Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

114 Court may presume existence of certain facts. —The Court may presume the existence of
any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of
natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of
the particular case. Illustrations The Court may presume—
(a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or
has received the goods knowing them to be stolen1, unless he can account for his possession;
(b) That an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material
particulars2;
(c) That a bill of exchange, accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good
consideration;
(d) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period
shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in
existence3;
(e) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed4;
(f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;
(g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to
the person who withholds i5t;
(h) That if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law,
the answer, if given, would be unfavourable to him;
(i) That when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation
has been discharged.
But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following, in considering whether
such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it:— As to illustration
(a) — A shop-keeper has in his till a marked rupee soon after it was stolen, and cannot
account for its possession specifically, but is continually receiving rupees in the course of his
business;
As to illustration (b)—A, a person of the highest character, is tried for causing a man's death
by an act of negligence in arranging certain machinery. B, a person of equally good character,

1
Mohan Lal v Ajit Singh AIR 1978 SC 1183; 1978 Cr LJ 1107
2
Union of India v J S Brar AIR1993 SC 773: (1993) 1 SCC 176

3
TVEV Varier v Secretary 1978 Cr LJ 86
4
Vashisht v Union Of India (1993) 1 (Supp) SCC 431
5
Chako v State (1985) 5 SCC 602
who also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and
explains the common carelessness of A and himself;
As to illustration (b)—A crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the
criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of
the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to
render previous concert highly improbable;
As to illustration (c)— A, the drawer of a bill of exchange, was a man of business. B, the
acceptor, was young and ignorant person, completely under A's influence;
As to illustration (d)—It is proved that a river ran in a certain course five years ago, but it is
known that there have been floods since that time which might change its course;
As to illustration (e)—A judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed
under exceptional circumstances;
As to illustration (f)—The question is, whether a letter was received. It is shown to have been
posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbances;
As to illustration (g)—A man refuses to produce a document which would bear on a contract
of small importance on which he is sued, but which might also injure the feelings and
reputation of his family;
As to illustration (h)—A man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled by law
to answer, but the answer to it might cause loss to him in matters unconnected with the matter
in relation to which it is asked;
As to illustration (i)—A bond is in possession of the obligor, but the circumstances of the
case are such that he may have stolen it.
(i) There would be presumption in favour of wedlock if the partners lived together for long
spell as husband and wife; but it would be rebuttable and heavy burden lies on the person
who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place6.
(ii) Presumption is rebuttable. If there is any such circumstance weakening such presumption,
it cannot be ignored by the court7.
(iii) When oral and other reliable evidences are satisfactorily giving evidence that the pair
lived together as husband and wife, merely because family register does not show them as
husband and wife is not a clinching evidence to deny their relationship of husband and wife8.

6
Tulsa v. Durghatiya, 2008 (1) SCR 709: 2008 (4) SCC 520
7
Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy, AIR 2005 SC 800
8
Lalta v. District IVth upper Distt. Judge Basti, AIR 1999 All 342.
(iv) Genuine and correctness of document have to be proved by a person believes upon it by
cogent and direct evidence9.
(v) A court may legitimately draw a presumption not only of the fact that the person in whose
possession the stolen articles were found committed the robbery but also that he committed
the murder10.
(vi) The recovery made some days after the dacoity does not raise a presumption under
section 114(a) in respect of the offence of dacoity11.
Presumptions in Rape Cases under Section 114-A of Indian Evidence Act

The newly-added S. 114-A deals with cases of prosecution for rape under clauses (a), (b), (c),
(d), (e) or (g) of S. 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, where sexual Intercourse by the accused
is proved, and the question before the Court is whether such intercourse was with or without
the woman’s consent. In such cases, if the woman, in her evidence, states before the Court
that she did not consent, the Court must presume that she did not so consent.

This new provision (inserted in 1983) has brought about a rather radical change in the Indian
Law relating to rape cases.

Formerly, the rule was that corroboration of the victim’s version was not essential for a
conviction, but as a matter of prudence, it would have to be established if the mind of the
judge, unless circumstances were strong enough to make it safe to convict the accused
without such corroboration. As observed by the Supreme Court, although the victim of a rape
cannot be treated as an accomplice, her evidence is to be treated almost like accomplice
evidence, requiring corroboration12.

Now, of course, the position is different, and S. 114-A raises a presumption in favor of the
rape victim.

The following three conditions must be satisfied before the presumption contained in S. 114-
A can be raised:

(a) It should be proved that there was sexual intercourse.

9
Ashok Kumar Uttam Chand Shah v. Patel Mohmad Asmal Chanchad, AIR 1999 Guj 108
10
Mukund alias Kundu Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 359
11
Vasant alias Roshan Sogaji Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 2 Crimes 104 (Bom).
12
Sk. Zakir v. State of Bihar, 1983 Cri. L.J. 1285
 (b) (b) The question before the court should be whether such intercourse was with or
without the consent of the woman.
(c) (c) The woman must have stated, in her evidence before the court that she had not
consented to the intercourse.
(d) This presumption would apply not only to rape cases, but also to cases of attempted
rape, as for instance, when the victim was disrobed and attempts were made to rape
her, which, however, could not materialize because of intervening circumstances13.
(e) In a case of alleged gang rape of a girl above the age of 16, the F. I.R. was lodged
seven days after the occurrence. The girl admitted that she was desirous of marrying
one of the accused, and the chemical examiner’s report ran counter to any sexual
intercourse. In the circumstances, it was held that the presumption under S. 114-A
could not be invoked14.
(f) Lastly, it may be noted that the presumption under S. 114-A can be drawn only when
the accused says that he indulged in sexual intercourse with the consent of the girl. If
the case of the accused is not that such intercourse was had with her consent, no
presumption can be drawn under the section15.

13
Fagnu Bhai v. State of Orissa, 1992 Cri. L.J. 1808
14
Sharrighan v. State of M.P., 1993 Cri. L.J. 120
15
Ravindranath v. State of U.P., 1991 Cri. L.J. 31
 Case Study
Sr. 1
No. Subject Law of Crimes/Indian Penal Code

1. Case Title and Citation Salim vs State (Nct Of Delhi)

2. Topic May presume by Court of law
3. Scope/Chapter Chapter VII of Indian Evidence Act,
1872
4. Provision/s of Law Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act,
1872- “Section 114 enables court to
presume the existence of a fact
having regard to the course of
natural events, human conduct and
public and private business in their
relation to the facts of any
particular case. In view of ‘may
presume’ court has got its
discretionary power to draw the
presumption.”
5. Briefs Facts of the case The appellant on 03.11.2011 at about
03.50 pm on Surhera Road, Near
Village Surhera within the
jurisdiction of P.S. Jaffarpur Kalan,
was driving a tractor and while
driving the said tractor, the appellant
had hit one scooter bearing no.DL
4SR 9025 from behind, which was
being driven by Sh. Nahar Singh
while his wife Ms. Sunita was riding
pillion and due to the impact, both
Nahar Singh and Ms. Sunita fell
down. Sh. Nahar Singh had suffered
simple injuries whereas Ms. Sunita
was crushed under the wheels of
appellant's tractor and had died.
6. Preliminary Issues (or) Issues
raised/framed and adjudged (before Trial
Court) (or) Question of Law involved (or)
Points for determination
7. Judgment
Whether the testimony of the
eyewitness is true or not?
On the date of the accident, he was
working in his field and was
irrigating his fields adjacent to the
approach road from Jafarpur to
Surhera Village. Therefore, since
PW-2 was busy in irrigating his field,
hence possibility of PW-2 having
witnessed the accident does not arise.
A farmer who is irrigating his field
and working in his field will
concentrate on his field and not on
what is happening on the road.
Therefore, admission made by PW-2
in his cross examination that his
attention was drawn towards the
accident after hearing the collision is
natural human conduct. Further, as
per Section 114 of Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 the court may presume the
existence of certain facts having
regard to the human conduct.
Therefore, in the light of evidence
which has come on record of PW-2
and having regard to the human
conduct, it can be presumed that PW-
2 noticed the accident after hearing
the sound of collision and his
testimony that he had seen the
accident happening is opposed to
normal human conduct when PW-2
 was working in his fields. Therefore,
it can be safely concluded that PW-2
had not witnessed the manner in
which the accident had taken place
but he had reached at the accident
spot after hearing the collision and
thereafter, had chased the appellant
and had apprehended him along with
the offending tractor

8. Grounds for Appeal/Additional Points, if

any
9. Cases referred Dalbir Singh vs State of Haryana
Appeal (Criminal) 426/2000 date of
decision 04.5.2000 CA had held that
in matters pertaining to Section 304-
A IPC, the drivers of the offending
vehicle cannot be given the benefit of
probation so as to provide deterrence
10. Judgment and Order The conviction was upheld.
11. Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta/ Special Bearing in mind the galloping trend
observation (if any) in road accidents in India and the
devastating consequences visiting
the victims and their families,
criminal courts cannot treat the
nature of the offence under Section
304-A IPC as attracting the
benevolent provisions of Section 4 of
the P.O. Act. While considering the
quantum of sentence, to be imposed
for the offence of causing death by
rash or negligent driving of
automobiles, one of the prime
considerations should be deterrence.
A professional driver pedals the
accelerator of the automobile almost
throughout his working hours. He

12. Comment or Observations or Critical
Analysis by the Researcher
must constantly inform himself that
he cannot afford to have a single
moment of laxity or inattentiveness
when his leg is on the pedal of a
vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and
should not take a chance think that a
rash driving need not necessarily
cause any accident
The SC has done justice by
upholding the conviction. As by
presuming that this case was of rash
and negligent driving as one person
has died not due to his own mistake.
 Case Study
Sr. 2
No. Subject Law of Crimes/Indian Penal Code

1. Case Title and Citation

State Of Orissa v Damburu Naiko

2. Topic May presume by Court of law

3. Scope/Chapter Chapter VII of Indian Evidence Act,
1872
4. Provision/s of Law Section 114 A of Indian Evidence Act,
1872- “ In a prosecution for rape
under clause
(a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or
clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g)
of sub-section (2) of section 376 of
the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860),
where sexual intercourse by the
accused is proved and the question is
whether it was without the consent
of the woman alleged to have been
raped and she states in her evidence
before the Court that she did not
consent, the Court shall presume
that she did not consent.”
5. Briefs Facts of the case The case of prosecution is that on the
fateful day the victim Bhotruni along
with other girls, PWs. 2 to 4 went to
Papadahandi to witness Dasahara
festival. At about 4.00 p.m.while they
were returning home, PW. 1, the
victim was ahead of them and when
they reached inside the forest, the
appellants and two others gagged the
mouth of PW. 1 and kidnapped into
the forest, covered her eyes with a
piece of cloth and threatened to kill
her if she would raise cries.

They made her to lie down on the

ground and raped her one after
another. PWs. 2 to 4 ran back

6. Preliminary Issues (or) Issues
raised/framed and adjudged (before Trial
Court) (or) Question of Law involved (or)
Points for determination
7. Judgment
Papadahandi and reported, to the
police on duty in the festival, of the
incidence and PW. 5, the constable
came along with them. They found
the victim's eyes covered with a piece
of cloth and that she was crying. She
was taken to Papadahandi. She laid
the complaint. The accused were
arrested on October 31, 1977.
Is corroboration necessary to the
evidence of the victim of rape?
The court was of the view that it is
not necessary that there would be
corroboration to the evidence of the
victim of rape. If her evidence
inspires confidence to be truthful that
itself would be sufficient to convict
the accused. We need not see
corroboration to the evidence of PW.
1. She was a simple village girl and
she will not leave out her own
assailants and implicate falsely other
innocent persons with the allegation
that she was raped by them. Further it
said that even if they seek for
corroboration the injuries on her
private parts; medical evidence of the
doctor and her first information
report provides such corroboration.
The court wholly accepts her
evidence as truthful. Thus the appeal
was accordingly allowed. The
judgment of High Court and the
order of acquittal of the respondents
were set aside. The judgments and
convictions and sentences recorded
by the trial court and affirmed by the
Sessions Courts were restored and
the respondents were made to
surrender and serve out the
sentences.
8. Grounds for Appeal/Additional Points, if
any
9. Cases referred
10. Judgment and Order The conviction was upheld for the
charges of rape.
11. Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta/ Special It is not necessary that there would be
observation (if any)
corroboration to the evidence of the
victim of rape. If her evidence
inspires confidence to be truthful that
itself would be sufficient to convict
the accused. Court need not see
corroboration to the evidence of the
victim. A simple village girl and she
will not leave out her own assailants
and implicate falsely other innocent
persons with the allegation that she
was raped by them. Even if court
seek for corroboration the injuries on
private parts; medical evidence of the
doctor and victim’s first information
report provide such corroboration
12. Comment or Observations or Critical The SC has done justice by
Analysis by the Researcher
upholding the conviction. As by
presuming that in this case though
there was no other witness but the
testimony of the victim can be relied
upon as by presuming that there was
no consent of the victim to her rape.
 Case Study
Sr. 3
No. Subject Law of Crimes/Indian Penal Code

13. Case Title and Citation

Ramdas v State of Maharashtra

14. Topic May presume by Court of law

15. Scope/Chapter Chapter VII of Indian Evidence Act,
1872
16. Provision/s of Law Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act,
1872- “114 Court may presume
existence of certain facts. —The
Court may presume the existence
of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened, regard being had
to the common course of natural
events, human conduct and public
and private business, in their
relation to the facts of the
particular case.
Illustration (g) That evidence
which could be and is not produced
would, if produced, be unfavorable
to the person who withholds it.”
17. Briefs Facts of the case In this case after the marriage of the
deceased Shantabai with the
appellant Ram Das certain
unforeseen circumstances came into
existence which led the appellant to
suspect the fidelity of his wife
culminating in her death by poison.
The witness gave evidence that he
has received a letter from his
brothering saying about the threat
given by Ramdas to commit murder
of his wife, Shantabai. He said he
handed over the letter to the police
but when he was examined by the
police he did not mentioned about it.
The defece requested the court to
 direct the prosecution for the
production of the letter and the letter
was however not produced.

18. Preliminary Issues (or) Issues (1) Whether the accused had
raised/framed and adjudged (before Trial
caused the death of his
Court) (or) Question of Law involved (or)
Points for determination wife by administering her
poison?
(2) What would be the
inference for not
producing the letter
mentioned by witness?

19. Judgment Judge came to a finding that although

the deceased died of poison, yet the
prosecution had not been able to
establish which particular poison
caused her death or that the said
poison was present in the house of
the accused or was administered by
him. The Judge further held that the
motive alleged by the prosecution
was not strong enough to raise an
inference of murder against the
accused. Finally, from the
circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution, the Judge held that the
circumstances were not absolutely
incompatible with the innocence of
the accused.

When the letter was not produced the

only reasonable inference that could
 be raised by the court was that the
letter did not contain any threat as
deposed by the witnesses and if it had
been produced it would have falsified
the witnesses. And hence acquittal
was awarded.

20. Grounds for Appeal/Additional Points, if

any
21. Cases referred Devidas v Shrishailappa, AIR 1961
SC 1277; 1962 (1) SCJ 557
Where the documents are not in the
possession or control of a party, the
non-production of the document
would not give rise to presumption
against the party.
22. Judgment and Order Acquittal was awarded to the
accused.
23. Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta/ Special Where the documents are not in the
observation (if any)
possession or control of a party, the
non-production of the document
would not give rise to presumption
against the party
24. Comment or Observations or Critical The SC has done justice by not
Analysis by the Researcher
upholding the conviction. As by
presuming that in this case when the
document is not produced that means
that it is not containing anything
against the accused or else if it did
then it would have been produced in
the court.