G.R. No.

102900 October 2, 1997

MARCELINO ARCELONA, TOMASA ARCELONA-CHIANG and RUTH ARCELONA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ERLINDA PILE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAGUPAN CITY, Branch XL, and MOISES FARNACIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

What are the remedies and the grounds therefor to invalidate a final and executory judgment? May extraneous matters, not found in the records of the original case, be used to void
such final judgment? Procedurally, may an independent action for annulment of a decision filed in the Court of Appeals prosper in the face of a claim that the remedy of intervention
could have been availed of in the regional trial court during the original proceedings? Are all the co-owners pro indiviso of a real property indispensable parties? Does the non-
inclusion of some of such co-owners in a suit involving tenancy over said property constitute sufficient ground to nullify the final decision rendered in such case?

The Case

These are the main questions raised in this petition for review of the Decision1 in CA G.R. SP No. 24846 promulgated on July 16, 1991 by the Court of Appeals2 denying petitioners'
plea for annulment of a final and executory judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. D-7240, and the Resolution3 promulgated
on November 21, 1991 by the appellate court denying their motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U.S.A. Petitioner
Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-
Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which
they inherited from their deceased parents.4 The six Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences
ownership over the fishpond.

On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of three (3) years but was
renewed up to February 2, 1984.5

Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the
termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al.

Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted Civil Case D-7240 for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with
motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., before Respondent Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40. The case was intended to maintain
private respondent as tenant of the fishpond.6

On October 31, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:7

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows; to wit:

1. Declaring and recognizing Moises Farnacio as tenant-caretaker over the fishpond in question located at Lomboy District, Dagupan City;

2. Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation of said fishpond, with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law;

3. Ordering the Branch Clerk of Court to withdraw and deliver to the plaintiff all the amounts deposited with this Court; and

4. All others claims of the parties are hereby denied for lack of merit.

Olanday, et al. elevated the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)8 which affirmed with slight modification the decision of the trial court on May 31, 1985. On
appeal, this Court9 sustained the IAC decision in G.R. No. 71217. On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private respondent was placed in possession of
the entire property covered by TCT 34341.

Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff.10 The case was
docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners "to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 50, Dagupan City."11 Respondent Court promulgated in due course the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this petition for review before us on May 10, 1992. On August 24, 1992, due course was granted to the petition, and the parties filed their respective
memoranda.

The Issues

In their Memorandum dated November 7, 1992, petitioners allege that Respondent Court of Appeals has committed the following errors:12

I. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud.

II. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that lack of due process and jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners are also valid grounds for
annulment of judgment.

III. In annulment of judgment the grounds should be based solely on the records of the case. It is then an error for the Respondent Court of Appeals to consider matters extraneous
to the records of the case.

IV. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners should have intervened in the proceedings for issuance of writ of execution before the lower court.

V. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioners are estopped or are guilty of laches in questioning the decision of the lower court.

The Court believes that these five assigned errors may be condensed into three issues:

(1) May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside
from extrinsic fraud?

(2) May extraneous matters, not found in the records of the original case, be used in voiding or defending the validity of such final judgment?

(3) Procedurally, will an independent action for annulment of the decision of the regional trial court (which was affirmed both by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court) filed
before the Court of Appeals prosper, or is intervention before the court of origin the only remedy?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Grounds for Annulment of Final Judgment

Petitioners contend that Respondent Court of Appeals erred in decreeing "the all-sweeping and categorical pronouncement that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is
extrinsic fraud," and in thereby ignoring various Supreme Court rulings that a final judgment may also be annulled for "a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; b) lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of necessary or indispensable parties; and c) lack of due process."13 Petitioners argue that, being co-owners of the subject property, they are
"indispensable parties."14 Inasmuch as they were not impleaded in Civil Case D-7240, "the questioned judgment of the lower court is void insofar as the petitioners are concerned
for want of jurisdiction over their persons and [for] lack of due process."15 Petitioners "do not see any reason why a person who was not made a party at all could not assail the same
proceedings involving his property and affecting his rights and interests."16

Petitioners further maintain that since "the case involves the personal status of the private respondent, or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, then the
petitioners as non-residents" are entitled to extra-territorial service,17 which is a "due process requirement." As they were never served with summons, to "bar them [from]
questioning the proceedings of the lower court will be compounding injustice . . . . If a party to a case can assail the proceedings for defective service of summons," the same right
should be afforded to a person who was not made a party at all.18

Public respondent disposed of petitioners' above contention in this

wise:19

First.Annulment of judgment, as the Supreme Court had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud (Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, 170 [sic] SCRA 160, 170). Islamic
Da' Wah Council of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, 178, 186, citing Anuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29, emphatically announced that there can be no question as to the right of any
person adversely affected by a judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in obtaining
the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, there is nothing in the petition that extrinsic fraud, as Macabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings during the trial of Civil Case No. D-7240.

The essence of the instant petition is worded by the petitioners as follows:

The common property involved in this case is covered by a Torrens Title, specifically mentioning the co-owners thereof. To bind the entire property and the owners thereof, all the
registered owners must be impleaded. The private respondent ONLY IMPLEADED the three co-owners, excluding the petitioners herein. For the petitioners to be bound by the
questioned decision, such would really be a derogation of their constitutional right to due process. The questioned decision, too, suffers the fatal defect of utter want of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, since the petition for annulment of judgment is not based on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the petition suffers from a basic and fundamental infirmity that deprives
petitioners of a valid cause of action against respondents herein.

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the ground(s) for annulment of judgment to only one, namely, extrinsic fraud. While it is true that in the cited cases of Canlas vs.
CA20 and Islamic Da' Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,21 this Court said that a judgment "may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud,"22 we
should hasten to add that in Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation,23 where the above ruling on annulment of judgment was based, we held that there are
really three ways by which a final judgment may be attacked: 24

Under existing rules, there are three (3) ways by which a final and executory judgment may be set aside. The first is by petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised
Rules of Court, when judgment has been taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, in which case the petition must be filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, but not more than six (6) months after such judgment was entered. The second is by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement
of the judgment. This remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent
upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment.[fn: Abbain v. Chua, 22 SCRA 798; Cadano v. Cadano, 49 SCRA 33; Anuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 329] As explained in
Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, [fn: 37 Phil. 291, 949] "under accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, the proper remedy in such case, after
the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action enjoining the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been
disposed of, he may institute suit to recover it." The third is either a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the challenged judgment (which is) is void upon its
face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. As aptly explained by Justice Malcolm in his dissent in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, supra, "A
judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should
be lopped off, if the power so to do exists."

Since the aforementioned decision in Civil Case No. Q-5866 is not void upon its face, it may only be annulled by direct action on the ground of fraud.

It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. [Aring v. Original, 6 SCRA 1021, 1025;
Velasco v. Velasco, 2 SCRA 736] Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a
trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." [46 Am. Jur. 913] . . . .

It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court25 on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six (6) months
from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment
that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere inspection of the
judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law. This doctrine is recognized in other cases: 26

. . . . There is no question that a final judgment may be annulled. There are, however, certain requisites which must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action
for annulment. "Under the present procedure, aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may
procure final and executory judgment to be a set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud." (I Moran's Rule of Court 1950 Ed., 697, citing Anuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921). Reason of
public policy which favors the stability of judicial decisions are (sic) mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors (Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25).

On the one hand, extrinsic fraud is the ground to annul a voidable final judgment; the declaration of nullity of a patently void final judgment, on the other, is based on grounds other
than extrinsic fraud. To say, then, that petitioners can avail themselves only of the ground of extrinsic fraud and no other is to fail to appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of
annulment/nullity.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Its exercise must strictly comply with the legal requisites; otherwise, a challenge on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime.
Such jurisdiction normally refers to jurisdiction over the subject. As an example, in a case involving the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the original of which
was lost, stolen or destroyed, the court must strictly comply with the requisites of Section 109 of P.D. 1529; otherwise, its jurisdiction may be attacked anytime. Thus, we ruled in
New Durawood Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals:27

In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al., [238 SCRA 158, at 162 (November 14, 1994)] this Court ruled:

In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is
in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked
any time.
In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner's chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner
corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact "lost or destroyed," there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate
Certificates of Title . . . ," In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence, the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.

It is obvious that this lapse happened because private respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already stated, governs the
issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title.

Section 109 of the said law provides, inter alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate certificate "shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his
behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied). In this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register
of Deeds.

Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec. 107 of the
P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in case of the refusal or failure of the holder — in this case, the petitioner — to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a
"petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds," and not a petition for reconstitution.

Ineluctably, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. As we elucidated in Leonor vs. CA:28

Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's
civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their
marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and
seriously abused his discretion in unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage
under the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rules.

Jurisdiction over the Persons

of Indispensable Parties

True, the above dispositions refer to jurisdiction over the subject matter. Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction over the
persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff
upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or
otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against
such defendant is null and void.29 A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law and, hence, it can
never become final and executory.30

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be
joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where
possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.31 It is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."32 The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.33

Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is
impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion
the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable
parties. Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals34 held that no final determination of a case could be made if an indispensable party is not impleaded:

. . . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.

Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain
an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. Former Chief Justice Moran, an eminent authority on remedial law, explains:35

. . . . As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a
judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property might be
harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits
by requiring the person asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the
whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.

Contrariwise, it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination
of the action. In other words, a tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.

Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded. As defined:36

An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.

A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete
relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.

Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of
the property being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.37

Ergo, res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicarium faciunt.38 Thus, the Court, through former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, held that a person who was not impleaded in
the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.39

Admittedly, in this case, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court in rendering its decision in Civil Case No. D-7240 is not patent on the face of said judgment. However, there were
glaring documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence referred to by the trial court in its decision which should have prompted it to inquire further whether there were other
indispensable parties who were not impleaded. These facts and circumstances should have forewarned the trial court that it had not acquired jurisdiction over a number of
indispensable parties. In American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the
face of the judgment only.40 We believe that this rule should be applied to this case, considering that in the assailed trial court's decision, referrals were made to crucial evidence
which if scrutinized would readily reveal that there were indispensable parties omitted.

First, the decision referred to the subject property "as Lot No. 3312 of the Cadastral Survey."41 This lot was particularly described in private respondent's Complaint dated February
6, 1984 filed in Civil Case D-7240.42 Obviously such description was copied by private respondent from the transfer certificate of title over the subject fishpond issued on August
12, 1975 naming all the co-owners, including the herein petitioners and the fact of their foreign residences, thus:43

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the City of Dagupan, formerly in the Province of Pangasinan bounded and described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 3312 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan), situated in the City of Dagupan . . . .

is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of PACITA ARCELONA, married to Miguel Ulanday; TOMASA ARCELONA, married to
Tung Ming Chiang; MARCELINO V. ARCELONA, married to Soledad Tiongco; MARIA V. ARCELONA, married to Oreste Arellano; BENEDICTO V. ARCELONA, married to
Ruth Suget; and NATIVIDAD ARCELONA, married to Agrimero Cruz; all of legal age, Filipinos, the second and fifth named residents of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., third &
fourth of Manila; first of Villasis, Pangasinan & the last named of Lingayen, Pangasinan as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Section 39
of said Act as may be subsisting, and to

xxx xxx xxx

Entered at the City of

Dagupan Philippines, on the
12th day of August in the year
nineteen hundred and seventy
five at 4:00 p m.
(Emphasis supplied).

Considering that private respondent was suing to establish his status as a tenant over the subject fishpond, the responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably
rested on him as provided under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 3 requires that "every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs." Further, Section 7 of the same rule states that
"(p)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

Second, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent "in his motion to dismiss (before said Court) alleged that petitioners knew of the lessee as revealed by the
testimony of Pacita Olanday, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. D-7240 and a sister of petitioners. (TSN, pp. 15-16, hearing of October 2, 1984, Civil Case No. D-7240)." That
being so, why did private respondent fail to include petitioners as defendants in the case below? It should be noted that the lease contract was between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday,
et al. Private respondent, a caretaker-tenant of Tandoc, knew or should have known that there were co-owners other than Olanlday, et al. And even conceding arguendo that
petitioners had authorized Olanday, et al. to enter into a lease contract with Tandoc, this fact did not authorize the latter to represent petitioners in the civil case he brought. Under
Rule 9, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the pleader is required to set forth the names, if known to him, of persons who ought to be parties, if complete relief is to be accorded to those
who are already parties but who are not joined; and to state why they have been omitted. Surely, he brought suit to establish his status as a tenant. It is thus his responsibility to state
the names of all the persons against whom he wants to establish his status as tenant.

Third, both the private respondent and the trial court knew of the obvious omission of petitioners as party defendants. Telling is the fact that, by reciting part of the transcript of
stenographic notes, private respondent himself provided clear evidence in his memorandum that he knew of the existence of other co-owners who were not impleaded in his case
against Olanday et al.:44

As admitted by Pacita Olanday, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. D-7240, the petitioners know of the lease with Cipriano Tandoc; they were authorized to lease the shares of
the petitioners. Here is the testimony of Pacita Olanday:

ATTY. VINLUAN:

Q. You made mentioned that you were authorized by your brothers and sister who are (sic) residing in the United States to enter into a contract. Did these brothers and sister of
yours make any special power of attorney authorizing you to that effect?

xxx xxx xxx

A. I talked with my brothers when they "balik-bayan", they said I will make an agreement. (tsn. October 2, 1984 pp. 15 and 16 — CV# D-7240).
He also knew that in executing the lease, Pacita Olanday represented only her sisters (Maria and Natividad) who were residing in the Philippines. Definitely, at the time of the
execution of the contract, she had no brother residing in the Philippines because her only brothers, Marcelino and Benedicto Arcelona, (the latter now deceased and represented in
this case by Petitioner Ruth Arcelona) were living in California. This fact can be deduced from the recitals of the RTC decision:45

It is undisputed in the records that the defendants (referring to Olanday, et al.) are co-owners and civil law lessors of a fishpond otherwise known as Lot No. 3312 of the Cadastral
Survey of Dagupan City; that as owners, they entered into a Contract of Lease (Exh. "1") with one Cipriano Tandoc dated March 4, 1978 for a term of three (3) years from February
2, 1982, which contract was renewed for another two (2) years up to February 2, 1984. On the 31st of January, 1984, Exhibit "3", an "Affidavit of Surrender of Rights and Possession
of Lessee over a Fishpond" was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Pacita Olanday who signed for herself and in behalf of her two (2) sisters. Plaintiff Moises Farnacio was
however, instituted as caretaker-tenant over the same fishpond by Cipriano Tandoc on the date of the Contract of Lease was entered into between the owners-lessors and Cipriano
Tandoc. The private agreement (Exh. "D") signed by Cipriano Tandoc and Moises Farnacio is, however, assailed in a criminal case for falsification in the Fiscal's Office." (Emphasis
supplied).

In fact, only these co-owners who are residing in the Philippines were joined as defendants in Civil Case D-7240. But the mention of Pacita's relatives who were residing abroad
should have made the trial court aware of the existence of indispensable parties who were not yet impleaded.

Despite this knowledge of the apparent defect in the complaint and in its jurisdiction, the trial court did not take the initiative to implead petitioners as defendants or to order private
respondent to do so, contrary to the clear mandate of Rule 3, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court46 which provides:

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

The foregoing testimony on the existence of other co-owners was a clear signal that indispensable parties had not yet been impleaded. Indeed, this knowledge should have put the
private respondent and the trial court on guard. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on private respondent and on the trial court,
respectively. Since no evidence was presented to prove that petitioners were aware of the civil case filed against Olanday et al., they cannot be faulted for not intervening therein.

In sum, we hold that the nullity of a judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary
and testimonial evidence found in the records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.

Before ending our discussion on the first issue, we must stress that the then Intermediate Appellate Court and this Court, in affirming the RTC decision in Civil Case No. D-7240
which we here nullify, had not been given the occasion to rule on the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties; verily, this question had not been
raised before the two appellate courts. The review of civil cases by appellate courts is confined only to the issues raised by the parties. Hence, appellate courts do not have the
privilege or the opportunity afforded the trial courts to consider matters beyond the specifically contested issues, e.g., jurisdiction over indispensable parties, as in this case. Such lack
of jurisdiction could not have been known by the appellate courts, including this Court, as it was not patent from the documents or submissions filed before them. The issue raised
before the then Intermediate Appellate Court and this Court was formulated in this wise: "(t)he validity of private respondent's claim that he is a tenant of the petitioners' fishpond,
with security of tenure as such assured under the law, is the basic question presented in this appeal."47 We underscore the fact that the issue of whether all the indispensable parties
had been validly impleaded, if at all, had not been raised at that time. In any event, whether the indispensable parties were actually impleaded and jurisdiction over them was
acquired was a factual question for the trial court to determine. Consistent with the basic doctrine that factual findings of lower courts are binding on appellate courts unless covered
by the recognized exceptions,48 appellate courts must be able to rely on the implied affirmation of the trial court that jurisdiction had been acquired over indispensable parties,
especially when this was not raised as an issue on appeal. The responsibility for impleading indispensable parties for the exhaustive trial of a case cannot rest on this forum or on the
then Intermediate Appellate Court. Indeed, the Decision of this Court affirming the said trial court's decision is captioned only as "Pacita A. Olanday, Maria A. Arellano and
Natividad A. Cruz, petitioners, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Moises Farnacio, respondents", clearly indicating that petitioners herein had been omitted as indispensable
parties in the proceedings before the trial court and before the appellate tribunals. Substantial justice requires that this error be now rectified.

Second Issue: Estoppel and Laches

Apart from holding that there was only one ground to annul a judgment, namely, extrinsic fraud, the appellate court — using extraneous evidence — also found that estoppel and
laches had set in against petitioners, thereby barring them from asserting lack of jurisdiction over their persons. These "extraneous matters" are stated by the Respondent Court in this
wise:

. . . True, indeed, that petitioners were not original parties to the action and that the decision embraces half of the property in dispute belonging to petitioners as co-owners thereof.
But they cannot now complain they were denied due process. It will be recalled that the contract of lease was entered with one Cipriano Tandoc on March 4, 1978 for a term of three
years, which contract was renewed for another two years up to February 2, 1984. During all the years of the existence of the lease contract, it would be incredulous for petitioners to
assert that they never knew of such lease agreement from their three sisters, the defendants herein. Petitioners raised no overt protest against the lease contract executed by their
sisters with Cipriano Tandoc in 1978 and renewed in 1982. Petitioners took no direct action to promptly disavow or disaffirm the action taken by their sisters to lease the entire
property to Tandoc.

It is likewise unbelievable that during all the years that the subject property (fishpond) is under litigation in Civil Case No. D-7240 from 1984 to 1991, petitioners were not aware
that their property is subject of the controversy. By their continued silence, they have permitted the acts of their sisters in leasing the property and they cannot now be heard, after a
prolonged period of time, to denounce such acts as done without their knowledge and consent. The rule of acquiescence by silence has estopped petitioners to deny the reality of the
state of things which they made to appear to exist and upon which others have been led to reply. Parties must take the consequences of the position they assume. Sound ethics require
that the apparent in its effects and consequences should be as if it were real, and the law properly so regards. (Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Morales, 173 SCRA 629, 633).

In Santiago Syjuco, Inc. vs. Castro, 175 SCRA 171, 192, it was held, inter alia:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . Likewise, in Criminal Case No. 16866 for falsification against respondent Farnacio before Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, witness Juan Bernal testified
that the petitioners herein Tomasa Arcelona, Marcelino Arcelona and Ben Arcelona authorized their sisters Natividad Cruz, Corazon Arcelona, Pacita Olanday to lease the fishpond to
Cipriano Tandoc. (TSN, pp. 5-6, hearing of August 10, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 16866).49
Petitioners balk at these pronouncements, arguing that in annulment of judgments, "the grounds thereof must be based solely on the records of the case." They contend that "to permit
the court's record to be contradicted or varied by evidence dehors would render such records of no avail." Petitioners contend that Respondent Court of Appeals erred in taking into
account "the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16866 to show alleged knowledge of the petitioners herein of the lease of the property to Cipriano Tandoc."50 Petitioners submit that
the bone of contention in this case is

not knowledge of the petitioners of the Lease Contract executed by Pacita Olanday et al. and Cipriano Tandoc, but whether the petitioners knew of the case filed by private
respondent against Pacita Olanday et al. involving their common property.

Petitioners stress that Private Respondent Farnacio is "a total stranger" and has absolutely no privity of interest with them because it was Tandoc, not Farnacio, who entered into a
lease contract with Olanday, et al.51

Petitioners deny any concealment or deception on their part that would constitute estoppel. They contend that in the transfer certificate of title, their names "were specifically
mentioned as co-owners of the property on which the private respondent sought to be installed in physical possession as tenant."52 They aver that Respondent Court of Appeals'
finding that they had knowledge of the lease contract "is based on presumption not on clear and convincing evidence." Assuming, according to petitioners, that they can be held in
estoppel, it can only be as against Cipriano Tandoc, not private respondent who "was never a party to the lease contract."53

Since the judgment is void "insofar as the petitioner are concerned for lack of jurisdiction [over] their persons and for want of due process," and since they "were never given the
opportunity to institute any action to protect their interest," petitioners contend that to bar them now by laches and estoppel "will create an unfair and unjust situation." For as
petitioners candidly state, they "do not question the pronouncement that private respondent is the tenant of Pacita Olanday et al."; however, they submit that the issue in this case is
whether private respondent "is also the tenant of herein petitioners entitled to be placed in physical possession and cultivation of their undetermined share in the property without
[petitioners] being made parties in the case."54

Private respondent counters that "Pacita Olanday . . . testified that she was authorized to lease the share of . . . petitioners." According to private respondent, while petitioners were in
the Philippines, they were informed of the appointment of private respondent as caretaker-tenant of the entire fishpond, and they did not object to such appointment.55 Further,
private respondent contends that petitioners failed to intervene in the case before the writ of execution was granted on "May 5, 1991" despite the "appearance . . . of their counsel,
Atty. Marina Cruz, when the motion for issuance of said writ was heard." Private respondent adds that he was "impliedly recognized" as a tenant when petitioners "received their
corresponding shares [i]n the lease rental of the property from the private respondent, through Olanday, et al. and their counsel, Atty. Marina Cruz."56

As correctly put by petitioners, we hold that Respondent Court of Appeals, in deciding the petition to declare the judgment void, cannot consider extraneous matters to vary what the
records bear. In other words, the Court of Appeals cannot annul or declare null the assailed decision with such extraneous matters. The validity or nullity of the said decision must
stand or fall on its own face and the evidence on record.

In an action to declare a judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, only evidence found in the records of the case can justify the annulment of
the said judgment. Contrariwise, the nullity of the judgment due to lack of jurisdiction may be proved at most by the evidence on record but never by extraneous evidence. Sen.
Vicente J. Francisco aptly explains this in his treatise on the Rules of Court:57

The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the ground that the judgment or order is null and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. The aggrieved party may attack the validity of the final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order to annul the
same, as certiorari, which is not incidental to, but is the main object of the proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may also be attacked collaterally as when a party files a
motion for the execution of the judgment and the adverse party resists the motion by claiming that the court has no authority to pronounce the judgment and that the same is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties.

In cases of collateral attack, the principles that apply have been stated as follows: "The legitimate province of collateral impeachment is void judgments. There and there alone can it
meet with any measure of success. Decision after decision bears this import: "In every case the field of collateral inquiry is narrowed down to the single issue concerning the void
character of the judgment and the assailant is called upon to satisfy the court that such is the fact. To compass his purpose of overthrowing the judgment, it is not enough that he
shows a mistaken or erroneous decision or a record disclosing non-jurisdictional irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the judgment. He must go beyond this and show to the
court, generally from the fact of the record itself, and not by extraneous evidence that the judgment complained of is utterly void. If he can do that his attack will succeed for the
cases leave no doubt respecting the right of a litigant to collaterally impeach a judgment that he can prove to be void.

The reason for the rule of exclusion of extraneous proof to show that the judgment complained of is utterly void for lack of jurisdiction has been expressed in the following words:
"The doctrine that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the record alone, thereby excluding extraneous proof seems to be the natural unavoidable result of that stamp of
authenticity which, from the earliest times, was placed upon the "record," and which gave it such "uncontrollable credit and verity that no plea, proof, or averment could be heard to
the contrary." . . . Any rule, . . . would be disastrous in its results, since to permit the court's record to be contradicted or varied by evidence dehors would render such records of no
avail and definite sentences would afford but slight protection to the rights of parties once solemnly adjudicated.

We should add, however, that where an action for annulment of judgment is grounded on extrinsic fraud, extraneous evidence is admitted. We have held that, although a person need
not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled by reason of extrinsic fraud, he must prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and
that he would be adversely affected thereby.58 Fraud must be extraneous, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act committed by a
prevailing party outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case, because of fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent.59 As distinctly defined in Cosmic Lumber Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:60

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. (fn: Makabingkil v. PHHC, No. L-
29080, 17 August 1976, 72 SCRA 326, 343-344) Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts
of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. (fn: Id., p. 344 citing
U.S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L. Ed. 93, 95)

In deciding the "petition for annulment of judgment" — which should be a "petition to declare judgment void" — Respondent Court of Appeals should not have considered the
following matters which find no support from the records and are thus considered "extraneous": (1) the assumption that petitioners knew of the five-year lease contract with private
respondent and the pendency of Civil Case No. D-7240 from 1984 to 1991; and (2) the testimony of Juan Bernal in a separate criminal case before another court concerning the
authority granted to Olanday et al. and where petitioners were not parties. The rule is that the nullity of the decision arising from want of jurisdiction and/or due process should
appear from the records of the case. And the validity of the judgment cannot be anchored on mere suppositions or speculations, as Respondent Court did.

Equally important, the finding of estoppel and laches by Respondent Court is not supported by the evidence on record. The silence of petitioners can easily be explained by the fact
that they were not in the country during the pendency of the subject civil case. Such absence from the country was never rebutted by private respondent. Even in the proceedings
antecedent to this case before us now, petitioners were merely represented by their attorney-in-fact.61 Moreover, they were not at all impleaded as parties in the judgment sought to
be voided. Neither were they properly served summons. The indelible fact is that they were completely ignored.

In any event, we ruled in Alabang Development Corporation vs. Valenzuela62 that no laches attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction:

The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of the lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence
allowing the said order/decision to become final. There is no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in their comment, the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of
lands covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the proceeding. As the Court ruled in Bernal case on the matter of intervention [fn: 93 SCRA at pp. 247, 248] "a valid
judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties' such as petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Title to the properties in question and "this aspect of
the case commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of later intervention."
Petitioners have precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside for want of
jurisdiction the decision and all proceedings of respondent judge.

On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel is predicated on and finds its roots in equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended
to prevent a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly separable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like laches, must be intentional and unequivocal, for when misapplied, it can easily
become a most convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is a principle that, as a rule, can be invoked only in highly exceptional and legitimate cases.63 In Cruz vs. Court
of Appeals,64 we reiterated the requisites of estoppel:

In Kalalo vs. Luz, [fn: 34 SCRA 337] We held that the essential elements of estoppel in respect to the party claiming it are: (a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of
the truth as the facts in question; (b) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (c) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to
change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.

The herein facts ineluctably show the absence of the first element in this case. Inasmuch as there is no proof that petitioners had knowledge of the pending tenancy case filed by
private respondent, it is only fair that they should not be held in estoppel for failing to intervene in and to question the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil Case No. D-7240. Thus,
private respondent may not say that he was misled into believing that petitioners knew of the lease contract and of the litigation of Civil Case No. D-7240. Undisputedly, from the
evidence on record, petitioners had no such knowledge.

Petitioners' receipt of lease rentals cannot be used as proof of recognition of private respondent as a caretaker-tenant. This issue was not raised in the lower court and is being alleged
for the first time before us. Well-settled is the doctrine that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.65

Third Issue: Intervention as a Remedy of Petitioners

Petitioners contend that Respondent Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that their only remedy was intervention during the execution stage of Civil Case No. D-7240. Inasmuch as
"annulment of judgment could be made either collaterally or directly," petitioners insist that their resort to "direct action in annulling the Decision of the lower court should not be
taken against them."66 Moreover, petitioners argue that "in proceedings for execution of a final decision or judgment, it is the ministerial duty of the court of origin to issue the
writ."67 Petitioners add that because their action would result in the "modification, alteration, and annulment of the judgment, the specific provision of law that annulment of
judgment of the Regional Trial Court is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals should prevail."68

Private respondent counters that petitioners deliberately did not intervene "to afford them opportunity to question, as they now question, the validity of any decision to be rendered in
said case, . . . in the event of an adverse decision."69

We hold that intervention is not the only remedy to assail a void final judgment. There is no procedural rule prescribing that petitioners' intervention in the hearing for the issuance of
a writ is the only way to question a void final judgment. As already stated, petitioners were not aware of such hearing. Besides, as already discussed, a direct action is available in
assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic fraud, while a direct or a collateral action may be used to show lack of jurisdiction.

The assailed Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals cites certain cases allowing intervention as follows:70

A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may
be involved in the execution. (Suson vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 70, 75, citing Paman vs. Severis, 115 SCRA 709; Seavan Carrier vs. GTI Sportswear, 137 SCRA 580)

These cases, which require intervention of parties who may be adversely affected by the decision, are not applicable. In the cited Suson vs. Court of Appeals,71 the parties, though
not impleaded, knew of the case and were in fact directed by the trial court to intervene, but they refused to do so. These particular facts are absent in the instant case where, to
repeat, petitioners were abroad when Civil Case D-7240 was prosecuted.

In any event, as earlier pointed out, jurisprudence upholds the soundness of an independent action to declare as null and void a judgment rendered without jurisdiction as in this case.
In Leonor vs. Court of Appeals,72 Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor, through a "petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus . . . sought the nullification of both the decision dated
December 14, 1992 and the order dated February 24, 1993 of the trial court for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion."73 We held in that
case that:74
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decisions in Civil Case No. D-
7240, AC-G.R. SP-05237-CAR and G.R. No. L-71217 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-105586December 15, 1993

REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26671 ordering petitioner to
vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to the private respondent; and its 21 May 1992 resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta
Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land ,
consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition
that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming
that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond
and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action.1
Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond 2 and, thus, in a decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board).3

An appeal was filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889. In due course, the RTC rendered a
decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and affirming in toto the trial court's decision.

The RTC decision held that:

Even conceding for the sake of argument that the defendant-appellee was allowed by the plaintiff-appellant, through her sister Aniceta Garcia (her administratrix over the
land in question) to occupy and use the landholding in question on condition that the defendant would vacate the same upon demand of the owner or plaintiff herein, without
paying any rental either in cash or produce, under these facts there was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657, thereby placing the dispute
involved in this case within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Perhaps, it would be different if the defendant was merely a trespasser, without any right whatsoever, when he
entered and occupied the subject landholding. The defendant, as a matter of fact, was a legal possessor of the land in question and therefore to determine his rights and
obligations over the said property, the DARAB is the proper forum for such issue.4

Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26671. On 27
February 1992, as earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in question
and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.5

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:

The agrarian dispute over which the DAR may have jurisdiction by virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which involves tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangement is concerned with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of
holding a piece of agricultural land between the landowner and the farmer or farmworker.

In the case at bar, there can be no dispute that between the parties herein there is no tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over the
land in dispute. Other than his bare allegation in the Answer with Counterclaim, and his affidavit, private respondent has not shown prima facie that he is a tenant of the
petitioner. The affidavits of his witnesses Antonio Samin and Daniel Villareal attest to the fact that they acted as mediators in the dispute between the parties herein
sometime in October 1990, but no settlement was arrived at, and that the subject land is a fishpond. To the same effect is the affidavit of Feliciano Garcia. Absent any prima
facie proof that private respondent has a tenancy relationship with petitioner, the established fact is that private respondent is possessing the property in dispute by mere
tolerance, and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the petitioner , private respondent became a squatter in said land. We hold that the Municipal
Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a resolution dated 21 May 19927 for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner raises the following issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY
EJECT THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:

1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS ARE CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS;

2. THAT BEING AN AGRICULTURAL LAND THE SAME IS GOVERNED BY OUR TENANCY LAWS WHERE RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT CANNOT
BE SIMPLY APPLIED; AND

3. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON
WORKING ON A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR NOT IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB.8

The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private respondent.

It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:9

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the
defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

In her complaint before the court a quo, private respondent stated that she is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner
is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the tolerance of her (private respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that he
(petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because of petitioner's refusal to vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was to file an action
for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court.

In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged that the land involved in the dispute is an agricultural land and hence, the case must be filed with the Court of Agrarian
Relations (not the MTC). Moreover, petitioner contended that it was his refusal to increase his lease rental (implying tenancy) that prompted the private respondent to sue
him in court. 10
It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the
alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. 11 The court continues to have the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of determining
whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 12

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore the question at issue is agrarian. In this
connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, 13 provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor or lessee. 14

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond
is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial. 17

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land
being agricultural is only one of
them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned,
such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. 19

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in
order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government
under existing tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). 20

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or
both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or judicial person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another
the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. 21

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between the petitioner and the
private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for
petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land.

Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle, swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this case. The fact remains that the
existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is
properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner of the land in question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had the legal right to demand upon
petitioner to vacate the land. And as correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court:

. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful possession became illegal when the petitioner (now private respondent) through her sister made a demand on him to vacate and he refused to
comply with such demand. Such is the ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136, 144, wherein it was held:

While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate is made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply
with such demand (Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 432; Yu vs. De Lara, 6 SCRA 786, 788; Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1957). A person who occupies the land of another
at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him (Yu vs. De Lara, supra)." 22

The present case should be distinguished from the recent case of Bernas vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals. 23 In the Bernas case, the land occupant (Bernas) had a
production-sharing agreement with the legal possessor (Benigno Bito-on) while the records in this case fail to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was sharing the harvest or
paying rent for his use of the land. Moreover, the agreement between the overseer (Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere
tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to use the land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In the
Bernas case, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to establish the existence of an agricultural tenancy or leasehold relationship between him and the legal possessor. The
evidence in this case, on the other hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was an agricultural tenant or lessee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 110592. January 23, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YOLANDA VELASCO Y PAMINTUAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was herein appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of
unlawfully selling shabu, in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. 6425).[1]
The prosecutions version of appellants apprehension is as follows:
After close surveillance by the Narcotics Unit of Station 7 of the Western Police District Command confirmed reports that appellant, notoriously tagged as the Shabu Queen of
Quiricada, Tondo, was indeed illicitly peddling the prohibited drug, a crack team composed of Pat. Ricardo Godoy, Pfc. Lamberto Gan, Pat. Renato Yumang, and Pat. Eduardo
Chiapoco launched a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991 in Quiricada Street. Pat. Godoy was the designated poseur-buyer while the rest stealthily positioned
themselves around the area. Donning a basketball outfit as disguise and accompanied by a confidential informant, Pat. Godoy searched for appellant and found her in an alley beside
a creek near her house on Quiricada St. apparently preparing to launder some clothes. Pat. Godoy told appellant that he wanted to buy shabu and gave her a fifty peso marked bill.
Appellant asked him to wait for a while and went inside her house. When she returned, she reached into her pocket and gave Pat. Godoy less than a gram of shabu wrapped in
aluminum foil known in street parlance as a deck. After the exchange and upon Pat. Godoys pre-arranged signal, his couching teammates rushed to the scene and immediately
apprehended the appellant. When the police officers asked appellant to open her pockets, they found five more decks of shabu.
Appellant was then brought to the police precinct for investigation by Pat. Vicente Rodriguez, the officer-in-charge of the Narcotics and Anti-hoodlum Section. The six aluminum
foils containing shabu were referred to the Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Western Police District and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. A booking sheet
and arrest report which recorded the incidents of the operation were prepared by Pat. Rodriguez, while a joint affidavit of apprehension was executed by the members of the buy-bust
team.
On her part, appellant claimed that on June 28, 1991, between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M., she was at home laundering clothes in her kitchen when police officers, with their guns drawn,
suddenly barged into her house. Two officers held her and frisked her body for shabu while the other two went upstairs, ransacked her room and even stole some pieces of jewelry
belonging to her sister and nieces. She claimed that no shabu was found on her person nor anywhere within the premises of her house. The police officers allegedly brought her
outside and asked her to locate a certain Minang. Unable to point to Minang whom appellant claims she does not know, the police officers took her instead. While at the precinct,
appellant was again told to locate Minang or think of somebody else to take her place, otherwise appellant would be charged. The police officers also asked for grease money.
Appellant insisted that she did not know the person they were looking for and that she was poor and could not give them any grease money. Appellant denied selling shabu to the
police officers. and alleged that she had no idea why she was brought to the police precinct and charged with having sold shabu. She further claimed that she had never met the police
officers before and that she has no knowledge of any reason which might have impelled them to impute false charges against her. In sum, the defenses of the appellant are denial and
frame-up, as she maintained that the six decks of shabu were planted evidence.
The trial court nonetheless found that her defenses could not offset the positive testimony of Pat. Godoy that his unit received information concerning accused-appellants drug
pushing activities from a confidential informant, that they verified the information by surveillance and that the buy-bust operation was conducted strictly as planned and as described
in the arrest report and joint affidavit of apprehension. Thus, her conviction.
Now before us on appeal, appellant raises a single error in her Appellants Brief, namely: that the trial court erred in admitting the decks of shabu in evidence against her because they
were obtained through a warrantless arrest and search.[2] It appears from her Reply Brief with Motion To Dismiss, however, that appellant likewise assails the jurisdiction of the trial
court (RTC) over the case.[3] Thus, two issues are up for resolution.
In amplification of her lone assigned error, appellant contends that as she was not committing any offense but was merely washing clothes in her house when the police officers
arrested her unarmed with a warrant, the warrantless arrest cannot be justified under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 5. Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
And so she posits that there being no valid warrantless arrest, the search incidental thereto which yielded several decks of shabu is, perforce, illegal.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, appellant argues that in line with the case of People v. Simon[4] which provides for the gradation of penalties depending on the amount of
drugs involved, her maximum prison term should only be six (6) years inasmuch as the decks of shabu seized from her do not even amount to one gram. Her case is, she concludes,
cognizable by the appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court, considering the passage of R.A. 7691[5] (effective on April 15, 1994) which expanded the jurisdiction of said inferior court
to include exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, and in effect divested the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over her case.
The two issues should be resolved against appellant.
The trial court correctly gave credence and weight to the prosecution evidence that appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto, thus completely debunking her claims of denial and
frame-up, and validating both the warrantless arrest and search on her person and the use of the confiscated shabu as evidence against her. While it is true that the Court, in People v.
Ale,[6] recognized that:
By the very nature of anti-narcotics operation, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of
heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great,[7]
there is no showing that appellants apprehension was marred by such official abuse. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are
policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice,
when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the principle that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect, must
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed.[8] This becomes all the more so in view of the fact that a claim of a frame-up, like alibi,
is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[9] Clear and convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of frame-up[10] which, unfortunately, are
inexistent here. In this connection, appellants attempt to undermine Pat. Godoys credibility, by harping on the seeming improbability that a drug pusher would readily sell prohibited
drugs to a complete stranger,[11] must be rejected. The Court has repeatedly held that drug pushing when done on a small level, as in this case, belongs to those types of crimes that
may be committed anytime and at any place.[12] For it is neither uncommon nor improbable that a drug pusher would sell to a total stranger, since what matters is not the existence
of familiarity between the procurer and pusher but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the drugs.[13] We wind up our discussion on this issue by
reiterating the Courts ruling in People v. Simon:
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyer is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such
causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellants entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted
by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their
official duty. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed x x x.[14]
Moving on to the jurisdictional issue, appellants position is premised on two relatively recent legal developments. The first is R.A. 7659[15] (effective on December 31, 1993) which
amended the penalties imposed by R.A. 6425. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659, the penalty imposed for the violation of many of the provisions of R.A. 6425 was life
imprisonment to death regardless of the amount of drugs involved. Section 17 of R.A. 7659 introduced the following amendment:
SECTION 17. Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the Crime - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua[16] depending upon the quantity.

xxx xxx xxx. (Italics supplied.)

In the Simon case,[17] the Court has had the occasion to rule that the abovementioned beneficent provisions can be applied retroactively to judgments which may have become final
and executory prior to December 31, 1993 and even to those who are already serving their sentence. This doctrine was reiterated in People v. Martinez[18] where the Court held that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine as a conjunctive penalty shall be imposed only when the shabu involved is 200 grams or more, otherwise if the quantity involved
is less than the foregoing, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal minus the fine.[19]
x x x the component penalties of prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal shall each be considered as a principal imposable penalty x x x of the total complex
penalty x x x to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved x x x and that the modifying circumstances shall be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty. Thus, the Court directed that the quantities (of the different drugs) enumerated in Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, be divided into three, with the resulting
quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively used as bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three x x x periods according to the severity thereof.
Under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be
applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the
medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.[20] (Italics supplied.)
Evidence uncontroverted by the prosecution shows that the total amount of shabu involved in the instant prosecution is less than one gram. Thus, as correctly argued by appellant, in
the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the penalty properly imposable upon her should be the same as the penalty imposed in the Martinez case.[21]
The second significant legal development is R.A. 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years.[22]
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellants case, we rule in the negative. It has been consistently held as a
general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.[23] Where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
[24]
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.[25] Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. Thus, the general rule
enunciated above is the controlling doctrine in the case at bar, At the time the case against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the amendments introduced by R.A.
7659 and R.A. 7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over alt cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive
cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.
xxx xxx xxx.
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court
(RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the
commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to
stress, prospective in nature.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against the accused-appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan is
AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that the proper imposable sentence should be the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as the minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as the maximum thereof. However, it appearing from the records that the appellant has been in jail for more than 4 years and 2
months,[26] thereby having served more than the maximum imposable penalty, her immediate release from custody is hereby ordered, unless she is otherwise detained for some
other cause.[27]
SO ORDERED