1. Sta. Ana v. Menla, GR L-15564. April 29, 1961 1, Act 3110).
1, Act 3110). The loss occurred during the Liberation of this country in 1945, and the application
2. Laburada v. LRA, GR 101387. March 11, 1998
3. Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty Devt. Corp., GR 123346. Nov. 29, 2005
4. Antiporda v. Mapa, GR 34118. Oct. 28, 1930
5. Casimiro Devt. Corp. v. Mateo GR 175485. July 27, 2011
6. People v. RTC of Manila, GR 81541. Oct. 4, 1989
7. Dimson v. Rural Progress Administration, GR L-3783. Jan, 28, 1952
8. Gabriel, Jr. v. Crisologo, GR 204626. June 9, 2014
9. Lagrosa v. CA, GR 115981-82, Aug. 12, 1999. Aug. 12, 1999
10. Bass v. De la Rama, GR L-47662. Sept. 30, 1942
-------------------
1. Sta. Ana v. Menla, GR L-15564. April 29, 1961
FACTS: On June 24, 1947, attorney for oppositor Eulalio Menla filed a petition for reconstitution,
alleging that the court records of the above-entitled case were destroyed in or about March, 1945.
Notice for the hearing of the abovemotion was furnished the attorney for the applicant Pascual
Sta. Ana, who thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution, on the following
ground: that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. On November 21, 1957,
the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the records of the above-entitled case
reconstituted upon (a) the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial; (b) the blue print
plan, PSU 9624 and 96264 covering the land in question; and (c) the decision of the court dated
November 28, 1931.
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio,
presiding, ordering the reconstitution of the records of the above-entitled case, and against
another order for the issuance of the decree of registration over the lands subject of this
proceeding, in the name of the oppositors Arcadio Narvades and Dominga Narvades.
On June 24, 1947, attorney for oppositor Eulalio Menla filed a petition for reconstitution, alleging
that the court records of the above-entitled case were destroyed in or about March, 1945. Notice
for the hearing of the abovemotion was furnished the attorney for the applicant Pascual Sta. Ana,
who thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution, on the following ground:
that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. On November 21, 1957, the court
denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the records of the above-entitled case reconstituted
upon (a) the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial; (b) the blue print plan, PSU
9624 and 96264 covering the land in question; and (c) the decision of the court dated November
28, 1931.
A motion to reconsider the order for reconstitution was denied.
On March 26, 1958, counsel for the oppositors filed a motion, alleging that the applicant had
abandoned his right to the reimbursement of his expenses for registration and praying that a
decree for the registration of the land be issued in the name of the oppositors. Opposition to this
petition was again filed by attorney for the applicant, on the ground that as the decision in the case
became final 30 days after November 28, 1931, and the oppositors have slept on their rights, their
cause of action is barred by Statute of. Limitations. The lower court overruled the objection and
on May 14, 1958, it ordered issuance of the decree of registration of the parcels of land in the
name of the oppositors. A motion to reconsider the same having been denied, the applicant has
prosecuted this appeal.
In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that as the decision in the registration case was
rendered on November 28, 1-931, it had become unenforceable 15 years later, that is, at the time
the petition for the reconstitution of the records was presented on June 24, 1947. The above
contention is without merit. Act No. 3110, which governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
records, provides that records of judicial proceedings in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Court
of First Instance may be reconstituted as soon as practicable, after the occurrence of any fire or
other public calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the records of judicial proceedings. (Sec.
for the reconstitution was made on June 24, 1947. It is apparent that the petition for reconstitution
herein is not belated; it must have taken some time before the oppositors-appellees, who asked
for the reconstitution, came to know of the loss of the judicial records of the registration case.
Besides, in a resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1946, the period for there constitution of
judicial records was extended to June 30, 1947. (42 O.G. No. 10, p. 2446) In any case such
reconstitution was also extended by the provisions of Republic Act No. 441 to June 7, 1951.
The second assignment of error is as follows:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS
LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS
NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except
in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final,
it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in
a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person
of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding
the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF
REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON A DECISION
WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY CASE ON A DECISION
THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law that limits the period
within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is what is stated in the
consideration of the second assignment error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character
and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land. Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefore has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered
to be registered.
For the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the applicant-appellant.

2. Laburada v. LRA, GR 101387. March 11, 1998
3. Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty Devt. Corp., GR 123346. Nov. 29, 2005
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC. v. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON
G.R. No. 134385
• The 2 petitions involve properties covered by OCT No. 994 which encompasses 1342
hectares of the Maysilo Estate, and stretches over 3 cities.
• GR 123346:
o Respondent CLT Devt. sought to recover from petitioner Manotok Realty the
possession of Lot 26 covered by aforementioned estate. Respondent’s claim is based on a title
issued in its name by the Register of Deeds-Caloocan, which title in turn was derived from Estelita
Hipolito by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 Dec. 1988. Hipolito’s title
came from Jose Dimson’s title, which was issued pursuant to a CFI order. Dimson’s title appears
to have been sourced from OCT 994.
o Petitioners challenged the validity of the title relied by respondent, alleging that
Dimson’s title was irregularly issued, and hence, the subsequent titles flowing therefrom are void.
Petitioners’ title likewise traced as its primary source OCT 994, which was transferred to Alejandro
Ruiz & Mariano Leuterio who acquired the property through an “Escritura de Venta” (Deed of Sale)
executed by Don Tomas Arguelles & Don Enrique Llopis. Ruiz & Leuterio then sold the property
to Gonzales and then to his heirs, wherein the lot was subdivided into 7 parcels.
o The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents.
o CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
• GR 134385:
o 18 Dec 1979: Dimson filed with CFI a complaint for recovery of possession & damages
against petitioner Araneta Institute, alleging that he was the absolute owner of part of the Maysilo
Estate, and that petitioner had been illegally occupying the land & refused to vacate the same. On
the other hand, petitioner alleged that Dimson’s title to the land was void.
o CFI ruled in favor of Dimson, with the following findings:
o CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
• 29 Nov 2005: The SC denied the consolidated petitions.
• The petitioners then duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration
ISSUE: Whether the Court can still overturn (at this point) its decision in MWSS v. CA & Heirs of
Gonzaga v. CA wherein it sustained the validity of OCT 994 registered on 19 APR 1917, and
nullified the same OCT registered on a later date 3 MAY 1917.
HELD: YES
• The Court held that the earlier factual finding in the case of MWSS v. CA is indefensible.
NOTE: What is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT 994 indicates that it was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 MAY 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration
since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry
made in the book being the original certificate of title.
• The aforementioned case recognized an OCT 994 registered on 19 APR 1917, a title
that never existed and, even assuming that it did exist, is now acknowledged as spurious. It would
be incoherent for the Court to reiterate jurisprudence that gave effect tot OCT 994 registered on
19 APR 1917, and at the same time, acknowledge that the same OCT never existed. Hence, the
Court can certainly decline to infuse further validity to such erroneous premise.
• Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us.
Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners could not
be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and their properties
were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court.
Land Titles; The original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is
transcribed; What stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration
made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.—With the plain language of the law as mooring,
this Court in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued
on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a
marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry
of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of
title is made by the register of deeds. Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as
it provides that the certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the
second, it was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree
of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Same; The date when the decree of registration is received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds is the date of registration since that was when he is able to transcribe the decree in the
registration book, such entry made in the book being the original certificate of title.—Otherwise
stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree
of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land registration office of the decree for
transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged
as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when
he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being
the original certificate of title. Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register
of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
4. Antiporda v. Mapa, GR 34118. Oct. 28, 1930
FACTS: On July 17,1928, the respondent judge ordered the registration of three parcels of land
in favor of the herein petitioner, Pilar Antiporda. On October 27,1928, final decree of the
registration was issued in the name of the aforesaid judge by the chief of the General Land
Registration Office in his capacity as ex-officio chief clerk of Court in land registration matters. On
November 9,1929, Clemente,Tomas, and Juan Antiporda, relations of Pilar Antiporda filed a
petition for review of the decree on the ground that Pilar Antiporda obtain the registration by fraud,
well knowing that she was not the only heir and successor of the property in question and that she
deliberately, fraudulently, willfully, and maliciously excluded the rest of her coheirs, Juan and
Tomas Antiporda, from the original application of registration, contrary to the understanding
previously had between them.
On March 31,1930, the respondent judge, upon the sforementioned petition for revision, issued
an order setting aside the decision and the decree rendered and issued in said land registration
case on July 17,1928, and October 27,1928, respectively, in regard to lots Nos. 1 and 2 and
likewise set aside his order of general default with respect to Juan, Tomas and Clemente
Antiporda. Thereupon Pilar Antiporda and her husband, Juan Arada, filed the present petition in
this court setting forth the facts hereinbefore stated, and contending that the respondent judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in reopening the final decree in the aforesaid land registration case,
inasmuch as the application for review was made more than one year after the issuance and entry
of said decree.
The respondents insist that as the decree was not inscribed in the office of the register of deeds
of the Province of Rizal until November 21,1928, the filing of the petition for review on November
9,1929, was made within the year allowed by section 38 of the Land Registration Act for the
reopening of the final decree on the ground of fraud.
It is very evident that the respondents confuse the entry of the final decree with its inscription in
the office of the register of deeds, and though the matter is fully discussed in the case of De los
Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil., 227), we shall nevertheless present a brief synopsis of the salient
points of the present case.
HLED:
That the "entry of the decree" as expressed in section 38 of the Land Registration Act means the
entry in the office of the chief of the General Land Registration Office in his capacity as chief clerk
cannot be disputed. If there is any doubt on that point, it is sufficient to examine the first two
clauses of section 41 of the Land Registration Act which read as follows:
Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy
thereof, under the seal of the court, to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city
in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called
the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted
exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall
be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court.
As may be seen there is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the
certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the
entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. The former entry is the one referred
to in section 38 of the Land Registration Act and the entry of the certificate of title is not there
mentioned.
In the present case, the petition for a review was filed too late and it would, of course, be useless
to proceed with a new trial of the case. In such circumstances, a writ of certiorari is properly
applied.
The petition is granted and the order of the respondent judge dated March 31, 1930, is hereby
declared null and void, and the decision of July 17,1928, as well as the final decree issued on
October 27,1928, is declared valid and in force. Without costs. So ordered.
5. Casimiro Devt. Corp. v. Mateo GR 175485. July 27, 2011
Facts:
1) Registered parcel of land originally owned by Isaias Lara, respondents’ maternal grandfather,
which was passed on to his children.
2) The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad Lara-Mateo.
3) Deed of sale was executed in favor of Laura, one of Felicidad’s children, who applied for land
registration; OCT was thereafter issued.
4) Property used as collateral to secure a succession of loans, a TCT of which was eventually
issued in the name of China Bank.
5) Casimiro Development Corp. thereafter purchased the property from CB; Felicidad died
intestate.
6) CDC brought action for unlawful detainer in the MeTC against the sons of Felicidad; the latter
claimed MeTC did not have jurisdiction; the land was classified as agricultural; has been in
continuous possession of the land.
7) MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, RTC against, CA and SC in favor CDC.
8) Respondent brought action for quieting of title, RTC favored CDC, CA against (not a buyer in
good faith).
Issue:
Is the concerned Certificate of Title in the name of Laura indefeasible and imprescriptible?
Ruling:
Yes. The property has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration before
CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank; OCT has already been issued
to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein
described, subject to liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves. Neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing various
transfers, and even acknowledged the registration of the land under the name of Laura.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value. Considering that China Bank’s TCT was clean title,
that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased
the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank.
NB:
If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will
not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system
and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership.
The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular
property described therein. The issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not
preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real
property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be
holding the property in trust for another person.
Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from
collateral attack.
6. People v. RTC of Manila, GR 81541. Oct. 4, 1989
PEOPLE v. RTC-Manila, Presided by HON. JUDGE RICARTE M. TOGONON and
APOLINARIO BATACLAN, JULIA BATACLAN, FRANCISCO SAGUILAYAN, ZENAIDA P.
BATACLAN, FRANCISCA BATACLAN, NAPOLEON BATACLAN, LILIBETH BATACLAN and
ELEAZAR BATACLAN
GR No. 81541
October 4, 1989
FACTS:
Private Respondents (PR) sold several parcels of land (Dasma, Cavite) in favor of Ricardo Silverio
 Parcels – registered at that time in the names of PR
One of the parcels, covered by TCT No. T-110942 is the subject matter of a litigation bet. The PR
and Pedro Caragao and his co-owners for reconveyance and cancellation of title and damages in
a civil case before the RTC of Cavite in Tagaytay
Pedro Caragao then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original
TCT of the parcel under litigation without the knowledge of the PR, so the owners’ copy (which is
of the PR’s) of the title in question did not bear any annotation of such notice of lis pendens.
When the PR sold the 2 parcels of land to Silverio, they warranted that the properties are “free
from liens and encumbrances whatsoever”
On the basis of such express warranty vis-a-vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at the
back of the original, Asst. Fiscal Dilao of Manila filed an information for "Falsification of Public
Document" against the PR.
Before the arraignment, PR filed a Motion to Quash
 Grounds:
o A notice of lis pendens is not a lien or an encumbrance within the
contemplation of the law much less of the parties
o They were not summoned by the Register of Deeds concerning the alleged
notice of lis pendens despite the fact that all the parcels of land were, at the
time of the sale to Silverio, registered in the names of the private respondents
o Annotation of the lis pendens was caused without their knowledge
o Their TCT is clean – did not bear any annotation of notice of lis pendens
o Prior to the sale, the accused did not mortgage or otherwise encumber the
said property as security for the payment of any obligation
RTC sustained PR’s Motion to Quash and dismiss
 Notice of lis pendens is not a lien or encumbrance
 It is a mere cautionary notice to prospective buyers of certain property that said property
is under litigation, and that any sale made thereof shall be subject to the result of such
litigation
Pedro Caragao filed his opposition only after the issuance of the order granting the Motion to
Quash
 Contention: notice of lis pendens is the evidence of the lien or encumbrance on the
subject property, and not the lien or encumbrance itself charged in the information
He also moved for reconsideration after 5 days. (DENIED)
ISSUE: W/N a notice of lis pendens is a lien or encumbrance within the contemplation of criminal
law, in particular, the crime of falsification of public document
RULING:
*If so, then the PR would have committed falsification
NO.
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while a notice of lis pendens is
an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.
It may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and remains uncancelled, he could rest secure that
he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of
which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment
or the decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation,
its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.
The lower court is therefore correct in ruling that a notice of lis pendens being a mere
cautionary notice to a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation,
then it imposes no obligation on the owner, but on the prospective buyer. It cannot
conceivably be the "lien or encumbrance" contemplated by law.
On the other hand, a "lien" is a charge on property usually for the payment of some debt or
obligation. A "lien" is a qualified right or a proprietary interest, which may be exercised over the
property of another. It is a right, which the law gives to have a debt satisfied out of a particular
thing.
The following are considered encumbrances: A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and
binding real property; A lien is already an existing burden or charge on the property while a notice
of lis pendens, as the very term connotes, is only a notice or warning that a claim or possible
charge on the property is pending determination by the court.
All that it does is to give notice to third persons and to the whole world that any interest
they may acquire in the property pending litigation will be subject to the eventuality or
result of the suit. It follows to reason, therefore, that the mere failure to state in a public
document, as a notarized deed of sale, the existence of a notice of lis pendens does not
constitute falsification of a public document.
The petitioner's sophistry stretches the legal meaning of lien and encumbrance too far to be
tenable. Be that as it may, not all claims against a property can be considered a lien within the
contemplation of law.
 First, such claims must be in satisfaction of some debt or performance of an act under
a contract.
 Second, the legal right to enforce such payment or performance of an act be anchored
on an existing or demandable obligation and not merely dependent upon the result of a
pending litigation where the claims of the parties are not yet finally determined.
Such claims in a pending litigation only ripen to a "lien within the contemplation of law when there
is already a valid judgment rendered because then it becomes a judgment or judicial lien.

7. Dimson v. Rural Progress Administration, GR L-3783. Jan, 28, 1952
FACTS: Claiming that he was in actual, and peaceful possession of lots Nos. 609, 610, 611, 631,
634, 635, 636, 638, 639, 641, 642, 597 and 870 of the Dinalupihan Estate, province of Bataan, of
some of the lots since 1924 and of the other lots since 1940, without mentioning the number of
the lots he had been in possession since 1924 and 1940; and that he had cleared, cultivated and
placed permanent and valuable improvements thereon; complaining that since May 1948, the
defendant attempted to disturb his occupation by putting in possession of the lots, persons who
had no right thereto; that on June 1948, the defendant, through its agent and other persons acting
in its behalf, by threats and intimidation, made known to him its intention to put other persons in
possession of the lots and persisted in its avowed intention to carry out; and that unless restrained
by the court the defendant is likely to carry out its intent to place such persons in possession of
the lots, which if carried out would cause him irreparable damage and injury in the amount of at
least P50,000, the plaintiff prays that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P5,000; and that after hearing his right to be in possession of the lots
referred to be protected and confirmed, the writ of preliminary injunction be made final, and the
defendant be ordered to pay him the sum of P50,000 as damages.
The trial court ordered the defendant to appear and show cause why the writ prayed for should
not be granted. The day after the required appearance, the defendant filed an answer denying the
allegations, claims and pretension of the plaintiff as set forth in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the
complaint and pleading lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the same. By way of special defense, the
defendant alleged that it was the owner and in possession of the lots mentioned in paragraph 2 of
the complaint since they were acquired by it, as shown by a copy of a public instrument attached
to the answer and made part thereof, and as such owner it had leased the lots to persons who in
good faith planted palay therein which was then to be harvested, and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the possession of, and had nothing to do with, the lots. The defendant ends its answer
and special defense with the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for be denied and
the complaint dismissed with costs.
In addition to its answer the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. An opposition
thereto was filed. Acting on the motion to dismiss, the court held that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and ordered the plaintiff to amend the complaint
within five days, and directed the dismissal of the complaint should the plaintiff fail to do so as
ordered. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The plaintiff did not amend his complaint but
appealed from the order dismissing it.
HELD:
It is not enough to allege in a complaint that the plaintiff is in actual physical or material
possession of certain lots or parcels of land and that his possession has been, or is being disturbed
by the defendant to entitle the former to have such possession protected by the court. It is an
essential allegation that he is lawfully in possession of the parcels of land. Such lawful possession
may be enjoyed by the owner, tenant, usufructuary, usuary, emphyteuticary, antichretic creditor,
the creditor in a contract known as foros, guardian, trustee, executor, administrator of the estate
of a deceased or an absentee, or by a person to whom the possession of the land was lawfully
transferred. If the plaintiff predicates his right, upon acquisition of title to a parcel of land by adverse
possession, lie must allege such adverse possession in the complaint. Adverse possession, as a
means of acquiring title to a parcel of land, cannot, however, be pleaded, if the parcel of land, the
subject of litigation, is covered by a Torrens title in the name of another person, corporation or
juridical entity, for the title to a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title can no longer be acquired
by acquistive prescription.[1]
It appearing from the answer of the defendant that the lots of the Dinalupihan Estate, claimed by
the plaintiff to be in his possession without any allegation as to how he came to be in possession
thereof, are covered by Torrens certificate of title No. 1301 in the name of the Monte de Piedad
and Savings Bank and that the Dinalupihan Estate, which comprises the lots, to the possession
of which the plaintiff claims to be entitled, was sold by the registered owner to the defendant, the
Rural Progress Administration, it is obvious that no person, corporation or juridical entity can have
lawful possession of trie lots included in the Estate thus sold, but only by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, transferring the possession of the lots to such person, corporation or juridical
entity. Such transfer of possession must be averred. Mere material or physical possession by one
other than the registered owner who did not transfer the possession of the lots to the one claiming
to be in possession thereof does not entitle the latter to be protected. The allegation in the answer
that the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank was the registered owner of the Dinalupihan Estate
and that it sold the estate to the defendant is not denied and hence is deemed admitted. The
plaintiff could have denied it by amending his complaint. This he failed to do.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
8. Gabriel, Jr. v. Crisologo, GR 204626. June 9, 2014
FACTS:
 Carmeling Crisologo alleged that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land
(TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; (properties were covered by an assessment of Real
property and payment of realty taxes were updated)
 She discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth,
by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed houses on the
said lots.
 Upon discovery, Atty Carmelita Crisologo (daughter of Carmeling Crisologo) demanded
that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon.
 Petitioners promised to buy the said properties but failed to do so.
 Petitioners refused to vacate the said properties despite repeated demands made by
Crisologo.
 Crisologo filed a complaint for recovery of possession and/or ownership with damages
against petitioners.
 Petitioners countered that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles were void;
that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and
continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never
in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land.
 MTCC ruled in favor of Crisologo
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioners
 CA reinstated the decision of the MTCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of
land.
Held: Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
The nullity of the decrees of registration
and certificates of titles in Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title
within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity,
however, is not that sweeping. The said provision expressly states that “all certificates of titles
issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid xxx
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered
on August 24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set.
But whether or not Crisologo complied with the said conditions would not matter because, this
would be a collateral attack on her registered titles.
The respondent’s certificates of title
give her the better right to possess
the subject parcels of land
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein.
The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title
are immune from a collateral attack.
As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on
the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
As the lawful possessor, the respondent
has the right to eject the petitioners
The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be resolved in this suit to
recover possession is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the subject parcels of land. Therefore, the foremost relevant issue that needs to be
determined here is simply possession, not ownership.
9. Lagrosa v. CA, GR 115981-82, Aug. 12, 1999. Aug. 12, 1999
UBEN LAGROSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ROMULO & EVELYN A.
BANUA, and CESAR OROLFO, respondents.
FACTS: The consolidation was granted considering the property involved is one and the same in
both petitions and Ruben Lagrosa, petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 31683 is the same Ruben
Lagrosa, who is the private respondent in CA G. R. SP No. 32070; in the same manner that Evelyn
Arizapa Banua is the private respondent in CA-G. R. SP No. 31683 while Cesar Orolfo who is the
caretaker of the subject property representing Evelyn Arizapa Banua, is the petitioner in CA-G. R.
SP No. 32070.
Both petitions involve the possession of sixty-five (65) square meters of residential lot located in
Paco, Manila, originally owned by the City of Manila which, in due course, following its land and
housing program for the under-privileged, awarded it to one Julio Arizapa who constructed a house
and upholstery shop thereon. The award was in the nature of a Contract to Sell payable monthly
for a period of twenty (20) years. Julio Arizapa is the predecessor-in-interest of respondent Evelyn
Arizapa Banua in CA-G.R. SP No. 31683, while Cesar Orolfo, petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 32070,
is the caretaker of the same subject property as authorized and appointed by Evelyn Arizapa
Banua, in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title No. 197603 covering the said property is
registered. Cesar Orolfo, as aforestated, represented Evelyn Arizapa Banua, in CA-G.R. SP No.
32070.
As found by the trial court, the title of respondent Evelyn Arizapa Banua to the subject property is
evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by the City of Manila in her favor and the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 197603, issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Manila.[4] Respondent
Evelyn Arizapa Banua derived her title as follows: Before Julio Arizapa could make the full
payment for the said lot, he died on January 20, 1987, intestate, at the age of 67 and was survived
by his wife, Josefa Albaytar Arizapa and children[5] His wife Josefa Alabaytar Arizapa died
intestate on January 21, 1988. On February 17, 1988, Evelyn Arizapa and her brothers and sisters
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition adjudicating unto themselves as the sole heirs of the
deceased, the aforesaid lot and a Renunciation in favor of Evelyn Arizapa under which they
renounced and waived all their rights over the aforesaid lot in favor of Evelyn Arizapa. The Notice
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Julio Arizapa and Josefa Albaytar was duly
published in the BALITA in its March 4, 11 and 18, 1988 issues. On March 22, 1988, the heirs of
Julio Arizapa wrote a letter to the City of Manila, through the City Tenants Security Committee,
requesting that the award of said lot be placed under the name of Evelyn Arizapa based on said
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and the Renunciation. On December 26, 1988, the Committee
approved the request by Resolution. On January 8, 1990, Evelyn Arizapa paid the amount of
P29,500.00 to the City of Manila which constituted the full payment of the lot for which Evelyn
Arizapa was issued Official Receipt No. 738608 by the City Treasurer. On April 8, 1991, the City
of Manila executed a Deed of Sale over the lot in favor of Evelyn Arizapa and, on the basis thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 197603 was issued to Evelyn Arizapa.
Petitioner Ruben Lagrosa claims to be the lawful possessor of the subject property by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage executed in his favor by Presentacion Quimbo on
the basis of a Contract of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Julio Arizapa in favor of the latter.
Lagrosa posits that he cannot be evicted from the subject property because he had prior
possession as assignee of the said Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage executed by
Presentacion Quimbo in his favor, and with the consent of Mauricia Albaytar, the sister of the
deceased Josefa Albaytar Arizapa, after the demise of the spouses Julio Arizapa and Josefa
Albaytar.
ISSUE: Hence, the instant petition on grounds that may be summarized as follows: (1) that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Contract of Real Estate Mortgage and the
Assignment of Mortgage as illegal; (2) that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 197603 in the name of Evelyn Arizapa Banua despite
the fact that Josefa Arizapa was the only legal wife of Julio Arizapa and that they were childless;
(3) that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Cesar Orolfo was appointed
caretaker of the subject property and that he was not given a chance to present his evidence
before the lower court.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
Moreover, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification
or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose. Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding.[22]
The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral proceeding.[23] Thus, the arguments of petitioner Lagrosa in the
ejectment suit are misplaced.
As to Lagrosas prior possession of the subject property, their stay in the property as correctly
found by the respondent Court of Appeals was by mere tolerance or permission. It is well-settled
that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
It must be borne in mind that, as mere assignee of the mortgage rights of Presentacion Quimbo,
the Defendant-Appellant is not entitled to the physical possession of the mortgaged property. The
same is true even if the Defendant-Appellant was himself the mortgagee. In point of fact, during
the lifetime of Julio Arizapa and Josefa Albaytar, they had possession of the property. The
Defendant-Appellant managed to take possession of the property only because of the alleged
consent thereto by Mauricia Albaytar, who was merely the sister of Josefa Albaytar. By then, the
couple, Julio Arizapa and Josefa Albaytar were already dead. Mauricia Albaytar thus had no lawful
authority to allow anybody to enter into and occupy the property. There is no evidence in the
records that Mauricia Albaytar had been appointed by any Court as the Administratrix of the estate
of the Spouses.[25]
By Lagrosas own admission, he is merely an assignee of the rights of the mortgagee of the lot
and that, consequently, the respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the only right of action
of Lagrosa as such assignee of the mortgagee, where the mortgagor is already dead, is that
provided for in Section 7 of Rule 86[26] and Section 5 of Rule 87[27] of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the mortgagee does not acquire title to the mortgaged real estate unless and until he purchases
the same at public auction and the property is not redeemed within the period provided for by the
Rules of Court.
The issues raised by petitioner in CA G. R. SP No. 32070 that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Cesar Orolfo as the caretaker of the subject property and that he was not given
a chance to present his evidence before the lower courts are also factual. The jurisdiction of this
court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the record or that they so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.[28] We find no such showing in this case. More importantly, whether
Cesar Orolfo is the caretaker of the property as appointed by Evelyn Arizapa Banua and the
representative of the latter is now beside the point. As was discussed by this Court, petitioner
Ruben Lagrosas right to possess the subject property is clearly inexistent in relation to herein
respondent Evelyn Arizapa Banua.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 31683 and 32070
promulgated on January 7, 1994 is AFFIRMED in toto.
10. Bass v. De la Rama, GR L-47662. Sept. 30, 1942
FACTS:
Pedro Ferrer was the owner of an undivided one-fourth of a parcel of land of 5,047,014 square
meters situated in the municipality of Escalante, Province of Occidental Negros, under transfer
certificate of title No. 2112. On July 16, 1920, he conveyed his interest our participation in said
land to Hijos de I. de la Rama by way of mortgage to secure the payment of P12,500 with interest
thereon at 12 per cent per annum. The mortgage was duly recorded in the office of the register of
deeds and annotated on the certificate of title on July 27, 1920.
On December 18, 1923, the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros, at the instance of the herein
plaintiff Joaquin V. Bass, levied execution on the one-fourth interest of Pedro Ferrer in the said
land by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No.
19816, entitled "Joaquin V. Bass vs.. Pedro Ferrer." Notice of the levy was presented to the office
of the register of deeds and entered in the day book on December 18, 1923, but was not annotated
on the certificate of title. Pursuant to that levy, the provincial sheriff advertised and sold at public
auction the said one-fourth interest of Pedro Ferrer in the land above mentioned, adjudicating it to
the judgment creditor Joaquin V. Bass for the sum of P4,811,35, which was the amount of the
judgment plus interest, costs, and expenses of the sale. The certificate of sale was presented to
the office of the register of deeds and entered in the day book on April 9, 1924; but, like the notice
of levy, it was not annotated on the corresponding certificate of title. It does not appear that the
sheriff ever issued a final deed of sale in favor of Joaquin V. Bass after the lapse of one year.
Neither does it appear whether or not the execution debtor Pedro Ferrer exercised the right of
redemption within said statutory period.
In or before 1924 Juliana Fuentebella Vda. de Ferrer, Pedro Ferrer, and Francisco Ferrer instituted
civil case No. 2911 in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros against the Negros Coal
Co., Ltd., Esteban de la Rama, and Hijos de I. de la Rama; and by way of cross-complaint filed in
said case on July 30, 1924, the defendant Hijos de I. de la Rama foreclosed the mortgage
executed by Pedro Ferrer as well as those executed separately by his co-owners Juliana
Fuentebella and Francisco Ferrer on the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 2112. By
virtue of the judgment obtained in said case by Hijos de I. de la Rama against Pedro Ferrer and
his co-owners, the provincial sheriff advertised and sold at public auction on January 5, 1929, the
land described in transfer certificate of title No. 2112, adjudicating it to the judgment creditor Hijos
de I. de la Rama for the sum of P50,000. Upon presentation of the certificate of sale to the register
of deeds of Occidental Negros, the latter, on January 7, 1929, cancelled transfer certificate of title
No. 2112 in the name of Juliana Fuentebella, Francisco Ferrer, and Pedro Ferrer and issued
transfer certificate of title No. 11411 in the name of Hijos de I. de la Rama. Subsequently the
sheriff's sale was confirmed by the court in an order dated July 27, 1929.
On the last-mentioned certificate of title are noted the following are subsisting encumbrances on
the land in question: (1) A mortgage of P400,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank, recorded
October 24, 1935; (2) another mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank to secure credit
of P1,000,000 to P2,000,000, recorded February 25, 1938; and (3) notice of lis pendens by the
plaintiff in this case, recorded April 21, 1939.
HELD:
It will be noted that section 51 declares the effect of registration, while section 52 specifies the
manner of registration. The two sections are complementary to each other and should be
interpreted together. To hold that the mere entry of a document in the day or entry book, without
noting it on the certificate of title, is sufficient, would render section 52 nugatory and destroy of the
principal features of the Torrens System of registration, namely, that all encumbrances on the land
or special estates therein shall be shown or at least intimated upon the certificate of title so that a
person dealing with the owner of the land need not go behind the certificate and inquire into
transactions the existence of which is not there intimated.
In connection with plaintiff's laches, it may further be noted that previous to his filing of a notice of
lis pendens on the land in question the Philippine National Bank has recorded two mortgages on
said land, the first amounting to P400,000 and the second, at least P1,000,000. These
encumbrances appellant cannot ignore. Yet he makes no offer to satisfy them, nor even , for that
matter, De las Ramas's original mortgage, which was anterior to appellant's notice of levy on
execution. That only goes to emphasize how untenable is appellant's pretension.
It is not necessary for us to determine whether or not Exhibit 8 is a forgery, in view of the
conclusions we have reached above; but we cannot overlook the glaring fact that crime was
committed in connection with the trial of this case. If the witness Joaquin V. Bass really forged
Exhibit 8, he committed the crime of forgery; and if he did not, he perjured himself when he testified
that he did. In any event, this phase of the case should be investigated in the interest of the
administration of justice.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the provincial fiscals of Iloilo and Occidental Negros, who
are hereby directed to investigate Joaquin V. Bass in relation to Exhibit 8 and his testimony in this
case and to take such action as the result of their investigation may warrant.