See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259880454

Relevance of Piagetian Cross-Cultural

Psychology to the Humanities and Social
Sciences

Article in The American Journal of Psychology · November 2013

DOI: 10.5406/amerjpsyc.126.4.0477 · Source: PubMed

CITATIONS READS

12 53

1 author:

Georg Oesterdiekhoff
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
126 PUBLICATIONS 238 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

traumzeit der menschheit View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Georg Oesterdiekhoff on 28 September 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Relevance of Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology to the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author(s): Georg W. Oesterdiekhoff
Source: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 126, No. 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 477-492
Published by: University of Illinois Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/amerjpsyc.126.4.0477 .
Accessed: 02/12/2013 10:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Illinois Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Journal of Psychology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Relevance of Piagetian Cross-Cultural
Psychology to the Humanities
and Social Sciences
GEORG W. OESTERDIEKHOFF
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Jean Piaget held views according to which there are parallels between ontogeny and the histori-
cal development of culture, sciences, and reason. His books are full of remarks and consider-
ations about these parallels, with reference to many logical, physical, social, and moral phenom-
ena. This article explains that Piagetian cross-cultural psychology has delivered the decisive data
needed to extend the research interests of Piaget. These data provide a basis for reconstructing
not only the history of sciences but also the history of religion, politics, morals, culture, philoso-
phy, and social change and the emergence of industrial society. Thus, it is possible to develop
Piagetian theory as a historical anthropology in order to provide a basis for the humanities and
social sciences.

Jean Piaget on Ontogeny and History
Half a century ago, Parsons and Shils (1961) designat-
ed Jean Piaget as one of the greatest sociologists and
psychologists. Moreover, Piaget could have gained
the status of a Darwin or a Newton of the humanities
and social sciences if he had worked out his develop-
mental psychology more clearly than he actually did,
to a theory of the history of mind, culture, and social
development. One could maintain that Piaget failed
to reach this goal because he did not do enough to
develop his approach as a fundamental theory of the
humanities and social sciences, to understand history
and culture, to describe the development of psyche
and consciousness in history, and to draw all the con-
clusions needed. Surely he wanted to develop child
psychology as a tool to reconstruct the world history
of consciousness, reason, and mind, and additionally
or correspondingly the history of society, culture, and
sciences. He recognized the study of ontogenesis as a
laboratory in which to explore the main characteris-
tics of psyche and reason across history and cultures
since the Pleistocene (Piaget, 1996, p. 142f). Thus, he
emphasized his role as a genetic epistemologist and
not only a child psychologist so as to express this
further horizon.
However, he did not do enough to draw these con-
clusions and to carry out this program in order to reach
his goal. As a consequence, developmental psychology

American Journal of Psychology

Winter 2013, Vol. 126, No. 4 pp. 477–492 • © 2013 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 is largely or even solely a theory of ontogenesis and not
a theory of culture and history, as it was in the time of
James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget, Heinz Werner, or
Karl Lamprecht. Therefore, the modern-day scholar of
history, sociology, economics, ethnology, or any of the
other social sciences or humanities has little idea of the
role developmental psychology could play in shaping
or providing a basis for these disciplines. It is therefore
necessary to resume these endeavors to enhance the
role of Piaget and developmental psychology in the
realm of scientific disciplines.
Piaget described the ontogenetic development of
psyche, reason, and consciousness in relation to the
complete world understanding such as logic, nature,
social relations, and morality. In most or all of his
books, and sometimes also in his articles and essays,
he hinted at the historical parallels of the phenom-
ena he found among children. His main reference
points were the worldview and customs of tribal
societies or occidental philosophy, especially classi-
cal Greek philosophy. For example, his books about
chance (1975b), causality (1969), morals (1932), and
the worldview of children (1959) are full of parallels
to corresponding phenomena in premodern cultures.
There is hardly any relevant phenomenon to be found
among children, whose correspondence to histori-
cal data he did not recognize and did not mention.
He repeatedly described the way that both ancient
humans and early sciences share the same primitive
concepts of causality, chance, number, and physics
as children apply. These parallels consist not only
of some main traits but usually refer to the smallest
details too (Piaget, 1969, 1950/1975a, 1975b).
For example, in his book about moral develop-
ment, Piaget (1932) paralleled children’s understand-
ing of rules to that of ancient humans regarding laws
in nature and society and, accordingly, the adolescent
treatment of rules to that of modern societies and
democratic legislation. In the same book, he recog-
nized children’s “objective responsibility” as a key
to understanding the main features of ancient law,
traits of legislation and trials. Correspondingly, he
described the evolution of “subjective responsibility,”
the restriction of the free will of sane humans, as the
single reference point to the attribution of judicial
responsibility, both in modern adolescents and in
modern law, especially since the Enlightenment. In
his book on the worldview of children, Piaget (1959)
478 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
made numerous remarks about the parallels between
ontogenetic and historical phenomena. His descrip-
tions of conceptual realism, magic, animism, and
artificialism, the four main phenomena of children’s
worldview, are full of remarks about resemblances to
the core structures of ancient philosophy and to the
thinking of the so-called primitives.
However, he usually only described the histori-
cal phenomena in a few sentences or short sections.
Thus, he never wrote a book about the history of law,
based on notions gained through child psychology.
He never wrote a book about the history of technol-
ogy, religion, magic, politics, economics, customs,
cultures, and so on, applying developmental con-
cepts. Conversely, he wrote his books mainly about
the development of children, additionally inserting
occasional, very short reflections on historical phe-
nomena. But there is one exception to this procedure.
His Psychogenesis and the History of Sciences, with
Garcia (1989), is fully dedicated to the historical gen-
esis and development of sciences, using ontogenetic
phenomena only as a reference basis. Likewise, his
three other volumes on the development of sciences
(Piaget, 1950/1975a, Vols. 8–10) deviated at least par-
tially from the usual procedure described. Thus, only
in the description of the history of sciences did Piaget
realize his ambitious program to carry out research
on children in order to understand the history of hu-
mankind, societies, and reason. Only in this area did
he complete the transformation of ontogenetic data to
human history, as the flamboyant approach of genetic
epistemology intended or implied. However, com-
pared with his research in this area, the deficiencies
in all other areas become more apparent. The main
objective of Piaget would be realized only if scholars
were to reconstruct the history of psyche, reason,
mentality, customs, religion, magic, law, economics,
and so on, at least to the same degree as Piaget himself
did in the research of the history of sciences.
How did Piaget explain the resemblances between
ontogenetic and historical phenomena? He repeat-
edly said that all human beings have to go through
the same stages. Therefore, it would be quite normal
for ancient mentality to share the same structures that
characterize children’s reason (Piaget, 1950/1975a,
Vol. 9, p. 253; 1984, p. 173f). This answer is reason-
ably correct but far from being sufficient, because the
question immediately arises as to why the so-called
primitives and ancient philosophies did not surpass
the childlike structures and did not reach the same
higher levels that characterize modern populations.
Obviously, humans of premodern societies remain
bound to lower stages, whereas modern humans at-
tain higher stages. But why does the cognitive devel-
opment of premodern humans stop earlier in com-
parison to their modern counterparts?
Piaget often said that the so-called primitives are
only bound to preoperational stages. In most or all
of his books, he determined this classification subse-
quently and stepwise with regard to all phenomena
relating to psyche and the whole world understand-
ing in physics, social relations, and morals. Whereas
psyche, reason, and the worldview of premodern
peoples are shaped by preoperational structures, the
Ionian philosophy is based on the establishment of
concrete operations, which had obviously originated
in the minds of these philosophers at that time. Fi-
nally, the historical evolution of the formal operations
accounts for the rise of mechanical philosophy and
physical sciences in the 17th and 18th centuries (Piag-
et, 1950/1975a, Vol. 9, p. 74f, p. 67, p. 96, p. 179, Vol.
10, p. 184; Piaget & Garcia, 1989, p. 30). Only rarely
did Piaget also attribute the higher stage of concrete
operations to premodern populations but not the
adolescent stage of formal operations. “In particular
it is quite possible (and it is the impression given by
the known ethnographic literature) that in numerous
cultures adult thinking does not proceed beyond the
level of concrete operations, and does not reach that
of prepositional [formal] operations, elaborated be-
tween 12 and 15 years of age in our culture” (Piaget,
1974, p. 309).
Accordingly, Piaget would support older theo-
ries, which maintained that greater portions of adult
humans in premodern societies do not develop quali-
tatively beyond the levels of children, whereas only
modern humans can attain higher stages. Therefore,
the adolescent stage of formal operations might be a
recent historical evolution, originated in socialization
techniques to be found solely in modern cultures.
Many scholars in several humanities and social sci-
ences, especially between 1800 and 1945 (to a lesser
extent up to 1970 and later), shared the theory of the
childlike psyche of premodern humans. This idea
formed the center of the theory of Auguste Comte,
the founder of sociology, and of Norbert Elias, held to
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 479
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
be the last representative of classical sociology. Most
of the founders of psychoanalysis, such as Carl Gus-
tav Jung, Sandor Ferenczi, or Karl Abraham, and of
developmental psychology, such as James Mark Bald-
win, G. Stanley Hall, William Stern, Karl Zeininger,
or Heinz Werner, adhered to this idea of the child-
like psyche of ancient humans. Werner (1948) wrote a
book in 1926 that was fully dedicated to the compari-
son between premodern humans and modern chil-
dren. He evidenced the similarities in all aspects of
psyche and personality, ranging from understanding
nature, logic, and reason to morals and magic. This
book, famous in Germany, the United States, and
elsewhere for many decades, unfolded some of the
theoretical consequences, which formed the motives
behind the work of Piaget himself (Langer, 1988, pp.
68–85; Kearney, 1973; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009c, 1997,
pp. 7–45; 2000, pp. 49–79; 2011, pp. 25–39).
Furthermore, main representatives of humanities
and social sciences, along with countless ethnogra-
phers, voyagers, missionaries, and practitioners in
developmental regions, supported this idea of the
childlike psyche of primitive humans, among them
Albert Schweitzer. Herbert Spencer and Leonard
Hobhouse, the leading sociologists in England for
some generations, Edward Tylor and James Frazer,
the fathers of British anthropology and members of
the Folklore Society, and Karl Lamprecht, the most
read historian in Germany 100 years ago, belonged to
this group (Oesterdiekhoff, 1997, 2000, 2011, 2012a,
2012b). Moreover, also in the time span from 1970 up
to now there are some scholars who have adhered to
this theory and delivered corresponding contribu-
tions, among them Habermas (1976), Ibarra (2007),
Radding (1985), and especially Hallpike (1979, 2004).
However, today such voices are rare and do not
belong to the mainstream of research and to the “of-
ficial spirit” of the sciences, whereas they expressed
leading ideas of the sciences and public opinion from
the era of the Enlightenment to 1945 or to 1970. The
ideological climate has changed dramatically, espe-
cially since 1970. Ideologies of “cultural relativism”
and “unity of mind” have replaced older theories of
development and evolution, theories of primitive
mentality and of psychogenesis. However, nobody
has actually empirically falsified the older theories,
although there are some widespread and deep-rooted
illusions that this has been achieved (see Berry, 1974).
 Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology
The easiest way and first step to applying develop-
mental psychology to the historical disciplines would
be to carry out research among contemporary bands
of hunters and gatherers, nomads, peasant societies,
and illiterate populations in backward and traditional
milieus in developing countries. Astonishingly, nei-
ther Piaget nor the scholars of Piagetian cross-cultural
psychology (PCCP) regarded this procedure as the
main instrument to realize the actual targets of Piaget.
PCCP collected data on numerous developmental
phenomena from greatly varying social settings (see the
samplers edited by Poortinga, 1977; Dasen & Berry,
1974; Dasen, 1977; Eckensberger et al., 1979; Kearney,
De Lacey, & Davidson, 1973; Schöfthaler & Gold-
schmidt, 1984). The researchers and Piaget (1974) him-
self, in his statements about PCCP, saw in the results no
direct and internal link to his ideas about the parallels
between ontogenesis and history. Whenever he (1996)
spoke about these parallels and the reconstruction of
history, he overlooked the possibilities PCCP was able
to offer, he neglected to base his related considerations
on PCCP, and he did not even mention PCCP in this
context, as if PCCP had nothing to do with his main
research goal. It seems to me that only a handful of
scholars worldwide identified the far-reaching pos-
sibilities PCCP was able to offer.
Most test researchers confirmed the universal ap-
plicability of Piagetian stage theory. The peculiarities
of the early stages are globally identifiable and are
universal traits of all humans. Humans from all cul-
tures develop the first two stages roughly the same
way. Whether humans from exotic cultures reach or
fail to reach the higher stages, they nevertheless give
largely the same answers as humans from developed
countries give when they reach or fail to reach higher
stages (De Lemos, 1973, p. 80f). Basing his summary
on several related studies, Dasen (1973, p. 90) wrote,
“It is generally recognized that the nature of the con-
cepts and the stages through which they develop are
identical in all Western and non-Western cultures.
The rate of development, on the other hand, is af-
fected by environmental influences.”
Development of Concrete Operations
Most research was carried out on the development of
concrete operations in all five continents. It develops
stepwise between the sixth and 12th year of life among
480 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
school children of modern, industrialized countries
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1941). The formal operations
unfold stepwise and gradually between the 10th and
20th year of life in modern adolescents. Their origi-
nation provides the complete and encompassing for-
mation of concrete operations. The evolution of the
fourth stage is dependent on the full functioning of
the third stage as its inevitable predecessor (Piaget,
1950; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958, 1969).
Modern humans commonly develop concrete op-
erations completely; however, humans of premodern
cultures do so only partially or not at all. I will very
briefly present a few related data to illustrate this.
Laurendeau-Bendavid (1977) researched the stage
development among 559 children in the age range
5 to 17 years from Rwanda and French Canada. She
investigated four groups of children from Rwanda,
those with a school attendance of 3 and 6 years, with
a completed school biography, and illiterate children
and adolescents, and compared them with children
from Montreal. She applied tests on seriation, num-
ber, surface, causality, animism, and quantification of
probabilities. The children from Montreal reached
the stages some years earlier than the children from
Rwanda. Among the unschooled children from
Rwanda, 5% to 20% reached concrete operations,
depending on the tests mentioned. These children
did not do much better when they were 17 years
old than at the age of 13 years. Not even 20% of the
17-year-old teenagers reached concrete operations.
Between 10% and 40% of the school children with
incomplete school education from Rwanda, with 3
or 6 years of related experience, arrived at concrete
operations. In dependence on the test, 53%–85% of
the Rwandese children with completed school atten-
dance, aged 15 or 17 years, attained concrete opera-
tions (Laurendeau-Bendavid, 1977, p. 156).
In his study on Papua New Guinea, Kelly (1977)
tested 216 unschooled and 216 schooled children in
the age range 6 to 19 years (mean 11 years) on con-
servation of quantity and length and on formal op-
erations (pendulum task). With regard to the total
sample of 532 test subjects, the percentages with suc-
cessful conservation and with established concrete
operations are small (Table 1; Kelly, 1977, p. 186).
Hundreds of tests on concrete operations in de-
velopmental regions delivered comparable results.
According to de Lemos (1973), 50% of adult aborigi-

TABLE 1. Conservation tasks in Papua New Guinea
Conservation Conservation
Age (yr) Sex of quantity (%) of length (%)
6–9 M 17 5
F 21 4
10–12 M 43 8
F 11 3
12–19 M 55 20
F 34 8
Note. Data from Kelly (1977, p. 186).
nal Australians attain concrete operations with regard
to quantity and 75% with regard to length. According
to Dasen (1974b, p. 395f ), only 0% to 30% of adult
aborigines attained conservation tasks. The adults
often perform worse than their children because they
have even less contact with the White culture and
schools (Table 2).
In the 1960s, 40% of the illiterate Chinese children
in Hong Kong aged 13 reached concrete operations,
and not one reached formal operations (Goodnow &
Bethon, 1966). Forty to fifty percent of 15-year-old city
dwellers in Zambia attained conservation of weight
(Heron & Simonsson, 1974). Fifty percent of the adult
illiterate Wolof from Senegal attained conservation of
volume (Greenfield, 1966). Roughly the same percent-
ages among illiterate adult Algerians attained conser-
vation of speed and time (Bovet, 1974). Thirty-seven
percent of teenagers from Iraq aged 13 years reached
conservation of speed and 80% reached conservation
of length (Al-Fakhri, 1977, p. 211). Peluffo (1962, 1967,
p. 192) found that only 20% of illiterate adults from
Sardinia attained conservation of volume at that time.
Generally, European children from the countryside 50
or 60 years ago developed less rapidly than city resi-
dents (Maistriaux, 1955, p. 442f; Tuddenham, 1969).
Asymptotic developments regarding concrete
operations are typical for Africans, aboriginal Aus-
tralians, Eskimos, Native Americans, and Papuans
(Ponzo, 1966; de Lemos, 1974; de Lacey, 1974; Vernon,
1969). According to reports from Peluffo, Maistriaux,
Goodnow, and Bethon, they were characteristic of
European and Chinese children from weaker milieus
half a century ago, too. Freitag (1983, p. 354) found
that 50% of illiterate teens aged 16 living in favelas in
São Paulo stayed at the border of preoperational and
concrete operational stages, 41.6% were within the
concrete stage, and only 8.4% moved to the border
of concrete and formal operational stages.
The attainment of concrete operations is nearly
complete among adolescents in most advanced coun-
tries. However, half a century ago, asymptotic and
incomplete attainments were common in the weaker
social milieus of Western countries, too. There may
be illiterate, traditional, and backward regions within
developing countries that have a minimum of con-
crete operations or are even largely preoperational.
The usual phenomenon is a certain presence of con-
crete operations. However, only greater or smaller
parts of the populations attain this stage and then only
in specific areas. Concrete operations are far from
dominating the world understanding and reason-
ing of premodern populations. “According to this
evidence, it can no longer be assumed that adults of
all societies reach the concrete operational stage”
(Dasen, 1974a, p. 418).

TABLE 2. Conservation tasks in Australia

Canberra (White children) Hermannsburg (aborigines) Areyonga (aborigines)

Conservation 100% 70% 40% 30% 30%

of quantity (9 years) (16 years) (adults) (15 years) (adults)
Conservation 80% 50% 20% 9% 10%
of weight (12 years) (15 years) (adults) (14 years) (adults)
Conservation 50% 60% 30% 30% 0%
of volume (12 years) (15 years) (adults) (15 years) (adults)
Note. Data from Dasen (1974b, p. 395f).

RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 481

This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Development of Formal Operations
The formal operations unfold gradually between the
10th and 20th years of age in schooled adolescents
of modern societies (Piaget & Inhelder, 1958, 1969;
Schröder, 1989). This fourth stage is often divided
into substages A and B. Easier forms of syllogisms
belong to A, and more complicated forms such as
counterintuitive syllogisms, the pendulum task, or
the four-color test belong to B. Nearly all modern
adolescents master the easier forms of syllogisms, but
only 30% to 50% of them accomplish tasks belonging
to B (Schröder, 1989; Mogdil & Mogdil, 1976, Vol. III,
p. 149; Flynn, 2007, p. 31; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971;
Oesterdiekhoff & Rindermann, 2008). Substage A
unfolds between 10 and 15 years of age and B unfolds
between 15 and 20 years of age, if it appears at all.
It is obvious that the weak development of con-
crete operations among premodern populations
affects the possibilities of the formal operations oc-
curring. If only 0%, 20%, 30%, 50%, or 70% of a re-
spective population reaches concrete operations, the
percentages of those who attain formal operations
might be much smaller. It can be expected that the
weaker and asymptotic development of the third stage
extends to an almost complete lack of the fourth stage.
Moreover, the asymptotic development of Substage B
among modern populations is linked both to the lack
of formal operations and the asymptotic development
of concrete operations among premodern popula-
tions. Only the brighter and more educated milieus
in modern societies develop the formal operations at
a high rate (Gellathy, 1987, p. 43).
According to Laurendeau-Bendavid (1977, p.
155f), the unschooled Rwandese never reach the for-
mal operations. Only one Rwandese test subject with
incomplete school attendance reached the formal
stage. Pupils there must attend school for at least 6
years without interruption in order to gain the chance
to reach the formal level with 13 years. Twenty-five
percent of Rwandese children with completed school
experience reached the formal stage (probabilities)
but only one pupil from the three other groups (0, 3,
and 6 years of school attendance) did so. “Finally, in
the three other tasks concerning causal reasoning and
formal thinking [causality, animism, probabilities],
only the fully schooled subjects appear more ad-
vanced than all the others, and there is no difference
between any of the partially schooled and unschooled
482 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
groups” (Laurendeau-Bendavid, 1977, p. 158). School
experience must therefore have a certain amount and
quality in order to arouse formal operations.
According to Freitag (1983), only one illiterate
favela resident among hundreds attained the formal
level. Illiterate people from China, India, Malaysia,
Africa, Brazil, Australia, Central Asia, and Europe do
not develop the formal operations (Goodnow & Be-
thon, 1966; Ashton, 1975; Ember, 1977; Lurija, 1982;
Dasen, 1974b, p. 400; Peluffo, 1967; Were, 1968; Wer-
ner, 1979; Kelly, 1977, p. 184; Hallpike, 1979; Flynn,
2007, 2008; Oesterdiekhoff, 2006c, 2009b, 2009c,
2011, 2012a).
Half a century ago in Sardinia, 55% of people
from the middle classes, 25% of country children
aged 11 years, and 20% of illiterate adults reached
the formal operations (combinatorial tests) (Peluffo,
1967, p. 195). Whereas 66% of White boys and 44%
of White girls from sixth grade in New South Wales
(Australia) reached the formal operations (pendulum)
(Philp & Kelly, 1974), not one person among the 532
Papuans accomplished this task (Kelly, 1977, p. 183).
In a follow-up study with 1,536 university students
from Papua New Guinea and Malawi, where the pen-
dulum task was replaced by the easier four-factor test
(an electronic analogue to the four-chemical test), it
was found that only a few test subjects were able to
solve this problem (Kelly, 1977, p. 184).
The problems of developing even the border of
concrete and formal operations or the easiest phases
of formal operations were documented by Lurija
and coworkers (1982, p. 108) in their famous survey
about the Kashgars in Uzbekistan in 1932 and 1933.
Eighty to ninety percent of illiterate Kashgars did
not understand the easier forms of syllogisms as well
as children from industrialized countries up to their
10th year of life do. Lurija found the same peculiari-
ties to cause this failure as Piaget had identified with
regard to children in their first decade of life. Later
studies evidenced that illiterate adults of traditional
cultures from all continents answer the same way as
adult Kashgars or modern children (Oesterdiekhoff,
2009b, pp. 73–82). Humans who do not even handle
syllogisms have no chance of using abstract and de-
ductive forms of logic and reasoning. “So it seems
correct to state that there may be no theoretic syllogis-
tic thinking in the cultures that are strictly traditional”
(Tulviste, 1979, p. 77).
 The notion that the adolescent stage of formal op-
erations is largely bound to educated populations of
modern, industrial societies has passably or partially
gained the status of a well-known doctrine. “It would
seem that throughout history many societies have
never manifested combinatorial and prepositional
logic or the other characteristics of formal thinking”
(Ross, 1974, p. 413). In the meantime, hundreds of
scholars and testers have confirmed these conclu-
sions (e.g., Chapman, 1988, p. 98; Dasen, 1974a,
pp. 412, 418, 421; 1974b, pp. 395, 400; Segall, Dasen,
Berry, & Poortinga, 1990, p. 154; Ibarra, 2007; Hall-
pike, 1979; Eckensberger et al., 1979; Werner, 1979;
Flynn, 2007; Habermas, 1976; Kohlberg, 1974; Oes-
terdiekhoff & Rindermann, 2008; Oesterdiekhoff,
1997, 2009b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Piaget, 1974, p. 309;
1950/1975a, Vols. 8–10).
Culture and Cognitive Development
Formal operations appeared among the intellectual
elite in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, when
magic, animism, and artificialism (core concepts of
preformal, childlike stages) were replaced by me-
chanical philosophy and physical sciences (Piaget
& Garcia, 1989; Piaget, 1950/1975a, Vols. 8–10; Oes-
terdiekhoff, 2011, in press). The establishment of
compulsory school systems in Europe 100–150 years
ago, based on scientific curricula, caused the rise of
formal operations, at least Substage A, among greater
parts of the population. Secondary school attendance
and universities enhanced these evolutions. Today
the world faces a spread of school education, based
on scientific curricula, and thus observes the evolu-
tion of higher stages on all continents, unequally but
continuously. The 20th century was the era not only
of the global spread of modern societies but also of
the higher stages of cognition (Flynn, 2007, 2008;
Oesterdiekhoff, 2009c, 2012a, 2012b; Barber, 2005).
The internal link between scientific curricula
and formal operations is the main reason for the phe-
nomenon that premodern populations never had a
chance to establish the adolescent stage. They did not
provide modern, scientific curricula, and therefore
they had no formal operations in their minds. Barber
(2005) estimated that changes in school education
explain two thirds of rising intelligence. Of course,
many phenomena of modern cultures have played
their part in fostering cognitive growth. Nutrition,
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 483
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
maternal care, preschool education, schools, occu-
pational improvements, and media have also contrib-
uted. But most scholars of PCCP and intelligence
research agree on the prevailing role of school educa-
tion (e.g., Flynn, 2007; Irvine & Berry, 1988; Neisser,
1998; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009b, pp. 82–98; 2012a, pp.
49–78; 2012b, pp. 130–154).
Thus, the lack of the adolescent stage character-
izes developmental, traditional, illiterate, or backward
milieus in current developing countries; European,
Western, and Japanese cultures partially 100 years
ago, largely 200 years ago, and nearly completely 300
years ago; the famous agrarian civilizations such as
the Chinese Empire, the Roman Empire, India, Per-
sia, Arabia, Egypt, and other well-known cultures of
the past; peasant societies and early kingdoms; bands
of hunters and gatherers; nomadic cultures; and
Pleistocene humans (Oesterdiekhoff, 2009b, 2009c,
2011, 2012a, 2012b).
In the view of developmental psychology, the
great divergence concerns the difference between
modern and premodern societies and not the differ-
ence between tribal societies and civilizations. There-
fore, the rise of modern, industrial culture and the
growth of adolescent stages are two sides of the same
phenomenon and belong to each other.
Some authors have refuted the empirical results
of PCCP. They maintain that the deficit results in
the development of operations would show only a
diverging development but would not disclose the
existing ones (Berry, 1974; Cole & Scribner, 1974).
This argumentation extrapolates that instead of op-
erations, exotic peoples would manifest exotic and
alien cognitions, unknown in Western cultures and
opaque to the test procedures practiced in psychol-
ogy. Thus, these critics support theories of cultural
relativism. Some others say the results might show
only performance deficits but not competence defi-
cits. If exotic cultures really needed the operations,
they would apply them. They do not show them in
test procedures because they have no experience
with tests and are not accustomed to abstractions and
deductions because they do not need them in their
everyday life. When really necessary, all people are
able to apply the achievements and abilities needed
(Cole & Scribner, 1974).
These relativistic ideas are not supported by the
empirical data. The tests reveal not only the lack of
 higher stages but also the existing and working ones;
that is, the prevalence of the lower stages. Thus, the
lack of performance is usually rooted in a failing of
competence. The higher stages are not established
because the lower stages are manifest. The people at
preformal stages display forms of world understand-
ing, behavior, and performance that developmental
psychology knows as parts and dimensions of lower
stages. Thus, there are no alien cognitions that re-
place the lack of formal operations, but instead the
lower stages of cognition are at work (Oesterdiekhoff,
2009b, pp. 63–129; Hallpike, 1979).
The so-called training studies showed that op-
erations cannot be easily learned (Mogdil & Mogdil,
1976). The premodern people cannot surmount their
magical–animistic schemes, just as children are not able
to surmount magic, animism, and other manifestations
of their anthropological stage. These phenomena are
deeply rooted in psyche and personality, in psychocog-
nitive structures. Developmental psychology does not
deal with “information” and “techniques” but with
anthropological stages. Only when premodern people
settle in modern cultures, attend schools, and partici-
pate in modern culture early in their childhood can
they attain higher stages. Later in life they have difficul-
ties in surmounting their preformal structures. They
do not give up their adherence to magic, animism, pre-
causality, and all the other manifestations of the child-
like psyche and preformal stages, as the relevant data
from ethnography and cross-cultural psychology have
shown (Dasen, 1974b; Nurcombe, 1973; Werner, 1948;
Oesterdiekhoff, 2009b, pp. 63–82; 2012a, pp. 49–78;
2012b, pp. 70–97, 172–192; Lévy-Bruhl, 1923, 1931, 1938;
Jahoda, 1974; Hallpike, 1979; Lurija, 1982; Maistriaux,
1955, p. 441).
Anthropological Conclusions
When modern populations stay at Substage A, their
“anthropological summit,” their “developmental age”
or “mental age” is roughly spread between 10 and 15
years of age. When premodern populations stay largely
at preoperational stages, they mainly reach the mental
age of children up to 7. When they are more on the
concrete level, they are spread between the two other
groups, roughly between 7 and 12 years. Laurendeau-
Bendavid found that unschooled adolescents aged 15
or 17 years usually did not develop above an intellectual
level of a 7-year-old child. “If there is no schooling, and
484 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
if the cultural environment offers no particular chal-
lenges of its own, development very rarely reaches the
level of concrete operations. It seems that at the age of
7 years, the unschooled subjects have already reached
a level which they do not surpass in subsequent years”
(Laurendeau-Bendavid, 1977, p. 144). Lurija (1982)
found the same in his famous study on the Kashgars.
In all his tests (perception, generalization, abstraction,
deduction, inference, problem solving, imagination,
and self-analysis), the illiterate adult Kashgars, aged
30 or 50 years, did not exceed the level of children
aged 6 or 7 years. The answers and reactions of both
groups were identical.
Intelligence research has estimated the mental age
of people since the days of Alfred Binet or even before.
Porteus (1937) computed the mental age of Khoisan
at 7 and a half years, and Vernon (1969) computed
that of illiterate Brazilians and other groups at 7 years.
Maistriaux (1955, pp. 419, 414, 454) compared several
groups of Arabians and Black Africans both in their
countries and in France, with different school educa-
tion, and estimated their mental age within a range
from 5 to 11 years, respectively. His test subjects did
not largely exceed the level of children aged 7 years,
even when their biological age was 20 or 30 years
(Maistriaux, 1955, p. 454). Thus, the psychometric
intelligence approach comes to the same conclusion
as the cognitive developmental approach regarding the
mental age of premodern and modern populations.
However, the developmental approach allows
further conclusions. PCCP showed that premodern
populations stay at preformal stages with regard to the
understanding of nature, social relations, and mor-
als. The stages cover the whole understanding of the
world, the whole development of psyche and person-
ality, and therefore concern the entire anthropological
structure or summit of a person or a population. The
intelligence approach can only measure reasoning
abilities (mental age); the developmental approach
can additionally identify the anthropological summit
or the level of the entire personality. Rightly inter-
preted, PCCP comes to the conclusion that premod-
ern populations stay at the anthropological stages of
children, whereas only modern populations attain
higher or adolescent stages. The psychostructural
difference between premodern and modern popula-
tions is spread between 0 and 15 developmental years,
usually between 3 and 10 years.
 Numerous scholars have paralleled children
and primitives, as shown earlier. “In this respect the
performance of traditional peoples is closely par-
alleled by that of young children in industrialized
countries” (Gellathy, 1987, p. 37). But there must
be some differences between premodern popula-
tions and children because children do not usually
build houses and temples, and they do not work in
agriculture and trades. However, developmental psy-
chology and PCCP cannot identify these differences
because both groups share the same stages, cogni-
tive structures, ideological worlds, and behavioral
consequences stemming from them. However, pre-
modern populations have more life experience and
knowledge than children have. According to Hallpike
(1979), premodern peoples and children share the
same qualitative development (stages and structures)
but not the quantitative development (knowledge and
experience). However, the influence of the qualitative
structures on reason and behavior is overwhelming.
What is the right formula to express common-
alities and differences? The right formula is iden-
tified when one says that “premodern peoples stay
at anthropological stages of children and share their
cognitive structures down to the smallest details, with
regard to the entire world understanding, apart from
some forms of knowledge and life experience.” It is
necessary to use such clear words if one wants to
secure a complete understanding of the facts. Having
done so, it becomes obvious that this notion is one of
the most important in all the humanities and social
sciences. This is the only discovery in social sciences
and the humanities that corresponds to the discovery
of evolutionary theory in biology (Oesterdiekhoff,
2011, pp. 206–220; 2012a, pp. 581–602).
Thus, PCCP delivers the basis for historical an-
thropology or historical psychology.
PCCP as a Key to Understanding Premodern Societies
Culture and worldview, religion and magic, conduct
and customs, reasoning and emotions, morals and
politics of premodern societies can be understood
fully by reference to the notions about preformal
structures that developmental psychology and PCCP
have described. Primitives have understandings of
birth and death, sickness and health, childhood and
adulthood, females and males, animals and plants,
earth and heaven, rivers and oceans, mountains and
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 485
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
forests, and so on, which are completely different
from modern understandings and related emotions.
Whichever kind of experience we want to face and
examine, we always find deviations between our and
their interpretations, as ethnography and ethnology
have described (Evans-Pritchard, 1976; Fortune,
1963; Lévy-Bruhl, 1923, 1931, 1938, 1971, 1983, 1985).
If we want to find a theoretical framework for these
data and facts, we need look no further than to de-
velopmental psychology. Developmental psychology
delivers the long-sought theoretical foundation to
ethnology and historical disciplines (Hallpike, 1979;
Oesterdiekhoff, 2009b, 2011; Radding, 1985; Ibarra,
2007; Habermas, 1976).
It is by no means difficult to combine ethnology
and developmental psychology, as many would sur-
mise. Conversely, ethnological and developmental
data correspond to each other in a way that makes it
hard to believe that ethnologists from the last genera-
tions found it so difficult to find this link. Whatever
child psychologists have written about children’s
thinking about earth and sky, magic and ghosts, myths
and fairy tales, life and death, animism and artificial-
ism, conceptual realism and dream understanding fit
the ethnological descriptions detail for detail, some-
times word for word, as Hallpike and I elaborated in
some of our books.
I am able to give only some very brief examples
here to provide a concise insight into these coher-
ences. Von den Steinen (1894) reports about some
Indians from the Brazilian jungle who ran behind a
slave. They saw a turtle on the way and maintained
that the slave had turned into this animal in order to
escape. Many ethnographers have described at length
that primitives around the world fully believed that
any kind of metamorphosis could take place any-
where at any time. Stones can transform into humans
and gods, plants and humans can transform into any
forms of animals, and so on (Oesterdiekhoff, 2011, p.
110; Lévy-Bruhl, 1931, 1938, 1971, 1983, pp. 57–61):
No metamorphosis, however ridiculous it
might appear to us, is therefore ruled out sim-
ply as physically impossible. . . . According
to our way of thinking, if we could suppose it
possible for a man to change at a substitution of
one kind of outward and visible appearance for
another—from smooth-skinned biped to shaggy
 quadruped. Certainly something more than that
would seem to be involved: the new dog would
seem scarcely likely to have much in common,
mentally speaking, with the former man. More,
we are so convinced of this incongruity that any
such change is necessarily considered by us to
be possible only in the realm of fancy; noth-
ing will ever persuade us that in sober reality a
man could turn into a dog, or a dog into a man.
But with the Australian Aborigines the case is
different. From their earliest infancy they have
been accustomed to hear about beings who are
at the same time both animals and men and can
change with complete ease from the one form
to the other. (Lévy-Bruhl, 1983, p. 83)
It would be impossible to convince a modern
person, no matter which kind of technique or con-
ditioning is used, of the existence of metamorphic
transformations. Children up to their sixth year of
life are the only sane people in modern societies who
share the beliefs about metamorphosis. De Vries
(1969) put a dog mask on a cat’s head. Beforehand,
the children tested had sufficient opportunity to be-
come acquainted with the cat presented. Children
aged 4, 5, and 6 years believed that the cat had turned
into a dog and expected it to start barking and biting.
Older children of 7 or 8 years only saw a cat wear-
ing a dog mask. De Vries (1969) and Flavell (1977)
understood the replacement of metamorphosis by
the recognition of the invariance of species as part of
the establishment of concrete operations, similar to
the understanding of the invariance of volume and
other physical phenomena.
Nearly every early child psychologist and n­ early
every ethnographer has described the animistic
schemes in the reasoning of their subjects. Children
and premodern peoples regard stones, rocks, moun-
tains, plants, forests, rivers, oceans, stars, sun, moon,
clouds, rainfalls, and so on as living beings. They do
not differentiate between dead matter and living be-
ings. The premodern peoples adore and sacrifice to
rivers and forests, mountains and moon, regarding
them as persons and gods. They entertain dialogs
with sun and moon, rivers and rainfalls, plants and
rocks (Tylor, 1871; von den Steinen, 1894; Evans-
Pritchard, 1976; Lévy-Bruhl, 1971, 1985; Oesterdiek-
hoff, 2007a; 2011, pp. 96–101; 2009b, pp. 211–223).
486 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Piaget (1959, 1969) showed that animism, an-
thropomorphism, and personification are stronger
the younger the children are. Children only in their
first decade tend to animism. Adolescents in mod-
ern societies replace the animistic understanding of
the world with the mechanical worldview and ani-
mistic explanations with empirical-causal ones. The
transformation from the animistic to the mechanical
worldview is part of the evolution of formal opera-
tions. The empirical surveys within PCCP evidenced
that premodern populations maintain their children’s
animism lifelong and never establish empirical-causal
explanations (Mogdil & Mogdil, 1976; Peluffo, 1962,
1967; Kälble, 1997; Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955;
Jahoda, 1958a, 1958b). The evolution of mechanical
philosophy and physical sciences in the 17th century
was the first step in the evolution of formal opera-
tions and the modern worldview, thus replacing the
animistic worldview of the Middle Ages (Fetz, 1982;
Fetz, Reich, & Valentin, 2001; Kälble, 1997; Piaget &
Garcia, 1989; Piaget, 1950/1975a, Vols. 8–10; Oester-
diekhoff, 1997, 2012a, 2012b).
The tendency to personification and anthropo-
morphism, as part of animism, is typical for both
groups. For generations, child psychologists ex-
plained that children attribute humanlike reason,
understanding, and morals to plants and especially to
animals. Only adolescents on the formal operational
level recognize the differences between animals and
humans with regard to willpower, reason, and mor-
als (Bühler, 1930; Stern, 1924; Werner, 1948; Piaget,
1959; Zeininger, 1929). Ethnography documented the
same with regard to premodern peoples around the
world. They assume that animals and plants know
everything about what happens in human settlements
and can understand human language, as if they had
humanlike reason. They fully believe that their talk-
ing to plants makes them grow and that plants can
walk if they want (Fortune, 1963; Lévy-Bruhl, 1971).
The Azande ask the termites about future activities
to help them plan or ask about the truth of past oc-
currences (Evans-Pritchard, 1976). The peoples take
blood revenge against predators and horses of hostile
tribes. If they have courts they accuse, convict, and
punish animals as if they were delinquents. Up to
the time of the Enlightenment, medieval courts con-
victed animals by the same methods as were applied
against criminals (Fischer, 2005; Oesterdiekhoff,
2009d, 2011, pp. 102–109). “The capital punishment
of a dumb animal for its crimes seems to us so irra-
tional and absurd that we can hardly believe that sane
and sober men were ever guilty of such folly” (Evans,
1906, p. 157). Judicial procedures against animals and
related complete misunderstandings of the capacities
of animals clearly show not only the intellectual weak-
ness of these peoples but also their childlike psyche
and personality in the deepest sense possible.
Child psychologists described magical beliefs
and procedures as inevitable parts of children’s
psyche. Children in their first decade of life cannot
avoid grasping the order of the world as if organized
by magic. The world was created by magic, occur-
rences and regularities originated in magic. Adults
and gods steer and control the world by their magic.
Full belief in magic is a part of the preoperational
stage. The last remains of magic usually last until the
tenth year of life. With the formal operational stage,
the empirical-causal explanations eliminate magic. In
comparison with the child, the modern adolescent
has surmounted magical beliefs (Piaget, 1959, 1969,
1950/1975a, Vol. 5; Zeininger, 1929; Werner, 1948;
Stern, 1924; Bühler, 1930; Jahoda, 1974; Oesterdiek-
hoff, 2009b, pp. 203–211; 2011, pp. 112–132).
Ethnography found out that there is no premod-
ern society without the full belief in magic with far-
reaching and astonishing practical consequences.
The peoples understand the world as ruled by magic,
carried out by humans, ghosts, and gods. They rec-
ognize every incident in terms of magic, from strong
rainfalls, accidents, and sickness to birth and death.
Deaths by accident or disease are in reality assas-
sinations by magicians. Ordeals are used to detect
them, and the relatives punish the murderers. The
villages are full of alleged murderers who are believed
to have killed others, who actually died of natural
causes. The people buy charms at great cost in order
to kill people, to seduce partners, to grow plants, to
catch fish, to find gold, and to defeat enemies. They
kill or punish people who are believed to have caused
harm by magic. They really believe that people are
capable of arousing storms on oceans, turning into
other species, causing rainfalls or sunshine, or bring-
ing about births and deaths magically (Fortune, 1963;
Evans-Pritchard, 1976; Mair, 1969; Lévy-Bruhl, 1923,
1931, 1938; Oesterdiekhoff, 2002, 2006a, 2007c, 2012a,
2012b, in press).
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 487
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
If we only knew from these peoples their magical
beliefs and practices, this would provide sufficient
evidence of their childlike psyche and personal-
ity in the deepest sense possible. The elimination
of magical beliefs since the rise of mechanical phi-
losophy, physical sciences, and the Enlightenment
manifests the origination of formal operations and the
psychocognitive maturation of humankind beyond
preformal levels for the first time in history. The cor-
respondence to the emergence of adolescence among
modern populations is complete.
Feuerbach (1985) was the first to maintain that
the childlike psyche of premodern humankind ex-
plains religion, whereas the maturation of human-
kind accounts for the modern elimination of religion
and the rise of atheism. In my opinion, my book on
religion (in press) will be the first comprehensive
book that explains the nature of religiousness and
atheism, including all relevant aspects, in terms of
developmental psychology, thus following Feuer-
bach’s approach. The core concepts of all religions
are as follows: (1) Gods or ancestors created the
cosmos by magic. (2) The running of the world is
ruled by gods. (3) Gods punish or reward humans
on earth and in heaven. (4) Humans communicate
with their gods by prayers and sacrifices (to feed
them). (5) Humans have a life after death, preferably
in heaven or paradise, or they reincarnate. (6) An-
cient humans are capable of creating myths that tell
biographies about gods and to believe in such tales.
Religiousness is thus rooted in a psyche, which is
susceptible to myths. (7) Divinities are imaginary
giants or deceased ancestors.
Children’s adherence to magic and artificialism
account for the religious belief into divine creation
and rulership regarding cosmos and world (1, 2).
Children’s expectations toward parents explain the
belief in divine reward and punishment, in prayers
and sacrifices (3, 4). Cognitive egocentrism and child-
like wishful thinking disclose the belief in the immor-
tality of the soul, in paradise and heaven (5). Further-
more, child psychologists describe the age between
4 and 8 as the time when children are keen on myths
(Stern, 1924; Bühler, 1930; Zeininger, 1929; Piaget,
1950/1975a, Vol. 5). Countless ethnologists disclosed
that premodern peoples have the same attitudes to-
ward myths as children have. Thus, the mythical
belief in gods is rooted in the childlike m ­ entality, as
 Wundt (1914), Fetz et al. (2001), Campbell (1996), and
many others had already detailed (6).
The most important gods in all premodern societ-
ies are the deceased parents, grandparents, and other
relatives (7). Ancestors usually have been more impor-
tant in cults and sacrifices than any other divinities,
in China, India, Africa, Australia, Polynesia, ancient
America, and Greek–Roman antiquity (Frazer, 1911,
1922, 1924; Lévy-Bruhl, 1931, 1938, 1971; Durkheim,
1965; Oesterdiekhoff, 2009b, pp. 261–277, 2011, pp.
147–162, 2012a, 2012b, in press). Piaget (1959), Ze-
ininger (1929), and Bovet (1951) evidenced that by
their sixth year of life, children regard their parents
(and other adults) as gods who master the world. The
first skeptical crisis weakens the adoration of parents
in favor of the imaginary god of the established culture.
However, the premodern peoples never experience
this crisis but remain bound to the adoration of el-
ders, even after their death. Thus, ancestor worship,
the adoration of parents and grandparents, is rooted in
lifelong lasting childlike attitudes and in preoperational
stages. The adoration of god the father in heaven is
obviously psychologically not so far removed from the
family religion. Therefore, primitive religions cultivate
a belief in ancestor gods, god the father in heaven, and
other domain gods at the same time.
Premodern cultures do not know atheism and
agnosticism. Intellectuals of the Middle Ages are all
believers, without exception. Disenchantment of the
world, decline of religion and magic, and seculariza-
tion originated in the era of the Enlightenment for
the first time. Agnosticism and atheism spread in the
educated classes of the 19th century and have now
reached roughly half of the Europeans and Japanese.
Although 90% of the populations of developing coun-
tries are still believers, the situation there is chang-
ing too. Seventy-nine percent of the members of the
Royal Society of London “deny religion completely,”
and 97% of them profess to be atheists. Ninety-three
percent of the members of the American Academy
of Sciences are atheists (Larson & Witham, 1998, p.
313). My theory (2007a, 2008, 2012a, 2012b, in press)
explains the rise of atheism according to the rise of
formal operations and psychocognitive maturation.
The century of rising formal operations is also the era
of rising atheism: It is clear that the decline of religion
is only a manifestation of the rise of anthropological
summits. As Piaget (1959) explained the decline of
488 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
magic, animism, and artificialism in modern adoles-
cents, he delivered the decisive tools to explain reli-
gion and atheism as well. Thus, my theory can fully
confirm and extend the early analysis of Feuerbach.
These short expositions are intended only to de-
liver a first and concise insight into the possibilities
the developmental approach allows in providing a
foundation for ethnology and historical disciplines.
Understanding of all kinds of behavior and conduct,
ideologies and philosophies, politics and morals can
benefit from being referred to preformal stages of cog-
nition and psyche.
Conclusions
PCCP is much more important to humanities and so-
cial sciences than is usually recognized. PCCP reveals
the main objectives behind the lifework of Piaget. It
confirms that humankind has developed the same
way as children and adolescents in modern societies.
Developmental psychology is not only a child psy-
chology but also a psychology that reveals the history
of the development of mind, psyche, and personality,
the history of consciousness of the entire humankind.
PCCP implies a psychology of cultures and peoples,
a psychology of populations, which lived in tribal
societies, medieval societies, and antiquity. Scholars
such as Baldwin, Lamprecht, Schneider, Wygotski,
Lurija, Piaget, Brunner-Traut, and Habermas recog-
nized developmental psychology as a key discipline
for all historical sciences. They all need developmen-
tal psychology as their necessary foundation.
Developmental psychology is an instrument for
explaining religion, magic, customs, politics, and
economics. Premodern societies can be understood
only by reference to the preoperational and concrete
operational stages. Conversely, the evolution of indus-
trial societies, physical sciences, the Enlightenment,
democracy, and the humanitarian revolution in the
past 300 years has to be linked to the rise of anthro-
pological stages and formal operations. For example,
the evolution of humane punishment systems in law,
the removal of the ordeal process, and objective re-
sponsibility in legislation and trial are psychocogni-
tive evolutions. Piaget himself (1932, 1950/1975a, Vol.
10) saw the links between the rise of formal operations
and the rise of sciences, democracy, and industrial-
ism. These five unique developments share largely
cognitive-evolutionary aspects, sciences, enlighten-
ment, and humanism purely and totally, industrial-
ism and democracy partially (Oesterdiekhoff, 2005,
2006b, 2007b, 2009a, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). Thus, it is
apparent that the rise of anthropological stages is the
hand, whereas the five transformations, which took
place in roughly the same time span and in the same
world region, namely in the Western world between
1650 and 1950, are only the five fingers of this hand.
NOTE
Address correspondence about this article to Georg W.
Oesterdiekhoff, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute
of Sociology, P.O. Box 6980, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany (e-
mail: Oesterdiekhoff@t-online.de).
REFERENCES
Al-Fakhri, S. (1977). The development of the concept of
speed among Iraqi children. In P. Dasen (Ed.), Piagetian
psychology (pp. 203–215). New York, NY: Gardner.
Ashton, P. T. (1975). Cross-cultural Piagetian research. An
experimental perspective. Harvard Educational Review,
45, 475–506.
Barber, N. (2005). Educational and ecological correlates
of IQ: A cross-national investigation. Intelligence, 33,
273–284.
Berry, J. W. (1974). Radical cultural relativism and the concept
of intelligence. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture and
cognition (pp. 225–230). London, England: Methuen.
Bovet, M. C. (1974). Cognitive processes among illiterate chil-
dren and adults. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture
and cognition (pp. 311–334). London, England: Methuen.
Bovet, P. (1951). Le sentiment religieux et la psychologie de
l’enfant [Religious sentiment and child psychology].
Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé.
Bühler, K. (1930). Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes [The
mental development of the child]. Jena, Germany: Gustav
Fischer.
Campbell, J. (1966). The masks of God. New York, NY: Pen-
guin.
Chapman, M. (1988). Constructive evolution: origins and de-
velopment of Piaget’s thought. Cambridge, MA: University
Press.
Cole, M., & Scribner, S. (1974). Culture and thought. New
York, NY: Wiley.
Dasen, P. (1973). Piagetian research in Central Australia. In
G. E. Kearney et al. (Eds.), The psychology of aboriginal
Australians (pp. 89–96). New York, NY: Wiley.
Dasen, P. (1974a). Cross-cultural Piagetian research: A sum-
mary. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture and cogni-
tion. Readings in cross-cultural psychology (pp. 409–424).
London, England: Methuen.
Dasen, P. (1974b). The influence of ecology, culture and Eu-
ropean contact on cognitive development in Australian
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 489
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
aborigines. In P. Dasen & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Culture
and cognition. Readings in cross-cultural psychology (pp.
381–408). London, England: Methuen.
Dasen, P. (1977). Piagetian cross-cultural psychology. New
York, NY: Gardner.
Dasen, P., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.). (1974). Culture and cognition.
Readings in cross-cultural psychology. London, England:
Methuen.
De Lacey, R. D. (1970). A cross-cultural study of classificatory
ability in Australia. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture
and cognition (pp. 353–366). London, England: Methuen.
De Lemos, M. M. (1973). The development of conservation.
In G. E. Kearney et al. (Eds.), The psychology of aborigi-
nal Australians (pp. 71–88). New York, NY: Wiley.
De Lemos, M. M. (1974). The development of spatial concepts
in Zulu children. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture and
cognition (pp. 367–380). London, England: Methuen.
De Vries, R. (1969). Constancy of generic identity in the years
three to six. Society for Research in Child Development
Monographs, 34(4, no. 127), 1–67.
Durkheim, É. (1965). The elementary forms of religious life.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Eckensberger, L., et al. (Eds.). (1979). Cross-cultural contribu-
tions to psychology. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Swets
& Zeitlinger.
Ember, C. R. (1977). Cross-cultural cognitive studies. Annual
Review of Anthropology, 6, 33–56.
Evans, E. P. (1906). The criminal prosecution and capital
punishment of the animals. London: Faber & Faber.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1976). Witchcraft, oracles, and magic
among the Azande. Oxford, England: University Press.
Fetz, R. L. (1982). Naturdenken beim Kind und bei Aristo-
teles. Grundfragen einer genetischen Ontologie [Aristo-
tle’s and the child’s reasoning about nature]. Tijdschrift
voor Filosofie, 44, 473–512.
Fetz, R. L., Reich, K. H., & Valentin, P. (2001). Weltbildent-
wicklung und Schöpfungsverständnis. Eine strukturgene-
tische Untersuchung bei Kindern und Jugendlichen [De-
velopment of worldview and belief in creation]. Stuttgart,
Germany: Kohlhammer Verlag.
Feuerbach, L. (1985). The essence of Christianity. New York,
NY: Harper & Collins.
Fischer, M. (2005). Tierstrafen und Tierprozesse [Punish-
ment and trials against animals]. Hamburg, Germany:
Lit-Verlag.
Flavell, J. (1977). Cognitive development. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Flynn, J. (2007). What is intelligence? Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Flynn, J. R. (2008). Lurija und das Paradox massiver IQ-
Gewinne längs der Zeit [Lurija and the paradox of mas-
sive IQ gains over time]. In G. W. Oesterdiekhoff & H.
Rindermann (Eds.), Kultur und Kognition (pp. 111–132).
Hamburg, Germany: Lit-Verlag.
 Fortune, R. F. (1963). Sorcerers of Dobu. New York, NY: Dut-
ton.
Frazer, J. G. (1911/1922/1924). Belief in immortality and the
worship of the dead (3 vols.). London, England: Macmil-
lan.
Freitag, B. (1983). Der Aufbau kindlicher Bewusstseinsstruk-
turen im gesellschaftlichen Kontext [Children’s reasoning
in its social context]. Munich, Germany: Fink Verlag.
Gellathy, A. R. H. (1987). Acquisition of a concept of logical
necessity. Human Development, 30, 32–47.
Goodnow, J., & Bethon, G. (1966). Piaget’s tasks: The effects
of schooling and intelligence. Child Development, 37,
573–582.
Greenfield, P. (1966). On culture and equivalence. In J. Brun-
er et al. (Eds.), Studies on cognitive growth (pp. 270–318).
New York, NY: Wiley.
Habermas, J. (1976). Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen
Materialismus [Reconstruction of historical materialism].
Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.
Hallpike, C. (1979). Foundations of primitive thought. Ox-
ford, England: Clarendon.
Hallpike, C. (2004). The evolution of moral understanding.
London, England: Prometheus Research Group.
Havighurst, R., & Neugarten, B. (1955). American Indian
and White children. Chicago, IL: University Press.
Heron, A., & Simonsson, M. (1974). Weight conservation in
Zambian children: a nonverbal approach. In P. Dasen &
J. Berry (Eds.), Culture and cognition (pp. 335–350). Lon-
don, England: Methuen.
Ibarra, L. (2007). Creencias, mitos y rituales en el mundo
prehispánico. Una explicación desde la teoría histórico-
genética [Beliefs, myths, and rituals in the pre-Hispanic
world. An explanation from historico-genetic theory].
Guadalajara, Mexico: Universidad de Guadalajara.
Irvine, S. H., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.). (1988). Human abilities
and cultural context (2 vols.). Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Jahoda, G. (1958a). Child animism: I. A critical survey of
cross-cultural research. Journal of Social Psychology, 47,
197–212.
Jahoda, G. (1958b). Child animism: II. A study in West Af-
rica. Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 213–222.
Jahoda, G. (1974). Supernatural beliefs and changing cogni-
tive structures among Ghanaian university students. In
P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.), Culture and cognition (pp.
141–158). London, England: Methuen.
Kälble, K. (1997). Die Entwicklung der Kausalität im Kul-
turvergleich [The development of causality across cul-
tures]. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Kearney, G. E. (1973). Early psychological studies. In G. E.
Kearney et al. (Eds.), The psychology of aboriginal Austra-
lians (pp. 16–26). New York, NY: Wiley.
Kearney, G. E., De Lacey, P. R., & Davidson, G. R. (1973). The
psychology of aboriginal Australians. New York, NY: Wiley.
490 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Kelly, M. (1977). Papua New Guinea and Piaget: An eight year
study. In P. Dasen (Ed.), Piagetian cross-cultural psychol-
ogy (pp. 169–202). New York, NY: Gardner.
Kohlberg, L. (1974). Studien zur kognitiven Entwicklung
[Studies on cognitive growth]. Frankfurt am Main, Ger-
many: Suhrkamp.
Kohlberg, L., & Gilligan, C. (1971). The adolescent as a phi-
losopher: The discovery of the self in a postconventional
world. Daedalus, 100, 1051–1086.
Langer, J. (1988). A note on the comparative psychology of
mental development. In S. Strauss (Ed.), Ontogeny, phy-
logeny, and historical development (pp. 68–85). Norwood,
NJ: Ablex.
Larson, E. J., & Witham, L. (1998). Leading scientists still
reject God. Nature, 394, 313.
Laurendeau-Bendavid, M. (1977). Culture, schooling, and
cognitive development: A comparative study of children
in French Canada and Rwanda. In P. Dasen (Ed.), Piaget-
ian psychology (pp. 123–168). New York, NY: Gardner.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1923). Primitive mentality. New York, NY:
Macmillan.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1931). Le surnaturel et la nature dans la
mentalité primitive [The supernatural and nature in the
primitive mentality]. Paris, France: Felix Alcan.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1938). L’expérience mystique et les symboles
chez les primitives [Mystical experience and symbols
among aborigines]. Paris, France: Felix Alcan.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1971). The “soul” of the primitive. Chicago,
IL: Henri Regnery.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1983). Primitive mythology. St. Lucia, Austra-
lia: University of Queensland Press.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1985). How natives think. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Lurija, A. R. (1982). Cognitive development. Its cultural and
social foundations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Mair, L. P. (1969). Magie im schwarzen Erdteil [Magic on the
black continent]. Munich, Germany: Kindler Verlag.
Maistriaux, R. (1955). La sous-évolution des noirs d’Afrique.
Sa nature, ses causes, ses remèdes [The under-evolution
of African Blacks. Its nature, causes, and remedies]. Revue
de Psychologie des Peuples, 10, 397–455.
Mogdil, S., & Mogdil, C. (1976). Piagetian research (Vol.
1–8). London, England: Penguin.
Neisser, U. (Ed.). (1998). The rising curve. Long-term gains
in IQ and related measures. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Nurcombe, B. (1973). Precausal and paracausal thinking. In
G. E. Kearney et al. (Eds.), The psychology of aboriginal
Australians (pp. 105–124). New York, NY: Wiley.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (1997). Kulturelle Bedingungen kog-
nitiver Entwicklung. Der strukturgenetische Ansatz in
der Soziologie [Cultural conditions of cognitive growth].
Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2000). Zivilisation und Strukturgen-
ese. Norbert Elias und Jean Piaget im Vergleich [Civiliza-
tion and the genesis of structures]. Frankfurt am Main,
Germany: Suhrkamp.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2002). Das archaische Prozess-
und Beweisrecht und die “immanente Gerechtigkeit.”
Erklärung von Struktur, Entwicklung und Untergang
ordalförmiger Konfliktregelungen [The archaic trial and
immanent justice]. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für
Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung, 1, 175–192.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2005). Entwicklung der Weltgesell-
schaft. Von der Steinzeit zur Moderne [The development
of world society]. Hamburg, Germany: Lit-Verlag.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2006a). Irrationale Denk- und Ver-
haltensweisen am Beispiel von Hexerei und Magie und
ihr Stellenwert in der Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit
[Irrational patterns of reason and behavior exemplified by
magic and witchcraft]. Sozialwissenschaftliches Journal,
1(2), 79–104.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2006b). Kognitive Entwicklung und
sozialer Wandel. Zur Wechselwirkung von Psyche und
Gesellschaft im Lichte der strukturgenetischen Soziologie
[Cognitive development and social change]. Sozialwissen-
schaftliches Journal, 1(1), 9–37.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2006c). Kulturelle Evolution des
Geistes. Die historische Wechselwirkung von Psyche und
Gesellschaft [Cultural evolution of mind]. Hamburg, Ger-
many: Lit-Verlag.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2007a). Ancient sun cults: Under-
standing religious rites in terms of developmental psy-
chology. Mankind Quarterly, 48(1), 99–116.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2007b, April). Die Entstehung der
Industriemoderne in Europa. Der strukturgenetische
Erklärungsansatz [The rise of modern society in Europe].
Sozialwissenschaftliches Journal, 2(1), 9–35.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W., with Rindermann, H. (2007c, Sum-
mer). The spread of AIDS in developing countries. A
psycho-cultural approach. Journal of Social, Political,
and Economic Studies, 32(2), 201–222.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2008). Magic and animism in old
religions. The relevance of sun cults to the world-view of
traditional societies. Croatian Journal of Ethnology, 45(1),
43–66.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2009a). The arena games in the Ro-
man Empire. A contribution to the explanation of the
history of morals and humanity. Croatian Journal of Eth-
nology, 46(1), 177–202.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2009b). Mental growth of humankind
in history. Norderstedt, Germany: Bod.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2009c). Psyche und Gesellschaft in der
Entwicklung [Development of psyche and society]. Nor-
derstedt, Germany: Bod.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2009d, Spring/Summer). Trials
against animals. A contribution to the developmental
RELEVANCE OF PIAGETIAN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY • 491
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
theory of mind and rationality. Mankind Quarterly, 3(4),
346–380.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2011). The steps of man towards civi-
lization. The key to disclose the riddle of history. Norder-
stedt, Germany: Bod.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2012a). Die Entwicklung der Men-
schheit von der Kindheitsphase zur Erwachsenenreife [The
development of humankind from childhood to adult-
hood]. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer Verlag.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (2012b). Die geistige Entwicklung der
Menschheit [The mental development of humankind].
Weilerswist, Germany: Velbrück.
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W. (in press). Traumzeit der Menschheit.
Wesen, Ursprung und Untergang der Religion [Dream-
time of humankind].
Oesterdiekhoff, G. W., & Rindermann, H. (Eds.). (2008).
Kultur und Kognition [Culture and cognition]. Hamburg,
Germany: Lit-Verlag.
Parsons, T., & E. Shils, A. (Eds.). (1961). Theories of society.
Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Peluffo, N. (1962). Les notions de conservation et de causalité
chez les enfants provenant de différents milieux physiques
et socio-culturels. Archives de Psychologie, 38, 275–291.
Peluffo, N. (1967). Culture and cognitive problems. Interna-
tional Journal of Psychology, 2(3), 187–198.
Philp, H., & Kelly, M. (1974). Product and process in cogni-
tive development. British Journal of Educational Psychol-
ogy, 44, 248–265.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York,
NY: Free Press.
Piaget, J. (1950). The psychology of intelligence. London, Eng-
land: Routledge & Kegan.
Piaget, J. (1959). The child’s conception of the world. New
York, NY: Littlefield, Adams.
Piaget, J. (1969). The child’s conception of physical causality.
Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams.
Piaget, J. (1974). Need and significance of cross-cultural stud-
ies in genetic psychology. In P. Dasen & J. Berry (Eds.),
Culture and cognition (pp. 299–310). London, England:
Methuen.
Piaget, J. (1975a). Gesammelte Werke [Collected works] (10
vols.). Stuttgart, Germany: Klett Verlag. (Vols. 8–10 origi-
nally published 1950)
Piaget, J. (1975b). The origin of the idea of chance in children.
New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Piaget, J. (1984). Theorien und Methoden der modernen Er-
ziehung [Theories and methods of modern education].
Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Fischer.
Piaget, J. (1996). In J.-C. Bringuier, Jean Piaget. Im Allge-
meinen werde ich falsch verstanden [Jean Piaget. Gener-
ally I am wrongly understood]. Hamburg, Germany:
Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
Piaget, J., & Garcia, R. (1989). Psychogenesis and the history of
sciences. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
 Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1941). Le développement des quan-
tités physiques chez l’enfant [Development of physical
quantities among children]. Neuchâtel, Switzerland:
Delachaux & Niestle.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1958). The growth of logical think-
ing from childhood to adolescence. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child.
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Ponzo, E. (1966). Acculturazione e detribalizzazione [Social-
ization and detribalization]. Rivista de Psicologia Sociale,
13, 41–107.
Poortinga, Y. H. (1977). Basic problems in cross-cultural psy-
chology. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger.
Porteus, S. D. (1937). Primitive intelligence. New York, NY:
Macmillan.
Radding, C. M. (1985). A world made by men. Cognition and
society 400–1200. Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press.
Ross, R. J. (1974). The empirical status of the formal opera-
tions. Adolescence, 9, 413–424.
Schöfthaler, T., & Goldschmidt, D. (Eds.). (1984). Soziale
Struktur und Vernunft [Social structure and reason].
Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.
Schröder, E. (1989). Vom konkreten zum formalen Denken
[From concrete to formal thought]. Bern, Switzerland:
Huber.
Segall, M. H., Dasen, P. R., Berry, J. W., & Poortinga, Y. H.
(1990). Human behavior in global perspective. Boston,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
492 • OESTERDIEKHOFF
This content downloaded from 128.210.151.153 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 10:25:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
View publication stats
Steinen, K. von den. (1894). Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-
Brasiliens [Among the native tribes of central Brasil].
Berlin, Germany: D. Reimer.
Stern, W. (1924). Psychology of early childhood up to the sixth
year of age. New York, NY: Holt.
Tuddenham, R. D. (1969). A Piagetian test of cognitive de-
velopment. In W. B. Dockerell (Ed.), On intelligence (pp.
49–70). Toronto, ON: Oise.
Tulviste, P. (1979). On the origins of theoretic syllogistic
reasoning in culture and the child. Quarterly Newsletter
of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1,
73–80.
Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture (2 vols.). London, Eng-
land: J. Murray.
Vernon, P. E. (1969). Intelligence and cultural environment.
London, England: Methuen.
Were, K. (1968). A survey of the thought processes of New
Guinean secondary students. Unpublished master’s thesis,
University of Adelaide, Australia.
Werner, E. E. (1979). Cross-cultural child psychology. Mon-
terey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Werner, H. (1948). Comparative psychology of mental develop-
ment. New York, NY: Follet.
Wundt, W. (1914). Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der
Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte [Psy-
chology of peoples]. Vol. 5: Mythus und Religion [Myth
and religion] (2nd ed.). Leipzig, Germany: Kröner Verlag.
Zeininger, W. (1929). Magische Geisteshaltung im Kindesalter
und ihre Bedeutung für die religiöse Entwicklung [Magic
and religion of children]. Leipzig, Germany: Barth Verlag.