FREEDOM OF RELIGION

UCCP Inc vs Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc

FACTS:

Petitioner UCCP is a religious corporation organized under Philippine laws. It is a confederation of

evangelical churches of different denominations. Respondent BUCCI, is likewise a religious corporation
with a personality separate from UCCP. BUCCI belonged to one of the governing bodies of UCCP which
is the Cebu Conference Inc (CCI) until BUCCI constructed a fence that encroached upon the right of way
allocated by UCCP for CCI. This triggered a series of events which led to the formal break-up of BUCCI
from UCCP. Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Article of Incorporation and By-Laws, which
provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same but UCCP disagreed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BUCCI is entitled to free exercise of religion by dis-affiliating itself from UCCP and not
subject to UCCP’s bylaws.

Ruling:
Yes. The matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities
are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction
over them in matters that are legal and corporate. BUCCI, as a juridical entity distinct from UCCP,
possesses the freedom to determine its steps. This case concerns BUCCI’s power as a church to
disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have religious color and are therefore
ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and cannot review. Conversely, the Court owes recognition
to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another
religious corporation a secular matter well within the civil courts purview.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise
of police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or
not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for
fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should
not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the
worthy from the unworthy.

Facts:This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the
renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.In 1985, the petitioners, officers of
Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in
Bulacan.The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay,
a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violation
of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions
for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.In
1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.In this instant
case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.

Ruling:The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately
and independently of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious
purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not contemplate
solicitation for religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose
are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be
held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is acquitted of the
offense charged.
EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

Facts:
Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA No. 1265 an act
making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions, and by Department Order No. 8, the
rules and regulations for conducting the flag ceremony in all educational institutions. (Petitioners)
Jehovah's Witnesses believed that by doing the aforementioned, is religious worship or devotion akin to
idolatry against their teachings. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom.

Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

Ruling:
Yes, such freedom is violated upon expulsion of petitioners. Religious freedom is a fundamental right
which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the public is
affected. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of serious and present danger
to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.

Petitioners in this case stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe
in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. Thus, the
expulsion of petitioners is not justified and violated their freedom of religion.
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR
Facts:Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband
died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.

Issue:Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

Ruling:No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put
it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at
bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

Facts: Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA No. 1265 an act making flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions, and by Department Order No. 8, the rules and regulations for
conducting the flag ceremony in all educational institutions. (Petitioners) Jehovah's Witnesses believed that by doing
the aforementioned, is religious worship or devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They think the action of
the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's
power and invades protection against official control and religious freedom.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

Ruling:Yes, such freedom is violated upon expulsion of petitioners. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which
is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of
man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, that is, freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the public is affected. The only limitation to religious freedom is the
existence of serious and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.

Petitioners in this case stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through
the observance of the flag ceremony. Thus, the expulsion of petitioners is not justified and violated their freedom of
religion.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

Facts: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. The Philippine Bible Society (PBS), a nonprofit organization engaged
in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles claim violations of their rights
under 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.

Issue: WON the Free Exercise of Religion Clause prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use
tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization..

Ruling: No, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable
sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. In this case, the fee in
Sec. 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for
the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central
feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is
subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made
or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.For the foregoing reasons, the court finds the
attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends freedom of religion guarantees of the
Constitution to be without merit.

G.R. No. L-25254 November 22, 1926

VERZOSA vs ZOSIMO FERNANDEZ, ET AL.,

Facts:On February 20, 1807, a number of individuals constituting or representing the guild of sangley mestizos of
the pueblo of Pagsanjan, in the Province of Laguna, united themselves into a religious association or brotherhood for
the purpose of raising and supplying, from year to year, the means necessary to meet the expenses of the annual
fiestas in honor of the most Holy Sacrament and of their patroness the Virgen Lady of Guadalupe, as well as for the
further purpose of procuring the celebration of an annual requiem mass for the repose of the souls of the deceased
members. The step met the approval of their superior, the Archbishop of Manila and the brotherhood was formally
organized under the name of La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento. Under the law as it then existed royal
approval was essential to the legality of an association of this character; and it was not until July 23, 1819, that a
royal cedula was issued by the king of Spain, placing the brotherhood upon a lawful basis and defining the manner
in which it should be organized and conducted. Meanwhile, however, under the approval of the Archbishop, the
association had begun exercising its functions and had maintained a de facto existence from the time of its first
organization.

Issues: WON the defendants should be accountable to the Court for the fund held by them as trustees pertaining to
the Brotherhood.

Ruling: Yes, the court have undoubted jurisdiction to compel a trustee to account for the trust funds in his hands and
property to perform his trust. In this connection we note that, under the terms of the foundation, the board of
directors of the brotherhood was required to account to the gobernadorcillo, for the time being, of the town of
Pagsanjan. But in view of the fact that officials of the civil government have, since the change of sovereignty in
these Islands, ceased to concern themselves with the performance of this trust, it was observed that in this action the
defendants should be required to account to the court.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not
there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent
purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be
denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from
the unworthy.

FACTS : In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang
Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio
Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of
P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information
was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law,

ISSUE : WON charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose

HELD : Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned All contributions designed to promote
the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on
voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression
"charitable purpose Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually
all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused It does not
follow, therefore from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which
may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental
interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it
also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general
regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even
though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited
previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise
.
Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by
DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners
wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of
Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not
involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the
courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise,
there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to
be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or
non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for
their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither
were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to
comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a
religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland
which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to
promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony
or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about
freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules
and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance
in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly
excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.