Villanueva vs CA
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
"In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the CA under RA 5434, the appeal shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within
15 days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment; or in case a motion for
reconsideration is filed within said period, then within 10 days from notice of the resolution denying
the MR.”
It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be filed both with the
Court of Appeals and with the board, commission or agency that rendered the decision appealed
from. In the instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the
Insurance Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals.
The said failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of law for the perfection of
its appeal is fatal. It renders the decision of the Insurance Commission final and executory and the
same can no longer be a subject of review.
The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the
right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
case.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, but only when it would serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. In the case at bar, however,
the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of liberality, nor has the private respondent
advanced any compelling reason to warrant the same.
Teope vs People
RULING: NO. The CA did not err. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure7
clearly provides that:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred from availing of the remedies allowed by the rules
against the judgment of the RTC, one of which is the right to file an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or
the court.
Thus, having no right to appeal the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, the petition for
mandamus cannot prosper.
Madrigal Transport Inc v Lapanday Holdings
No. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari filed with
the Court of Appeals. The issue raised there was the trial court's alleged error in dismissing the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner argues that it could still institute the Complaint,
even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency earlier. As petitioner was challenging the trial court's
interpretation of the law — posing a question of law — the issue involved an error of judgment, not
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to "grave abuse of discretion."
Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41, petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an
appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner could have
done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is to appeal the judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the
trial court's Order did not dismiss the action without prejudice. (NOTE: sec 1 of Sec 41 was amended
in 2007)
HEAVY DISCUSSION:
Appeal
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of
Court to be appealable.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing
more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation
in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but
leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
Petition for Certiorari
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
FOR CERTIORARI TO PROSPER, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess
of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave
abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised
for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the
basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction,
but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power
of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of
the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The
parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition
for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court
or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or
final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely
filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available
under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Yes, BUT exception to the rule was not established by petitioner.
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the availability of
appeal. Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not
prove adequate — either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total
failure of justice could result — a writ of certiorari may still be issued. Petitioner cites some of these
exceptions to justify the remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court, but these are not
applicable to the present factual milieu.
These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of power. On the contrary, petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within
which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal.

Hrs. of Sps. Reterta v Sps. Mores
Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting
the respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that
the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the
case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead
of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that
the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners' motion for reconsiderationwas an appeal
from the final order dismissing the action upon the respondents' motion to dismiss. The said rule
explicitly states thusly:
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a
judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting
forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only
seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and
evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient
to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying
a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason
either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to
stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment
or final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed
decision on May 15, 2002 — included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable. IEHSDA
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since
amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a
procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be
right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time
when it issued its assailed final order.
THE SETTLED RULE PRECLUDING CERTIORARI AS A REMEDY AGAINST THE FINAL ORDER WHEN
APPEAL IS AVAILABLE NOTWITHSTANDING, the Court rules that the CA should have given due
course to and GRANTED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR TWO EXCEPTIONAL REASONS,
namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid
the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order
of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when
it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised
is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an
adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of
the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to
the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being
patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
[Reason for the wide breadth and range of discretion]
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper
remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural
requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order
that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice.
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy
the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending
control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
Madarang vs. Morales
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. —
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional
circumstances.
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show
that their counsel's negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and
prudence. The mere allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80
years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people
in their advanced years. It is as empty as the bigotry that supports it.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence
and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel's negligence.
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final
order.
The decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had
six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from
judgment.
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition
for relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court
should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
Pinausukan vs. FEBTC
Annulment of Judgment; When to file
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer
resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as "a last
remedy," 32 is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for
relief.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic
fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Pinausukan's petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective
The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan's disregard of the fourth requirement mentioned
earlier consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action.
Pinausukan's failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment. for
only by the affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting
the extrinsic fraud can the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for
its petition for annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals
alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.
The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of the case,
and to his failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which the CA did not
accept as constituting extrinsic fraud, because such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not
amount to extrinsic fraud because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party,
and did not occur outside the trial of the case. Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the
developments in the case was Pinausukan's own responsibility. As a litigant, it should not entirely
leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the continuing duty to keep itself abreast of the
developments if only to protect its own interest in the litigation. It could have discharged its duty by
keeping in regular touch with its counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.
Aranas v. Mercado
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial
on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita's motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of
their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from
the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at any time during the course of the administration proceedings.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution is
expressly made non-appealable.
Jose v. Javellana
Thus, while there can be no question as to respondent Chua's liability to PBB (since he already admitted to executing these promissory notes as a co-
maker), still, the court a quo's findings on: (a) whether John Dennis Chua was properly authorized to sign these promissory notes on behalf of CST, and
(b) whether John Dennis Chua actually signed these promissory notes in his personal capacity, would certainly have the effect of determining whether
respondent Chua has the right to go after CST and/or John Dennis Chua for reimbursement on any payment he makes on these promissory notes,
pursuant to Article 1217 of the Civil Code.
Contrary to PBB's contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be
corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court's judgment. It is well-settled
that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions of law and fact.

Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and appealable.
FIRST BANCORP, INC. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JANE THOMAS LIGHTNER
First of all, the denial of Javellana's motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of respondent (plaintiff below) on the ground that it is premature and states no cause of action is
final because it terminated the proceedings so that nothing more can be done in the trial court. The order ended the litigation. There are two
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction — (1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or
Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy
to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved.
from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
If the aggrieved party appeals by writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the CA and it turns out, from the brief of appellant, that only
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal
questions of law are raised, the appeal shall be dismissed.
from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the
credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call
for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to
for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the
pending actions, such as the present case. Consequently, we rule that Javellana's notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only
questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the
PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK vs. FELIPE CHUA
appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain
In the present case, respondent appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her complaint on the ground that it failed to state a
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to
cause of action against petitioner (defendant therein), and for prematurity, as the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband had
avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
not yet been liquidated prior to its filing.
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
With the foregoing premises, we agree with petitioner's contention that a question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against
defendant or that the action is premature is one of law.
A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "put
an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or
for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering
falsehood of facts," simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as
as established those facts which are not in dispute.
alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action
After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be
necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of the other.
settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final
judgment. Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that the partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory
The Court further ruled that a review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on the factual and material allegations of the complaint would only
order that was never meant to be treated separately from the main case.
limit itself to whether the law was properly applied given the facts alleged in the complaint. What would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact. Thus, the appeal of respondent to the CA by writ of error is a wrong mode of appeal; consequently, the SAMUEL JULIAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CITY
appeal should have been dismissed. SHERIFF, respondents.

SPOUSES DADIZON VS CA Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory. It is well-established that "[t]he right to
appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." "Thus, one who seeks to
RULING: Yes. This petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. They should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court,
avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."
which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to
the Supreme Court (See Sec 2 Rule 41). They are:
Rule 41(4) of ROC provides that appellant shall pay the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original payment shall be transmitted together with the original record.
jurisdiction; and

b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
Also, it is likewise provided in the rules that the failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. It is a condition
The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the judgment, AND shall point out the error of fact or sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over the case. The requirement of an appeal fee is not a
law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons.
notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which
event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.

EXCEPTION: when persuasive reasons exist that merits leniency.

PCI LEASING VS ANTONIO MILAN (Read Sec 1, Rule 22)

This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, petitions for review from the RTC to
the CA, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, and petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. It is to be noted, however, that
IN THIS CASE:
under Section 5 Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and the filing thereof does not toll the
period within which an appeal may be taken. Petitioner submits that he only found out about the requirement to pay the docket fees when he received the CA Resolution denying
his appeal on April 22, 2005 or three days short of one year from Fling of the said appeal. This Court finds this not to be logically true to human
In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-
experience. It is unusual for petitioner's counsel not to advise him of the required docket fees. More often than not, counsels are aware of the docket
40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a Resolution, denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Said Resolution was received by PCI Leasing on
fees required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior to Filing pleadings in court. This is so because counsels are not
January 17, 2001.[65] Therefore, PCI Leasing should have filed its Notice of Appeal within 15 days from January 17, 2001 or until February 1, 2001. PCI
expected to shoulder or advance payment for their clients. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's counsel did not
Leasing actually filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days after receipt of the Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
inform him of the requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that petitioner apparently failed to
communicate with his counsel after the filng of said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that "litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should not be reckoned from May 3, 2001,[66] the date of
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. "It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from
receipt of the RTC Resolution dated April 6, 2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion.
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.
HOWEVER, despite the fact that it was filed out of time and hence final and executory, the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. In Barnes
vs Padilla, the SC stated that it has relaxed the doctrine of immutability of final judgments on the following grounds: to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances (SC used this ground in this case) (c)
Moreover, the counsel's negligence binds petitioner and, for that reason alone the loss of his remedy was caused by his own negligence.
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of
Consequently, a relaxation of the rule cannot be granted. The bitter consequence of such grave inadvertence is to render the trial court's order final
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Hence, the civil
and executory.
case was REINSTATED.

MARCELINA GACUTANA-FRAILE, petitioner, vs. ANGEL T. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN T. DOMINGO, ATTY. JORGE PASCUA AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC
BONUS – CA also erred in dismissing the notice of appeal on the ground that it involved purely questions of law, without even looking at any
BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents
substantive pleading.
 It is well-settled that "(i)n order for fraud to serve as basis for annulment of a judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character,
otherwise there would be no end to litigations. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed outside the trial
of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent.'' Thus, it "refers to some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting
his case to the court, or was used to procure judgment without a fair submission of the controversy." This Court has not just once ruled that the fraud
must be committed by the adverse party and not by one's own counsel
There exists no doubt that the notice of appeal must specify the court to which the appeal is being taken. However, considering that the notice of
appeal was filed by petitioners on October 1, 1997 or just three months from July 1, 1997, the date of effectivity of said Rule, we apply the same policy
of leniency as earlier enunciated in the Solar Team case.
Thus, the appeal should have been given due course for a proper review of the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 169-M-92 by the Court of
Appeals.

The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because otherwise, "there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel
could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.
Osorio vs Judge Dizon, AM No. RTJ-04-1838

Anent the failure to transmit the records to the Court of Appeals within the period prescribed by law, we find that respondent Casila-Derayunan was
remiss in the performance of her duty under Section 10 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which provides:
EXCEPTION: the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or where the application of the rule will result in
outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require and relief ought to be accorded to the client who
Sec. 10. Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal. — Within thirty (30) days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance
suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
with the preceding section, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court:

xxx xxx xxx

IN THIS CASE:
(d). To transmit the records to the appellate court.

Marcelina’s allegation is a mere conclusion and does not find support in the evidence submitted. To impute negligence is one thing, to
prove such negligence was in collusion with the Domingos is another. The lapses committed by Atty. Pascua were simple negligence, and not gross or
palpable negligence amounting to extrinsic fraud. While Marcelina’s case was pending, he filed the required pleadings and presented evidence in
support of the former’s cause. His filing of a defective notice of appeal and motions for recon cannot be said to be sheer absence of real effort on his
part to defend his client’s cause amounting to gross negligence. Moreover, Marcelina was not outrightly deprved of her property as she was given
ample opportunity to adduce evidence on her behalf.
She ought to know that she is required to transmit the complete records to the appellate court within thirty days after the perfection of the appeal.
Based on the records, the appeal was given due course and the records were ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals as early as September 25, 2002
but the same was not transmitted
within the 30-day period. Her explanation that she was saddled with heavy work load is not an excuse for her not to perform her duties but serves
only to mitigate her liability.

Estrella vs Espiridon, GR No. 134460

We find cogent reasons for a relaxation of the application of the rules of procedure in this case. The fact that complainant's co-plaintiff Amor filed an urgent motion did not exculpate her from liability because eight months had already lapsed
without her transmitting the records to the appellate court when said motion was filed. It has been held that the failure of the clerk of court to
transmit the records of a case constitutes negligence and warrants disciplinary action. The clerk of court is an

Further, in the higher interest of orderly administration of justice and to spare the parties from further delay in the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No.
essential officer of our judicial system. As an officer of the court, he performs delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
46671 as well as Civil Case No. 169-M-92, we move on to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioners' appeal should have been given due course by
administration of justice. Among the duties of the Branch Clerk of Court is the prompt and orderly transmittal of appealed cases and the records to
the trial court despite the failure of petitioners to specify in their notice of appeal the appellate court to which they intended to bring their appeal.
the appellate court.

Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides:

We find complainant's claim that respondent Judge violated the Rules of Court when he acted on his co-plaintiff Amor's Motion to Discharge Counsel
and Withdraw Notice of Appeal after the perfection of appeal, to be untenable.
Sec. 5. Notice of appeal. — The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed
from, specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, upon the perfection of appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, but prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court,
it can still exercise residual jurisdiction such as allowing the withdrawal of appeal. At the time the Motion to Discharge Counsel and Withdraw Appeal
was filed by complainant's co-plaintiff Amor, the records were not yet forwarded to the appellate court. Thus, respondent judge did not exceed the
trial court's jurisdiction when he acted on the motion.
However, the fault of the respondent judge lies in the fact that he treated Amor's motion as a non-litigated motion which he granted without any
hearing. While the defendants would naturally not oppose such a motion, Amor had other co-plaintiffs, herein complainant Osorio and his wife who
could be prejudiced by the withdrawal of their appeal. Thus, the respondent judge should have set the motion for hearing so as to give the other
plaintiffs the chance to be heard; or, he should have required complainant and his wife to comment on said motion. As a judge, he should exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and the procedural laws.
Villamor V. NPC (NAPOCOR)
Section 2 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the provision governing execution of judgments pending appeal, provides:
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court
while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Passing on the provision of the Rules, this Court explains:
xxx the trial court may only grant discretionary execution while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either of the original record or
the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion. When not all of the parties have perfected their appeal and the
period to appeal has yet to expire, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to order discretionary execution. Discretionary execution
is thus barred when the trial court loses jurisdiction and this occurs when all of the parties have filed their respective appeals or when the period to
appeal has lapsed for those who did not file their appeals and when the court is no longer in possession of the records of the case.
The mere filing by one party of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and to resolve pending incidents, like a
motion for execution pending appeal filed by the party within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal because the court must hear and
resolve such motion for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal.
As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the case.
The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or co-plaintiffs and neither may the defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff or co-
defendants of the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to move for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing a notice of
appeal. The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest the party favored by a decision of the right to move for a more favorable
decision or to ask for execution pending appeal. It is only after all the parties respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the court loses jurisdiction
over the case
In the present case, when NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal on time, the appeal was deemed perfected with respect to it only. The appeal did not
deprive petitioner of its right to file a motion for execution within the reglementary period of appeal or fifteen days from his receipt of the trial courts
February 20, 1998 Resolution denying NAPOCORs Motion for Reconsideration. The records do not show that copy of the said February 20,
1998 Resolution was furnished petitioners counsel. There can thus be no notice to speak of from which the 15-day reglementary period of appeal is
counted.
When a notice required to be given is not furnished to the attorney of record of a party, the corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent
procedural steps that he may take does not start. Even if it is assumed that petitioners counsel did receive a copy of the trial courts Resolution
of February 20, 1998 on the same date as the counsel of NAPOCOR did, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was still filed within the
reglementary period.
It bears noting that a certified true copy of the Notice of Transmittal issued by Clerk of Court shows that the records of the case were transmitted to
the appellate court on September 30, 1998, long after petitioner filed his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. That the trial court had earlier given
due course to NAPOCORs appeal by Order of March 9, 1998 and therein directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court is
inconsequential
With respect to the issuing of the writ of execution. As a general rule, such should be issued when the case has reached finality. The exception to such
is the execution of judgment pending final appeal. In such case, the movant must show good reason to the court why such should be granted. In the
case at bar, petitioner failed to show good cause why such should be granted. Reason for such general rule is that respondent may be injured or may
suffer damage if respondent secures reversal of such judgment.
Fortune Life V. CA
The general rule is, petitioner states, once the appeal from a trial court judgment has been perfected said court loses jurisdiction over the case. By
way of exception, it retains jurisdiction, inter alia, to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal. Under the facts of this case, upon perfection of the appeal to respondent court, the trial court lost its jurisdiction a. The first requirement of an appellant's brief is a subject index. The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing
over the case only insofar as the subject matter of the appeal is concerned but not the right of petitioner to recover damages against the bond. The ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents. Unlike in other jurisdiction, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal
cause of action in the first is the occurrence of the risk insured under the marine policy whereas in the second, it is the breach of the condition in the memoranda filed before appellate courts. (That’s why for convenience, dapat naay subject index)
bond, to wit: "to answer for any damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the execution." Granting arguendo that the trial court lacked
b. An assignment of errors follows the subject index. An assignment of errors in appellate procedure is an enumeration by appellant of
jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages, private respondent is estopped by laches from raising the same.
the errors alleged to have been committed by the court below in the trial of the case upon which he seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment.
There is no controversy that the appeal of petitioner has been perfected. As a necessary consequence thereof, the trial court was divested of
It has been held that a general assignment of errors is unacceptable under the rules. Thus, a statement of the following tenor: that "the
jurisdiction over the case. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mentions three (3) instances when the trial court is allowed to exercise "residual"
CFI of this City incurred error in rendering the judgment appealed from, for it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence," was deemed
jurisdiction after the perfection of the appeal, namely: (1) to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
insufficient. The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the facts that the trial court erred.
involve any matter litigated by the appeal; (2) to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the
appellate court; and (3) to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals. Petitioner relies on the first instance as basis for its stand that the trial court
c. The rules then require that an appellant's brief must contain both a "statement of the case" and a "statement of facts." A statement of
has the authority to hear its application for damages. Its reliance thereon is misplaced. Although the application for damages is beyond the scope of
the case gives the appellate tribunal an overview of the judicial antecedents of the case and providing material information regarding the nature of
the matter to be litigated by the appeal, there is no "protection and preservation" of its "rights" to speak of.
the controversy involved. These enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for its appraisal.

Respondent court was emphatic in its disquisition on this subject matter:

The statement of facts comprises the very heart of the appellant's brief. The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are
determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the case. The brief must state the facts admitted by the parties, as well as the facts in
The private respondent's application for damages being heard by the respondent court may not be considered an exception to Section 9 of Rule 41 of
controversy.
the Rules of Court. The provision speaks of "protection and presentation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal." The action for damages, in fact, and in actuality, however, is an act of vindication, is punitive in nature and not an act to protect and preserve,
Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in dispute must be backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule
but to punish and make one party, the petitioner, to pay damages for having availed of a writ of execution pending appeal
specifically requires that one's statement of facts should be supported by page references to the record. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a
page reference to the record, it may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether.
It is, moreover, clear that the pursuit of damages against the bond posted by the petitioner in this case, is a futile undertaking for by its express
language, approved by the respondent court, the bond may only be answerable in damages where two conditions concur: one, that judgment has, in
d. When the appellant has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is required to state the issues to be considered by the
fact, been rendered on appeal, and second, that the judgment appealed from has been reversed on appeal. The very proceedings before the
appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors: they are not the same.
respondent court, now sought to be struck down, are the very reason preventing the realization of these conditions.

The statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court. (Kahibaw na ta unsay question of fact and
Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue the disputed orders inasmuch as the case had already come under the exclusive appellate
question of law)
jurisdiction of respondent court.

e. Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his arguments on each assigned error. An appellant's arguments go hand in hand with
De Liano vs CA (Taas ni kay gi-disect ang each part sa brief)
his assignment of errors, for the former provide the justification supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolves the issues.

FACTS: There was a case filed for the cancellation of 2 real estate mortgages (REM) in favor of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
The appellant has to show that he is entitled to the reversal of the judgment appealed, and he cannot do this unless he provides
executed by private respondent Benjamin Tango over his house and lot in Quezon City. Other defendants in the case were De Liano and `Abrille, Jr.,
satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is therefore essential that the errors and reasons assigned should be supported by a citation of
who are senior executives of SMC.
authorities. Otherwise, the court may not consider the assigned errors.

The RTC of QC rendered a decision ordering SMC to release the REM in favor of Tango. SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the
In this regard, the rules require that authorities should be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins, as well as the page
aforesaid decision to the CA. In due time, their counsel filed an Appellants' Brief which failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the ROC.
of the report where the citation is found. (This is for convenience daw para din a mag pakli pakli ang court)

The appellee (respondent) was quick to notice these deficiencies, and accordingly filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal. And so, appellants
f. Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the appropriate heading, the reliefs prayed for. In so doing, the appellate court is left in
averred that their brief had substantially complied with the requirements. They proffered the excuse that the omissions were only the result of
no doubt as to the result desired by the appellant.
oversight and as such could be considered "harmless" errors.

IN THE CASE AT BAR: Naa to’y amended brief gi-file but contained similar defects as to the original brief, thus:
The CA dismissed the appeal hence the case at bar.

1. The brief filed by appellants lacked an assignment of errors but included a statement of issues. 2. The "statement of facts" lacked page references
ISSUE: WON the appeal was validly denied due the failure to comply with Sec. 13, Rule 44 of the ROC.
to the record. 3. Authorities were cited in an improper manner, that is, the exact page of the report where the citation was lifted went unspecified. 4.
The amended brief did not even follow the prescribed order: the assignment of errors came after the statement of the case and the statement of
RULING: YES. The petition was validly denied. Section 13, Rule 44 of the ROC governs the format to be followed by the appellant in drafting his brief
facts.
(pre tan-awa nalang sa codal kay taaas kayo)
 The half-hearted attempt at submitting a supposedly amended brief only serves to harden our resolve to demand a strict observance of
the rules. The negligence of the lawyer binds the client. DENIED.
Lui Enterprises vs Zuelling Pharma
RULING: YES. The CA’s denial of the appeal was proper. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA may, on its
own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant's brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs
(a), (c), (d), and (f). (Awa lang codal kay taas kaayo)
Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited.
Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises' appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely statutory right.” The right to appeal "must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law.” Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.
There are exceptions to this rule. One of which is SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant's brief. It admitted that its appellant's
brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.
However, it did not even correct its admitted "technical omissions” by filing an amended appellant's brief with the required
contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal.
Steel Corp v Equitable PCI Bank
Consolidation of cases is not discretionary, but mandatory.
Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words,
consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to determine
all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.
The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the
work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It contributes to the
swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before
the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which
would otherwise require a single judgment.
In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve identical parties, subject matter, and issues. In fact, all four (4) arose from the same decision rendered by
the Rehabilitation Court. As such, it became imperative upon the CA to consolidate the cases. Even though consolidation of actions is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and normally, its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, in this
instance, we find that the CA gravely erred in failing to order the consolidation of the cases.
By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in effect, dispensed a form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the multiplicity of suits.
Such action is not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always be ordered whenever it is possible.
2. No. CA has no power to grant such. It is not a relief that may fall in the prayer for general relief which is added to the demand of specific relief –
contrary to what defendant believe.
Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Essentially, the GENERAL RULE provides that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those assigned will be considered, save
for the following EXCEPTIONS: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration
of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing
on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but which the determination of a question properly assigned is
dependent. None of these exceptions exists in this case. IEHSDA
It is very plain in the language of the prayers of BDO-EPCIB that it only requested the CA to modify the existing rehabilitation plan. It never sought the
termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Thus, given the factual backdrop of the case, it was inappropriate for the CA, motu proprio, to terminate
the proceedings. The appellate court should have proceeded to resolve BDO-EPCIB's appeal on its merits instead of terminating the proceedings, a
result that has no ground in its pleadings in the CA.
". . . It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the
theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum allegata et probate." (Italics in
original.)
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of
a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. (Emphasis supplied.)
Trinidad Go v Chavez
Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the prompt disposition of unmeritorious cases which clog
the court dockets and do little more than waste the courts' time. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, rather than
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of their case, rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation that: DIETHS
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to
speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when
to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
We agree that the CA had the discretion to dismiss petitioners' appeal. The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in hind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
Here, we find that the failure to serve a copy of the appellant's brief to two of the adverse parties was a mere oversight, constituting excusable
neglect. A litigant's failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to warrant dismissal of that appeal. In such an
instance, all that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his opponent with a copy of his brief. Anent the failure to append a copy of
the assailed judgment, instead of dismissing the appeal on that basis, it is more in keeping with equity to simply require the appellants to immediately
submit a copy of the Decision of the lower court rather than punish litigants for the reckless inattention of their lawyers. ScCIaA
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
“That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in
the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.”
However, later on, Celestina executed a document purporting to set aside the deed of donation.

Petitioners insist that the donation was inter vivos.

This case involves voluminous records meriting a review on the merits by the CA. Otherwise, the efforts of the petitioners to protect their collateral in
their judicial battle will lead to naught once they lose their remedy of an appeal just because of procedural niceties. Adherence to legal technicalities
RTC: the provision in the Deed of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed rescinded
allows individual error to be suffered in order that justice in the maximum may be preserved. Nonetheless, "we should indeed welcome," as Judge
and of no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa.
Learned Hand once wrote, "any efforts that help disentangle us from the archaisms that still impede our pursuit of truth".

Aggrieved, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, in an action
Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.
technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help Dom: mao ra ning CIVPRO na part.
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
McDonalds v. Macjoy
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
the IPO, ratiocinating that the predominance of the letter M, and the prefixes Mac/Mc in both the
Cabuenas vs. Ardiente
MACJOY and the MCDONALDS marks lead to the conclusion that there is confusing similarity
between them especially since both are used on almost the same products falling under classes 29
Facts: Respondents Felisa and her eight (8) children filed a complaint for reconveyance and partition. They alleged that the subject land was in the and 30 of the International Classification of Goods
name of Felisa; that Felisa discovered that Tax Declaration No. 120150 (covering their land) was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
petitioners; that upon inquiry, the respondents learned that the transfer of the tax declaration in the name of petitioners was by virtue of a deed of
The respondent went to the CA via a Petition for Review with prayer for Preliminary
sale purportedly executed by Felisa.
Injunction under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

As regards the respondent's argument that the petition raises only questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review, suffice it to say that
In the alternative, the respondents prayed that Felisa did not intend a sale but possibly a mortgage only.
the contradictory findings of the IPO and the CA constrain us to give due course to the petition, this being one of the recognized exceptions to Section
RTC Ruling 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. True, this Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts. Nevertheless, when the
factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to
the RTC dismissed the complaint "for want of a valid cause of action." It concluded that the deed of sale was valid and, being a notarized document, its
the findings culled by the court of origin, as here, this Court will review them.
due execution was presumed.

FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. vs. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU

CA Ruling

Rule 45 distinguished from Rule 65 (TOPIC)

the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It ruled that Felisa never intended to sell the subject property to petitioners as she believed that the
transaction was one of mortgage. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court clarified that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission
decisions shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing Decision and Resolution of the Court of
be filed before the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, in an action for reconveyance and/or partition of parcel of land.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where the issue is limited to grave abuse of discretion. As an original action, it cannot be
Dom: mao raning part na CIVPRO.
considered as a continuation of the proceedings of the labor tribunals.

Ganuelas vs. Cawed

On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited to questions of law. In labor cases, a
Rule 45 petition is limited to reviewing whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion and
Facts: Celestina executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of her niece Ursulina, one of herein petitioners.
deciding other jurisdictional errors of the National Labor Relations Commission.
When a decision of the Court of Appeals under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions record; or (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
of law may be decided upon. different conclusion.

ANGELES vs. PASCUAL

The Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot review factual issues However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant reversing or modifying the findings of the CA, which are consistent with the established facts.
Verily, the petitioners did not prove the concurrence of the elements of abuse of rights.
Sec 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly
set forth." In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the
VIVARES VS SPOUSES SUZARA
function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions. A
question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. RTC, however, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Not satisfied with the
Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the
outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.
proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue;— all these are issues of fact. Questions like
these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition In order for one to have an expectation of privacy, it is necessary that there is a manifest intention to keep certain posts private. Note that the
and therein distinctly set forth. Supreme Court did not expressly mention any discussion about “Appeals in Special Rules”, but merely discussed the applicability of the Writ of Habeas
Data in the case at bar. I will check the SCRA later for any “implied discussion”.
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, but the circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is
attendant herein.

The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
the CA of the RTC. Resultantly, the fact of Angeles' encroachment on Pascual's Lot 4 was proved by preponderant evidence. act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
SPOUSES ANDRADA VS PILHINO SALES CORP

However, despite the erroneous arguments of STC, the writ of habeas data still does not issue in this case, owing to the fact that the students did now
Their insistence, which represents their disagreement with the CA’s declaration that the second and third elements of abuse of rights, supra, were not
show any manifest intention to keep their posts and pictures private.
established, requires the consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an appeal by petition for review on
certiorari cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social network (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility. United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
This restriction of the review to questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is true that the Court has, at
times, allowed exceptions from the restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are the following, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or NATIONAL POWER CORP VS HON SYLVA AGUIRRE PADERANGA, ET.AL (DAGHAN RESPONDENTS PULOS TAG.IYA SA YUTA NGA GI.EXPROPRIATE)
impossible; (c) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) When the findings of facts
are conflicting; (f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court; (h) When the findings are conclusions without citation
NPC filed a petition for certiorari with CA, assailing the RTC decision. Petition was denied holding that under Rule 41 (2) of 1997 ROC,
of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
the Fling of a record on appeal is required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an action for expropriation in
disputed by the respondent; (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the subsequent adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the
subject of separate appeals. Hence, the appeal.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER 65 WAS IMPROPER

The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
RULING: PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT course of the law. An Appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case.

In Rule 41(2) of ROC (read lng kay taas ang provision),x x x no record in appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
if FINAL ORDER - if the order disposes of the action
manner.
or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal.

– PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI 45 (kani nga certiorari is APPEAL to SC by a PETITION FOR REVIEW)
Court said that while a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes the existence of
multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation. In Municipality of Binan v Garcia, in an action of expropriation, there are 2 stages. FIRST, it is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain (Condemnation proceeding). SECOND, it is
INTERLOCUTORY - merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, hence basically
concerned with the determination by the Court of just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
provisional in its application

– PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under 65 (kani nga certiorari is WHEN NO OTHER REMEDY)

Therefore, in actions for eminent domain, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty days counted from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed for actions in general. As such, the complaint falls under the
classification of "other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require" in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41. IN THIS CASE:

The assailed resolutions declaring the appeal of petitioners as having been abandoned and accordingly dismissed are in the nature of a
final order, hence, the remedy is a petition for review on certiorari under 45 and not petition for certiorari under 65
On the contention that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent Enriquez, Court said that Enriquez can actually participate in the
determination of the value of her property which is expropriated pursuant to Sec 3 Rule 67 par. 3 .x x x “however, at the trial of the issue of just
compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT CERTIORARI WAS PROPER, THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY CA.
be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award”. So if she does not agree with the determination of the value, THEN SHE
MAY APPEAL. (reason jud is kay wala daw mi file ug answer si Enriquez sa complaint of expropriation ni NPC. . . But wala sya mi oppose sa
expropriation, only ra sa determination sa JC, so despite that, maka participate jpon sya if ang issue na is JC, which is the present case, so maka.appeal
sya if ever aggrieved sa value) A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The abuse of discretion must be as
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have fied a record on appeal within 30 days
from receipt of the trial court's decision. The trial court's dismissal of its appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.

IN THIS CASE:

There was no grave abuse committed coz under Sec. 1(e) Rule 50, one of the grounds for dismissal of appeal is failure of appellant to
Wa na nako apila ang discussion on just compensation and right of way.
serve and file the required brief or memorandum within the time provided.

DENIED.
CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion, hence it is neither mandatory
nor ministerial. Circumstances surrounding the case must be taken into account.

SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA and LUZVIMINDA CASTILLO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and AMADO BRAVO, JR., respondents.
 The petitioners’ excuse for their failure was flimsy and discreditable, hence dismissal was valid. The records of the case clearly showed
that through their counsel, they received the assailed resolution. The CA was guided by the Report of the Judicial Records Division of the CA and by
the certification issued by the Postmaster of Quezon City.
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO WARRANT RELAXATION OF THE RULES DOES NOT APPLY
Bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will automatically compel the Court to suspend
procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with
the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
DENIED.
Brgy. Dasmarinas vs Creative Play Corner School, GR No. 169942
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from
the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above, it is clear that the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, may
only grant a further extension when presented with the most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15 days. Thus, when the CA
denied petitioner's Second Motion for Extension of five days, it was merely following the above mentioned provision of the rules after it found the
reason for the second extension as not compelling. And, considering that the CA has already sufficiently explained how it was able to arrive at the
conclusion that there is no compelling reason for such second extension, we deem it unnecessary to repeat the same especially since we are in total
agreement with the ratiocination of the CA.
As to petitioner's invocation of liberal application of the rules, we cannot heed the same. "It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and
that the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may
be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons."
Moreover, as pointed out by respondents, petitioner had not only
once transgressed procedural rules. This Court has previously held that "[t]echnical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to
benefit the deserving." Petitioner's low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is undeserving of their
relaxation.
Also, we cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that considering that no prejudice was caused to respondents by the belated filing of the petition
as the latter were free and not detained hence, the CA should have just disregarded such belated filing. Likewise, the filing of the petition and
payment of the corresponding docket fees prior to petitioner's receipt of the CA's resolution denying its Second Motion for Extension does not,
contrary to petitioner's position, render such belated filing moot. If such would be the case, the delay in the delivery of court resolutions caused by
the limitations of postal service would serve as a convenient cover up for a pleading or a motion's belated filing. This would be contrary to the aim of
procedural rules which is to secure an effective and expeditious administration of justice.
Alfonso V. Andres
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on
its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass
by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for
delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners,
but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.
Petitioners are at fault on this case and cannot rely on such reason so as to relax the rules.
Petitioners failed to prove that the circumstances would merit an exception.
Petitioner likewise argued that technicalities should be disregard on the ground that the merits of
their case are strong. The court disagrees, the partition made by petitioners’ descendants and
subsequent sale in favor of respondent was valid notwithstanding the absence of publication with
respect to the extrajudicial partition