In Praise of Cultural Imperialism

Washingtonpost.
Newsweek Interactive, LLC
In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?

Author(s): David Rothkopf
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 107 (Summer, 1997), pp. 38-53
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
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In Praise of
Cultural
T t t C)
lmperlallsm o
. .
by David Rothkopf
fi -
_ ze gates ol t ze wor c are groamng

W * Ishut. From marble balconies and
| over the airwaves: demagogues
| decry new risks to ancient cultures
| and traditional values. Satellites: the
Intemet, and jumbo jets carry the contagion. To many people,
has become a synonym for "danger."
Of course, now is not the first time in history that chants and
anthems of nationalism have been heard. But the tide of nationalism
sweeping the world today is unique. For it comes in reaction to a coun-
tervailing global altemative that for the first time in history is clear-
ly something more than the crackpot dream of visionaries. It is also the
first time in history that virtually every individual at every level of soci-
ety can sense the impact of intemational changes. They can see and
hear it in their media, taste it in their food, and sense it in the products
that they buy. Even more visceral and threatening to those who fear
these changes is the growth of a global labor pool that during the next
decade will absorb nearly 2 billion workers from emerging markets, a
D A V I D R O T H K O P F is managing director of Kissinger Associates and an adjunct pro-

fessor of intemational affairs at Columbia University. He served as a senior official in the U.S.
Department of Commerce during the first term of the Clinton administration.
38 F o R E I G N P O L I C Y
Rothkopf
pool that currently includes close to 1 billion unemployed and under-

employed workers in those markets alone. These people will be working
for a fraction of what their counterparts in developed nations eam and
will be only marginally less productive. You are either someone who is
threatened by this change or someone who will profit from it, but it is
almost impossible to conceive of a significant group that will remain
untouched by it.
Globalization has economic roots and political consequences, but it
also has brought into focus the power of culture in this global environ-
ment the power to bind and to divide in a time when the tensions
between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to
international relations.
The impact of globalization on culture and the impact of culture on
globalization merit discussion. The homogenizing influences of global-
ization that are most often condemned by the new nationalists and by
cultural romanticists are actually positive; globalization promotes inte-
gration and the removal not only of cultural barriers but of many of the
negative dimensions of culture. Globalization is a vital step toward both
a more stable world and better lives for the people in it.
Furthermore, these issues have serious implications for American for-
eign policy. For the United States, a central objective of an Information
Age foreign policy must be to win the battle of the world's information
flows, dominating the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.
CULTURE AND CONFLICT
Culture is not static; it grows out of a systematically encouraged

ence for selected customs and habits. Indeed, Webster's Third New
rlaiiorlal Diciiorlary defines culture as the "total pattem of
behavior and its products embodied in speech, action, and artif
dependent upon man's capacity for leaming and transmitting
edge to succeeding generations." Language, religion, political a
systems, and social customs are the legacies of victors and market
reflect the judgment of the marketplace of ideas throughout popu
tory. They might also rightly be seen as living artifacts, bits and
carried forward through the years on currents of indoctrination,
acceptance, and unthinking adherence to old ways. Culture is
the organizers of society politicians, theologians, academics, a
ilies to impose and ensure order, the rudiments of which cha
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 39
Power of Culture
time as need dictates. It is less often acknowledged as the means of jus-

tifying inhumanity and warfare. Nonetheless, even a casual examina-
tion of the history of conflict explains well why Samuel Huntington, in
his The Clash of Civilizations, expects conflict along cultural fault lines,
which is precisely where conflict so often erupts. Even worse is that cul-
tural differences are often sanctified by their links to the mystical roots
of culture, be they spiritual or historical. Consequently, a threat to one's
culture becomes a threat to one's God or one's ancestors and, therefore,
to one's core identity. This inflammatory formula has been used to jus-
tify many of humanity's worst acts.
Cultural conflicts can be placed into three broad categories: religious
warfare, ethnic conflict, and conflict between "cultural cousins," which
amounts to historical animosity between cultures that may be similar in
some respects but still have significant differences that have been used
to justify conflict over issues of
The decline of proximity, such as resource

demands or simple greed.
cultural distinctions Religion-based conflicts occur

between Christians and Muslims,
may be a measure of Christians and Jews, Muslims
] o and Jews, Hindus and Muslims,
tne progress ol Sufis and Sun
civllization, a tangible Cath°liCs
conflicts that spring f
sign of enhanced (and in some

ferences include those
communications and Chinese an
. nese and Japanese, Chinese and
UlUlderStandlNg. Malays, Normans and Saxons,
Slavs and Turks, Armenians an
Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Turks, Turks and Greeks,
Chechens, Serbs and Bosnians, Hutus and Tutsis, blacks
ers, blacks and whites, and Persians and Arabs. Conflicts
tural cousins" over resources or territory have occurred bet
and France, France and Ger-lllany, Libya and Egypt, and ma
Another category that might be included in our taxon
cultural conflict. This conflict is primarily ideological an
enough rooted in tradition to fit within standard definition
yet it still exhibits most if not all of the characteristics of
40 F O R E I G N P O L I C Y
Rothkopf
clashes. The best example here is the Cold War itself, a conflict
between political cultures that was portrayed by its combatants in
broader cultural terms: "godless communists" versus "corrupt capital-
ists." During this conflict, differences regarding the role of the individ-
ual within the state and over the distribution of income produced a
"clash of civilizations" that had a relatively recent origin.
Finally, as a reminder of the toll that such conflicts take, one need
only look at the 20th century's genocides. In each one, leaders used cul-
ture tO fuel the passions of their armies and other minions and tO jUSti-
fy their actions among their people. One million Armenians; tens of
millions of Russians; 10 million Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals; 3 mil-
lion Cambodians; and hundreds of thousands of Bosnians} Rwandans,
and Tlmorese all were the victims of"culture" whether it was ethnic,
religious, ideological, tribal, or nationalistic in its origins. To be sure,
they fell victim to other agendas as well. But the provocative elements
of culture were to these accompanying agendas as Joseph Goebbels was
to Adolf Hitler- an enabler and perhaps the most insidious accomplice.
Historians can, of course, find examples from across the ages of "superiz
or" cultures eradicating "inferior" opponents in the American West,
among the native tribes of the Americas and Africa, during the Inqui-
sition, and during the expansion of virtually every empire.
SATELLITES AS CULTURAL DEATH STARS
Critics of globalization argue that the process will lead to a stripping

away of identity and a blandly uniform, Orwellian world. On a planet
of 6 billion people, this is, of course, an impossibility. More important-
ly, the decline of cultural distinctions may be a measure of the progress
of civilization, a tangible sign of enhanced communications and under-
standing. Successfill multicultural societies, be they nations, federations,
or other conglomerations of closely interrelated states, discern those
aspects of culture that do not threaten union, stability, or prosperity
(such as food, holidays, rituals, and music) and allow them to flourish.
But they counteract or eradicate the more subversive elements of cul-
ture (exclusionary aspects of religion, language, and politicaVideological
beliefs). History shows that bridging cultural gaps successfully and serv-
ing as a home to diverse peoples requires certain social structures, laws,
and institutions that transcend culture. Furthermore, the history of a
number of ongoing experiments in multiculturalism, such as in the
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 41
Power of Culture
European Union, India, South Africa, and the United States, suggests
that workable, if not perfected, integrative models exist. Each is built on
the idea that tolerance is crucial to social well-being, and each at times
has been threatened by both intolerance and a heightened emphasis on
cultural distinctions. The greater public good warrants eliminating
those cultural characteristics that promote conflict or prevent harmony,
even as less-divisive, more personally observed cultural distinctions are
celebrated and preserved.
The realization of such integrative models on a global scale is impos-
sible in the near term. It will take centuries. Nor can it be achieved
purely through rational decisions geared toward implementing carehslly
considered policies and programs. Rather, current trends that fall under
the broad definitional umbrella of"globalization" are accelerating a
process that has taken place throughout history as discrete groups have
become familiar with one another, allied, and commingled ultimately
becoming more alike. Inevitably, the United States has taken the lead
in this transformation; it is the "indispensable nation" in the manage-
ment of global affairs and the leading producer of information products
and services in these, the early years of the Information Age.
The drivers of today's rapid globalization are improving methods and
systems of intemational transportation, devising revolutionary and
innovative information technologies and services, and dominating the
intemational commerce in services and ideas. Their impact affects
lifestyles, religion, language, and every other component of culture.
Much has been written about the role of information technologies
and services in this process. Today, 15 major U.S. telecommunications
companies, including giants like Motorola, Loral Space & Communi-
cations, and Teledesic (a joint project of Microsoft's Bill Gates and cel-
lular pioneer Craig McCaw), offer competing plans that will encircle
the globe with a constellation of satellites and will enable anyone any-
where to communicate instantly with anyone elsewhere without an
established telecommunications infrastructure on the ground near
either the sender or the recipient. (Loral puts the cost of such a call at
around $3 per minute.)
Technology is not only transforming the world; it is creating its own
metaphors as well. Satellites carrying television signals now enable peo-
ple on opposite sides of the globe to be exposed regularly to a wide range
of cultural stimuli. Russian viewers are hooked on Latin soap operas,
and Middle Eastem leaders have cited CNN as a prime source for even
Rothkopf
local news. The Internet is an increasingly global phenomenon with

active development under way on every continent.
The United States dominates this global traffic in information and
ideas. American music} American movies, American television, and
American software are so dominant so sought after and so visible that
they are now available literally everywhere on the Earth. They influ-
ence the tastes, lives, and aspirations of virtually every nation. In some}
they are viewed as corrupting.
EXPORTING AMERICAN IDEAS
American Share of World Market American Share of World Market

for Prepackaged Software (1994) for Prerecorded Music
*Figille is an estimate based oll ttoltzme of

1T.S.-ounned lepettoilte licensedfot manilfactitle
abl oad combined u?ith domestic sales in 1996.
Anlerican Share of World Book Market (1995)
Sources: Business Software Alliance, Recording Industry Association of America, Euromonitor Mc.
France and Canada have both passed laws to prohibit the satellite
dissemination of foreign -- meaning American-content across their
borders and into the homes of their citizens. Not surprisingly} in many
other countries -- fundamentalist Iran communist China, and the
closely managed society of Singapore-central governments have
aggressively sought to restrict the software and programming that reach
their citizens Their explicit objective is to keep out American and
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 43
Power of Culture
other alien political views, mores, and, as it is called in some parts of the
Middle East, "news pollution." In these countries, the control of new
media that give previously closed or controlled societies virtually unlim-
ited access to the outside world is a high priority. Singapore has sought
to filter out certain things that are available over the Intemet essen-
tially processing all information to eliminate pomography. China has
set up a "Central Leading Group" under the State Planning Commis-
sion and the direct supervision of a vice premier to establish a similar
system that will exclude more than just what might be considered
obscene.
These govemments are the heirs of King Canute, the infamous
monarch who set his throne at the sea's edge and commanded the waves
to go backward. The Soviet Union fell in part because a closed society
cannot compete in the Information Age. These countries will fare no
better. They need look no further than their own elites to know this. In
China, while satellite dishes are technically against the law, approxi-
mately one in five citizens of Beijing has access to television program-
ming via a dish, and almost half of the people of Guangzhou have access
to satellite-delivered programming. Singapore, the leading entrepot of
Southeast Asia, is a hub in a global network of business centers in which
the lives of the elites are virtually identical. Business leaders in Buenos
Aires, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, Istanbul, Los Angeles,
Mexico City, Moscow, New Delhi, New York, Paris, Rome, Santiago,
Seoul, Singapore, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo all read the same newspapers,
wear the same suits, drive the same cars, eat the same food, fly the same
airlines, stay in the same hotels, and listen to the same music. While the
people of their countries remain divided by culture, they have realized
that to compete in the global marketplace they must conform to the
culture of that marketplace.
The global marketplace is being institutionalized through the cre-
ation of a series of multilateral entities that establish common rules for
intemational commerce. If capital is to flow freely, disclosure rules must
be the same, settlement procedures consistent, and redress transparent.
If goods are also to move unimpeded, tariff laws must be consistent, cus-
toms standards harmonized, and product safety and labeling standards
brought into line. And if people are to move easily from deal to deal, air
transport agreements need to be established, immigration controls stan-
dardized, and commercial laws harmonized. In many ways, business is
the primary engine driving globalization, but it would be a mistake to
Rothkopf
conclude that the implications of globalization will be limited primari-

ly to the commercial arena.
In politics, for example, as intemational organizations arise to coor-
dinate policy among many nations on global issues such as trade, the
environment, health, development, and crisis management, a commu-
nity of intemational bureaucrats is emerging. These players are as com-
fortable operating in the intemational environment as they would be at
home, and the organizations that they represent in effect establish glob-
al standards and expectations-facilitating the progress of globalization.
The community of nations increasingly accepts that such suprana-
tional entities are demanded by the exigencies of the times; with that
acceptance also comes a recognition that the principal symbol of
national identinamely sovereignty-must be partially ceded to
those entities. The United States in particular seems to have problems
with this trend. For example, the United States was involved in creat-
ing the World Trade Organization and now undermines its effectiveness
by arbitrarily withdrawing from its efforts to blunt the effects of the
Helms-Burton act. Still, the recognition that sometimes there are inter-
ests greater than national interests is a crucial step on the path to a more
peaceful, prosperous world.
TOWARD A GLOBAL CULTURE
It is in the general interest of the United States to encourage the

opment of a world in which the fault lines separating nat
bridged by shared interests. And it is in the economic and p
interests of the United States to ensure that if the world is
toward a common language, it be English; that if the world is
toward common telecommunications, safety, and quality stan
they be American; that if the world is becoming linked by te
radio, and music, the programming be American; and that if
values are being developed, they be values with which Ameri
comfortable.
These are not simply idle aspirations. English is linking the world.
American information technologies and services are at the cutting edge
of those that are enabling globalization. Access to the largest economy
in the world-America's-is the primary calTot leading other nations to
open their markets.
Indeed, just as the United States is the world's sole remaining mili-
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 45
Power oJ Culture
Unveiling a New Global Culture
McL9onald S Corporatlon
tary superpower, so is it the world's only information su

Japan has become quite competitive in the manufacture of components
integral to information systems, it has had a negligible impact as a man-
ufacturer of software or as a force behind the technological revolution.
Europe has failed on both fronts. Consequently, the United States holds
a position of advantage at the moment and for the foreseeable future.
Some find the idea that Americans would systematically seek to pro-
mote their culture to be unattractive. They are concemed that it
implies a sense of superiority on Americans' part or that it makes an
uncomfortable value judgment. But the realpolitik of the Information
Age is that setting technological standards, defining software standards,
producing the most popular information products, and leading in the
related development of the global trade in services are as essential to the
well-being of any would-be leader as once were the resources needed to
Rothkopf
support empire or inc ustry.

The economic stakes are immense considering the enormous invest-
ments that will be made over the next 10 years in the world's informa-
tion infrastructure. The U.S. government estimates that
telecommunications investment in Latin America alone during this
period will top $150 billion. China will spend a similar amount, as will
the member states of the Associ-
ation of South East Asian
Nations. In fact, the market for Americans should
te ecommunlcatlons servlces 1S
expected to top $1 trillion by the not deny the fact

turn of the century.
During the decade ahead, not
that of all the
only will enormous sums be nations in the
directed toward the establish-
ment of the global network of world! theirs is the
networks that the Clinton
administration has dubbed the most just and the
"Global Information Infrastruc-
ture," but those sums will pay for
best model for the
the foundations of a system that
future.
will dictate decades of future
choices about upgrades, systems
standards, software purchases, and services. At the same time, new
national and international laws will be written, and they will determine
how smoothly information products and services may flow from one
market to another. Will steps be taken to ensure that Internet com-
merce remains truly free? What decisions will be made about the
encryption of data that will impact not only the security of information
markets but the free flow of ideas and the rights of individuals in the
Information Age? Will governments allow the democratizing promise of
the Intemet to enable virtually anyone with a computer to contact any-
one else?
The establishment of the Global Information Infrastructure is not
just an enormous commercial opportunity for the world's information
leader. The development of the rules governing that infrastructure will
shape the nature of global politics decisively, either enhancing or under-
mining freedoms, thereby either speeding or slowing the pace of inte-
gration, understanding, and tolerance worldwide. The nature of
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 47
Power of Culture
individual and national relations will be transformed. Those wires and

constellations of satellites and invisible beams of electronic signals criss-
crossing the globe will literally form the fabric of future civilization.
Consequently, it could not be more strategically crucial that the
United States do whatever is in its power to shape the development of
that infrastructure, the rules goveming it, and the information travers-
ing it. Moreover, even if much of this process of developing what we
might call the "infosphere" is left to the marketplace (as it should be),
govemments will control crucial elements of it. Govemments will
award many of the biggest infrastructure development contracts offered
in the next decade: Some will assist their national companies in trying
to win those contracts, and state officials will meet to decide the trade
rules that will govern international traffic in the world's telecommuni-
cations markets, the global regulatory environment, encryption stan-
dards, privacy standards, intellectual property protections, and basic
equipment standards. Govemments will determine whether these are
open or closed markets and what portion of development dollars will be
targeted at bringing the benefits of these technologies to the poor to
help counteract information inequities. Already some government
intercessions into this marketplace have failed. Notably, Japan's efforts
to shape the development of high-definition television standards sent
that nation down an analog path in what tumed out to be a digital race.
Yet there are many places where there is an important role for govem-
ments and where the United States should have a carefully considered
overarching policy and an aggressive stance to match.
EXPORTING THE AMERICAN MODEL
Many observers contend that it is distasteful to use the oppo

created by the global information revolution to promote Ame
ture over others, but that kind of relativism is as dangerou
wrong. American culture is fundamentally different from i
cultures in so many other locales. American culture is an am
influences and approaches from around the world. It is mel
sciously in many cases into a social medium that allows indi
freedoms and cultures to thrive. Recognizing this, America
not shy away from doing that which is so clearly in their ec
political, and security interests- and so clearly in the interes
world at large. The United States should not hesitate to promote
ues. In an effort to be polite or politic, Americans should not
48 F o R E I G N P O L I C Y
Rothkopf
fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most
just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and
improve itself, and the best model for the future. At the same time,
Americans should not fall under the spell of those like Singapore's Lee
Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir bin-Mohamad, who argue that
there is "an Asian way," one that non-Asians should not judge and that
should be allowed to dictate the course of events for all those operating
in that corner of the world. This argument amounts to self-interested
political rhetoric. Good and evil, better and worse coexist in this world.
There are absolutes, and there are political, economic, and moral costs
associated with failing to recognize this fact.
Repression is not defensible whether the tradition from which it
springs is Confician, Judeo-Christian, or Zoroastrian. The repressed
individual still suffers, as does society, and there are consequences for
the global community. Real costs accrue in terms of constrained human
creativity, delayed market development, the diversion of assets to
enforce repression, the failure of repressive societies to adapt well to the
rapidly changing global environment, and the dislocations, struggles,
and instability that result from these and other factors. Americans
should promote their vision for the world, because failing to do so or
taking a "live and let live" stance is ceding the process to the not-
always-beneficial actions of others. Using the tools of the Information
Age to do so is perhaps the most peaceful and powerful means of
advancing American interests.
If Americans now live in a world in which ideas can be effectively
exported and media delivery systems are powerful, they must recognize
that the nature of those ideas and the control of those systems are mat-
ters with which they should be deeply concerned. Is it a threat to U.S.
interests, to regional peace, to American markets, and to the United
States's ability tO lead if foreign leaders adopt models that promote sep-
aratism and the cultural fault lines that threaten stability? It certainly is.
Relativism is a veil behind which those who shun scrutiny can hide.
Whether Americans accept all the arguments of Huntington or not,
they must recognize that the greater the cultural value gaps in the world,
the more likely it is that conflict will ensue. The critical prerequisite for
gaining the optimum benefits of global integration is to understand
which cultural attributes can and should be tolerated-and, indeed,
promoted-and which are the fissures that will become fault lines.
It is also crucial that the United States recognize its limitations.
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 49
Power of Culture
Americans can have more influence than others, but they cannot assure
every outcome. Rather, the concerted effort tO shape the development
of the Global Information Infrastructure and the ideas that flow within
it should be seen merely as a single component of a well-rounded for-
eign and security policy. (And since it is not likely to be an initiative
that is widely liked or admired or enhanced through explicit promotion,
it is not an approach that should be part of American public diplomacy
efforts.)
Of course, implementing such an approach is not going to be easy in
an America that is wracked by the reaction to and the backlash against
globalization. Today, the extreme left and right wings of both major
political parties are united in a new isolationist alliance. This alliance
has put the brakes on 60 years of expanding free trade, has focused on
the threats rather than the promise posed by such critical new relation-
ships as those with China and other key emerging markets, and has
seized on every available opportunity to disengage from the world or to
undermine U.S. abilities to engage or lead effectively. It will take a com-
mitted eXort by the president and cooperation from leaders on Capitol
Hill to overcome the political opposition of the economic nationalists
and neoisolationists. It will not happen if those in leadership positions
aim simply to take the path of least political resistance or to rest on the
accomplishments of the recent past. In a time of partisan bickering,
when the emphasis of top officials has shifted from governing to poli-
ticking, there is a risk that America will fail to rise to these challenges.
While the Clinton administration has broken important ground in
developing a Global Information Infrastructure initiative and in dealing
with the future of the Intemet, encryption issues, and intellectual prop-
erty concerns, these efforts are underfunded, sometimes managed to suit
political rather than strategic objectives, shortsighted (particularly the
steps conceming encryption, in which rapid changes and the demands
of the marketplace are being overlooked), and poorly coordinated. At
the same time, some of America's most powerfil tools of engagement-
which come in the form of new trade initiatives-seemingly have been
shelved. This problem is most clearly manifested in the fact that fast-
track negotiating-authority approval has not yet been granted and in
the real possibility that Congress will refuse to grant such approval
before the tum of the century.
The Clinton administration and its successors must carefully consid-
er the longHterm implications of globalization, such as the impact of the
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rise of new markets on America's economic influence and how Ameri-

ca can maintain its leadership role. Aspects of American culture will
play a critical role in helping to ensure the continuation of that leader-
ship. American cultural diversity gives the United States resources and
potential links with virtually every market and every major power in the
world. America's emphasis on the individual ensures that American
innovation will continue to outstrip that of other nations. Working in
its favor is the fact that the "Pax Americana" is a phenomenon of the
early years of globalization and that the U.S. ascendancy to undisputed
leadership came at the same time as the establishment of intemational
institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund; thus, for all the challenges of adjustment, the
United States has more leadership experience than any other nation in
this new global environment. Also, though some may decry Americans'
emphasis on "newness" and suggest that it is a result of their lack of an
extensive history, it also represents a healthy lack of cultural "baggage":
It is this emphasis on newness that puts the United States in the best
position to deal with a world in which the rapidity of change is perhaps
the greatest strategic challenge of all.
IDENTITY WITHOUT CULTURE
The opportunity lies before us as Americans. The United States is in a

position not only to lead in the 21st century as the dominant power of
the Information Age but to do so by breaking down the barriers that
divide nations- and groups within nations and by building ties that
create an ever greater reservoir of shared interests among an ever larger
community of peoples. Those who look at the post{Cold War era and
see the "clash of civilizations" see only one possibility. They overlook
the great strides in integration that have united the world's billions.
They discount the factors that have led to global consolidation and the
reality that those factors grow in power with each new day of the globH
al era integration is a trend that builds upon itself. They argue that
America should prepare for the conflicts that may come in this interim
period without arguing that it should accelerate the arrival of a new era
with every means at its disposal.
Certainly, it is naive to expect broad success in avoiding fiture conH
flicts among cultures. But we now have tools at our disposal to diminish
the disparities that will fuel some of those conflicts. While we should
S U M M E R 1 9 9 7 51
Power of Culture
prepare for conflict, we should also remember that it is not mere ideal-
ism that demands that we work for integration and in support of a uni-
fying global culture ensuring individual rights and enhancing
international stability: It is also the ultimate realpolitik, the ultimate ac
of healthy self-interest.
Allowing ourselves to be swept up in the backlash against globaliza-
tion would undermine America's ability to advance its self-interests.
Americans must recognize that those interests and the issues pertaining
to them reach across the disciplines of economics, politics, science, and
culture. An interdisciplinary approach to international policymaking is
thus required. We must also iillly understand the new tools at our dis-
posal. We must understand the profound importance and nature of the
emerging infospherej and its potential as a giant organic culture
processor, democratic empowerer, universal connector, and ultimate
communicator. Moreover, it is not enough to create and implement the
right policies using the new tools at our disposal. Policymakers must bet-
ter communicate the promise of this new world and make clear Amer-
ica's stake in that promise and the role Americans must play to achieve
success. The United States does not face a simple choice between inte-
gration or separation, engagement or withdrawal. Rather, the choice is
between leading a more peaceiill world or being held hostage to events
in a more volatile and violent one.
Want to Know More ?

The Clash of Civitizations and the Rernalcing of the Wo
ington (Nesv Yorkv Simon & Schuster} 1996), is tht hot book of dle mc)ment
<n the t(:)piC C¢ culture tmd its iUlpclCt on internationcl reL1tions. It supports tlle
thesis that ca;llture is the great divi(:ler am:)-ng [?eoples b-v.lt fails tO acknrwledgye
the culttlral c<lasolidations that have brought the wc)rld into the few big block.s
described in the t?ook. It also fails to pc.stulate a positive agenda for the UnitS
ed States in this new wrld} oxrerl(:)c)ks the powerful teXchn-kagical fc rces that
rnight work tc) help hridge culturcll disrides, cmd succ.lmbs to tlle n(:)tic)n tllXclt we
live i11 a postoideol(lgicl era, which is clbstlrd given tllat the ideolcgyical fclulto
line isstle cf the past centur.r how to jtlstly clistribute income-is more press-
inCt, ark challenging today than esZer before. Another recent weark of note on
the questi:)n of culture'S impact on the ev(:luti:n (:)f the g-lob<ll community is
Benjamin Bclrber's Jihad versus McWorld (New Y(:rk: Times B:caks, 1995), in
Rothkopf
wlwicll he <rgues rlzat workl cc!nflict increXasingly will center on tensions

hetween locXll values <nd glohalizing forces. For theories of how cultural fc)vm-
dations may affect a society'< political and economic development, see Trust:
The Social Virtues and the Creaiiorl of Prosperiry (New York: Free Press, 1995) in
which Francis Fukuyama ties a society's <-lbility to create complex organiations
sucll (IS InUltin<itiC)nal C(:)@Orsltit:)nS to the level of trust fc)und in individual rela-
tionships within the culture. Fin<lly, Seymour Martin Lipset's American Excep-
iionalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996) deals with the relationship hetween
national and ctllt-ural identity in the Unit:ed States. Just as enlightening, howS
ever, would be to invest in a subscription to Wized Inagazine or to dexZote an
hc)ur (I week to visiting intenzation<ll Weh sites using any (:)f the awkw<rd,
clut:nsy, and fnlstrating network navigation software packages on the market.
Whatever their defects, tlley cannot help but amafie even the cynical. You can
find links to some examples of tllese Web sites on FOREIGN POLICYXS home
plge at www.foreignpolicy.com.
S U M M ER 1 9 9 7 53

In Praise of Cultural Imperialism

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Washingtonpost.

Newsweek Interactive, LLC

In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

_ ze gates ol t ze wor c are groamng

D A V I D R O T H K O P F is managing director of Kissinger Associates and an adjunct pro-

pool that currently includes close to 1 billion unemployed and under-

CULTURE AND CONFLICT

Culture is not static; it grows out of a systematically encouraged

time as need dictates. It is less often acknowledged as the means of jus-

The decline of proximity, such as resource

cultural distinctions Religion-based conflicts occur

sign of enhanced (and in some

SATELLITES AS CULTURAL DEATH STARS

Critics of globalization argue that the process will lead to a stripping

local news. The Internet is an increasingly global phenomenon with

EXPORTING AMERICAN IDEAS

American Share of World Market American Share of World Market

*Figille is an estimate based oll ttoltzme of

Anlerican Share of World Book Market (1995)

conclude that the implications of globalization will be limited primari-

TOWARD A GLOBAL CULTURE

It is in the general interest of the United States to encourage the

Unveiling a New Global Culture

tary superpower, so is it the world's only information su

support empire or inc ustry.

expected to top $1 trillion by the not deny the fact

individual and national relations will be transformed. Those wires and

EXPORTING THE AMERICAN MODEL

Many observers contend that it is distasteful to use the oppo

rise of new markets on America's economic influence and how Ameri-

IDENTITY WITHOUT CULTURE

The opportunity lies before us as Americans. The United States is in a

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wlwicll he <rgues rlzat workl cc!nflict increXasingly will center on tensions

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