SPECPRO 3D- 2012

Rule 88

1. TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose Cano, was
appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him at
P4,000 which was approved by the court. The court later on approved the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the
conversion of some of the agricultural lands to a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved
by court designating Florante as the sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed
moved that the area designated for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the
enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and his tenants will lose their
landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florante’s petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it would
prejudice the lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of
administration of the party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and
approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes sale,
mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled. The lease was
obtained with the court’s approval hence if the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it
order its revocation or reduction of the subject of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction of the land
leased because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under
administration.

2. JAUCIAN V QUEROL
Facts: Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero executed a private writing in which they acknowledged their
debt to Roman Jaucian. Rogero signed in the capacity of surety for Dayandante; but as clearly appears from
the instrument itself both debtors bound themselves jointly and severally to the creditor. Rogero brought an
action asking that the document be canceled as to her upon the ground that her signature was obtained by
means of fraud. In his answer, Jaucian, by way of cross-complaint, asked for judgment against the plaintiff for
the amount due upon the obligation. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Rogero died. Supreme
Court rendered in its decision in favor of Jaucian holding that the disputed claim was valid.

Meanwhile, proceedings were had for the administration of the estate of Rogero; Querol was named
administrator; and a committee was appointed to pass upon claims against the estate. This committee made
its report and about a year and half after the filing of the report, Jaucian filed a petition praying that the court
issue an order directing the administrator of Rogero’s estate to pay him. This was opposed by the
administrator upon the grounds that the claim had never been presented to the committee on claims for
allowance and that the court was therefore without jurisdiction to entertain the demand of the claimant. A
hearing was had upon the petition and on April 13, 1914, the decision was rendered declaring that since Rogero
was simply a surety for Dayandante, the administrator has a right to require that Jaucian produce a judgment
for his claim against Dayandante. Pursuant to this order, Jaucian brought an action against Dayandante.
Execution was issued upon this judgment, but was returned by the sheriff wholly unsatisfied. Jaucian then filed
another petition in the proceedings upon the estate of Rogero, and renewed the prayer of the original
petition. The petition was again opposed by the administrator. After hearing, the judge entered an order
refusing to grant Jaucian's petition.

Appellant contends that the trial judge erred (a) in refusing to give effect to the order dated April 13, 1914; and
(b) in refusing to order the administrator of the estate of Rogero to pay the appellant the amount demanded
by him.
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SPECPRO 3D- 2012

Issue: w/n the order (April 13, 1914) has become final. NO
w/n Jaucian may claim from the estate. NO

Held: It was not a final order, and therefore it was not appealable. In effect, it held that whatever rights Jaucian
might have against the estate of Rogero were subject to the performance of a condition precedent, namely,
that he should first exhaust this remedy against Dayandante. The order of April 13, 1914, required no action by
the administrator at that time, was not final, and therefore was not appealable. We therefore conclude that no
rights were conferred by the said order of April 13, 1914, and that it did not preclude the administrator from
making opposition to the petition of the appellant when it was renewed.

Appellant contends that his claim against the deceased was contingent since the deceased was merely a
surety of Dayandante. She claims that contingent claims "may be presented with the proof to the committee,"
it follows that such presentation is optional; that there is nothing in the law which says that his claim is barred
or prescribed, and that such creditor, at any time within two years from the time allowed other creditors to
present their claims, may, if his claim becomes absolute within that period present it to the court for
allowance.

However, the SC held that Rogero, though surety for Dayandante, was nevertheless bound jointly and
severally with him in the obligation. She was liable absolutely and unconditionally for the full amount of the
obligation without any right to demand the exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor previous to its
payment. Rogero, and her estate, was liable absolutely for the whole obligation, if the claim had been duly
presented to the committee for allowance it should have been allowed, just as if the contact had been with her
alone. It is thus apparent that this claim was an absolute claim. Such claims are barred if not presented to the
committee in time.

3. CU UNJIENG V. TIAOQUI
FACTS:
Tiaoqui, during his lifetime, instituted civil case against Cu Unjieng for the recovery of money. Upon posting of
a bond, the Court ordered attachment of the property of the latter. Yioaqui died during the pendency of the
case. Cu Unjiengs set up counterclaim for the lossses they suffered and damages because of the attachment.

In the meantime, the instestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Tioaqui followed their ordinary
course, no claims were presented against the deceased. The court ordered the final accounting of the estate,
the administrators asked for extension, in view of the fact that the balancing of the business would be made in
a few months and that certain credits and properties were under pending litigation.

After a few more motions to extend, the finall accounting was finally delivered to the court, estate taxes were
paid and the properties delivered to the heirs. The instestate proceeding was ordered closed.

The administrators filed a motion to reopen the intestate proceedings because of the pending litigation with
the Cu Unjiengs. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for the annulment of the delivery of the properties in favor of the
heirs.

ISSUE:

W/N Cu Unjiengs were entitled to have the deed of delivery cancelled despite their failure to file their claim in
the intestate proceeding

HELD: NO

Probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot be denied that if the
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SPECPRO 3D- 2012

defendants-appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the protection of their rights, they should
timely apply to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should
prosper.

The administrators were also in duty bound to inform the probate court of the existence of the counterclaim,
which duty was partly complied with by them when they reiteratedly informed the court that it was not
possible to present a final account or project of partition on the ground that there were pending litigations,
and when they applied for the reopening of the intestate proceedings and for authority to continue the
pending suit. Cu Unjiengs were not relieved thereof by the conduct that might have been observed by the
administrators, which conduct, on the other hand, can not be considered improper.

The court was not informed of said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was ready for distribution,
it appearing from the report of the committee that there were no debts to be paid and it being inferable form
the record that the expenses of administration, including the inheritance tax, had already been paid.
Appellants have available the remedy afforded by section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which they
may, after having obtained favorable judgment, ask that the heirs contribute in proportion to the value of the
properties received by them, to pay their counterclaim.

Moreover the attachment obtained by Tioaqui was nominal, being the fifth attachment, it seems unnecessary
to adopt so drastic a measure as to result in depriving the heirs of their possession of the properties received
by them by order of the court

4. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JANUARIA GONZALES VS. DE GUIA | MORAN

FACTS
 In the summary settlement of the estate of Januaria Gonzales, the court below ordered the heirs to pay
the creditor of the estate, Sisenando Abarro, the amount of P800, with legal interest.
 No payment having been made, lot No 1157, the only property left by the deceased, was ordered sold at
public auction and awarded to the creditor himself as the highest bidder thereat.
 The sheriff’s deed of sale contained a proviso to the effect that the property was subject to redemption
within one year.
 The period expired with no redemption being made. The purchaser filed a motion in court praying that the
sheriff be ordered to execute a final deed of sale in his behalf.
 Tomasa de Guia, heir of the deceased, opposed the motion, alleging that she had delivered to the sheriff
the amount of P1,056.40 for the redemption of the property.
 This allegation was found by the court to be true and, accordingly, the motion filed by the purchaser was
overruled.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

 W/N de Guia, heir of the deceased, has a right to redeem property sold to pay the creditor of estate?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. THE SALE MADE IN FAVOR OF ABARRO IS FINAL.

 In administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court
for payment of debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption.
 Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property
for payment of debts of a deceased person.
 The purchaser acted undoubtedly under the erroneous impression that legal redemption, as noted by the
sheriff on the deed, was valid, accepting thus the deed without any objection whatsoever.
 But, as a general rule, and under the circumstances of the case, no estoppel attaches to validate a contract
or any part thereof that in itself is contrary to law.

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SPECPRO 3D- 2012

5. ECHAUS V. BLANCO

Facts: Petitioner Angelina Echaus instituted Civil case No. 6628 against Charles Newton Hodges praying for the
recovery of her share in the profits covering the Ba-Ta subdivision plus damages. During its pendency and
before a decision could be rendered by the Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his
death, he was substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate. A petition for the settlement of the estate of
C. N. Hodges was instituted before and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to creditors was
published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation. A judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor
of Echaus and a writ of execution was subsequently issued against PCIB. However, the writ was not enforced
as plaintiff opted to file a motion in Special Proceedings No. 1672 for the payment of the judgment.
Respondents opposed the motion contending that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6628 is null and
void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. It was alleged that money claims against a defendant who
dies without a judgment having been rendered in the RTC shall be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in the
estate proceedings as laid down under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This procedure was not
followed in Civil Case No. 6628.

Issue: Whether judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is valid and may be satisfied in the special proceedings for the
settlement of estate.

Ruling: YES, the judgment is valid and its satisfaction may be obtained in the special proceeding.

Being a money claim, Civil Case No. 6628 should have been dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the
intestate estate of C. N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 21.Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules."
However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its conclusion in Civil Case
No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim in Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment
rendered therein is null and void. The case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., L-18936, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA
126, is in point. "2. . . . Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said
judgment — reached after a full dress trial on the merits — will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived
its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate
claims is imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative. And, waiver
is to be determined from the administrator's 'acts and conduct.' Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead
the statute of non-claims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to
such waiver. "3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to respect.
Non quieta movere. Plaintiffs claim has passed the test in three courts of justice: the Court of First Instance, the
Court of Appeals and this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellant's technical
objection - after judgment had become final in the civil case — that plaintiff's claim should have been litigated
in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such objection does not go into the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter."
When PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be substituted as defendant, it
registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the sake of argument that the trial court, after
the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB,
participated actively in the said case. It did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it raise the
issue of jurisdiction at any stage. It has been consistently held by this court that while lack of jurisdiction may
be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction
will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.

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