MODULE I

Article Crime Elements Penalty

-Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the
Philippine Islands,
- not being a foreigner
114 Treason - levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort Reclusion Perpetua to Death

*For conviction, testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act OR
confession of accused in open court
Conspiracy & Proposal to Conspiracy – Prision Mayor
115
commit treason Proposal – Prision Correcional
- Allegiance to the Government of the Philippines
-not an alien
116 Misprison of Treason Accessory to Treason
-having knowledge of conspiracy
-conceals, does not disclose or make known
-Without authority
-Enters military or naval establishment
Prision Correcional
-To obtain confidential info relative to defense of Philippine Archipelago
117 Espionage
-Having possession of confidential info relative to defense
Penalty next higher if offender is public officer or employee
-By reason of public office
-Discloses contents to representative of foreign nation
-by unlawful or unauthorized acts
Inciting to war or giving -provokes or gives occasion for a war Public officer - Reclusion temporal
118
motives for reprisals - to involve the Philippine Islands or exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on their Private individual – Prision Mayor
persons or property
-on the occasion of a war in which the Government is not involved
-violates any regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of enforcing
119 Violation of neutrality Prision Correcional
neutrality

1. By prision correccional
correspondence has been prohibited
by the Government
2. By prision mayor
correspondence be carried on in
ciphers or conventional signs; and
Correspondence with -Time of war
120
hostile country -Correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops notice or information given might be
useful to the enemy
3. By reclusion temporal
If the offender intended to aid the
enemy by giving such notice or
information, he shall suffer the
penalty of
Reclusion temporal to death
-Owing allegiance to the Government
121 Flight to enemy country -Attempts to flee or go to an enemy country when prohibited by competent Arresto Mayor
authority
 Promotes, maintains, or heads
-Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government
Reclusion Perpetua rebellion or insurrection
134 -Purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
Rebellion Reclusion Temporal Participates, executes commands of
135 other armed forces
others
(Penalties) -Depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives
Reclusion Perpetua
Leads or in any manner directs or
commands others to undertake coup
d’etat
-Swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
134-A -Directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or Any person in the government
any military camp or installation Prision Mayor in maximum service who participates, or executes
Coup d’etat
135 -By any person belonging to the military or police or holding any public office of period directions or commands of others
(Penalties) employment with or without civilian support or participation for the
-Purpose of seizing or diminishing state power Any person not in the government
service who participates, or in any
manner supports, finances, abets or
Reclusion temporal in aids in undertaking a coup d'etat
maximum period
Proposal and conspiracy to
commit coup d’etat
Prision Mayor in minimum w/ fine
not exceeding Php8K
Conspiracy and proposal
Conspiracy to commit Prision correctional in maximum
136 to commit coup d’etat,
rebellion period w/ fine not exceeding PHp5K
rebellion or insurrection
Prision Correcional in medium period
w/ fine not exceeding Php2K

Proposal to commit rebellion

-Public officers or employees
Disloyalty of public -Who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power OR shall
137 Prision Correcional
officers or employees continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels OR
shall accept appointment to office under them
-any person who shall incite others
-without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government
Inciting a rebellion or
138 -to the execution of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code Prision Mayor in minimum period
insurrection
-by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other
representations tending to the same end
 persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation,
or by other means outside of legal methods, any of the following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding
of any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal Prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 10,000
139 government or any public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his pesos
functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
Sedition
140 3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prision
(Penalty) any public officer or employee; correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 5,000
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge pesos
against private persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or
province, or the National Government (or the Government of the
United States), of all its property or any part thereof.

Conspiracy to commit Prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding
141
sedition 2,000 pesos

-Without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition

-Should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition,
-By means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or
other representations tending to the same end

OR upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against Government or any of the duly
constituted authorities
prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding
142 Inciting Sedition
OR which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions 2,000 pesos
of his office

OR which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes

OR which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots

OR which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
OR to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices
TOPICS
CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE - Articles 114-121
(Treason, Espionage, War Crimes)
Article 114. Treason. - Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United
States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner,
levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by
reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open
court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of
treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by prision
mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos. (As amended
by E.O. No. 44, May 31, 1945).
Article 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty. - The conspiracy or
proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P10,000 pesos, and prision
correccional and a fine not exceeding P5,000 pesos.
Article 116. Misprision of treason. - Every person owing allegiance to (the United
States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and
having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not
disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or
fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as
the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.
Article 117. Espionage. - The penalty of prision correccional shall be inflicted
upon any person who:
1. Without authority therefor, enters a warship, fort, or naval or
military establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans,
photographs, or other data of a confidential nature relative to the
defense of the Philippine Archipelago; or
2. Being in possession, by reason of the public office he holds, of the
articles, data, or information referred to in the preceding paragraph,
discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed if the offender be a public
officer or employee.
Article 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. - The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee, and that of
prision mayor upon any private individual, who, by unlawful or unauthorized
acts provokes or gives occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the
Philippine Islands or exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or
property.
Article 119. Violation of neutrality. - The penalty of prision correccional shall be
inflicted upon anyone who, on the occasion of a war in which the Government
is not involved, violates any regulation issued by competent authority for the
purpose of enforcing neutrality.
Article 120. Correspondence with hostile country. - Any person who in time of war,
shall have correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by
enemy troops shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional, if the correspondence has been prohibited
by the Government;
2. By prision mayor, if such correspondence be carried on in ciphers
or conventional signs; and
3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby
which might be useful to the enemy. If the offender intended to aid
the enemy by giving such notice or information, he shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal to death.
Article 121. Flight to enemy country. - The penalty of arresto mayor shall be inflicted
upon any person who, owing allegiance to the Government, attempts to flee or
go to an enemy country when prohibited by competent authority.

Articles 134 -142 (Rebellion, Insurrection, Coup de’ etat)
Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
Article 134-A. Coup d'etat; How committed. - The crime of coup d'etat is a swift
attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed
against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any
military camp or installation, communications network, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or
simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or
persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office of
employment with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of
seizing or diminishing state power. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. - Any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to
undertake a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions
or commands of others in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period.
Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner
supports, finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of
unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them,
signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as performed similar
acts, on behalf or the rebels shall be deemed a leader of such a rebellion,
insurrection, or coup d'etat. (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved on October
24, 1990).
Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection. - The
conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat shall be punished by prision
mayor in minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand
pesos (P8,000.00).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be
punished respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine
which shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by prision
correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00). (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved October 24, 1990).
Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or
employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power,
or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the
rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).
Article 138. Inciting a rebellion or insurrection. - The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms
or being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to the
execution of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations
tending to the same end. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 139. Sedition; How committed. - The crime of sedition is committed by
persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force,
intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods, any of the following
objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding
of any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or
municipal government or any public officer thereof from freely
exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any
administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any public officer or employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge
against private persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality
or province, or the National Government (or the Government of the
United States), of all its property or any part thereof.
Article 140. Penalty for sedition. - The leader of a sedition shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos.
Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. - Persons conspiring to commit the
crime of sedition shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 142. Inciting to sedition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should
incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition,
by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or
other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons
who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate
scurrilous libels against the (Government of the United States or the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines) or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others
to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety
and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil
practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Human Security Act R.A. 9372
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of
the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the
Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private
persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and
Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree
Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall
be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty
of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of
parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to
commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3
hereof and decide to commit the same.
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17
of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof,
cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of
from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission
of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18
of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit
by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime,
or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by
harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator
of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories
shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
Articles 146 - 147 (Illegal Assemblies and Associations)
Article 146. Illegal assemblies. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon
the organizers or leaders of any meeting attended by armed persons for the
purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under this Code, or of any
meeting in which the audience is incited to the commission of the crime of
treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority
or his agents. Persons merely present at such meeting shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor, unless they are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision
correccional.
If any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm, it shall be
presumed that the purpose of said meeting, insofar as he is concerned, is to
commit acts punishable under this Code, and he shall be considered a leader or
organizer of the meeting within the purview of the preceding paragraph.
As used in this article, the word "meeting" shall be understood to include a
gathering or group, whether in a fixed place or moving. (Reinstated by E.O. No.
187).
Article 147. Illegal associations. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon the founders, directors, and presidents of associations totally or
partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable
under this Code or for some purpose contrary to public morals. Mere members
of said associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).
BP 880 – Public Assembly Act; Compare with Article 131 (Prohibition,
interruption, dissolution of peaceful meeting)
Article 131. Prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings. - The penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the
holding of a peaceful meeting, or shall dissolve the same.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who shall
hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of
its meetings.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together
with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress
of grievances.

BP 880
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies
shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately
ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a
responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and
order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law
enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or
organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to
provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble
and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement
agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the
demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and
units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry
any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks,
shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes
with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot
device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual
violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of
property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a
permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the
police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the
law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of
the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible
disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful
objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-
participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn
the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will
be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding
subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable
period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made
during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a
law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall
be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during
the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly
is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may
be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or
organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is
required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes
in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no
person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending
an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of
the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the
right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement
agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters
from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
CRIMES AGAINST CONGRESS - Articles 143 – 145
Article 143. Act tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies. - The
penalty of prision correccional or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or fraud, prevents the
meeting of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or
divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or
board. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from
200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who disturbs the meetings
of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or
divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or
board, or in the presence of any such bodies should behave in such manner as
to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).
Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. - The penalty of prision mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or
fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any
of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees
or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the
penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special
session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS IN AUTHORITY - Articles 148 – 152
Article 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos, when
the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer
or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If
none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed.
Article 149. Indirect assaults. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming
to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of
any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.
Article 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or
divisions. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before the
National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and
subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees,
subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee chairman
or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to
obey such summons, or being present before any such legislative or
constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation
or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or
records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of
their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall
restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience
to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official.
Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the
preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the
agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious
nature, the penalty of arresto menoror a fine ranging from 10 to P100 pesos shall
be imposed upon the offender.
Article 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed
as such. - In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board, or commission,
shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio
policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by PD No.
299, Sept. 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
CASES:
1. Laurel v. Misa G.R. No. L-409, Jan 30, 1947 – include the dissenting and concurring
opinions when you read this case; Treason
Facts:
The herein petitioner filed for petition of habeas corpus based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to
the laws of the government or sovereign.
Issue: whether or not absolute allegiance of a citizen is suspended during an enemy occupation
and whether or not the petitioner is guilty of treason
Ruling:
NO, as ruled by the court the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign
de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution
provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them). What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control
and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant.
The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation. Therefore, the petitioner
is guilty of treason, change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same
sovereign people.
Concurring:
Perfecto, J.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation
is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to
law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the
laws obedience to which was also suspended. Allegiance has been defined as the obligation
for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in
return for the protection which he receives. "Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means
fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject, it is the
name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support
which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its
substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. Petitioner advances the theory that
protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government
having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were
relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the
sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved,
society has to disintegrate
Dissenting:
Paras, J.
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation. The inhabitants of
the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power
whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government,
if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such
obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law
and order, and for the proper administration of the country
2. People v. Adlawan G.R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949 83 Phil 194 – Review of Complex
Crimes in the Context of Treason. Be ready to explain the concept of Complex Crimes;
Facts:
This case review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court
upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court terms
"complex crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape. The herein appellant
committed 23 crimes from the year 1943-1945, , Adlawan adhered to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give aid and comfort to
said enemy by going out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese forces in search of
guerilla and other elements resisting the enemy of the Philippines. In the course of doing so,
Adlawan also committed murder, torture, robbery, and rape.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the
information. But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower
court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:
1 voluntary surrender
2 the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases
against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and
unnecessary cruelty
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with
murder, rape and
Robbery
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.

Issue: Whether or not adlawan is entitled to the modification of sentence
Ruling:
The Supreme Court said that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength should not have been considered. These are by their nature inherent in the offense
of treason. However, the facts show that in committing treason, appellant augmented the
wrong by being cruel to captured guerilla suspects, subjecting them to torture and death. He
also chose to add ignominy by stripping off the clothes of a guerilla suspect’s wife and abusing
them with other Filipino girls. These two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty
and ignominy may be appreciated. The penalty for the crime of treason is reclusion perpetua
to death, and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Appellant is given the benefit of voluntary
confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of
unnecessary cruelty and ignominy, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum.
3. People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 185; - sedition not rebellion
Facts:
Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political
faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected
Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for
Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly
relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as
Congressman regarded himself as the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong,
became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of
Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In
time the strain in their relations became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each
other.
Punzalan ran for re-election and on the the other side, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal
to run against him. On the eve of election of 1951 election, at the house of Pasumbal’s father
then being used as his electoral headquarters, Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks
through
Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his
Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference
with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan
was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death would be the surest way in
order to eliminate him from the electoral fight. Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference
with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had even
outlined the manner of attack, but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be
postponed because Pasumbal may yet win the election the following day, thereby rendering
unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan. Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty,
armed with garands and carbines, arrived. Upon reaching the house of Punzalan, they fired
shots, Another set of armed men walked toward Punzalan’s house among which is
Congressman umali who was holding a revolver.
Issue: Whether or not Congressman Umali was guilty of complex crime of rebellion with
murder
Ruling:
No, given the fact that the charge being imposed upon the accused in not existing at the
moment, the court have ruled that they may be properly convicted of the several and separate
crimes that they have committed. Though it has been decided that most serious crime
committed was not rebellion but of a sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the
raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for
the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under
rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government.
Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely,
Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient
to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged
and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the
purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The
robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an
afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from
the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to
replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains.
Crimes committed: sedition, multiple murder, arson(Set up punzalan’s house on fire),
frustrated murder(throwing the grenade causing Pedro LAcorte to be blind in one eye) and
physical injuries(wounding several person because of grenade)
4. Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, Aug 10, 2006, – Understand the case in general,
what is important for this case is the concurring opinion of Justice Callejo for us to
understand the gravamen of coup d’etat
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
led by Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, entered the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments,
disarmed the guards, and planted explosives around the building. Through media, they
announced their grievances against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s government and demanded
that she – along with her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) – resign.
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion, and
General Order No. 4, which called upon the PNP and AFP to suppress the rebellion taking
place in Makati. The government also sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers, in order
to prevent a bloody confrontation. After several hours of confrontation, the negotiators
succeeded and the soldiers laid down their arms and defused the explosives around the
premises. A total of 321 soldiers were surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) respectively recommended that those involved be charged with
coup d’etat, and the filing of the corresponding information against them. General Narciso
Abaya, herein respondent, also ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers and directed
AFP to conduct their separate investigation regarding it. The accused in the criminal case filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), invoking Republic Act (RA) No. 7055, prayed that the
trial court also assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal.
However, Colonel Julius A. Magno, the officer-in-charge of the Judge Advocate General’s
Office (JAGO) recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the incident, including the
herein petitioners, be prosecuted before the general court martial for violation of Article 96 of
the Articles of War. On June 27, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved.
Instead of filing their answer to Colonel Magno’s charge, the petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Prohibition, praying that the respondents desist from charging
them with a violation of Article 98 of the Articles of War. They cited the RTC’s determination
that the offense for violation of Article 98 is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the
crime of coup d’etat, hence, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction. The petitioners also claim that the offense charged against them before the
General Court Martial has already prescribed. They claim that, almost two years after the
incident, only Lt. Trillanes was arraigned. They claimed that the offense prescribed on July 25,
2005. The respondents counter, under R.A. No. 7055, the offense charged against them
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) is service-connected and properly
cognizable by the court martial. They further assert that, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the
accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
HELD:
NO, the petitioners are not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Article 2 of the Articles of War
(C.A. No. 408) provides that all officers and soldiers in the active service of the AFP are subject
to military law.
On the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 provides the general rule that those
persons subject to military law who commit crimes or offenses punishable under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), other special laws, and other government ordinances, shall be tried by the
proper court. The law provides for the sole exception that service-connected offenses shall be
tried by the court martial. The law also provides, as an exception to the exception, that the
President, in the interest of justice, may order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
The law specified the term “service-oriented crimes” in the following paragraph, stating
that these service-oriented crimes are “limited to those defined in Article 54 to 70, Articles 72
to 92, and Articles 95 to 98”. This delineation is necessary in order to preserve the peculiar
nature of the military justice system over military personnel.
The Court ruled that the offense for the violation of Article 96, or conducting
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, is indeed service-connected. They emphasized the
wordings used in the Information filed against them – i.e., their alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and that their behavior allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession – was indicative of the of the “service-
connected” nature of the offense, as it has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior
as military officers. Also, the penalty prescribed for the offense – that is, dismissal from the
service – is also indicative of the same.
The Court also ruled that they cannot sustain the RTC’s declaration that the offense is “not
service-connected, but rather absorbed in the furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat”,
as it practically amended the law. As such, the declaration made by the RTC is void. Hence, as
the offense for the violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is clearly service-connected
and cognizable under the military court, their petition for prohibition must fail.
Concurring Opinion, Justice Callejo
Case law has it that common crimes committed in furtherance of a political crime, such as
rebellion, are therein absorbed. A political crime is one directly aimed against the political
order as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.
The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
Coup d’etat is a political crime because the purpose of the plotters is to seize or
diminish State power. If a crime usually regarded as common, like murder, is perpetrated to
achieve a political purpose, then said common crime is stripped of its common complexion,
being part of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the
latter. Such common offenses assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same to justify the imposition of the graver penalty.
The service-connected punitive acts defined and penalized under the Articles of War are sui
generis offenses not absorbed by rebellion perpetrated, inter alia, by the officers and enlisted
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or coup d’etat. This is so because
such acts or omissions are merely violations of military discipline, designed to secure a higher
efficiency in the military service; in other words, they are purely disciplinary in their nature,
and have exclusive regard to the special character and relation of the AFP officers and enlisted
personnel.
The Articles of War is the organic law of the AFP. Not all service-connected punitive acts
under the Articles of War may be prosecuted before the courts-martial independently of a
crime defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code against the same accused based on
the same set of delictual acts. Congress may criminalize a service-connected punitive offense
under the Articles of War. Officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP charged of coup d’etat
can no longer be charged with mutiny under Article 67 of the Articles of War before courts-
martial for the same delictual or punitive act.
Common crimes committed in furtherance of a political crime, such as rebellion and coup
d’etat, are therein absorbed. Being part and parcel of the political crime, the common crime
acquires the political character of the latter, hence, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense or complexed with the same to justify the imposition of the grave penalty.
While the principle of absorption applies to crimes defined and penalized by special laws, that
rule does not apply to crimes which, by statutory fiat, are sui generis, like those punished under
the Articles of War.
However, it must be emphasized that not all service-connected punitive acts under the Articles
of War may be prosecuted before the courts-marital independently of the crime penalized
under the RPC against the same accused before the same set of acts. The Congress may
criminalize a service-connected punitive offense under the Articles of War, such as what they
did when the crime of coup d’etat was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code precisely to
criminalize mutiny. Without Article 134-A, they would only be charged and penalized for
mutiny under Article 67 of the Articles of War.
SEPARATE OPINION (Concurring and Dissenting): (Tinga, J.)
R.A. No. 7055 generally restored civil jurisdiction over offenses involving members of the
AFP. Justice Tinga is of the position that the broad propositions adopted by the majority
practically render inutile the intent of the law – that is, the restoration of civilian supremacy of
the military.
Justice Tinga reasoned that the R.A. No. 7055 precisely authorizes the civil court to
independently determine whether the offense in the information before it is actually service-
connected. It is therefore for the trial courts to determine, before arraignment, whether or not
the offense is service-connected. If the trial court does determine that the offense is not
service-connected, the military court will have no jurisdiction over the acts constituting the
offense.
His concurrence is based on the peculiar nature of Article 96 of the Articles of War. Not only
does Article 96embody a rule uniquely military in nature, it also prescribes a penalty wholly
administrative in character, which the civilian courts are incapable of rendering. For that
reason alone, Justice Tinga concurred that the petitioners should be made to face the civilian
trial, as well as the courts-martial, for their crimes. However, had the petitioners faced other
charges instead of the sole Article 96 charge, he would have voted to grant their petition.
5. Espuelas y Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. L-2290, Dec 17, 1951, 90 Phil 524 –
Sedition
Facts:
Oscar Espuelas was convicted by the CFI of Bohol of violation of Article 142 of the RPC.
CA affirmed his conviction. Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall
write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any
of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace
of the community.
Espuelas took a picture of himself, showing he committed suicide by hanging himself;
and had this picture printed in several newspapers with a copy of his “suicide note.” He said
in his letter, his reason for committing suicide was because he was not pleased with the Roxas
government. He also stated the situation of the Hukbalahaps in Central Luzon, that “in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis” and to teach their
children to burn pictures of Roxas.
Issue: Whether Espuelas is guilty of seditious libel?
Ruling: SC affirmed conviction.
Yes, he is guilty of seditious libel as provide by Article 142 of the RPC. The letter
is a scurrilous libel against the Government.1 It calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons infested with Nazis and Fascists. The communication reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government.
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government
or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and
are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are
conducive to the destruction of the very government itself.
Sedition is another limit of free speech and writing. T he freedom of speech secured by
the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility
whatever one may choose."
Criticism against the government must be specific, constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack
is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In Espuelas’ letter, one will
find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth.
Instead the article drips with malevolence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries
to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this
appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy. When the use of
irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbance, the
rationale of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection
of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but
only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels
against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof."
The appellant proclaimed' to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no
power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary
and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was
no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the
administration of Roxas and his men. The letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of
all Roxas officials
6. People v. Nabong, G.R. No. 36426, Nov 3, 1932, 57 Phil 455; Against
Congressmen
Facts:
CFI of Nueva Ecija convicted Atty. Ignaco Nabong guilty of sedition under Section 8
of Act No. 292, with fin of Php200 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in the Philippines, died and a necrological
service in his memory was to be held at Santa Rosa on the evening of January 30. The fact that
said meeting was to be held came to the attention of Major Silvino Gallardo, in charge of the
Philippine Constabulary in Cabanatuan, and he was informed that the red flag would be
displayed in this meeting as an emblem of the communists. The provincial fiscal opined that
the display of the flag is unlawful. Major Gallardo requested Nabong to interfere and prevent
the display of the red flag. Nabong refused Major Gallardo’s request; hence he instead asked
Juan Feleo to which the latter promised to comply.
At the meeting the red flag was displayed, and upon learning of this fact, Major Gallardo,
accompanied by several Constabulary officers and soldiers, went to the place in Santa Rosa
where the meeting was being held. Upon arrival they found Feleo making a speech, which
appeared to be seditious in nature, Major Gallardo caused him to be arrested and removed
 from the place. Ignacio Nabong then delivered a speech in Tagalog. In the course of this
speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary:
"They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are
bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug.—In view of
this, we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Over-throw the present government
and establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that
there may be marks on their sides."
Major Gallardo heard Nabong’s speech, and Nabong was arrested afterwards.
Issue: Whether Nabong’s speech was seditious?
Ruling: SC affirmed with modification, adding 6 months of imprisonment.
The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by
violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently
intended to be understood. The use of the whip, an instrument designed to leave marks on
the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would
have us impute to the language. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce
the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary
They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order
of the Government, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission,
as amended. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact
result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely
at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public
order.
7. Festin v. CFI Manila and Bautista v. CFI Baguio, G.R. No. L-34022 & G.R. Nos.
L-34046-7, March 24, 1972
Facts:
In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a public
document punishable by prision mayor. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when
in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. He was arrested by the City Sheriff
in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition, he was confined at
the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend the
plenary session of the Constitutional Convention.
As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for each of the Revised
Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not higher than prision mayor. he is a duly elected
and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Two criminal complaints, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet by a certain Moises Maspil, for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised
Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public
meetings.
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective
warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary
immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution
as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest.
Issue: Whether Martinez y Festin and Bautista Sr. enjoy parliamentary immunity?
Ruling:
No. Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason,
felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or
adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law.
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute.
Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision
that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November
15, 1935. The repugnancy between such an expansion of the congressional immunity and the plain
command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption that the penalty
to which a public officer will be subjected in the event of arrest for an offense punishable by less
than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope.
Record from the Constitutional Convention also provides that the history of
parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National
Assembly from criminal arrest.
The petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in
L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-
34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed.
8. People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Facts:
Jalosjos was convicted of rape and was detained in prison. He sought permission to attend
sessions saying that it is his duty to his constituents to represent them in the House. The accused-
appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense.
The accused-appellant’s “Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives” was filed on the grounds that—
1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest—not even the police power
of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.
 4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/ restrictions when allowed
to leave jail.
Issue: Whether or not he can invoke privilege immunity and be allowed to discharge duties?
Ruling:
Court ruled the negative. A member may be arrested, even if the house is in session, for crimes
which have a punishment of more than 6 years imprisonment. Constitution does not provide for a
special treatment for the members of each House from that of the other convicts. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government
office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater
is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives,
the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored
by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that—
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement
of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that—
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of
the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that
the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused- appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded
capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose
call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can
not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his
mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to
leave jail.
election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.
More explicitly, “imprisonment” in its general sense, is the restraint of one’s liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements
from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is
the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it “[is] something more
than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier.”
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual’s status in
society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates
for re- entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant’s claim that re-election
to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
Illegal Associations
9. People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-27683, Oct 19, 1976 – subversion
FACTS
Finding the accused guilty of violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known
as the Anti- Subversion Act, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.
The accused Silvestre Liwanag then a young man from the farms of Concepcion, Lubao, Pampanga,
joined the “Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon”, more popularly known by its acronym
“Hukbalahap”. an organization whose purpose, as its name implies, was to resist the Japanese
occupation forces in the Philippines. He held the position of commander of Squadron 18-E with
station in Lubao, Pampanga until 1944, when he was promoted to the rank of military inspector, a
position he held until liberation when the organization was disbanded. Before the national elections
of 1946, the Hukbalahap was revived. The accused was designated provincial commander for
Pampanga and later as vice commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command (CLRC).
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) held a conference. The accused was nominated to
the Central Committee (CC), which is the governing body of the Party. In that conference, it was
also agreed to change the name of “Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan” or HMB. Being a member of
the Hukbalahap and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the accused
carried over his membership to the HMB. The accused was designated as supervisor and adviser to
Squadron 18 of Field Command (FC) 25 of the HMB operating in the province of Bataan until early
in 1956.
In the latter part of 1956, the accused was named chief of the RECO Military Department (RMD)
of RECO 2, a position he held until March, 1958.
the appellant and his men had an encounter with Government forces in Magalang, Pampanga. The
HMB sustained three casualties, while the Government had two, including a P.C. lieutenant. The
HMB under the command of the appellant retreated to Telabastagan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
where they stayed until about the last part of March, 1958, when they again had an encounter with
the P.C. and had to retreat to Bataan.
After this encounter, the appellant asked for, and was granted, leave to rest and recuperate from his
ailment which he spent in the mountain of Bataan. Although on leave, his advice was sought after.
In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo Encarnacion captured the
appellant and his
wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan.
the appellant was charged for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known
as the Anti-Subversion Act, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and remained as officer
and/or ranking leader of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having
renounced his aforementioned leadership and/or membership therein within the period prescribed
by law, and, while remaining as such leader or high-ranking member, has taken up arms against the
Government by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against civilians,
Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces.
On April 14, 1961, the appellant filed a motion to quash the
information upon the grounds that the defendant has been previously convicted of rebellion based
upon the same overt acts as in the instant case, and that Republic Act No. 1700 is an ex post facto law
(bill of attainder) in that it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than
that annexed to the crime when committed.
the trial court rendered the appealed decision finding the accused guilty of the crime of subversion,
as charged.
In seeking a reversal of the decision, the appellant assigned four errors allegedly committed by the
trial court. On the fore is his claim that he was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him when the trial court granted the motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the
witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation be adopted and made part of the evidence
for the prosecution.
The appellant also contends that the “two-witness” rule on the same overt act, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1700, has not been observed and complied with in convicting him. In support
thereof, the appellant presented a brief summary of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution which would tend to show that no two witnesses testified to the same overt act.
The appellant further claims that he had been charged with rebellion and subversion based upon
the same overt act, and since he had already been convicted of rebellion, he cannot now be
prosecuted for subversion.
ISSUE
Ruling: Conviction affirmed.
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime distinct
from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up
arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code. Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and the
taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive
association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
In the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of
rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its laws, the territory of the Philippines,
and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed
property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957.
In the instant case, however, the accused is prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for
having remained a high ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military
arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in
said organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms
against the Government. Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms
against the Government, the same is not specific as to the period covered-by it. But, since the
appellant is prosecuted for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered
is that from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was
captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period
covered in the instant case is from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put
twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained.
Republic Act 1700, Republic Act 7363
Direct Assault
10. People v. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, Oct. 17, 2001 – direct assault of the 1st form
FACTS
Julio Recto y Robe a guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) two counts of the complex crime of
qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971), (2) the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder (Criminal Case No. 1972), and (3) homicide
(Criminal Case No. 1973).
September 22, 1994, four (4) Informations, all signed by State Prosecutor II Felix R. Rocero, were
filed against appellant. The fifth Information was dated October 18, 1994.
The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971 charged appellant with direct assault with
frustrated murder, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1970, charged appellant with direct assault with frustrated murder of one
MELCHOR RECTO, knowing that the latter is a duly appointed [b]arangay [c]hief [t]anod
Criminal Case No. 1971, charged appellant with direct assault with frustrated murder of one Barangay
Captain PERCIVAL ORBE, knowing that the latter is a duly elected barangay captain
Criminal Case No. 1972, which charged appellant with direct assault with murder of one
ANTONIO MACALIPAY, knowing that the latter is a duly elected [b]arangay [k]agawad of
Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon.
Criminal Case No. 1973, appellant was charged with murder of one EMILIANO ‘RENATO’
SANTOS, alias EMY, inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries in different parts of his body which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Criminal Case No. 1975, appellant was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
in his possession and under his custody and control, one (1) handgun locally called ‘pugakang’ with
one live ammunition, which he used in killing Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano
‘Renato’ Santos and [which was] confiscated by the police authorities.
“In the early afternoon of April 18, 1994 at Ambulong, Magdiwang, Sibuyan Island, Romblon,
Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his residence together with Barangay Kagawad Antonio
Macalipay and Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto, appellant’s cousin. They were trying to settle a land
dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in progress, Orbe was
summoned by SPO4 Fortunato Rafol to proceed to the bodega of Rance.
“There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed, and the palay stored therein,
stolen.
“SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male, also made their investigation and reported their findings to Linda
Rance. At this point, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto passed by. He saw SPO4 Rafol, Wilfredo Arce,
[S]pouses Crestito and Linda Rance at the bodega. He went to Barangay Captain Orbe and inquired
why they were there. Barangay Captain Orbe told him that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed
and the palay, stolen. Orbe requested Melchor Recto to stay as he might be needed.
Thereupon, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto began his own ocular investigation.
“While SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the group of [A]ppellant Julio Recto
et al. arrived. The group stopped at the first ‘trampa’ near the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe advised
them not to create trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them.
Thereafter, [A]ppellant Recto, while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain
Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped
backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain
Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised
and uttered the words: ‘Do not do it. We’ll just settle this. (Ayoson ta lang ine).’ Julio Recto, however,
immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, causing him to fall down on
the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the
latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy.
“Melchor Recto saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside
the old dilapidated bathroom of the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the
bathroom, Melchor Recto peeped through the window and saw [A]ppellant Recto fire his gun at
Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While
crawling, Santos fired another shot towards Regis, Jr[.], but, the latter was able to reach and hack
the former with a bolo.
“Amidst the din, Percival Orbe and Melchor Recto heard [A]ppellant Julio Recto saying: ‘Where is
that kapitan?’ When Melchor could no longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom
window and ran. While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter’s thigh. Barangay Captain
Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the top and landed [o]nto the ricefield. Before he could
take a step, he was also shot by [A]ppellant Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to
continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded
Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad
Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano ‘Renato’ Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by
herein appellant.”
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that appellant had fired at a barangay tanod, Melchor Recto, who was at the
crime scene “on the occasion of the performance of his official duties.” It added that appellant had
shot a barangay captain, Percival Orbe, also “on the occasion of the performance of his official
duties.”
The lower court ruled out treachery in the killing of Emiliano Santos, because there had been a gun
duel between him and appellant. However, it convicted and sentenced appellant to death for the
murder of Antonio Macalipay. Because of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty, this
review by the Supreme Court is mandatory and automatic, without need of a notice of appeal.
ISSUE
WON there is a Qualified Direct Assault with Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and
1971) – NO (1970 – attempted homicide, 1971 - complex crime of qualified direct assault with
attempted homicide)
WON there is a Qualified Direct Assault with Murder (Criminal Case No. 1972) – NO (qualified
direct assault with homicide)
HELD
Qualified Direct Assault with Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971)
However, the trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by “any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any
of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition”; and
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, “shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.”
The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the element of public uprising. The
second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a)
the assault is committed with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
(c) when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority.
An agent of a person in authority is “any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or
by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.”
In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto—being then the barangay chief tanod— was clearly an
agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not
“engaged in the performance of his official duties” at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked
“on the occasion of such performance,” as we will now show.
It must be emphasized that Melchor Recto was on his way home when he happened to pass by the
bodega of the Rance couple.
Melchor explained that when appellant’s group arrived, it was Barangay Captain Percival Orbe and
Kagawad Antonio Macalipay who talked to the group. Melchor did not do anything to avert the
tension. He only watched what was transpiring and later hid himself when the first shot was fired.
Thinking that appellant had already left the bodega, Melchor, while hiding inside the old bathroom
for several minutes, decided to jump out of a broken down window and ran towards the national
road.
Clearly, from his arrival at the scene of the crime to his departure therefrom, Melchor was not
engaged in the performance of his official duties. Neither was he attacked on the occasion thereof.
Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a
mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his
official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault.
We now determine the criminal liability of appellant with respect to the attack. He shot Melchor
only once, but the latter sustained five gunshot entry wounds all located at his backside, at the vicinity
of his buttocks. Because the gun used by the former was a de sabog, each bullet contained several
pellets inside. In other words, a single shot from a de sabog results in the spewing of several pellets.
The nature of the weapon used for the attack and the direction at which it was aimed—the victim’s
back—unmistakably showed appellant’s intent to kill.
However, for reasons other than his own desistance, appellant was not able to perform all the acts
of execution necessary to consummate the killing, since the wounds he inflicted were not mortal. In
United States v. Eduave, this Court has held that if the wounds would not normally cause death, then
the last act necessary to produce homicide has not been performed by the offender. Thus, appellant’s
liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
The penalty that is lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide
shall be imposed upon appellant.
After applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since
there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.
In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe—
then a barangay captain, a person in authority—amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was
attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify
appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups.
A felony “is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.” In this case, the nature of the weapon used by appellant
unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds inflicted by the accused
on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe were not fatal.
As evidenced by the Medico-Legal Certificate and the testimony given by of the same hospital, Orbe
sustained several gunshot wounds in the vicinity of his right elbow. Those injuries could not have
caused his death. Moreover, no surgical intervention was required; only medication was given to
him to prevent any secondary infection from setting in.
Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring
about the death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being fired at. Although
appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe
with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some reason other than his
spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed attempted homicide.
Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex crime of
qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should be the penalty for
the most serious crime—in this case qualified direct assault—the same to be imposed in its
maximum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law should also be applied in this case.
Qualified Direct Assault with Murder (Criminal Case No. 1972)
First, the victim’s companions outnumbered those of appellant. As shown by the pleadings and
records of the case, his group consisted of seven individuals; the victims, sixteen.
Second, the heated confrontation arose as a consequence of an earlier judgment of the trial court in
favor of appellant’s group. This case strained the relations of the parties who, after all, were related
by blood and marriage. In fact, prior to this event, appellant—believing that his uncle Cornelio
Regis, Jr. should get the landlord’s share of the palay or rice harvest—attempted to harvest the fields
thrice. All of these attempts failed, because Linda Rance hired a group of bodyguards headed by the
victim, Emiliano “Renato” Santos. In short, the confrontation was not totally unexpected.
Third, both groups were armed. The exchange of gunfire was substantiated by the Medico-legal
Certificates presented by both the prosecution and the defense. Moreover, the deceased Santos
carried a gun which Alberto Rance, son of Crestito and Linda, had given him for his protection.
Fourth, appellant’s group asked the police station commander to assemble the workers of the
disputed rice field at the Municipal Building to inform them of the trial court’s Decision awarding
the land to Cornelio Regis, Jr. For this reason, the members of the group were to start collecting the
landlord’s share of the harvest
Fifth, appellant was seen holding a balisong or fan knife during the heated confrontation, before he
pulled out the shotgun and pointed it at the other group. Macalipay, in a bold yet foolish attempt,
stepped forward in front of appellant and told him: “Ayosan ta lang ini?(No, don’t, because we will
just settle this).”And “[s]imultaneously with the last word in the phrase [‘]don’t because we will just
settle this,[‘]” appellant fired his gun, killing the victim.
Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that
was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more
open to attack. Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by
appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately
choose the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself.
Further, the shooting took place after a heated exchange of words and a series of events that
forewarned the victim of aggression from appellant. In this case, it appears to have occurred on
sudden impulse but preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and put the deceased on guard.
“If the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was
vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused, but was purely accidental.
“When there is no evidence that the accused has, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to
commit the crime, or there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation,
calculation or reflection, treachery cannot be considered.”
Section 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code states that “there is treachery when the offender
commits any of crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.”
In this case, appellant was out in the open during the entire span of time from the heated discussion,
to the brewing of the violence, and up to the shooting of Macalipay. At the time, his every action,
which indicated the imminence of more violence, was visible to them—to the victim and the latter’s
companions. Appellant was actually vulnerable to any attack that they could have made at the time,
had they chosen to. His mode of attack was therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery,
the killing is homicide, not murder.
Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties
when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.
Applying the provisions of Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty for complex
crimes), appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with
homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious
crime, to be imposed in the maximum period. This penalty shall comprise the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than
that prescribed for homicide.
11. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010
Facts:
● Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school
teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu.
● Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma.
● According to prosecution, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that
Gemma called him a “sissy” while in class. She slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed
her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s violent assault,
Gemma suffered a contusion and continued to experience abdominal pains and started
 bleeding two days after the incident. She was admitted to a Hospital and was diagnosed,
to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
● To her defense, Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain
from calling her son names, so that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma
proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced
to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.
● RTC convicted Lydia of direct assault
● CA- ruled that Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private
individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she
engaged in a fight with Lydia. So not direct assault. However, CA convicted her of slight
physical injury
Issue: Whether the accused guilty of direct assault
Ruling:
Yes. Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official
duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils
who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry
when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a “sissy”. Lydia refused to
be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim.
Gemma then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma’s fall to
the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of RPC.
The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her
official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia
continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated
person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall
divider while she was going to the principal’s office.
Assaults
12. People v. Abalos, G.R. No. 88189, July 9, 1996 328 Phil 24
Facts:
● The incident transpired during the fiesta near the appellants house. On that night, while
the accused Tiburcio Abalos were having heated argument with his father Police Major
Cecilio Abalos, a woman shouted for help.
● The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major
Abalos, “What is it, sir?” The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around
to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly
left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and
three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting
the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed
unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he
sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant
struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray bullets should a
gunfight ensue. Labine collapsed then died.
● Trial court convicted the accused with complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.
Issue: whether the conviction of the lower court was right
Held: Yes. The trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados
contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is
not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing
assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is
a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must
be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his
agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority
or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault
the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. Here, Labine
was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an
agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when
assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in
Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a
policeman and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates
that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
13. People v. Tac-an y Hipos, G.R. No. 76338-39, Feb 26, 1990 (concentrate on the doctrine
related to persons in authority)
 ● Appellant Renato Tac-an, and the deceased Francis Ernest Escaño III, were
classmates in the third year of high school in Tagbilaran City. They were close
friends and also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang.
● Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived. Francis’ mother
noticed that Renato had a handgun with him, so Francis was then advised by his
mother to distance himself from Renato. Francis withdrew from the gang, the
relationship between the two turned sour.
● There were times when Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other. Also, renato
attributed to Francis the graffiti describing the former “bayot”. Renato was angered
when he saw Francis seating on the scrapbook he made to be passed and promptly
kicked the chair on which Francis was seated.
● While class was ongoing, he went out but he came back with a revolver and was looking
for Francis. He killed Francis.
● The trial court convicted the accused with aggravating circumstance of “in contempt of
or insult to the public authorities” because the killing was done with the presence of
their teacher.
Issue: Whether the teacher a public authorities.

Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a
public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person
in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for... the application of which any person
"directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is
not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the
ordinary words used by such... statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,... the provision the trial
court applied in the case