1

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTERS 6 LAWYER’S could not be distributed among the heirs because the
OATH stock certificates were not in her possession. The
dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the
other heirs, on the other, which delayed the
A.C. No. 2841 July 3, 2002
proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash
RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE
and the shares of stocks.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty.
CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.
Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the orders
PER CURIAM:
of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly
"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate
prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of
to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an
stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and
oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974),
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for
the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the
truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
probate court, had this to say:
crusader."1 These were the eloquent words of the late
"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and
are urged, to settle their differences with the
honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic
view to closing the estate which has been
and deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner,
pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs,
forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and the lawyers, are reminded that the
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has
prolongation of administrative proceedings can
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
only benefit the executor or administrator or the
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
counsels for the contending parties. It always
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
results in the diminution of the share of each of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
the heirs because the estate is burdened with
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a
the expenses of the administration proceedings,
mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened
the heir must have to pay attorney's fee and the
advocacy in direct proportion to a litigant's financial
longer the proceedings the bigger the attorney's
posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the
fee."3
dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor
Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate
alike."2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by
proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for attorney's fee
his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such
in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's
lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted
refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares
position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to
of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to
be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its
her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could
sanctity and nobility.
not accept that explanation because as executrix, she
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement
was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the
of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which has since
assets of the estate.
been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City,
directing the executrix to comment why the securities
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge
were not in her possession. She filed her comment,
Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino
through her husband, that some Philippine and
S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio
American securities were not in her possession. To
Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending
determine which securities were in her possession,
for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the
Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order
principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be
requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest
shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña
inventory of all the securities of the estate. However,
caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and
she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then
by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various
issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her
maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer
to take possession of all certificates of stocks or their
that he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or
replacements belonging to the estate and to make an
unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money or
up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their
malice.
nature and their value." Again, she did not comply with
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the
the order.
terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to
C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his
the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed
seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was
the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court
named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such,
to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay.
she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as
Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty.
her lawyer.
Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both
Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978
here and in the United States of America), and real
directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or
estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left
proceeding without first informing the court." The
no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have
executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact,
been simple and speedy. However, since the death of
he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with
the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his
this Court.
estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order
dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.
authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned
to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on
that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project
the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to
of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967,
submit a report to the probate court. To provide money
the probate court approved the project except certain
for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to
portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In
release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00
view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal,
from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with
the other heirs filed several motions praying that the
supporting receipts upon her submission of her report
estate's remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its
on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed
shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United
the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix,
prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R.
through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently opposed
No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13,
the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had
1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:
already been earmarked for her husband's attorney's
fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as
executrix should oppose such an order of the
court which is and would be for the benefit of
the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs
completely agreed with what the trial court did.
xxx
"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders he should be complimented in
finding ways and means of promptly and
expeditiously determining the assets of the
estate to be ultimately distributed among the
heirs."
On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for
contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders of
October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978
and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the
court which securities were and were not in her
possession and to give the reason therefor.
On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña
were held in contempt of court and fined P250.00 each
for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979
requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy
Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain
their failure to comply with the order, but they did not
submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-
10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the
proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order
requiring the executrix to distribute immediately among
the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the
Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall,
Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance
within 10 days from notice; and within the same period,
to file a written report to the court stating (a) what other
certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her
possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not
with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the
executrix and her husband, Atty. Occeña, did not comply
with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her
to explain why she should not be punished for contempt
of court. After several postponements at her instance
and that of her husband, the incident was set for
hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared,
thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a
half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the performance
of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981,
adjudged her in contempt of court.
Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then
CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages
(P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of
litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981,
the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña
filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against
Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering
unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice
and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect
contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance
with the probate court's order of October 16, 1979. For
lack of merit, Atty. Occeña's complaint was dismissed by
then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution
dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this
Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge
Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a
Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed
the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to substantiate
his charges during the investigation.
Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on
the said administrative complaint, Atty. Occeña and his
wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO.
14957 for damages against the former. The couple
alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the
judge's comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June
11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action, the comment being an absolutely
privileged communication.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and
administrative complaints, found to be groundless, Atty.
2
Occeña further delayed with malice the probate
proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge
Ruiz.
More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the
proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater harm to
the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing
partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no
less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court and the
Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the
interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if
not all, were without merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge
Antonio Beldia, in the same probate proceedings, was
also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless
administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil.
These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty.
Occeña in securing restraining orders from the Court of
Appeals or as grounds for the judge's inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an
attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz,
on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court
Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with
gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of
filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the
inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty.
Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15
days from notice which was extended to another 15
days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer.
What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for
lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on
December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon. Upon
Atty. Occeña's motion, he was given an extension of 15
days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his
answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he
appear during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended
when this Court issued a temporary restraining order in
G. R. No. 62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge
Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for prohibition. However,
on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's
petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the
administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984,
but again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña
failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the
hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On
December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for
Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was
reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic
request of Atty. Occeña, the hearing was postponed to
August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus,
in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court
considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right
to present evidence.4
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence
presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has
"abused, misused and overused the judicial
system,"5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision
suspending6 him from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The decision7 unfolded a long list of his
administrative offenses, thus:
I
Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the
court; gross misconduct in office
During the probate proceedings, respondent
Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed
with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with
the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the
order of the probate court directing the said
executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to
determine the assets of the estate in the U.S.,
$1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the
order ordering the same executrix to report to
the probate court the securities belonging to the
estate. Atty. Occeña's refusal to obey the said

orders and elevating the same to the higher
courts unnecessarily delayed the probate
proceedings.
II
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued
groundless suits and gave aid or consent
to the same; delayed persons for money or
malice
Respondent, together with his wife, filed against
the judge of the probate court two actions for
damages which were both dismissed for lack of
merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent
also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint
charging the judge of the probate court with
knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders.
The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of
merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an
administrative complaint which was again
dismissed for failure of respondent to
substantiate the charge.
By filing the above-cited civil actions for
damages, administrative complaint and criminal
charge which were found to be groundless and
unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the
settlement of the estate proceedings by
harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time,
effort and money to defend himself against said
frivolous and unmeritorious cases.
In fact, respondent's propensity to file
groundless administrative charges, as well as
civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge
Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled
the case. As a measure of self defense, these
judges were compelled to prepare and file
pleadings or comments thereby using time
which could have been devoted to expediting
the closure of the estate proceedings.
Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings
in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
questioning the interlocutory orders of the
probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions,
were determined to be groundless and without
merit.
III
Disobeying the laws
Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office
by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of
Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court,
entitled "Charges Against Judges of First
Instance," which reads as follows:
"Sec. 6. Confidential – Proceedings
against judges of first instance shall be
private and confidential."
During the pendency of the administrative
complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z")
filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the
Supreme Court, he violated the private and
confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to
wit:
1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et
al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No.
SP-10604", questioning an interlocutory order of
the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V") to which he
attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his
aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge
Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to
the issue raised in said petition.
2. In another petition for prohibition and
certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et
al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No.
SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an
interlocutory order of the probate court, he
attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and
complete copy of the said administrative
complaint although not relevant to the question
therein raised; and
3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a
letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan
3
(Exh. "Y"), he also attached as Annex "A" thereof
a true and complete copy of said administrative
complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said
administrative complaint is not germane to the
charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").
By repeatedly violating said provision of the
Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the
court, put to naught one of the principal
purposes thereof which is to protect the
personal and professional reputation of judges
from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and
counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs.
Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960;
Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page
260). Respondent committed gross misconduct
in office and has not conducted himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.
IV
Did falsehood and consented to the doing
of same in court.
In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz
(Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"), respondent
alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1")
that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was
held in contempt and censured, "without any
hearing," for not obeying the probate court's
order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").
However, the records of the Ogan estate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that
in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate
court directed said executrix to explain within 5
days from notice why she should not be cited for
contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8,
1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing
on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning
(Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980
after the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset
to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by
the Supreme Court of the respondent's petition
for review impugning the Court of Appeals'
decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981,
page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the
order setting the hearing of the contempt
charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were
received by the respondent and his wife-
executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of the
hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent
appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981),
the court received executrix's motion for
postponement of the hearing, which was denied
for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May
12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was rendered holding the
executrix in contempt and penalized with
censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the
executrix and her counsel did not attend.
Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed
falsehood when he subsequently alleged under
oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan,
dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh.
"Y") that "without prior notice and without
any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix
Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and
censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2";
page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with
the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh.
"C"), directing said executrix to remit
immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir
Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet
whatever necessary expenses that she might
incur in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels
of land owned by the estate at Vinton County,
Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix
committed falsehood when they stated in their
petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued
"without hearing" and thus a violation of

procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in
its decision which has become final (Exh. "E"),
confirmed this falsehood when it held that the
petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her
right to be heard when the respondent
judge issued the two orders in
question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule
1388 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised Rules of
Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to
this Court a certified true copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of facts.10
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's
motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his
decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has
remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court
issued an Order11requiring "the parties to move in the
premises, by informing the Court about the status of the
decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña
from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly
indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten
(10) days from notice."
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has
been waiting for this Court's action on his decision
suspending Atty. Occeña.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation
and Motion praying that the case be referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
recommendation. This Court denied the motion and
instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now
deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report
and recommendation. After going over the records, he
recommended "that the temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the
decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty.
Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period
of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty.
Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of
law for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney;
likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of
attorneys."
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation
of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same being
supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 12 His
guilt, however, cannot be presumed.13 It must indicate
the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the
motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer
must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
and counsel.14 All these requirements have been
complied with in the case at hand.
In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to
appear in the hearing of the administrative case against
him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times
so that he could be accorded the full measure of due
process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately
proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña
deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations
against him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2)
malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly
immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty.
Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral
conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court.
Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyer's
oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following
duties, thus:
“I, ____. ____(place of birth), do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
4
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God."
As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated
his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings
No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that
through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully
delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-
eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not
only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who
heard the case. For respondent's part and that of his
wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them.
As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay
"can only benefit the executor or administrator" and
"the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's
fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty.
Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial
proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of
justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and
grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond
measure his privilege to practice law.
This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his
right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither
should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to
harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the
same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to
the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice.15
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is
a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. 16 A
lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.17 He must faithfully perform his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession
subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this
Court which includes suspension and disbarment.
Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to
remain in the legal profession even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the legal profession.18 Atty. Occeña has
definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged
in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession,19 because it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their
trust and confidence.20
Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable
under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C.
OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4838 July 29, 2003
EMILIOGRANDE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended
party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch
273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintif
versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the
proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check
No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn
against her account with the Philippine National Bank,
as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but
respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon
its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested
that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is
not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed
upon by complainant to accept the check.
Consequently, he desisted from participating as a
complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to
the dismissal of the same and the release of the
accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was
returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason:
"Account Closed." On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote
a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face
value of the check.1 However, his demand was ignored
by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint
against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On
September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed
the necessary information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva.2
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent
for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.3
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to
respondent’s given address at Carmelo Compound,
Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was
required to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice.4 However, it was returned unserved
with the notation "Moved".5 The Assistant National
Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of
respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. 6
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the administrative complaint
filed against her was served at the aforesaid address.
This was again returned unserved with the notation:
"Refused". Thus, the case was referred to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 7
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating
Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent
guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon
complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio
Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have
sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing
so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his
complaint against her client in exchange for a check
which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by
respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to
deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which
she should be accordingly penalized. 8 Such an act
constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such
malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
5
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefore. – A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a
lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since
this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to
enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof
is equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross
misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.9
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason
whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,10because it is important that members of
the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest
standards of morality.11Any wrongdoing which indicates
moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary
action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of
the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct
must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.12
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately
refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains
the nobility of the legal profession.13 Her conduct not
only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority;
it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at
the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career
in the administration of justice because obedience to
the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every
lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to
serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to
follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and
foremost command of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to
comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even
an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct
which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing
her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends
to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY.
EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon
receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in
her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015
ATTY.ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,
vs.

ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on
April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan
for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of
authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the
legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's
actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct
and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's
Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer
group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as
members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered
with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years
1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the
UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such
illicit relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992
to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being
already married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and
while also being romantically involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000
to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin
and while still being romantically .involved with
CCC;
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime
during the period from May 2004 until the filing
of the Petition, while still being romantically
involved with CCC.3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and
without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by
representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby
convincing the two women to start a love affair with
him, when in. truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that
sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000,
respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in
cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick
Development Corporation (KOC). However, despite
being a public officer and a government counsel,
respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal
counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby
sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the
Philippine Government.5
Complainant further claims that respondent even
attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the
latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation
proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate
number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen
several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in
his own home and in the OGCC premises itself. 6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case,
complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a
Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles
in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the
alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee
6
Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice
& Human Rights Committees recommended that
respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and
corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction
by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the
Revised Penal Code.7
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the
Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal
the evidence by requesting complainant's parents,
spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to
have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in
Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time.
Respondent's request, however, was refused by the
spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the
subject of the Senate Inquiry.8
It appears from the documents presented by
complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
finding probable cause against respondent, and an
Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019.9 Complainant also claims that respondent abused
his authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon
University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde,
and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his
male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations"
and entertained the romantic gestures of his female
students in exchange for passing grades. 10 The Petition
was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar
Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to
present any counter-statement of facts in supp01i of his
defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the
petition suffers from procedural and substantive
infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate
the allegations or charges against him. Respondent
pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled
"Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal
requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere
scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail
messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the
owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the
allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority,
were not properly established. Respondent further
argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses
were merely self-serving and deserved scant
consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's
Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint
were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure
to make specific or even general denials of such in his
Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by
Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for
"lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the
case for mandatory conference on August 28,
2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears
that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel
Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory
conference allegedly due to a previously scheduled
hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was
opposed by complainant and eventually denied by
Commissioner Villadolid in his Order 19 dated August 28,
2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to
several persons who shall be complainant's hostile
witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the
presentation of complainant's witnesses on September
11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas 21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD
received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order dated August

28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to
sometime during the third week of October. In said
motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has
viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore
eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated.
Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical
certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was
suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007,
complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that
based on his personal verification with the court
personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)
of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for
hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant
also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to
delay the proceedings because he knew that
complainant worked overseas and was only in the
country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in
complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was
denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG
Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty.
Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus
(Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion
Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC
case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate
Report had recommended the disbarment of
respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were
presented to establish that the email messages
submitted by complainant indeed originated from
respondent based on their familiarity with respondent,
paiiicularly, the email messages which contained
references to his daughter, his relationship with
complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally
introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that
sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with
another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his
wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent
at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC,
whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that
time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more
than one occasion, brought with him his students during
their drinking sessions and had even one student driving
for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty.
Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations
with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that ODD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to
inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent
upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with
DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual
marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled
that during complainant's farewell party in February
2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six
years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made
to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that
complainant included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was
concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was
terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thi1iy (30) days from
receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After
which, the case was considered submitted for report and
recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received
complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments),24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to
Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally
request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Parañaque
City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing
in said court during the first scheduled mandatory
7
conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also
received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies of
the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the
Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman,
and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already
barred from submitting his verified position paper and
that any decision or judgment would have to be based
solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper. 28
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and
recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a
Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient
evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an officer
of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the
Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in
the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and
the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that
despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to
present certified true copies of the relevant documents
which support his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent,
Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's
asse1iion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral
conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE.
Based on the Rep01i, complainant was not able to
discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the
email messages pertaining to this adulterous affair;
thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's
claim that respondent committed grossly immoral
conduct by having illicit relations with ODD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2
thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution. is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state.
xxxx
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon
I, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct"' nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the
following conclusion and recommendation: V.
Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there
is more than sufficient evidence establishing
Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing
and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar, this Commissioner respectfully
recommends that Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a
STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his
conduct in a manner consistent with the norms
prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of
Governors disbarred respondent, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian
Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his
name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which
complainant was required to submit his comment.36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28,
2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent
was required to comment on complainant's motion in an
Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same date,
complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the
Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).39 Subsequently, respondent filed a
Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave40 dated September 12,
2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
Opposition41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar
Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this
Court on November 11, 2014.43
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent
committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant
his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court
agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding
that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was
fully supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession.44 Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension proceedings against a
member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently
held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a
member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
8
testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c)
the witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party
with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise
doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers,
the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the
parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine
mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. 46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant
evidence the grounds by which respondent has been
found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions,
revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to
have not only failed to retain good moral character in
their professional and personal lives, but have also
made a mockery of the institution of marriage by
maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred
because he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with
the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.47
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty.
Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice
law after his philandering ways was proven by
preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far
removed from the exercise of his profession would not
save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to
the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow
from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section
27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not !imitative and
are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To
reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar. 49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez
v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent
Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding
our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid
second marriage, despite the existence of his first
marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance. which makes 'a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage."
In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who
has borne him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit

relations with both married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit
relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued
that complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did
not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents.1âwphi1 Due to respondent's own failure to
attend the hearings and even submit his own position
paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with
DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that
respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2
thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.52 (emphasis in the
original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with
Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03
thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was
the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case
for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate
Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to
be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the
same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No.
367" herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the
abovementioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein
attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for
graft and corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan."53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely
pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to
adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed
against him, and that complainant's statements were
merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any
evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically
denied complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge
and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the
IBP-CBD Report, viz:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's
pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to
mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily
admitted or denied said allegations or explained the
same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof,
however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of
Complainant's position of being not present in the
country and not being able to acquire the necessary
documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of
9
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice"
and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
the candor required of him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the
foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no
other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention
was more so established because complainant was able
to submit supporting documents in the form of certified
true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's
Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding
that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he
took before admission to the Bar, which states:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines: I will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same: I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance
by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the
Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate
in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors approving and adopting, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the
1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal
records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies
of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the
Cou1i Administrator to all the cou1is in the country for
their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 7 Duties and
responsibilities of a lawyer
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26,
1991
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U.

JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar
respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC
Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the
exercise of their legal profession committed in the
following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short)
and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain
Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the
original owner. However, they failed to register the sale
or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in
the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land
dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short)
another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia
spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty.
Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if
the Valencias could show documents evidencing
ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in
the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the
deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia
were not able to settle their differences. (Report of
Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty.
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino
for the recovery of possession with damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia
Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia,
Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the
Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw.
Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed
of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano.
For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount
of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the
signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed
purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed
the belief that the said document is not authentic.
(Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under
Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house. While the
petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973,
issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in
this case has already become final and executory"
(Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of
execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of
the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining
portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of
Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty.
Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly
violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as
Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting
the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the
petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of
Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of
"Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent
introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against
Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for
10
purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three
lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170
against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia
Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw
and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw
fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed
and ratified before him as Notary Public by one
Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as
a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died
already about eight years before in the year
1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos,
fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation
with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as
Notary Public, executed and ratified before him,
two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los
Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds
were not in fact executed by the supposed
vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino
Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul
and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the
transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia
Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost
during the last world war. For this reason, her
grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of
confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with
renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint,
p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still
offered to sell the same property in favor of the
complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of
donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the
property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute
a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and
notarized the deed of sale in the name of her
grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her
grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over
the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal)
and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public
document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated
the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed
in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment
proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543)
against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the
Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two
resolutions of the Second Division both dated December
3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and
1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia
Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were
ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these
cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.1âwphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was
appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of
Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the
investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge
Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis,
Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the
respondents and the alleged threats against the person
of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch
XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala
of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.

After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr.,
recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty.
Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional
charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw
and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for
six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying
the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the
subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the
New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos
are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial
documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in
rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public of judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in
which they make take part by virtue of their
profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail
any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed
may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would
constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40
O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs.
Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned,
applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of
Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is
said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest
or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic
indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate
court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it
is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491
that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of
the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the
property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground
for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute
malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that
the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No.
V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor
by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and
received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which
would show that Paulino bought the property. This
charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled
jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater
weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-
25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De
11
los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28,
1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished
only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by
another witness, deserves credence and can be relied
upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so
delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to
believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty.
Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its
subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime
duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the
court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the
expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union
vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not
to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause
in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal
means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an
attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent
with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In
re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may
suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his
unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant
as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood
but is rather intended to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order
that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence
in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw
failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw
and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543,
Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but
she never submitted herself for cross-examination.
Several subpoenas for cross-examination were
unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of
her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent
lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm.
Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw
was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be
stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by
the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should
be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of
desistance by complainant for lack of interest does
not ipso factoresult in the termination of a case for
suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs.
Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at
bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence
to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in
Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based
on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia:
hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed.,

vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence
presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia
against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391
was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her
additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers
involved in these administrative cases conspired in
executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and
rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and
Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors
and only two meters separate their houses. It would not
be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer,
would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo
in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue
the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the
differences between the parties in a meeting held in his
house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an
involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the
conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of
conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One
of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A
lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his
brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity
and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law:
strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This
friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1.
Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of
attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six months from finality of this
judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges
therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa
Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September
7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this
administrative case were postponed on the basis of
respondent's motions for postponement. These motions
were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said
dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v.
Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon
verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said
case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud
Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he
used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court
in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers
that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but
an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name
and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name
appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D.
Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official
record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not
authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed
in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear
that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple
of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
"truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor
and frankness should characterize the conduct of the
lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the
12
court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the
truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D.
Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the
general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the
client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when
he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the
courts instead of the name by which he was authorized
to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor
in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is
his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from
imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and
warned that a repetition of the same overt act may
warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the practice
of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been
unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is directed
forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as
soon as possible. The request of complainant to appear
in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel,
Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order
of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of
the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that
with his appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to
devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The
denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was
due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It
was likewise noted that the prosecution had already
rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de
parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted
that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the
accused that must be taken seriously into consideration.
In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is
not one of them. What is easily discernible was the
obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio.
Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in
his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much
less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for
him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who
expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The
petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on
October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for
the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental.
Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties.
As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a
case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent

Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently,
on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised
on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of
work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in
the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the
urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de
oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a
crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962,
with the proceedings having started in the municipal
court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus:
"In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging
that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing
in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the
prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to
take the stand, after which the government would rest,
the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel
for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on
October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that
the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order
not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the
accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for
the accused. The defense obtained postponements on
May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9,
1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of
February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the
trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964
at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at
its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight
(8) times, and that the government witnesses have to
come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was
noted in such order that there was no incompatibility
between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the
court and the performance of his task as an election
registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the
ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio,
since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner
was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially
the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding
such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of
repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It
makes even more manifest that law is indeed a
profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a
mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree
of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A
recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v.
Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate
that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law
is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in
its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of
one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration
thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant,
a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio.
The fact that his services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore
that other pressing matters do compete for his
attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance
13
since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford
either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles
Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This
Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those
duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v.
Estebia11reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true
that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that
as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must
exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf
of the person assigned to his care. He is to render
effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of
him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation.
For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the
petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and
reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could
in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was
rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v.
Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be
no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and
it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in
addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this
new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a
member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not
being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he
did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point
though to his responsibility as an election registrar.
Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be
availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the
immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It
may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as
to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in
good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are
times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and

to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-
interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,
JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa
Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to
annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during
the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased
husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed
an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15,
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered
their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On October
5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by
including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his
appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita
who had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm,
wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground that their
client had consulted with him about her case, on which
occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to
Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written
opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion,
Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3,
1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the
case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney
Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above
and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
July 13, 1945.
Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in
connection with civil case No. 70075 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find
that the basic facts which brought about the
controversy between you and the defendant
therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the
property described in the complaint, as the
same was purchased and/or built with funds
exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the
houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal
estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the
property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P.
Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado
without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of
May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion
that your action against Mr. Assad will not
ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to
presume that your husband had the legal right
to dispose of the property as the transfer
certificate of title was in his name. Moreover,
the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes,
as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the
14
annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it
was made during the Japanese occupation, nor
on the simple allegation that the real purchaser
was not a citizen of the Philippines. On his last
point, furthermore, I expect that you will have
great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser
was other than Mr. Assad, considering that
death has already sealed your husband's lips
and he cannot now testify as to the
circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you
that I cannot appear in the proceedings in your
behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me
are herewith returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney
Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate
broker came to his office in connection with the legal
separation of a woman who had been deserted by her
husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a
pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain
Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the
deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian during
the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if
he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should
give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid
even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes;
that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would
have no objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him
about a suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian
to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her
husband had made; that according to her the case was
in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she
wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known
the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to
tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same
reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted
that the basis of her action was not that the money paid
her husband was Japanese military notes, but that the
premises were her private and exclusive property; that
she requested him to read the complaint to be
convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he
then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the
property and she answered yes, in the name of her
husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property
was registered in her husband's favor, her case would
not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office
on Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney Federico
Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in
looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that
Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended
to her and requested her to leave the "expediente"
which she was carrying, and she did; that he told
Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs.
Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling
Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had
said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law
office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which had
been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the
"expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him
(Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request
that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs.
Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he
forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without
keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never
saw Mrs. Hilado since their last meeting until she talked
to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed
extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request
him to handle his case stating that his American lawyer

had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of
other attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on
January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer
Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez
David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed
the complaint. His Honor believed that no information
other than that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in
the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and
concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and
the respondent did not attain the point of creating the
relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this
much is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm
mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his
signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion
was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted
at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting
those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Granting the facts to be no more
than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the
relation of attorney and client between Attorney
Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules
accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet
with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney
and client) a professional one and not merely
one of principal and agent, the attorneys must
be employed either to give advice upon a legal
point, to prosecute or defend an action in court
of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form
such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the
like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep.
(abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or
charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake
the case about which the consultation was had.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney
in his professional capacity with the view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded
established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged
in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client's
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his
client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway
Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the
employment of an attorney. The contract may
be express or implied and it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. An acceptance of the relation is
implied on the part of the attorney from his
acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a
request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see
Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88
A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides
that "an attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e)
of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client." There is
no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting
attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both
15
parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in
the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil.,
258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources
higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly
said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378,
"information so received is sacred to the employment to
which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the
interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the
adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence
which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential
security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no
secret communication was transmitted to him by the
plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should
discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers,
personal and private in character, were turned in by her.
Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the
mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude
the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has
been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's
opponent applies equally even though during
the continuance of the employment nothing of a
confidential nature was revealed to the attorney
by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural
Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney,
representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to
the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much
knowledge the attorney acquired from his
former during that relationship, before refusing
to permit the attorney to represent the adverse
party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286,
F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney
from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the ascertain in detail the
extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the
subsequent litigation on the attorney's
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
as This rule has been so strictly that it has been
held an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client,
he acquired no knowledge which could operate
to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent
adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910],
31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a
great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret
and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.
And the theory would be productive of other un salutary
results. To make the passing of confidential
communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of
the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining
his right to change sides, would not enhance the
freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered,
to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their
rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call
for an investigation of what information the attorney has
received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with
his new position. Litigants would in consequence be
wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn
of the proceedings, if an investigation be held, the court

should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the
facts that came to him. "Now the abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an
evil which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John
H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290,
2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick
for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.;
Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been
said in another case, the question is not necessarily one
of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we
nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the cause of
the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained
legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to
prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above
reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the
bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as
dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that
upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had
the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a
distinguished member, "into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the
purpose of which stems from the realization that the
attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other
side after he has given professional advice to the
opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the
contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to
prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from
the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and
independent fee for consultation and advice was
conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a
preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure
and secure his future services, and induce him to act for
the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being
deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of
receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in
the absence of an express understanding to the
contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the
services contemplated; its payment has no relation to
the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services which he has retained him to perform." (7
C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter
Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take the
trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the
interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he
was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his
firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice
from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and
estop him in the same manner and to the same degree
as if he personally had written it. An information
obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law
firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7
C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary
rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not
only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with the
firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule
is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present
instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of
the firm and carries his initials intended to convey the
impression that it was dictated by him personally. No
16
progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the
client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free
from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if
the prohibition were not extended to the attorney's
partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four
months had passed from the date Attorney Francisco
first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a
waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification. In one
case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was
allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the
judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct
of the cause in the court below the attorney had been
suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We
are all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to
make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to
make it sooner; that professional confidence once
reposed can never be divested by expiration of
professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash.
Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and
not by certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts
have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the
parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The
summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not
confined to requiring them to pay over money collected
by them but embraces authority to compel them to do
whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in
their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from
the general principles of equity and policy, will always
look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and
guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting
from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The
courts acts on the same principles whether the
undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to
appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S.,
1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows
from the facts that they are officers of the court where
they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law
for the administration of justice and as such subject to
the disciplinary authority of the courts and to its orders
and directions with respect to their relations to the court
as well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137
Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorney stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other
court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for
disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered,
without costs.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P.
PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF
MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's
decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against
the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the
protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at
some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
execution of a simple money judgment which
has long become final and executory. Some of
the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far
from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those
who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the
petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N.
Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to
the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the

decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
"professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the
treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and
patient reprobing into the records of the case, however,
we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted
litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our
decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this
adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position
with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner
spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to
be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an
execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed
that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property,
why did they not adopt this position from the very start,
or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso
Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch?
They chose, however, to attack the execution in a
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the
projected execution sale six times. More than eight
years after the finality of the judgment have passed,
and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez
spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the
issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the
execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would,
as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For
instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily
from the scene following the rendition of the
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife,
Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the
controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed
with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil
case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge
Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any
action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta
vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held
that courts of first instance have no power to restrain
acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on
October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously
issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out
the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez
and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which
Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of
the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a
month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in
the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the
writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of
stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez'
judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil
case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to
adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent
motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared
during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent
judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of
execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite
the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court
assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to
recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion
is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
17
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of
injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined
was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now
assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback,
prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time
from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ
of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses
and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of
Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among
others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction
was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal
from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another
"remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he
filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963,
which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to
recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the
reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which
in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for
he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was
merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with
supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
stockholders in the Republic Bank. 1 As a matter of fact,
when the motion was set for hearing on December 21,
1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
produce the said cash dividends within five days, but
the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the
respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said
motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to
the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of
the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the
case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners
acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the
enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407."
From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached
by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of
"remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a
simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they
ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy
had been exhausted, they interposed another until the
case reached this Court for the second time. 3
Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one
member of this Court are persuaded that justice was
practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court
sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as
the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of
execution, the validity and regularity of which
are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is
not the recall of the writ, but an independent
action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be
established as a basis for the subsequent
issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event
of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course
of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had
already availed of this remedy in civil cases
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction
of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that
the said cases could not be branded as having been
instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in
the above-quoted statement must not be considered out
 18

of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of
already availed of the suggested remedy only in the execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas &
of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their that the said urgent motion is the same motion
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by
execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the injunction issued in civil case 7532.
"proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is
writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified
Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N.
Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble
were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have costs assessed against the petitioners.
jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are
without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial
jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5
However, the recall and the denial of the writs of LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTERS 8 TO SOCIETY
preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did (CANONS 1-6)
not amount to the termination or dismissal of the
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they
vs.
could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she
DECISION
instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall
PER CURIAM:
writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002
on the same grounds which she advanced in the former
a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the Integrated Bar
case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil
(CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the
Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
same when they instituted the herein petition
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20,
(complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
1964, with the consent of the parties because of the
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann")
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
condemned."
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to
you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
be commended; what we do not and cannot
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
home very late at night or early in the morning of the
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
following day, and sometimes did not go home from
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
replied that she slept at her parents' house in
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
respondent together on two occasions. On the second
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
abandoned the conjugal house.
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
birthday celebration at which he saw her and
primacy is indisputable.
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have
of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
several counsel in this case but the participation of each
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went
counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of
to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the
against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
household appliances.
counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a
singular or plural in construction, so that when we said
folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
"counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate
letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to
delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic
Irene, reading:
civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had
My everdearest Irene,
rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments
1962. And it is on record that the movants are such
away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission,
prayer for you that you may find meaning in
"entered his appearance in the case at bar about the
what you're about to do.
time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only
petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or
for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims
but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October,
bigger plan for the two of us?
1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case
I hope that you have experienced true
No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
happiness with me. I have done everything
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears

humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you
from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of
your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I
have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my
heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL
ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS.
AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL
BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she
was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I
LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING
THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance,
in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All
You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong
City. Their attendance was reported in Section B
of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as
Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their
adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene
as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the
complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning
or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage,
calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her
wedding, vowing to continue his love for her
"until we are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the
19
bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as
his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial
and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in
public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece
of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the
marriage between Complainant and Irene as a
piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT
reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to
support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable
social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs
afoul of the Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In
pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution
of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up
the complainant's marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal
and low profile special relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a
REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the
girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing
Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was
born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH
MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed
by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to
Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD,
complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-
examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended 19 that respondent
be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set
aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for
lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for
lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the
original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this
Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the
Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting
aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit,
gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present
petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD
Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated
October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not sufficiently prove
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainant's wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated
17 October 2002, respondent through
counsel made the following statements to
wit: "Respondent specifically denies having
[ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and
known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent
specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low
profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his
Answer are an admission that there is
indeed a "special" relationship between
him and complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth
of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the
father of the child. Given the fact that the
20
respondent admitted his special relationship
with Irene there is no reason to believe that
Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity
of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically
denied that he is the father of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised
Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship,
he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative
pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it
in affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held
that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having
"personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38
years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT
MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on
"DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the
signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate 29 shows that they
were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the
child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's
Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which
he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene
gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that
the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala,"
who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between
respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence – that
evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 – which is
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not
lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A

member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign
court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances. 34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the
grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall
keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married
man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not
his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on
the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does
not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which
act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that
the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals
of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable
under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of
whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case substantiate
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
21
indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he
took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in
the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution andobey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article
XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No.
209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of
the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for
nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been
granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,"
which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on
motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004
granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed
before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular
No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal,
the petitioner may withdraw the same at any
time before it is finally resolved, in which case
the appealed resolution shall stand as
though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was
declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should
be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage

with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect
for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review
before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003
Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's
complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced
by complainant would, in the fair estimation of
the Department, sufficiently establish all the
elements of the offense of adultery on the part
of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that
she was going out on dates with respondent
Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls
and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala
never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala)
himself was married to another woman.
Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once
more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more
apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No.
71-B, 11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City, which
was a few blocks away from the church where
she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers
apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's
vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live
in the said address whereas Eala asserts that
that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for
the firm that both had formed smacks too much
of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was
where Moje stayed all throughout after her
separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit
affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at
the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information
that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents
Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father
of the child Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent
and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if
the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the
criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
22
which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this
Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely diferent capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in
the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No.
XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala,
is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of
his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules
1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton
("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against
Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay")
and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed
a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11,
1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the
following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time
resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don
Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a
U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name – agreed that
the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton,
requested me to prepare several documents
that would guarantee recognition of him being
the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others,
the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr.
Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property
for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a
loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing
the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that
Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real
property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct
and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant

prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier
to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent
claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s
counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in
the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent
admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness
and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"),
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San
Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San
Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the
Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded
the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that
he was already 76 years old and would already retire by
2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also
said that his practice of law is his only means of support
for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied
the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no
more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already
been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon
1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to
any client which will involve defiance of the laws which
he is bound to uphold and obey. 9 A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a
U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused
the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly
rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including
the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite
its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent
advised and aided Stier in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus,
he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such
an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he
may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was
suspended from the practice of law for three years for
preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to
commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent
Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law
for one year for preparing a contract which declared the
spouses to be single again after nine years of separation
23
and allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective
upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of
marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family. 1 It is
this inviolability which is central to our traditional and
religious concepts of morality and provides the very
bedrock on which our society finds stability. 2 Marriage is
immutable and when both spouses give their consent to
enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged
even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the
marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the
"permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the
Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family
Code is the justification. 3 Where it applies and is duly
proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from
the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code requires the application of procedural
and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these
requirements mostly devolves upon petitioner, the State
is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the
procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State
with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the
case to the lower court for proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court 4 is an appeal from a decision of
the Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City6 dismissing
petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter
"Florence") petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
due to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and
engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin
(hereafter "Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married
at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. 7
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for
"declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp. 8 Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's
petition.9
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial
court a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. 10
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant." 11
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.12
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 13
Hence, this appeal.14
The Court's Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jose Danilo C. Jabson15 filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he
found no collusion between the parties, 16 he did not
actively participate therein. Other than entering his
appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing
more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding
Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute
to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).
"In the cases referred to in the preceding
paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed
the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e.,
dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence,
the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the
following pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, 17 briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095 (italics ours)."18
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case not just at
the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as
well. Other than the "manifestation" filed with the trial
court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any
pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the
proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias
Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the marriage,
we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial
court as "prematurely rendered" since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual
disputes of the case, this being within the province of
the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus:
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code are as follows (omitting guideline [8] in the
enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional
24
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the

decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig
City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper
trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be
denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent
had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth
attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and
1968. Before be could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child
out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent
did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before
Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as
escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the
1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual
congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their
intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he
would marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly
made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage.
He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended
in 1971, when she learned that respondent married
another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the
taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972.
On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's
failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
comment required and that she remains interested in
the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a
motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed
by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's
third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo
from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as
well as the length of time this case has been pending as
reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon
payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November
17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant's
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the
dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's
oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia
25
Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant
because mere intimacy between a man and a woman,
both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the
part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose
sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not
find complainant's assertions that she had been forced
into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see
and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given
birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have sexual congress with him.
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate
a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should
be entered into because of love, not for any other
reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act
of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving
to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into.
Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble,
the twenty-six years that respondent has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to
be no other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent,
who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado,
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa
Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on
the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He
was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in
the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he
became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who
represented to him that she was a widow. They had
carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born
on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan
(Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1,
1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil
ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious
ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto.
Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In
the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of
the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his
mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in
his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he
has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband.
After much patient investigation and surveillance, she
discovered that he was living and cohabiting with
Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo
Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband
and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their
housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and
Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94
Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their
testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan
introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn
Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay
list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the
apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She
Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with
Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He
admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix
Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving
financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress
and the plumber. He claims that they were paid
witnesses. He declared that he did not live with
Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained
to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure
the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her
absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to
Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor
General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He
waived the presentation of additional evidence. His
lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the
complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has
proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous
relations with a married woman separated from her own
husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of
his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations
with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within
"that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community"
(7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608,
August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member
of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
26
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court
a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member
of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his
answer, the respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25,
Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3,
1958, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman
Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by
her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel,
cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The
respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual
intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A.
Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint,
formally charging respondent with immorality. The
complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when
complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent
Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the
said respondent invited the complainant to
attend a movie but on their way the respondent
told the complainant that they take refreshment
before going to the Lyric Theater; that they
proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R.
Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on
the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,
respondent proposed to complainant that they
go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by
love of respondent and the respondent's
promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced,
and before they entered the hotel room
respondent registered and signed the registry
book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after
registering at the hotel, respondent shoved
complainant inside the room; that as soon as
they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to
the bed and undressed himself; that
complainant begged respondent not to molest
her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway
I have promised to marry you'; and respondent,
still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his
overtures of love, again assured complainant
that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that
I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent
pulled complainant to the bed, removed her
panty, and then placed himself on top of her and
held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that
when respondent was already on top of
complainant the latter had no other recourse but
to submit to respondent's demand and two (2)
sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock
until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they
left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party
together; that after the sexual act with
complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but
complainant refused telling that they had better
wait until they were married; that after their said
sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that
she was already on the family way, complainant
repeatedly implored respondent to comply with
his promise of marriage but respondent refused
to comply; that on February 20, 1959,
complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal
knowledge with the complainant through a

promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and
has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute
a conduct which shows that respondent is
devoid of the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of and
must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the
respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on
May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on
June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to
the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse
with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off, following a
quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to
practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had
the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20,
1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.
Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the
case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his
answer his intention to present additional evidence in
his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present
such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266,
April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the
Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent
had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-
examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this
Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the
facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a
public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon
Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The
hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and
Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at
that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at
7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent
on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga
City. When she learned that respondent had left for
Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in
August of that year telling him that she was in trouble.
Again she wrote him a letter in September and another
one in October of the same year, telling him that she
was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving
no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga
City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent
and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in
July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that
complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the
complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20,
1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate
issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
a certificate of admission of complainant to the
Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical
records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the
respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified
that she gave money to the respondent whenever he
asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony
of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E)
27
shows that he used to ask for money from the
complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant
was subjected by the respondent himself failed to
discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General,
the respondent averred that he and complainant were
sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that
they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is
established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness
of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh.
E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255,
t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630,
December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission
to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court,
now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of law, it is essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April
30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that
he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her
on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to
show where he was on that date. In the case of United
States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking
for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly
indeed if he demand and expect that same full
and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the
very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not
fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in
section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is
already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of
the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers can not be restricted. Times
without number, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In
re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm.
Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs.
Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53
O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral
conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or
disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the
respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and
has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental

ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that
members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the
highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar
against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor
and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby
disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24
December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar
with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the
complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and
of the complaint by moving from one place to another,
such that he could not be found nor reached in his
alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April
1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent's success in evading service of the
complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon
resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from
the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his
answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an
Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension
Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had
contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on
14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was
single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was
married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in
1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her
private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the
son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his
marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason
Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted
that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as
evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained
that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla,
she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid
risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be
in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she
had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan
Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay
for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her
pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or
Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed
investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both
28
parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared
and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent
did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor
scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986,
where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant;
respondent once again did not appear despite notice to
do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and
rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for
2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to
appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered
respondent to have waived his right to present evidence
and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective
memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8
December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his
memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this
Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the
witness stand and testified substantially
as follows: she and respondent met for
the first time in 1979 as fourth year high
school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was
then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single (id.); respondent
was aware of her marital status (ibid, p.
14); it was then that respondent started
courting her but nothing happened of
the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they
[complainant and respondent] moved to
Manila were they respectively pursued
their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent
continued courting her, this time with
more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she
decided nothing would come of it since
she was married but he [respondent]
explained to her that their marriage was
void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her
mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him
[respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their
marriage license, despite her
[complainant's] objection, he
[respondent] wrote "single" as her
status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was
no need to go to court to declare it as
such (ibid, 14-15); they were married
before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City
Court of Manila on June 14, 1977
(Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17);
Jason Terre was born of their union on
June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7,
1986, p. 18); all through their married
state up to the time he [respondent]
disappeared in 1981, complainant
supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was
unaware of the reason for his
disappearance until she found out later
that respondent married a certain Vilma
[sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case
for abandonment of minor with the City
Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which
was subsequently filed before Branch II
of the City Court of Pasay City as
Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D;
tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise

filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and Helina Malicdem with
the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, where a prima facie case
was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7,
pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant
filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on
Audit where he was employed, which
case however was considered closed for
being moot and academic when
respondent was considered
automatically separated from the
service for having gone on absence
without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July
7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant
Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted
marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares.
There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May
1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem
in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by
claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and
void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration
of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as
to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended
defense is the same argument by which he had
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior
marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and
void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a
second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known
that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract
a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even
if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan
Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his
own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that
his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was
deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As
noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that
she was still legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their
marriage, respondent went through law school while
being supported by complainant, with some assistance
from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for
delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that
respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member
of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the
purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a
petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of
the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to
meet the standard of moral fitness for
29
membership in the legal profession.
Whether the marriage was a joke as
respondent claims, or a trick played on
her as claimed by complainant, it does
not speak well of respondent's moral
values. Respondent had made a
mockery of marriage, a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes
and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent
there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he
made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as
he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a
secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent
Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him
and supported him through law school, leaving her
without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem
while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission
to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this
error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent
Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on
the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May
1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador
F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member
of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in
its Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred the
Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report
and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor
General on 17 February 1988, only respondent and his
counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had
not been duly served with notice of the hearing. The
hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset
to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon
failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the
Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor
General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for
investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated
18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for
hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both
complainant and respondent to submit additional copies
of their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9
September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988
because only complainant appeared, respondent having
failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The
hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20
October 1988 because neither complainant nor her
counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was
once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only

complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14
November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times,
first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January
1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission,
upon the unexplained failure of respondent to appear at
the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to
make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter
submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly
received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989.
On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her
exhibits as follows:
1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan
Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as
shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict
Laguitan.
Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the
child as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel
Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a
baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's
Hospital and for which respondent paid the bills for the
hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of
doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino
Medical Clinic.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave
birth to a baby boy at said clinic and for which
respondent paid the bill for hospitalization, medicines
and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L.
Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his
paternity of the children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing
respondent either singly or with the rest of the family
during happier times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and
respondent really lived together as husband and wife
and begot two children and the respondent admits these
through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L.
Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was
supporting the schooling of the children as he himself
signed the correspondence and was marked as Exh. 'G-
2-A'. 1
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors submitted to us its
findings and recommendation, which may be summed
up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent
Tinio met each other and in time became lovers.
Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband
and wife. As a result, complainant bore respondent two
(2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and
Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the
course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that
respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted
marriage with someone else and that the prior marriage
was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued
living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10) years
later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were
abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling
helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of
respondent's parents in supporting her children who
were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave
her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting
that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP
Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his
illicit relationship with complainant and his having
begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the
Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate
children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with
the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board
recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from
the practice of law "not for having cohabited with the
30
complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate
children," the suspension to remain in effect until
respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be
suspended from the practice of law but not merely
because he has failed in his obligation to support the
children complainant bore him but also because for a
prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with
complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the
requirement of good moral character that is required for
the continued right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine Bar, 2Concubinage imports moral turpitude
and entails a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting the suspension upon evidence
satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that
respondent is supporting or has made provision for the
support of his illegitimate children and that he has given
up his immoral course of conduct.
[A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000]
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE
O. ALOVERA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces
disbarment for having penned a Decision [1] dated
January 30, 1995 long after his retirement from the
Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested
complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay,
Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of
the Bar Confidant on April 21, 1997, [3]complainant
sought the disbarment of respondent enumerating the
following particulars to support her contention that the
questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared
after the retirement of respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge
Alovera prior to his retirement bear the
stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-
Roxas City, with the initial of the one who
received it for filing with the court-record
except the Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87
records) admitting, and the Decision dated
January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued
prior to the retirement were all type-written
in the same type-[writer] except the
January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the
Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2)
documents appear to have been type-
written on the same type-[writer].
c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs
formally offered their evidence one year
after the last witness was presented last
December 10, 1993.
Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer
their evidence but it took them one (1) year and five (5)
days to file such a simple pleading. It goes against the
normal human experience when plaintiffs who are
allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very
quick in having things done because there is no
opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs a while to
formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days prior to
the retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing is highly
suspect.
d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence
showed badges of fraud. It was not
received by the trial court. Page 67 shows
this clearly. It would not be surprising if the
same was also inserted into the records on
a much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz
must be made to explain this too.

It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz,
counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on January 31,
1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the records.
e) There is no showing that the January 25,
1995 Order (p. 87) admitting the formal
offer was even received by a Court staff for
filing with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30,
1995 Decision (pp. 88-93) which was
allegedly decided five (5) days after the
Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) was
allegedly issued. What a swift action from a
retiring judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to
the counsel for the plaintiffs but is shown to
have been received by one of the plaintiffs
only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience
for a lawyer such as Atty. Villaruz who is a
practitioner in the locality and who is in
Court almost everyday that he will not
follow up if there is already a decision
rendered in a case where he was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte or even be told
about it.
i) The records show that all orders after the
retirement of Mr. Alovera bear the stamp
"RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received
them for filing in the court records.
Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint
as purely speculative and not based on personal
knowledge, the respondent, in his Comment [4] dated
August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply self-serving
complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful
scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186
would reveal that respondent observed due process
when he resolved the said case against complainant. [5] It
was only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in
RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a resolution,
the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which
ostensibly having become final was also executed, did
the matter get out of hand.[6]His said decision,
respondent argued, may only be impeached, annulled or
otherwise set aside under three (3) modes, [7] all of which
were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of
time, or like an action to annul the judgment, though
still available, should not have been filed in the same
court, which rendered the questioned decision, but
should have been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals.
[8]
As to the absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the
questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame to
the then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita
Aluad, contending that after the decision was rendered
on January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and he
surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive
and record the decision, might have lost it
"momentarily."[9]
In a Resolution [10] dated October 22, 1997, this
Court referred the instant case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation. While in the process of investigation,
three (3) incidents occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Capiz Chapter, approved Resolution No. 9,
Series of 1997 on December 17, 1997,
questioning the order, dated November 28,
1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17,
Roxas City, which ordered the suspension
from the practice of law of herein
respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of
December 22, 1997, resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R.
No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A.
Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela,"
ordering the respondent judge therein to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or
implementing his questioned order dated
31
November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-
6186, which ordered the suspension of Atty.
Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court,
entitled "Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-
Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela," under
G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was
still pending, questioning the Order of
November 28, 1997 which ordered
respondent's suspension from the practice
of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation [11] by
the Office of the Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998,
inquiring from the Court whether to proceed with the
investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned
incidents.
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office
of the Bar Confidant to proceed with the investigation of
the instant case.[12]
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal
researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer,
Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and
special proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17,
Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of Regional
Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the complainant
herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs.
Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the January 10,
1993 proceedings inside his chambers. Respondent
himself did not testify and neither did any other witness
testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who
both failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their
oral testimonies, respondent offered and presented their
respective affidavits.[13] Complainant chose not to object
thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel,
to cross-examine them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report
dated November 17, 1999 of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, are as follows:
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres,
Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria
Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs")
through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an
action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15,
Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V.
Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late
Faustina Borres. The action sought, among others, the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in
the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of
land with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in
Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of
land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186
was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default
and ordered the Borres heirs to present their evidence
on July 30, 1993.[14]
It was only after three (3) postponements that the
Borres heirs were able to start presenting their evidence
ex-parte on October 8, 1993. For lack of material time,
however, the presentation of evidence was again reset
to November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and
reset to December 10, 1993.[15]
On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and
civil actions scheduled for trial, which commenced at
about 10:00 in the morning, before Br. 17, including Civil
Case No. V-6186, which was listed number four in the
court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing
and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17,
took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz
appeared for the accused in a criminal case [16] before Br.
17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and
resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the hearing of
criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was
called at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs
as well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer
inside the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at

11:57 in the morning without Civil Case No. V-6186
being heard.[17]
At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty.
Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court
stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City,
while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that
Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the
proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was
hesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its
own court stenographer. She relented though when told
that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no
available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17
and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the
chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned her
to enter the chambers, which is separate from the
courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge
Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she did
not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the
stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty. Villaruz to start
the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by
Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to
be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called. At that instant Judge
Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just
continue," and then went out of the chambers. [18] Judge
Alovera would occasionally return to the chambers in
the course of the proceedings, but he would just sit
down and listen while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his
direct examination of the witness and presenting
documentary evidence. [19] The proceedings lasted up to
12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making only
two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he
made at the end when he ordered the plaintiffs to file
their written offer of evidence on January 20, 1994.[20]
From this point on, complainant would establish how the
January 30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case
No. V-6186 came about.
Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31,
1995, or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated
his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC
Branch Clerk of Court.[21] As part of her functions as such
OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would
first be received by her from the judge, and would
stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of
receipt as well as her initial or signature. [22] This is in
accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. [23]
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon,
court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to
type the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge
Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it,
Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to
decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft
decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as
Judge Alovera was dictating it.[24]
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired
Judge Alovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman,
later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186,
behind him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he
uttered to the latter, "Receive this, receive this, "
referring to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision,
which he was holding. As he spread the decision on her
table, he continued, "Because I will defend you even up
to the Plaza Miranda. And give copies to these
two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at his back.
[25]
Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would
not receive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and
she did not argue with him anymore so as not to
embarrass him for being her former superior. [26] She then
went out of the office while retired Judge Alovera, as
well as the two plaintiffs were still inside. [27] At about the
same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee
of Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and
special proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside
the office of Br. 17 while trying to have her co-
employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody,
however, received the same because it was already
seven (7) months after his retirement. [28] A little later,
she found the questioned decision, together with the
formal offer of exhibits of January 20, 1995 and the
order of January 25, 1995, on the top of her table.
Although she noticed that these records were not
stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, she
32
went on to attach the said records to the expediente of
Civil Case No. V-6186. [29] She even gave a copy of the
questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo
Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was received for him
by Ireneo Borres.[30] After keeping the expediente,she
then entered the questioned decision in her logbook. [31]
The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned
decision executed when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee
of the property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case
No. V-6186, surrendered possession of the said property
in favor of the Borres heirs,[32] Said transfer of
possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution
issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding
Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of
Court Susan Mendoza Arce.[33]
Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan
together with his husband who is employed at the
Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what
happened to her property in Panay, Capiz. [34] She was
thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, which
resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a
Petition for Relief from Order, questioning the January
30, 1995 decision and the January 19, 1996 Writ of
Execution.[35] She also prayed "that disciplinary and
contempt proceedings be taken against those involved
in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the
administration of justice."[36]
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-
6186 as he was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at
the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order.
[37]
In the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed
that the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly filed by the
plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995,
while the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was
issued on January 31, 1995. He concluded then that the
said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995.
When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused
to answer and just kept quiet.[38] He likewise observed
that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186
submitting the same for decision, except for the order
made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during
the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers, where
he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer
of exhibits.[39] Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes
during the said proceedings and who was not a member
of the staff of Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on the
records as the official stenographer in the course
thereof.[40] Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997,
Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by
complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the
possession of the property in question. In the same
resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995
decision null and void, the same not being filed with the
clerk of court and not properly rendered in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court.[41]
Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous
proceedings, coupled with the prayer of complainant in
her petition for relief "that disciplinary and contempt
proceedings be taken against those involved in the
perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of
justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the
said anomaly.[42] After considering the testimonies of
Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the
investigation, together with the documentary evidence
presented, he concluded, thus:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances the
following facts are established that:
1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on
December 10, 1993. What transpired was a
mock or simulated trial inside the chamber
of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto
Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat,
a court stenographer from another court,
were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17
court personnel were present as there was
actual court session in open court going on
at that time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were
with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained

with him even after his retirement on
January 31, 1995. He did not return the
record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court
Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned
up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together
with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz
dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order"
dated January 25, 1995, after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer
and the Order admitting the exhibits were
not properly filed and do not bear markings
of having been received by the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera,
though dated January 30, 1995, was filed
with the court on August 1, 1995 by former
Judge Alovera himself and because he was
no longer a judge his submission was
refused.
- CONCLUSIONS -
The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though
dated January 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR No.
issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the
pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty.
Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or
any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could
have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later.
Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated
January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have
been made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer
of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge
Alovera dated January 30, 1995.
xxx xxx xxx
The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were
made after the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no
longer a judge.
The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera
constitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave
misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from
the practice of law and ultimately their disbarment. [43]
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant
recommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring
that it found more than sufficient evidence to sustain
complainant's charge against respondent that, indeed,
the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186,
which divested complainant of her property in Panay,
Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirement
from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.
This Court finds the recommendation of the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken. Respondent has
thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and
legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable
fraternity of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has
forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once
again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to
its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's
cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation
voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
33
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in
solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit
of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law[44] to be forgotten afterwards nor is it
mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all
times.[45] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the particular
provisions of which are applicable to the case at bar,
provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the
vanguard of our legal system. When respondent took
the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a
solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. [46] In this
covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V.
Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on
how respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner
in having the questioned decision dated January 30,
1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution
divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent
gravely abused his relationship with his former staff,
pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a
judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an
officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts and
not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to
all and sundry.[47] In so doing, he made a mockery of the
judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and
lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its
demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of
law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice - a vital function of
democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer
must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority [48] for there is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a
high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.
[49]
Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent
to present substantial defense to refute the charges
against him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a

valid explanation. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.[50]
Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing
in this case, the Court finds as appropriate the
recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant
in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the respondent
brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and
calls for the severance of respondents privilege to
practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is
hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys
and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ADMIN. CASE No. 3637 January 24, 2001
RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC. Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA, Respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this
Court the instant complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and
gross misconduct on the part of the latter. The
complaint alleges as follows:
1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent
executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the
complainant over a parcel of land located in the
Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T -
55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the
registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and
Oscar D. Granada. A copy of this Real Estate
Mortgage is herewith attached as - Annex
"A". 1âwphi1.nêt
2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate
Mortgage the respondent submitted a Special
Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was
purportedly authorized and empowered by the
registered owners Pedro Torres and Oscar D.
Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of
land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this
Special Power of Attorney is herewith attached
as Annex "B".
3. That on the security of, among others, the
aforesaid parcel of land over which the
respondent represented that he is authorized to
mortgage, complainant extended and released a
loan to the respondent in the amount of
P91,427.00.
4. That complainant subsequently and much
later learned that the respondent was not at all
authorized and empowered by the registered
owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the
aforesaid parcel of land when it was joined as a
defendant in a complaint filed by the aforesaid
Oscar D. Granada for removal of cloud on title
with preliminary injunction and damages. A copy
of this complaint is herewith attached as Annex
"C".
5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in
the hearing conducted in connection therewith
Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically
denied having executed and signed the Special
Power of Attorney, Annex B, submitted by the
respondent to the complainant in support of his
application for a loan.
6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 60, was subsequently decided against
the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court
found that the Special Power of Attorney, Annex
B, was indeed forged and falsified because the
spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L. Granada
have not signed the same and wherein the Court
also made the finding that the defendant,
considering that he has benefited from the said,
falsified document, is presumed to have a hand
34
in the preparation of the same. A copy of this
Decision is herewith attached as Annex "D".
7. That the respondent has not appealed from
the aforesaid Decision thereby making the
findings of fact made therein final as against
him.
8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in
presenting to the complainant Bank a forged
and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose
of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a
lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his
conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue
further in the practice of law .1
Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his
comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross
misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing
any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from
complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did
not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the
special power of attorney appointing him (respondent)
as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of
attorney purportedly authorized respondent to
mortgage the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental
in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also
claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he
was not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:
Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto
H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of
the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet
considering that he actually benefited from the
said falsified documents, he is presumed to
have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-
annex "D".)2
Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from
complainant rural bank without depriving it of the
opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well
as to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of
attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus,
respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances,
it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross
misconduct against complainant rural bank.
After receipt of respondent's comment, the Court
referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced
their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the
matter was resolved on the basis of their respective
pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From these
pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted
facts:
Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a
certain Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by
virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent
applied for a loan and concomitantly executed a
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the
complainant bank covering the property of
Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada. With such
security, complainant extended to the
respondent his loan in the amount of
P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the
respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged
property was foreclosed by the complainant
bank. Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered
owner of the mortgaged property filed a
complaint against the respondent and the
complainant for the annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney.
After the trial, the court declared null and void
the said Special Power of Attorney as well as the
Real Estate Mortgage for being products of
forgery. This decision was not appealed by the
defendants.
There is no showing that respondent, despite
the adverse decision, returned or offered to
return the money he took from the complainant
bank. The bank then instituted this disbarment
proceeding against the respondent. 3
The IBP found from the above facts that respondent
violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:

This office believes that the actuation of the
respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as
a lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in
this proceeding.
As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C,
entitled "Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L.
Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al", the plaintiffs
Granada spouses have not signed the
questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of
the respondent and the said spouses' signatures
as appearing in the Special Power of Attorney
are not their true and genuine signatures for
actually they have not executed nor granted a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein
respondent authorizing him to mortgage the
one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the
mortgaged property. The trial court stressed
that:
"...Although there is no showing that
Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually
falsified the signatures of the spouses,
Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering
that he actually benefited from the said
falsified documents, he is presumed to
have a hand on the same.
Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in
fact he admitted that he notarized the
said documents, Exhibit "A" and "B" with
the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the
signatures appearing in the said
documents were the signatures of Atty.
Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres,
registered owners of the property in
question."
Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the
questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the
respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:
"Q Now, compañero, will you please relate to
this Honorable Court the circumstances under
which you notarized this Special Power of
Attorney now marked as Exh. "A" on April 21,
1975?
"A Yes, sir. I remember that on that same
day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H.
Pilla personally appeared before me and he
brought along with him this Special Power of
Attorney executed in his favor. He told me to
notarize it. I asked him about the signature of
Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature
and he said "Yes". I also asked him about the
signature of the other principal and he said also
"yes". With that assurance and being a brother
lawyer I accommodated him. Knowing that he
will not do anything that is illegal and I have
confidence in him considering that he is a
lawyer and he knows what he was doing, I
accommodated him."
(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil
Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental)
If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the
falsification of the Special Power of Attorney,
why did he not explain before the trial court or
before this office the circumstances on how he
obtained the same. He did not even bother to
identify his alleged client who provided him the
forged Special Power of Attorney. Instead,
respondent is banking on his defense that the
complainant bank has not introduced any
evidence to prove that he forged the Special
Power of Attorney. He relied on the argument
that his transaction with the complainant bank
was purely commercial business and did not
involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is
true that the respondent maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity as he asserted,
why did he represent before the notary public
that the signatures appearing in the Special
Power of Attorney were the signatures of the
35
real owners if he was not actually aware that the
signatures were that of the real owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the
respondent is misrepresentation constituting
gross misconduct at the very least. This is a
violation of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood
to no man.4
In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-
00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors,
substantially adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but
modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as follows:
...to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, said recommendation
is with modification that Respondent
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for THREE (3) years for misrepresentation.5
We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case
No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from the
falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in
the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably
failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced
denial that he had no knowledge of the forgery. The
Court cannot give credence to respondent's negative
assertion that he did not know that the special power of
attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer,
respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a
public document must personally appear before the
notary public to attest that the same is their own free
act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement,
respondent caused the special power of attorney to be
notarized without the parties appearing before the
notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the
same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan
therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a
hand in the falsification of the document especially
considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it.
Indeed, "the settled rule is that in he absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and
who used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification."6 Further, "if a person had in his
possession a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
the clear presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification."7
Respondent's acts clearly fall short of the standards set
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." The fact that the conduct pertained to
respondent's private dealings with complainant rural
bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.8 Possession of good moral character is not
only a good condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.9
Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the
IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years is approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty.
Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct. He is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its
finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal

record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999
(A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as
well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty.
Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), 1 in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that
sometime in November, 1992, she was referred
to the respondent who promised to process all
necessary documents required for complainant's
trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a
partial payment of the required fee in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which
was received by Ester Calis, wife of the
respondent for which a receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994
complainant had several conferences with the
respondent regarding the processing of her travel
documents. To facilitate the processing,
respondent demanded an additional amount of
Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and
prevailed upon complainant to resign from her
job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of
her travel documents complainant issued
Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524
in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued
a receipt. After receipt of said amount,
respondent furnished the complainant copies of
Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa
Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which
would be asked during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport,
Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be
assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to
Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of
Matiao Marketing, Inc. The complainant was
furnished documents to support her assumed
identity.1âwphi1.nêt
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious
documents, the complainant demanded the
return of her money, however she was assured
by respondent that there was nothing to worry
about for he has been engaged in the business
for quite sometime; with the promise that her
money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent
demanded for the payment of the required fee
which was paid by complainant, but the
corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport,
respondent assured the complainant that it will
be given to her on her departure which was
scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date
complainant was given her passport and visa
issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer.
Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and
a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the
respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International
Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo
and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore
Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel
documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and
36
informed him of by her predicament. From
September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was
detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was
deported back to the Philippines and respondent
fetched her from the airport and brought her to
his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took
complainant's passport with a promise that he
will secure new travel documents for
complainant. Since complainant opted not to
pursue with her travel, she demanded for the
return of her money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996
respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00;
P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through
counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for
the refund of a remaining balance of One
Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00)
which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went
to see the respondent, however his wife informed
her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to
business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see
the respondent however she found out that the
respondent had transferred to an unknown
residence apparently with intentions to evade
responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of
receipts for the amount paid by complainant,
applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and
answers asked during interviews; receipts
acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the
complainant together with demand letter for the
remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was
received by the respondent. 2
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring
an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was
no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the
scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance
whatsoever was made by the respondent. 3 As a result
of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the
respondent to comply with the orders of the
Commission, the investigation against him
proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar
Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent
was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa
for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no
mention of job placement or employment
abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to
secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under
an assumed name was accepted by the
complainant which negates deceit on the part of
the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial
refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid
by the complainant. However, the transfer of
residence without a forwarding address
indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended
that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as
a member of the bar until he fully refunds the
fees paid to him by complainant and comply
with the order of the Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6, of the
Rules of Court. 4
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board

of Governors for review. The Board in a
Resolution 5 dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt
and approve with amendment the recommendation of
the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo
Calis be DISBARRED for having been found
guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the
IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the
records in this case, we find the Resolution passed by
the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree
with the finding of the Commission that the charge of
illegal recruitment was not established because
complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the
matter. In fact she did not mention any particular job or
employment promised to her by the respondent. The
only service of the respondent mentioned by the
complainant was that of securing a visa for the United
States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could
give her visa and travel documents; that despite
spurious documents nothing untoward would happen;
that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even
promised to refund her the fees and expenses already
paid, in case something went wrong. All for material
gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are
disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in
a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's
relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is
the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 6 The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he
should be a person of good moral character. 7 This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. 8 We have
sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the
Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law. 9
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly
jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he
made her travel with spurious documents. How often
have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal
recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because
they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent
totally disregarded the personal safety of the
complainant when he sent her abroad on false
assurances. Not only are respondent's acts illegal, they
are also detestable from the moral point of view. His
utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat
to the Bar and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. 10 We must stress that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He
can be deprived of his license for misconduct
37
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
giving him the opportunity to be heard. 11
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of
respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his
total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are
contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct.
Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent
Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his
unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct
toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the
recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is
in order. 12 Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to
return the complainant's money upon demand, but he
stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the
hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the personal records of respondent.
Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the
complainant immediately the amount of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing
the amount he collected from her.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE No. 5252 May 20, 2004
PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged
respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross misconduct
and as being unfit to continue his membership in the
Bar. In a three-page complaint-affidavit complainant
averred that respondent obtained a loan from the former
and, to secure the repayment thereof, drew and issued
two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first check (No.
0350973) was presented for payment upon maturity,
the same was dishonored for insufficient funds.
According to complainant, respondent, acting with
malice and deceit, dated the second check "January 24,
1996," so that, once presented for payment, it would be,
considering, in passing, that the loan was incurred on 23
November 1996, a stale check. She alleged that, despite
repeated verbal and written demands, respondent had
failed to make good his obligation.
Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent
to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. In
a letter, dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked
that the complaint be now considered submitted for
resolution in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply
with the order of the Court requiring him to file his
comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the
Court noted the letter of complainant, and it directed
that the complaint be thereby referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file
his answer to the complaint, respondent continued to
ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case
was set for hearing by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. The complainant appeared. Respondent did
not show up despite his having been duly notified of the
hearing by personal service effected on 12 February
2002. Respondent’s failure to appear prompted the
Commission on Bar Discipline to grant the request of
complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte.
An order was issued setting the proceedings on 18
March 2002 for such reception of evidence. A copy of
the order was served on respondent on 28 February
2002 at his given address.
On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter
from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of PTT,
requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March
to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was already
committed to attend a hearing at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20 March 2002.
The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception
of complainant’s evidence ex-parte was held, but the

same was without loss of right on the part of respondent
to conduct, if desired, a cross-examination of the
witness. The evidence of complainant showed that
complainant used to avail of the notarial services of Atty.
Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In
1995, respondent requested complainant, and the latter
agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the baptismal of
his daughter. In November 1996, respondent
accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence
of complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent
the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at 5% a
month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank
Checks No. 35073 and No. 35076, each for P31,800.00,
dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996,
respectively. When presented for collection Check No.
035073 was dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. The other check,
Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24 January 1996,
was not accepted for being a stale check.
Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent
but her efforts proved to be futile. Several demand
letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto
Jacinto, complainant’s lawyer, but these letters also
failed to elicit any response. A criminal complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No.
035073. Finding probable cause, the complaint was
subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A
warrant of arrest was issued by the court, but
respondent somehow succeeded in evading
apprehension. Sometime in November 2000, respondent
went to the house of complainant and promised to pay
the checks within a month’s time. Complainant agreed
to have the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but,
again, respondent failed to make good his promise.
The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was
set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer was directed to
transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as possible
for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An order was issued to this
effect, and a copy thereof was served upon respondent
on 09 April 2002.
On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-
examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear despite due
notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant that
she had no other witness to present and was ready to
close her evidence, she was given a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file a formal offer and
respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit
his comment and/or opposition thereto. The order, dated
22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on 28 May
2002. The formal offer of complainant’s evidence was
deemed submitted for resolution on 25 June 2002
pending proof of service of a copy thereof upon
respondent and the filing of the necessary comment or
opposition thereto by the latter.
In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set
the reception of evidence for respondent on 13
November 2002 in order to give him another
opportunity to rebut the evidence of complainant.
Respondent again failed to appear on the date set
therefor, prompting the Commission to rule on the
admissibility of Exhibits "A" to "D" with their
submarkings. There being no appearance on the part of
respondent despite due notice, the case was considered
submitted for resolution by the Commission in its order
of 26 February 2003.
The Commission submitted its report and
recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending
the suspension of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that
he be ordered to pay to complainant the value of the
two unpaid checks he issued to complainant.
The Court adopts the recommendation.
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended
from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or
misconduct in office.1 The word "conduct" used in the
rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties
but it also refers to any misconduct, although not
connected with his professional duties, that would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
38
privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court are not limitative 2 and are broad
enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty,
of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. 3 Such
misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law,4 in serious doubt.
Respondent’s issuance of worthless checks and his
contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation
for nearly eight years is appalling 5 and hardly deserves
compassion from the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty
of gross misconduct, and he is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon receipt hereof. This decision is
without prejudice to the outcome of the Criminal Case
for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against
him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record
in the Bar Confidant’s Office and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral
Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper 2 as
follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she
became his lover and common-law wife. In October
2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper
San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a
religious group known as the Faith Healers Association
of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although
he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in
November to December 2007, prompting her to return
home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her
back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his
followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with
drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007,
the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a
bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed
stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the
women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia),
having received information that she was weak, pale
and walking barefoot along the streets in the
mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the
Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately
dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The
religious group refused to release her, however, without
the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee
(PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to
rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against
respondent. Additionally, complainant charges
respondent with bigamy for contracting a second
marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the
subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley
G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted
documents including the following: Affidavit 3 of Delia
dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1
Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the
Certificate of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H.
Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract 6 between
respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics
Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the
marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April
27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H.
Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City,
Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution 8 of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran

and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-
Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention
against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint
of herein complainant.
Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008
Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to
submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof,
and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense
in a verified pleading,"11 he did not file any
Answer.1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on
September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly
notified, only complainant’s counsel was present.
Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the
CBD, in his Report and Recommendation 12 dated
September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a
mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and
Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in
the world can countenance. The subsequent detention
and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct
[which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the
respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral
conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the
celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose
Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the
respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a
married woman, and having a child with her. In the
instant case, not only did the respondent commit
bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in
1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also
made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and
subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All
these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent
is made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no
choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo
S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by
Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the
Investigating Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED
the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the
IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation
well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the state upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.15 When a lawyer’s moral character is assailed,
such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it
behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present
evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body
and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in
the Roll of Attorneys.16
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never
attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the
charges brought against him, suggesting that they are
true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008
manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in
a verified pleading," he never did.
Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyer’s Oath
reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that
I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
39
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution 18 of the Provincial
Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against respondent
and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears
special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-
accused in the complaint) has the effect of
strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo
Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really
physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the
person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on
the day private complainant was fetched by the two
women and police officers, complainant was already
freely roaming around the place and thus, could not
have been physically detained. However, it is not really
necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact,
she was always accompanied wherever she would
wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape
especially considering the remoteness and the distance
between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval,
Biliran where she is a resident. The people from the
Faith Healers Association had the express and implied
orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to
keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go
freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-
respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being
reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that
complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists
and feet.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution
in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein
co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of
complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations
against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the
charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence,
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.20
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly
immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a
lawyer.21
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is
DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory
and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia
Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant
[Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the
respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles
from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent
Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy
attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in
Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of
filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours
because they did not settle their accounts as demanded.
After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and
while she is about to step out of the car, respondent
hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the
morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop
in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the
complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting,
respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did
every time they met. Along the way, complainant was
wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she
just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt
Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold
(sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand
was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt
and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message
to respondent informing him that she decided to refer
the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back
the case folder from him. The communications
transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read
as follows:
Sent by - forget the case. I decided
complainant to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by - "does this mean I can not c
respondent u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see
you
anymore)
sent by - I feel bad. I can’t expect
complainant that u will take advantage of
at 6:17:59 pm the situation.
Follow-up - wrong to kiss a girl
message especially in the lips if you
Sent by don’t have relationship with
complainant her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking
respondent advantage of the situation, 2
At 6:32:43 pm put it rightly it s an
expression of feeling. S sri"
(I’m very sorry. Its not taking
advantage of the situation,
to put it rightly it is an
expression of feeling)
Follow up - I’m s sri. Il not do it again.
message Wil u stil c me s I can show u
by respondent my sincerity" (I’m so sorry.
at 6:42:25 pm I’ll not do it again. Will you
still see me so I can show
you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent
another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying
"I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri.
Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may
forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time."
Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33
pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n
me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time
behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of
admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to
provide legal services to the complainant; that he met
with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March
2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the
case which complainant was intending to file against the
40
owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a
sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant
rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to
him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt
Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have
been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that:
1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness
filed by complainant against respondent pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the
legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana
since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana
because the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6
December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the
complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s
fees and it was respondent who always paid for their
bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July
2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner
Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the
penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117
dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond
the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing
with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether
respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or
which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by
which we deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our
liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree
of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their
possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in
good standing. The continued possession of good moral

character is a requisite condition for remaining in the
practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr., 7 we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character of members of the Bar. They
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act
or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the
court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality,
not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout
their legal career, in order to maintain their good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They
may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was
defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing
complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I
kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right
face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We
said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered
(sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my
right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me
and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no
force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs
displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything
happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her
except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor,
IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should
say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each
other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of
Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen
minutes then she arrived. And so I said … she opened
my car and then she went inside so I said, would you
like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes,
okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas
Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her
case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her,
would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said
41
yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after
discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about
9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s
go. So when I said let’s go so I stood up and then I went
to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me
then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told
me just drop me at the same place where you have
been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and
that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue.
So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say
tilted her face towards me and when she’s already
facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said
good night. She went down the car, that’s it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I
have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside
my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so
then at the same corner. So before she went down ,
before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered
her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her
again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the
lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing
as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of
immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must not simply be
immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as
constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the
practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married
woman. This court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in
illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly
immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to
have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had
carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would
flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 21 respondent lawyer was
disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three

children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him
and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 22 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies
to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions
of marriage and family, institutions that this society
looks to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there
can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be
disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with
another married woman and left complainant with whom
he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such
acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting
respondent’s disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 respondent married
complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act
of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality."
Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being
admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter
satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to
maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at
all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is,
therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of
kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual
and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in
turning the head of complainant towards him and
kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such
act, even if considered offensive and undesirable,
cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made
use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to
lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him,
deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against
the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to
compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he
who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence,
the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui
negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis
probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant
miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed
complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after
the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text
message, respondent immediately extended an apology
to complainant also via cellular phone text message.
The exchange of text messages between complainant
and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place
where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
42
route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a
private place or a more remote place where he could
freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances,
respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be
imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When
deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring
those who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular
sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but
should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the
bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with
his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in
the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most
weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of
the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice
of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well
as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it
must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the
offense should also be considered. 36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an
isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty
to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell
Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for
grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her
blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed
and considering that this is respondent’s first offense,
reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what
she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor.
Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come
out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral
conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents
is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be
corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent
is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and
cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5141 September 29, 1999
(Formerly CBD Case No. 317)
PRISCILA L. TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without
paying it back.
On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of
P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six
months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To
guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent
executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit "B"). After the lapse
of six months, and despite repeated demands,
respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she
will not recover her money, Ms. Toledo sought the help
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which
referred the matter to the Commission on Bar
Discipline.1âwphi1.nêt
On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order
directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-
complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order,
respondent did not answer the complaint.
On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner
Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order setting the case
for hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite
due notice, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly,
complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-
parte after which, the case was considered submitted
for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown
by the registry return. However, she again did not do
anything about it.
On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution
recommending the suspension from the practice of law
of respondent for a period of six months "for her flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating
her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer." The
Commission, however, declined to discipline her for
failing to meet her financial obligation, the same having
been incurred in her private capacity.
We agree with the Commission that respondent may not
be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for
failing to pay her obligation to complainant.
Complainant's remedy is to file a collection case before
a regular court of justice against respondent. The
general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
569 [1923]; Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
We, however, find the recommendation to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for six months to be
grossly disproportionate to the act complained of, i.e.,
her failure to appear before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. With her legal knowledge and
expertise, respondent may have known all along that
the Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint for
collection of a sum of money which she borrowed in her
private capacity. Hence, her adamant refusal to appear
before said body.
We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of
one's membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits
himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization.
However, as the complaint lodged against the
respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act
that she committed in the exercise of her profession, the
IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline
respondent. As the Commission on Bar Discipline
correctly suggested, complainant's remedy is to file the
necessary collection case in court for her to recover the
amount respondent owed her.
It was, however, still necessary for respondent to
acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference
to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her
wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to
disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the
practice of law for one month is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE
MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution.
Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished all courts of
the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This
Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal
record of respondent attorney.
43
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
A.C. No. 5916 July 1, 2003
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-
Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F.
Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming
an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are
summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondent’s]
persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC
checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand
(P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks
were issued by defendant in replacement for
previous checks issued to the complainant.
Based on the exchange of letters between the
parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter
dated June 19, 2001, had committed to
‘forthwith effect immediate settlement of my
outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr.
Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on
or before the end of June 2000.’ Again, in a
letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made
a ‘request for a final extension of only ten (10)
days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July
10, 2000), within which to effect payment
of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao.’ Needless to say, the
initiation of this present complaint proves that
contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel
never made good on his dishonored checks.
Neither has he paid his indebtedness."2
In his Answer3 dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons
that because all of his proposals to settle his obligation
were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise
to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the
Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because of the following:
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a
member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as
an attorney for a party to case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to
the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear
that the offense with which the respondent is
being charged by the complainant, is merely a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22,
for brevity), which is a special law, and is not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC,
for brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the
offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC,
which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in
payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds
in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or
fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude;

"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the
Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing
obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the
said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an
unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court
would not countenance;
"(c). A careful examination of the specific
grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec.
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows
beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged
issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P.
22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary
action against a member of the Bar, to warrant
his disbarment or suspension from his office as
attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
"(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a
member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does
NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This is
because, the door to the law profession swings
on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless
there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated
immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of
the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney,
by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is
inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of
the doubt."4
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his
Reply.5 Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing
on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the
parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing,
respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed
himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his
principal debt and P20,000 for attorney’s fees).
Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to
settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of
payment for attorney’s fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-
CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for
the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on
leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency.
Complainant’s counsel objected and Commissioner
Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another
case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a
loud voice, "It’s up to you, this is only disbarment, my
family is more important." 6 And, despite the objection
and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made no effort to
comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness
before leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report, 7 Commissioner
Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the
attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to
the latter’s claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that
involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that
‘‘[w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted
against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the
latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of violation
of BP 22."8 The "refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude
towards complainant’s counsel and the [commission
sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against
him."9Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598, 10 the Board of Governors
of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years. The
Resolution, together with the records of the case, was
transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Court’s Ruling
44
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period of
suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.11 In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence
in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this
Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he
issued several worthless checks, he contends that such
act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is
evident from the records that he made several promises
to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his
obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse,
he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred
the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning
that the latter had refused to accept the former’s plan of
payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had
no obligation to accept it, considering respondent’s
previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for
the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had
voluntarily committed himself to the payment of his
debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had
no real intention to settle them is evident from his
unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in
incurring debts without any intention of paying for them
puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay
their financial obligations. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.12
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly
issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the
deleterious effects of such act to public interest and
public order.13
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the
Code specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." In Co v. Bernardino, 14 the Court considered the
issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule
and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained
thus:
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him
for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]).
Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil.
569 [1923]).
"The evidence on record clearly shows
respondent's propensity to issue bad checks.
This gross misconduct on his part, though not
related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar, puts his moral character in serious
doubt. The Commission, however, does not find
him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that

he eventually paid his obligation to the
complainant, albeit very much delayed.
"While it is true that there was no attorney-client
relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did
not require the professional legal services of
respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject
conduct merits condemnation from this Court.
"As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down
in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the
principle that it can exercise its power to
discipline lawyers for causes which do not
involve the relationship of an attorney and client
x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice
Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will
not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a
general rule with many exceptions x x x. The
nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory
rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a
person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will
be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him x x x.
"Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the
erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in
an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that
an attorney may be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an
unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not
curators of the morals of the bar. At the same
time the profession is not compelled to harbor
all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as
to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of
all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to
that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed
manner in which respondent dealt with
Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002
hearing, when the former was expected to settle
his obligation with complainant. We cannot
countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He
should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary
authority over him by virtue of his membership
therein.15
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority
of the officer assigned to investigate his case. Assuming
that he had a very important personal matter to attend
to, he could have politely explained his predicament to
the investigating commissioner and asked permission to
leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed
dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without
the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege.16 It demands a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law.17 In this case, respondent fell short of
45
the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of
law and justice.18
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his
gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended from the practice
of law for two years. However, in line with Co v.
Bernardino,19 Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.20 and Saburnido v.
Madroño21 -- which also involved gross misconduct of
lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient
in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of
gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one
year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the
court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7494 June 27, 2008
WILSON CHAM, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in
occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter,
vacating the same without paying the rentals due.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998,
respondent entered into a Contract of Lease 2 with
Greenville Realty and Development Corp. (GRDC),
represented by complainant as its President and General
Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned
by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon
City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a
term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent
informed the complainant that she would no longer
renew the same but requested an extension of her stay
at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a
commitment that she would be paying the monthly
rental during the extension period. Complainant
approved such request but increased the rental rate
to P8,650.00 per month for the period beginning 1
October 1999 until 30 June 2000.
Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October
2000 without paying her rentals from July to October
2000. She also failed to settle her electric bills for the
months of September and October 2000. The Statement
of Account as of 15 October 20043 shows that
respondent’s total accountability is P71,007.88.
Sometime in October 2000, a report reached
complainant’s office that respondent had secretly
vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the
door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant’s
repeated written demands for payment of her
obligations despite due receipt of the same, compelling
complainant to file the present Complaint.
In her Answer,4 respondent alleged that she had
religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated
the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that
she transferred to another place because she was given
notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to
give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but
which never happened until presently. Respondent
actually wanted to ask that complainant to account for
her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do
so since she did not know complainant’s address or
contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn
over to the complainant the door keys to the vacated
apartment unit.
After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, the parties were given time to submit
their respective Position Papers per Order 5 dated 17
February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his
Position Paper.6 Respondent, despite the extension

given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner
Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and
Recommendation,7 recommending the imposition of the
penalty of three-month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended
that herein respondent be held guilty of having
violated the aforequoted provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and imposed upon
her the penalty of three (3) months suspension
from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution
No. XVII-2006-5858 dated 15 December 2006, amending
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED,
the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL
of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be
dismissed and respondent must face the consequences
of her actions.
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she
executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy the
apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October
1998 to 30 September 1999, paying a monthly rental
of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease
contract9 on 30 September 1999, the same was
renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an
increased rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such an
arrangement, respondent was able to stay at the leased
premises until October 2000, undoubtedly incurring
electric bills during the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is,
indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt.
Complainant is able to fully substantiate that
respondent has existing obligations that she failed to
settle.
Annex "D"10 of the Complaint is a letter dated 11
September 2000 signed by complainant and addressed
to respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid
rentals for the period of three months, particularly, from
1 July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to have
been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex "H"
of the same Complaint is another letter dated 30 August
2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier demand for
respondent to settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her
unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was
sent through registered mail and received by one Nonie
Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of
both letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint.
Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she
must be deemed to have admitted them. Section 11,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied
deemed admitted. – Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of
unliquidated damage, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied.
Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where it is the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests
on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment. 11
Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence
that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the
fact of payment.12 In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,13 the receipts
of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be
the best evidence. A receipt is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money or goods have been
delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to
discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was
unable to produce receipts or any other proof of
46
payment of the rentals due for the period of 1 July to 20
September 2000.
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully
failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and
electric bills constitute "just debts," which could be any
of the following: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law;
or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.14
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral
duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they
became due. Respondent should have complied with
just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and
adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the
court’s integrity, since she is an employee thereof.
Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to
pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for
administrative sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her
unpaid obligations, and without the complainant’s
knowledge and consent. Respondent’s abandonment of
the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent
and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which
explicitly state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Respondent’s defense that she does not know where to
find the complainant or his office is specious and does
not inspire belief considering that she had been
occupying the apartment unit and paying the rents due
(except for the period complained of) for almost two
years. How she could have dealt with complainant and
GRDC for two years without at all knowing their office
address and contact numbers totally escapes this Court.
This is only a desperate attempt to justify what is clearly
an unjustifiable act.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.15 In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence
in the judicial and legal system is ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay
their financial obligations. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.16
The Court stresses that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. 17 It demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent
to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for
the practice of law.18 In this case, respondent fell short of
the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of
law and justice.19
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her
professional or private capacity is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment
because good character is an essential qualification for
the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege. 20 The Court has held that
the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, 21 for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s
suspension from the practice of law, 22 or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation. 23
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by
respondent’s gross misconduct. The case at bar merely
involves the respondent’s deliberate failure to pay her
just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which
would have been a more serious offense. The

Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for three
months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of
gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one
month from the practice of law, effective upon her
receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition
of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the
court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,
vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme
Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch
VI. City Court of Quezon City, recommended the
dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores,
Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the
following grounds:
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967,
(Criminal Case No. Q- 7171), Branch IV, Court of
First Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving
moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine
of P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974,
under Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the
undersigned amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his
handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my
present deputy clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo
Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from
his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon
request of the undersigned primarily to
dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr.
Flores, which I strongly disapproved of, and to
avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged
lawyer with unquestionable integrity. After his
transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten
notes, he persisted in taking this unwarranted
course of action in at least three (3) cases of
Branch VI.
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as
manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified
use of strong and contemptuous language in
addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a
letter, dated March 11, 1976. 1
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy
Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was required to file his
answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this
case was transferred to the First Division. 2
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976
wherein he alleged, among others, that his conviction
for libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then
Commissioner Abelardo Subido, who was also convicted
of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had
approved his appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court of
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City; that the
respondent never tried to unduly influence the
complainant in the discharge of the latter's duties and
responsibilities; that while respondent's language in his
letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the same could
not be considered contemptuous either directly or
indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the
sentiments of an aggrieved employee who deserves a
better treatment from his superior after more than six
years and nine months of highly dedicated and very
efficient service in the City Court of Quezon City; that if
ever respondent requested favors from his superior,
these were all done in the spirit of friendship which the
complainant professed to him before he left Branch VI of
the City Court of Quezon City on March 9, 1976; that
from October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March
8, 1976, the respondent was practically doing the work
47
of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored the
complainant on the fine interpretation and application of
the law; that it was Judge Zari who tried to corrupt him
as may be gathered from the following instances: On
January 8, 1976, after the trial in Criminal Case No VI-
5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases against
Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the respondent to
conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal
constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari,
likewise, told the respondent to join him for lunch at
Alfredo's Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after
conducting the ocular inspection, the respondent
proceeded to Alfredo's Steakhouse where he joined
Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel of Chua
and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the
respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the
ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of his
illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records
of said cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-
166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime
of estafa, the respondent was instructed to convict both
the accused because the complainant was a relative of a
certain Judge Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-
170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio Villanueva y
Elazo, Dominador Garcia y Orteza and Balbino Domingo
y Ramos, for the crime of theft, he was instructed by
Judge Zari to convict the accused Dominador Garcia y
Orteza because according to said judge, the
complainant is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court
required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of the
respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of
the respondent that he had not allowed the respondent
to interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions;
that while the complainant is aware of his limitations, he
is certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a
member of the Philippine Bar to "tutor" and give him
finer interpretation of the law; that he admits that
Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua and
VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before
this court; that he did not call the respondent to his
chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular
inspection on the illegal constructions; that he did not
invite the respondent for lunch that day; that the truth
was that after the trial, he went to Alfredo's Steakhouse
in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that
while in the said place, the complainant was surprised to
see the respondent in the company of the accused; that
he counseled the respondent to be more circumspect as
these people had cases before his sala; that it is true
that from then on up to the relief of the respondent on
March 8, 1976, the records of the aforesaid case could
not be found by the respondent because the
complainant had the records brought inside his chamber
in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the
respondent to manipulate the records; that he did not
instruct the respondent to convict the accused in
Criminal Case No. VI-166624 and in Criminal Cases Nos.
VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the complainant
is a relative of a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO,
respectively; and that he requested Atty. Reynaldo
Elcano to affix his initial in all orders, decisions and
sentences in order to pinpoint responsibility. 5
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that
when the respondent applied for the position of Deputy
Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he
submitted, among others, an affidavit dated June 10,
1969 that contains the following statement "That I am a
person of good moral character and integrity and have
no administrative, criminal or police record;" that the
respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No.
212 (1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before
then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data
sheet, the respondent admits having acted as counsel
for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice
by notaries and others who are not admitted to the
practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the
community, because such persons have not
demonstrated their capacity by submitting to
examinations lawfully established in the practice of law.

This administrative case was referred to the Executive
Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and
recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and
City Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit
themselves from investigating this
case. 6
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the
investigation of this administrative case recommended
that the respondent be separated from the service on
the following findings:
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is
a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude."
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10
provides that one of the grounds for
disciplinary action is "conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude."
Evidence adduced by the complainant which
was admitted by the respondent was that on
April 28, 1967 respondent was convicted of the
crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay
a fine of P5,000.00 which he paid on July 18,
1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.
Moral turpitude has been defined as
including any act done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. 7
Some of the particular crimes which
have been held to involve moral
turpitude are adultery,
concubinage, 8 rape, arson, evasion of
income tax, barratry, bigamy,
blackmail, bribery, 9 criminal
conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery,
libel, making fraudulent proof of loss
on insurance contract, murder,
mutilation of public records,
fabrication of evidence, offenses
against pension laws, perjury,
seduction under promise of
marriage, 10 estafa, 11 falsification of
public document, 12 estafa thru
falsification of public document. 13
"Moral turpitude" has been defined as
an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellow
men, to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. 14 It
implies something immoral in itself,
regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not
merely be mala prohibita but, the act
itself must be inherently immoral. The
doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. 15 Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not
of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the fact of their being
positively prohibited. 16 Hence, the
crime of illegal possession of firearm
or ammunition does not involve moral
turpitude for under our laws, what is
punishable is the possession of a
firearm or ammunition without a
license or authority. 17
Bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude. 18
However in another, the Supreme
Court seems to imply that libel is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
The mere filing of an information for
libel, or serious slander, against a
municipal officer is not a ground for
suspending him from office, as such
48
offenses do not necessarily involve
moral turpitude. 19
When respondent submitted his application for
the position of Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch
VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted
among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969,
which reads as follows:
That I am a person of good moral
character and integrity and have no
administrative, criminal or police
record.
On blank space of a personal data
sheet opposite question No. 10, which
asked if applicant has previously been
convicted of a criminal offense,
accused placed no. It was later
discovered that accused was
previously convicted of theft. Accused
was acquitted of falsification of public
document under Art. 171, par. 4,
because there is no legal obligation to
reveal previous conviction. 20 However
he maybe guilty of perjury under Art.
183. 21
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under
PD 807, Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is "falsification
of public documents."
The second charge is "persistent attempts to
unduly influence the complainant amounting to
undue interest in cases pending before Branch
VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the
complainant and to his present Deputy Clerk of
Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano."
Respondent admitted that in writing the four
(4) notes (Exhibits "F", "F-1", "F-2", & "F-3"), he
intervened for and in behalf of Gaw Chin in
Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the
sala of the complainant because the accused
was a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.
On the other hand, the defense of the
respondent is that he was practically doing the
work of the complainant and tutoring him in the
finer interpretation and application of the law,
and he was preparing the decisions in both
criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying
to influence the complainant.
The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", &
"F-3" speak for themselves. There is no need
for the undersigned to quote the same.
A proposition by an attorney to his
client to visit with his wife the
family of the judge before whom
the client's cause is to be heard,
and to endeavor, in conversation
thus to be had in advance of the
hearing, to commit the judge to an
expression of opinion favorable to
the client's case warrants his
dismissal from the bar. 22
The acts of the respondent amounts to
conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. 23
The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior
Officers as manifested by respondent in calling
for and unjust use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the city judges when he
wrote the letter, dated March 11, 1976."
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
'By the tenor of your reply, you
have made the change of heart and
have developed cold feet. You have
badly shaken my belief in your
credibility. Indeed, you are truly a
woman, very fickle and
unpredictable, but very impulsive.
I take this as a clear indication of
your desire to enlist the sympathies
and, if possible, like the other five
(5) judges, involved them in the
mess originally of your own making
and design and align them with you

against me, hoping to impress upon
me that by the tyranny of numbers,
I will be convinced that mine is a
lost cause.
However, I regret to inform the six
of you that by your conduct, you
have dismally failed to live up to
your oaths, ...
Kindly pardon me if I say that, the
six of you must be out of your wits
when you all decided to lay the
blame on me and condemned
without trial for the alleged
inefficiency.
Yes, when you all decided to
sacrifice me you are all laboring
under deep and nagging
hallucinations, induced and
prompted by your serious concern
to save the face of a colleague.
By the way, could any of the
Honorable Judges of Branches I, III,
V & IX honestly and truthfully say
the public service in their
respective branches is efficient, so
that they could now come to the
succor of a colleague and are also
competent to promote the
efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if
that is true, promotions of Judges in
the City Court would be fast, the
Purge in the Judiciary would not
have affected Quezon City and the
unprepared and the inexperienced
would not have come to the Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of
strong language by him in his letter was
justified and very much called for it being the
indubitable manifestation of the indignation
and disgust of the respondent, urged upon
him by the complainant who engineered the
respondent's illegal transfer from Branch VI of
the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a
valid and subsisting appointment to the
Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a
letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to
quote the pertinent provision of which:
'as a measure to promote more
efficient public service, after due
and circumspect deliberation by
and among the judges. '
pursuant to the authority granted to the
executive judge under Administrative Order
No. 6 of the Supreme Court which provides as
follows:
To re-assign temporarily the
personnel of one branch (sala) to
another branch (sala) or to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, in case of
vacancy in the position of Presiding
Judge of a branch (sala), or when the
interest of the service requires. In the
latter case, the assignment shall be
made in consultation with the
Presiding Judge of the branch (sala)
concerned; and in case of
disagreement, the assignment of the
Executive Judge shall be effective
immediately, unless revoked by the
Supreme Court.
The transfer was made in consultation with
the presiding judge of the branch concerned
who is the complainant in this case.
A detail is the movement of an
employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an
appointment and shall be allowed,
only for a limited period in the case
of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific
positions. If the employee believes
49
that there is no justification for the
detail, he may appeal his case to the
commission. Pending appeal, the
decision to detail the employee shall
be executory unless otherwise
ordered by the commission. 24
An employee may be reassigned
from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency.
Provided: That such reassignment
shall not involve reduction in rank,
status or salary. 25
In the instant case there was actually a
reassignment of employee from one branch to the
Office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court
and in consonance with PD 807.
The language of attorney in his motion for
reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court
as a "Civilized, democratic tribunal," but by
innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his
motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's
decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and
accusing two justices for being interested in
the decision of the case without any basis in
fact; asking the other members of the Court to
inhibit themselves for favors or benefits
received from any of the petitioners including
the President — constitute disrespectful
language to the Court. It undermines and
degrades the administration of justice.
The language is necessary for the defense of
client is no justification. It ill behooves an
attorney to justify his disrespectful language
with the statement that it was necessary for
the defense of his client. A client's cause does
not permanent an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective the thought that
"since lawyers are administrators of justice,
oathbound servants of society, their first duty
is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to
the administration of justice; to this their
client's success is wholly subordinate; and
their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 26
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent
had committed insubordination, a ground for
disciplinary action. 27
The evidence of record supports the findings of the
investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone
is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the
respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to
speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to
Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the
City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and
uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding
different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of
Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge
Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted
undue influence in the disposition of the cases
mentioned therein. 9
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically
justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact of
conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together
with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of
the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C.
Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to
malign people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending
before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City
presided by the complainant is inimical to the service.
This alone warrants severe disciplinary measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City
Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the
respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral
character and integrity and have no administrative,

criminal or police record. " This averment is not true
because the respondent had been convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967.
This prevarication in a sworn statement is another
ground for serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is
warranted by the evidence adduced during the
investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon
City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is
hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI
of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all
retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as
well as, in any government instrumentality or agency
including government owned or controlled corporations
effective upon the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal
record.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 229 April 30, 1957
IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
vs.
NARCISO N. JARAMILLO, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Juan T. Alano for complainants.
Narciso N, Jaramillo in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:
The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of
estafa in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and,
on appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of appeals
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months
and one day of arresto mayor to one year and one day
of prision correccional in its decision promulgated on
April 17, 1954. On August 5, 1955, while the respondent
was serving sentence for said conviction, the Solicitor
General filed in this Court the present complaint for
respondent's disbarment.
In his answer respondent contends that his conviction
was a judicial error; that it was unfortunate on his part
that the trial court did not believe his explanation of the
loss of the amount involved in the criminal case; that his
imprisonment and the sufferings and mental anguish he
has suffered since the commencement of the criminal of
the criminal case constitute more than sufficient
punishment; that for this Court to further disbar him is
excessively inhuman, humiliating and cruel.
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves
moral turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction
no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy
of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the
bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.
Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and
ordered to surrender to this Court, within fifteen days
from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore
issued to him. So ordered.
A.C. No. 1037 December 14, 1998
VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect
the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can
never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all
classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly
bound to uphold the law, 1 it is imperative that they live
by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath
and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the
legal profession.
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurreccion
charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts
constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct
in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a
50
lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through
reckless imprudence case, in which Complaint
Resurreccion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson
was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando
Basto Sr. The complaint alleged that, pursuant to the
amicable settlement previously reached by the parties,
he gave P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never
gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was
compelled to give another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as
settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded
the return of the money from respondent, to no avail.
Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment.
The records show that the Office of the Solicitor Genaral
(OSG) conducted several hearings on the matter, during
which the complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo
Lopez. Although respondent had been notified, he failed
to attend a number of such hearings. He eventually
appeared through his new counsel, Atty. Wenceslao
Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend
the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973
Order,2deemed the investigation of the case terminated.
But upon the motion of the respondent, the OSG on
October 31, 1973, set aside its earlier Order and once
again set the case for a hearing of the former's
evidence. Since, then, however, it appears that the OSG
has not been able to submit its report and
recommendation on the case.
In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took
cognizance of the case,3 and tasked Commissioner
Jesulito A. Manalo with the investigation, of which both
the complainant and the respondent were duly notified.
Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the
pursuit of the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not
be found.4 In his Report, Commissioner Manalo
presented the following facts.
Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was
accused of having converted and appropriated
[for] his own personal benefit the amount
P2,500.00 representing the amount which was
delivered by the complainant to the respondent
as compensation or settlement money of a case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainat alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was
involved in a vehicular accident which occured at
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City which
involved a boy [named] the name of Armando
Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By
reason of the said incident, complainant was
accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence
before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In
the preliminary investigation, the father of the
victim Mr. Armando Basto Sr., was represented by
Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8
August 1970 and respondent received from the
complainant the amount of P2,500.00.
Respondent allegedlly assured complainant that
the sum [would] be delivered to his client Mr.
Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in
writing having received the amount of P2,500.00.
Contrary however, to the assurances of the
respondent, he had not delivered the said
amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not
dismissed for which reason complainant was
compelled to pay anew the heirs of the victim the
amount P2,500.00. Demands were made for the
respondent to return the said amount of
P2,500.00 but the latter failed. By reason thereof,
complaint filed a complaint for estafa against the
respondent before the City Court of Quezon City
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. III-
149358 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Ciriaco C. Sayson".
In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant
Victoriano P. Resurrection appeared assisted by
his counsel. There was however, no appearance
for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The
investigator declared his failure to appear as a
waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto Sr.
was presented as witness. He testified that he

[was] the father of Armando Basto Jr. who was
ran over by a motor vehicle then driven by the
respondent. By reason of such death a case was
filed in court and he was represented by Atty.
Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A
settlement arrangement was arrived at and
complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00
to the respondent for the latter to turn over the
same to his client. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, however,
failed to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00
to his client for which reason the case was not
immediately dismissed. To effect dismissal of the
case, complainant was forced to pay anew the
sum of P2,500.00
Complainant was next presented as witness and
the testified that on 30 May 1970, he was
involved in a vehicular accident which resulted in
the death of one armando Basto, Jr. By reason
thereof, he was accused of homicide thru
reckless imprudence [,] and to effect settlement
of that case he agreed to pay the amount of
P2,500.00.
On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his
counsel conferred with [the] respondent in the
latter's office at may Building, Rizal Avenue,
Manila and in a conference, a settlement was
arrived at whereby complainant [would] pay the
amount of P2,500.00. This was done and
payment was delivered to the respondent who
acknowledged having received the said amount.
Subsequently, complaint learned that the said
amount of P2,500,00 was not delivered by
respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father
of the victim for which reason he was compelled
to pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs
of the victim.
Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said
amount of P2,500.00 from the respondent.
Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times,
Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson still failed to return the
money. Thus, complainant filed a complaint for
estafa which was elevated in Court and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 49358.
A Decision finding respondent guilty of [the]
crime of estafa was promulgated by the City
Court of Quezon City.5
Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and
recommendation in this wise:
Complainant was able to establish by more than
convincing that the misappropriation was in fact
committed by the respondent. This fact [is]
eloquently poroven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of
which were not controverted by the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, undersigned
Commissioner respectfully recommends that the
above-entitled case be endorsed by the
Honorable Board Governors to the Supreme Court
with the recommendation that the complain[ant
be] disbarred and his name be stricken off . . . the
roll of attorneys.
xxx xxx x x x6
On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution adopting and approving the report
and recommendation of Commissioner Manalo. The
Resolution, signed by IBP National Secretary Roland B.
Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28, 1998, is
worded as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202
Adm. Case No. 1037
Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs.
Atty. Ciriaco C. sayson
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty.
Ciriaco C. Sayson is DISBARRED and . . . his
51
name . . . stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for
having been found guilty of Estafa promulgated
by the City Court of Quezon City and [which]
complainant was able to establish by more
convincing evidences that misappropriation was
in fact committed by the respondent, all of
which were not controverted by the
respondent.7
The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings
and conclusion, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be
disbarred.
Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on September 20,
1973.8Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals9 and upheld by this Court. 10
In In re Vinzon,11 the Court disbarred a lawyer who had
been convicted of estafa and held that "moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty or good morals. In essence and in all respects,
estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals.
In a more recent case, 12 the Court upheld the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar
a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through
falsification of public documents, because the was
"totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In
adopting, the recommendation, we held that "good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the
bar.13 Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired. 14 However, in the present
case, the Court notes that even if respondent's
culpability for estafa has been indubitably established,
there is no indication that he has served sentence,
returned to complainant what was due him or showed
any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the
resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by
his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General and to inform the IBP of his change of address,
a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the
very serious charges brought against him. Respondent
Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy
to remain a member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it
is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby
DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out
his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the disbarment of
Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral
turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding
the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient
ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his
Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and
that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June
11, 2004.4After that hearing, complainant manifested
that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD
directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on
July 27, 2004.6Afterwards, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa
rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was
later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March
12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that
respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of
the latter for frustrated homicide, 7 which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were
summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla
and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his
wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the
car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer
and a prominent member of the Baguio community who
was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a
turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused
also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held
him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his
car to help him get up. But the accused, by now
enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal
the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on
the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time,
got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but
the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The
taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back
to his car and got his revolver making sure that the
handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked
them up intending to return them to the accused. But as
he was handing the same to the accused, he was met
by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired
and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the
thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes
whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver,
the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano." 8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who
came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid
artery on the left side of his neck, 9 complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received
timely medical assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi
driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated
November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent
filed an application for probation, which was granted by
the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court
in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant,
Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the
Court of Appeals.11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner
Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred
52
from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only
been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character,
based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while
driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to
assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his
attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent
simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and
overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied
when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation,
Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final
action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of
Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case,
respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide.
Since his conviction has already been established and is
no longer open to question, the only issues that remain
to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of
frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which
is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 15 a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the
basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the
particular circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s contention
and held that homicide in that case did not involve
moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations
and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained
that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral
turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as
explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not
involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence
of aggravating circumstances. For a better

understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the
crime are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that
the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop
the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa
was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the
left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show
that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but
only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor
of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly
found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice
law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued
and shot complainant when the latter least expected it.
The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as
a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.
He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position
to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing,
he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for
his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted.
Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic
incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait
in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity
with which he pursued complainant, we see not the
persistence of a person who has been grievously
wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a
false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law
and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We
remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to
"obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that
he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And
yet, it has been four years 21 since he was ordered to
settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance,
as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity,
good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty.
Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that
could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may
relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so
53
gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and
unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent
displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into
the practice of law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed
dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s
family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent
concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainant’s family that had sought a conference with
him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to
fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been
mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The
trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than
three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not
support his allegation that three people including the
complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing
him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three
people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries
sustain the complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on
the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.29The rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or
allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,
they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance
public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law
is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach."31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not
merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed,
we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function be competent,
honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus, whenever a clear
case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital
yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
accomplish the end desired. In the instant case,
however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We
are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be
irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal
profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of
truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated
homicide, the attending circumstances – not the mere
fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness
to remain in the legal profession. In the present case,
the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness
to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the
Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-
complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint
of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque
Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and
praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living
then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some
nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting
a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the
respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary
public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The
respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case,
assured the latter that he could secure a separation
from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring
his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29,
1939. This was done and the respondent right then and
there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was
stipulated, among other things, that the contracting
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each
other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or
waiving whatever right of action one might have against
the party so marrying. After the execution and
acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the
respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and
assured them that they were single and as such could
contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit
then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon
hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his
diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off
if this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on
the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11,
1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad
Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the
respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of
P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and
the same is not material in the resolution of the present
case, we do not find it necessary to make any express
finding as to whether the full amount or any portion
thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent,
the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit
A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven
years separation of husband and wife would entitle
either of them to contract a second marriage and for
that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after
the execution of said document he realized that he had
made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent
for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came
to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit
A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed
by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and
Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and
prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by
him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and
tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The
advice given by the respondent, the preparation and
acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute
malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice
of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law
is upon the implied condition that his continued
54
enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon
his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it
appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of
the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the
responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to
continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege
should be declared terminated. In the present case,
respondent was either ignorant of the applicable
provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the
complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to
his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members
of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to
follow the recommendation of the investigator, the
Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances
stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that
immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent
endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign
another document cancelling the previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of
malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously
stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding
the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the
parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for
judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and
negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot
proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the
same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial
proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was
employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales
manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later
as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing
(Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was
on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering
housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical
and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the
supervision of daily activities and operations of the
sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting,
weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and
attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him
by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the
farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted
over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio
Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis
from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private
respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However,
in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent
ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral
and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco,

private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well
as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17,
1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84,
against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay
for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was
dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as
penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
of employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu
City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having
been denied for lack of merit, 5 petitioner filed this
petition presenting the following issues for resolution:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed;
(2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement,
payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other
benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to
payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The
discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the
corollary questions presented by private respondent,
such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
function as farm administrator, the character of the
pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private
respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature
of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the
Solicitor General recommended a modification of the
decision of herein public respondent sustaining the
findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter
in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the NLRC
was required to submit its own comment on the petition.
In compliance with the Court's resolution of November
16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992
largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes
this case unique is the fact that because
of the special relationship of the parties
and the nature of the action involved,
this case could very well go down (in)
the annals of the Commission as
perhaps the first of its kind. For this case
is an action filed by an only son, his
father's namesake, the only child and
therefore the only heir against his own
father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the
records, two (2) observations were
noted that may justify why this labor
case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that
petitioner and private respondent had
with each other, were personal matters
affecting father and son relationship.
And secondly, if any of the complaints
pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the
way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from
employment was illegal because of want of just cause
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due
55
process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive
labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct
the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a
ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda
Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the
executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions
of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant
petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for
failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the
transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section
16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court,
which provide that want of page references to the
records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of
Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling, and that every and all reasonable means
to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each
case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for
the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a
labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who
heard the case was not the judge who penned the
decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and
resolution with due care and makes certain that they
truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned
to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the
hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case,
presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
that there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the
Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of
procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,
ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that
rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure,
not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge
private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of
one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and
due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law
and after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the causes for which an employer may
validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor

Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof, with due
entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates
provided by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason
whereof the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-
employee's health, is also a ground for termination of
his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled
that abandonment by an employee of his work
authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal
from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find
that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not
illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of
substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and
conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings
of an administrative agency, such as herein public
respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared "final" by law are not
exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor
General on this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner
in his work from October 1982 to December
1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of
work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess
in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula
under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan
of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City
(Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-
44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private
respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987
at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery,
petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that
city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside
Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the
context of the special circumstances involved
and basic human experience, petitioner's
illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered
as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
III's absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event,
such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for
dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or
absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-
employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor
and Social Legislation, 1989
edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases,
illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA
328), the Court rules that for abandonment to
arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from
which it may be inferred that the employee has
no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva
Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
56
cause for termination of employment, there
must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. . . Mere
absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing
to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case,
that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's
absence and his decision to leave his residence
inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations. Second he
has some medical certificates to show his frail
health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote
a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent
of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when
he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these
are indications that petitioner had no intention
to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute
the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for
his various afflictions which required medical treatment.
Neither can it be denied that private respondent was
well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital
bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City
until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to
whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as
to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods
for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains
that on account of said illnesses, the details of which
were amply substantiated by the attending
physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner,
there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from
work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified
refusal to resume employment and not mere absence
that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid
ground for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a
managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an
amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This
is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself
where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about
what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His
duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him
to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at
all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his
employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential
only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and
effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this
regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at
least a showing of increased production during the time
that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control
over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is
because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations
were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and
control exercisable by private respondent as employer
was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the
control contemplated refers only to matters relating to
his functions as farm administrator and could not extend
to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of
discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner
would be staying at the house in the farm, there really
was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no
formal employment contract to begin with) requiring
him to stay therein for the duration of his employment
or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of
transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to
terminate an employer-employee relationship.

Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he
was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to
work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee
of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his
salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only
in January, 1983 when he became convinced that
petitioner would no longer return to work that he
considered the latter to have abandoned his work and,
for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of
money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an
allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a
son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual
deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April,
1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving
said pension or allowance when he was angered by what
he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him
to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one
Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding
petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado
los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges
with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to
abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister
motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm
and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent
takes the novel position that the agreement to support
his son after the latter abandoned the administration of
the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to
implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private
respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness
and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills.
The assertion regarding abandonment of work,
petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of
1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's
accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his
pension or allowance was discontinued since April,
1984, and his indication of having recovered and his
willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14,
1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is
immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance,
with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in
view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a
finding of abandonment may justly be made there must
be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the
more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself
admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to
work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-
1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not
without valid causes of which private respondent had
full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to
believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work,
private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by
any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a
conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment
cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983,
when private respondent supposedly "became
convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the
farm, the latter continued to perform services directly
required by his position as farm administrator. These are
duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional
farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm
57
from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting
the payment of the additional cash advances for
molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex
Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts
for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which
petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities
and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's
prerogative to request or even command his child to run
errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as
the property values and monetary sums involved, it is
unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter
to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be
handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be
held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the
terms, specifications and other details relative thereto,
such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had
abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by
private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of
place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern
himself with matters relating to or expected of him with
respect to what would then be his past and terminated
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority
an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as
to compel him to continue to perform work-related
tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of
attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of
petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age,
married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL,
am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District,
and a duly accredited planter-member of the
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have
check/checks with BIPA representing payment
for all checks and papers to which I am entitled
to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted
as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as
my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed,
TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and
stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the
power and authority to sign for me and in my
name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts
or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn
the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of
my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said
check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said
check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment
was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of withholding
tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his
full recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and,
specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned
his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of
Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative
of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We

perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition
without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the
failure of private respondent to serve reasonably
advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also
failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said
office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important
stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to
petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as
to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be
determinative of petitioner's employment status in view
of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if
such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances
given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare,
it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary
business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory
that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted
into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter
abandoned his work. As we have determined that no
abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums
received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were
in consideration for services rendered emanating from
an employer-employee relationship and were not of a
character that can qualify them as mere civil support
given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also
hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly
converted into a voluntary resignation without any
positive act on the part of the employee conveying a
desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of
resignation as a ground for termination by the employee
of his employment38 does not square with the elements
constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that
there was a violation by private respondent of the due
process requirements under the Labor Code for want of
notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition,
argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to
cases where the employer seeks to terminate the
services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but
not to the situation obtaining in this case where private
respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground
since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing
applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in
this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or
omission(s) constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known
address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may
answer the allegations as stated against him in
the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period
from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a
58
decision to dismiss him stating clearly the
reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice
to the right of the worker to contest the validity
or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer
shall submit a monthly report to the Regional
Office having jurisdiction over the place of work
at all dismissals effected by him during the
month, specifying therein the names of the
dismissed workers, the reasons for their
dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last
held by them and such other information as may
be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there
can be no question that petitioner was denied his right
to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor,
much less a chance to be heard. Even as private
respondent controverts the applicability of the
mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process
in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice
was served by him on petitioner. This fact is
corroborated by the certification issued on September 5,
1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the
Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the
employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this
case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still
had to be served upon the employee sought to be
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the
pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service
thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of
substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is
the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken.
The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of
such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of
tenure in favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on
the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the
respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons'
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an
employer was not complied with. This
however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for
dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to
observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12,
Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil
Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the
rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his
employer to observe procedural due process. The
public policy behind this is that, it may encourage
the employee to do even worse and render a
mockery of the rules of discipline required to be
observed. However, the employer must be

penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his
employment because he has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred
in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279
of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed
employee to reinstatement and back wages and,
instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due
process requirements. Private respondent, for his part,
maintains that there was error in imposing the fine
because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit
the employer's report on dismissed employees to the
DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now,
Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not
the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to
be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in
no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security
of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and
statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief
available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of
regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits of their
monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of
just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on
numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application
of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
some cases certain events may have transpired as
would militate against the practicability of granting the
relief thereunder provided, and declares that where
there are strained relations between the employer and
the employee, payment of back wages and severance
pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and
more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the
Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and to his backwages computed from the time
his compensation was withheld up to the time
of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188
SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable
Court held that when it comes to
reinstatement, differences should be made
between managers and the ordinary
workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers
cannot operate freely in a competitive and
profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease
and liberality as that of rank and file workers
who had been terminated. Similarly, a
reinstatement may not be appropriate or
feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188
SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that
petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The
59
present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious
and peaceful employee-employer relationship
is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral
damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries
such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that
such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant which was the proximate cause
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a
matter of right, it being left to the court to decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of
cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages
where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to
labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if
the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an
award of the damages prayed for in this petition would
be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify
their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal
dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely
without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and
private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning
the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated
this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a
peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The
records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual
antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good
faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for
damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that
no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be
awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the
validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor
General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No.
0452-84 should be modified. There was no
voluntary abandonment in this case because
petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
absence, or such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay
backwages for a period not exceeding three
years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s)
salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in
accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr.
vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties
are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as
revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court
and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded
that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their
clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients'
respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of

the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between
their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but
to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for
dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every
phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of
them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and
protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated
the situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who
handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful
to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that
a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the
amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained
the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in
this controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not
particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task
of resolving cases involving disputes among members of
a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an
aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and
enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations.
While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the
legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by
the thought that we may have failed to bring about the
reconciliation of the father and son who figured as
parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to
law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the
breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds.
In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges
victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that
with the impartial exposition and extended explanation
of their respective rights in this decision, the parties
may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate
resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages
for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, supra
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."1
60
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called
up the published telephone number and pretended to be
an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an
expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee
a court decree within four to six months, provided the
case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at
the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator
and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star. 2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se
are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not
served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him
and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is
not contrary to law, public policy and public order as
long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C.
No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4,
2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were
required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April
25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the
case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings
and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand,
filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306
and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law
is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the
legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the
acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the Court’s
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had
no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the
August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes
and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that
an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
61
Such data must not be misleading and may include only
a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and
italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Adm. Case No.
6290
Complainant,
Present:
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,- versus
- PANGANIBAN,SANTIAGO,CARPIO, andAZCUNA, JJ. ATTY.
ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,Respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with
the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana
Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty.
Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the
latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the
respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and
subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the
respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to
obtain a false marriage contract, [1] which states that
they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of
Manila[2]and the National Statistics Office (NSO) [3] prove
that no record of marriage exists between them. The
false date and place of marriage between the two are

stated in the birth certificates of their two children,
Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III. [5] But in the
birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver
Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7]another date and
place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February
1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant
alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to
the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati
City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent
would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged
immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband,
who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted
her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led
to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3)
threatened the complainant and her family on 24
January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to
deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities
and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the
allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she
declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No.
2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City. [8] Her
husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with
another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the
respondent denied that she caused the dissemination of
a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor
Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who
caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who
went around the city of Makati on the pretext of
conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondents
good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its
Certificate of Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence,
she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa
case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to
the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. [10] The respondent
likewise denied that she threatened the complainant
with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this
disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to
get even with her. She terminated
complainants employment after receiving numerous
complaints that the complainant extorted money from
different people with the promise of processing their
passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged
on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire
the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this
complaint, which they did and for which they were re-
hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she
had received numerous awards and citations for civic
works and exemplary service to the community. She
then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for
being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the
parties agreed that the complainant would submit a
Reply to respondents Answer, while the respondent
62
would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also
agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached
affidavits would constitute as the respective direct
testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her
claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the
name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior
partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group
identification card[13] signed by the respondent as
Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents
husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she
neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor
allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If
there was an instance that her husband appeared in
court, he did so as a representative of her law firm.The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false
reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law
partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted
with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing
her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as
senior partners because they have investments in her
law office.[14]
The respondent further declared that she
married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in
Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their
marriage contract was not registered she applied for
late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as
evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and
authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the
birth certificates of her children as to the place and date
of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]
Sometime after the parties submitted their
respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13
November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this
disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding
and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not
acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30
September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to
substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of
the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law
by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card of Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as
Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases
Nos. 20729 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for
the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest
to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San
Juan recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25
October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from
reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six

months with a warning that a similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of
Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with
modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in
not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by
complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,
[16]
we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack
of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a because they have investments in her law office. [20] That
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court.The
complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his case by
convincing evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case
which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet
convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held
that when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the
outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.
We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent
is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
63
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate
to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer
for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose
like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
[19]
Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a
lawyer, but he holds himself out as one.His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in
the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D.
Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first
two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in
the letterhead of her law office as senior partners
is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group
identification card is another proof that the respondent
assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to
the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification
card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the
Group.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer
is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of
the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9
and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to
respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney in this
Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of
Court, respondent.
RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte
charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon
City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged
engaging in the private practice of law which is in
conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of
Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized
representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the
plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
37. A typographical error was committed in the
complaint which stated that the address of defendant is
No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an
amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who
subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant,
however, was surprised to receive a temporary
restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of
Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court, enjoining the
execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary
restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was
never notified of the application for preliminary
injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to
Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the
reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her
lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for
ejectment, and told her that if she wanted the execution
to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the
law office of respondent, at the same time giving his
calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa
Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise
she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope.
Complainant told respondent that she could not decide
because she was only representing her sister. To her
consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order
granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by the
respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Brach 37 had
issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision
in Civil Case No. 37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the
antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance of
the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and
claimed that contrary to complainant Samonte's
allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and the
hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the motion for the
issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order was duly
served upon the parties, and that the application for
injunctive relief was heard before the temporary
restraining order was issued. The preliminary injunction
was also set for hearing on August 7, 1996.
The respondent's version of the incident is that
sometime before the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the temporary restraining order,
complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because
of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of
the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to
calm her down, and assured her that the restraining
order was only temporary and that the application for
preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the
Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to
court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant
returned to his office, and informed him that she wanted
to change counsel and that a friend of hers
recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time
showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her
case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with
the law firm, although he was invited to join but he
choose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned
to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot
64
convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary
injunction, she will file an administrative case against
respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but
the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the
Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that
the complainant must have filed this administrative
charge because of her frustration in procuring the
ejectment of the defendant lessee from the premises.
Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complainant
against him.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella
Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set
for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on
September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither
complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due
notice. The return of service of the Order setting the last
hearing stated that complainant is still abroad. There
being no definite time conveyed to the court for the
return of the complainant, the investigating Judge
proceeded with the investigation by "conducting
searching question" upon respondent based on the
allegations in the complaint, and asked for the record of
Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case was
set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to
give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was
again no appearance despite notice.
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the
statements in his Comment, and submitted
documentary evidence consisting mainly of the
pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC
Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to show that the questioned
orders of the court were not improperly issued.
The investigating judge made the following findings:
For failure of the complainant to appear
at the several hearings despite notice,
she failed to substantiate her allegations
in the complaint, particularly that herein
respondent gave her his calling card and
tried to convince her to change her
lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be
established with certainty that
respondent indeed gave her his calling
card even convinced her to change her
lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the
records of the Civil Case No. Q-96-
28187, complainant was duly notified of
all the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the TRO and the subsequent
orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo,
Jr. of RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's
lack of interest in prosecuting this
administrative case could be an
indication that her filing of the charge
against the respondent is only intended
to harass the respondent for her failure
to obtain a favorable decision from the
Court.
However, based on the record of this
administrative case, the calling card
attached as Annex "B" of the
complainant's affidavit dated September
25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent
to complainant would show that the
name of herein respondent was indeed
include in the BALIGOD, GATDULA,
TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW
OFFICES. While respondent denied
having assumed any position in said
office, the fact remains that his name is
included therein which may therefore
tend to show that he has dealings with
said office. Thus, while he may not be
actually and directly employed with the
firm, the fact that his name appears on
the calling card as partner in the
Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig &
Celera Law Offices give the impression
that he is connected therein and may
 65

constitute an act of solicitation and times must only be characterized by propriety and
private practice which is declared decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. 3
unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch
is to be noted, however, that Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby
complainant failed to establish by reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law
convincing evidence that respondent with the warning that a repetition of the same offense
actually offered to her the services of will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
their law office. Thus, the violation cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any
committed by respondent in having his office engaged in the private practice of law.
name included/retained in the calling SO ORDERED.
card may only be considered as a minor
infraction for which he must also be
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
administratively sanctioned.
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be
vs.
admonished and censured for the minor
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS
infraction he has committed.
MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
respondent is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
substantiate her allegation that it was the respondent
JR., respondents.
who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law
convince her to change counsels. We find however, that
Office for respondents.
while the respondent vehemently denies the
complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his
AQUINO, J.:
name appears on the calling card attached to the
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954,
complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the
in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
complainant. The respondent testified before the
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law
Investigating Judge as follows:
under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm
Q: How about your statement that
organized in Illinois.
you even gave her a calling card of
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente
the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo,
A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
Dimailig and Celera law Offices at
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
Room 220 Mariwasa building?
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
A: I vehemently deny the allegation
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
of the complainant that I gave her a
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979,
calling card. I was surprised when
denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
she presented (it) to me during one
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is
of her follow-ups of the case before
Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in
the court. She told me that a friend
using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
of hers recommended such firm and
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
she found out that my name is
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm,
included in that firm. I told her that I
cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
have not assumed any position in
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
the law firm. And I am with the
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
Judiciary since I passed the bar. It is
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with
impossible for me to enter an
members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
appearance as her counsel in the
Respondents, aside from being members of the
very same court where I am the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Branch Clerk of Court.
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
The above explanation tendered by the
Mckenzie.
Respondent is an admission that it is his name
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents'
appears on the calling card, a permissible form
use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
of advertising or solicitation of legal
representation that being associated with the firm they
services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the
could "render legal services of the highest quality to
calling card was printed without his knowledge
multinational business enterprises and others engaged
or consent, and the calling card 2 carries his
in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
name primarily and the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at
not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from
gives the impression that he is connected with
practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his
SO ORDERED.
name in the professional card constitutes an act
of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par.
(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
the Public Officials and Employees" which vs.
declares it unlawful for a public official or FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
employee to, among others: Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
(2) Engage in the private practice City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
of their profession unless MONTEMAYOR, J.:
authorized by the Constitution or This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
law, provided that such practice preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against
will not conflict or tend to conflict Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
with official functions. Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and preliminary investigation he was conducting in
behavior of every one connected with an office charged September, 1957 in connection with the killing of
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with Pasay City. To better understand the present case and its
the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all implications, the following facts gathered from the

pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may
be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number
of persons were accused as involved and implicated in
said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance
of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito
Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced
them to death. They all appealed the sentence although
without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the
extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed
automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new
trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again
found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was
affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President
Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The
purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the
record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine
Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang
conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive,
questioned a number of people and obtained what
would appear to be confession, pointing to persons,
other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial
court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote
to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and
confessions obtained by those who had investigated the
case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva
conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he
should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of
Justice who decided to have the results of the
investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and
Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for
the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the
appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal
supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and
confessions of some of those persons investigated, such
as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman,
Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of
several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on
said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was
studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime,
the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the
Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and
confessions and written statements, of which the motion
for new trial was based, and respondent Salva
proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for
said purposes a committee of three composed of himself
as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A.
Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being
conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz
was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office
on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me
in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the
time and place by this office against you and Sergio
Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva
asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation
from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel,
Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that
same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for
postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary
investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction
of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to
conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact
that the same case involving the killing of Manuel
Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the
same day filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a
cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation
being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the
preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits
66
and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, and which were being investigated,
implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the
instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that
inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar
Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and
consideration before us, no court, much less a
prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any
right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
or reinvestigation of the case for that would be
obstructing the administration of justice and interferring
with the consideration on appeal of the main case
wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted
and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite
him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he
subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the
latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear
at the investigation with his witnesses for his own
protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any
evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims
that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary,
Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited
to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never
have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having
made such request that he be allowed to appear at the
investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva
that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he,
Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of
Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of
several persons who were being investigated by Salva
and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner
should have been interested, even desirous of being
present at that investigation so that he could face and
cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they
testified in connection with their affidavits or
confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying
the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed
to respondent Salva asking that the investigation,
scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed
because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena,
not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited
to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the
preliminary investigation which he and his committee
began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal
intervened though nominally, for according to
respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the
prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is
tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court
such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of
said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is
handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor
General. Consequently, there would be no reason or
occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved
in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our
opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation
because according to him, in the original criminal case
against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named
Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the
reason that he was arrested and was placed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against
the other accused had commenced, even after the
prosecution had rested its case and the defense had
begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista
remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to
respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled
the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957.
Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and
plan of action, whether to present the same evidence,
oral and documentary, presented in the original case
and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of
the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the

Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and
determine the value of said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he be convinced that the
persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel
Monroy were other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-
appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might
act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of
the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva.
For, as contended by him and as suggested by
authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is
not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the
guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close
scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst
this court is averse to any form of vacillation by
such officers in the prosecution of public
offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and
avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice
Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape nor innocent sufer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one. (69 United States law Review, June,
1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of
Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite
petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law,
petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation
since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply
involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy
according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits
and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or
was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he
need not be present at said investigation because his
presence there implies, and was more of a right rather
than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as
claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the
desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the
said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and
renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to
being made to appear at said investigation, he could not
be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation
was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by
him, the purpose of said investigation was only to
acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence
involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio
Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them,
then he, respondent, could well have conducted the
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and
without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by
the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in
respondent's office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to
accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the
proceeding, including members of the press. A number
of microphones were installed. Reporters were
everywhere and photographers were busy taking
pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission
67
of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news
photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only
this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during
said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after
Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent
Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen
of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to
let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced
as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva,
addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the
press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent
was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and
prerogative to make and address the questions to the
witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members
of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he,
respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and
publicize his investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to
have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not
ask questions, this according to the transcript now
before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide
publicity to what took place during the investigation,
and this involved headlines and extensive recitals,
narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by
the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the
incidents that took place during the investigation. It
seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the
killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried
and finally determined by the lower court and which was
under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was
being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with
the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly
disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the
door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what
was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for
which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this regard went well
beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity
when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the
interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by
meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a
penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel
more strongly than the others favored the imposition of
a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature
deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public
censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva
was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation
involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is
concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary
injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation,
is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to
appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent
may not compel him to attend said investigation, for
which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent
against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent
Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and
censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in
connection with his investigation, which we consider and
find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is
warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a
more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan
Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules
1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present
complaint are as follows:
Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an
application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all the
requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a
permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of
respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to
Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent
Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows,
quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his
family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and
Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs.
Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the
construction of the building of the abovenamed person
has started and that the undersigned and his family,
and those other families mentioned above are
respective owners of the residential houses adjoining
that of the high-rise building under construction of the
said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention
the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse
effects to the undersigned and his above referred to
clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to
their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the
building would only be a regular and with standard
height building and not a high rise one but an inspection
of the same would show otherwise. Note that its
accessory foundation already occupies portion of the
vacant airspace of the undersigned’s residential house
in particular, which readily poses danger to their
residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and
damage to property, loss of life and for the protection of
the safety of all the people concerned, they are
immediately requesting for your appropriate action on
the matter please at your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal
Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal
Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub
par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was
already full compliance on the part of the owner of the
Building under construction with
the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and
308 of the National Building Code and on the part of
your good office, your compliance with the provisions of
Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited
Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable
legal effect of the non-compliance with said Sections
301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by
all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only
to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the
original, partly supplied)
By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the
application for building permit because of a personal
grudge against his wife Susan who objected to
respondent’s marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano,
respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton being still
subsisting.5
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his
Complaint Affidavit6 he filed against respondent before
the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3
(e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-
68
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and
(c)8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).9
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6,
2005,10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended
the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following
findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that
respondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife
for a building permit for the construction of their
commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the
complainant was that his wife was not in favor of
Imelda’s relationship with respondent who is a married
man. And the other reason is that respondent was not
authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the
construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we
find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the
charges and accusations of complainant. We find no
clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the
disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is
proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant
to overcome the presumption and establish his charges
by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of
the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on
the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55
SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani
vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005, 12 the Board of Governors
of the IBP adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review 13 filed by
complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule
1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda
Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with
Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December
17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his
influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan
to oppose his wife’s application for building permit, in
violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as
the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant
maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29,
200515 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant’s
complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and
Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of
which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated
September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo
Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not
an opposition for the issuance of complainant’s building
permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as
to whether compliance with the requirements for the
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the
Office of the Building Official after conducting an
investigation found out that there was [a] violation of
the Building Code for constructing without a building
permit committed by herein complainant’s wife Susan
Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued.
Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the
said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia
applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by
respondent, the same is being processed pending
approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal
Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent
the allegation that respondent was engaged in the
private practice of his law profession despite being
employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into
consideration the explanation and clarification made by
the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside

from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is
no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds
the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and
7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used
his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his
own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is
nothing to show that he opposed the application for
building permit. He just inquired whether complainant’s
wife fully complied with the requirements provided for
by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his
concerns about "the danger and damages to their
properties, health and safety" occasioned by the
construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building
permit was filed on September 28, 2004, 17 whereas the
questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and
received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal
Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day,
ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e]
notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal
action against you."18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4,
200519 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer
showed, complainant’s wife eventually withdrew the
application as she had not yet secured clearances from
the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the
barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainant’s charge that respondent
engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law while
he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a
position coterminous to that of the appointing authority,
suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that
his private practice is not prohibited.20
It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted
contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage
is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable,
for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17,
1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA, 21 when the
Family Code of the Philippines had already taken
effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to
have had the impression that the applicable provision at
the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. 23 For while
Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code
shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification
thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to
grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community."24 Gross immoral conduct on the other hand
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.25
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la
Cruz,26 this Court declared that the therein respondent’s
act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral
conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after
the mitigating following circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his
second marriage or for a period of almost seven
(7) years, he has not been romantically involved
with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble
intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to
support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child
and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
69
e. After the annulment of his second marriage,
they have parted ways when the mother and
child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained
celibate.27
In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since
1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his
claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable
provision when he contracted the second marriage
abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife
abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted,
until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is
no showing that he was romantically involved with any
woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has
remained an absentee even during the pendency of this
case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted
marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which
they have been living in fact elected him and served as
President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999
and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code
provisions which applied at the time he contracted his
second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude
of his residential community towards his second
marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go
scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of
contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.28
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the
Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he
was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there
until he came back to the Philippines together with his
second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as
"ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."
Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v.
Rafanan:29
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers
is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in
the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the
rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation
to be well-informed of the existing laws and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless
they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar.
Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN,
CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C.

TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN,
TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO,
MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T.
WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS
AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP.,
VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and
ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of
the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors,
officers, stockholders and related interests totaling
₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the
Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310
million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977,
the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public
bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March
26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted
the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith the
then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act
No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the
Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin
T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms,
Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,
Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo
O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
70
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to
nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued
by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments,
this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-
0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as
then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central
Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly
"intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then
Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials
on the procedureto bring about GENBANK’s liquidation
and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found
that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former
function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted
that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled
that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year
prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year
1986. The said section prohibits a former public official
or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with
within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second
Division to the Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July
11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the
resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case
No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling
but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing
the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via
a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged
that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits
a former government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on
behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not
apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive
issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
the legal profession and the government, we shall cut
our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we
trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early
statements of standards did not resemble modern codes
of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one
source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their
time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed
towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored
the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations
of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the
court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in
the litigation context, but ultimately had broader
application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early
post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly
from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural
rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over
time, but the variation in early America was far greater.
The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of
conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps
in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and
post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation
fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark
ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-
century, American legal reformers were filling the void in
two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the
highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a
new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers.
This concise statement of eight statutory duties became
law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new
level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than
the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms
of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath
and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
71
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit
an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty
and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law
started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-
client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in
formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and
did not provide a comprehensive statement of a
lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal
ethics.21
form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The
bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by
lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes
gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the
oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of
bar associations themselves. Local bar associations
formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form
again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had
left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably
the Alabama State Bar Association and the American
Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting
substantive standards of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a
comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several
states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the
American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of
Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and
duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full
measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have
questioned the form and function of the canons. Among
their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the
process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it
for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service."25 These concerns were classified
as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest
conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest
representation conflicts" are unique to government
lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to
correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen
new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts"
and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The
rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that
the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions
would be influenced by the temptation to take action on
behalf of the government client that later could be to

the advantage of parties who might later become
private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate
in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection
with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend
many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in
1933 and 1937, respectively. 31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again
adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was
growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA
Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational
and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to
replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical
principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were
supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became
the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969,
the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model
Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners
remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in
August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used
the "restatement format," where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each
rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The
Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and
reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with
Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite
nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was
drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new
realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
72
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase "investigated and passed
upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore,
properly applicable to both "adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse
interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and
later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the
issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest
conflict"sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first,
the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of
the "intervention" made by the former government
lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in
its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction
or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which
was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the
following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists
that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum
dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials
of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime
C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel
Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T.
Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977,
they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with
the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the
said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference
with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank
can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it
may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board,
it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal
stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court
in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March
29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in
filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said
minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor
General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision
and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General
Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board,
dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section
29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a
repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together
with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or
needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-
praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In
fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of
advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept
of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act
No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners
or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the
same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid
the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather
all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm
within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been
taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
73
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board
shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance,
as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board
under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all
convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or
otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts
and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section
34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be
set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its
actions under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in
an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining
order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall
be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance
and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean
the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities
as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of
business. Provided, however, That this shall not include
the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a
run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of
this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to
the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos.
72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter"contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law" are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of
argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza
falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from
the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that

respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also
given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK
thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is
different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case
No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged
ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not
involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve
the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares
of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words,
the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue
in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of
the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03.
"Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous
feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or
between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the
word "intervene." Under the first interpretation,
"intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even
if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.43 Under the second interpretation,
"intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to
the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where
the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer "should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed,
the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has
investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust
disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969
Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the
prohibition extended only to a matter in which the
lawyer, while in the government service,
had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model
Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR
1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as
a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of
respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
74
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the
petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory
pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the
parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we
note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of
proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting
the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the
part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off
from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have
not been without difficulties. To date, the legal
profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR
9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar
will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is
already difficult for government to match compensation
offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that situation. The
observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the
government may play to recruit lawyers is have them
defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income
in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that
the sacrifice of entering government service would be
too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a
technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make
it less appealing to enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye
on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused
to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive
the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the
tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court
found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description
of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In
the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify
respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been
a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of
many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a
fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case
at bar was filed more than four years after the filing
of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the

circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as
highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was
not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It
cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the
work done by the latter. 52 The effects of this prejudice to
the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be
overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible
adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An
individual who has the security of knowing he or she can
find private employment upon leaving the government
is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions
when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist
illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks
this assurance of private employment does not enjoy
such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the
right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old
job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence."54 The case at bar involves the
position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly
stressed that the position of Solicitor General
should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the
innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right
to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their
office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule
of law.
No less significant a consideration is the
deprivation of the former government lawyer of
the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former
government lawyer may extend to all members of his
law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger
of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be
remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of
gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative
exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward
results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free
flow of information between the government-client and
its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety
theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts
have abandoned per sedisqualification based on Canons
4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule
6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides"
carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not
cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the
act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central
Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the
shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank.
Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To
be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
75
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al.,
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest
of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly
defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied
Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding.
It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in
Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et
al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides
are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule
6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that
a government employee might be subject to a conflict of
loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a
lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or
she is currently charged with prosecuting might be
tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary
words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
"The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan,
however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a
private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had
just been disloyal to his or her last client – the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently
confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government
lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the
least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank
and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to
curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence
of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan
again warns against extending this concern too far. He
explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what
appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be
the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x
x."67 More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote
him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make
significant decisions based on friendship rather than on
the merit says more about the present officials than
about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of
will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not
seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility
that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view,
among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be
subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines
that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent
Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted
by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the
IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make
relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without
any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their
concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
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SO ORDERED.