which it was not) different from the actual case
before it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,33 the Court
had the opportunity to define an obiter dictum and discuss
its legal effects as follows:

[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the
way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.
It does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and is made without argument, or full consideration
of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a
mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for
purposes of res judicata."34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo erred in
applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated
in Lu was actually incorrect. This is because depending on
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an
intra-corporate controversy may involve a subject matter
which is either capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid down the
parameters in determining whether an action is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst
[I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional
Trial Courts).36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-
corporate controversy may be classified as an action
whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and
Amended Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to
have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation's bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO
has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with
the corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus,
Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of the Alliance
Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM
pending completion of subscription to the SR0.37
Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as
7
the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as
scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of
sum of money. The mere mention of Alliance's impending
SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of
Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary
estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not
claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the
shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was
merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the
severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be
held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of
money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would
be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint,
then it would simply be the consequence of their principal
action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court
passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC38 dated October 5, 2016,
which introduced amendments to the schedule of legal
fees to be collected in various commercial cases,
including those involving intra-corporate controversies.
Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC effective 16
August 2004, incorporated the equitable schedule
of legal fees prescribed for petitions for
rehabilitation under Section 21 (i) thereof and,
furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof
that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the
said rule shall apply to petitions for insolvency or
other cases involving intra-corporate controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT
a new schedule of filing fees as follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court is hereby DELETED as the fees covering
petitions for insolvency are already provided for in
this Resolution. As for cases involving intra-
corporate controversies, the applicable fees shall
be those provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or
7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court
depending on the nature of the action.
xxxx

This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same
upon its effectivity. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in
lieu thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for
actions where the value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7
(b) (3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of
the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate
controversies for the determination of the correct filing
fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the
one hand, the amendments concretize the Court's
recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate
controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary
estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to
correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject
matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments
brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016
only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this
case, such amendments may nevertheless be given
retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the
resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they
merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and
not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court
thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of
procedural rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural
laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal
sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect of transactions or considerations already past.
Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statutes." The general rule against giving statutes
retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the
obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not
prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending
at the time of their enactment where they neither create
new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to
all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.1âwphi1
8
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest
All, et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al.
should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in
accordance with the applicable fees provided under
Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions
not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court,
in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to
the R TC in order:
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing
fees in the amount of ₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by
the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is
insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.' s payment of any
discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular
proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already
sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the
case with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is
DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and
the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L. CASE
NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
GONZALES V GJH LAND
PETITIONERS: Manuel Luis C. Gonzales
Francis Martin D. Gonzales
RESPONDENTS: GJH Land (former S.J. Land)
Chang Hwan Jang
Sang Rak Kim
Mariechu N. Yap
Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II
CITATION: GR No. 202664
DATE: November 10, 2015
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
 NATURE – Nature of the case as an intra-corporate
dispute
 Manuel Gonzales and Francis Martin Gonzales –
filed a COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION with
DAMAGES, against GJH Land before RTC
Muntinlupa
o They are seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J.
Land Inc.’s shares which they purportedly
bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1,
2010
o They alleged that the subscriptions for the
said shares were already paid by them in full
in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were
nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011
to the corporation’s stockholders, hence, their
plea for injunction.
 The case was raffled to Branch 276, which is not a
Special Commercial Court.
o Said branch issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO).
o in an Order dated August 24, 2011, granted
the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
 RESPONDENTS
o Filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
pointing out that the case involves an intra-
corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard
by the designated Special Commercial Court
of Muntinlupa City
o Branch 276 denied the motion for
reconsideration, holding that it has no
authority or power to order the transfer of the
case to the proper Special Commercial Court.
 ISSUE: WON Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa
City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter
 HELD:
o Branch 276 [has] correctly categorized [the
present case] as a commercial case, more
particularly, an intra-corporate dispute,
considering that it relates to petitioners'
averred rights over the shares of stock offered
for sale to other stockholders, having paid the
same in full.
o As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that
a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a
particular case's subject matter is different
from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas
a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless
provided by the law itself, is governed by the
Rules of Court or by the orders issued from
time to time by the Court.
9
o It is important to mention that the Court's
designation of Special Commercial Courts
was made in line with its constitutional
authority to supervise the administration of all
courts as provided under Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The objective
behind the designation of such specialized
courts is to promote expediency and efficiency
in the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over
the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD
902-A. Such designation has nothing to do
with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to
all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first
place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or
dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed,
given that the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a
matter of legislative prerogative.
o To restate, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely intended as a
procedural tool to expedite the resolution of
commercial cases in line with the court's
exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was
not made by statute but only by an internal
Supreme Court rule under its authority to
promulgate rules governing matters of
procedure and its constitutional mandate to
supervise the administration of all courts and
the personnel thereof. Certainly, an internal
rule promulgated by the Court cannot go
beyond the commanding statute. But as a
more fundamental reason, the designation of
Special Commercial Courts is merely an
incident related to the court's exercise of
jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is
distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. The RTC's general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is
therefore not abdicated by an internal rule
streamlining court procedure.
CHUA V EXECUTIVE JUDGE
PETITIONERS: Richard Chua
RESPONDENTS: The Executive Judge, MTC Manila
CITATION: GR No. 20290
DATE: October 2, 2013
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
 RICHARD CHUA – filed before OCP Manila a
complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40)
counts of violation of BP 22.
o After conducting preliminary investigation, the
OCP found probable cause and, on 22 March
2012, filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP
Blg. 22 before the MeTC.

 MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a total of
₱540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts
of violation of BP Blg. 22.
 Finding the said amount to be beyond his means,
petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to
ask whether he could pay filing fees on a per case
basis instead of being required to pay the total filing
fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once.
o The MeTC clerk of court opined that petitioner
could not.
o Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing
fees.
 Due to non-payment of the required filing fees, the
MeTC designated the forty (40) counts of violation of
BP Blg. 22 as undocketed cases under UDK Nos.
12001457 to 96. Subsequently, the OCP moved for
consolidation of the said cases.
 Petitioner filed a Motion entitled “Urgent Motion to
Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per
Case Basis” – in it petitioner reiterated his request that
he be allowed to pay filing fees on a per case basis
instead of being required to pay the total amount of
filing fees in its entirety.
o the Executive Judge issued an Order denying
petitioner’s Urgent Motion.
o the Executive Judge of the MeTC ratiocinated
that granting petitioner’s plea would constitute
a deferment in the payment of filing fees that,
in turn, contravenes Section 1(b) of the Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
o Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no
avail.
 ISSUE: WON the Executive Judge of the MeTC
committed grave abuse of discretion, in light of the
facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing
petitioner’s request of paying filing fees on a per case
basis.
 HELD:
o YES.
o In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case
basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or
deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for
all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22
filed before the MeTC. He, in fact,
acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact,
admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such
obligation in its entirety.
o Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at
least be allowed to pursue some of the cases,
the filing fees of which he is capable of
financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his
current financial status, he simply cannot
afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP
Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal
in granting petitioner’s request.
o The Executive Judge erred when she treated
the entire₱540,668.00 as one indivisible
10
obligation, when that figure was nothing but
the sum of individual filing fees due for each
count of violation of BP Blg.22 filed before the
MeTC. Granting petitioner’s request would not
constitute a deferment in the payment of filing
fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full
the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the
cases filed.
o Filing fees, when required, are assessed and
become due for each initiatory pleading filed.
In criminal actions, these pleadings refer to
the information filed in court.
o In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioner’s
request, the Executive Judge further argues
that since all forty (40) counts of violation of
BP Blg. 22 were brought about by a single
complaint filed before the OCP and are now
consolidated before the court, the payment of
their tiling fees should be made for all or none
at all.
o That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP
Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint
filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains
that there are still forty (40) counts of violation
of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC
and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual
filing fees to be paid.
o Neither would the consolidation of all forty
(40) counts make any difference.
Consolidation unifies criminal cases involving
related offenses only for purposes of trial.
Consolidation does not transform the tiling
fees due for each case consolidated into one
indivisible fee.
o Allowing petitioner to pay for the tiling fees of
some of the forty ( 40) counts of violation of
BP Big. 22 tiled before the MeTC, will
concededly result into the absolute non-
payment of the filing fees of the rest. The fate
of the cases which filing fees were not paid,
however, is already the concern of the MeTC.
FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V
AGCAOILI
PETITIONERS: Fedman Development Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Federico Agcaoili
CITATION: GR No. 165025
DATE: August 31, 2011
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
 On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDC’s consent,
transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent
Federico Agcaoili
 As consideration for the transfer:
o Agcaoili agreed to pay Interchem P150,000
upon signing of the deed transfer

o To update the account by paying to FDC the
amount of P15,473.17 through a 90-day
postdated check
o To deliver to FDC the balance of P137,286.83
in 135 equal monthly instalments of P1,857.24
effective October 1980, inclusive of 12%
interest per annum on the diminishing balance
 In December 1980, the centralized air-conditioning
unit of FSB’s fourth floor broke down. He then
informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the
payment of his condominium dues and monthly
amortizations. FDC cancelled the contract to sell.
 Agcaoili was then prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in
the RTC Makati City, Branch 144. For injunction and
Damages.
o The parties later executed a compromise
agreement that the RTC approved.
o RTC rendered judgment in favour of Agcaoili,
FDC appealed but the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
 ISSUE: WON RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
this for failure to pay the correct amount of docket
fees
 HELD:
o If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient
in relation to the amounts being sought, the
clerk of court or his duly authorizes deputy
has the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment, and the plaintiff will be required
to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of
the amounts of damages does not
immediately divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no
bad faith or intent to defraud the government
on the part of the plaintiff.
o The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees
at the time of the filing of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading fails to vest
jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet,
where the plaintiff has paid the amount of
filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and
the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the
trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the
case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of
the deficiency assessment.
IN RE: EXEMPTION OF
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM
PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES
A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
 The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks
clarification from the Court on whether or not it is
11
exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal
bonds and supersedeas bonds.
 On December 6, 2005, the Court issued A.M. No.
05-10-20-SC, In re: Exemption of the National
Power Corporation from the Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees, on the basis of Section 13,
Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the
Charter of the National Power Corporation). It
reads:
 The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator, to
DECLARE that the National Power Corporation
(NPC) is still exempt from the payment of filing
fees, appeals bond, and supersedeas bonds.
 On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued
A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that: The Court
Resolved, upon recommendation of the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
to DENY the request of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) for exemption from the
payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Section
13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request
appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, which
includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of
cases in courts.
 Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification
as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees
and court fees.
 Section 22 of Rule 141 reads: Sec.
22. Government exempt. The Republic of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in
this rule. Local government units and government-
owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying
such fees. (emphasis supplied)
 Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on
privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that
the NPC shall remain as a national government-
owned and controlled corporation. Thus, NPC is
not exempt from payment of filing fees.
ISSUE: WON NPC is exempt from payment of
filing/docket fees. No
HELD: Since the payment of legal fees is a vital
component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be
validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As
one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive

domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less the Executive.
Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-
making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution
and development inEchegaray v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent
with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section
13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
[T]he 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x. More completely, Section 5(2) [sic] 5 of
its Article X provided:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of case,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and
more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
12
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was
expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative
if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by
this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal
fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the
Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic
Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the
payment of legal fees.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby CLARIFIED that the National
Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of
legal fees. SO ORDERED.
UNICAPITAL VS. CONSING
PETITIONERS: UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL
REALTY, INC., and JAIME J. MARTINEZ
RESPONDENTS: RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 168
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
 In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and
his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz),
obtained an P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital,
P12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24,
1997 and the remaining P6,000,000.00 on August
1, 1997.
 The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes
and a Real Estate Mortgage over a 42,443 square
meter-parcel of land located at Imus.
 Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc.
(PBI), a real estate company, was already

interested to develop the subject property into a
residential subdivision.
 In this regard, PBI entered into a joint venture
agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate
development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing,
the loan and mortgage over the subject property
was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real
Property and, after further negotiations, Dela Cruz
decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI.
 For this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing,
Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.
 Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased
one-half of the subject property for a consideration
of P21,221,500.00, while PBI bought the
remaining half for the price of P21,047,000.00.
 In this relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT to be
divided into three separate titles.
 However, even before URI and PBI were able to
have the titles transferred to their names, Juanito
Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed
Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the
subject property as evidenced by TCT, that they
did not sell the subject property; and that Dela
Cruz's title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599, thereto was a
mere forgery.
 Prompted by Teng and Yu's assertions, PBI
conducted further investigations on the subject
property which later revealed that Dela Cruz's title
was actually of dubious origin.
 Based on this finding, PBI and Unicapital sent
separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and
Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the purchase
price they had paid for the subject property.
 On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint,
denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory
Relief and later amended to Complex Action for
Injunctive Relief.
 In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the
incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon
him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the
purchase price they had paid for the subject
property constituted harassment and oppression
which severely affected his personal and
professional life. He also averred that he was
coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 as Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing
a case against him, kept on forcing him to issue a
post-dated check in the amount sought to be
recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge that
he had no funds for the same
ISSUES:
(a) in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285, whether or not the
CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City's denial of
Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss; and
(b) in G.R. No. 192073, whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the RTC-Makati City's denial of Consing, Jr.'s
motion for consolidation.
13
HELD:
A. Propriety of the denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion
to dismiss and ancillary issues.
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled
that the existence of a cause of action is determined by
the allegations in the complaint.In this relation, a complaint
is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, then the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.As edified in the case
of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v.
Todaro, citingHongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, Limited. v. Catalan (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the
court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged
therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity
of the material allegations. If the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of
the defense that may be presented by the defendants.
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should
stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is
able to convey a cause of action; and not that the
complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be
misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is
properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section
1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the
latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same
rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.'s complaint
in SCA No. 1759 properly states a cause of action since
the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for
damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.'s complaint contains
allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner
in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands
against him. Among others, the complaint states that
Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered
by [Unicapital and PBI, et al.;] Accordingly, these specific
allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the
recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil
Code which states that "[e]very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." As explained in the HSBC case:

[W]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal
because [it is] recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance
with the purpose for which it was established, and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.[71] (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Consing, Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action
for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
The rationale therefor was explained in the case
of Manaloto v. Veloso III, citing Concepcion v. CA, to wit:
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity
for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality
must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is
a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of
the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person
from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human
personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons
are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.[74]
To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also
lead to the payment of moral damages under Article
2219(10) if the Civil Code.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged
that "[he] has come to discover that [Unicapital and PBI, et
14
al.] are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate
and libelous[;] [and that] [t]hey have spread their virulent
version of events in the business and financial community
such that [he] has suffered and continues to suffer injury
upon his good name and reputation which, after all, is the
most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses -
especially considering that he is an investment banker."In
similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these
allegations may result into the recovery of damages
pursuant to Article 26, and even Article 2219(10), of the
Civil Code.
Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.'s contention that the
case should be dismissed on the ground that it failed to
set out the actual libelous statements complained about
cannot be given credence. These incidents, as well as the
specific circumstances surrounding the manner in which
Unicapital and PBI, et al. pursued their claims against
Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a
standing rule that issues that require the contravention of
the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full
ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should
not be within the province of a mere motion to
dismiss,[78] as in this case. Hence, as what is only required
is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the Court in view of the
above-stated reasons finds that the RTC-Pasig City's
denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate
the reversal of the CA's ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of
discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.[79] This the Court does
not perceive in the case at bar.
Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the
Court equally finds that the causes of action in SCA No.
1759 were not as Unicapital, et al. claim misjoined even if
Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated
certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised
Securities Act.[80]
The rule is that a party's failure to observe the following
conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in
a misjoinder of causes of action:[81]
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same

parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court
provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein;
and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)
A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing,
Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for
any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the
Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought
damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.'s alleged acts of
making him sign numerous documents and their use of
the same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually
advances an injunction and damages case[82] which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig
City.[83] Therefore, there was no violation of Section 5,
Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof.
Besides, even on the assumption that there was a
misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not
result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.'s complaint. Section
6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "[m]isjoinder
of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action" and that "[a] misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be
severed and proceeded with separately."
Neither should Consing, Jr.'s failure to pay the required
docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has
long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.'s
insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of
docket fees enunciated in the case ofManchester
Development Corporation v. CA should be applied in this
case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that
Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his
failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees. As
pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon.
Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is
a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply. (Emphasis and italics
in the original)
Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s
apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered" claim for
15
damages to the tune of around P2,000,000.00 per month
may balloon to a rather huge amount by the time that this
case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by
then fall due shall be subject to assessment and any
additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien
against the judgment as explicitly provided under Section
2, Rule 141 of the Rules.
Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s
complaint was properly verified, suffice it to state that
since the copy submitted to the trial court was duly
notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and that it was only
Unicapital, et al.'s copy which lacks the notarization, then
there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the rules on pleadings.[90]
In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of
the CA in sustaining the RTC-Pasig City's denial of
Unicapital et al.'s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be denied.
B. Propriety of the denial of Consing, Jr.'s motion for
consolidation.
The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-
Makati City's denial of Consing, Jr.'s motion for the
consolidation of the Pasig case, i.e., SCA No. 1759, and
the Makati case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418. Records
show that the CA upheld the RTC-Makati City's denial of
the foregoing motion, finding that the consolidation of
these cases was merely discretionary on the part of the
trial court. It added that it was "impracticable and would
cause a procedural faux pas" if it were to "allow the [RTC-
Pasig City] to preside over the Makati case."[91]
The CA's ruling is proper.
It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject
matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried,
in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to
settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in
a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In
addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts
in two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed
of in a single suit.[92] The governing rule is Section 1, Rule
31 of the Rules which provides:
SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
In the present case, the Court observes that the
subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No.
99-1418, although involving the same parties and
proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should

remain unconsolidated since they proceed from
different sources of obligations and, hence, would not
yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an
injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code
provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while
Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages
suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject
promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals
with whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused
the manner in which they demanded payment from
Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with
whether or not Unicapital may demand payment from
Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes.
Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no
practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought
in each case are separate and distinct from the other.
Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-Makati
City could not have been faulted in retaining Civil Case
No. 99-1418 in its dockets since pre-trial procedures have
already been undertaken therein and, thus, its
consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-
Pasig City would merely result in complications on the part
of the latter court or squander the resources or remedies
already utilized in Civil Case No. 99-1418.
All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No. 1759
and Civil Case No. 99-1418 to be improper, impelling the
affirmance of the CA's ruling. Consequently, the petition in
G.R. No. 192073 must also be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285
and 192073 are DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals' Joint Decision dated October 20, 2005 and
Resolution dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
64019 and 64451 and the Decision dated September 30,
2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101355 are hereby AFFIRMED.
PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE
NATIONALE DE PARIS 460
SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION
June 15, 2005
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
 Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton)
availed credit facilities of respondent Banque
Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure
payment, co-petitioners Automotive Corporation,
Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group
executed a corporate guarantee.
 Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP.
Thereafter, BNP demanded the payment of
Proton‘s obligation to its co-petitioners pursuant to
corporate guarantee. But the same remained
unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Proton et al.
16
The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton
et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
case because BNP did not properly pay the
docket fees. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion of Proton et al. Hence this present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction
when there is an improper payment of docket fees
HELD:
The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment
made by the clerk of court which turned out to be
incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has
the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must
pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the
complaint merits dismissal.
RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
AID
Citation: A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
Date of Promulgation: August 28, 2009
Ponente: Corona, J.
FACTS:
 Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No.
24, series of 2008 which requested the IBPs
National Committee on Legal Aid] (NCLA) to ask
for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters.

 The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008
and required the IBP, through the NCLA, to
comment thereon.
 In a comment dated December 18, 2008, the IBP,
through the NCLA, made the following comments:
o (a) Under Section 16-D of RA 9406,
clients of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) are exempt from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to the
institution of action in court and other
quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand,
clients of legal aid offices in the various
IBP chapters do not enjoy the same
exemption. IBPs indigent clients are
advised to litigate as pauper litigants
under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court;
o (b) They are further advised to submit
documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the requirements under
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., certifications from
the barangay and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
However, not only does the process
involve some expense which indigent
clients could ill-afford, clients also lack
knowledge on how to go about the
tedious process of obtaining these
documents;
o (c) Although the IBP is given an annual
legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives
from the government is barely enough to
cover various operating expenses;
o (d) While each IBP local chapter is given
a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid
subsidy),] said allocation covers neither
the incidental expenses defrayed by legal
aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases
nor the payment of docket and other fees
collected by the courts, quasi-judicial
bodies and the prosecutors office, as well
as mediation fees and
o (e) Considering the aforementioned
factors, a directive may be issued by the
Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent
clients an exemption from the payment of
docket and other fees similar to that given
to PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA
9406. In this connection, the Supreme
Court previously issued a circular
exempting IBP clients from the payment
of transcript of stenographic notes.
ISSUE:
recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in
connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court.
RULING:
17
At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental
Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the
administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice
by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact
echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during
the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded
by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24,
the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively
performed its duty to participate in the development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the administration of justice.[11]
We now move on to determine the merits of the request.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
MAKING AN IDEAL A REALITY
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not
simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in
a democracy and in the rule of law. As such, it is
guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of
poverty.[12] (emphasis supplied)
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the
most important pillar of legal empowerment of the
marginalized sectors of our society.[13] Among others, it
has exercised its power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights[14] to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged
and to allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of
their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are permitted
under Section 21, Rule 3[15] and Section 19, Rule 141[16] of
the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.
The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to improve the
administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively, [17] assists the
Court in providing the poor access to justice. In particular,
it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the
NCLA.
A NEW RULE, A NEW TOOL
FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Under the IBPs Guidelines Governing the Establishment
and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the
IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined means and
merit tests shall be used to determine the eligibility of an
applicant for legal aid:
The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable
determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid
 18

program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved
to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal
fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the
legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really
further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will
guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor
trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be
observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP
chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling
cases for the said clients:
FINAL WORD
Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right,
there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be
effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For
a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to
free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide
addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to
courts by exempting them from the payment of fees
assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the
guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is
advanced and access to justice is increased by
bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to
justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental
Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices
of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on the
Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the
Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be
assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR]
provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this
connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the
publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general
circulation within five days from the promulgation of this
resolution.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to
promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the
Philippines of the import of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE
GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
Citation A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC
Date of Promulgation: August 19, 2009
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
 In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the
Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc., wrote:
The Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst.
Indorsement to pay a nominal
fee of Php 5,000.00 and the
balance upon the collection
action of 10 million pesos, thus
giving us access to the Justice
System previously denied by an
up-front excessive court fee.
The Hon. Court Administrator
Jose Perez pointed out to the
need of complying with OCA
Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule
141 that reserves this privilege
to indigent persons. While
judges are appointed to interpret
the law, this type of law seems
to be extremely detailed with
requirements that do not leave
much room for interpretations.
is
In addition, this law deals mainly
with individual indigent and it
does not include Foundations or
Associations that work with and
for the most Indigent persons.
As seen in our Article of
Incorporation, since 1985 the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
reached-out to the poorest
among the poor, to the newly
born and abandoned babies, to
children who never saw the
smile of their mother, to old
people who cannot afford a few
pesos to pay for common
prescriptions, to broken families
who returned to a normal life. In
other words, we have been
working hard for the very Filipino
people, that the Government and
the society cannot reach to, or
have rejected or abandoned
them.

Can the Courts grant to our
Foundation who works for
indigent and underprivileged
people, the same option granted
to indigent people?
The two Executive Judges, that
we have approached, fear
accusations of favoritism or
other kind of attack if they
approve something which is not
clearly and specifically stated in
the law or approved by your
HONOR.
Can your Honor help us once
more?
Grateful for your understanding,
God bless you and your
undertakings.
We shall be privileged if you find
time to visit our orphanage the
Home of Love and the Spiritual
Retreat Center in Antipolo City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Courts can grant to foundations like the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption
from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants.
RULING:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts
cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of
legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the
foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged
people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is
the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of
the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts
and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal
assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the
provision on free access from the Constitution on the
ground that it was already covered by the equal
protection clause was defeated by the desire to give
constitutional stature to such specific protection of the
poor.[1]
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules,
specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court,[2] and Sec.
19
19, Rule 141, Rules of Court,[3] which respectively state
thus:
Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to
litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment
of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful
fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall
be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that
the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk
of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by
the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof,
without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court
may impose. (22a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal
fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that
of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and
(b) who do not own real property with a fair market value
as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three
hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered
in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the
litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property
with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any,
shall be attached to the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested
person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint
or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a

natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of its
members,[4] is a juridical person. Among others, it has
the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as
well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization.[5] As a juridical person, therefore, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing
fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for
indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.
Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free
access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only
a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For
one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged
people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition
of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule
on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too
time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from
legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
SO ORDERED.
LAPU-LAPU v PEZA
Petitioner: City of Lapu Lapu
Respondent: PEZA
Citation G.R. No. 184203
Date of Promulgation:November 26, 2016
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
 Marcos issued P.D. 66 in 1972, declaring the
establishment of PEZA, Export Processing
ZoneAuthority
 (EPZA) was created to carry out this
policy2.EPZA was declared exempt from all
taxes.
 Certain parcels of land of public domain located
in Lapu-Lapu Cebu were reserved to serve assite
of the Mactan Export Processing Zone4.
 In 1995, Ramos directed PEZA to assume and
exercise all EPZA’s power, all the properTes of
EPZAwere transferred to PEZA5.
20
First Casea.Lapu-Lapu demanded from PEZA real
property taxi.No provision in the Special Economic Zone
Act (SEZA) of 1995 exempted PEZAunlike P.D. 66 that
explicitly provided for EPZA’s exempTonii.88M from
years 1992 to 2002b.PEZA ²led declaratory relief with
R±Cc.R±C Pasay– PEZA remained tax exempt, Sec 24
of SEZA 1995 applies only to privatedevelopersd.
CA- Dismissed; pure quesTons of law, should have been
directed to CA via peTTon forreview on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PEZA is exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
RULING:
YES. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority is
exempt from payment of real property taxes.
These are consolidated... the City of Lapu-Lapu (the
City)... appealed the Regional Trial Court 's decision
finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property
taxes.
The Province of Bataan (the Province)... assails the
Court of Appeals' decision... granting the PEZA's petition
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals... ruled that the
Regional Trial Court,... gravely abused its discretion in
finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the
Province of Bataan.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 66 in 1972... the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) was created to operate, administer, and
manage the export processing zones established in the
Port of Mariveles, Bataan... and such other export
processing zones that may be created by... virtue of the
decree.
EPZA was declared exempt from all taxes that... may be
due to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces,
cities, municipalities, and other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Specifically, Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66
declared the EPZA exempt from payment of real...
property taxes
From all income taxes, franchise taxes, realty taxes and
all other kinds of taxes and licenses to be paid to the
National Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities
and other government agencies and instrumentalities...
the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No.
7916 or "the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995"
The PEZA was granted the power... to register, regulate,
and supervise the enterprises located in the economic
zones.
By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in
Mariveles, Bataan became the Bataan Economic Zone...
and the Mactan Export Processing

Zone the Mactan Economic Zone. s for the EPZA, the
law required it to "evolve into the PEZA
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No.
282, directing the PEZA to assume and exercise all of the
EPZA's powers, functions, and responsibilities "as
provided in Presidential Decree No. 66
II. JURISDICTION
NAVIDA, et. al v DIZON, et. al
Petitioners: 7 paqes case title pa lang, ‘di ko na ilalagay
petitioners at respondents.
Respondents: 5 cases ang involved, consolidated into
one.
Docket No.: G.R. No. 125078
Date of Promulgation: May 30, 2011
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petitions for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45
o Petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078 and
125598 both assail the Order of the RTC
of Gen San, which dismissed the case in
view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC over the subject matter of the
complaint.
o Petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856,
and 128398 seek the reversal of the
Orderdated October 1, 1996 of the RTC
of Davao City, which also dismissed the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 1993: a number of personal injury suits were filed
in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
foreign countries, including the Philippines.
o Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages
for injuries they allegedly sustained from
their exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a chemical used to kill
nematodes (worms), while working on
farms in 23 foreign countries.
o Cases - transferred to, and consolidated
in, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division.
o Cases that involved plaintiffs from the
Philippines were "Jorge Colindres
Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,",
and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell
Oil Co., et al.,".
o Defendants in the consolidated cases
prayed for the dismissal of all the actions
under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens (forum non conveniens is a
discretionary power that allows courts to
dismiss a case where another court,
21
or forum, is much better suited to hear the
case.)
 July 11, 1995: The Federal District Court
conditionally granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
 Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result
from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally
affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an
action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in
his home country or the country in which he was
injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and,
upon proper motion, the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if the case had
never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
 Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General
Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598
 August 10, 1995: A total of 336 plaintiffs
from General Santos City (the petitioners
NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint in
the RTC of General Santos City.
 Defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co.
(SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW);
Occidental Chemical Corp.
(OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc.,
Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co.,
Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and
Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce
N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
(DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co.,
Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine
Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical
Corp. (Collectively referred to as
defendant companies.)
 Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of
damages in view of the illnesses and
injuries to the reproductive systems which
they allegedly suffered because of their
exposure to DBCP.
o Claimed, among others, that they
were exposed to this chemical
during the early 1970’s up to the
early 1980’s when they used the
same in the banana plantations
where they worked at; and/or
when they resided within the
agricultural area where such
chemical was used; that their
illnesses and injuries were due to
the fault or negligence of each of
the defendant companies in that
they produced, sold and/or
otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing
products; and that they were
allowed to be exposed to the said

products, which the defendant
companies knew, or ought to
have known, were highly injurious
to the former’s health and well-
being.
 Most of the defendant companies
respectively filed their Motions for Bill of
Particulars.
 May 15, 1996: DOW filed an Answer with
Counterclaim.
 May 20, 1996: without resolving the
motions filed by the parties, the RTC of
General Santos City issued an Order
dismissing the complaint.
o First, the trial court determined
that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case, to wit: The
substance of the cause of action
as stated in the complaint against
the defendant foreign companies
cites activity on their part which
took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the
territorial domain of the
Philippines. xxx Accordingly, the
subject matter stated in the
complaint and which is uniquely
particular to the present case,
consisted of activity or course of
conduct engaged in by foreign
defendants outside Philippine
territory, hence, outside and
beyond the jurisdiction of
Philippine Courts, including the
present Regional Trial Court.
o Second, the RTC of General
Santos City adjudged that
NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into
submitting their case to the
Philippine courts, merely to
comply with the U.S. District
Court’s Order and in order to
keep open to the plaintiffs the
opportunity to return to the U.S.
District Court.
o Third, the trial court ascribed little
significance to the voluntary
appearance of the defendant
companies. Defendants have
appointed their agents authorized
to accept service of
summons/processes in the
Philippines pursuant to the
agreement in the U.S. court that
defendants will voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of this court.
While it is true that this court
acquires jurisdiction over persons
of the defendants through their
voluntary appearance, it appears
22
that such voluntary appearance of
the defendants in this case is
conditional. Thus in the
“Defendants’ Amended
Agreement Regarding Conditions
of Dismissal for Forum Non
Conveniens” filed with the U.S.
District Court, defendants
declared that “(t)he authority of
each designated representative to
accept service of process will
become effective upon final
dismissal of these actions by the
Court”. The decision of the U.S.
District Court dismissing the case
is not yet final and executory
since both the plaintiffs and
defendants appealed therefrom.
Consequently, since the authority
of the agent of the defendants in
the Philippines is conditioned on
the final adjudication of the case
pending with the U.S. courts, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by this
court over the persons of the
defendants is also conditional.
o Fourth, the RTC of General
Santos City ruled that the act of
NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case
in the Philippine courts violated
the rules on forum shopping and
litis pendencia. This court frowns
upon the fact that the parties
herein are both vigorously
pursuing their appeal of the
decision of the U.S. District court
dismissing the case filed thereat.
To allow the parties to litigate in
this court when they are actively
pursuing the same cases in
another forum, violates the rule
on ‘forum shopping’ so abhorred
in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the
filing of the case in the U.S.
courts divested this court of its
own jurisdiction. This court takes
note that the U.S. District Court
did not decline jurisdiction over
the cause of action. The case was
dismissed on the ground of forum
non conveniens, which is really a
matter of venue. By taking
cognizance of the case, the U.S.
District Court has, in essence,
concurrent jurisdiction with this
court over the subject matter of
this case. It is settled that initial
acquisition of jurisdiction divests
another of its own jurisdiction.

o In conclusion, the trial court held
that it is but proper to dismiss the
case for to continue with these
proceedings, would be violative of
the constitutional provision on the
Bill of Rights guaranteeing
speedy disposition of cases (Ref.
Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution).
 Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of
Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
 May 21, 1996: Another joint complaint for
damages against SHELL, DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and
CHIQUITA was filed before RTC of Davao
City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.
These plaintiffs (ABELLA, et al.) amended
their Joint-Complaint on May 21, 1996.
 Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al.,
ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in
the banana plantation and/or as residents
near the said plantation, they were made
to use and/or were exposed to
nematocides, which contained the
chemical DBCP.
o Claimed that such exposure
resulted in "serious and
permanent injuries to their health,
including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their
reproductive capacities”; that the
defendant companies
manufactured, produced, sold,
distributed, used, and/or made
available in commerce, DBCP
without warning the users of its
hazardous effects on health, and
without providing instructions on
its proper use and application,
which the defendant companies
knew or ought to have known,
had they exercised ordinary care
and prudence.
 Except for DOW, the other defendant
companies filed their respective motions
for bill of particulars; ABELLA, et al., filed
their opposition.
 May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996: DOW
and DEL MONTE filed their respective
Answers dated
 October 1, 1996: The RTC of Davao City
junked this in its Order stating that: The
Court however is constrained to dismiss
the case at bar not solely on the basis of
the above but because it shares the
opinion of legal experts given in the
interview made by the Inquirer in its
Special report “Pesticide Cause Mass
Sterility,” Former Justice Secretary
23
Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion
said: The Philippines should be an
inconvenient forum to file this kind of
damage suit against foreign companies
since the causes of action alleged in the
petition do not exist under Philippine laws.
There has been no decided case in
Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to
those adversely affected by DBCP. This
means there is no available evidence
which will prove and disprove the relation
between sterility and DBCP.
 Present case
 The main contention of the petitioners
states that the allegedly tortious acts
and/or omissions of defendant companies
occurred within Philippine territory. Said
fact allegedly constitutes reasonable
basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction
over the case.
 DOLE similarly maintains that the acts
attributed to defendant companies
constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also
argues that if indeed there is no positive
law defining the alleged acts of defendant
companies as actionable wrong, Article 9
of the Civil Code dictates that a judge
may not refuse to render a decision on
the ground of insufficiency of the law. The
court may still resolve the case, applying
the customs of the place and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of
law.
 CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues
that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the cases filed
before them. CHIQUITA avers that the
pertinent matter is the place of the alleged
exposure to DBCP, not the place of
manufacture, packaging, distribution,
sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of
a tort, which states that the law of the
place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action.
CHIQUITA and the other defendant
companies also submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the RTC by making
voluntary appearances and seeking for
affirmative reliefs during the course of the
proceedings.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the court is correct when it
dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
a) The court did not simply dismiss the case
because it was filed in bad faith with
petitioners intending to have the same

dismissed and returned to the Texas
court.
b) The court dismissed the case because it
was convinced that it did not have
jurisdiction.
II. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
a) The acts complained of occurred within
Philippine territory.
b) Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is broad enough to cover the
acts complained of.
c) Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S.
District Court over petitioners’ claims did
not divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction
over the same.
d) The Compromise Agreement and the
subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop
Party Respondents Dow, Occidental and
Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice
remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte
and Chiquita.
HELD: Yes, to both issues.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by
law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged
by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of
the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever
kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental
to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
24
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of
action and that the total amount sought in the complaints
is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over
the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the
basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant,
which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when
they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of
action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond
the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream
of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where
territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be
determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In
personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of
damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any
of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to
prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff
claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in
General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific
areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical
DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a
quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially
filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and
documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as
doctors, co-workers, family members and other members

of the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines.
Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily,
unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative
reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of
the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of
the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or body’s jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction vs, Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is
different from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or
the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court
has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the
decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an
exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error
of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide
the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over
the case.
Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to
allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on
allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record.
This Court does not rule on allegations which are
manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This
Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not
appearances.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions
for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and
128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated
May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the
25
Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 16, and its subsequent Order dated
December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this case to
the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further
and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein
that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte
to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of the
previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in
G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are
considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
MASLAG v MONZON, et. al.
Petitioner: Darma Maslag
Respondents: Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and
Registry of Deeds of Benguet
Docket No.: G.R. No. 174908
Date of Promulgation: June 17, 2013
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
 1998: Petitioner filed before the MTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet a Complaint for reconveyance
of real property with declaration of nullity of
original certificate of title (OCT) against
respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon), William
Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
 After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon
guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property and ordered her to reconvey
the said property to petitioner, and to pay
damages and costs of suit.
 Respondents appealed to the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet which issued its October 22, 2003 Order,
declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. It further held that it
will take cognizance of the case pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
 May 4, 2004: Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a
Resolution reversing the MTC Decision.
 Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC’s
May 4, 2004 Resolution.
 The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and
observed that the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution
(the subject matter of the appeal before the CA)
set aside an MTC Judgment; hence, the proper
remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42,
and not an ordinary appeal.
 Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CA
denied petitioner’s MR in its September 22, 2006
Resolution: The proper remedy, is a petition for
review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41.

 Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays that
the CA be ordered to take cognizance of her
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in
dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
In its October 22, 2003 Order, the RTC declared that the
MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case based on the supposition that the same is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court, it took cognizance of the case
and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they
so desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and,
eventually, submitted the case for its decision after they
had submitted their respective memoranda.
We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas
of the RTC. Since it involves a question of jurisdiction, we
may motu proprio review and pass upon the same even at
this late stage of the proceedings.
In her Complaint for reconveyance of real property with
declaration of nullity of OCT, petitioner claimed that she
and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the disputed property since
the 1940’s.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to
reconvey the portion of the property which she claimed
was fraudulently included in Monzon’s title. Her primary
relief was to recover ownership of real property.
Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint involves title to real
property. An action "involving title to real property," on the
other hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiff’s
cause of action is based on a claim that she owns such
property or that she has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same."
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title
to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs
to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed
value of the subject property. Pertinent provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
26
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) x
x x.
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a
Declaration of Real Property dated November 12, 1991,
which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "A",
showing that the disputed property has an assessed value
of ₱12,400 only. Such assessed value of the property is
well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC,
thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP
129 in determining which court has jurisdiction over the
case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was
correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for
the dismissal of an improper appeal:
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the
Court of Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead
of by petition for review from the appellate judgment
of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.1âwphi1

Two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on
issues of fact and law
The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in
cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It
is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in
cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction
over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for
Review with the CA.
Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of
appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC
in the Order or Decision being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have
taken cognizance of the case and review the court a
quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. The RTC Resolution was a continuation of
the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a
judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
With regard to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order,
the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect
(other than to confuse the parties whether the RTC
was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It
cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the
active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court
or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of
appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41.
Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually
did, petitioner resorts to arguing for what the RTC should
have done. She maintains that the RTC should have
issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction
because it had earlier ruled that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only
statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot
seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly
held that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without
jurisdiction is void and cannot be given any effect." By
parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring
that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case when under the law it has none
cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation
27
of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP
129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and
the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the
courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same.
Besides, in determining the proper mode of appeal from
an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is
the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in
rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at
what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the
RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC
should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into
what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case
is a question which already involves the merits of the
appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the
mode of appeal was improper to begin with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed May 31,
2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365 are AFFIRMED.
BPI v EDUARDO HONG
Petitioner: Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-
in-interest of Far East Bank and Trust Company
Respondents: Eduardo Hong, doing business under the
name and style "Super Line Printing Press" and the Court
of Appeals
Docket No.: G.R. No. 161771
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2012
Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45
 September 16, 1997: EYCO Group of Companies
("EYCO") filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764.
o Stay order was issued on September 19,
1997 enjoining the disposition in any
manner except in the ordinary course of
business and payment outside of
legitimate business expenses during the
pendency of the proceedings, and
suspending all actions, claims and
proceedings against EYCO until further
orders from the SEC.
 December 18, 1998: the hearing panel approved
the proposed rehabilitation plan prepared by
EYCO despite the recommendation of the
management committee for the adoption of the
rehabilitation plan prepared and submitted by the
steering committee of the Consortium of Creditor
Banks which appealed the order to the
Commission.
 September 14, 1999: SEC rendered its decision
disapproving the petition for suspension of

payments, terminating EYCO’s proposed
rehabilitation plan and ordering the dissolution
and liquidation of the petitioning corporation. The
case was remanded to the hearing panel for
liquidation proceedings.
o On appeal by EYCO, the CA upheld the
SEC ruling.
 EYCO then filed a petition for certiorari before this
Court but was eventually dismissed under
Resolution dated May 3, 2005; final and executory
on June 16, 2005.
 November 2000: Case was still pending with the
CA, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela City, a petition for extra-
judicial foreclosure of real properties mortgaged to
it by Eyco Properties, Inc. and Blue Star
Mahogany, Inc. Public auction of the mortgaged
properties was scheduled on December 19, 2000
 Claiming that the foreclosure proceedings initiated
by petitioner was illegal, respondent Eduardo
Hong, an unsecured creditor of Nikon Industrial
Corporation, one of the companies of EYCO, filed
an action for injunction and damages against the
petitioner in the same court (RTC of Valenzuela
City).
 After hearing, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO).
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that:
o by plaintiff’s own allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction over the reliefs
prayed for belongs to the SEC, and
o plaintiff is actually resorting to forum
shopping since he has filed a claim with
the SEC and the designated Liquidator in
the ongoing liquidation of the EYCO
Group of Companies.
 Respondent asserted that the RTC has
jurisdiction on the issue of propriety and validity of
the foreclosure by petitioner, in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the suit being in the
nature of a real action.
 January 17, 2001: the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss; MR also denied.
 Petitioner challenged the validity of the trial court’s
ruling before the CA via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
 The CA affirmed the trial court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion to dismiss; MR dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC can take cognizance of
the injunction suit despite the pendency of SEC Case.
HELD: NO. The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear and decide a case. A court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action is conferred only
28
by the Constitution or by statute. The nature of an
action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which
court or agency of the government has jurisdiction
over the same, are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint in relation to the law
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for,
whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to
any or all of such reliefs. And jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Perusal of the complaint reveals that respondent does not
ask the trial court to rule on its interest or claim -- as an
unsecured creditor of two companies under EYCO --
against the latter’s properties mortgaged to petitioner. The
complaint principally seeks to enjoin the foreclosure
proceedings initiated by petitioner over those properties
on the ground that such properties are held in trust and
placed under the jurisdiction of the appointed Liquidator in
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. Thus, Civil Case No. 349-V-
00 is one for injunction with prayer for damages.
An action for injunction is a suit which has for its
purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or
for a particular time, from the commission or continuance
of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue
performance of a particular act. It has an independent
existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as
a part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. In an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue.
As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising x x x
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of

the property in controversy exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive
of the above-mentioned items exceeds Four hundred
thousand pesos (₱400,000.00). (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Sec. 6 (a) of P.D. No. 902-A
empowered the SEC to "issue preliminary or permanent
injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases
in which it has jurisdiction." Such cases in which the SEC
exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction are the
following:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of
the board of directors, business associates, its
officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholder,
partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission;
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any
or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members
or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state
insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity; and
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.19
Previously, under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Recovery, the SEC upon termination of cases involving
petitions for suspension of payments or rehabilitation may,
motu proprio, or on motion by any interested party, or on
the basis of the findings and recommendation of the
Management Committee that the continuance in business
of the debtor is no longer feasible or profitable, or no
longer works to the best interest of the stockholders,
parties-litigants, creditors, or the general public, order the
dissolution of the debtor and the liquidation of its
remaining assets appointing a Liquidator for the purpose.
The debtor’s properties are then deemed to have been
conveyed to the Liquidator in trust for the benefit of
creditors, stockholders and other persons in interest. This
notwithstanding, any lien or preference to any property
shall be recognized by the Liquidator in favor of the
security or lienholder, to the extent allowed by law, in the
implementation of the liquidation plan.
However, R.A. No. 8799, which took effect on August 8,
2000, transferred to the appropriate regional trial courts
the SEC’s jurisdiction over those cases enumerated in
29
Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799
provides:
SEC. 5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which
should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed.
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799, SEC Case No. 09-
97-5764 was no longer pending.1âwphi1 The SEC finally
disposed of said case when it rendered on September 14,
1999 the decision disapproving the petition for suspension
of payments, terminating the proposed rehabilitation plan,
and ordering the dissolution and liquidation of the
petitioning corporation. With the enactment of the new
law, jurisdiction over the liquidation proceedings ordered
in SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 was transferred to the RTC
branch designated by the Supreme Court to exercise
jurisdiction over cases formerly cognizable by the SEC.
There is no showing in the records that SEC Case No. 09-
97-5764 had been transferred to the appropriate RTC
designated as Special Commercial Court at the time of the
commencement of the injunction suit on December 18,
2000. Given the urgency of the situation and the proximity
of the scheduled public auction of the mortgaged
properties as per the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, respondent
was constrained to seek relief from the same court having
jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings – RTC of
Valenzuela City. Respondent thus filed Civil Case No.
349-V-00 in the RTC of Valenzuela City on December 18,
2000 questioning the validity of and enjoining the
extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by petitioner. Pursuant to
its original jurisdiction over suits for injunction and
damages, the RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 75
properly took cognizance of the injunction case filed
by the respondent. No reversible error was therefore
committed by the CA when it ruled that the RTC of
Valenzuela City, Branch 75 had jurisdiction to hear and
decide respondent’s complaint for injunction and
damages.
Lastly, it may be mentioned that while the Consortium of
Creditor Banks had agreed to end their opposition to the
liquidation proceedings upon the execution of the
Agreement dated February 10, 2003, on the basis of
which the parties moved for the dismissal of G.R. No.
145977, it is to be noted that petitioner is not a party to the

said agreement. Thus, even assuming that the SEC
retained jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764,
petitioner was not bound by the terms and conditions of
the Agreement relative to the foreclosure of those
mortgaged properties belonging to EYCO and/or other
accommodation mortgagors.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2002 and
Resolution dated January 12, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64166 are AFFIRMED.
DY v. BIBAT-PALAMOS
Petitioner: Ernesto Dy
Respondents: Hon. Gina M. Bibat- Palamos, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City, and Orix Metro Leasing and
Finance Corporation
Docket No.: G.R. No. 196200
Date of Promulgation: September 11, 2013
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65
 Petitioner Ernesto Dy and his wife, Lourdes Dy,
were the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which
was engaged in the shipping business.
 1990: Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-
maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing
and Finance Corporation to fund its acquisition of
M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel.
 As additional security for the loan, Limchia
Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.
 Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I
was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to
make the scheduled payments as required in their
promissory note.
 After receiving several demand letters from
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the
restructuring of their loan.
o Lourdes issued several checks to cover
the remainder of their loan but the same
were dishonored by the bank, prompting
respondent to institute a criminal
complaint for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law.
o Lourdes appealed to respondent with a
new proposal to update their outstanding
loan obligations.
 August 18, 1992: Respondent filed the Complaint
and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Preferred Ship Mortgage under Presidential
Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for
Attachment with the RTC.
 RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned
over its possession to respondent. On September
28, 1994, respondent transferred all of its rights,
30
title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I
to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado).
 July 31, 1997: RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted
on their loan because respondent agreed to a
restructured schedule of payment. There being no
default, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
M/V Pilar-I was premature.
o Ordered that the vessel be returned to
Spouses Dy.
 CA affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to
reimburse the respondent for repair and dry-
docking expenses while the vessel was in the
latter’s possession.
 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision,
dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings
of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses
Dy to reimburse respondent.
 August 17, 2010: Petitioner filed a motion for
execution of judgment with the RTC.
o July 29, 2010: During the intervening
period, Colorado informed the RTC that
M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession,
had sustained severe damage and
deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard
because of its exposure to the elements
and it sought permission from the court to
cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its
parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow.
o In his Comment/Objection, petitioner
insisted that he had the right to require
that the vessel be returned to him in the
same condition that it had been at the
time it was wrongfully seized by
respondent or, should it no longer be
possible, that another vessel of the same
tonnage, length and beam similar to that
of M/V Pilar-I be delivered but Colorado
responded that the vessel had suffered
severe damage and deterioration that
refloating or restoring it to its former
condition would be futile, impossible and
very costly; and should petitioner persist
in his demand that the ship be refloated, it
should be done at the expense of the
party adjudged by the court to pay the
same.
 December 13, 2010: RTC issued an Order
granting the motion for execution but denying
petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in
the same state in which it was taken by
respondent; MR denied
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner was justified in
resorting directly to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65

2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the return of
M/V Pilar-I in the same condition when it was
seized by respondent.
HELD: The Court finds the petition to be partly
meritorious.
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort to The Supreme Court
Justified
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct
invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the interest of
justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is
involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower courts
cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring
this case immediately to the attention of this Court. Lastly,
petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel
issue of law – that is, whether in an action to recover, a
defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in
litigation may be allowed to return the same in a
deteriorated condition without any liability.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition
should have been filed with the CA, following the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to
state any special or important reason or any exceptional
and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct
recourse to this Court.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the
Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must
remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform
its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities;
or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate
and direct handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle
of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court
take cognizance of this case to put an end to the
controversy and resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in
light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment
promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to
call upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
31
Wrong Mode of Appeal; Exception
Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to rule in his favor despite the fact
that he had been deprived by respondent of his property
rights over M/V Pilar-I for the past eighteen (18) years.
Moreover, the change in the situation of the parties calls
for a relaxation of the rules which would make the
execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable
or unjust. According to petitioner, for the RTC to allow
respondent to return the ship to him in its severely
damaged and deteriorated condition without any liability
would be to reward bad faith.
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the latter
merely observed due process and followed the principle
that an execution order may not vary or go beyond the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Respondent
adds that the proper remedy should have been an
ordinary appeal, where a factual review of the records can
be made to determine the condition of the ship at the time
it was taken from petitioner, and not a special civil action
for certiorari.
There are considerable differences between an ordinary
appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been
exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases.
The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on
the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or
legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal.
In contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original action designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer, or
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of in excess of jurisdiction." A court
or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion if its exercise of judgment was
so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse must be extremely patent and
gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive
duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility."
Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of
the lower court, as asserted by petitioner, may only be
reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari because the
issue raised by the petitioner does not involve any
jurisdictional ground. It is a general rule of procedural
law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode
of appeal, his petition may be dismissed outright to
prevent the erring party from benefiting from his
neglect and mistakes. There are exceptions to this
otherwise ironclad rule, however. One is when the
strict application of procedural technicalities would

hinder the expeditious disposition of this case on the
merits, such as in this case.
Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding Return of the
Vessel in its Former Condition
Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the
responsibility for the deterioration of the vessel because
the latter, despite having in its possession the vessel M/V
Pilar-I during the pendency of the foreclosure
proceedings, failed to inform the court and petitioner
himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel
to take effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by
the party sought to be estopped and reliance by the party
claiming estoppel on the representation made by the
former. In this case, petitioner cannot be estopped from
asking for the return of the vessel in the condition that it
had been at the time it was seized by respondent because
he had not known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.
On the contrary, respondent argues that petitioner is
barred from asking for a modification of the judgment
since he never prayed for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the
same condition that it had been at the time it was seized.
Petitioner could have prayed for such relief in his prior
pleadings and presented evidence thereon before the
judgment became final and executory. During the course
of the trial, and even at the appellate phase of the case,
petitioner failed to ask the courts to look into the naturally
foreseeable depreciation of M/V Pilar-I and to determine
who should pay for the wear and tear of the vessel.
Consequently, petitioner can no longer pursue such relief
for the first time at this very late stage. Moreover,
respondent posits that it can only be held liable for the
restoration and replacement of the vessel if it can be
proven that M/V Pilar-I deteriorated through the fault of
respondent. Nowhere in the prior decision of this Court,
however, does it appear that respondent was found to
have been negligent in its care of the vessel. In fact,
respondent points out that, for a certain period, it even
paid for the repair and maintenance of the vessel and
engaged the services of security guards to watch over the
vessel. It reasons that the vessel’s deterioration was
necessarily due to its exposure to sea water and the
natural elements for the almost twenty years that it was
docked in the Colorado shipyard.
On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of
judgments. When a judgment becomes final and
executory, it is made immutable and unalterable,
meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this
Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly
administration of justice and to put an end to judicial
controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors,
public policy and sound practice dictate that
judgments must become final at some point.
32
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain
exceptions. When a supervening event renders the
execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the
interested party can petition the court to modify the
judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A
supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new
circumstance which develops after a judgment has
become final and executory. This includes matters which
the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because
they were not yet in existence at that time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a
supervening event.1âwphi1 Petitioner, who did not have
possession of the ship, was only informed of its
destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated
July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision
of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance
Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and
Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During
the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this
Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened
condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of
Colorado.
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should
have had the foresight to ask for the return of the vessel in
its former condition at the time respondent took
possession of the same during the proceedings in the
earlier case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Court’s
decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances,
that is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the
case and the belated delivery of this information to the
courts by the party in possession of the same.
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment
is permissible in light of the exceptional incident present in
this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled
to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition in which
respondent took possession of it. Considering, however,
that this is no longer possible, then respondent should pay
petitioner the value of the ship at such time.
After having been deprived of his vessel for almost
two decades, through no fault of his own, it would be
the height of injustice to permit there turn of M/V Pilar-
I to petitioner in pieces, especially after a judgment by
this very same Court ordering respondent to restore
possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would
leave petitioner with nothing but a hollow and illusory
victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and
declared that respondent wrongfully took possession
of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the beneficial
use of his extremely deteriorated vessel that it is no
longer seaworthy and has no other commercial value
but for the sale of its parts as scrap.
Moreover, the incongruity only becomes more palpable
when consideration is taken of the fact that petitioner's
obligation to respondent, for which the now practically

worthless vessel serves as security, is still outstanding.
The Court cannot countenance such an absurd outcome.
It could not have been the intention of this Court to
perpetrate an injustice in the guise of a favorable decision.
As the court of last resort, this Court is the final bastion of
justice where litigants can hope to correct any error made
in the lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED.
Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the value of M/V
Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case
is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
64, Makati City, for the proper determination of the value
of the vessel at said time.
II. JURISDICTION
NAVIDA, et. al v DIZON, et. al
Petitioners: 7 paqes case title pa lang, ‘di ko na ilalagay
petitioners at respondents.
Respondents: 5 cases ang involved, consolidated into
one.
Docket No.: G.R. No. 125078
Date of Promulgation: May 30, 2011
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petitions for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45
o Petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078 and
125598 both assail the Order of the RTC
of Gen San, which dismissed the case in
view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC over the subject matter of the
complaint.
o Petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856,
and 128398 seek the reversal of the
Orderdated October 1, 1996 of the RTC
of Davao City, which also dismissed the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 1993: a number of personal injury suits were filed
in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
foreign countries, including the Philippines.
o Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages
for injuries they allegedly sustained from
their exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a chemical used to kill
nematodes (worms), while working on
farms in 23 foreign countries.
o Cases - transferred to, and consolidated
in, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division.
o Cases that involved plaintiffs from the
Philippines were "Jorge Colindres
Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,",
and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell
Oil Co., et al.,".
33
o Defendants in the consolidated cases
prayed for the dismissal of all the actions
under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens (forum non conveniens is a
discretionary power that allows courts to
dismiss a case where another court,
or forum, is much better suited to hear the
case.)
 July 11, 1995: The Federal District Court
conditionally granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
 Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result
from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally
affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an
action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in
his home country or the country in which he was
injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and,
upon proper motion, the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if the case had
never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
 Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General
Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598
 August 10, 1995: A total of 336 plaintiffs
from General Santos City (the petitioners
NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint in
the RTC of General Santos City.
 Defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co.
(SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW);
Occidental Chemical Corp.
(OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc.,
Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co.,
Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and
Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce
N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
(DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co.,
Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine
Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical
Corp. (Collectively referred to as
defendant companies.)
 Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of
damages in view of the illnesses and
injuries to the reproductive systems which
they allegedly suffered because of their
exposure to DBCP.
o Claimed, among others, that they
were exposed to this chemical
during the early 1970’s up to the
early 1980’s when they used the
same in the banana plantations
where they worked at; and/or
when they resided within the
agricultural area where such
chemical was used; that their
illnesses and injuries were due to
the fault or negligence of each of

the defendant companies in that
they produced, sold and/or
otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing
products; and that they were
allowed to be exposed to the said
products, which the defendant
companies knew, or ought to
have known, were highly injurious
to the former’s health and well-
being.
 Most of the defendant companies
respectively filed their Motions for Bill of
Particulars.
 May 15, 1996: DOW filed an Answer with
Counterclaim.
 May 20, 1996: without resolving the
motions filed by the parties, the RTC of
General Santos City issued an Order
dismissing the complaint.
o First, the trial court determined
that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case, to wit: The
substance of the cause of action
as stated in the complaint against
the defendant foreign companies
cites activity on their part which
took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the
territorial domain of the
Philippines. xxx Accordingly, the
subject matter stated in the
complaint and which is uniquely
particular to the present case,
consisted of activity or course of
conduct engaged in by foreign
defendants outside Philippine
territory, hence, outside and
beyond the jurisdiction of
Philippine Courts, including the
present Regional Trial Court.
o Second, the RTC of General
Santos City adjudged that
NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into
submitting their case to the
Philippine courts, merely to
comply with the U.S. District
Court’s Order and in order to
keep open to the plaintiffs the
opportunity to return to the U.S.
District Court.
o Third, the trial court ascribed little
significance to the voluntary
appearance of the defendant
companies. Defendants have
appointed their agents authorized
to accept service of
summons/processes in the
Philippines pursuant to the
agreement in the U.S. court that
34
defendants will voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of this court.
While it is true that this court
acquires jurisdiction over persons
of the defendants through their
voluntary appearance, it appears
that such voluntary appearance of
the defendants in this case is
conditional. Thus in the
“Defendants’ Amended
Agreement Regarding Conditions
of Dismissal for Forum Non
Conveniens” filed with the U.S.
District Court, defendants
declared that “(t)he authority of
each designated representative to
accept service of process will
become effective upon final
dismissal of these actions by the
Court”. The decision of the U.S.
District Court dismissing the case
is not yet final and executory
since both the plaintiffs and
defendants appealed therefrom.
Consequently, since the authority
of the agent of the defendants in
the Philippines is conditioned on
the final adjudication of the case
pending with the U.S. courts, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by this
court over the persons of the
defendants is also conditional.
o Fourth, the RTC of General
Santos City ruled that the act of
NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case
in the Philippine courts violated
the rules on forum shopping and
litis pendencia. This court frowns
upon the fact that the parties
herein are both vigorously
pursuing their appeal of the
decision of the U.S. District court
dismissing the case filed thereat.
To allow the parties to litigate in
this court when they are actively
pursuing the same cases in
another forum, violates the rule
on ‘forum shopping’ so abhorred
in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the
filing of the case in the U.S.
courts divested this court of its
own jurisdiction. This court takes
note that the U.S. District Court
did not decline jurisdiction over
the cause of action. The case was
dismissed on the ground of forum
non conveniens, which is really a
matter of venue. By taking
cognizance of the case, the U.S.
District Court has, in essence,

concurrent jurisdiction with this
court over the subject matter of
this case. It is settled that initial
acquisition of jurisdiction divests
another of its own jurisdiction.
o In conclusion, the trial court held
that it is but proper to dismiss the
case for to continue with these
proceedings, would be violative of
the constitutional provision on the
Bill of Rights guaranteeing
speedy disposition of cases (Ref.
Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution).
 Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of
Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
 May 21, 1996: Another joint complaint for
damages against SHELL, DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and
CHIQUITA was filed before RTC of Davao
City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.
These plaintiffs (ABELLA, et al.) amended
their Joint-Complaint on May 21, 1996.
 Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al.,
ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in
the banana plantation and/or as residents
near the said plantation, they were made
to use and/or were exposed to
nematocides, which contained the
chemical DBCP.
o Claimed that such exposure
resulted in "serious and
permanent injuries to their health,
including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their
reproductive capacities”; that the
defendant companies
manufactured, produced, sold,
distributed, used, and/or made
available in commerce, DBCP
without warning the users of its
hazardous effects on health, and
without providing instructions on
its proper use and application,
which the defendant companies
knew or ought to have known,
had they exercised ordinary care
and prudence.
 Except for DOW, the other defendant
companies filed their respective motions
for bill of particulars; ABELLA, et al., filed
their opposition.
 May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996: DOW
and DEL MONTE filed their respective
Answers dated
 October 1, 1996: The RTC of Davao City
junked this in its Order stating that: The
Court however is constrained to dismiss
the case at bar not solely on the basis of
ISSUES:
35
the above but because it shares the
opinion of legal experts given in the
interview made by the Inquirer in its
Special report “Pesticide Cause Mass
Sterility,” Former Justice Secretary
Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion
said: The Philippines should be an
inconvenient forum to file this kind of
damage suit against foreign companies
since the causes of action alleged in the
petition do not exist under Philippine laws.
There has been no decided case in
Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to
those adversely affected by DBCP. This
means there is no available evidence
which will prove and disprove the relation
between sterility and DBCP.
 Present case
 The main contention of the petitioners
states that the allegedly tortious acts
and/or omissions of defendant companies
occurred within Philippine territory. Said
fact allegedly constitutes reasonable
basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction
over the case.
 DOLE similarly maintains that the acts
attributed to defendant companies
constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also
argues that if indeed there is no positive
law defining the alleged acts of defendant
companies as actionable wrong, Article 9
of the Civil Code dictates that a judge
may not refuse to render a decision on
the ground of insufficiency of the law. The
court may still resolve the case, applying
the customs of the place and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of
law.
 CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues
that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the cases filed
before them. CHIQUITA avers that the
pertinent matter is the place of the alleged
exposure to DBCP, not the place of
manufacture, packaging, distribution,
sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of
a tort, which states that the law of the
place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action.
CHIQUITA and the other defendant
companies also submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the RTC by making
voluntary appearances and seeking for
affirmative reliefs during the course of the
proceedings.

III. Whether or not the court is correct when it
dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
c) The court did not simply dismiss the case
because it was filed in bad faith with
petitioners intending to have the same
dismissed and returned to the Texas
court.
d) The court dismissed the case because it
was convinced that it did not have
jurisdiction.
IV. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
e) The acts complained of occurred within
Philippine territory.
f) Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is broad enough to cover the
acts complained of.
g) Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S.
District Court over petitioners’ claims did
not divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction
over the same.
h) The Compromise Agreement and the
subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop
Party Respondents Dow, Occidental and
Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice
remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte
and Chiquita.
HELD: Yes, to both issues.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by
law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged
by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of
the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever
kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental
36
to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of
action and that the total amount sought in the complaints
is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over
the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the
basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant,
which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when
they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of
action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond
the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream
of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where
territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be
determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In
personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of
damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any
of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to
prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff
claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in
General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific
areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical
DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a

quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially
filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and
documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as
doctors, co-workers, family members and other members
of the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines.
Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily,
unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative
reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of
the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of
the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or body’s jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction vs, Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is
different from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or
the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court
has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the
decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an
exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error
of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide
the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over
the case.
Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to
allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on
allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record.
This Court does not rule on allegations which are
manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This
Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not
appearances.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions
37
for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and
128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated
May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the
Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 16, and its subsequent Order dated
December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this case to
the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further
and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein
that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte
to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of the
previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in
G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are
considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
MASLAG v MONZON, et. al.
Petitioner: Darma Maslag
Respondents: Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and
Registry of Deeds of Benguet
Docket No.: G.R. No. 174908
Date of Promulgation: June 17, 2013
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
 1998: Petitioner filed before the MTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet a Complaint for reconveyance
of real property with declaration of nullity of
original certificate of title (OCT) against
respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon), William
Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
 After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon
guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property and ordered her to reconvey
the said property to petitioner, and to pay
damages and costs of suit.
 Respondents appealed to the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet which issued its October 22, 2003 Order,
declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. It further held that it
will take cognizance of the case pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
 May 4, 2004: Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a
Resolution reversing the MTC Decision.
 Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC’s
May 4, 2004 Resolution.
 The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and
observed that the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution
(the subject matter of the appeal before the CA)
set aside an MTC Judgment; hence, the proper
remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42,
and not an ordinary appeal.
 Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CA
denied petitioner’s MR in its September 22, 2006

Resolution: The proper remedy, is a petition for
review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41.
 Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays that
the CA be ordered to take cognizance of her
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in
dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
In its October 22, 2003 Order, the RTC declared that the
MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case based on the supposition that the same is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court, it took cognizance of the case
and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they
so desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and,
eventually, submitted the case for its decision after they
had submitted their respective memoranda.
We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas
of the RTC. Since it involves a question of jurisdiction, we
may motu proprio review and pass upon the same even at
this late stage of the proceedings.
In her Complaint for reconveyance of real property with
declaration of nullity of OCT, petitioner claimed that she
and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the disputed property since
the 1940’s.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to
reconvey the portion of the property which she claimed
was fraudulently included in Monzon’s title. Her primary
relief was to recover ownership of real property.
Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint involves title to real
property. An action "involving title to real property," on the
other hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiff’s
cause of action is based on a claim that she owns such
property or that she has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same."
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title
to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs
to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed
value of the subject property. Pertinent provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
38
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) x
x x.
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a
Declaration of Real Property dated November 12, 1991,
which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "A",
showing that the disputed property has an assessed value
of ₱12,400 only. Such assessed value of the property is
well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC,
thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP
129 in determining which court has jurisdiction over the
case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was
correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for
the dismissal of an improper appeal:
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the
Court of Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead
of by petition for review from the appellate judgment
of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.1âwphi1
Two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on
issues of fact and law
The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in
cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It
is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in
cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction
over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for
Review with the CA.
Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of
appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC
in the Order or Decision being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have
taken cognizance of the case and review the court a
quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. The RTC Resolution was a continuation of
the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a
judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
With regard to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order,
the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect
(other than to confuse the parties whether the RTC
was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It
cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the
active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court
or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of
appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41.
Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually
did, petitioner resorts to arguing for what the RTC should
have done. She maintains that the RTC should have
issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction
because it had earlier ruled that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only
statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot
seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly
held that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without
39
jurisdiction is void and cannot be given any effect." By
parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring
that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case when under the law it has none
cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation
of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP
129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and
the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the
courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same.
Besides, in determining the proper mode of appeal from
an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is
the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in
rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at
what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the
RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC
should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into
what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case
is a question which already involves the merits of the
appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the
mode of appeal was improper to begin with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed May 31,
2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365 are AFFIRMED.
BPI v EDUARDO HONG
Petitioner: Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-
in-interest of Far East Bank and Trust Company
Respondents: Eduardo Hong, doing business under the
name and style "Super Line Printing Press" and the Court
of Appeals
Docket No.: G.R. No. 161771
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2012
Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45
 September 16, 1997: EYCO Group of Companies
("EYCO") filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764.
o Stay order was issued on September 19,
1997 enjoining the disposition in any
manner except in the ordinary course of
business and payment outside of
legitimate business expenses during the
pendency of the proceedings, and
suspending all actions, claims and
proceedings against EYCO until further
orders from the SEC.
 December 18, 1998: the hearing panel approved
the proposed rehabilitation plan prepared by
EYCO despite the recommendation of the
management committee for the adoption of the
rehabilitation plan prepared and submitted by the

steering committee of the Consortium of Creditor
Banks which appealed the order to the
Commission.
 September 14, 1999: SEC rendered its decision
disapproving the petition for suspension of
payments, terminating EYCO’s proposed
rehabilitation plan and ordering the dissolution
and liquidation of the petitioning corporation. The
case was remanded to the hearing panel for
liquidation proceedings.
o On appeal by EYCO, the CA upheld the
SEC ruling.
 EYCO then filed a petition for certiorari before this
Court but was eventually dismissed under
Resolution dated May 3, 2005; final and executory
on June 16, 2005.
 November 2000: Case was still pending with the
CA, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela City, a petition for extra-
judicial foreclosure of real properties mortgaged to
it by Eyco Properties, Inc. and Blue Star
Mahogany, Inc. Public auction of the mortgaged
properties was scheduled on December 19, 2000
 Claiming that the foreclosure proceedings initiated
by petitioner was illegal, respondent Eduardo
Hong, an unsecured creditor of Nikon Industrial
Corporation, one of the companies of EYCO, filed
an action for injunction and damages against the
petitioner in the same court (RTC of Valenzuela
City).
 After hearing, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO).
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that:
o by plaintiff’s own allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction over the reliefs
prayed for belongs to the SEC, and
o plaintiff is actually resorting to forum
shopping since he has filed a claim with
the SEC and the designated Liquidator in
the ongoing liquidation of the EYCO
Group of Companies.
 Respondent asserted that the RTC has
jurisdiction on the issue of propriety and validity of
the foreclosure by petitioner, in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the suit being in the
nature of a real action.
 January 17, 2001: the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss; MR also denied.
 Petitioner challenged the validity of the trial court’s
ruling before the CA via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
 The CA affirmed the trial court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion to dismiss; MR dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC can take cognizance of
the injunction suit despite the pendency of SEC Case.
40
HELD: NO. The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear and decide a case. A court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action is conferred only
by the Constitution or by statute. The nature of an
action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which
court or agency of the government has jurisdiction
over the same, are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint in relation to the law
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for,
whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to
any or all of such reliefs. And jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Perusal of the complaint reveals that respondent does not
ask the trial court to rule on its interest or claim -- as an
unsecured creditor of two companies under EYCO --
against the latter’s properties mortgaged to petitioner. The
complaint principally seeks to enjoin the foreclosure
proceedings initiated by petitioner over those properties
on the ground that such properties are held in trust and
placed under the jurisdiction of the appointed Liquidator in
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. Thus, Civil Case No. 349-V-
00 is one for injunction with prayer for damages.
An action for injunction is a suit which has for its
purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or
for a particular time, from the commission or continuance
of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue
performance of a particular act. It has an independent
existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as
a part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. In an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue.
As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising x x x
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive
of the above-mentioned items exceeds Four hundred
thousand pesos (₱400,000.00). (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Sec. 6 (a) of P.D. No. 902-A
empowered the SEC to "issue preliminary or permanent
injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases
in which it has jurisdiction." Such cases in which the SEC
exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction are the
following:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of
the board of directors, business associates, its
officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholder,
partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission;
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any
or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members
or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state
insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity; and
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.19
Previously, under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Recovery, the SEC upon termination of cases involving
petitions for suspension of payments or rehabilitation may,
motu proprio, or on motion by any interested party, or on
the basis of the findings and recommendation of the
Management Committee that the continuance in business
of the debtor is no longer feasible or profitable, or no
longer works to the best interest of the stockholders,
parties-litigants, creditors, or the general public, order the
dissolution of the debtor and the liquidation of its
remaining assets appointing a Liquidator for the purpose.
The debtor’s properties are then deemed to have been
conveyed to the Liquidator in trust for the benefit of
creditors, stockholders and other persons in interest. This
notwithstanding, any lien or preference to any property
shall be recognized by the Liquidator in favor of the
security or lienholder, to the extent allowed by law, in the
implementation of the liquidation plan.
41
However, R.A. No. 8799, which took effect on August 8,
2000, transferred to the appropriate regional trial courts
the SEC’s jurisdiction over those cases enumerated in
Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799
provides:
SEC. 5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which
should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed.
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799, SEC Case No. 09-
97-5764 was no longer pending.1âwphi1 The SEC finally
disposed of said case when it rendered on September 14,
1999 the decision disapproving the petition for suspension
of payments, terminating the proposed rehabilitation plan,
and ordering the dissolution and liquidation of the
petitioning corporation. With the enactment of the new
law, jurisdiction over the liquidation proceedings ordered
in SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 was transferred to the RTC
branch designated by the Supreme Court to exercise
jurisdiction over cases formerly cognizable by the SEC.
There is no showing in the records that SEC Case No. 09-
97-5764 had been transferred to the appropriate RTC
designated as Special Commercial Court at the time of the
commencement of the injunction suit on December 18,
2000. Given the urgency of the situation and the proximity
of the scheduled public auction of the mortgaged
properties as per the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, respondent
was constrained to seek relief from the same court having
jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings – RTC of
Valenzuela City. Respondent thus filed Civil Case No.
349-V-00 in the RTC of Valenzuela City on December 18,
2000 questioning the validity of and enjoining the
extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by petitioner. Pursuant to
its original jurisdiction over suits for injunction and
damages, the RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 75
properly took cognizance of the injunction case filed
by the respondent. No reversible error was therefore
committed by the CA when it ruled that the RTC of
Valenzuela City, Branch 75 had jurisdiction to hear and
decide respondent’s complaint for injunction and
damages.
Lastly, it may be mentioned that while the Consortium of
Creditor Banks had agreed to end their opposition to the
liquidation proceedings upon the execution of the

Agreement dated February 10, 2003, on the basis of
which the parties moved for the dismissal of G.R. No.
145977, it is to be noted that petitioner is not a party to the
said agreement. Thus, even assuming that the SEC
retained jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764,
petitioner was not bound by the terms and conditions of
the Agreement relative to the foreclosure of those
mortgaged properties belonging to EYCO and/or other
accommodation mortgagors.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2002 and
Resolution dated January 12, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64166 are AFFIRMED.
DY v. BIBAT-PALAMOS
Petitioner: Ernesto Dy
Respondents: Hon. Gina M. Bibat- Palamos, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City, and Orix Metro Leasing and
Finance Corporation
Docket No.: G.R. No. 196200
Date of Promulgation: September 11, 2013
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
 Nature: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65
 Petitioner Ernesto Dy and his wife, Lourdes Dy,
were the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which
was engaged in the shipping business.
 1990: Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-
maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing
and Finance Corporation to fund its acquisition of
M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel.
 As additional security for the loan, Limchia
Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.
 Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I
was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to
make the scheduled payments as required in their
promissory note.
 After receiving several demand letters from
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the
restructuring of their loan.
o Lourdes issued several checks to cover
the remainder of their loan but the same
were dishonored by the bank, prompting
respondent to institute a criminal
complaint for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law.
o Lourdes appealed to respondent with a
new proposal to update their outstanding
loan obligations.
 August 18, 1992: Respondent filed the Complaint
and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Preferred Ship Mortgage under Presidential
Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for
Attachment with the RTC.
42
 RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned
over its possession to respondent. On September
28, 1994, respondent transferred all of its rights,
title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I
to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado).
 July 31, 1997: RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted
on their loan because respondent agreed to a
restructured schedule of payment. There being no
default, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
M/V Pilar-I was premature.
o Ordered that the vessel be returned to
Spouses Dy.
 CA affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to
reimburse the respondent for repair and dry-
docking expenses while the vessel was in the
latter’s possession.
 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision,
dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings
of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses
Dy to reimburse respondent.
 August 17, 2010: Petitioner filed a motion for
execution of judgment with the RTC.
o July 29, 2010: During the intervening
period, Colorado informed the RTC that
M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession,
had sustained severe damage and
deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard
because of its exposure to the elements
and it sought permission from the court to
cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its
parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow.
o In his Comment/Objection, petitioner
insisted that he had the right to require
that the vessel be returned to him in the
same condition that it had been at the
time it was wrongfully seized by
respondent or, should it no longer be
possible, that another vessel of the same
tonnage, length and beam similar to that
of M/V Pilar-I be delivered but Colorado
responded that the vessel had suffered
severe damage and deterioration that
refloating or restoring it to its former
condition would be futile, impossible and
very costly; and should petitioner persist
in his demand that the ship be refloated, it
should be done at the expense of the
party adjudged by the court to pay the
same.
 December 13, 2010: RTC issued an Order
granting the motion for execution but denying
petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in
the same state in which it was taken by
respondent; MR denied
ISSUES:

3. Whether or not the petitioner was justified in
resorting directly to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65
4. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the return of
M/V Pilar-I in the same condition when it was
seized by respondent.
HELD: The Court finds the petition to be partly
meritorious.
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort to The Supreme Court
Justified
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct
invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the interest of
justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is
involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower courts
cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring
this case immediately to the attention of this Court. Lastly,
petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel
issue of law – that is, whether in an action to recover, a
defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in
litigation may be allowed to return the same in a
deteriorated condition without any liability.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition
should have been filed with the CA, following the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to
state any special or important reason or any exceptional
and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct
recourse to this Court.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the
Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must
remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform
its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities;
or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate
and direct handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle
of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court
take cognizance of this case to put an end to the
controversy and resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in
43
light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment
promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to
call upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
Wrong Mode of Appeal; Exception
Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to rule in his favor despite the fact
that he had been deprived by respondent of his property
rights over M/V Pilar-I for the past eighteen (18) years.
Moreover, the change in the situation of the parties calls
for a relaxation of the rules which would make the
execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable
or unjust. According to petitioner, for the RTC to allow
respondent to return the ship to him in its severely
damaged and deteriorated condition without any liability
would be to reward bad faith.
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the latter
merely observed due process and followed the principle
that an execution order may not vary or go beyond the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Respondent
adds that the proper remedy should have been an
ordinary appeal, where a factual review of the records can
be made to determine the condition of the ship at the time
it was taken from petitioner, and not a special civil action
for certiorari.
There are considerable differences between an ordinary
appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been
exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases.
The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on
the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or
legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal.
In contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original action designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer, or
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of in excess of jurisdiction." A court
or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion if its exercise of judgment was
so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse must be extremely patent and
gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive
duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility."
Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of
the lower court, as asserted by petitioner, may only be
reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari because the
issue raised by the petitioner does not involve any
jurisdictional ground. It is a general rule of procedural
law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode
of appeal, his petition may be dismissed outright to

prevent the erring party from benefiting from his
neglect and mistakes. There are exceptions to this
otherwise ironclad rule, however. One is when the
strict application of procedural technicalities would
hinder the expeditious disposition of this case on the
merits, such as in this case.
Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding Return of the
Vessel in its Former Condition
Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the
responsibility for the deterioration of the vessel because
the latter, despite having in its possession the vessel M/V
Pilar-I during the pendency of the foreclosure
proceedings, failed to inform the court and petitioner
himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel
to take effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by
the party sought to be estopped and reliance by the party
claiming estoppel on the representation made by the
former. In this case, petitioner cannot be estopped from
asking for the return of the vessel in the condition that it
had been at the time it was seized by respondent because
he had not known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.
On the contrary, respondent argues that petitioner is
barred from asking for a modification of the judgment
since he never prayed for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the
same condition that it had been at the time it was seized.
Petitioner could have prayed for such relief in his prior
pleadings and presented evidence thereon before the
judgment became final and executory. During the course
of the trial, and even at the appellate phase of the case,
petitioner failed to ask the courts to look into the naturally
foreseeable depreciation of M/V Pilar-I and to determine
who should pay for the wear and tear of the vessel.
Consequently, petitioner can no longer pursue such relief
for the first time at this very late stage. Moreover,
respondent posits that it can only be held liable for the
restoration and replacement of the vessel if it can be
proven that M/V Pilar-I deteriorated through the fault of
respondent. Nowhere in the prior decision of this Court,
however, does it appear that respondent was found to
have been negligent in its care of the vessel. In fact,
respondent points out that, for a certain period, it even
paid for the repair and maintenance of the vessel and
engaged the services of security guards to watch over the
vessel. It reasons that the vessel’s deterioration was
necessarily due to its exposure to sea water and the
natural elements for the almost twenty years that it was
docked in the Colorado shipyard.
On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of
judgments. When a judgment becomes final and
executory, it is made immutable and unalterable,
meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this
Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly
44
administration of justice and to put an end to judicial
controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors,
public policy and sound practice dictate that
judgments must become final at some point.
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain
exceptions. When a supervening event renders the
execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the
interested party can petition the court to modify the
judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A
supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new
circumstance which develops after a judgment has
become final and executory. This includes matters which
the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because
they were not yet in existence at that time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a
supervening event.1âwphi1 Petitioner, who did not have
possession of the ship, was only informed of its
destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated
July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision
of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance
Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and
Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During
the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this
Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened
condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of
Colorado.
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should
have had the foresight to ask for the return of the vessel in
its former condition at the time respondent took
possession of the same during the proceedings in the
earlier case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Court’s
decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances,
that is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the
case and the belated delivery of this information to the
courts by the party in possession of the same.
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment
is permissible in light of the exceptional incident present in
this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled
to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition in which
respondent took possession of it. Considering, however,
that this is no longer possible, then respondent should pay
petitioner the value of the ship at such time.
After having been deprived of his vessel for almost
two decades, through no fault of his own, it would be
the height of injustice to permit there turn of M/V Pilar-
I to petitioner in pieces, especially after a judgment by
this very same Court ordering respondent to restore
possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would
leave petitioner with nothing but a hollow and illusory
victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and
declared that respondent wrongfully took possession
of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the beneficial
use of his extremely deteriorated vessel that it is no
 45

longer seaworthy and has no other commercial value

but for the sale of its parts as scrap.

Moreover, the incongruity only becomes more palpable

when consideration is taken of the fact that petitioner's
obligation to respondent, for which the now practically
worthless vessel serves as security, is still outstanding.
The Court cannot countenance such an absurd outcome.
It could not have been the intention of this Court to
perpetrate an injustice in the guise of a favorable decision.
As the court of last resort, this Court is the final bastion of
justice where litigants can hope to correct any error made
in the lower courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED.

Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the value of M/V
Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case
is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
64, Makati City, for the proper determination of the value
of the vessel at said time.