Andabai T. Arimao vs Saadea P.

Taher Technical Education and Skills Development Authority

FACTS:
 Petitioner was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-
formal Education, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, respondent was
appointed Education Supervisor II. Petitioner’s appointment,
however, was protested by a certain Alibai T. Benito, who
claimed that said appointment did not pass through any
evaluation by the personnel selection board.
 Petitioner’s appointment was eventually disapproved by the
Civil Service Commission-Field Office (CSC-FO), Cotabato
City, for failure to meet the experience required for the
position. On 02 May 1996, the CSC, through Resolution No.
96- 3101, affirmed the findings of the CSC-FO and ordered
petitioner to be reverted to her former position of Education
Supervisor II. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
decision.
 In the interim, petitioner applied for and was granted by the
DECS-ARMM an academic scholarship with pay effective 30
October 1996 in her capacity as Education Supervisor II.
The scholarship was limited to a period of one year.
 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
Subsequently, she filed a petition for review of the two
CSC Resolutions before the Court of Appeals which,
however, denied due course to the petition on 10 June
1998. On 17 October 1998, the Court of Appeals issued
an Entry of Judgment declaring the denial of the petition
to be final and executory.
 The position of Education Supervisor II being occupied by
respondent was devolved from DECS-ARMM to the
(TESDA)- ARMM.
 On 2 December 1998, petitioner informed the CSC Regional
Office in Cotabato City that she was already allowed by the
Director of TESDA-ARMM to report for duty, only that she
and respondent are reporting to the same position. On 10
December 1998, the CSC Regional Director enjoined
respondent from reporting to the TESDA-ARMM. It
appears, however, that respondent continued to report
as Education Supervisor II
 On 7 December 1998, respondent, unaware that petitioner
was granted a study leave from October 1996 to October
1997, filed a complaint before the Regional Director,
ARMM, relative to petitioner’s continued absence. On 24
December 1998, upon the complaint filed by respondent, the
Executive Secretary of ARMM, by authority of the ARMM
Regional Governor and per his Memorandum of even date,
declared petitioner to have been Absent Without Leave
(AWOL) by reason of her failure to report to her office
for at least a year after the expiration of her study leave
and directed that she be dropped from the payroll.
 Petitioner appealed the decision but was denied by the
ARMM Regional Governor.
 Datu Guimid P. Matalam, Regional Vice Governor/Acting
Regional Governor, ordered petitioner to reassume her
former position as Education Supervisor II, and revoked the
ARMM Executive Secretary’s Resolution dated 24
December 1998. However he also issued and order to
maintain the Status Quo on the part of Ms. SAADEA P.
TAHER, Education Supervisor II with permanent status duly
approved by the Civil Service Commission. And declared
that such memorandum supersedes and revokes all
inconsistent order herewith.
 However, on 4 August 2000, ARMM Regional Governor
Misuari issued a Memorandum 15 to the TESDA-ARMM,
ordering petitioner’s reinstatement, presumably in
 accordance with CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and CSC-
ARMM directive dated 26 July 2000.
 Respondent thus filed a Petition for Prohibition before the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, claiming that she has
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as she stands
to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is
removed from the office which she has held for more than
five years.
TRIAL COURT:
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction commanding
ARMM Regional Governor Misuari and the TESDA-ARMM to
desist from carrying out the said Memorandum and holding that
the 04 August 2000 Memorandum of the ARMM Regional
Governor could no longer be implemented because the CSC
resolutions ordering petitioner’s reinstatement, relied upon by
ARMM Regional Governor Misuari, were superseded by the
CSC resolutions finding petitioner on AWOL and dropping her
from the payroll. According to the trial court, this controversy has
to be resolved by the CSC, which has the exclusive jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions
affecting employees in the public service.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion
was denied on 31 January 2002.
 e CSC, acting on the letter of the Regional Solicitor General
of the ARMM regarding the implementation of CSC
Resolution No. 96-3101, issued Resolution No.
020743. 22 According to the CSC, it issued Resolution No.
01-0132 because petitioner did not inform the Commission
that she had been declared on AWOL and dropped from the
rolls since 24 December 1998. 23 ARMM Regional Governor
Misuari’s Memorandum dated 04 August 2000 ordering
petitioner’s reinstatement is rendered moot and academic
because prior to the said date she was already separated
from the service
ISSUE:
I. WON a writ of prohibition lies to enjoin the directive of the ARMM
Governor to reinstate petitioner to the position of Education
Supervisor II despite petitioner’s having been declared on AWOL
and dropped from the roll;
II. Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for prohibition and whether the filing of the petition for prohibition
violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
III. Who, as between petitioner and respondent, is entitled to the
position of Education Supervisor II.
RULING:
I.
NO. Petitioner cannot be reinstated by mere directive of the ARMM
Regional Governor. the Memorandum shows that the order of
petitioner’s reinstatement was made in reliance on, or in
implementation of, CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and CSC-ARMM
Directive Order dated 26 July 2000, both of which ordained her
reinstatement. However, these directives relied upon by ARMM
Regional Governor Misuari were rendered functus officio by no
less than the CSC itself per its Resolution No. 020743, which, as
previously noted, ruled that the TESDA-ARMM is not under legal
obligation to reinstate petitioner because she was already
dropped from the rolls effective 24 December 1998. CSC
Resolution No. 01-0132, ordering the implementation of CSC
Resolution No. 96-3101, was issued because petitioner purposely
concealed and withheld from the CSC the information that she had
been declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls. 33 With Resolution
No. 020743, CSC Resolution No. 01-0132 was effectively revoked.
Likewise, with the finality of the AWOL order and her having
been dropped from the rolls, petitioner legally lost her right to
the position of Education Supervisor II. In any case, she has
already received from the DECS-ARMM her salaries as Education
Supervisor II for the period October 1996 to 1997, or the period
corresponding to the time the position was still with the said
department.
II.
NO. The trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the petition for
prohibition.
The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an
encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on
the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted
when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or to put a stop to multiplicity of actions. Thus, for
a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Under Republic Act No. 6734, 36 executive power in the ARMM is
vested in the Regional Governor, who has control of all the regional
executive commissions, boards, bureaus and offices, and exercises
general supervision over the local government units within the
Autonomous Region. 37 The assailed Memorandum of ARMM
Regional Governor Misuari was presumably issued in the exercise of
his power of control and supervision. However, by ordering the
reinstatement of petitioner to her former position based upon an
outdated CSC Resolution, despite the AWOL order and her being
dropped from the rolls, ARMM Regional Governor Misuari acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
III.
NEITHER petitioner nor respondent is entitled to the position of
Education Supervisor II.
The finality of the disapproval of petitioner’s promotion, as well as
that of the Order declaring petitioner on AWOL and dropping her
from the rolls, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found by the CSC in its
Resolution No. 020743, TESDA has no legal obligation to reinstate
petitioner to the position of Education Supervisor II. This, however,
should not be construed as a declaration that respondent is entitled
to the position of Education Supervisor II
Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O.
292, provides:
All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be
submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The
disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher
position invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and
automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the
affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services
actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
Section 19 of the same rule states:
SEC. 19. An appointment though contested shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance if the appointee assumes the duties of
the position and the appointee is entitled to receive the salary
attached to the position. However, the appointment, together with the
decision of the department head shall be submitted to the
Commission for appropriate action within 30 days from the date of its
issuance otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thereafter.
Likewise, such an appointment shall become ineffective in case the
protest is finally resolved against the protestee, in which case he
shall be reverted to his former position.
It must be noted that while respondent’s appointment to the position
of Education Supervisor II was approved as permanent and
completed, it was nonetheless made subject to the outcome of the
protest filed against petitioner’s appointment. 41 At the back of the
appointment, the following appears:

This appointment is subject to the outcome of the protest of Alibai

Benito in the appointment of Andabai Arimao former incumbent to
the position. 42

As a chain reaction of the disapproval of petitioner’s promotional

appointment as Director II, respondent’s appointment to Education
Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. The efficacy of respondent’s
appointment was dependent on the validity of petitioner’s
promotional appointment which in turn was subject to the outcome of
the protest against it.

Thus, as of 17 October 1998—or the date of finality of the denial of

the petition questioning the disapproval of petitioner’s appointment
as Director II—both petitioner and respondent were reverted to their
former positions. Petitioner should have been allowed to re-assume
her position of Education Supervisor II as of the said date, and
thereafter remain in the said office until she was dropped from the
rolls in 1999. Respondent, in turn, should have been made to return
to her former position.

Indeed, for all intents and purposes, respondent became the

Education Supervisor II by virtue of her appointment as such on 25
July 1995. However, her tenure ended when petitioner was reverted
to the same position on 17 October 1998. Thus, during respondent’s
occupancy of the position of Education Supervisor II after petitioner’s
promotional appointment had been disapproved, respondent should
be deemed a de facto officer only. 43 A de facto officer is"one who
has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a
good officer in point of law." He is one who is in possession of the
office and discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color
of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. 44 The difference between the basis of the authority of
a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on
right, the other on reputation
BIENVENIDO LAUD V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP),
through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo,
applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3)
caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of
the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao
Death Squad" may be found.
 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola
(Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified that
he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that
buried the victims.
 Judge William Simon P. Peralta acting as Executive Judge
of Manila-RTC after finding a probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant, issued Search Warrant No.
09-144077.
 The herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud filed
iled an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally
Seized Evidence9 premised on the following grounds: (a)
Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of
his position as Vice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by the
Court; (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in
Davao City; (c) the human remains sought to be seized are
not a proper subject of a search warrant; (d) the police
officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for
exhumation of human remains; (e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause; (f) the rule against
forum shopping was violated; and (g) there was a violation of
the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to
be seized.
MANILA-RTC RULING
Granted the petition and denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by The People of the Philippines on the grounds that. a) the
People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the
issuance of a search warrant by the Manila RTC which was to
be implemented in Davao City where the offense was allegedly
committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court; (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4)
years before the search warrant application was filed rendered
doubtful the existence of probable cause; and (c) the applicant, i.e.,
the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject
matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same
as the one contained in a previous application before the RTC of
Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-RTC) which had been denied.
CA RULING:
The CA granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by The People of the
Philippines and held that the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application
therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section
2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, provided that the application is
filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF), with the
endorsement of its head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City,
and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive Judge or
Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this case.
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since,
among others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he
personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in December
2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims – two
bodies in each of the three (3) caves.
ISSUES:
WON the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta
invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
RULING:
NO. Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which
provides that "[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-
Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least a reprimand
shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as such,”
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative
penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as
Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of
such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may
be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer
whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
In the Case of Funa v Agra A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its
face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the
acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those
of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get
involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of
an office without being lawful officers.
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following
elements must concur: (a) there must be a de jureoffice; (b) there
must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (c)
there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
In the case at bar, The existence of the foregoing elements is rather
clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd
Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the
said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only
divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality –
that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was general
acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was
regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd
Vice Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical
possession of the said office is presumed to being good faith,
as the contrary was not established. Accordingly, Judge Peralta
can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as
if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative
impediment.

The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality

that third persons cannot always investigate the right of one
assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right to
assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
such. Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed
valid insofar as the public – as distinguished from the officer in
question – is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated,
not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but
ESTRADA v DESIERTO
FACTS:
 In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
 From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next
day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then
the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a
fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the
petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money
from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August
2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for
Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then
Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and
the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato
Cayetano) for joint investigation.
 The House of Representatives did no less. The House
Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the
exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
 January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding
lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy
Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in
demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers
walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their
concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA
Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted
more and more people.
 On January 19, The Philippine National Police and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
 At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time
since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will
not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.
 At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for
a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election.
 OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
 At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up
his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
ISSUE:
 WON whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave
while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
RULING:
NO. The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section
8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President, the Vice President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice President shall have
been elected and qualified.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear,
it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace
in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President
We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It
was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking
of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up;
and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the part tense.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an
administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars
him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not
be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges
voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings
were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment
case pending against petitioner when he resigned.