INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST THE ARMS OF

GOVERNMENT: LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY

By

Rt Hon Mr Justice Dr Patrick Matibini, SC, FCIArb, MP

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE KENYAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY POST-

ELECTION SEMINAR HELD AT PRIDE-INN PARADISE BEACH HOTEL,
MOMBASA, KENYA BETWEEN 4TH TO 8TH MARCH, 2018

1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional
relationships amongst the three arms or branches of government.
Namely, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.
In so doing, the paper will address various doctrines and related issues.
These include: the character of a Constitution; the doctrine of separation
of powers; checks and balances; presidential and parliamentary
systems of governance; constitutionalism; structure of government;
freedom of Parliament; parliamentary privilege versus the courts; the
sub judice rule; independence of the judiciary; judicial review of
executive action; and ultimately render a conclusion.

1.1 WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?

A Constitution refers simply to the framework or composition of
government. In essence, it refers to the manner or mode in which
government – the executive, legislature and judiciary – is structured. To
this extent, a Constitution addresses also the distribution of powers
amongst the arms or branches of government, as well as the
procedures for the exercise of the powers. While the idea of a
Constitution is co-equal with the government itself, that of constitutional
government or Constitutionalism is not, although it is itself of great
antiquity.1 constitutional government connotes a government defined,
regulated, and limited by a Constitution, written or unwritten and limited
not just in a conventional or political sense, but as a matter of law with
all its coercive force.

1
CH. Mc IIwain, “Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern” (1940) P5
2
 From its origins at a period when democracy was not yet being
practiced nor even accepted anywhere in the world, it should be clear
that constitutional government is not the same as and need not be a
democratic government; that is, a government freely elected by
universal suffrage.2 For example, the constitutional government of
England before the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1918, was
certainly not a democratic government. Similarly, an unelected colonial
government regulated and limited by a colonial institution is another
example of a constitutional government, which is not a democratic one.
Therefore, constitutional democracy combines the notion of a
constitutional government regulated and limited by a Constitution.3

A written Constitution is thus as act of deliberate creation, a code of

charter of government. Conversely, an unwritten one is an inheritance,
“an organic growth from nature and life of a people, a product of their
habits” of their national character and usages.4 A written Constitution as
something separate from and antecedent to government; something
consciously framed as an act of deliberate choice and creation, raises
the question as to who has the right and power to frame and approve it
– the people, or the government?5 Obviously, if a Constitution is the
source from which the government derives its existence and power, the
government cannot logically, make it; government cannot create itself.6
The Constitution of such a community cannot be the act of government
which is to be constituted by the Constitution; something as yet to be

2
B.O. Nwabueze, Ideas and Facts in Constitutional Making (Spectrum Books Limited, 1993) Page 4
3
Ibid page 5.
4
J.S Mill, Representative Government, Reprinted in Unitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (1910)
Everyman, Library page 189-190.
5
B.O. Nwabueze supra, note 2, at page 7.
6
Ibid.
3
 constituted, and therefore as yet non-existent cannot act.7 As the act by
which a frame of government is constituted for a people, a Constitution
has therefore to be an original act of the people.8 Hence, the notion of
the people as a constituent power, as the authority to approve and
adopt a Constitution.9

1.2 SEPARATION OF POWERS

Separation of powers is a political doctrine under which the legislature,
executive and judicial branches of government are kept distinct to
prevent abuse of power.10 In effect, the doctrine dictates that in order to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in one person or decision
making body, there must be some separation of the three branches of
government. The model is also known as Trias Political.11 The model
was first developed by the ancient Greeks in the Constitutions that
governed the City States.12 Aristotle writing in the 4th century BC
recognized that the “rule of a master is not a constitutional rule.”13 The
doctrine of separation of powers came into wide spread use by the
Roman Republic.14 It was outlined in the Constitution of the Roman
Republic.15 Under this model, the State is divided into branches as
estates and each estate of the State has separate and independent
powers and areas of responsibility.16

7
Ibid.
8
Ibid at page 8.
9
Ibid.
10
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, “Separation of Powers” http len Wikipedia.org./wik/separation of powers D.1.
11
Ibid.
12
Aristotle Politics, Book One VIII.
13
Wikipedia, Free Encyclopedia, supra note 10, at page 1.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
4
 During the age of enlightenment, several philosophers, such as John
Locke, [1632-1704], advocated the principle in their writings. John
Locke noted the temptations to corruption that exist, where the same
persons have the powers of making laws, to have also in their hands the
power to execute them.17 Locke’s views were part of a growing English
radical tradition.18 But the classic formulation of the theory of separation
of powers comes from the writings of the 18th Century philosopher
Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), who articulated the fundamentals
of the doctrine of separation of powers as result of visiting England in
1729-1731. In his work, L Espirit des Louis – The spirit of the laws-he
explained that there are three functions of government. In order to
protect individual liberty, the three functions of government – the
formulation, the application, and enforcement of the law, should be kept
separate and performed by three organs of government – the executive,
the legislature and the judiciary.19 The structure should also provide a
system of checks and balances between or amongst the different
branches, to ensure that no one body can monopolize power in order to
abuse it.

Locke’s and Montesquieu’s ideas found a practical expression in the

American Revolution in the 1780’s.20 The framers of the American
Constitution adopted and adapted the separation of powers doctrine.
Thus to ensure the preservation of liberty, the three branches of
government, are separated and balanced. Each has separate
personnel and they are separate elections for the executive and the
17
Parliament of New South Wales “Separation of Powers Doctrine and Practice http www Parliaments
NSW/Au/Prod/Parliament Publications nsfloE88B2 C638 DC23 EE51 at page 2.
18
Ibid.
19
National Constitutional Centre, Separation of Powers and a System of Checks and Balances,
“http//www/Constitution Centre or explore Basic Governing Principles/Separation Of Powers page 2.
20
Parliament of New South Wales, supra note 17, at page 8.
5
 legislature.21 Each has specific powers and some form of veto over the
other. Thus, in keeping with the doctrine, the Constitution of the United
States vests the legislative power in Congress, 22 the executive power in
23
the President, and the judicial power in the Supreme Court, and other
inferior courts.24 The United States Constitution adheres to
Montesquieu’s strict model of separation of powers. This is not
surprising because the United States Constitution was produced in
1787, just 25 years, after the Espirit des Louis was published, and the
draftsmen were well versed in Montesquieu constitutional theories.25

1.3 CHECKS AND BALANCES

Implicit in the doctrine of separation of powers, is the notion of checks
and balances. In order to prevent one branch from becoming Supreme
and to induce the branches to co-operate, governance systems
employing separation of powers typically are created with a system of
“checks and balances;” a term like separation of powers,26 is also
specifically credited to Montesquieu.27 Checks and balances refer to
the various procedural rules that allow one branch to limit another, such
as the authority to veto legislation passed.28 The system of checks and
balances is designed to allow each branch to restrain the other(s).

21
Ibid.
22
Article 1 of the United States Constitution.
23
Ibid Article 2
24
1 bid Article3
25
National Constitutional Centre supra note 19.
26
Ibid.
27
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia supra note – at page 9.
28
Ibid.
6
1.4 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS OF
GOVERNANCE
In democratic systems of governance, a continuum exists between a
“Presidential Government” and a “Parliamentary Government”.
Separation of powers is a feature more inherent to presidential systems.
While “fusion of powers” is a characteristic of parliamentary system.
“Mixed systems” fall somewhere in between, usually near the mid-point.
In fusion of powers, one estate (invariably the elected legislature), is
supreme and other estates are subservient to it. In a parliamentary
system, when the term of the legislature ends, so too may the tenure of
the executive selected by the legislature.29 In a presidential system, the
executive’s term may or may not coincide with the legislature’s their
selection is technically independent of the legislature.30

However, when the executive’s party controls the legislature, the

executive often reaps the benefits of what is in effect a “fusion of
powers”.31 Such situation may thwart the constitutional goal or popular
perception that the legislature is the more democratic branch or the one
closer to the people, reducing it to a virtual “consultative Assembly;”
politically or procedurally unable or unwilling to hold the executive
accountable.

1.5 CONSTITUTIONALISM
The idea of having a constitution and applying the doctrine of separation
of powers, as well as checks and balances, is to promote

29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
7
 constitutionalism. The notion of constitutionalism was expressed by De
Smith in the following terms.32
“The idea of constitutionalism involves the proposition that the exercise
of governmental power shall be bound by rules, rules prescribing the
procedure according to which legislative and executive acts are to be
performed and delimiting their permissible content – constitutionalism
becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb the
arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of
political power, and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon
which authority may not trespass, there is significant room for
enjoyment of the individual liberty.”

1.6 STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

Most modern democratic governments, as previously observed,
comprise three arms of government. Namely, the executive, the
legislature, and the judiciary. And all the three arms or branches of
government are creatures of the Constitution. And, consequently, (at
least in a constitutional democracy), subordinate to the Constitution.
We shall briefly conduct a survey of these three arms or branches of
government.

1.6.1 THE EXECUTIVE

The executive branch of government is primarily charged with the
responsibility of administering the laws of the country. In fact, in most
countries, the executive tends to be the largest and most influential
branch of the government. Typically, (especially in presidential
systems), the executive power of the republic is vested in the President

32
John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo, and Peter Slinn, Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the
Commonwealth. An Eastern and Southern African Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) at
page 1.
8
 in consultation with Cabinet. The President is also typically the Head of
State, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Owing to the
large nature of the executive, the President exercises executive powers
either directly or through subordinates. Apart from administering laws,
the main function of the executive is to formulate government policies
and programmmes. Apart from Cabinet, the President is also assisted
by various Constitutional office holders. These may include the
Secretary to the Cabinet, Attorney General, and Director of Public
Prosecutions to mention, but a few.

The main functions of the executive may be summarized as follows:33

(a) to ensure good governance and secure management of public
affairs as well as the exercise of public powers and duties;
(b) to initiate legislation in the form of Bills for passage by the
legislature into laws;
(c) to govern citizens and provide an enabling environment for the
provision of education, health, employment, housing, food,
clothing, water and other needs in accordance with the laws of the
land;
(d) pass subsidiary legislation in the form of delegated legislation;
(e) defend the country against both internal and external enemies;
(f) appoint judicial officers and make other local and diplomatic
appointments; and
(g) prudently manage the finances of the country as appropriated by
the legislature during the annual budget meeting and collectively
be accountable to the legislature.

33
Chifumu K Banda SC, “Principles of Separation of Powers, “Checks and Balances,” A paper presented to the Post-
Election Seminar for Members of Parliament of the National Assembly of Zambia held at Parliament Buildings,
th th
Lusaka, between 12 to 14 Nov. 2016, pages 4-5.
9
1.6.2 THE LEGISLATURE
The legislative power is vested in the legislature. The three traditional
functions of the legislature are to, make laws, exercise oversight
function over executive branch of government, and to approve the
budget. A principal means of exercising the oversight function over the
executive is through the committee system. In addition, Members of
Parliament have the liberty to ask the executive, written or oral
questions. They are further at liberty to move motions on various
matters or issues.

1.6.3 THE JUDICIARY

The judiciary comprises a hierarchy of courts created by the
Constitution and their main function is to decide legal disputes. Thus in
the main, the function of the judiciary is to interpret the law. And where
necessary, exercise checks and balances on the other two branches of
government. Namely, – the executive, and the legislature.

We will now proceed to consider some of the major issues affecting the
three arms or branches of government.

1.7 FREEDOM OF PARLIAMENT

Supremacy, (or even misleadingly sovereignty) of Parliament has long
been one of the doctrines offered by British constitutional lawyers,
including Dicey.34 Whatever it may have meant in the 19th Century,
England, the doctrine has been severely dented in the 20th century.35 In
any case, these terms – parliamentary supremacy or sovereignty – have
not survived the transplantation into the political order of modern polities
34
John Hatchard and Peter Slinn, Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial, Independence. A Commonwealth
Approach (London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999) page 37.
35
Ibid.
10
 or States established by written Constitutions. Various written
Constitutions impose a variety of limitations upon the legislative power.
The trend now is that Parliaments are established and empowered by
Constitutions as the seats of Constitutional authority. But those
Constitutions also clearly set or delimit their powers.

Thus under the Constitutions, Parliaments are granted specified powers

and functions, as already pointed out, not only to enact laws, approve
budgets, but also to oversee the executive. It is also relevant to
acknowledge the significance of the “freedom of Parliament” derived from
its diverse role in legislating, controlling the executive and providing a
cockpit for the national political debate.36 This freedom includes
especially individual freedom of speech of members in debate.37

1.8 PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE VERSUS COURTS

Parliamentary privilege versus the courts relates to potential clashes that
may ensue between the legislature and the judiciary. Parliamentarians
generally claim that what is said and done inside Parliament is the
exclusive domain of Parliament. And, therefore, no outside agency has
the power to interject or interfere. The basis of this contention is that
members are exercising the sovereign and constitutional power of the
public whom they represent and therefore the activities in Parliament are
not justiciable by institutions created by the Constitution.38 On the other
hand, over the years, courts have taken the view that they have power to
interfere for violation of the law.39

36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid at pages 65.
39
Ibid.
11
 The logic behind their contention is that Members of Parliament can only
have the power and privileges in so far as the activities are legislative in
nature and nothing beyond this.40 These rival contentions occasionally
give rise to head on collision between these two branches of government.
How are these rival contentions to be resolved? I postulate that these
rival contentions are to be resolved through the doctrine of exclusive
cognizance.

1.8.1 EXCLUSIVE COGNIZANCE

The doctrine of exclusive cognizance refers to the freedom of the House
to regulate its own affairs. Thus Parliaments retain the right to be the
sole judge of the lawfulness of their own proceedings and to settle – or
depart from – their own codes of procedure.41 This is equally the case
where the house in question is dealing with a matter which is finally
decided by sole authority such as an order or resolution or where (like a
bill) it is the concern of the House.42 The principle holds good even
where the procedure of a House or the rights of its members or officers
to take part in proceedings depend on statute.43

The doctrine of exclusive cognizance was given fullest expression by

the courts in the case of Bradlaugh v Gosset.44 In that case a question
arose whether Bradlaugh who had been returned a member had
qualified himself to sit by making an affirmation instead of taking the
oath by an order of the House. In the course of his judgment in an
action seeking inter alia, to have the order declared void, Stephen J,

40
Ibid.
41
Sir Malcom Jack Editor, Eskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Use of Parliament, Twenty
Fourth Edition (London, Lexis Nexis, 2011) page 227
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
[1884] 12 QBD 271.
12
 declared that even if the House of Commons forbade a member to do
what statute required him to do, and in order to enforce the prohibition,
excluding him from the House, the court had no power to interfere. He
went on to observe that:
“The House of Commons is not subject to the control of ….. [the] courts
in its administration of that part of the statute law which has relation to
its own internal proceedings … Even if that interpretation should be
erroneous, the court has no power to interfere with it, directly or
indirectly.”

The principle or notion of “exclusive cognizance” was affirmed by the

High Court of Zambia in the case of Nalumino Mundia.45 This was an
application for leave to apply for an order of certiorari directed to the
Chairman of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly of Zambia,
requiring him to remove into the court for the purpose of having it
quashed an order suspending the applicant; Nalumino Mundia, from the
National Assembly of Zambia for a period of three months. In delivering
the judgment, Hughes J, observed that the application raised an
important constitutional issue of the extent of the High Court’s
jurisdiction in relation to the affairs of Parliament. Hughes J noted that
the question had led to considerable conflict in England in reconciling
the law of privilege of Parliament, with the general law. In resolving the
question, Hughes, J, relied on Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice
17th Edition, where the learned authors observed at page 252 as
follows:
“The solution gradually marked out by courts is to insist on their right in
principle to decide all questions of privilege arising in litigation before
them with certain large exceptions in favour of parliamentary jurisdiction.
45
(1971) Z.R.70.
13
 Two of these which are supported by great weight of authority are the
exclusive jurisdiction of such House over its own internal proceedings
and the right of either House to commit and punish for contempt.”

In India, in the case of Gupta and others v The Speaker of the

Legislative Assembly of West Bangal Air,46 the court made the following
observation at page 23 of the judgment:
“The Constitution lays down the respective jurisdiction of the legislatures
and the courts. It is the business of the legislatures and the courts to
make laws and of the courts to administer them. The powers, privileges
and immunities of the State legislature, and their members have been
laid down in the Constitution. Within the legislature, members have
absolute freedom of speech and discussion (Article 194). Subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, they can regulate their own procedure
(Articles 208, 212).

In such matters and within their allotted spheres, they are supreme and
cannot be called in to account by the courts of the land. The courts are
therefore not interested in the formative stages of the law. Even where a
law has been promulgated, it is not the duty of the courts to act in a
supervisory character and rectify the defects “suo motu.”

In the Gupta case, the court adverted to the English case of the Queen v
Lord Commissioners of the Treasury,47 where it was held that the
legislature had the exclusive cognizance to decide its own affairs. Thus
in the Gupta case, the court adopted the statement of Blackburn J, as
follows:

46
1956 CAL 378.
47
[1872] 7Q.B. 387.
14
 “I must observe in saying this that there is not the slightest intention on
my part to question the exclusive prerogative of the House of Commons
in voting the money. As long as the thing remains “in fieri,” a resolution
in the House, it could not I believe be brought properly before this court.
But when the money has been voted, and the money has been granted,
and an Appropriation Act has been passed, then it becomes an Act of
the legislature, and we must construe it when it comes before us as we
should do any other Act.”

It also instructive to note that the learned authors of M.N Kaul and S.L
Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament,48 state as follows at
page 239:
“Parliament is sovereign within the limits assigned to it by the
Constitution. There is inherent right in the House to conduct its affairs
without any interference from an outside body… In the matter of judging
the validity of its proceedings, the House has also collective privilege to
declare what it will discuss and in what order, without any interference
from a court of law… The House is not responsible to any external
authority for following the procedure it lays down itself and it may depart
from that procedure at its own discretion. The validity of any
proceedings in Parliament cannot be questioned in any court on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. No officer or member of
Parliament in whom powers are vested for regulating the procedure on
the conduct of business or for maintaining order, in Parliament is subject
to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those
powers…..”

48
New Dehli, Metropolitan Book Company Private Limited, 2009.
15
 The immunity of parliamentary proceedings from impeachment and
question in the courts is in essence a safeguard of the separation of
powers; it prevents the other two branches of the government; the
executive and the judiciary, calling into question or inquiry into the
proceedings of the legislature.49

1.8.2 THE SUB JUDICE RULE

Another matter which has bearing on parliamentary privilege, is the issue of

the sub judice rule. Sub judice refers to a situation where a matter is before a
court. And as a result, cannot be subjected to debate in Parliament. In order
to explain the notion of sub judice, I cannot do better than to quote
from the learned authors of M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher Practice
and Procedure of Parliament, 50 at page 1122 as follows:

"It is the absolute privilege of the legislatures and Members thereof to

discuss and deliberate upon all matters pertaining to the governance
of the country and its people. Freedom of speech on the floor of the
House is the essence of parliamentary democracy. Certain
restrictions on this freedom have, to a limited degree, been self-
imposed. One such restriction is that the discussion on matters
pending adjudication before courts of law should be avoided on the
floor of the House, so that the courts function uninfluenced by
anything said outside the ambit of trial in dealing with such matters.
While applying the restrictions regarding the rule of sub judice, it has
to be ensured that the primary right of freedom of speech is not
unduly impaired to the prejudice of the legislatures.”

49 th
Harry Evans, Odgers Australian Senate Practice 12 edition (Community Ltd, 2008).
50
Sixth edition, (New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Company P.V.T Limited, 2009).
16
The learned authors of M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher Practice and Procedure
of Parliament, (supra), refer to a ruling of the Indian Speaker on this subject
in the following terms still at page 1122:
"The rule whether a motion which relates to a matter which is
under adjudication by a court of law should be admitted or
discussed in the House has to be interpreted strictly. While on the
one hand the chair has to ensure that no discussion in the House
should prejudice the course of justice, the Chair has also to see
that the House is not debarred from discussing an urgent matter
of public importance on the ground that a similar, allied, or linked
matter is before a court of law. The test of sub judice in my
opinion should be that the matter sought to be raised in the House
is substantially identical with the one on which a court of law has
to adjudicate. Further, in case the Chair holds that a matter is sub
judice, the effect of this ruling is that the discussion on the matter
is postponed till judgment of the court is delivered. The bar of sub
judice will not apply thereafter, unless the matter becomes sub-
judice again on appeal to the "Higher Court."
(See L.S. Deb 9 — 5 1968 — C3154).

The learned authors of M.N. Kaul and S. L Shakdher Practice and

Procedure of Parliament, (supra) conclude at page 1122 that:
The question whether a particular matter is sub judice is decided
by the Speaker on the merits of each case. After all, the Speaker
as the holder of an office of the highest distinction, has the sole
responsibility cast upon him of maintaining the prestige and
dignity of the House. 51

51
See Raj Narain Singh v Atmarah Govind Kher [1954] Allahabad 319.
17
1.9 INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
The doctrine of separation of powers means also in effect the
independence of the judiciary. The source of this independence in most
Commonwealth States reflects the British experience; the Constitutions
providing for the qualification of judges, their mode of qualification and
security of tenure and generous remuneration.52 The meaning of this
independence is in essence that: 53

(a) judges and magistrates are free from executive and legislative
interference or other improper influences in deciding cases;
(b) the courts are accessible to the people not merely without
unnecessary obstacles in their way, but with assistance by way of
legal aid etc where need;
(c) judges and magistrates alone, are free to manage the courts
including allocation of cases;
(d) the judiciary enjoys sufficient resources within the national and
economic constraints, to deliver timely and effective justice;
(e) the judiciary has an adequate establishment and an effective support
service controlled by registrars;
(f) the judicial role is respected by people and particularly by their
rulers;
(g) the judgments are obeyed; and
(h) the State does not establish rival tribunals devoid of proper judicial
safeguards and procedure.

The fruits of judicial independence will then be seen in the quality of

justice administered; in upholding the Constitution and its values; in

52
John Hatchard and Peter Slinn, supra note – 34 at page 36.
53
Ibid.
18
 protecting human rights and in maintaining the balance between the
individual and the State.54

1.10 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTION

Judicial review refers to the power of the court to supervise inferior
courts, tribunals, public bodies and persons entrusted with statutory
powers in the exercise of those powers.55 The remedy of judicial review
is not concerned with reviewing the merits of the decision in respect of
which the application for judicial review is made, but rather the decision
making process itself.56 That is to say, to ensure that an individual or
other entity is given fair treatment by the authority to which it has been
subjected and that it is not part of that purpose to substitute the opinion
of the judiciary or of individual judges for that of the authority constituted
by law to decide the matters in question.57

Judicial review is a very powerful weapon in the armory of the courts to

review a decision that has been made by a member of the executive or
an administrator, which it is alleged was made improperly; without
authority as in excess of the powers conferred on the decision maker; or
because of the failure by the decision maker to observe the rules of
natural justice.58 Therefore, through the remedy of judicial review, the
judiciary exercises check and balances on both the legislature and
executive branches of government.

1.11 CONCLUSION

54
Id.
55
Patrick Matibini, Zambian Civil Procedure: Commentary and Cases, Volume 1 (Durban, LexisNexis, 2017) page
152
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
John Hatchard and Peter Slinn supra note 34, at page 106.
19
It is crystal clear from the preceding discussion, that the Constitution not
only enjoy a special place in the life of any nation, but is also primarily
responsible for defining the institutional relationships amongst the three
arms or branches of government. Namely, the executive, the legislature
and the judiciary. At the centre of these relationships, is the doctrine of
separation of powers, which is the hallmark of any democratic
government. The doctrine of separation of powers is also responsible
for shaping the principal organs of the State – the executive, legislature
and judiciary, as well as influencing the development of society both for
the present and future generations.

END

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