International Phenomenological Society

Phenomenology and Positivism

Author(s): D. Sinha
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Jun., 1963), pp. 562-577
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 PHENOMENOLOGYAND POSITIVISM

I
The central-point of Positivism is the emphasis on the given in the
interpretationof knowledge. All knowledge, according to positivistic
philosophyin general,is to be based on the sense-givenas the real source
of knowledge.Positivismthus tends to be;a philosophyof the given which
seeks to base all systems of knowledge,free from ideal presuppositions,
on -the "positive,"i.e., on what is actually and originallygiven. In this
sense, Husserlclaims, phenomenologyis genuinepositivism.(,,Sagt Posi-
tivismusso viel wie absolutvorurteilfreieGrUndungaller Wissenschaften
auf das ,,Positive",die originarzu Erfassende,dann sind wir die echten
Positivisten." 1)
Phenomenologyon principlerefersback to evidence.For phenomeno-
logy, the immediate "seeing" (Sehen) - not barely the sensuous - expe-
riencingseeing but seeing in generalas originallygiven consciousness,is
the source of authority(Rechtquelle)for all rational statements.It has
the function of provingright, in so far as they are originallygiven. As
"the principleof all principles,"Husserlformulates:"Everytype of first-
hand intuitingforms a legitimatesource of authority;whateverpresents
itself in "intuition"at first hand, in its bodily reality so to, say, is to be
acceptedsimply as it presentsitself to be, thoughwithinthe limits within
which it presentsitself."2
To state it in anotherway, this principleof referringto self-givenness
means "not to search deductively after constructionsunrelated to the
matterin question,but to derive all knowledgefrom its ultimatesources,
fromprinciplesseen by themselvesin the formof insights(selbstgesehenen-
eingesehenenPrinzipien);not to be divertedby any prejudices,by any
verbal contradictions,or indeedby anythingin the world, even underthe
name of "exactscience,"but to grantits rightto whateveris clearlyseen,
which as such constitutesthe "original,"what precedesall theories,that
which sets the ultimatenorm."3
1 Ed. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phinomenologie und phiinomenologische
Philosophie, Vol. I, ? 20.
2 Ibid., ? 24.
3 Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den ,,Logischen Untersuchungen," (1913) ed., by
E. Fink in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, I (1939), ? 3.

562
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 ANDPOSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 563

Regarding the principle of givenness, Husserl's phenomenology is

precededby the traditionof empiricismand positivism.But the distinc-
tion between the two schools is chiefly determinedby the interpretation
of the "given."Even the Husserlian"principleof all principles"as such
does not make it clear as to what is to be considered as immediately
given or intuited at first hand. The given may range from the barely
sense-given, i.e., the data of sensuous intuition, to the highest possibility
of the ideal generalities of thought. Here exactly phenomenology joins
issue with positivism and empiricism. Negatively speaking, phenomeno-
logy shares in common the radical tradition of the empiricist of not
acceptingideal constructionsor metaphysicalpresuppositionsor theories
- beyondthe elementsof the given.But the "given"has a far wider scope
for the phenomenologistthan for the positivist.
Here arises the questionwhetheror not universalsor generalessences
can be consideredas given in the genuinesense of the term. Phenomeno-
logy does not agree with the positivists in restrictinggivenness.to parti-
cular experience only and rejecting the possibility of any intuiting of
general-essencesand relations. According to Husserl's observation,the
positivistsare prejudicedin not acceptinganythingother than particular
data, and especially sense-data. The traditional empiricism takes as
presuppositionthat only the individualcan be originallyintuited. With
the denial of intuitive graspabilitygoes -hand in hand the denial of the
possible being of universals.
Husserl'scriticismshows how this denial of generalitiesin knowledge
implies serious contradictionwithin empiricism itself. Thus, Locke's
doctrine of "generalideas," his doctrine of- intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge,and the recognitionthat pure mathematicsand pure morals
are founded on these in sharp distinctionfrom the empiricalsciences,
manifestly contradictsthe empiricist standpoint itself. Locke seeks to
present an epistemological grounding of the objectivity of objective
sciences ,eine erkenntnistheoretische BegrUndung der Objektivitat der
objektiven Wissenschaften") - worked out through inner-psychological
investigations.4And this was effected through his sensualism of data
(Datensensualismus)with the doctrineof outer and inner sense. Sensua-
lism remains the basis.of Locke's psychologism- the only indubitable
basis of. all knowledgeis self-experience(Selbsterfahrung)and its'region
of immanentdata. Locke's successor,Berkeley,goes furtherand reduces
the naturalexperienceof appearingbodily things to the complex of sen-
suous data themselves.From the standpointof data-sensualismLocke

4 See Husserl's last work, Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentalePhinomenologie, ? 22.

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564 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

offers his theory of abstractionism in the form of "general ideas," con-

structed purely out of particular data of outer and inner sense.
As against Locke's abstraction-theory, Husserl argues that general
essentialities (Wessenheiten) are objects, rather, meant as objects in con-
sciousness.As individualobjects they are unities in manifold conscious-
ness meaningthem. Husserlclaims immediateself-comprehension(Selbst-
erfassung)with regardto such special objects.
Husserl,however,anticipatesthe possible objectionthat may be raised
against his own thesis of general essentialities.Thinking is a mediate
consciousness, while intuition is immediate. Intuition implies passivity,
taking in a given, while thinking is a manifold activity going out from the
given. To this it is posited that as passivityhas its manifoldimplication
in spite of immediacy,so in the case of thinkingactivitytoo. The whole
form of active synthesismay constitutethe unity of self-givingin thought.
So Husserl suggeststhat the idea of "intuition"(Anschauung)should be
broadened,so as to cover ideal conceptsand types.5
- In this respect Husserl criticizes empiricism,particularlyof Locke's
form, as only an apparentintuitionismor apparentempiricism(Scheinem-
pirismus).For, the empiricistprincipleof going back upon experience,
upon self-graspingviewing, is only partly worked out and not in its full
consistency. Although Locke started with the idea of inner-psychological
investigations (innenpsychologischen Untersuchungen), he failed to grasp
the idea of an "eideticscience of pure consciousness."6
In a different context, in ,,Logische Untersuchungen," Husserl has
already shown the inadequacyof a purely psychologicalbasis for ideal
laws (,,Idealgesetze," as distinguished from ,,Realgesetze"). He argues
that psychologycannotgive morethan empiricaluniversals,resultingfrom
psychicalphenomena,psychicaldispositions,and organicprocesses.That
is why psychologists cannot give any apodictically evident and over-
empirical and absolutely exact laws which constitute the core of all logic.

II
The distinction of Husserlian Phenomenology from the empiricist-
positivist philosophy of Hume is particularly worth noting. David Hume
draws the empiricistdirectionof Locke to its furtherradicalconclusion.
Sensualismremainsthe basis of Locke's psychologicalorientationof the
theory of knowledge- the only indubitablebasis of all knowledgeis the
primarylevel of immanentdata of outer and inner sense. Berkeleycarries

5 Husserl, Erste Philosophie. Vol. I, ? 19.

6 Ibid.

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 ANDPOSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 565

the sensualistic explanation to a radically nominalistic extent, so as to

deny the concept of "body" altogether.
David Hume pursuesthis sensationalismmore radicallyand makes of
it an atomisticpsychology.In Hume, sensationalismcomes to full com-
pletion. All beings - bodily as well as mental - reduce themselves to
elementarypsychical data, to the mass of perceptionsnot integratedto
any "I."Atoms of consciousness(Bewufptsei'nsatome)are the perceptions;
and correspondingto the naturallaws of the outerworldare here the inner
laws of associationand habit. Consequently,the whole world with all its
objectivityis reduced to a system of apparentforms, of fictions, which
growin subjectivitynecessarilyaccordingto immanentpsychologicallaw.
Thus a "fictionalistic epistemology" (fiktionalistische Erkenntnistheorie)
naturallyspringsfrom Hume's psychology.All categoriesof objectivity
are fictions.
So far as the skepticalattitudetowardsthe objectiveworld of science -
or, as Husserlputs it, "objectivism"of science in general- is concerned,
Husserlwouldin a sensejoin issue with Hume.Husserl,like Hume, would
question the objective validity of the scientific world. But while Hume, in
his questioningattitude,does not go furtherthan the common categories
of objectiveexplanation,such as causality,substance,etc., Husserl fixes
his attention on the mathematico-physicalconstructionfrom the given
world of common experience, as following from the Galilean' "mathemati-
zation of nature." Husserl is not against the validity of the scientific world
as such; but he points out emphaticallythe disconnectionof such an
abstractedscientificexplanationfrom the concreteworld of experience-
what he calls ,,Lebenswelt,"or the prescientificworldof life.7 So, in con-
trastto Hume,Husserlbringsundercriticalexaminationnot the commonly
acceptedcategoriesof science, but ratherthe whole attemptof the Gali-
lean and succeedingscience of constructingtheoretico-logicalsuperstruc-
ture in place of what stands as the world of lived experience.
However, Husserl subjectsHumeanismto sharpcriticismfrom within.
Accordingto Husserl, Hume and the succeedingpositivistsmake out of
impressionsand ideas, the only two elements of consciousness,material
signs (sachlicheMerkmale).This attributionof thing-character(thoughof
the psychicaltype) vitiates the Humean distinctionbetween impressions
and ideas, and the primacyof impressions.My consciousness,being the
region of immediate appearance, demonstrates thereby a region of imme-
diately experienced beings. Thus the distinction of impressions and ideas
seems to indicate a bare distinction of things (Sachunterschied).
- 7 In his last work, ,,Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die
trans-
zendentale Phainomenologie,"Husserl shows the departureof the objectively true and
valid universe of modern science, as inauguratedby Galileo, from the ,,Lebenswelt"
See Ibid., III. A.

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566 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

From this follows a confusionabout impressionsregardingthe eviden-

cing characterand the entitativecharacter.On the one hand, impression
is looked upon as a thing and as such describedby the use of a material
sign. At the same time impressionis taken to be experienceof the expe-
rienced, of the self-given. Now, bare things exist without signifying
anything,meaninganything.But impressionis, for Hume, the epistemo-
logical title for the intuition competentfor the acts of consciousnessin
the form of evidence-verification. It is in trutha title for evidence-consci-
ousnessin general,or spoken of in the widest sense, ,,Selbstanschauung,"
in general, as a possible foundationfor each process of making evident,
for each verification.But a real thing as such cannotverify anything;but
only the self-viewingof the thing, the perceptionor remembranceof it,
can verify.
Husserlseeks furtherto show falsitiesin the inductive-empirical objec-
tivism as demonstratedin Hume'ssystem.The fundamentalconcepts and
the clarifyingfundamentalprinciplesof Humeanpsychologyand episte-
mology are made out of the method of inductive empiricism.Hume
attemptsto build an empiricismon grounds of inner consciousnessby
bringinginner facts of experience,under inductive empiricallaws. This
naturallyreducesthe sphereof consciousnessto a sphereof bare irratio-
nality, because for bare empiricallaws there are no absolute reasons of
validity. In the light of such empirical-inductivecharacter,the Humean
psychology of atomistic mental states falls in line with objective psycho-
logy. Yet, the Humean psychologyby its own admission is-subjective
psychology,and as such somethingdifferentfrom objective psychology,
so far as it presumesto be the fundamentalscience of all possible know-
ledge and science. Thus, here lies a fundamentalanomalyin the Humean
theory.
The corrective to such empiricist psychology should, according to
phenomenology,lie in a differentdirection,namely, in the recognitionof
the intuitionof universals,conceptualgeneralities,and generalrelations,
instead of being restricedto the experienceof individualor temporary
particularities.Consciousnessshould be taken as holding within its scope
immediateessence-insightsof pure generalitiesand necessity.The extreme
nominalism of Hume is completely blind to the general intuition of
universalstatementsand principles.
Further,Husserldemonstratesa fundamentalcontradictionin Humean
skepticism.He remarks,"The whole constructionof the Humean skepti-
cism as a theorywhich seeks to demonstrateall reality and all science of
reality as fiction, becomes possible only through a kind of intellectual
dishonesty."8 On the one side Hume recognizesthe pure rationaltruth

8 Husserl, Erste Philosophy, vol. I, ? 25.

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 ANDPOSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 567

of causality - and as a matter of fact the explanation of this rationality

is his problem. (Hume admittedlytakes "necessaryconnection"as the
essenceof the categoryof cause, althoughhe shows that its objectivityis
false and it is only "subjectivelydetermined").On the other side, the
final thesis of this theory is the absolute irrationalityof the principlein
view of its contrastwith the verdict of immediateexperiencein the form
of impressions.
Humean skepticismends in the bankruptcyof philosophyitself, as a
matter of fact, of all systematicknowledgeabout the "world.""It is in-
deed the bankruptcyof objectiveknowledge."9 In this fate of Humeanism,
Husserl finds an apparentcontradiction.For, accordingto Humeanism,
philosophydemonstratesas the final science that all sciencesof facts are,
upon ultimate analysis, unreasonable.But the hidden anomaly remains
that philosophy itself, so far as it is universal psychology, should be
regardedas a science of facts. On the one side, the reasonabilityof
immanent psychology is presupposed,because through it the Humean
theory itself is demonstratedas reasonable;on the other side, the result
of this theory, that no science derived from experience can at all be
reasonable,provesthe invalidityof this psychology.
To be quite consistentwith his skepticalstandpoint,Hume should not
have even assertedthat generalinsightsare but subjectivefictions. For, it
should strictly follow that this very general propositionitself would be
unintelligible.

III
However,in spite of this contradictionin Humeanskepticism,Husserl
still finds in it a foreform (Vorform) of his own phenomenological philo-
sophy. For Husserl,Hume'spositivismnot only marksthe completionof
skepticism,but also the deciding step towards a transcendental"funda-
mental science" (Grundwissenschaft). The consistent sensualisticsubjec-
tivism of Hume makesfor an intuitionisticand immanentphilosophy,and
thus in a way anticipatesa genuinely intuitionisticphilosophy such as
phenomenology. Husserl in fact admits that Hume's "Treatise" gives the
first systematic sketch of a pure phenomenology, which, though under the
name of psychology, attempts to supply an actual "transcendental"pheno-
menology, though reversed in the direction of sensualism.10
In the thoroughgoing skeptical phase of empiricism in the philosophy
of Hume, behindall its negativism,Husserlstill finds involvedthe positive
9 Die Krisis, ? 23.
10 ,,Nachwort zu meinen "Ideen zu einer reinen Phlinomeno-logieund phinomeno-
logische Philisophie", Jahrbuch ffurPhilosophie und phinomenologische Forschung,
Bd. XI (1930).

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568 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

anticipationof what Husserl calls "transcendental"philosophy.Husserl

tracesin Hume the most significantstep in the developmentof the philo-
sophyof "transcendental subjectivism,"which found its properexpression
in Kantianism.How is this significantstep markedby Humeanskepticism?
The most far-reachingresult of the empiricisticskepticismwas to bring
to closer notice in an unambiguousway what was already implied in
Cartesianism,namely, that the total world-knowledge- pre-scientificas
well as scientific- is fundamentally:a riddle.Alreadywith Descartes,the
immanentsensuousnessis takento produceworld-pictures.WithBerkeley,
this sensuousnessproducesthe worldof bodies.And withHume,the whole
mind, constitutedof "impressions"and "ideas,"along with the laws of
associationand the faculty of "imagination,"producesthe whole world
itself - the world of rational science as well as of common experience.
This production,however, is barely a fiction, a representationwhich is
innerlydetermined.Thus, throughthe regenerationand radicalizationof
the Cartesianfundamentalproblemin Berkeley, and decidedlyin Hume,
"dogmatic"objectivismwas shakento its core - not only the contemporary
mathematicalobjectivismwhich attributedto the world itself a mathema-
tical-rationalself-subsistence,but the objectivismin general which had
ruled throughcenturies."
The fundamentalproblemof Hume was to make intelligiblethe naively
acceptedcertaintyof the worldas a matterof course(naiveSelbstverstdnd-
lichkeit). Once Hume had discernedthat the world is one constructed
in subjectivity,the so-called objectivityof being and objective truth of
sciencebecamereallya problemfor him. The naive objectivityof common
sense and science, divorced from the concrete performingsubjectivity,
could no longerbe accepted.The real problemof Hume lay in the world-
riddle in the deepest and final sense - the riddle of a world whose being
is being out of subjective "achievement" (Sein aus subjektiver Leistung).12
Thusthe atomisticpositivismof Hume endedup with a worldof fictions
by abandoningphilosophyas a science of truths.However, as a reaction
againstthe negativismof Hume, and at the same time takingthe positive
hints containedtherein, a constructiveand systematicphilosophyin the
form of "transcendentalsubjectivism"made its way. And that was the
philosophyof Kant.'3

't Die Krisis, ? 24.

12 Ibid., ? 25.
13 Of course, Husserl always stresses the point that a merely psychological theory

of knowledge, i.e., an explanation of knowledge on the basis of empirical-psychol-

ogical analysis - as in-Humeanism, hardly approximates a theory of knowledge in
the specific transcendental-philosophical sense. Cf. H-usserl, Manuskript M11,
,,Phiinomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie,"111.5-6.

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 ANDPOSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 569

Husserl's use of the expression "transcendental" should be fully clari-

fied in this context. It serves as the leading concept in the motive of
asking back (Riickfrage) for the last source of all knowledge-forms, of
the reflection of knowing of itself and its knowing life in which all know-
ledge-validating forms occur. And this source is entitled I-self (Ich-selbst),
with my total actual and possible life of knowledge, finally my concrete
life in general. The whole transcendental problem moves round the
relation of, this, my "I," the ego, to my mind and then around the relation
of this "I" and my conscious life in the world, of which I am conscious
and whose true being I recognize in my own knowledge-forms (Erkennt-
nisgebilden).

IV
Husserl's attitude towards the nineteenth-century empirio-critical posi-
tivism of Germany may be considered in this connection. The German
positivists, like Mach and Avenarius, had introduced the empirio-critical
method and theory of knowledge as against the prevailing transcendental-
idealist philosophy by reducing truth to sense-contents, and by rejecting
an essential opposition between the inner world of the subject and the
outer world, and by advocating the ideal of strict scientificity. Moreover,
the positivist theory of ,,Denkikonomie" sought to interpret theoretical
and scientific processes of man by direct analogy with technical-economic
practice. Accordingly, "law" is simply explained as an instrument of
,,Denkokonomie" - economically ordered experience lying ready for use.
Indeed, the positivism of Mach already shows the signs of phenomo-
logical thinking. The pure description of the given as the only method of
acquiring knowledge and also the aim of establishing philosophy "as a
strict science," as later taken up by Husserl, echo the background of
empirio-critical positivism. However, Husserl, in his attempt of a pheno-
menological "innovation of pure logic and theory of knowledge (,,Neube-
griindung der reinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"), expressly departs
from empiriocriticism. Regarding the description of the given, Husserl
obviously does not think of the sensuously perceptible givenness, but of
one which we attain through another way of comprehending, namely,
through "eidetic" or "intutive" grasping of essence or essential structures.
Husserl further opposes the positivist theory of ,,Denkikonomie." At
first approving of Mach's analysis of the economic nature of scientific
,,Erkenntnispraxis," Husserl warns against the epistemological conse-
quences which Mach had drawn out of these analyses. For Mach, laws
are nothing but technical instruments for the economical ordering of the
multiplicity of empirical data. Husserl, on the other hand, takes this
principle of unification in ,,Denkikonomie" as an anthropological rela-

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570 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
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tion. The a priori validity of the mathematicaland the logical is the

presuppositionof each significantteaching of ,,Denkikonomie," rather
than its result.Husserl arguesagainstthis theory almostin the same form
as against psychologism.As psychologismmistakenlyexplains the ideal
characterof the form of inferentialconclusionas the result of a psychical
act, so ,,Denk6konomie"traces the logical-idealconditionsin its analysis
of the economicnatureof theoreticalexperimenting.On this point Husserl
would rather agree with Neo-Kantianism as against psychologism and
,,Denkakonomie."
In spite of this critique of ,,Denkikonomie," Husserl at the same time
accepted Mach as one who had preparedthe way to phenomenological
methodthrough"analysisof sensations."Husserleven goes on to charac-
terize the positivisticempiricismof Avenariusand Schuppeas "transcen-
dental philosophy."14

The philosophy of Kant serves for Husserl as the model of true trans-
cendental philosophy - of "philosophy as strict science" (,,Philosopkie als
strangeWissenchaft").For, here is posited the original source in subjec-
tivity out of which the categorialforms of knowledgeare originatedand
throughwhich they are validated.It is a philosophywhich, as againstthe
scientific as well as prescientificsubjectivism,returns to the knowing
subjectivityas the originof all objectivemeaning-formationsand meaning-
validities. In this way it undertakesto understandthe existent world in
terms of forms of meaningand validity, and to give way to a new kind
of scientificityand philosophy.Thus the Kantiansystemfor the first time
- leaving aside the negativistic-skepticphilosophyof Hume - attemptsan
actual universal "transcendentalphilosophy," meant as strict science.
Husserlhimself seeks to develop this very idea of philosophyas a tran-
scendentalscience in his own system - phenomenologyas a science of
pure consciousness.
Here it may be, questionedwhy Hume's skepticism,though containing
subjectivepsychologyand being subjectivein method, still falls far short
of such a science of consciousnessas envisagedin phenomenology.The
emphasisin Humeanismis, of course,shiftedfrom the worldof objectivity
to the sphereof consciousness.And, in this shiftingthe process of reduc-
tion in terms of "impressions"is pursued.
Reduction,althoughin differentsense, is also the methodof phenome-
nology. Indeed,the methodof transcendentalreductionis the only funda-
mental method of phenomenologyand is the approachto the thematic

'. Die Krisis, ? 56.

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 PHENOMENOLOGY
ANDPOSITIVISM 571

domainof philosophy- the avenueto transcendentalsubjectivity.Pheno-

menologicalreductionindicatesthe switchingover from the naturaltheo-
reticalstandpointto a new one, gainingtherebythe whole field of absolute
consciousness.
The slogan of phenomenologicalreductionis to go back "to the things
themselves"(,,zu den Sachen") as the immedate "phenomena"in the
regionof pure consciousness.The Humeanprogramof empirisisticreduc-
tion seems apparentlysimilarto, such a procedureso far as there is also
the movementfrom objective categoriesto impressionsthemselves.And
the negativeaspectof the program,namely,freedomfrompresuppositions
and beliefs, also seems to be commonto both the systems.15
But the great differencebetween the phenomenologicaland the positi-
vist reductionis the recognitionof the ideal essencesas phenomenain one
case and referenceto nothingbut sense-impressionsin the other. Positi-
vistic reductionis vitiated by the bias of over-simplificationin the light
of sense-dataonly, without the recognitionof any deeper essentialistic
insight.
The apparentsimilarityin respectto the said negativeaspectalso should
not be over-emphasized.Phenomenologyseeks to go furtherthan the aim
of merelyremovingthe theoreticalpreconceptionsand tracingback to the
immediatedata. The whole world of naturalexperience,and all theories
and scienceswhichrelateto this world,are subjectedto radicalsuspension
or "bracketing.""To eliminatethe world-beliefin the depth of its tran-
scendental originality means performingthe phenomenologicalreduc-
tion."16
Closely related to reductionis the concept of analysis, occurri in
common in the philosophies of positivism and phenomenologyalike -
particularlyin view of the role of analysis in modem neo-positivistic
philosophy.
The phenomenologicalprinciple of analysis no doubt contains within
itself the essenceof tracingback from the given complex of experienceto
the simple elementsof "phenomena."However,it shouldbe clearlynoted
that a systematicphenomenologywould not direct its efforts one-sidedly
towards a real (reelle) analysis of experience.'7The immanentstudy of
pure experiences,the study of their own proper essences, should not be
mistakenas a study of the real componentsof experience.

15 Prof. Landgrebe refers to the "negative result" of phenomenology in the sense

of cognition of Being, so far as the method of reduction prevents rash metaphysical
hypostasization.See "Phenomenologyand Metaphysics,"Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research, Dec. 1949.
;16 E. Fink, ,,Die phdnomenologische Philosophie in der -gegenwartigen Kritik,"
Kant-Studien, Bd. 38 (1933).
7 Ideen 1, ? 128.

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572 RESEARCH
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PHILOSOPHY

Underthe naturalisticmotive of psychologysuch a mistakeis apt to be

committed.And such is the case with the sensualisticanalysis of expe-
rience in Humeanism."Impressions"and "ideas" are with Hume real
componentsof experience,andare only passiveelementswhichare devoid
of any intentionalreference.The whole direction in the psychologistic
atomism of Hume is from the sense-givento the correspondingmental
elements.The doublecorrespondencebetweenthe noematicand the noetic
aspects of the intentional act - the problem which concerns, phenomeno-
logy in particular - has been altogether missed in Humeanism.

VI
Analysis has been carried in a widely different direction by the modem
Neo-Positivistsand is, of course, to be sharply distinguishedfrom the
phenomenologicalanalysis.Neo-positivism,or logical positivism,in com-
mon with positivismof the originaltype, seeks to interpretthe world in
terms of perceptibleelementsof sense-data;but the approachis through
logical analysis of language - forms of propositions through which we
express our knowledgeof. the world. The task of philosophy,according
to this school, lies not in the discoveryof any new kind of facts, but in
the clarification of propositions and their relations in language. Thus
positivisticanalysisis concernedwith finding equivalentexpressions,but
with simplerstructure.'8
The logical-positivistprogramof analysisis thus concernedonly with
the logical structureof language rather than with the meant content.
Phenomenologicalanalysis,on the other hand, is not, as such, concerned
with linguisticexpressions,but with the phenomenawithin the region of
immanentexperiencemeant by such expressions.It undertakesto trace
the elements and structure of the phenomena obtained through phenome-
nological intuiting.
Of course, even for the phenomenologist, sometimes certain expressions
do provide the point of departure for analysis, but only towards unfolding
their meaningsand therebycomingto the phenomenameant.Thus, in his
"LogicalInvestigations,"Husserl raises the question of the phenomeno-
logical and intentionaldifferentiationin expressions,having the physical
side and the psychicalside of meaning.19With regardto names,he points
to a distinctionbetweenwhat they "demonstrate"and what they signify-

Is Cf. "By analysis they (the analytic philosophers) meant something which,
whatever precise description of it they chose, at least involved the attempt to rewrite
in different and in some way more appropriate terms those statements which they
found philosophically puzzling." J. 0. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p. vii.
19 Logische Untersuchungen.Vol. II, I. i. 6.

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 PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM 573

and sometimesto a distinctionbetweenthat which a name signifies (the

meaning, the "content"of nominal representation)and that which it
names (the object of representation).He further makes a distinction
between"occasional"and "objective"expressions,particularlyin view of
such expressionsthat have referenceto the momentary-contentof demon-
stration and as such belong to a further stage of expressions whose
meanings change from case to case.20 The meaning of the former is
dependentupon the contextof the speakingperson,whilethat of the latter
is not so dependent,but rather bound throughits express appearance-
content.An "objective"expressionis to be understoodwithoutreference
to the context of the person expressingit and to the circumstancesof his
expression.On the other side, an essentiallysubjectiveor essentiallyocca-
sional expressionis one to which a conceptuallyunited groupof possible
meaningsso belongs that it is essentialto the expressionto orientateits
actual meaningaccordingto the speakingperson and his positions.21
The points of reference for the logical positivist are, after all, the
elementaryfacts and factual relations,correspondingto which stand the
simple elementarypropositions- "atomic"propositions,as Russel and
Wittgensteinwould hold. The units of analysis are, in any case, the
elementarypropositionsor "protocolsentences,"as some positivistslike
Neurathwould posit. The latter may even give rise to some sort of lin-
guistic solipsism,which is far from a possibilityin phenomenology.
It may here be noted that Wittgenstein,in his later development(in
"PhilosophicalInvestigations")comes strangelyclose to the fundamental
attitudeof phenomenologicalmethodof intuiting.His motto is thus, "not
to think but to look." 22 Accordingto him, philosophylays bare the uses
of language;it seeks no more than to exhibit the actual functioningof
language.In all his explanationof language,Wittgenstein'sgeneral aim
is to breakthe rigidityof our termsof thought.But he disclaimsany thesis
of his own; he offers no doctrine. He merely describes the various
workingsof languageand lays them before us. He attemptsto proceedin
terms of what "goes,on" in our experience,and not by merely studying
the grammaticalstructureof the expressionsused with referenceto that.
Logical Positivismshows in itself an attemptto attributeto philosophy
a region of logical consequencesand precisionworked out scientifically,

20 Ibid., I. vii 26.

21. Although Logische Untersuchungen (vol. II) is largely occupied with the
question of the meaning of words, phenomenology can never be branded as a theory
of meaning (Bedeutungslehre).Such investigations in connection with meaning serve
only as preparation for a fuller epistemological explanation, and nothing further.
Cf. ,,Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den Logischen Untersuchungen"(1913), ? 10, ed. by
E. Fink in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 1939.
22 Philosophical Investigations I. 66.-

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574 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

to therebyeliminatethe unclaritiesand contradictions.And a similartask

of winningfor philosophyits -own domain of strictlyscientificinvestiga-
tions is no doubt undertakenin anotherway by Husserl. While Husserl,
in seeking this goal, went from actualityof facts to ideality of essences
and to their systematicdescription,positivismchose the oppositeway of
referringback from conceptsto facts and took logical analysisof language
as the only domain of philosophy.The whole linguistic analysis of the
positivistis alreadycommittedto the world of facts, while the phenome-
nological analysisis altogetherfree from such commitment.On the con-
trary,the latter is directedtowardideal contents,followed by an express
"bracketing"of the actualtruth of facts. "Intentionalanalysis"bringsout
the double-sidedaspects of intendingact (noesis) and intended content
(noema). It is concernedwith the correspondenceof intentionalact and
intentionalreferent.Thus, while the positivist analyzes language as the
passive and formal vehicle of -factualreference, the phenomenologist
analyzesthe double aspect of the intentionalact of consciousness.
Now, both positivism and phenomenology would negatively agree that
philosophy does not bring "mattersof fact" within its proper domain.
Hume admittedthat he was concernedphilosophicallynot with "matters
of fact"but with "relationsof ideas"which are only immanentin thought.
Husserl expressly"brackets"the naturalworld of facts and discoversthe
transcendentalessences in the immanentregion of pure consciousness.In
this sense both turn to subjectivism.But, while with Hume subjectivityis
only. another name for fictionality, and is just a nominal term for the
atomisticmental states, for Husserl, subjectivityis an autonomousregion
containingideal contentshavingtheir transcendentalstatus. The Humean
traditionof factionalismshows itself in modernpositivismin the form of
bare linguisticstructureof propostions,leavingno scope for any indepen-
dent region like the supposedone of pure consciousness.
This bringsus to the two fundamentallydistinct attitudestoward sub-
jectivity, as found in Humean positivismand in Husserlianphenomeno-
logy. The Humeandefinitionof subjectivitymay simply be characterized
as natural-psychological.Subjectivityis just taken to be equivalentto
mentality(to be mental);and what is mind otherthan a compositebundle
of fleeting atomic perceptions?Subjectivityas such has no locus standii
apartfrom the discretemental states bound togetherthroughassociation.
To Husserl, on the other hand, subjectivityis a fundamentaltruth - the
subjectivityof the pure ego. This subjectivity,however,shouldnot, in any
case, be taken in the narrowersense of empiricalsubjectivity.The pheno-
menologicalconcern with transcendentalsubjectivitydoes not imply in
any way a retrunto an introspectionisticsubjectivepsychology.Thus the
phenomenologistwould not confuse subjectivitywith the barely "mental"

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 ANDPOSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 575

or "individual,"or with what is "private."23 Rather, the essences which

the phenomenologistdiscoverswithinthe field of pure experienceare sup-
posed to be objective and invariable,insofer as they are independentof
the context of individualmind.
That phenomenologyinvestigatesphenomenawithinthe region of puri-
fed experiencedoes not bring phenomenologydown to the level of sub-
jective psychology. For, such a region should not be equated with the
mentalworld of the individual.It ratherindicatesa transindividual,and
at the same time presuppositional,status. This is what "transcendental"
and "pure consciousness"imply. Referringto the foundationalstatus of
pureconsciousness,Husserldeclares:"Pureconsciousnesshas the absolute
priorityin relationto which all being is aposteriori."24
In connectionwith subjectivity,the conceptof Ego shouldnaturallybe
taken into consideration.For, Husserlspeaksof subjectivitynecessarilyin
the context of the ego as the identicalsubject-poleof several acts of con-
sciousness.However,Husserl,in his earlierphase (1st Editionof Logische
Untersuchungen, Bk.II), had rejectedthe notion of an identicalsubjectas
the necessarycentreof referencebeyondthe intentionalacts of conscious-
ness, and rather sided with the Humean and empiricistictradition of
"empiricalI." But later on (alreadyin the 2nd edition of Logische Unter-
suchungen),25Husserldeniedthe positionand graduallycame to recognize
an integralstatusof the ego. In Ideen 1, he positiedthe indubitablereality
of the ego (in the Cartesianway) in relationto the contingentworld.
Apart from the atomistictraditionof Hume, some of the contemporary
British analyticphilosophers,such as Ryle in his The Conceptof Mind,
who attemptsa thoroughlyempiricist-analytical andneobehavioristictheory
of mindand ego. The conceptof mindin the Cartesiantradition,as a dis-
tinct kind of stuff like the body itself, is rejectedentirely.The positivistic
conceptof mind as nothingmore than "minding"would hardlyleave any
scope for a mind-substancethat possesses mental states and processes.
Consequently,a thoroughlypositivisticpictureof "I" as merelyan index-
concept is substitutedfor the I-self.
What the positivist, in an objective analysis, seeks to resolve in
linguistic-behavioristic terms, appears as a fundamentalconcrete datum
for the phenomenologistwith his inner-subjectiveattitude. Every con-
scious act pertainsto the act-performingEgo,,being directedfrom it. In
every act of consciousness,immediateor mediate, cognitive, volitional,
23 Cf. H. Spiegelberg's distinction of the different possible meanings of

"subjective"in orderto distinguishtherefrom the exact sense in which phenomenology

may be regarded as a study of the subjective. The Phenomenological Movement,
vol. II, p. 666ff.
24 Ideen vol. III, ? 12.
25 Log. Untersuchungenvol. II (2nd edition), V.i.8 (Zusatz).

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576 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

or emotional, "I am present, actuallypresent."The pure Ego serves as

the centerof all referenceand serves as the irremovableprinciplethrough
all possible phenormenological disconnecting.As Husserl points out, the
pure Ego remainsas residuumof the phenomenologicalsuspensionof the
world and of the empiricalsubjectivitybelongingto it.26
However, in Husserl's phenomenologytoo, we find an approach
throughthe analysisof the expression"I."27 Husserl makes it clear that
the word "IL"as a personalpronoun,lacks te objectivecharacterconveyed
by the expressionswhich he calls "objective."It is a word with whichthe
speakermarkshimself.Each personspeakinghas his I-representation(Ich-
vorstellung- and therewithhis individualconceptionof I); therefore,for
each person meaningof the word is different.But that each, in speaking
of himself,says "I," the word possessesthe characterof a universalmark
of this fact. However, the word "I" has not in itself strengthto directly
arouse the particularI-representationwhich determinesthe meaning in
the speech concerned.Rather, it has an indicatingfunction which calls
out, as it were, to the hearer: Your opposite means himself. Thus, for
Husserl, the linguistic approachto the I-meaningis only an indicating
step, hintingat some deeper essence behind the word. He warns that the
immediaterepresentationof the speakingperson should not be taken as
a graspingof the completemeaningof the word "I" in itself.
The phenomenologicalinvestigationinto the "constitution"of the in-
dividual ego in the form of what Husserl calls "I-man"(Ich-Mensch)
should throw some further light in this direction. Such analysis would
not confine itself to the bare empiricalphysico-mentalI, having body
and mind. It would ultimatelylead to a pure mentalI (rein seelishesIch).
Here lies the sharp differencebetween the empiricist-positivistand the
phenomenologicalway of thinking. Not only is the pure ego to be
abstractedfrom corporeality,it is to be essentially understoodas the
"subject"of acts and states, directingitself to the object. In the acts of
manifoldlyindividuatedcogito, the pure "I"exercisesits pure "functions."
Husserl recognizesboth aspects of the pure "I" in relationto functions,
namely,as distinguishedfrom the acts on the one hand,and as inseparably
relatedto them.28Husserl speaks of a quite peculiartranscendence- "a
transcendencein immanence"- in respect to the pure Ego, that remains
as residuumof the phenomenologicalsuspensionof the world, including
empiricalsubjectivity.29This decidingelement of "transcendence" makes
possible the phenomenologicalrecognitionof pure Ego as sharply dis-

26 Ideen I, ? 57.
27 Log. Untersuchungenvol. II, I.iii. 26.
28 Ideen II, ? 21, 22
29 Ideen I, ? 57.

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 AND POSITIVISM
PHENOMENOLOGY 577

tinguished from the so-called empirical ego (as a matter of fact the only
ego recognized)of Humeanism-empiricism, wholly reduciblein terms of
atomic mental states.
Such recognitionof the pure Ego is necessarilyconnectedwith Hus-
serl'sacceptanceof the comprehensibility of the pure "I-reflection."Such
self-comprehensionor self-perception(Selbstwahrnehmung) is obviously
a sharp contrastto the bare introspectiveinsight of Humeanismwhich
would not go deeper than the individual perceptions and experiences.
Husserl counts on a deeper insight than the merely psychological,and
thus finds in it an approachto an exact field of experience,that of "tran-
scendentalsubjectivity."Husserl, not being guided either by Nominalism
or Conceptualism, sought to follow a new - and enriched - form of in-
tuitionism.The pure Ego and the pure consciousnessinvolved therewith
is for the phenomenologistthe fundamentaldata at the heart of pheno-
menological reflection. Husserl indeed admits that the wonder of all
wondersis pure "I" and pure consciousness.(,,Das Wunderaller Wunder
Pure consciousnessis neither
ist reines Ich und reines Bewul3tsein").30
a nominal or conceptual construction, nor a derived inference. Tran-
scendental subjectivitysignifies not a product of speculative construc-
tions, it is rather"an absolutelyself-standingautonomousregion of direct
experienced31
D. SINHA.
CALCUTTAUNIVERSITY.

* In preparing this paper, the author is grateful to. Professor L. Landgrebe, of

the University of Cologne, for his help, and to members of the Husserl Archiv,
Cologne, for the use. of the unpublished materials, during the author's period of
study in West Germany.
'O Ideen III, ? 12.
31 Ibid., Nachwort, p. 141.

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