Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Oh Cho v.

Director of Lands (1946)

FACTS:

 Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection of his application based on disqualification as alien (Chinese) from
acquiring lands of the public domain.
 He had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for
registration on January 17, 1940
ISSUE: W/N Oh Cho entitled to decree or registration of the lot.

HELD: NO.

 GR: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public
domain
 Exception: in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño v. Insular Government) - not applicable since only
from 1880
 His immediate possesor failed to comply with the condition precedent to apply for the registration of the land of
which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894 so what was transferred to Oh Cho is merely
possesory right which cannot ripen to ownership by prescription (aliens disqualified to own by prescription)
Director of Lands vs. Santiago
G.R. No. L-41278
April 15, 1988
FACTS: this is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge, and
mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also
prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporation’s application for registration.
On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the
application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an
opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal
to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with
the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp
without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent
Judge Santiago.
A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to
appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the
sheriff as required by law.
On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default
was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant before the clerk
of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial
hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent
corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,
3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;
HELD: The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion
for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are
all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application for land registration is hereby
DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

1. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporation’s application for
registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is
registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent
corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject lots,
have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself.
As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the same is a public land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession
was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they
were trying to conceal this vital fact)
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of
the Public Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject lands…were forest lands and only later
declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption
that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such
possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales
patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show
that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as
alienable and disposable.

1. The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been
formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge
taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on
the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because
when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at
once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded …,” cannot
be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an
interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public
land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the
oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity
to establish the government’s claim.
3. The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be
liberal in setting aside a default judgment. “The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing
in court and given them an even chance to face their opponents.
Tthe Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which would only prolong the litigation
unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on the records before it.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care
applications to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and
plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioner’s opposition to
the application were so casually ignored.
NOTES:
1. The respondent corporation maintains that the appropriate remedy in this instance is appeal, which is expressly provided
in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and not certiorari. In Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos the
Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party is illegally declared in default.
Thus, it stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly, though not exclusively, available to a
defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in
default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default
set aside as a nullity.
2. Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:…
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. ..

Alba vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 5246Posts

Sept. 16, 1910
FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato
Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of
agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the
said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the
petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.
On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR)
asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner
of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands
decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners
deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to
be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father,
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of
property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)
He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the
two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case,
and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its
decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.
From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee
in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No.
496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act.
The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
purchase of 1864.
ISSUE:
1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had
been entered in February of the same year?
2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12,
1908.
1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud.
2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and
addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known.
The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this
contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered
into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the
two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)
The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and
while he petitioners were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee
was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for
registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include
in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it
was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants.
Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice
by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was
made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication “to all whom it may concern.”
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given]
exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government,
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.”
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
NOTES:
1. The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.
 1. The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential
characteristics of actual – as distinguished from legal-fraud
1. Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and
not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so,
for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
1. action in rem vs. action in personam:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that
only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in
some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud
6. Advantages of the Torrens System:
1. It has substituted security for insecurity. law library
2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days. law library
3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. law library
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the “three R’s” can transact his own
conveyancing. law library
5. It affords protection against fraud.
6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in
consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar
faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
G.R. No. L-19615 December 24, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE
LOS ANGELES, FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
ISIDORO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, oppositors-appellees.
Antonio G. Ibarra and H. I. Benito for other oppositors-appellees.
Jose W. Diokno for applicants-appellants
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositors-appellees Director of Lands and Province of Rizal.
BENGZON, JP, J.:
Squarely before this Court in this appeal is the important and fundamental question of whether a land
registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of title
thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the
issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.
The court a quo held in effect that it could be, as it dismissed the application to register title to the land
in its order brought here on appeal.
On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San Mateo
Rizal was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants.
Among other things it alleged that "applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land."
The required notices were given in which May 27, 1960 was set for the initial hearing. On March 3,
1960 the Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land "is a portion of the public domain".
The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition on May 24, 1960, asserting "the required 3.00
meters strips of public easement" on lots along Ampid River and a creek.
At the initial hearing on May 27, 1960 an order of general default was issued except as against the
Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal and eleven private oppositors who appeared therein. On July
10, 1960 the aforesaid private oppositors, Julio Hidalgo among them, filed their written opposition
claiming they "are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead
patents over said lots".
On July 25, 1961 a "Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating:
1. That the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the above-
entitled land registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu-148997, previously
patented on June 12, 1961 under Patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and
2. That Case No. N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, was set for hearing on May 27, 1960 but
no decision has as yet been received by this Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to this Honorable Court that Case No. N-2671,
LRC Record No. N-18332, be dismissed with respect to Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857 only, giving
due course, however, to the other lots in the application.
Acting thereon, the court required applicants in its order of July 29, 1961, to show cause why their
application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 (10.6609 hectares). On August 15, 1961 applicants
filed an "opposition to motion to dismiss". But on September 18, 1961 the court issued an order
dismissing the application with respect to Lot 11 "without prejudice on the part of applicants to pursue
the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action". After a motion for reconsideration was filed and
denied, applicants appealed to this Court.
As lone assignment of error it is alleged that "the lower, court grievously erred in dismissing the
application for registration as regards Lot No. 11, over which a homestead patent was issued by
the Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration proceeding". (Emphasis supplied.)
To start with, it is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative supervision and
executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private
ownership. (Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Vital vs. Anore 53 O.G. 3739; Republic vs. Heirs of Carle L-
12485, July 31, 1959; Director of Lands vs. De Luna, L-1441, Nov. 23, 1960.) Accordingly, a
homestead patent issued by him over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and
effect against the owner (Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 416; Vital vs. Anore supra).
Now, in the land registration proceedings applicants contended that as of November 21, 1959 — the
date they applied for registration — they were already "owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land". As a result, if applicants were to successfully prove this averment, and thereby show
their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo's
homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer public. The land
registration court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in applicants' favor and
declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the real
owners (Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 273; Zarate vs. Director of Lands, supra; Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 63 Phil. 654).
Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the validity
or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo's jurisdiction in the
land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance.
Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent
are not (De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480; Philippine National Bank vs. Ortiz Luis, 53 Phil. 649). A
homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as far
as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned (De los Reyes vs. Razon, supra). Applicants should
thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.
WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the orders appealed from and remand the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.
Junio vs. De Los Santos
GR No. L-35744 ; September 28, 1984
Facts:
Wenceslao Junio is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Bayambang, Pangasinan with an
area of 7.65 hectares covered by TCT No. 1004. An Affidavit of Adverse Claim was executed by
respondent Feliciano de los Santos, claiming one third undivided portion of Junio’s property by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Junio. Junio then denies having sold any portion of
his property to De Los Santos, hence his petition for the cancellation of said adverse claim. Junio
disputes the appropriateness of the annotation alleging that under section 110 of the land registration
act such inscription may be resorted only when there is no other means of registering an interest or
right, and that section 57 of the same statute provides for the registration of a documented sale
involving a titled property and that the register of deeds acted negligently in registering the document
without the formal legal requisites. Respondent de los Santos countered that he had tried to avail
himself of Section 57 by requesting Junio to surrender his owner’s dusplicate certificate of title but
since the latter refused to do so he was compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to section 110
of the LRA.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts were appropriate
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties
Held:
The court ruled that considering that Junio had refused to surrender the title; De Los Santos could not
avail of Section 57. Hence the latter correctly resorted to the annotation of an adverse claim. Further,
the court found that the genuineness and due execution of the sale between the parties is in controversy.
Moreover, although the grounds relied upon by Junio for the cancellation of the adverse claim were
unmeritous, it behoved the lower court to have conducted a speedy hearing upon the question of
validity of the adverse claim. The case was remanded to the RTC for hearing and for passing upon the
controversy on the merits between Junio and De Los Santos.