Liwayway Vinsons Chato vs Fortune Tobacco
Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602
Corporation
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The
general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of
his assigned tasks; However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.— The general rule is that a
public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An
officer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is
not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune
from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done
in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.
Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not
so tainted with malice or bad faith; Instances Where a
Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in His/Her Private
Capacity for Acts Done in the Course of the Performance
of the Functions of the Office.—In addition, the Court
held in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
(1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a
public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of
the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where
the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff. office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Carino vs Commission on Human Rights
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on
Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory
powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political
rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction
or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil
or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be
conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission
the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations invoking civil and political rights.—As
should at once be observed, only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance
to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules,
cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In the course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and
decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Commission on Human Rights having merely the
power to investigate cannot and should not try and
resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775.—Hence it is that the
Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
“to investigate,” cannot and should not “try and resolve
on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil
or political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.—These are matters undoubtedly and clearly
within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and
also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
DOH vs Camposano
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Department Secretaries
are authorized to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their
jurisdiction.—The Administrative Code of 1987 vests
department secretaries with the authority to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction.
Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents. Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr.
Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the
President, in line with the principle that the “power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint.” While the
Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service,
he nonetheless recognized the health secretary’s
disciplinary authority over respondents when he
remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the
secretary’s “appropriate action.”
Same; Same; Same; As a matter of administrative
procedure, a department secretary may utilize other
officials to investigate and report the facts from which a
decision may be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151
nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO
298 had the power to impose any administrative
sanctions directly—their authority was limited to
conducting investigations and preparing their findings
and recommendations.—As a matter of administrative
procedure, a department secretary may utilize other
officials to investigate and report the facts from which a
decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary
effectively delegated the power to investigate to the
PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly.
Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The
recommendations.—As a matter of administrative
procedure, a department secretary may utilize other
officials to investigate and report the facts from which a
decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary
effectively delegated the power to investigate to the
PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly.
Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not
merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess
the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts,
because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively charged. In the
present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order
dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to
the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even
noted a violation that had not been considered by the
PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita
N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commission’s Resolution. She even
misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the
recommendation with regard to Respondents Enrique L.
Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin
OPLE VS TORRES
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative
Order No. 308; As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of Administrative Order No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. —As is usual in
constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and
the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not
deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring
suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is
a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and
member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.—
Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to
fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Order No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
an administrative order.—Prescinding from these
precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject
that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. x x x An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be
in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that Administrative Order
No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987 rejected.—We reject the
argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative
policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a
general law and “incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance” and “embodies changes in administrative
structures and procedures designed to serve the people.”
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Order No. 308 cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy.—Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need
not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.”
Smart vs NTC
Administrative Law; National Telecommunications
Commission; Powers; Quasi-Legislative Power;
Administrative agencies possess quasilegislative or rule-
making powers and quasijudicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers.—Administrative agencies possess
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasilegislative or
rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules and regulations
that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.—
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law. They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be
valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It
may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat,
the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a
statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.
Same; Same; Same, Quasi-Judicial Power; The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature.—Not
to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making
power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasijudicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
EDU VS ERICTA
Constitutional Law; Police Power; State has inherent
power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society.—The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the State and imposing upon its government limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety,
good order and welfare.
Same; Same; Valid Delegation of Legislative Power;
Standard must be set to avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation.—What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them. The test is the completeness of the statute in
all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands cf
the legislature. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy.
PEOPLE VS MACEREN
Fishing; Administrative law; Fishery Adm. Order No. 84
penalizing electro fishing is null and void because the
Fishery Laws under which it was issued (Act 4003 and
R.A. 3512) did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.—We
are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Law, Act No.
4003, and under the law creating the Fisheries Law does
not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing
electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Same; Same; Lawmaking body cannot delegate to
administrative official the power to declare what act
constitute a criminal offense.—The law making body
cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It
can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Same; Same; An administrative regulation must be in
harmony with law; it must not amend an act of the
legislature.— Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provision. By such relations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
x x x The rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned
REPUBLIC VS DRUGMAKER’S LABORATORIES
Administrative Agencies; Administrative agencies may
exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if
there exists a law which delegates these powers to
them.—Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the
rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the
granting statute and must involve no discretion as to
what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the
details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set
out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of
separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of
non-delegability of legislative power.
Administrative Law; An administrative regulation may be
classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a
contingent rule.—An administrative regulation may be
classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a
contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of
subordinate legislation and designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They
usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law
or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret,
clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under
which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or
objective is merely to construe the statute being
administered and purport to do no more than interpret
the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute
means and refer to no single person or party in particular
but concern all those belonging to the same class which
may be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent
rules are those issued by an administrative authority
based on the existence of certain facts or things upon
which the enforcement of the law depends.
Same; When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed.—In general, an administrative regulation
needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the
“Administrative Code of 1987,” on prior notice, hearing,
and publication in order to be valid and binding, except
when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is
because “[w]hen an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance
is given the force and effect of law.”
ASTEC VS ERC
Statutes; Publication; Procedural Due Process;
Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due
process. The purpose of publication is to duly inform the
public of the contents of the laws which govern them and
regulate their activities.—Publication is a basic postulate
of procedural due process. The purpose of publication is
to duly inform the public of the contents of the laws
which govern them and regulate their activities. Article 2
of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 200, states that “[l]aws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.” Section 18, Chapter 5, Book I of Executive
Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
similarly provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.”
Same; Same; Same; Procedural due process demands
that administrative rules and regulations be published in
order to be effecttive.—Procedural due process demands
that administrative rules and regulations be published in
order to be effective. In Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
(1986), this Court articulated the fundamental
requirement of publication, thus: We hold therefore that
all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Manila Jockey Club vs CA
Horse Racing; Breakages; Words and Phrases;
“Breakages” are the fractions of ten centavos eliminated
from the dividend of winning tickets.—“Breakages” are the
fractions of ten centavos eliminated from the dividend of
winning tickets. For example the dividends due on a
winning ticket is ten pesos and ninety-eight centavos, the
fraction of ten centavos or eight centavos shall be
deducted from the dividends and set aside as part of
breakages.
Same; Franchises; Words and Phrases; Franchise laws
are privileges conferred by the government on
corporations to do that “which does not belong to the
citizens of the country generally by common right.”—
Franchise laws are privileges conferred by the government
on corporations to do that “which does not belong to the
citizens of the country generally by common right.” As a
rule, a franchise springs from contracts between the
sovereign power and the private corporation for purposes
of individual advantage as well as public benefit. Thus, a
franchise partakes of a double nature and character. In
so far as it affects or concerns the public, it is public juris
and subject to governmental control. The legislature may
prescribe the conditions and terms upon which it may be
held, and the duty of grantee to the public exercising it.
SM LAND vs BASES CONVERSION
Administrative Orders; Under the Administrative Code of
1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a general
or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statu
615 tory powers shall be promulgated in Executive Orders
(EOs). —Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of
the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated
in Executive Orders (EOs). In other words, it is through
these orders that the President ensures that laws are
faithfully executed, by handing out instructions to
subordinate executive officials and the public, in the form
of implementing rules and regulations, on how the law
should be executed by subordinate officials and complied
with by the public.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Through Section 5 of
Executive Order (EO) No. 109, Section 8 of EO No. 109-A
and now Section 8 of EO No. 423, the President effectively
delegated her inherent executive power to issue rules and
regulations on procurement to her subordinate executive
officials, her alter egos.—Amidst the changes effected on
procurement rules, the NEDA’s duty to issue a JV
Guidelines under the said executive orders remained
unaffected. Through Section 5 of EO No. 109, Section 8 of
EO No. 109-A and now Section 8 of EO No. 423, the
President effectively delegated her inherent executive
power to issue rules and regulations on procurement to
her subordinate executive officials, her alter egos, the
most recent of which reads in this wise: Section 8. Joint
Venture Agreements.—The NEDA, in consultation with
the GPPB, shall issue guidelines regarding joint venture
agreements with private entities with the objective of
promoting transparency, competitiveness, and
accountability in government transactions, and, where
applicable, complying with the requirements of an open
and competitive public bidding. Pursuant to said repeated
directives from no less than the Chief Executive, the
NEDA issued the JV Guidelines providing the procedures
for the coagulation of joint ventures between the
government and a private entity. In this regard, attention
must be drawn to the well-established rule that
administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV
Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-
making power granted by statute, have the force and
effect of law.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
Same; Same; Delegation of power; Legislative discretion
as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated; What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced.—The second
challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative
discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.
Same; Same; Same; Accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is valid delegation of legislative power.—There
are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there
is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz., the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of non-delegation of powers
is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the government,
but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power.—The principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its
delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the
authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power
has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
Same; Same; Same; Reason for the frequent delegation of
power by the legislature.—The reason is the increasing
complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even
in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
Same; Same; Same; Reasons for delegation of legislative
powers are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies; Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute is called power of
subordinate legislation.—The reasons given above for the
delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation
of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legisla-tion.”
Same; Same; Same; Administrative bodies implement the
broad policies by promulgating their supplemental
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.—With this
power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of “law
CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.—The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays
down a policy and a standard is established by the
statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957).
Republic Act No. 51, in authorizing the President of the
Philippines to make reforms and changes in government-
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy
that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of the free and independent
Government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard
was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry
out the mandate, and this he did by promulgating
Executive Order (No. 93) in accordance with Republic Act
No. 51, which, tested by the said rule, does not constitute
an undue delegation of legislative power.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
Administrative law; Power of President to create
municipalities.—Since January 1, 1960, when Republic
Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding" provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
This statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power
to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios.
Same; Same; Nature of power to create municipalities.—
Whereas the power to f ix a common boundary, in order
to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature—involving, as it does, the adoption
of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating"
said municipalities—the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature,
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for valid delegation of
power. —Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential that said law: (a) be complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard—the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of due
delegation of power not met by Section 68 of Revised
Administrative Code.— Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the President
the power to create municipalities, does not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Abdication of powers of Congress in favor of the
Executive.—If the validity of said delegation of powers,
made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
were upheld. there would no longer be any legal
impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the
President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant
of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about
a total collapse of the democratic system established by
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Nature of powers dealt with in
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.—It is true
that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs.
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public
welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But the doctrine laid down in these cases
must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
Issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect. Both
cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers
related to the exercise of their administrative functions,
calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is
not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The creation of
municipalities being essentially and eminently legislative
in character, the question whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact It is
purely a legislative question (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-
313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn,
79 P. 2d. 347-349).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof that issuance of
Executive Orders in question enteils exercise of purely
legislative functions.— The fact that Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 128 to 129, creating thirty-three
municipalities, were issued after the legislative bills for
the creation of the said municipalities had failed to pass
Congress, is the best proof that their issuance entails the
exercise of purely legislative functions
BALBUENA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEPARTMENT ORDER No. 8,
SERIES OF 1955, VALID; SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
AUTHORIZED TO PROMULGATE IT; FLAG CEREMONY
OR SALUTE PROVIDED THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON FREEDOM OF
RELIGION.—Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, is
valid. The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by
the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said
Department Order, and its provisions requiring the
observance of the flag salute, not being a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance
and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag
stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of religion (Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, et al., 106 Phil., 2; 57 Off. Gaz., [5] 820).

ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 1265 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
REQUIREMENTS IN SECTIONS 1 AND 2 THEREOF TO
OBSERVE DAILY FLAG CEREMONY WITH SIMPLICITY
AND DlGNITY AND THE PLAYING OR SlNGING OF
NATIONAL ANTHEM CONSTITUTE ADEQUATE
STANDARD.—The requirements set in Sections 1 and 2 of
the Act constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity
and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the
National Anthem. That the Legislature did not specify the
details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity
of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying'
down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion
of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to
establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated
power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility
that the delegation is intended to achieve
BOC EMPLOYEES VS TEVES
Constitutional Law; Administrative Agencies; Separation
of Powers; The principle of separation of powers ordains
that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere; The
principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions.—The principle of separation of powers ordains
that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of
non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which
means “what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.”
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation
of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is
the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
SERENO CONCURRING OPINION
Constitutional Law; Actions; Congress must revisit the
constitutional provision and weigh the question of
whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the
exercise of this constitutional duty to set tariffs in favor of
the President.—For the longest time, Congress has not
made its voice heard on this matter and has simply
allowed the President to determine tariff rates by one
executive order after another. From the above language, it
would seem that delegated presidential tariff rate setting
powers has been designed to be exercised only as an
exception, and not as the norm. Congress must revisit
this constitutional provision and weigh the question of
whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the
exercise of this constitutional duty to set tariffs in favor of
the President.
US VS ANG TANG HO
THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No.
2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing mor£ than to authorize the Governor-General to
make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of
power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within
itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law
or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
GovernorGeheral, the act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.

POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE.—By the organic

act and subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in
the Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the
people of the Philippine Islands.