REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Department of Justice
NATIONAL PROECUTION SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
City of Dasmarinas, Cavite

MARIETA C. YONGIS,
Complainant

- versus - I.S. No. __________________

For: Libel/ Oral
Defamation/Slander
RHONA V. SALONA,
Respondent

x-----------------------------------------x

REPLY-AFFIDAVIT

I, MARIETA “MAYETH” C. YONGIS, Filipino, of legal age, resident of

Blk 8 Lot 30 Rome St., Phase 4, Summerwind Village 4, Burol Main, Dasmarinas
City, Cavite respectfully submit hereunder, my reply to the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent RHONA V. SALONA, to wit:

To Begin With, And To

The Above-Respondent:

1. Her Malicious/Ill-willed/Libelous Statement is definitely supported by the

Best Evidence. For this Malicious/Ill-willed/Libelous Statement was
bannered in the form of a message in Facebook messenger from
respondent’s account to GLAYZEL F. TORRES’ account to wit
“HANGGAT DIPA NAPAPAHAMAK ANG MAMA MO ILAYO NYO
NA YAN KAY MAYETH, MAMA MO NA ANG NAGSABI NA HINA
HUNTING YAN NI REMULLA, a copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as ANNEX 2.

2. That the respondent had already a case of ORAL DEFAMATION under

Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code with Criminal Case No. 14-0182
filed on May 5, 2014 and had an ORDER on June 11, 2015, a copy of
which is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX 6, which clearly shows her
habitual personality to defame persons.

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A. ON THE ISSUE OF THE RESPONDENT’S DENIAL THAT HER
ACCUSATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OF THE CRIME OF ORAL
DEFAMATION OR SLANDER IN RELATION WITH ARTICLE 353
LIBEL IN THE PRESENT CASE:

3. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, libel may be committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means.

Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or

exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.

At the case at hand, the respondent sends several messages through

facebook to defame the complainant which she has no legal evidence to
support such allegations, whereas her messages can be read on the
screenshots of the latter as annexes herein attached thereto.

In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means,
but what the words used by him mean. Jurisprudence has laid down a test to
determine the defamatory character of words used in the following manner,
viz:

Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to

destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient
if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand
that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. . . . ”
[Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 427 (1988) citing U.S. v.
O’Connell, 37 Phil. 767 (1918)]

4. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the

commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. In the case at hand, the respondents implies

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 through her messages that I am a criminal in hiding and that I am
hunted by government authority (REMULLA).

B. ON THE ISSUE OF THE NON PUBLICATION OF THE MESSAGES

OF THE RESPONDENT IN RELATION WITH ARTICLE 353 LIBEL IN
THE PRESENT CASE

5. The respondent denies that her messages were not published. As

provided by Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51 (1995), there is
publication if the material is communicated to a third person. She sent the
messages through her facebook account to GLAYZEL TORRES imputing
that I am a criminal in hiding and that I am hunted by government
authorities (REMULLA). As provided by the court, it is not required that the
person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is
material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for “a
man’s reputation is the estimate in which others hold him in, not the good
opinion which he has of himself.”

C. ON THE ISSUE OF THE DENIAL OF THE RESPONDENT WITH MY

IDENTITY WHOM SHE ACCUSED OF HER DEFAMATORY REMARKS
IN RELATION WITH ARTICLE 353 LIBEL IN THE PRESENT CASE

6. That the respondent also denies that she is referring to me whereas she
alleges that she merely referred to one “MAYETH” without surname or
further identification. As provided by the Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American
and Lyons 42 Phil. 760, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be
shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as
the object of the defamatory statement. At the case at hand, GLAYZEL
TORRES testified through her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the respondent is
clearly and evidently referring to me.

In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) the Supreme Court
ruled that “in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it
is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116).” In an earlier case, the
high court also declared that” … defamatory matter which does not reveal
the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no
ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have
identified the personality of the individual defamed.”

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D. ON THE ISSUE OF THE DENIAL OF THE RESPONDENT THAT
THERE IS NO MALICE AND CRIMINAL INTENT ON HER PART WITH
HER ACCUSATIONS IN RELATION WITH ARTICLE 353 LIBEL IN THE
PRESENT CASE

7. That the respondent also denies that she has no malice, criminal or
defamatory intent in her accusations. That the law also presumes that
malice is present in every defamatory imputation. Thus, Article 354 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that:

“Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be

true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.”

Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged communication,

the character of which is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive
proof of express malice on the part of the accused. Once it is established that
the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests
on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was
prompted by malice or ill will. When this is accomplished the defense of
privilege becomes unavailing. [Santos v. Court of Appeals, No. L-45031, 21
October 1991, 203 SCRA 110, 114]

Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in

this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant
(malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant’s
imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the
defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to
overcome the legal inference of malice.

In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is
engendered by one’s sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive,
such feeling negatives actual malice. [Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal
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 Code, Vol. III, Bk. II, 1997 Ed., citing People v. de los Reyes, Jr., 47 OG
3569]

It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the dissemination of the
article alleged to be libelous must attend the distribution itself. It cannot be
merely a resentment against a person, manifested unconnectedly several
months earlier or one displayed at a much later date.

E. ON THE ISSUE OF THE WITNESS OF THE RESPONDENT IN THE

PRESENT CASE

8. That JUDITH E. MORALES’ statements do not apply on the present

case whereas the issue here is the accusation of the respondent against me
that she imputes against me that I am criminal in hiding which has no legal
basis or evidence. What she testifies is out of the issue and simply talks
about loans that I am not involved with. That her statements are not related
to the issue, without legal basis and merely untrue and fabricated.

F. ON THE ISSUE OF MY REPUTATION THAT THE RESPONDENT

BISMIRCHED IN THE PRESENT CASE:

9. Defamatory imputation in the advisory is evidently attendant in the present

set of facts. That the messages sent by the respondent would clearly and
sweepingly defame and besmirch my reputation as Manager in a law office.

10. That I am engaged in the business of legal services, and in the said industry,
reputation is of utmost importance because of what said industry entails,
which is to be honest with people, and helping them with legal services and
to accused me of such criminal accusations would be very defamatory.

11. My clientele include therefore a lot of people and institutions to which we

provide our legal services, and to say such things upon my reputation would
besmirch such.

12. Again, I emphasize that the messages she sent would create in the minds of
the public and my other clients, the idea that I am a criminal in hiding from
government authorities.

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 13. Moreover, said defamatory imputation would likewise result in the public,
doubt, not only insofar as my obligations are concerned, but also of my own
and the general integrity of our business.

14. The respondent’s messages are clearly a deliberate and malicious plot of
respondent in stark retaliation to helping and assisting MARLENE F.
FLORES, as our client and the same time, my friend.

15. It is clear from the facts of the case, that in the respondents messages to
GLAYZEL TORRES, maliciously impute to me that I am a criminal hiding
from government authorities which she has no legal evidence of what she is
accusing unto me.

16.With the foregoing facts, it is evident RHONA V. SALONA be investigated

and upon finding of probable cause that the corresponding information for
cases for appropriate criminal action be filed in the appropriate court or
tribunal PROMPTLY in the interest of fairness and honesty, and to ensure
speedy administration of justice.

Affiant further sayeth naught

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto affixed my signature below this

___ day of _________________ in the City of ___________________.

MARIETA Y. LOZARES
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to BEFORE ME this __th day of ______________

in the City of ______________________, Philippines. FURTHER CERTIFIES
that I have personally examined the herein affiant and was fully convinced that
she freely executed and understood the contents of this Reply-Affidavit

_____________________________________
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR.