CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 1
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS
A. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the
United States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, not
being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and
shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of
two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the
accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits
acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed P20,000 pesos. (As amended by E.O. No. 44, May 31,
1945).
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN
HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE
REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19
paragraph (1) thereof, states "Excessive fines shall not be imposed
nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. . .";
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society;
WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has
resulted not only in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction
of property but also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable
economic development and prosperity while at the same time has
undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's
ability to maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order and the rule
of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose
the death penalty for said crimes;
Now, therefore,
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority,
but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against
the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or
comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed 100,000 pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on
confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits
acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine
not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of
the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the
Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes
referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following
circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon
the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without
means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
physical injuries or rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same
Code a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with
law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an
offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present,
he shall suffer the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the
same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be

punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article
246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person
who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods,
and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal
grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 2
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons -
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of
Article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision
2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall
have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried
to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or
when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted
upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the
physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed
on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public
in general or where people usually gather or congregate for a
definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental
function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public
utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing
or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose
of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by
two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or
the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks
factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable
or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death
shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation."
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 3
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the Philippines
any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed.
"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug
Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain
a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in any form
or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every case
where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor
who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary.
"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,

unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any
prohibited drug.
"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or culture any medium
Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other plant
which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from
which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of
said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he
did not know such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of
the penalties herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug in
the Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any regulated drug.
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug
users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain
a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used in any form,
or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in
every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold
to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 4
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses
under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated
by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
administration, delivery, transportation or manufacture of dangerous
drugs, the cultivation of plants which are sources of dangerous
drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation
and forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds of the
crime including but not limited to money and other obtained thereby
and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, unless
they are the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but
those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed
without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs as
well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government shall be turned over to the
Board for proper disposal without delay.
Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or
misapplies or fails to account for seized or confiscated dangerous
drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or
instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after conviction

be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under
any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to
read as follows :
"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and
Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces,
'Planting' of Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided for
Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government
officials, employees or officers, including members of police
agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is
found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections
3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of
another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known
as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty
of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act,
shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the
penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be
from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty
of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of
the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall
be from six months and one day to six years, except when the
suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its
duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 5
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall
be from one month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall
be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be
required to cover such period of time as the court may determine."
Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed;
Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty
shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more
than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review
of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not
obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court,
the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days
but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten
(10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."
Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows :
"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty
in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a
crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law
in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by
the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall
be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any group who belongs to an organized/syndicated
crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the
moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the
offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve
to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices
and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the
act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had

knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty
and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and
to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith,
shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of
his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty
of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The
death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other and
shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible
to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized
at the moment of the execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the
method of carrying out the sentence shall be changed to gas
poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year
after the judgment has become final."
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person
over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall
be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records
of the case shall be forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power."
Section 26.
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision
of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 6
or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to
be in full force and effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the
approval hereof.
Approved: December 13, 1993
Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the
death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does
not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the
publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted
of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by
reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for
commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein
shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency
under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in
two national newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor
Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the
Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government
or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance
should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return
for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience
to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite
States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil.,
285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot
be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension;
that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482),
recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52
of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which
the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United
State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 7
of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819,
and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence
of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules
and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on
the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907,
that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer
the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested
in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier,
it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that
is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the
sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to
the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the
enemy toward the military government established over them, such
allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign
of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives as above described, and does not do away with the
absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a
foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just
as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own
legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance
of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he
receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a
foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the
citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he
receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship,
because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own
government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign
country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory
occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for
the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted
legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as
well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and
disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government,
are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses
against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government
were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason
above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as
against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for

the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet
article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were
still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to
respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all
the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of
the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary
for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the
protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940
United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who
are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government
which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the
occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and
binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their
legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary
for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his
army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer
temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government
or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied
territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former
may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and
weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the
latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and
conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the
action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves
of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise
by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of
the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal
Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 8
of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines,
in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed,
in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a
sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain
limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only
by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
approving the Independence Law above quoted and the
Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt
in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated
on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the
Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs.
United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of
the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained
by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people
of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although
limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the
States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal
as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against
the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change
of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more
extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated
in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein,
if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

[ GR No. L-322, Jul 28, 1947 ]
PEOPLE v. PEDRO MANAYAO ET AL. +
DECISION 78 Phil. 721
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo
Flores were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple
murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense
charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the
aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in
the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a
fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs.
He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the
Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan, municipality of Angat, Province
of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant,
conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of barrio
Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1).
Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino
companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the residents
of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945.
Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled
included men, women and children mostly women (Exhibits A, C,
and C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t. s. n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and
women the prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t. s. n.). Presently, the
Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses
on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t. s. n.), and proceeded to butcher
all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing,
among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi,
Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo,
Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia
(pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, t. s. n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia
and Dodi whom he bayoneted to death in the presence of their
daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10,
13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t. s. n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with
appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous
answer that no mercy would be given them because they were
wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t. s. n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita
Perez and Maria Paulino if he had been allowed to have his way.
For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed
to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that
the children knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t. s.
n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children
would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the
Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t. s. n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony
of eye-witnesses Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas
to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence
of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses
for falsely testifying against appellant such a motive is not even
insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly
states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of
the People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria,
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 9
both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and
saw them testify, had the following to say:
"The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great
weight. They are simple barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds
have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any
desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-
forward and frank in their testimony and did not show any intention
to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could nut have been
mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they
know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of 'Indong
Pintor' or Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the
narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of January 29,
1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were
involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the
massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese masters
took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting
moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to
retain a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could
not help but witness."
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino
is so clear, positive and convincing that it would be sufficient for
conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had
seen the corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban shortly
after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t. s. n.). And
appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two
sworn statements one made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus
Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command
(Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t. s. n.) and another made on September 5,
1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t. s. n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends
that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was
subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant
had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable
to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention.
We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although
organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the
Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was
an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of
Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely
untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
"* * * A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
* * * * * * *
"(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constituton or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one
years of age or more;
"(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of
a foreign country;
* * * * * * *

"(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless
subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted."
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel
cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before
he was admitted into the Makapili association, 'the aim of which was
to help Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And
counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and Jaws of Japan. We cannot
uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili
could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying
Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war with
Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese
constitution and laws, even if they had to subscribe to an oath, upon
entering the organization, to help China fight Japan. During the first
World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the
Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that
mission although the war ended before this could be done they
surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or
laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these
examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a
commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever
been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps
nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a
citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section
2, of said Constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal, military or civil service." (Italics supplied.)
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of
war, but it is brought more immediately and peremptorily into play
when the country is involved in war. During such a period of stress,
under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be
considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the
Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it
intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be
effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the
simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country
at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air
service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army,
Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say
that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous
acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his
Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of
our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 10
"But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a crime
amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and
withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never
prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen
might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance,
innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of
the criminal to hia country." (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol.
III, p. 731.)
"696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss
of his nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he
shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly
observe this duty." (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation
from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third asignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with
counsel that it is improper to separately take into account against
appellant the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men
and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the
crime. We likewise are of the same opinion, considering that under
paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
"whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So
that in appreciating the existence of a band the employment of more
than three armed men is automatically included, there being only
the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly
unacceptable that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued
by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because
he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service
for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs
5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code cannot be construed
as sanctioning as legal acts done in compliance with duties to or
orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an
illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could
entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to
obey his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that
therefore his acts should be considered. as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury, is no less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the
Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if
the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently
arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this
is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well
remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the
butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese themselves as regards the
little children. And his Japanese masters so fate willed it were the
very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino,
who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on the
day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we
find appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder
committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance,
that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating
circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court
voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death
penalty, convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of
P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims
named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the
costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the
imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 11

legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards

the punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and
appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a
fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision,
and the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant .Assistance
Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo
Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of
treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City
and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution
offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which,
according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision,
the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other
Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of
using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such
unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias
Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana
Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the
victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly
the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15,
1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her
that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she
was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her
hometown; that the accused came again and told her that
Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she
did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his
wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had
nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her
with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night,
again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was
raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding
for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when
Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That
accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos took
Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home
in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in
honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito
Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select
those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite
and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the
Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran
where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All
these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said
witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is
not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 12
support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully
convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully
substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two
girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were
taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and
his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the
Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite,
but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion
Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez
raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente
Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog,
testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the
accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an
uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against
the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in
Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named
Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on
July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went
to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then
out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a
revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car
where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car,
the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their
companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay);
that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the
latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and
Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving
and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the
Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the
accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the
Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said
Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese
"; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the
Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room
by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she
(Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another
Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap
while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda
S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No.
4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said
accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister
Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken as
witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a
case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving
at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two
girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the
Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence
threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had
sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused
subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of
conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused
brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and
violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.

Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the
accused came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used
as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel
Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in
a car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of
Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room
and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came
out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told
her immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel
Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said
Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and
there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in
raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness),
Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the
two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also
raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos)
testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came
and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be
witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that
understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to
Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the
office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both
daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her
(the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the
accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house;
that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home
on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and
in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused
Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house ultimately,
they related to her (mother) what happened; that both
daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than
to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother)
that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in
evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that
had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the
information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in
court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the
absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would
assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they
were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the
allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the
testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his
Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas,
Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of
Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers,
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942;
that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942,
against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet
and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and
Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit
best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said
Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at
length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and
companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 13
hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office
of the Puppet Governor where they were severely
reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held
on June and receptions was to select from among them
the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were
always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to
said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her
room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said
accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that
particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered
her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she was
sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully
corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said
testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not
questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the
accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits
the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the
morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests
not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of
its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United
State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was
treason because women's company kept up their morale, so
fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them
food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of
hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by
common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as
treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of
social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent
occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature
of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to
create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives.
What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their
nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable
and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of
adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed.,
1441
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort
given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as
enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of
charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is
to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the
other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or
ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country
enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the
government of the giver. That is treason. (See United
States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first
assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 14

the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than
the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and
willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken
the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by
fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its
army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side.
Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of
admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of
each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as
principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express

sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:

Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not

sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's
Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any
crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established
by the evidence.

All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and
substantiated by the evidence.

Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as

violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution,
which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is
not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in
the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this
enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might
be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus
afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general
law of criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced,
provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body
of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented
during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended

girls but these assaults are not charged against him and should be
ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No.
6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the
other crimes which he must suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and

sentence him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from
10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the
offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed
forty years.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes,

JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote. Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant
appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General
Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on
7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4,
5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count
4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have
sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty
on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to
death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do
not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness,
testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and
had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a
carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and
asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the
American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he
did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next
witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese and other
Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The
last witness stated that the American was walking as well as his
captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito
Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba
together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole
overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz.,
4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and
physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned
above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes
distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The
Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical
designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by
the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of
the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for
the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said
accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno,
tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said
Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 15
companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely
tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back
and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention
camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military
Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did
in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce
from their house; that said accused and his companions
did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the
face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained
them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo
Ponce was released the following day while his brother
was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of
him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the
Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused
acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2
Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of
Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as
guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who
were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6
days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and
the accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of
Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla
activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these
counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other
does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and
often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing
opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively,
so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 16

crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case,

it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would
not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical
injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the
culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an
element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are
charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were
carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual
and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to
increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21,
of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented
the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating

circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not
guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while
counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the

judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the
attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he
would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor

of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court,
including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right
to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that
the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is
made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36
Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to
aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the
designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not
sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome
this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below
did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect
the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel
"sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best,
although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern
in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct
the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as
a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was
enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the
case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty

of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an
aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this
respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla,

JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.


G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General
Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the
People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment,
P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces,
in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is
not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of
Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the
United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and
comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's
war efforts and operations against the United States and the
Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and
assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army
in armed conflicts and engagements against the United States
armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine
Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and
Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of
Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April,
1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any
of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the
Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the
accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in
confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said
these acts had not been established by the testimony of two
witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence
to the enemy. But the court did find established under the two-
witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had
their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija;
that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed
with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese
instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in Makapili
military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the
American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the
mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later
surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not
borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution
witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that
the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 17
performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding
in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the
witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was
seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this
point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another
if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused
doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just
walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization
is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according
to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire
of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in
order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to
collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the
oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be
gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the
act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt
act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the
punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of
treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to
fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even
though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived
psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side
nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the
enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented,
and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could
count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to
strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference
from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established
by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present
case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by
the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili
uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and
so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we
have to look for guidance from American sources on its meaning
and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-
witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers
have commented on it. We cull from American materials the
following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring
both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean
that there might be one witness to an overt act and another
witness to another overt act of the same species of treason;
and, in one case it has been intimated that the same
construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore
so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity
of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and
exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 18

permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by
in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated
and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally
to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England. virulent.'"

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the
3d ed., section 2038, p. 271: American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced
that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; to have intended that the law should operate with the same
or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.
of the overt act.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., charged de oficio.
259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to
produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros,
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each and Padilla, JJ., concur. Paras, J., concurs in the result.
bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the
recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this
doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform
in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the
accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually
gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must
be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the
judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the
reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional
provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made
conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This
provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the
amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to
an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury,
the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge,
regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged
and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are
familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or
conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy
witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the
needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another
eyewitness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the
path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two
witnesses but said that the founders of the American government
fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but
because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More,
the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be
guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence,
ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal
Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who
delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said:
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this
Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology
warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure
of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device
at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant
so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule,
whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be
remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was
warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be
practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult —
as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision
was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 19

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT Government, attempts to flee or go to an enemy country when
TREASON prohibited by competent authority.
Section Three. — Piracy and mutiny on the high seas
Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty.
— The conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason shall PIRACY AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE
be punished respectively, by prision mayor and a fine not PHILIPPINE WATERS
exceeding P10,000 pesos, and prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding P5,000 pesos. Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
(the United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo
without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement
against them, conceals or does not disclose and make known the or passengers.
same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province,
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high
or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case
seas.
may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.
QUALIFIED PIRACY
Art. 117. Espionage. — The penalty of prision correccional shall be
inflicted upon any person who:
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to
death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes
1. Without authority therefor, enters a warship, fort, or naval or
referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following
military establishment or reservation to obtain any information,
circumstances:
plans, photographs, or other data of a confidential nature relative to
the defense of the Philippine Archipelago; or
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing
upon the same;
2. Being in possession, by reason of the public office he holds, of
the articles, data, or information referred to in the preceding
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without
paragraph, discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign
means of saving themselves; or
nation.
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed if the offender
physical injuries or rape.ch
be a public officer or employee.
Section Two. — Provoking war and disloyalty in case of war
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974

B. CRIMES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW
OF 1974
PROVOKING WAR AND DISLOYALTY IN CASE OF
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
WAR
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. — The
travel from one place to another, thereby distributing the peace,
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any public
order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
officer or employee, and that of prision mayor upon any private
social progress of the people;
individual, who, by unlawful or unauthorized acts provokes or gives
occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the Philippine Islands
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or
or exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or property.
highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Art. 119. Violation of neutrality. — The penalty of prision
correccional shall be inflicted upon anyone who, on the occasion of
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
a war in which the Government is not involved, violates any
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
enforcing neutrality.
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people;
Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country. — Any person
who in time of war, shall have correspondence with an enemy
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be punished:
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution
and pursuant to proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972
1. By prision correccional, if the correspondence has been
and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and General Order No. 1,
prohibited by the Government;
dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of
the law of the land the following:
2. By prision mayor, if such correspondence be carried on in
ciphers or conventional signs; and
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby
which might be useful to the enemy. If the offender intended to aid
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and
the enemy by giving such notice or information, he shall suffer the
be understood, as follows:
penalty of reclusion temporal to death.
a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but
Art. 121. Flight to enemy country. — The penalty of arresto mayor
not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting
shall be inflicted upon any person who, owing allegiance to the

each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its
depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging
to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea,
the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers
and cargo from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It
shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage,
highway and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad
within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives
or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation
of goods, articles, or property or both.
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, committed by any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation
of person or force upon things of other unlawful means, committed
by any person on any Philippine Highway.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon
conviction by competents court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder
or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of
the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If
kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape
is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly
and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway
robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 20
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees,
or orders or instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as they are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants. Acting Attorney-General Tuason for
appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque
buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth
century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine
and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats
was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a
number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of
the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court
of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras
which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924
rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by
the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the
lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court
for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the
Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or
the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified
in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two
of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses
against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this
book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any
persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as
all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be
understood as including any part of the national territory.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 21
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the
Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as
such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the
United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from
another State to the United States are well-known. The political law
of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law
in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws
subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character,
continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to
the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,
1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person
and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1.
See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14,
1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands.
Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in
tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the
public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas,
and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress
shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the
statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the
United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec.
290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The
framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were
content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception
under the law of nations.
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 22

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
corresponding provisions in force in the United States. indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent
of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the instances. So ordered.
United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code,
like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words Romualdez, JJ., concur.
"United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word
should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar
reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the
Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend
all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal

Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United

States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of

another nation at war with the United States, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime
of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal
Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced
the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary
for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which
cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it
becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the

propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant
and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but
is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez,
registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act
No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed
as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the
crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at
such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance

G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y
ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y
Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were
charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named
accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy)
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew members of the
M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms,
to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1)
Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully
and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against
the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other
persona) properties belonging to the crew members and
passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money
amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand
Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of
passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts
and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the
total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00)
Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the
said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed
accused to take, steal and carry away the properties
abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treacherously
attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior
strength, use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador
Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael
Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan,
Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag,
Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia
Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad
Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico
Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul
Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal,
Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting
upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 23
persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad
and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which
could have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said
accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico
Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were
convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not
guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of
guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of
the four defendants because "there was a separate civil action for
breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court in
Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the
four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on
automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the
evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the
name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-
Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following
day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the
evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the
vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or three hours
after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after
awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch
to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw appellant
Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and
Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's
companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to
handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another
passenger, while Que and the other crew members were ordered to
throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter
Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from
the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among
the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime
Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as
they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were
hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized

that he was also hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he
pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion
from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it
could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a
gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra
until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he
was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in
the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming
from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his
Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something
worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to
direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies
overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel
reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure
pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats
nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and
Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and
Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken,
softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some
meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V
Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2,
1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-
jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang
Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul
Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario
Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty
to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara,
Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece
Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight
to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay,
Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as
evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that
accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime
of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money
to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants,
namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and
Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on
August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the
victims without means of saving themselves, or when the
seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel,
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 24
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the
crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is
mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error
in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating
circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be
devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits
"C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement
(Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of
Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in
evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the
defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross
examination, admitted the truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat
and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you
have signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in
Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069),
which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that
his participation in the commission of the offense was positively
testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a
passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde
Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-
14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr.
who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon
indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton
disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one
pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with
the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a statement
to the authorities stating therein his participation as well as those of
his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian
authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of
Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where
they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 25

Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00,

respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch
which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to the Acting In-
Charge of the NBI in Jolo.

The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and
answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you

are under investigation here in connection with the robbery
committed on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you
are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain silent
and to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You have
the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this
investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer
but cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free.
Should you decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall
be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used
for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?

A: No, sir.

3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to

signify that you so understand all your rights as above stated
and that you do not need the services of a lawyer?

A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)

Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his

constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits

"E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each
other as each admits his participation and those of the other co-
accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among
them. The conduct of appellant

Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is
a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is
responsible for the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-

Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part,


G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente,
imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI
were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been committed according to the information
as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan,
Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above
named accused, being strangers and without
lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking
advantage of their superior strength, conspiring
and confederating together, aiding and assisting
one with the other, with intent to gain and by the
use of violence or intimidation against persons
and force upon things, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their
guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de
Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-
Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat
and take, steal and carry away all their cash
money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise
and other personal belongings amounting to the
total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion
of the crime herein above-described, taking
advantage that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them
to jump into the water, whereupon, the said
accused, fired their guns at them which caused
the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have
performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de
Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid
himself, and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de
Guzman which prevented his death.
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only
Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 26
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going
considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and
Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No.
532, and hereby sentences each one of them to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However,
considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or
ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused
who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate
society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND
JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in
selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market,
in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July
7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and
Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his
store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods
were received under an agreement that they
would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said
goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for
themselves. However these people neither paid
the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the
goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979,
Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that
his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island
and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman
were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only
Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de
Guzman together with his friends who were also
travelling merchants like him, were on their way
to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the
goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The
goods they brought with them had a total value
of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas
Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that
night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas
Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's
group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh,
started selling their goods, They were able to sell

goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the
group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh,
went to sell their goods at another place,
Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to
Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
again slept at Kiram's house. However that night
Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon
inquiry the following day when Antonio de
Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he
slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio
de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place
suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell
goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram
did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group
again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used
the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at
that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at
Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and
Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house
about 15 meters away from the place where the
group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn).
Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking
with two persons whose faces the group saw but
could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling
their goods, the members of the group, together
with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas
Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh
positioned himself at the front while Kiram
operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat
painted red and green about 200 meters away
from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after"
Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other
pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58,
tsn). There were two persons on the other
pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De
Guzman recognized them to be the same
persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat
came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the
other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to
Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his
companions were divested of their money and
their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter
Kiram and his companions ordered the group of
de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the
pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.
With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was
good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh
hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked
Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped
into the water. As he was swimming away from
the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But
he was able to reach a mangrove where he
stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove,
he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro.
He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought
to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 27
he received first aid treatment. Later he was
brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead
bodies of his companions at the wharf, de
Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them
out to the PC and the two were arrested before
they could run. When arrested, Kiram was
wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and
de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the
Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram
(pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at
the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound,
scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C,
prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M.
Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan,
examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding
death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de
Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the
victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record
does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants
are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their
victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they
were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately
suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while
at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and
provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC.
The record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution
stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the
dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to
present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been
brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an
army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so
why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report
was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the
defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as
having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them.
Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred
from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason
why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or
manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple
murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt
the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the
report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 28

commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC
law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report
of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the
lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's
report and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord
with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed
shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay
in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased SO ORDERED.

Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the
deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman
informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were
killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the
appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is
baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused
for as Judge Rasul has stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the

information is sufficiently proved in this case. In
fact the following facts appear to have been
established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On
July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the
window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking
men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the
survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2) armed
strangers to whom the two accused talked in
Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house;
C) The two accused, without order from the two
armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to
the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman
and companion peddlers were divested of their
jewelries and cash and undressed while the two
accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove
conspiracy and make them equally liable for the
same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57;
People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The
convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply
justifies the imputation of all of them the act of
any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759).
(Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed

together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his
remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14,
1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of
victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the

injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or
gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible
gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the
testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and
Jamahali were armed with armalites.

[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER
P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in
docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with
other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M.
No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel
owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded
with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline,
and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87.
was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain
Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator
Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates,
including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos.
They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.
Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members
to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the
front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on
the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the
name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew
was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading
radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine
Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative
results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of
Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another
vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced
to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan,
Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and
anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline
where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the
vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant
Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving
the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels
leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and
completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas,
but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of
the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not
to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two
days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first
batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger
jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio
Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00
to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 29
appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought
to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the
members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident
was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the
officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements
regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the
pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas.
After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was
arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by
chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were
pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were
arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN
DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10,
1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high
powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters
M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together
with the complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct
the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10,
1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch
49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding
some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on
March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the
charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to
the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective
sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat
with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba
on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the
work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a
month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going

experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared
coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon
arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told
that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was
neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge,
averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified
that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali,
adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining
the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as
a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a
vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to
domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of
which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by
Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the
company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for
the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company
paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter,
together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate
the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27,
1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was
assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port
of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan.
Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil
and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the
purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William
Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T
Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the
transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the
port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd.
was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were
not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the
immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the
vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T
Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side
with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and
the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he
ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the
tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The
surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed
under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment
to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the
morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality
of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of
oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 30
same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time,
Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer,
purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer
took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan
was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he
had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators.
Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the
cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the
matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new
transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was
told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas
that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City,
where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person
by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio
Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not
arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-
appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy
in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said
crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the
principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering
that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the
death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the
law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are
hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer
return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,
jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the
amount of P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests
thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the
said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San
Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc.
the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer
return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby
condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc.,
the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine
Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the
accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be
deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention
at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila
during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing
to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the
City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of
accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O.
Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the
proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by
Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas
entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the
course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court
discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine
Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined
seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation,
they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign
statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents
of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in
finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the
pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were
not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants
conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect
obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in
declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco
and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that
the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery
or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of
1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and
sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions
without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are
contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred
in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-
appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the
commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that
he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that
he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under
the information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the
case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal
jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 31
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1)
what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-
lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what
are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?;
(4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by
accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as
such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit
"20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they
were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented
by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be
valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During
the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar,
made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were
apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed
the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when
asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that
an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it
is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law."
(Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of
Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy , but without prejudice to the sanctions
imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that
the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules
of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the
right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it
was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the
full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly,
denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553
[1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during
custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436
[1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is
to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-
called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In
fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section
12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a
phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According
to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants,
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction
of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU")
and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire
and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then
trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses,
officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less,
who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who
attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at
about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with
its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers
and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse,
about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold
its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo
was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the
price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
1991...
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than
one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the
Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the
Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 32
Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit
"B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the
pirates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the
three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded
the said vessel in the evening of March 2 1991 and remained on
board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which turned out to
be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants'
defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their
bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to
the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the
crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently
desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers
(allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T
Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an
indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their
families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their
voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at
sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with
human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible
that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion
"had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture
in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or
handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi
that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April
10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it
to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense,
much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.
Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate
and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must
adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on
April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in
Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was
likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the
dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a
testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is
telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part
in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial
court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and
different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in

fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common
criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones
assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang,
Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the
master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of
Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus,
Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with
money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These
acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an
objective common to all other accused- appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to
one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger
brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto
Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their
families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has
known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is
a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides, Loyola and
Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case
regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off
Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was
convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no
longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January
1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has
impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out
that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous
or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section
1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are
members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel,
whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are
neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel,
hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who,
on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole
or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994),
reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. -The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 33
(Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective
of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person. including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided
(underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high
seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659,
the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include
offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the
law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity
and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one
of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article
122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532
exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state
that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
(renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed
in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought
by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-
appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree
No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant
case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532
which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential
Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is
a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43
Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even
though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under
Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence
showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced
Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in
the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio
Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen
cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting
piracy or highway robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly
and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway
robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if
there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that
of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA
514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs.
Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA
498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who
does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission
of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived
benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates
in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer
from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by
buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn,
June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the
quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine
Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew
List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by
Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer,
and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June
3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival
and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by
accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the
execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 34
Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said
entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered
the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in
his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of
the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have
been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing
in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the
pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991,
Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of
the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee";
that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH",
Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that
the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its
voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record)
falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10
o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board,
and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that
the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after
the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco a. k.
a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor
prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross
cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel,
he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master"
(Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but
did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also
did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration"
upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the
evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on
the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the
"M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer
transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was
likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end
while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the
orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality
of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself
received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that
he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious
circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a
single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any
contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to
ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the
"M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert
Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source
of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles
off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his
firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine
transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without
any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was
a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be
noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly
more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the
exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less
than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have
been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to
far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation
-only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved.
This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm
was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was
"merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is
justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means
used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged
order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent
violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such
violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel.
Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was
equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities,
falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate
said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial
court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port
Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the
nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy.
Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the
deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did
not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences
of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants
justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6235
AN ACT PROHIBITING CERTAIN ACTS INIMICAL TO
CIVIL AVIATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in
the course or destination of an aircraft of Philippine registry, or to
seize or usurp the control thereof, while it is in flight. An aircraft is in
flight from the moment all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until any of such doors is opened for disembarkation.
It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of
foreign registry to land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the
control thereof while it is within the said territory.
Section 2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing
section shall be punished by an imprisonment of not less than twelve
years but not more than twenty years, or by a fine of not less than
twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty thousand pesos.
The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine of
not less than twenty-five thousand pesos but not more than fifty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person committing such
violation under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or
passenger of the aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or
explosive to destroy the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
serious physical injuries or rape.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to
ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft operating as a public
utility within the Philippines, and explosive, flammable, corrosive or
poisonous substance or material.
Section 4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or
material mentioned in the preceding section in any cargo aircraft
operating as a public utility within the Philippines shall be in
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 35
accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Section 5. As used in this Act
(1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid,
mixture or single compound, which by chemical reaction liberates
heat and gas at high speed and causes tremendous pressure
resulting in explosion. The term shall include but not limited to
dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black powders, bursters,
percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials, except
bullets for firearm.
(2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly
combustible and self-igniting by chemical reaction and shall include
but not limited to acrolein, allene, aluminum dyethyl monochloride,
and other aluminum compounds, ammonium chlorate and other
ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials.
(3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or
gaseous, which through chemical reaction wears away, impairs or
consumes any object. It shall include but not limited to alkaline
battery fluid packed with empty storage battery, allyl chloroformate,
allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other
similar materials and substances.
(4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal
drug, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical
reactions kills, injuries or impairs a living organism or person, and
shall include but not limited to allyl isothiocyanate, ammunition
(chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A, B or poison),
aniline oil, arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other
similar substances or materials.
Section 6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable
by an imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years
or by a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos but not more than
twenty thousand pesos: Provided, That if the violation is committed
by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated,
or caused, directed, cooperated or participated in the violation
thereof: Provided, further, That in case the violation is committed in
the interest of a foreign corporation legally doing business in the
Philippines, the penalty shall be imposed upon its resident agent,
manager, representative or director responsible for such violation
and in addition thereto, the license of said corporation to do
business in the Philippines shall be revoked.
Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable
with the minimum of the penalty provided in the next preceding
paragraph.
Section 7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property
resulting from a violation of Sections three and four hereof, the
person responsible therefor may be held liable in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or
operators of aircraft which are for hire are authorized to open and
investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the presence of the
owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if present; in
order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative
refuses to have the same opened and inspected, the airline or air
carrier is authorized to refuse the loading thereof.
Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air
carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition
printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are
subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to

board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier.
Section 10. The Civil Aeronautics Administration is hereby directed
to promulgate within one month after the approval of this Act such
regulations as are provided in Section four hereof and cause the
publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for
three consecutive weeks. Such regulations shall take effect fifteen
days after publication in the Official Gazette.
Section 11. This Act shall take effect after the publication mentioned
in the preceding section.
Approved: June 19, 1971
TERRORISM
Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR
PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the
"Human Security Act of 2007."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to
protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn
terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the
country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a
crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the
law of nations.
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall
uphold the basic rights and fundamental liberties of the people as
enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a
comprehensive approach, comprising political, economic,
diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the
root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as
justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures
shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building,
addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and
promoting equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction
or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive
branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the
exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive
department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human
rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable
under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in
the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private
persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 36
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and
Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability
Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the
Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of
the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years
of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under
Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended.
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire
to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40)
years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as
defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in
Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or
simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17)
years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as principal
or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code,
takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of
the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent
its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape
of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of
Communications. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-
Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record,
with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with
the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or

written words between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or
of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients,
journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words
of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written
application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in
Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is
about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or
suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such
crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective
means readily available for acquiring such evidence.
SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The
written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same,
the original application of the applicant, including his application to
extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-
Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as
classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or
whose communications, letters, papers, messages, conversations,
discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been
monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement
authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law
enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she
intends to do so, the legality of the interference before the Court of
Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the
following: (a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of
the charged or suspected person whose communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words
are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and
recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether
wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission
systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to
continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do
so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement
official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the
police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team,
judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and
record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions,
or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed,
or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length
of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any
authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 37
Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective
for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police
or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or
renew the said authorization for another non-extendible period,
which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public
interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant,
has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically
disabled to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next
in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or renewal:
Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the
termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the
appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any
violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person
subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the
termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording. The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law
enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of the
surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified
above.
SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. -
All tapes, discs, and recordings made pursuant to the authorization
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all
excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or
memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight
(48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-
eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or renewal
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be
deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a
sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall
be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled
to execute the required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant
among the members of the team named in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the
members of the team that required affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of
the tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries,
written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the
items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds
or destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not
less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police
or of the law enforcement official and the individual members of his
team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that
have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries
thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any,
made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by
each of such tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes,
discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and
summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda
made in connection therewith that have been included in the
deposit; and (d) the date of the original written authorization granted
by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte
application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and
recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the
original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or
copies of the whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and
recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part
of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda,
have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are
included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may
be, deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official
to omit or exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof
mentioned in this Section.
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of
the acts prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the
penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope
or sealed package and the contents thereof, which are deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be
deemed and are hereby declared classified information, and the
sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its
contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the
excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda
made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read,
replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order
shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department
of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the
application with proper written notice the person whose
conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or
written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring,
recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the
contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who
violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the
surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years
and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed
Package. - The written application with notice to the party concerned
to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package shall
clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed
envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its
classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any
of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words
(including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the
notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for
using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 38
or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries
thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection
therewith) as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who
violates his duty to notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty
of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened
to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part
or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein,
including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent
provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable
as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
hearing.
SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or
Recordings. - Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not
being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in
whatever manner or form any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission
of any other offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be
imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or
form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or
spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided,
That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by
such authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope
or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the
prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously procured said authorization.
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or
Group of Persons. - Any organization, association, or group of
persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or
which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the
acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before
a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity
to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional
Trial Court.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. -
The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the
contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel,
who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery
of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said
charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within
a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged
or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained,

and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement
personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the
surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits
under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before
detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present
him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest
the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night.
It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person
or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to
inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and
determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not
the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit
a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was
brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the
case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit
his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect
was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or
arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be
served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding
paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent
Terrorist Attack. - In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days
without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or
regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the
Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the
arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person
thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned
above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured
by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five
days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned:
Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the
suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not
established, shall be released immediately.
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper
Judicial Authority within Three Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has
apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected
person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.
SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The
moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is
apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be
informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by
the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person
concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 39
nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice,
the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately
contact the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall be
the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus
contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide
him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b)
informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of
his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal
counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d)
allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with
the members of his family or with his nearest relatives and to be
visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the service of a
physician or physicians of choice.
SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any
police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police
or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the
aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the
rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified,
the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or
leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at
the time the violation was done.
SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its
Contents. - The police or other law enforcement custodial unit in
whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has
been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a
securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby
declared as a public document and opened to and made available
for .the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person
under custody or any member of his or her family or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her
physician at any time of the day or night without any form of
restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of:
(a) the name, description, and address of the detained person; (b)
the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest
and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or
physicians who examined him physically and medically; (d) the state
of his health and physical condition at the time of his initial admission
for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the
detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f)
the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address
of the physician or physicians who physically and medically
examined him after each interrogation; (h) a summary of the
physical and medical findings on the detained person after each of
such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his family
members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names
and addresses of persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the
date and time of each of such visits; (1) the date and time of each
request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his
legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and
date and time of each departure of his legal counsel or counsels;
and, (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details
regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial
arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon
demand of the aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the
family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the person under custody or his or her physician issue a
certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the

concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring
any fees whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial
fees, and the like. This certified true copy may be attested by the
person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party
concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the certified
true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to
comply with the preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation.
- No threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any
form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill,
shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained person
resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or from such
inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and
usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the
Investigation and Interrogation of a Detained Person. - Any person
or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected
person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person
occurs as a consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or
coercion, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such
physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the infliction on
him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty
shall be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is
not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the
same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the
right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where
he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national
security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the
Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the
authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms
and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided
under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court
at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones,
cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of
communications with people outside the residence until otherwise
ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the
acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against
him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the
prosecutor or of the accused.
SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 40
of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-
terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of
probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy
to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a
member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police
or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly
authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or
cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather
or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a
bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution
concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide
the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the
written order of the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and
Records. - The written order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the
examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group
of persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association,
or group of persons in a bank or financial institution, and the
gathering of any relevant information about the same from said bank
or financial institution, shall only be granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that
effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly
authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-
Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex
parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish the
facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing
the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records:
(1) of the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of persons; or
(3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of
persons.
SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing
the Examination of Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same,
the original ex parte application of the applicant, including his ex
parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the written
authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the
person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized
by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the
acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to
challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the
interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism
shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of
persons, as the case may be. whose deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information
to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial Institution
where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who
will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired
information; and, (d) the length of time the authorization shall be
carried out.

SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and
Obtain Information on Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
authorization issued or granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to
freeze bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records, or to gather information about the same, shall be effective
for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police
or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or
renew the said authorization for another period, which shall not
exceed thirty (30) days renewable to another thirty (30) days from
the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the
application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the
original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-
Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically
disabled to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next
in rank to the original applicant among the members of the ream
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or renewal:
Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the
termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the
appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any
violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing
the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records. The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law
enforcement official who fails to notify in writing the person subject
of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who
violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the
penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after
Examination of Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and
Records. - All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes,
memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents
obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of
any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within
forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or
within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the extension or
renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in
a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall
be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law
enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the
examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 41
SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state:
(a) the identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined; (b) the
identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held
and maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen;
(d) the outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or
sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals; (f) the date of the original written authorization granted
by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte
Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date
of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; and (g)
that the items Enumerated were all that were found in the bank or
financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the
examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or
copies of the information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes,
memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents acquired from
the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records have been made, or, if made, that all such
duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed
package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the
bank data and information obtained after examination of deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the
items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever,
Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates,
shreds or destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer a
penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.
SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or
sealed package and the contents thereof, which are deposited with
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed
and are hereby declared classified information and the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents
shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless
authorized in a written order of the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon a written
application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application, with notice in writing to
the party concerned not later than three days before the scheduled
opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed
envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who
violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the
penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The
written application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not
later than three days of the scheduled opening, to open the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and
reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b)
for revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using
the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes,
memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as evidence.

SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work
sheets, reports, or documents acquired from the examination of the
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of:
(1) a person charged or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or
(3) a member of such organization, association, or group of persons,
which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act,
shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against
anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a
Bank or a Financial Institution. - Any person, police or law
enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of:
(1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or
group of persons, without being authorized to do so by the Court of
Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of
ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission
of any other offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police
or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an
authority from the Court of Appeals to examine the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial
institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or
group of persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this
Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall upon motion
duly filed be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed
package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution
of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously
procured said authorization.
SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court
Authorization. - An employee, official, or a member of the board of
directors of a bank or financial institution, who refuses to allow the
examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group
of persons; or (3) a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons in said bank or
financial institution, when duly served with the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or
Misrepresentation of Material Fact in Joint Affidavits. - Any false or
untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint
affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this
Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer
individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their
outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other
implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:
(1) to any person suspected of or charged before a competent
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 42
Regional Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall
be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use,
transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety
and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as
may be reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family
including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's
medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use
any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen
because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the
court for any legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper
division of the Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the
crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be
necessary for the regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any
of his/her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for
legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - The
seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by the bank or
financial institution for such person and the government during the
pendency of the investigation of the person suspected of or during
the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of the said
crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition while the
case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before
which the case or cases are pending.
SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the
person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be
innocent by the investigating body, or is acquitted, after his
arraignment or his case is dismissed before his arraignment by a
competent court, the seizure, sequestration and freezing of his bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall
forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the
competent court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be deemed
released from such seizure, sequestration and freezing, and shall
be restored to him without any delay by the bank or financial
institution concerned without any further action on his part. The filing
of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state the
release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism is convicted by a final judgment of a competent
trial court, his seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be
automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him
or her, the amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00)
a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were
seized shall be paid to him on the concept of liquidated damages.
The amount shall be taken from the appropriations of the police or
law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated
charges against him/her.

SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in
Restoring Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person
who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of
seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after
such suspected person has been found innocent by the
investigating body or after the case against such charged person
has been dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of
Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust
Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who is responsible for
the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of
the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public
officer who has direct custody of a detained person or under the
provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or
inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such
detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted
and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the
detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final
judgment of a competent court.
SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The
provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security
and Benefits Act) to the contrary notwithstanding, the immunity of
government witnesses testifying under this Act shall be governed by
Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided,
however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to
witnesses under said Republic Act No.6981.
SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified
Materials. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or
law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being
authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner
or form any classified information under this Act.
SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document,
or Spurious Evidence. - The penalty of twelve (12) years and one
day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document
or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act.
SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily
basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as
to ensure speedy trial.
SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another
Prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal
Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of
this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense
charged under this Act.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 43
SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon
acquittal, any person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to
the payment of damages in the amount of Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained
or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such
an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically
charged against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-
Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing of the
charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen
(15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award
of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right
of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges
against those responsible for charging him with the case of
terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release
or refuses to release the amounts awarded to the individual
acquitted of the crime of terrorism as directed in the paragraph
immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six months of
imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained
persons, the amount needed to complete the compensation shall be
taken from the current appropriations for intelligence, emergency,
social or other funds of the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current
budget of the police or law enforcement agency concerned, the
amount shall be automatically included in the appropriations of the
said agency for the coming year.
SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the
Informant. - The police or law enforcement officers to whom the
name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism was first revealed shall
record the real name and the specific address of the informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the
informant's name and address to their superior officer who shall
transmit the information to the Congressional Oversight Committee
or to the proper court within five days after the suspect was placed
under arrest or his properties were sequestered, seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered
confidential and shall not be unnecessarily revealed until after the
proceedings against the suspect shall have been terminated.
SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions
of Book I of the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act.
SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council,
hereinafter referred to, for brevity, as the "Council," is hereby
created. The members of the Council are: (1) the Executive
Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice,
who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance;
and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its other members.
The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility
for the proper and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism
policy of the country. The Council shall keep records of its
proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be
subject to such security classifications as the Council may, in its
judgment and discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of
the people, the security of the Republic, and the welfare of the
nation.
The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the
Secretariat of the Council. The Council shall define the powers,
duties, and functions of the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency as Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau of

Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil Defense,
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Anti-Money Laundering Council, the Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the Philippine National Police intelligence
and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the
Council.
The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate,
efficient, and effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-
measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and to
protect the people from acts of terrorism. Nothing herein shall be
interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism Council to exercise any
judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.
SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the
previous Section, the Council shall have the following functions with
due regard for the rights of the people as mandated by the
Constitution and pertinent laws:
1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures
against terrorists and acts of terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of
terrorism in the country and mobilize the entire nation against
terrorism prescribed in this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons
accused or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under this Act, and
monitor the progress of their cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information
system on terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism
operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known as
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who
give vital information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention,
prosecution, and conviction of person or persons who are liable for
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and
assistance of other nations in the struggle against international
terrorism; and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and
Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to handle all cases
involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
and all matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall
assign a team of prosecutors from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism
cases filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the Visayas
to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from Mindanao to handle
cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City.
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The
Commission on Human Rights shall give the highest priority to the
investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights
of persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this
purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who
may have violated the civil and political rights of persons suspected
of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 44
SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby
created a Grievance Committee composed of the Ombudsman, as
chair, and the Solicitor General, and an undersecretary from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and evaluate
complaints against the actuations of the police and law enforcement
officials in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold
office in Manila. The Committee shall have three subcommittees
that will be respectively headed by the Deputy Ombudsmen in
Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall
respectively hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three
Assistant Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor General,
and the regional prosecutors of the DOJ assigned to the regions
where the Deputy Ombudsmen hold office shall be members
thereof. The three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance
Committee in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints
against the police and other law enforcement officers in the
implementation of this Act. If the evidence warrants it, they may file
the appropriate cases against the erring police and law enforcement
officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the
complainants, decisions or judgments in the said cases shall
preclude the filing of other cases based on the same cause or
causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance
Committee or its branches.
SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or
convicted of the crime of terrorism shall be subjected to
extraordinary rendition to any country unless his or her testimony is
needed for terrorist related police investigations or judicial trials in
the said country and unless his or her human rights, including the
right against torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by
the requesting country and transmitted accordingly and approved by
the Department of Justice.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the
provision of an existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory
and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application,
the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who
commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act within the
terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of
the Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or
plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act
inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons
who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship
or Philippine airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of
said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises
belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official
capacity; (5) to individual persons who, although physically outside
the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against
Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their
citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime;
and (6) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly
against the Philippine government.
SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a
Joint Oversight Committee to oversee the implementation of this
Act. The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five members
each from the Senate and the House in addition to the Chairs of the
Committees of Public Order of both Houses who shall also Chair the
Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership
of the Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition
or minority members. The Joint Oversight Committee shall have its
own independent counsel. The Chair of the Committee shall rotate
every six months with the Senate chairing it for the first six months
and the House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking
opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice
Chair. Upon the expiration of one year after this Act is approved by
the President, the Committee shall review the Act particularly the
provision that authorize the surveillance of suspects of or persons

charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the Committee shall
summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members
of the Anti-Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions
from the members of Congress and to submit a written report of the
acts they have done in the implementation of the law including the
manner in which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime
of terrorism have been dealt with in their custody and from the date
when the movements of the latter were subjected to surveillance
and his or her correspondences, messages, conversations and the
like were listened to or subjected to monitoring, recording and
tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting other reports, the
Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of
Congress. The report may include where necessary a
recommendation to reassess the effects of globalization on terrorist
activities on the people, provide a sunset clause to or amend any
portion of the Act or to repeal the Act in its entirety. The courts
dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the
President a report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism
cases that have been filed with them starting from the date this Act
is implemented.
SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other
parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules or regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been
signed into law by the President, the Act shall be published in three
newspapers of national circulation; three newspapers of local
circulation, one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga;
three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo and
Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in
Cagayan de Oro, Davao and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism
that are punished shall be aired everyday at primetime for seven
days, morning, noon and night over three national television and
radio networks; three radio and television networks, one each in
Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio and television networks,
one each in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato
City and Zamboanga City. The publication in the newspapers of
local circulation and the announcements over local radio and
television networks shall be done in the dominant language of the
community. After the publication required above shall have been
done, the Act shall take effect two months after the elections are
held in May 2007. Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be
automatically suspended one month before and two months as after
the holding of any election.
Approved.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10168 June 20, 2012
AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF FINANCING OF
TERRORISM, PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Terrorism
Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012?.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to
protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism and to
condemn terrorism and those who support and finance it and to
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 45
recognize it as inimical and dangerous to national security and the
welfare of the people, and to make the financing of terrorism a crime
against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of
nations.
The State, likewise, recognizes and adheres to international
commitments to combat the financing of terrorism, specifically to the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, as well as other binding terrorism-related resolutions of
the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Chapter 7 of the
Charter of the United Nations (UN).
Toward this end, the State shall reinforce its fight against terrorism
by criminalizing the financing of terrorism and related offenses, and
by preventing and suppressing the commission of said offenses
through freezing and forfeiture of properties or funds while
protecting human rights.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
(a) Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) refers to the Council
created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended".
(b) Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) refers to the Council created by,
virtue of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human
Security Act of 2007?.
(c) Covered institutions refer to or shall have the same meaning as
defined under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), as amended.
(d) Dealing, with regard to property or funds refers to receipt,
acquisition, transacting, representing, concealing, disposing or
converting, transferring or moving, use as security of or providing
financial services.
(e) Designated persons refers to:
(1) any person or entity designated and/or identified as a terrorist,
one who finances terrorism, or a terrorist organization or group
under the applicable United Nations Security Council Resolution or
by another jurisdiction or supranational jurisdiction;
(2) any organization, association, or group of persons proscribed
pursuant to Section 17 of the Human Security Act of 2007; or
(3) any person, organization, association, or group of persons
whose funds or property, based on probable cause are subject to
seizure and sequestration under Section 39 of the Human Security
Act of 2007.
(f) Forfeiture refers to a court order transferring in favor of the
government, after due process, ownership of property or funds
representing, involving, or relating to financing of terrorism as
defined in Section 4 or an offense under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of
this Act.
(g) Freeze refers to the blocking or restraining of specific property
or funds from being transacted, converted, concealed, moved or
disposed without affecting the ownership thereof.
(h) Property or funds refer to financial assets, property of every kind,
whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however
acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including
electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such funds or
other assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers
cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds,
drafts, or letters of credit, and any interest, dividends or other
income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds or
other assets.

(i) Terrorist refers to any natural person who: (1) commits, or
attempts, or conspires to commit terrorist acts by any means,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully; (2) participates, as a
principal or as an accomplice, in terrorist acts; (3) organizes or
directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (4) contributes to the
commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and
with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of
the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.
(j) Terrorist acts refer to the following:
(1) Any act in violation of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Human
Security Act of 2007;
(2) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act;
(3) Any act which constitutes an offense under this Act, that is within
the scope of any of the following treaties of which the Republic of
the Philippines is a State party:
(a) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
done at The Hague on 16 December 1970 ;
(b) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971 ;
(c) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14
December 1973;
(d) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17
December 1979;
(e) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980 ;
(f) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988 ;
(g) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 ;
(h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome
on 10 March 1988; or
(i) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 15 December 1997.
(k) Terrorist organization, association or a group of persons refers
to any entity owned or controlled by any terrorist or group of
terrorists that: (1) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully; (2)
participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; (3) organizes or
directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (4) contributes to the
commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with
common purpose of furthering the terrorist act where the
contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the
terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit a terrorist act.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 46
Section 4. Financing of Terrorism. – Any person who, directly or
indirectly, willfully and without lawful excuse, possesses, provides,
collects or uses property or funds or makes available property, funds
or financial service or other related services, by any means, with the
unlawful and willful intention that they should be used or with the
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part: (a) to carry out
or facilitate the commission of any terrorist act; (b) by a terrorist
organization, association or group; or (c) by an individual terrorist,
shall be guilty of the crime of financing of terrorism and shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00).
Any person who organizes or directs others to commit financing of
terrorism under the immediately preceding paragraph shall likewise
be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the same penalty as herein
prescribed.
For purposes of this Act, knowledge or intent may be established by
direct evidence or inferred from the attendant circumstances.
For an act to constitute a crime under this Act, it shall not be
necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out a crime
referred to in Section 3(j).
Section 5. Attempt or Conspiracy to Commit the Crimes of Financing
of Terrorism and Dealing with Property or Funds of Designated
Persons. – Any attempt to commit any crime under Section 4 or
Section 8 under this Act shall be penalized by a penalty two degrees
lower than that prescribed for the commission of the same as
provided under this Act.
Any conspiracy to commit any crime under Section 4 or Section 8 of
this Act shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of such crime under the said sections.
There is conspiracy to commit the offenses punishable under
Sections 4 and 8 of this Act when two (2) or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of such offenses and
decided to commit it.
Section 6. Accomplice. – Any person who, not being a principal
under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as
defined in Section 5 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either
the crime of financing of terrorism or conspiracy to commit the crime
of financing of terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall
suffer the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the
conspirator.
Section 7. Accessory. – Any person who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime of financing of terrorism but without having
participated therein as a principal, takes part subsequent to its
commission, by profiting from it or by assisting the principal or
principals to profit by the effects of the crime, or by concealing or
destroying the effects of the crime in order to prevent its discovery,
or by harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of a principal
of the crime shall be guilty as an accessory to the crime of financing
of terrorism and shall be imposed a penalty two degrees lower than
that prescribed for principals in the crime of financing terrorism.
Section 8. Prohibition Against Dealing with Property or Funds of
Designated Persons. – Any person who, not being an accomplice
under Section 6 or accessory under Section 7 in relation to any
property or fund: (i) deals directly or indirectly, in any way and by
any means, with any property or fund that he knows or has
reasonable ground to believe is owned or controlled by a designated
person, organization, association or group of persons, including
funds derived or generated from property or funds owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated person,

organization, association or group of persons; or (ii) makes available
any property or funds, or financial services or other related services
to a designated and/or identified person, organization, association,
or group of persons, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) nor more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
Section 9. Offense by a Juridical Person, Corporate Body or Alien.
– If the offender is a corporation, association, partnership or any
juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible
officers, as the case may be, who participated in, or allowed by their
gross negligence, the commission of the crime or who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its commission. If the
offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke its
license. If the offender is an alien, the alien shall, in addition to the
penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further
proceedings after serving the penalties herein prescribed.
Section 10. Authority to Investigate Financing of Terrorism. – The
AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, is
hereby authorized to investigate: (a) any property or funds that are
in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; (b)
property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom there
is probable cause to believe that such person or persons are
committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in
or facilitating the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as defined
herein.
The AMLC may also enlist the assistance of any branch,
department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and -controlled
corporations in undertaking measures to counter the financing of
terrorism, which may include the use of its personnel, facilities and
resources.
For purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as the "Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits", as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise
known as the "Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines", as
amended; Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as "The General
Banking Law of 2000? and other laws, the AMLC is hereby
authorized to inquire into or examine deposits and investments with
any banking institution or non-bank financial institution and their
subsidiaries and affiliates without a court order.
Section 11. Authority to Freeze. – The AMLC, either upon its own
initiative or at the request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to issue
an ex parte order to freeze without delay: (a) property or funds that
are in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism;
or (b) property or funds of any person, group of persons, terrorist
organization, or association, in relation to whom there is probable
cause to believe that they are committing or attempting or conspiring
to commit, or participating in or facilitating the commission of
financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as defined herein.
The freeze order shall be effective for a period not exceeding twenty
(20) days. Upon a petition filed by the AMLC before the expiration
of the period, the effectivity of the freeze order may be extended up
to a period not exceeding six (6) months upon order of the Court of
Appeals: Provided, That the twenty-day period shall be tolled upon
filing of a petition to extend the effectivity of the freeze order.
Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, the AMLC, consistent
with the Philippines ’ international obligations, shall be authorized to
issue a freeze order with respect to property or funds of a
designated organization, association, group or any individual to
comply with binding terrorism-related Resolutions, including
Resolution No. 1373, of the UN Security Council pursuant to Article
41 of the Charter of the UN. Said freeze order shall be effective until
the basis for the issuance thereof shall have been lifted. During the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 47
effectivity of the freeze order, an aggrieved party may, within twenty
(20) days from issuance, file with the Court of Appeals a petition to
determine the basis of the freeze order according to the principle of
effective judicial protection.
However, if the property or funds subject of the freeze order under
the immediately preceding paragraph are found to be in any way
related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism committed within
the jurisdiction of the Philippines , said property or funds shall be the
subject of civil forfeiture proceedings as hereinafter provided.
Section 12. Exceptions for Investigative Requirements. –
Notwithstanding the immediately preceding provision, the AMLC
may decide to defer the issuance of a freeze order for as long as
necessary for any specific investigative/prosecutorial purposes.
Section 13. Humanitarian Exemptions. – The person whose
property or funds have been frozen under the first paragraph of
Section 11 may withdraw such sums as the court determines to be
reasonably needed for monthly family needs and sustenance
including the services of counsel and the family medical needs of
such person.1âwphi1
The person whose property or funds have been frozen under the
third paragraph of Section 11 may withdraw such sums as the AMLC
determines to be reasonably needed for monthly family needs
including the services of counsel and the family medical needs of
such person.
Section 14. Appropriation and Use of Funds of Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO). – Any appropriation and use of funds of PAO to
provide free legal assistance or services to persons charged of the
offenses defined and penalized herein shall not be construed as a
violation of this Act, thereby exempting the PAO from any liability.
Section 15. Publication of Designation. – The Department of Foreign
Affairs with respect to designation under Section 3 (e) (1) of this Act,
and the ATC with respect to designation under Section 3 (e) (2) and
(3) and Section 11 of this Act, shall publish a list of the designated
persons to which this Act or the Human Security Act applies. The
concerned agencies shall ensure that an electronic version of the
document is made available to the public on their respective
website.
Each respective agency or authority shall ensure that information on
procedures established in rules and regulations issued pursuant to
this Act for delisting, unfreezing and exemptions for basic,
necessary or extraordinary expenses shall likewise be made
available in their respective website.
Section 16. Duty of the Covered Institutions and/or Relevant
Government Agencies Upon Receipt of the Freeze Order. – Upon
receipt of the notice of a freeze order, the covered institutions and/or
relevant government agencies shall immediately preserve the
subject property or funds in accordance with the order of the AMLC
and shall forthwith serve a copy of the notice of the freeze order
upon the owner or holder of the property or funds. Any responsible
officer or other person who fails to comply with a freeze order shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months to four (4)
years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00), at the discretion of the court, without prejudice to
the administrative sanctions that the AMLC may impose on the
erring covered institution.
Section 17. Predicate Offense to Money Laundering. – Financing of
terrorism under Section 4 and offenses punishable under Sections
5, 6, and 7 of this Act shall be predicate offenses to money
laundering as defined in Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001?, as amended, and
subject to its suspicious transaction reporting requirement.
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 48

Section 23. Separability Clause. – If, for any reason, any provision
Section 18. Civil Forfeiture. – The procedure for the civil forfeiture of of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
property or funds found to be in any way related to financing of provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and
terrorism under Section 4 and other offenses punishable under effect.
Sections 5, 6, and 7 of this Act shall be made in accordance with
the AMLA, as amended, its Revised Implementing Rules and Section 24. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, executive orders,
Regulations and the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the proclamations, rules and regulations, and other issuances, or parts
Supreme Court. thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. – Subject to the
provision of an existing treaty, including the International Section 25. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at
which the Philippines is a State Party, and to any contrary provision least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
of any law of preferential application, the criminal provisions of this
Act shall apply: (a) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or
plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act
inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (b) to individual persons
who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship
or Philippine airship; (c) to individual persons who commit any of
said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises
belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official
capacity; (d) to individual persons who, although physically outside
the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against
Philippine citizens or persons of Philippine descent, where their
citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime;
and (e) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly
against the Philippine government.

The provisions of this Act shall likewise apply to a Filipino national

who, although outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines ,
commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act.

In case of an alien whose extradition is requested pursuant to the

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, and that alien is not extradited to the requesting State,
the Republic of the Philippines, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offense was committed in the Philippines, shall
submit the case without undue delay to the Department of Justice
for the purpose of prosecution in the same manner as if the act
constituting the offense had been committed in the Philippines, in
which case, the courts of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction over
the offense.

Section 20. Extradition. – The Philippines may, at its option, subject

to the principle of reciprocity, consider the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as a legal basis
for requesting or granting extradition in respect of the offenses set
forth under this Act.

Section 21. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – The

provisions of Book I of the Revised Penal Code shall apply
suppletorily to this Act.

Section 22. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within thirty (30)

days from the effectivity of this Act, the AMLC, in coordination with
relevant government agencies, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to implement effectively the provisions of this Act.

The rules and regulations to be promulgated may include, but not

limited to, designation, delisting, notification of matters of interest of
persons affected by the Act, exceptions for basic, necessary and
extraordinary expenses, matters of evidence, definition of probable
cause, inter-agency coordination, publication of relevant
information, administrative offenses and penalties, procedures and
forms, and other mechanisms for implementation of the Act.

G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC.,
on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State
Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178554
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson
Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National
President Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C.
Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of
National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff,
and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity as
PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178581
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL
ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY,
EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY),
SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF
CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB,
DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL.
GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR.
CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO
RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO
CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 49
SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz,
and representing the following organizations: HUSTISYA,
represented by Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own behalf;
DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also
on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN
SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA),
represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf,
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP),
represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and
PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented
by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179157
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented
by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE
OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S.
MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEÑA III and
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC),
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179461
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG
(BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-

TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST,
PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG
MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG
MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG
MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO
KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS RURAL POOR
ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN
NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO,
JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE
CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a
concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On
even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented
by their respective officers3 who are also bringing the action in their
capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA),
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned
Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY),
Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students
(LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang
Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 50
(ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and
Agham, represented by their respective officers,4 and joined by
concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr.
Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco,
Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de
Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member
organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-
Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA),
Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), which were
represented by their respective officers5 who are also bringing
action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E.
Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST),
other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing
on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised
in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP,
Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just
the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota
of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12
summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or
any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action,
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful
conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial
scrutiny of locus standi.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 51
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,
petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected
to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as
"enemies of the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet
to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and
the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,
LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and
Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the
Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging
them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to
the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the
law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads
the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of
judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under
RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,
belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R.
No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the
CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of

specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
organization, the United States of America17 (US) and the
European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and
Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP
and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an
application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372
has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the
present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully
and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by
Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño,
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to
resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of
the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino
Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial
proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with
direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of
recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription
under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before
the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24
Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu
Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of
a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges
against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion
charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives
Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of
GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion
charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo
Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist
movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN,
GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for
petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the
enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another,
rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it
easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having
been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no
relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372,
none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of
locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 52
zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance
to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not,
however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its
mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have
been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi.
Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of
"political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even
the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly
lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and
Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.
Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has
been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty.
Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that
the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must
be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have
been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights
advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with
locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger
of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To
rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as
taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is
an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,28
whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest
in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by
the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.
Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.30
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that
the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of
a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive
in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.34
Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or
granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy,
and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative
action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed
resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,37 to
rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based
merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of
the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual
controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or
anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge.
This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be
sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the
issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a
"credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court
to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18
U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material
support to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as
foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to
provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two
such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the
merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner
seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have
failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No
demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and
existing one.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 53
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend
to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are
merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not
avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since
the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.45
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the definition of the crime of terrorism46 under RA 9372 in
that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that
RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is
imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable
grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the
idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech
cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47
and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word
"intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court
stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that,
at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein
petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55
of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court
found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free
from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two
doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an
"as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that
a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review
of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada
decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law
as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what
is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."
As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 54
of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for
the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily
results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined
in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56
(Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation
of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only
extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds
for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified
by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected
earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that

generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a
criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-
its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the
grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.
A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the
State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to
third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to
free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that
are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis
in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the
Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court
has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 55
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In
Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition
of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual
or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not
preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there
was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It
stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that
do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the
specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's
facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated
defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important
guarantees of liberty under law."75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under
the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the
Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime
of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor
Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases,
similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as
to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the
offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated
by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
"unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 56

of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into

a protected speech.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely

inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element
of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact
that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race
will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White
Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as
one regulating speech rather than conduct.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the

criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and
not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the
expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the
element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as
in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it
has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive
interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against
agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements
and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and
underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct,

because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since
speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a
facial analysis.1avvphi1

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a

vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied
to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged
with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The
Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed
penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the

pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible
threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual

charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.