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House of Commons
Transport Committee
Marine Pilotage
Ninth Report of Session 2010–13
Volume II
Additional written evidence
Ordered by the House of Commons

to be published 17 September 2012, 22 October 2012, 10
December 2012, 21 January 2013 and 25 February 2013
Published on 7 March 2013

by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
The Transport Committee
The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the

expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its
Associate Public Bodies.
Current membership
Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair)

Steve Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)
Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton)
Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative, Spelthorne)
Karen Lumley (Conservative, Redditch)
Karl McCartney (Conservative, Lincoln)
Lucy Powell (Labour/Co-operative, Manchester Central)
Mr Adrian Sanders (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)
Iain Stewart (Conservative, Milton Keynes South)
Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton)
The following were also members of the committee during the Parliament.
Angie Bray (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton), Lilian Greenwood (Labour,
Nottingham South), Mr Tom Harris (Labour, Glasgow South), Julie Hilling (Labour,
Bolton West), Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton North), Mr John Leech (Liberal
Democrat, Manchester Withington) Paul Maynard, (Conservative, Blackpool North
and Cleveleys), Gavin Shuker (Labour/Co-operative, Luton South), Angela Smith
(Labour, Penistone and Stocksbridge), Julian Sturdy (Conservative, York Outer)
Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which
are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are
available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publication
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office
by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are
on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the
Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.
The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral
evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume.
Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Farrah Bhatti (Second
Clerk), Richard Jeremy (Committee Specialist), Adrian Hitchins (Senior Committee
Assistant), Eldon Gallagher (Committee Assistant), Nyree Barratt-Hendricks
(Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee,
House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for
general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is
transcom@parliament.uk
List of additional written evidence
(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/transcom)
Page
1 Victoria Group Holdings Ltd. Ev w1
2 Barrie Youde Ev w3, Ev w8, Ev w9, Ev w11
3 Terrence Crowe Ev w11
4 UK Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities Ev w12
5 Dave Devey MNM Ev w14
6 John H. Bryant BA MNI Ev w16
7 Stephen Chapman Ev w18
8 John Clandillion-Baker FNI Ev w18
9 Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Ev w20
10 Captain Rod Lewis Ev w21
11 Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee Ev w22
List of unprinted written evidence

The following memoranda have been reported to the House, but to save printing costs
they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons
Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Parliamentary
Archives, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be
addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A 0PW (tel.
020 7219 3074). Opening hours are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.
Barrie Youde
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Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027606/027606_w014_MP 19 - Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee.xml
Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w1
Written evidence
Written evidence from Victoria Group Holdings Ltd. (MP 02)
Background
1. There are more than 600 marine pilots in the UK, of whom a little less than a third are members of The
Pilots’ National Pension Fund (The PNPF). Some of them are employed by “Competent Harbour Authorities”
(CHAs) and others are authorised by CHAs, while being self-employed, usually as members of co-operatives.
CHAs with employed pilots make employers’ contributions to The PNPF and collect employees’ contributions
from their pilots, which they send to The PNPF. CHAs with self-employed pilots are supposed to collect their
pilots’ contributions and send them to The PNPF. In practice, this task is often delegated by the CHA to the
pilots themselves.
2. The PNPF has an estimated deficit of approximately £300 million. The Trustee of the PNPF has sought
and obtained a ruling from the High Court which will enable it to recover the deficit from a wide range of
ports and harbours ie the CHAs. The Approved Judgement, dated 28 June 2010, applies to CHAs with self-
employed pilots as well as employed pilots, even though the former are not employers and have never made
contributions to The PNPF on behalf of their pilots.
3. The consequence of this ruling will be the imposition of liabilities on CHAs for their share of the deficit
in the Scheme. This will have a devastating effect on the smaller ports which will be forced to increase their
dues/pilotage charges to meet these liabilities. This will make them uncompetitive with the larger ports which
not only have greater reserves at hand, but have the advantage of economies of scale. In addition, some ports
have long since ceased their commercial operations, but will still have a historical liability. It is highly probable
that, if an arbitrary recovery plan is imposed by the Trustee, many smaller ports will be forced to close.
4. The purpose of this submission is to make Members of the Transport Select Committee aware of the very
real threat posed by this grossly unfair judgement to the future viability of the UK’s smaller ports. In the worst
case, their demise will impact on the Government’s “green agenda” by reducing options for short-sea transport,
concentrating cargo-handling in a small number of large ports and significantly adding to the heavy truck miles
on our national road network. It will certainly lead to major job-losses in the ports themselves and in the many
local and regional businesses which depend upon them. The knock-on effect on their surrounding economies
and the nation’s prospects for recovery from the recession will be considerable.
Summary
5. The PNPF is a defined benefit pension scheme which has been operating since 1974. Membership is open
to marine pilots, both employed and self-employed, who are authorised by Competent Harbour Authorities
(CHAs). Membership of the Scheme is not compulsory and, of the 600 or so authorised pilots presently
operating in UK ports, fewer than 170 are members of the Scheme.
6. The PNPF has enjoyed past periods of surplus, but is now suffering (in common with many other schemes)
a substantial deficit. At the beginning of 2010 the Trustee of the PNPF sought the guidance of the High Court
in order to determine inter alia the extent to which the Rules of the Scheme might be varied in order to provide
The PNPF with the power to demand deficit contributions from a wider range of sources ie not just the
employed pilots, their employers and the self-employed pilots, but also CHAs which authorise self-employed
pilots and CHAs with no currently active pilots, but which had authorised pilots in the past.
7. The Approved Judgement was handed down on 28 June 2010. The Court held that the liability of CHAs
to contribute to the Scheme is not limited. Instead, the Trustee has the power to demand contributions from all
of the CHAs in an entirely unrestricted way.
8. The imposition of a liability on CHAs for the deficit in The PNPF has been both sudden and unexpected.
CHAs around the country with self-employed pilots had in many cases never heard of The PNPF until asked
for voluntary contributions in 2005. Even CHAs with employed pilots had not anticipated that they would have
to pay for deficits of this magnitude. Furthermore, the majority of the deficit in The PNPF (c.58%) relates to
pilots’ service pre-1988, when all of them were self-employed and when they were authorised by the Pilotage
Authorities and not by the CHAs, which had not yet been created. There is a strong feeling in the industry that
the Government should accept a degree of responsibility for this element of the problem.
9. The distribution of the notional liability to The PNPF across the various CHAs around the country is
completely arbitrary. For instance, there are some CHAs whose pilots were never members of The PNPF, so
they have no liability whatsoever; there are small ports with greater liabilities than large ports because of the
respective ages of their pilots. Thus, some ports are being made hugely more or less competitive than others
in a wholly unanticipated and unpredictable way.
10. The potential impact of the contributions to The PNPF on small ports is significantly greater than on
large ports. As a general rule, the notional liabilities are a bigger percentage of the turnover of small ports than
of large ports, because the latter’s ships are bigger and they need fewer pilots per tonne of throughput than
small ports do.
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Ev w2 Transport Committee: Evidence
11. In addition, the larger ports tend to have additional sources of income, from which they would be able
to subsidise their contributions to The PNPF, whereas the smaller ports tend to rely on a few streams of income.
Indeed, the Harbour Commissions and Conservancy Boards have no other sources of income to supplement
their statutory revenues.
12. The fairest way of recouping the deficit in The PNPF would be through the imposition of a levy on
every tonne of cargo shipped into or out of the country. At a relatively modest level (a few pence) such a
nationwide levy would not be sufficient to deter customers from using the UK’s ports, but would be capable
of raising the necessary money for The PNPF without jeopardising the futures of many small ports. If the
imposition of a levy were to save the small ports from disaster—and the thousands of jobs and businesses
around the country which depend upon them—then it would surely be worth supporting.
Detail
13. We have been aware of this issue for the last seven years and have been working with representatives
of other CHAs to minimise its impact on our respective ports, all of which are affected to a greater or lesser
extent by the rulings in this case.
14. The principal impact of the Approved Judgement on our businesses is the judge’s decision that the
Trustee of The PNPF can demand contributions from what are called Self-employed CHAs (SCHAs). These
are Competent Harbour Authorities (often ports), which authorise self-employed pilots or pilots’ co-operatives,
but have no direct employer-employee relationship with them.
15. The pilots in each district around the country were given the choice whether to remain self-employed or
to become employees when the Pilotage Act 1987, which abolished the Pilotage Authorities, came into force
on 1st October 1988. The majority of pilots opted for continued self-employment. We must assume that in
making this decision they considered its pros and cons and came to the conclusion that it was better to have
control of their own affairs, even if it meant that they had no employer to underwrite their pensions. Now,
however, the judge has ruled that the SCHAs should effectively act as employers and underwrite their pensions,
so they have had all of the benefits of self-employment for the last twenty years, but are not now expected to
suffer any adverse consequences from their original decision.
16. The Approved Judgement has a considerably greater impact on small ports than on larger ports. Bearing
in mind that the figures quoted will vary considerably from port to port, consider the example of a small port
in which pilotage is compulsory and visiting ships are an average of 1,800 tonnes. The throughput in a year
might be approximately 800,000 tonnes, so four pilots are required to perform 900 acts of pilotage between
them. In a large port the ships might be an average of 20,000 tonnes, so 900 acts of pilotage would account
for 9,000,000 tonnes of cargo. If each port had four pilots and each pilot had a deficit in The PNPF of £500,000
(or £2,000,000 in total), this would be equivalent to £2.50 for every tonne of cargo in the “small port”, but
only 22p per tonne in the “large port”.
17. We believe that it is unfair to expect CHAs to make contributions to their self-employed pilots’ pension
scheme. In fact, when the PNPF first asked for voluntary contributions, a number of small ports set up an
informal group to apply pressure on the Trustee of The PNPF and to gather evidence for the legal proceedings.
Since the Approved Judgement this consortium has been active in bringing the inequitable distribution of the
deficits in The PNPF to the attention of the Trustee, the Department for Transport and local and national
politicians, focusing specifically on the huge impact of the ruling on small ports.
18. The British Ports Association has yet to make any representations on behalf of those of its members
who are likely to suffer serious consequences should they be required to comply with demands from The
PNPF. However, both the Association of Participating Bodies (see below) and the British Ports Association
continue to promote their view that they represent the ports and that the matter will be resolved by direct
negotiation with the Trustee of The PNPF.
19. Unfortunately, the Association of Participating Bodies in The PNPF (the Association), which purports to
represent the CHAs in their discussions with the Trustee, is controlled by the large ports and it is virtually
impossible for the small ports’ voice to be heard in this forum. There is a serious danger, therefore, that the
Association and the Trustee will come to an arrangement which suits some or all of the large ports, but which
imposes such a burden on the small ports that many of them will simply be unable to make the requisite
payments to The PNPF and will be forced into administration or insolvency.
20. Accordingly, we have been promoting the idea of a nationwide levy on shipping to enable the deficit on
The PNPF to be recovered over a reasonable period of time and at a level of cost to the industry which neither
distorts competition nor pushes small ports over the edge. If a levy of perhaps 5p per tonne were charged on
all cargoes coming into and going out of the country for the next few years (in 2011 throughput was 520
million tonnes), it would be possible to recoup sufficient funds to plug the hole in The PNPF. A levy of this
size is unlikely to deter businesses from using ports in the UK. Furthermore, a mechanism already exists to
collect such a levy, as Trinity House has systems and staff in place to collect Light Dues from ships and could
act as the collection agent for this new levy, thus negating the need to establish a separate body.
21. The alternative to a nationwide levy—each CHA having to raise its own charges to recover the amount
of its pilots’ notional deficit—will have potentially disastrous consequences for many small ports. These employ
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hundreds of people themselves and also generate significant numbers of jobs in ancillary businesses, as well
as being important economic drivers for their immediate hinterlands. If they are allowed to fail, the knock-on
effect, especially when times are already hard for many regions of the country, could be extremely damaging.
Other Points
22. In many cases around the country, self-employed pilots have been allowed by the Trustee of The PNPF
to accrue extra pension entitlements by making additional contributions to the Scheme out of earnings from
“other sources” ie non-pilotage-related income. CHAs are often completely unaware of either the nature or the
quantum of these earnings, but are about to be compelled to underwrite the pensions deriving from them,
which will be added to their notional shares of the deficit.
23. There are fundamental questions to be answered by the Trustee and its professional advisers as to how
a deficit in the region of £300m has been allowed to accrue over a relatively short period of time. Unlike the
majority of company pension schemes, The PNPF remains open to new members and has taken no steps to
move from defined benefits (a final salary scheme) to defined contributions (a money purchase scheme).
Furthermore, it has not taken opportunities in the past to buy annuities for any of its pensioners and, when faced
with increasing liabilities and poor investment returns, it has made some questionable investment decisions.
Conclusion
24. It is critical to seek the support and understanding of politicians of all parties and other decision-makers
in order to protect the UK’s small ports from the arbitrary imposition of liabilities which many will be unable
to meet without potentially dire consequences for their financial viability.
25. It appears unlikely that the Association, which the Trustee continues to regard as the industry’s
negotiating body, will be able to develop an equitable solution, which takes proper account of the small ports’
ability to pay. Accordingly, we urge you to consider the merits of a nationwide levy on shipping to resolve
this issue.
July 2012
Written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03)

Introduction
1. The case which gives cause for concern is the abandonment by two designated Competent Harbour
Authorities (CHAs) of regulated standards in compulsory pilotage areas under the Pilotage Act of 1987,
contrary not only to international law but also in express breach of the common law of the Parliamentary
jurisdiction. It will be shown also that successive Secretaries of State have been complicit in the said breaches,
and have in consequence failed in their inherent duty to maintain order. Remedial action is therefore called for
as a matter of some urgency in order to prevent further disorder.
2. A compulsory pilotage area may be defined as an area in which a CHA considers, in accordance with
Section 2 of the 1987 Pilotage Act, that pilotage should be compulsory.
3. The motive for the conduct of the two CHAs (first at the Humber and later repeated at the Clyde) is pure
commercial greed. There is no other motive. It is otherwise inexplicable why anybody, least of all a CHA,
would wish to grant authorisation or promotion to pilots whose qualifications do not meet minimum established
standards, which is precisely what has happened on a large scale. All law confirms that the highest possible
standards are called for in compulsory pilotage areas.
The Historical Position

4. Pilotage is one of the oldest and most public of all services, having been governed by common law,
Parliamentary statute law (at both primary and secondary level) and international law as developed throughout
all history. Records available on the internet today show the state control of pilotage in the 13th century by the
Code of Oleron, which (duly amended with the passage of time) remains the basis for much commercial
maritime discipline and regulation.
5. Standards of qualification for pilots in compulsory pilotage areas have been required by law for a longer
period of time than have standards of qualification for any other class of mercantile mariner; and pilots have
been examined and authorised by licence or other similar instrument since the middle ages. By contrast,
examinations for Masters and Mates in the Merchant Service were not introduced until the middle of the 19th
century. In the late eighteenth century (1797) a licensing authority became empowered to place restrictions on
a pilot’s licence, commensurate with his knowledge and experience; and the practice thus developed of
restricting less experienced pilots to the pilotage of vessels of smaller size as a common-sense measure in the
interests of public safety. By 1833, Bye-laws were introduced by Parliamentary Act in order to govern the
restrictions (which are otherwise known as “classifications” or “post-qualification experience”) and other
matters more closely.
6. Bye-laws were maintained nationally under Section 18 of the Pilotage Act of 1913, by which time the
standard practice had developed in major ports that, even after due examination as to his knowledge, post-
qualification restrictions would be placed on the licence of any pilot for his first four years in practice. The
Humber and the Clyde were amongst the many ports which applied the four-year restriction as a standard
measure.
7. Appendix 1 shows Bye-Laws 65–75 as applicable at Liverpool in substantial detail under the 1913 Act.
Bye-Laws 16 and 17 as applicable at the Humber at the same time are shown at page 61 of Appendix 2.
8. The Bye-laws introduced the pilot by incremental stages to the pilotage of larger ships until it was—and
as a matter of common law still is—adjudged by regulated standard that the pilot would be sufficiently
experienced to undertake the pilotage of a ship of any size.
9. Prior to the introduction of the 1987 Pilotage Act, pilotage was administered on a port-by-port basis by
Trinity House or other local Pilotage Authorities. The Act of 1987 gives administrative power for the first time
to harbour authorities (CHAs) whose prime motive is to make commercial gain rather than to conduct any
administration of pilotage. The administration of pilotage had not previously rested with any commercial body;
and this is the cause of the present mischief.
The Modern Law

10. Most pilots throughout history have served on terms of self-employment as a matter of good practice.
Many still do so today by the express terms of Section 4(2) (b) of the 1987 Act. There is an obligation under
Section 4 (1) of the Act that a CHA must offer terms of employment to pilots but there is no power given to
any CHA to impose terms of employment on anybody where terms of employment are not wanted.
11. Upon the repeal of the Pilotage Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder, standards of post-
qualification experience were—and still are—maintained by purely ad-hoc means on a port-by-port basis.
(Please see Analysis of present standards maintained at major ports at Appendix 2.) It will be seen that in some
ports the standard period of restriction on a pilot’s licence is confirmed at more than four years.
12. The propriety of the regulated restrictions was confirmed in two cases which came before the Courts at
an apparent turning point in the law, on the introduction of the Pilotage Act of 1987 which repealed the Act
of 1913. In the first case (the Esso Bernicia, which was heard in the House of Lords,—report shown at
Appendix 3), the facts had arisen during the currency of the 1913 Act. Following a long line of ancient
authority, the House of Lords held (at page 2 of Appendix 3) that a pilot is an independent professional who is
engaged by a shipmaster to act as a principal and not as the servant or agent of any harbour authority. The
second case (the Cavendish—report shown at Appendix 4) was heard in the High Court in 1993, when it was
held that the introduction of the Act of 1987 had changed nothing of any significance; and that the duty of a
CHA in pilotage is (as had been the duty of Trinity House or other Pilotage Authority beforehand) limited to
maintaining an adequate supply of properly qualified pilots to be engaged by ships navigating in a compulsory
pilotage area. The Cavendish case of 1993 is therefore of high significance. It was emphasised in the judgment
that a CHA performs no pilotage; and that any pilotage is necessarily performed by authorised professional
pilots. It follows that the function of a CHA in pilotage is a purely administrative one.
13. The judgment in the Cavendish case was delivered by Mr Justice Anthony Clarke, as he then was.
Subsequently Mr Justice Clarke became Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Master of the Rolls and one of the
first judges to be appointed to the recently-created Supreme Court. Where in Lord Clarke’s judgment it is
stated (at page 298 of Appendix 4) that it is the function of a CHA to maintain an adequate supply of properly
qualified pilots and (at page 301 of Appendix 4) that “the position is in my judgment the same now as it was
under the 1913 Act”, the corollary is that upon the repeal of the Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder,
there was no Parliamentary intention that any of the standards of post-qualification experience written in the
former Bye-Laws should be abandoned. Manifestly there was no Parliamentary intention that the new Act of
1987 should be used as an excuse for disorder. Rather, the newly-created Competent Harbour Authorities were
placed in a position of trust to maintain the proper standards established by the former Pilotage Authorities
over many years. In the two CHAs which are of concern today, there has been a clear breach of the
Parliamentary trust imposed in them.
14. Of even greater legal significance is the case of the Sea Empress (as reported at Appendix 5) which
concluded in the Court of Criminal Appeal in April 2000, where it was shown that maladministration had
occurred at Milford Haven shortly before the events which are of concern today. The vessel Sea Empress was
a large oil-tanker and had been under pilotage in a compulsory pilotage area in 1996 when she grounded on
rocks at the entrance to the Haven. Widespread pollution, environmental damage and economic loss was
caused. It was a major disaster. The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR,
through its subsidiary Environment Agency) brought a criminal prosecution in respect of the pollution against
the authorising body (the CHA) of the compulsory pilot.
15. The case was heard at first instance in Cardiff Crown Court in 1999 before Mr Justice David Steel, the
presiding judge of the Admiralty Court. The CHA pleaded guilty to the charge. In summarising the facts prior
to passing sentence, the learned judge found that the pilot (as provided to the vessel by the CHA) was neither
negligent nor incompetent but was specifically lacking in post-qualification experience.
16. The express words of the judgment include: “The significance of these matters is all the greater in the
context of a scheme of compulsory pilotage. Shipowners and masters must needs engage a pilot. They have to
take the training, experience and expertise of the pilot provided at face value. While the master remains
nominally in command, it has to be recognized that the pilot had the con[duct of the navigation] and a master
can only interfere when a situation of danger has clearly arisen. The port authority imposes a charge for
pilotage but in the same breath has the added advantage of the pilot being treated for purposes of civil liability
as an employee of the shipowner. All this calls for the highest possible standards on the part of the port
authority.” (p.7)
17. The CHA (having pleaded guilty to the criminal charge against it) appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeal against the severity of the sentence imposed in Cardiff Crown Court. On hearing the Appeal in April
2000, Lord Bingham the Lord Chief Justice allowed a reduction in the sentence on the grounds (amongst
others) that, subsequent to the incident, the CHA had exerted its best efforts to improve the regulated standards
of experience amongst the pilots provided for engagement by vessels; and thereby to comply with the obligation
to maintain the highest possible standards in a compulsory pilotage area, as determined at common law. In
short, the classification rules/post-qualification rules at Milford Haven were significantly tightened up.
The Policy of the Department for Transport

The Humber
18. On 11 June 2001 (barely twelve months later) an extraordinary thing then happened in the compulsory
pilotage area of the Humber. In a contractual dispute, the CHA stated untruthfully that it had “no choice” other
than to revoke the authorisations of all of its authorised pilots; and, to compound its impropriety, to do so on
Notice (Appendix 6) in January 2002, which time-scale of seven months obviously precluded the maintenance
of any of the existing regulated standards of post-qualification experience amongst any new pilots who might
replace them. By the terms of the Notice, which was issued to every authorised Humber pilot, the maintenance
of established standards of experience after January 2002 became an obvious chronological impossibility. As
all other ports had done until that time (and as most still do) the Humber CHA had maintained regulated
standards on the basis of a contract with the pilots. In other words, there is and always has been common
agreement between pilots and harbour authorities that the maintenance of standards is necessary.
19. The Humber CHA was under no obligation at all to behave as it chose to do. The statutory power to
revoke the authorisation of any pilot is discretionary and is not obligatory in any circumstances (Section 3 of
the 1987 Act). Moreover, the power is in any event secondary to the obligation to “keep under consideration”
matters relating to compulsory pilotage, which is regulated by Section 2 of the Act. The untruthful statement
that the CHA had “no choice” was a disingenuous and obvious attempt to persuade authorised pilots to accept
the terms of employment which are referred to in the Notice-letter of 11 June 2001; under threat of
disqualification if unwilling. The DTLR was warned many times and by many different voices (including
Members of Parliament) as to the impropriety and the likely consequences of the Notice which the CHA had
issued. Nevertheless, the DTLR refused to intervene.
20. In consequence and as threatened, on 26 January 2002 the CHA abandoned all regulated standards of
experience, executed its Notice as delivered, de-authorised all of its pre-existing authorised pilots and granted
authorisations to new pilots whose experience fell far, far short of the previously regulated standards. Standards
of experience were not maintained at all.
21. The DTLR, for its part, in April 2002 then published a Report (Appendix 7) entitled “The New Humber
Pilot Service” which confirmed that the new arrangement (adopted in January 2002) had abandoned not merely
some but all regulated standards of experience for authorised pilots; and therefore did not comply with the
principle identified in the Sea Empress case. The DTLR made no effort to address the obligation that all
relevant standards need not only to be maintained in any and every compulsory pilotage area, but maintained
at the highest possible level. The abandonment of standards of experience was confirmed by a Pilotage
Direction issued in July 2002, which stated that the authorisation of Humber pilots would henceforward be
merely “on the recommendation of the Harbour Master”; and that any standard or regulated measure of
experience for pilots would therefore no longer apply. (The Pilotage Direction is shown at page 80 of
Appendix 2.)
22. To make matters substantially more dangerous, in a major port it is unusual for a Harbour Master to
hold any authorisation in pilotage at all. For that reason, specifically regulated standards of post-qualification
experience are particularly important in pilotage anywhere. It is grossly improper that an authorisation in the
name of the state for the purposes of safe navigation should occur on the mere “recommendation” or judgment
of any one person alone; particularly when that person is not (or might not be) himself authorised in any
relevant way. The grant of an authorisation is a grant of power; and it is not open to anybody to grant a power
which he does not himself possess. (Nemo dat quod non habet.)
23. The DTLR Report confirms (at Paragraph 10.9) that the obligations of a CHA in a compulsory pilotage
area are “strict and onerous”. The entire Report, however, represents an open travesty of any compliance with
those obligations. The Report shows a carefully detailed catalogue of the disorder and impropriety which had
arisen; which is not a thing which Parliament ever intended should happen, quite regardless of any case law.
The Report refers (at Paragraph 7.7) to a “crisis” which had arisen, following a lawful strike by the pilots
which began (with the approval of the Court of Appeal) on 12 December 2001 in protest at the behaviour of
the CHA; and (in a table at Paragraph 7.15) to the 946 occasions on which the CHA was unable to provide
any pilot at all (whether experienced or otherwise) to ships in want in a compulsory pilotage area. Of those
946 occasions, the same table shows that no fewer than 444 of them arose after 23 January 2002, when the
pilots’ strike ended, three days before the de-authorisation en masse on 26 January 2002. After 26 January
2002, the sole cause of the acute shortage of pilots which existed was the mass de-authorisation which the
CHA carried out that day by its own choice. Plainly, Parliament never did intend (nor even contemplate) that
such a thing might happen. That extraordinary event, in a major port on a hazardous estuary (at one of the
largest ports in Europe), was beyond the contemplation of any responsible person.
24. In October 2001 the pilots under Notice of de-authorisation had themselves given Notice to the CHA of
their intention to stage a strike in protest. In November 2001 the CHA (in response to the strike-Notice)
obtained a restraining injunction against the pilots in the High Court. The validity of the restraining injunction
was over-ruled in the Court of Appeal on 11 December 2001, when the Court determined that a strike by the
pilots would be wholly lawful in the circumstances. The crisis then facing the CHA was so great that it even
went to the extent of suspending compulsory pilotage altogether, not because the Humber estuary and its
approaches had become any less hazardous (manifestly they had not) but because the CHA knew full well that
it had placed itself in a position where it simply could not provide an adequate number of pilots. The CHA
was clearly aware that it had acted improperly. It is inconceivable that the CHA ever contemplated, when it
issued the mass de-authorisation Notice in June 2001, that compulsory pilotage in the Humber should perhaps
be suspended. Nor should it have done so. It clearly ought never to have issued the Notice which it chose to
issue, with or without the clear untruth contained within the Notice.
25. The DTLR, however, openly approved the crisis and disorder which the CHA had created by its own
Notice as issued. As the executive arm of Parliament, the DTLR expressed no syllable of disapproval and was
very clearly complicit in the disorder. Where the DTLR Report asserts (at Paragraph 5.25 of its Report) that
the arrangements newly put in place were “fit for purpose”, it is no more legally correct or proper than would
be an assertion that any other legally non-compliant arrangement might be fit for purpose. Fitness for purpose
and compliance with legally-required minimum standards are plainly two different things. The former is a
matter of mere opinion whereas the latter is a matter of fact and strict law.
26. The author of the Report is fastidious in his avoidance of any suggestion that there might have been
compliance with any relevant law. Plainly there was none, as the author makes clear that he knew perfectly
well. It is clear beyond a doubt that the DTLR intended to turn a blind eye to the impropriety of the CHA; and
in fact did so. The Report properly makes the point that there are more methods than one to train a pilot; but,
playing fast and loose with the common law, dismisses altogether the need to comply with the legal obligation
to maintain established minimum standards of post-qualification experience, particularly so where pilotage is
compulsory. In that regard, there was no compliance whatsoever.
27. As to the 133 authorised pilots who were de-authorised en-masse on 26 January 2002, 88 of them (two
thirds of their number) sued the CHA in a group action in the High Court in the matter of misfeasance in
public office. Their action was settled on terms out of Court, in April 2008, shortly before it was listed to be
heard at trial in the Admiralty Court.
International Law
28. As if in confirmation of the improper nature of the behaviour of the Humber CHA and the inadequacy
of the DTLR to keep it in check, in 2003 the International Maritime Organization (the maritime arm of the
United Nations Organization, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory state) issued its Resolution A960 in
which it is declared (at Paragraph 2.3.2) that developed standards in pilotage should not only be maintained
but should be “enforced”. (Appendix 8.) In compulsory pilotage areas this international obligation is clearly
much the greater, for all of the reasons identified by Mr Justice Steel in the SEA EMPRESS case.
The Clyde
29. In December 2007, the large vessel Red Jasmine was navigating in the Clyde under pilotage in a
compulsory pilotage area inward-bound in dense fog, assisted by two tug-boats. The head-tug Flying Phantom,
attached by a tow-wire to the ship’s bow, suffered a capsize with the loss of three lives. Subsequently the pilot
of Red Jasmine suffered mental stress and has since retired.
30. Between 2008 and 2010, having got away scot-free with its inadequacy in 2002, the Department for
Transport (DfT) (as the DTLR had become) then turned a blind eye to events as they were developing on the
Clyde, where (notwithstanding the Red Jasmine/Flying Phantom incident) the CHA had chosen to revoke the
authorisations of so many of its senior authorised pilots that it could no longer provide any pilot (not a single
pilot) whose post-qualification experience complied with the regulated standards applicable on the Clyde.
(Clyde standards as at July 2009 are shown at pages 42, 43 and 57 of Appendix 2.)
31. On 9 May 2008 in the Scottish Parliament, Mr Salmond the First Minister referred to the “obvious” risk
of “extreme damage” which arises when any standards in pilotage are not maintained.
32. By a letter of 3 April 2009 (Appendix 9) the shortage of properly qualified Clyde pilots was already so
acute that the Clyde Harbour Master on behalf of the CHA ordered the pilot of Red Jasmine to report for duty,
notwithstanding the fact that the medical advisor to the CHA had long-previously certified that the pilot was
psychiatrically unfit. Between 13 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, the CHA on the Clyde was invited to
indicate how many of its serving pilots held experience in accordance with the Clyde Regulations; and it
simply declined the invitation. Appendix 9 comprises a clip of the above correspondence with the Clyde CHA
in which the refusal (and therefore the failure) to show any compliance with any standards is clearly shown.
The Role of the Shipping Ministers

33. The DfT has been challenged repeatedly to explain its lack of interest in the maintenance of pilotage
standards in the two major ports of Humber and Clyde, particularly in light of the untruth and secrecy which
has taken place at those two ports respectively. It is alarming that the DfT has stated that it “does not accept”
the common law position. Still less does it accept the international law position. Appendix 10 is a copy of a
letter of 29 June 2009 signed by Paul Clark MP, the Shipping Minister at the time, setting out the Departmental
position. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the Department for Transport has cocked snooks at the laws of
pilotage within its own jurisdiction, as clearly have the two CHAs in question. It appears quite clear that the
Department has held in contempt the very law which it is its function to administer.
34. On 29 September 2010 I met the then-new Shipping Minister, Mike Penning MP. I was presented to him
at a meeting that day on another matter at Hope Cove, South Devon. Mr Penning indicated that he shared my
concerns for the matters raised here. Accordingly he has encouraged me to ventilate them, as have many others
including Andrew Miller MP, Sir Malcolm Thornton (MP 1979–97) and Lord Hunt of Wirral in more open
and express terms.
35. At a public meeting in Liverpool in January 2011, Mr Ian Timpson of the DfT was present. Mr Perry
Glading of Forth Ports Plc was in the Chair. Also present were Sir Alan Massey, Chief Executive of the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Captain Stephen Clinch, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Marine
Accidents. In response to a question from me, Mr Timpson had the good grace to admit that in due course the
DfT might become obliged to take action to restore order in pilotage.
36. There exists no authority, as far as I know, above or higher than the common law as determined in the
Courts when called upon to interpret the true meaning of the 1987 Pilotage Act as intended by Parliament.
37. The implementary power given by Section 32 (1) of the Act has not been exercised by any Secretary of
State since its enactment on 1st October 1988.
Conclusion
38. The experience of the last ten years has shown that where post-qualification standards are maintained
merely by ad-hoc means, they are not in fact maintained at all. In those ports where standards have been
properly maintained as required at law, the standards have been maintained as minimum standards. It could
not be, therefore, in the public interest nor in compliance with the law in any way, to allow those standards
to be diminished by choice; which clearly is what has happened on a large scale in the cases of the two
CHAs mentioned.
39. In both cases CHA has chosen to disregard established standards for reasons better known to itself,
contrary to the common law. Parliament has never intended that the public pilotage service should be
administered either by untruth or by secrecy on the part of any CHA, nor by efforts to impose terms of
employment on pilots where pilots did not require them, nor by inadequacy on the part of the DfT, all of which
unedifying things have happened in the United Kingdom on a gross and obvious scale.
40. In light of the acknowledgment by the DfT that the laws of pilotage in any compulsory pilotage area are
strict and onerous; and in light of the consistent failure of successive Secretaries of State to uphold those laws,
it is submitted most respectfully in the public interest that it is now the function of the Select Committee to
take steps to ensure that the failures—and the large-scale disorder which is inevitably caused thereby—continue
no longer.
41. A simple, inexpensive and effective first-remedial step would be the re-introduction of the terms of
Section 22 of the 1913 Pilotage Act, whereby a CHA would be obliged to furnish to the Secretary of State
returns on all pilotage matters at regular intervals. A copy of the Section is shown at Appendix 11. Public
propriety calls for nothing less. It would be a very mild obligation.
42. Even better would be the re-introduction of the Bye-Laws which regulated the relevant standards with
complete and simple success under Section 18 of the 1913 Act. It is unclear why this provision was ever
discontinued. The international obligations of the United Kingdom in safe pilotage remain undiminished in any
way. In light of the ever-increasing use of foreign-flag tonnage (which seems unlikely to be reversed in the
foreseeable future) those obligations are clearly greater than ever before.
43. It is perfectly clear that any Competent Harbour Authority remains accountable to Parliament, because
it is from Parliament alone that any CHA is granted power. It is equally clear that statutory power has been
abused to date by two CHAs acting in their own interests and with complete impunity. That is a state of affairs
which I trust that the Select Committee will find intolerable.
Appendices not published.

August 2012
Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03A)
Marine Pilotage
In the letter of 12 December 2011 (copy attached) in which Andrew Miller MP proposes that an inquiry
should be conducted into pilotage on the basis of persistent failures in the Department for Transport to address
relevant issues, I am the constituent mentioned by Mr Miller as having produced substantial evidence to him
in that regard. Subsequently, Mr Miller has been most assiduous in pursuing pilotage matters and I remain
most grateful to him.
Following the hearing of oral evidence on 17 December last, publication of the transcript of the hearing (ref.
HC 840-i, albeit as yet uncorrected) confirms that significant matters remain unaddressed by the Secretary of
State; and that no organisation holding a licence as a competent harbour authority under the 1987 Pilotage Act
at local level has been held accountable in the last 25 years; save only in one case (the Sea Empress case of
1999–2000), the judgment of which the Department refuses to recognise, as Mr Miller’s letter indicates.
Quite clearly there remains much work to be done to restore propriety into pilotage and most respectfully I
enclose also for your consideration some specific comments on the departmental evidence as given to the
Committee.
With my thanks for the proper concerns of the Select Committee.

Cc Andrew Miller MP
COMMENTS UPON THE EVIDENCE GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT TO THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON 17 DECEMBER 2012
UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE PREPARED 28 DECEMBER 2012 AND AUTHORISED

BY THE COMMITTEE FOR RELEASE
EVIDENCE GIVEN BY STEPHEN HAMMOND MP (SH) AND BY MR THOMAS BARRY (TB), CIVIL
SERVANT
Q 84 Chair: Minister, could you tell us whether there has been any risk assessment underlying the proposals
to extend the proposals to extend eligibility for pilot exemption certificates (PECs)?
SH .......................There has not been a risk assessment because there is no need for it. Nothing in this Bill
changes any of the safety standards or requirements of the competent harbour authority (CHA). There is no
change in standards; there is a change in conditions.........................
Comment
It is incorrect to suggest that there is (or could be) a change in conditions without there being a change in
standards. Standards and conditions amount in substance to the same thing. There is a clear proposal in the
Bill to relax conditions for the issue of a PEC; and the answer given by the Minister is therefore seriously
misleading.
Q85 Chair: ........Don’t you feel any concern that, although your best concern is to maintain safety standards,
the changes might in fact jeopardise those?
SH. No. If anything , the proposals in the Bill enhance safety for one very clear reason: CHAs will have
their power extended to take away exemption certificates immediately............................
Comment
The power to suspend a pilotage qualification immediately, if appropriate in the interests of public safety,
exists already at common law (Cooper v Forth Ports—Scottish Inner House/Court of Appeal—May 2011). It
is misleading to suggest otherwise. The removal of an individual qualification does nothing to enhance safety
in general and it is misleading also to suggest that it might do so.
Q99 Chair: How are the Government implementing A.960—The International Maritime Organisation’s
Resolution on the training and certification of pilots?
TB..................It is not for the UK Government to enforce; it is for the CHAs. Section 1.3 of the
recommendation says that the UK Government should encourage CHAs in relation to the application of
standards.
Comment
Recommendation 2 of the Resolution urges the Governments of Member States to give effect to the
Resolution as soon as possible. It is quite incorrect to suggest (as TB appears to do) that CHAs might have
powers which the Government does not. All powers of a CHA are given by the Government in any event and
by nobody else. Moreover, the Secretary of State has specific power by Section 32(1) of the Pilotage Act to
make regulations to give effect to the pilotage legislation. Successive Secretaries of State have resiled from
any exercise of the power. It is a gross impropriety for any Government to fail to recognise its responsibilities
in the exercise of powers which it has delegated to others. The principle delegatus non potest delegare applies,
requiring the greater body to ensure that any delegated powers exercised by the lesser body are exercised
properly and not otherwise. The principle confirms that a body which delegates powers cannot at the same
time delegate its own ultimate responsibility.
It is to be hoped that the United Kingdom is better represented in pilotage matters overseas by more accurate
statements than those in the information given by Mr Barry to the Select Committee on 17 December last.
Q100 Chair: You are still in support of [Resolution A.960]?

SH. Absolutely. To be absolutely clear, the Bill is fully compliant with that code [Resolution A 960?] as well.
Comment
It is wholly incorrect to suggest that Clause 2 of the Bill complies with Resolution A 960 in any way. Where
the Resolution requires (at Recommendation 2.3.2 of Annex 1) that the maintenance of developed standards
should be enforced, the Bill makes an express proposal at Clause 2 of its own text to relax standards and to
grant pilotage exemption to “any deck officer”, which is not the case under the present legislation. To entrust
the pilotage of any ship in a compulsory pilotage area to “any deck officer” by way of exemption from
compulsory pilotage is a high risk strategy which is not contemplated by the present legislation. Measures are
in place to prevent it and have been in place for many years. The entire purpose of the pilotage legislation
throughout history has been to minimise public risk and not in any way to create new risk, which is what
Clause 2 of the Bill very clearly proposes. It is a nonsense to suggest that the Bill might comply with Resolution
A 960 or with any other aspect of law.
Q110 Chair: Finally could you tell me whether the Department has ever revoked a licence from a competent
harbour authority?
SH: I am certainly not aware of it. I am reliably informed that the answer is no.
Comment
In light of Mr Barry’s answer to Question 99, Mr Hammond confirms the reluctance of the Department to
hold any local body accountable in pilotage administration. In consequence, disorder arises.
January 2013
Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 3B)

On 6 December the Department for Transport wrote to the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Association
advising of proposals to permit the grant of a Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) to any deck officer by the
removal of the present regulated standard restriction to Mister or First Mate as contained in Section 8 of the
Pilotage Act 1987. I attach a copy of the departmental letter. The final paragraph of the letter avers that the
Department is focused on securing marine safety. Because it is not possible to secure any public standard of
safety by a more permissive approach to any standard of navigation, it will readily be appreciated that an
anomaly is created by the present proposal. The anomaly is made more serious by the fact that the bodies who
grant the qualifications (namely the harbor authorities at local level) are rarely if ever held accountable by the
Department and are, moreover, in the main part commercial bodies having less public concern than the purely
public pilotage authorities which maintained pilotage discipline in the past.
The departmental letter refers also to the collision between the vessels Stena Feronia and Union Moon at
Belfast in March this year, which is more fully reported in Report 26/2012 of the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch. (A copy of the Report is also attached.) The Report makes it clear at Paragraph 2.4 that the only PEC
holder aboard Stena Feronia was neither the Master nor the First Mate of the vessel; and that, therefore, the
vessel was being navigated intentionally in clear breach of the provisions of Section 15 of the Pilotage Act, to
which criminal sanctions attach in respect of any breach. Even though Paragraph 3.2.2 of the Report concludes
that the inadequacy of the PEC arrangement was a positive contributory factor in the collision, there was no
prosecution of anybody in respect of any criminal breach of the Act.
The Report indicates (at Paragraph 1.1) that of the 108 persons aboard Stena Feronia, 47 were crew and 61
were fare-paying passengers and therefore members of the general travelling public. All 61 passengers were
ordered to their lifeboat stations in preparation to abandon ship (Paragraph 1.2.4). In those circumstances the
present inadequacies in the maintenance of pilotage law and the serious risks to public safety which arise in
consequence could hardly be more obvious.
LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM MARITIME
PILOTS’ ASSOCIATION
Dear Captain Cockrill,
Marine Navigation (No. 2) Bill

Thank you for your emails addressed to the Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP dated 17 and 26 November,
Stephen Hammond MP dated 16 November, and Richard Benyon MP dated 2 November regarding Sheryl!
Murray MP’s Marine Navigation (No. 2) Bill. I have been asked to reply.
I would like to reassure you that the Government has publicly recognised the key role marine pilots play in
the safe and efficient operation of port facilities and their personal contribution to the economic activity and
future prosperity of the UK. The Bill’s three Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) clauses are intended to
maintain those safe and efficient port operations while permitting greater flexibility for shipping and stronger
oversight by Competent Harbour Authorities (CHAs), which are responsible for managing pilotage in their
waters. Importantly, the Bill does not diminish the requirement under the Pilotage Act 1987 that a PEC holder
must satisfy a CHA that they possess the “skill, experience and local knowledge... sufficient for him to be
capable of piloting the ship.”
Mrs Murray and the Government tabled amendments to Clause 2 of the Bill at Report Stage on 30 November.
Instead of permitting any “member of the crew” to hold a PEC, the amended clause restricts the award of
PECs to only bona fide deck officers (including Masters and First Mates). At previous debates, Mrs Murray
and the Minister had agreed it would be helpful to provide this clarity that a PEC holder must be a crew
member with navigational responsibilities on the face of the Bill. The Chamber of Shipping, British Ports
Association and UK Major Ports Group all confirmed their support for the amendments.
The alternative wording for Clause 2 that you have suggested, “senior deck officer” or “deck officer engaged
on board at Management level holding a Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping A-II/2
Certificate of Competency”, would in practice maintain the existing restriction that only Masters or First Mates
may hold a PEC and therefore would not achieve the additional flexibility sought by the shipping industry.
The Port Marine Safety Code and accompanying Guide to Good Practice provide guidance on the
management of PECs and already recommend that CHAs seek a valid certificate of competency as a deck
officer from PEC applicants. This guidance can be reviewed to consider what advice would be valuable in
terms of the qualifications that might illustrate whether a deck officer is ready to apply for a PEC. As a member
of the Code’s Steering Group, you will be able to participate directly in this process.
In respect of the collision between the Stena Feronia and Union Moon, a significant contributory cause was
the alcohol consumption of the Master of the Union Moon. He was found to be three-and-a-halflimes over the
legal alcohol limit more than five hours after his last drink, and has been sentenced to one year’s imprisonment
for his role in this accident.
The Union Moon had not been navigated by a PEC holder. The ship’s Master had taken on board a pilot to
conduct the vessel through the pilotage area in Belfast Harbour. In line with the pilotage directions then
in force, the pilot disembarked at a point before the accident occurred. Belfast Harbour has since changed
those directions.
The accident investigation did identify flaws in the crewing arrangements made by the company managing
the Stena Feronia when the PEC holder was transferred from a sister ship. It was not a causal factor in the
accident but, nevertheless, the report’s sole recommendation is that the company amends its Safety
Management System.
The Government does not believe that the circumstances of this accident have any bearing on the Bill’s
proposals regarding the eligibility criteria for PECs. Further, the various actions taken in response to this
accident appear proportionate and focused on securing marine safety.
Yours sincerely,
Michael Read-Leah
Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03C)

RE: MARINE NAVIGATION (NO.2) BILL
This Bill stands referred to the Select Committee, The Bill contains a proposal that a present standard
obligation which needs to be shown by a candidate before the grant of a Pilotage Exemption Certificate by
Section 8 of the Pilotage Act 1987 should no longer be maintained, The standard obligation which it is proposed
to remove is that the candidate must show that, as a matter of responsibility and fact, he is at least the bona
fide First Mate of a nominated vessel. The proposal is that the standard level of responsibility be reduced by a
substantial degree, or even removed altogether: and I am therefore obliged to draw your attention to the
following facts and matters:
1. The common law provides in principle that the highest possible standards are called for in
compulsory pilotage areas. Pilotage exemption applies only in such areas. The principle was
approved by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, in the Court of Appeal in April 2000 (Copy
attached),1 following the judgment of Mr Justice David Steel. Presiding Judge of the
Admiralty Court (Copy attached)2 following the Sea Empress disaster of 1996. The rationale
of both judgments is that the highest possible standards are required not only to justify the costs
incurred by the imposition of compulsion in pilotage but also to protect the general public in
geographical areas where navigation is deemed to be so hazardous as to warrant the imposition
of compulsory pilotage in the interest of public safety, The reduction of any existing standard
in a compulsory pilotage area. as now proposed in the Bill, accordingly contravenes the
common law,
2. Paragraph 2.3.2 of Annex 1 of Resolution A960 of the International Maritime Organization on
behalf of the United Nations Organization (copy attached)3 calls strongly for the maintenance
of all “developed” (ie presently existing) standards in pilotage, by enforcement. The proposal
before the Select Committee is quite plainly that a developed standard be removed and therefore
no longer maintained; and therefore rebuts Resolution A 960 altogether.
The obviously increased risk of mischief which arises whenever any high standard of responsibility is
delegated downwards will need no further explanation to the Members of the Select Committee: and I am
bound to confirm that the proposal contained in the Bill contravenes both domestic and international law for
the reasons stated, in any event. The proposal is therefore unlawful.
November 2012
Written evidence from Terence Crowe (MP 04)

Contact Name Terence Crowe
6 Paddock Drive, Parkgate, South Wirral, Cheshire, CH64 6TQ. Tel. 0151 336 5521
1. Who am I
Terence Crowe, Liverpool Pilot Service (retired). Joined in 1956, retired 2004.
Served an apprenticeship from 1956 to 1964. Piloting from1964 to 2004, including nine years on the Rio
Nunez in Guinea West Africa. 1979–88.
Elected to Pilot representative in Liverpool 1992 to 2004. This position involved the general administration
of the Pilot Service, and sitting on various panels for recruitment, discipline, and pilotage authorization.
Co- Founder of the new Liverpool Pilot Service Limited, established the 1st June 1997.
2. Main Issue
The Humber C.H.A.s interpretation of the 1987 Pilotage Act. Particularly clause 4 (2)A (a) (b) ie employment
status of Pilots, leading to the sacking of 90% of the serving pilots and the loss forever of their expertise, the
life blood of pilotage, handed down over many years, and now denied to the next generations of pilots.
3. Interpretation
A view is taken that clause 4 does not make it clear as to what should happen if the Pilots and the C.H.A.
cannot agree on any new contract. This is seen as a default option which enforces employment status on the
pilots and denies them the right to choose their own future.
1
Not published
2
Not published
3
Not published
4. Profit
Profit from pilotage has resulted from the 1987 act , for the first time in history.
This profit is achieved at the direct cost to the Pilots and pilotage infrastructure.
5. Evidence
The present day Humber pilot service is living evidence of the folly of the conduct of the C.H.A. in 2002.
It is believed that over 200 prospective pilots have past through the port since the enforcement of employed
status. (Liverpool saw two pilots depart during the same period.)
6. Observation
The authors of the 1987 pilot age act could not have envisaged such an outcome, to their carefully worded
act. The actual dismissal of 90% of the largest pilot service in the UK (Re Lord Chauncey: Cavendish Report.)
7. Question?
How could any C.H.A. consider such an act of vandalism?
8. The Next Step

An inquiry into the conduct of this C.H.A. regarding the pilots in 2002, and the quality and length of training
of the new pilots.
9. The Future
The Liverpool Pilot Service (Liverpool Pilots Limited) Established 1 June 1997 is the most modern service
in the U.K. A contract for services is in place which meets all the requirements of the 1987 pilotage act, and
relieves the C.H.A. of their obligation to offer employment status to pilots. (A Humber type situation is there
by prevented.)
10. Comment
How could so many senior personell ie MP’s, Civil Servants, Ship owners feel able to stand by and watch
this catastrophy develop without stepping in?
A pilots position onboard ship is in general not understood. “In compulsory pilotage water the Master
SHALL hand over the conduct of the vessel to the Pilot.” He is not some form of guide or bystander. Is it
appropiate for a vessel carrying hazardous cargo to be under control of a pilot short on experience and time
in training?
11. Conclusion
The U.K. pilot services are a national asset and shoud not be left at the mercy of C.H.A.’s many of whom
have little maritime knowledge or experience, especially at the most senior level ie CEO’s, MD’s etc.
T.E. Crowe
Liverpool Pilot (rtd)
12. PS
The next pilot age act must establish unambiguously the right of all U.K. pilots to self employed status.
September 2012
Written evidence from the United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA)
(MP 06)
MEMORANDUM submitted to the Transport Committee by the United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea
Pilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA) comprised of the Corporations of Trinity House in Hull, London and
Newcastle, who, under Section 23 of the Pilotage Act 1987 are authorised to grant deep sea pilotage certificates.
Transport Committee invites evidence on issues affecting marine pilotage, and this Memorandum contains
the response of the three Corporations of Trinity House, who welcome the opportunity to assist the Committee.
Deep Sea Pilotage can be described in this context as: the provision of experienced Master Mariners with
specialist local knowledge, to client shipmasters, owners and ship-operators, on a voluntary basis for a fee,
whilst their vessels are transiting Northwest European waters, these being amongst the most congested and
high risk sea areas in the world.
Pilotage generally has been one of the functions granted to the Corporations of Trinity House by a number
of Royal Charters over the years, the first being to Trinity House London in 1514 when Henry VIII gave
powers inter alia to regulate pilotage. Our authority as deep sea pilotage authorities, under the Pilotage Act
1987 is the main remaining responsibility since this Act passed district pilotage to the Competent Harbour
Authorities in the United Kingdom.
Deep Sea Pilots are certificated by the Examining Boards of the three Trinity Houses following examination
using a common syllabus based on the 1976 Antwerp Rules agreed by the former North Sea Pilotage
Commission. A valid Certificate of Competency as Master Mariner is required, as are all relevant training
certificates and medical certification ENG1. Every candidate must have relevant nautical charts and publications
in his possession, corrected to date for the area for which he being examined, which currently extends from
Murmansk to Gibraltar, limited to Skagen in the east and to Longitude 14° 00’ in the west.
Every deep sea pilot licensed by the Authorities in the UK has substantial command experience, which,
together with extensive knowledge of our waters, conditions and risks, makes them a considerable asset to those
using their services. The pilots themselves are self-employed and gain assignments through their affiliation to
one of the two Deep Sea Pilotage Agencies operating in the UK. Other such agencies exist in France, Belgium,
The Netherlands and Germany.
The UK Authorities issue licences valid for one year only, and every licensed deep sea pilot must attend a
revalidation interview each January where it is assessed if he is fit for renewal of his certificate for the year.
In 2011 it was estimated that the number of licensed deep sea pilots operating in Northwest European waters
were: France 14, Germany 12, Netherlands 19 and the UK 45, giving a total of about 90. However, these
figures vary with demand by shipowners, often changing due to deep sea pilotage being voluntary and subject
to the commercial pressures in a volatile trading environment.
The typical cost to use a deep sea pilot for a container ship’s European port rotation—average seven days—
is about £3,000. This is a very small proportion of the costs of the vessel and its cargo freight, when considered
as a means of reducing risk to safe navigation by having an experienced pilot onboard. The added advantage
of a deep sea pilot’s local knowledge can save fuel costs, using experience of routes, passages and tides and
advising the shipmaster how best to conduct the voyage.
In many areas of the maritime world there are activities aimed at increasing the use of deep sea pilots to
reduce risk. The Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission is lobbying for pilotage to be compulsory in the Baltic
Sea. In Australia it is compulsory to take a pilot when transiting the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Straight
and in Turkey, whilst strongly recommended for transiting vessels, pilotage is compulsory for the Bosphorus
Straits for certain classes of ships. Singapore are also keen to have compulsory pilotage for certain high risk
vessels (gas carriers, tankers etc) in their confined and congested waters.
However, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defends the right of innocent passage and apart from
the above there are no areas outside port authority jurisdiction where vessels must use the services of a pilot.
We believe that this will continue for many years to come and therefore encourage shipmasters, owners and
operators to voluntarily make use of deep sea pilots, as an appropriate risk control measure, in our waters.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has, for many years, recognised the advantage of deep sea
pilotage in congested and restricted waterways. At the Twelfth IMO General Assembly in 1981 the following
Resolution A.486 (XII) was adopted: USE OF ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED DEEP SEA PILOTS IN THE
NORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL & SKAGERRAK.
This Resolution: “Recommends Member Governments to encourage ships flying their flag to make use only
of the services of deep sea pilots in possession of a deep sea pilot’s card in accordance with the Antwerp rules,
and invites the Governments of the coastal states of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Skagerrak to
provide information to IMO on how to secure the services of adequately qualified deep sea pilots. The
Resolution contain two Annexes: giving Example of deep sea pilot’s card and a List of competent authorities
in the littoral states of Northwest Europe.
In recent years, the UK ADSPA, together with representatives of deep sea pilots and the UK Safety of
Navigation Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, have worked to
develop a revision of the IMO Resolution A.486(XII) described above. This work came to fruition in May
2012, when a revised draft Resolution A.486 “RECOMMENDATION ON THE USE OF ADEQUATELY
QUALIFIED DEEP-SEA PILOTS IN THE NORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL AND SKAGERRAK” was
submitted to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee for consideration, as a joint submission by all 27 EU
Member States.
The Baltic States have a similar IMO Resolution, (A.480) recommending using adequately qualified Deep
Sea Pilots in the Baltic Sea, and agreed to revise their version at the same time and in the same way as the
North Sea resolution.
These revised Resolutions made stronger the recommendation for shipmasters, owners and ship-operators to
use qualified deep sea pilots, and added a new Annex 1 which listed: “Factors to be taken into account when
considering the use of a Deep-Sea Pilot to enhance the effectiveness of the Bridge Team for the safety of
navigation and the protection of the marine environment”.
This joint submission from the EU Member States (Res.A.486) and the Baltic (BPAC) members had been
commented upon by: various interested parties, in a joint submission to the MSC (MSC/90/25/21), wherein
those bodies and member states objected to the inclusion of Annex 1 in the revised resolution and requested
that it be removed. They claimed that the “Factors to be taken into account when considering the use of a
deep sea pilot” are subjective and cause them concern.
The UK Licensing Authorities provided the MCA delegation to IMO MSC with a written response to the
objections raised, and circulated this response to Northwest European Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (NEDSPA)
and the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission, requesting their support in progressing the Revised Resolution
A.486 without amendment or removal of Annex 1.
This Annex of the Revised A.486 and A.480 is seen as an important addition to the document; as it
recommends a risk based approach to assessing whether to use a Deep Sea Pilot when transiting the English
Channel, North Sea, Skagerrak, and Baltic Sea, and lists some of the factors to be considered when making
this decision. We strongly recommended that it be retained in the revised Resolution.
The ADSPA considers it unfortunate that several IMO Members objected to its inclusion resulting in removal
of the Annex.
These IMO Members and bodies were content to update the existing resolutions but they had strong
arguments against the Annex. The major objection was their opinion that the Annex will increase costs for
ship-owners and that this is a first step for implementing mandatory deep sea pilotage in the English Channel,
North Sea and Baltic Sea. The IMO NAV Sub-Committee can update the existing resolutions (A.480 and
A.486) but is not allowed to include the Annex.
The consideration of updating the Resolutions will not take place until IMO NAV 58 (2013). The Annex
can not now be included or discussed.
It is essential that the risk to the safety of navigation is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
It is the view of the UK Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities that the use of licensed pilots by vessels transiting the
English Channel, Dover Strait and the North Sea is one of the key control measures available in this regard
without which the risk is not ALARP.
This important control measure can make a significant contribution to navigation safety and protection of
the marine environment. We strongly recommend that shipmaster, owners and operators consider the use of a
deep sea pilot as an additional risk mitigation measure.
Estimating that there are some 90 licensed deep sea pilots providing their services to many different vessels
in the North Sea, English Channel and Skagerrak area, the number of vessels served by deep sea pilots are no
more than 2,000 per annum, which is based on each pilot undertaking approximately 20 vessel acts per year.
Therefore the actual use of the deep sea pilotage service is very small compared with the estimated 80,000
vessels that transit the Dover Strait on an annual basis, meaning a high percentage of the remaining vessels
are navigating in this area without a deep sea pilot and the identified risk control measure he provides.
It is, therefore, the strong recommendation of the UK Authorities for the licensing of Deep Sea Pilots that
the UK Government take all necessary actions to promote and encourage the use of adequately qualified deep
sea pilots by vessels in the congested and constrained waters around the UK, in order that safety of navigation
and protection of the marine environment are better assured and that risk to life and property is better protected.
Signed on behalf of the Corporation’s of Trinity House in Hull, London and Newcastle and the Association of
Deep Sea PIlotage Authorities of the United Kingdom (ADSPA)
September 2012
Written evidence from Dave Devey MNM (MP 07)

My Background
My name is Dave Devey and I am a retired pilot for the Port Of Liverpool, aged 70. I have spent a lifetime
in pilotage beginning in 1958 at the age of 16 as a cadet with The Blue Funnel Line and progressing through
the various stages of apprenticeship on to gaining my first Pilot’s Licence at the age of 24 in 1966. I then spent
over 40 years as a licenced/authorised pilot, retiring at the age of 65 in 2007 with an unblemished record. The
last 10 years of my career was spent as the elected Senior Representative of Liverpool Pilots and I represented
Pilots both nationally and in Europe as a committee member of the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots
Association. I was awarded the Merchant Navy Medal in 2007 for services to UK and European Pilotage.
Pilotage in the UK
The fact that the Transport Select Committee have chosen to invite evidence on the current position of
pilotage in the UK is a welcome step as it is a subject which indeed requires much airing following the many
years of neglect at the hands of a number of the Competent Harbour Authorities set up following the 1987
Pilotage Act.
We need to examine the reasons behind the 1987 Pilotage Act which offered employment to pilots and
transferred the means by which they were remunerated into the hands of the Competent Harbour Authorities.
The Act gave CHAs greater control over pilots and diminished their ability to act in an independent manner
in issues involving safety. This change was brought about under the guise of “the need for a more unified and
therefore better management of all port operatives under the single banner of The Competent Harbour
Authority”. What it actually achieved, in the cases of those who became employed, was to seriously devalue
the status and therefore the remuneration of the pilots and to gag them from speaking out about any
improprieties which arise from day to day within the port operation. “Loyalty to the company that now paid
their wages” was the new watchword. It should be noted that the revenue earned from pilotage comes from
the shipowner and is a separate and distinct payment from the port charges that are made. Prior to 1987 this
revenue went to the pilots themselves and the port authority took a commensurate share which paid for the
costs of running the pilotage operation which included the building and maintenance of launches and the wages
of pilot boat crews. Once harbour authorities took control of this money the pilots’ share diminished in
proportion and the savings were absorbed into the general harbour accounts.
UK Pilots prior to 1987 were self employed and therefore able to retain their status as independent
professional persons who, by reason of their independence, were able to uphold the safe practices of navigation,
which are essential to every port operation, without the constraints of financial pressures which are frequently
brought to bear on port authorities by their customers under the threat of “taking their custom elsewhere if
non-compliancy with their wishes”. The loss of this independence is a serious threat to the good governance
of our port operations and needs to be addressed before the situation deteriorates any further. To underline this
point I can best relate my personal experiences of what happened in my own port of Liverpool in the years
following the introduction of the 1987 Act. In 1988 Liverpool Pilots elected to forego their self employed
status and to join the CHA as employees of the Mersey Docks & Harbour Company. What followed was nine
years of confrontation which was only relieved in 1997 when, by mutual agreement, the pilots reverted to their
previous position of one of self employment. Since that day the relationship between the pilots and the harbour
authority has steadily improved and all issues relating to pilotage and port safety are discussed and resolved
following regular meetings. Liverpool Pilots are now recognised as one of the UK’s foremost bodies in the
pursuit of safe practices in pilotage. This should be the way forward for all CHAs who currently employ
their pilots.
What does a Pilot do?
The public’s perception of a pilot can vary from one of a level of no knowledge of his very existence to one
of “He’s a man who helps the captain to bring his ship in and out of port” This is usually followed by “I think
he drives the tug boat that pulls the ship” or “He goes out in a little boat and leads the ship in to/out of port”.
Only those people who have experienced a trip on a cruise liner will be aware that he comes on board and
goes up to the bridge and even the majority of those people think that he is there just to help the captain to
dock his ship. The reality is a sea mile away from this perception and is at the heart of why the pilotage
profession is currently being dumbed down by a number of the CHAs.
This public perception of what a pilot does has been supported and encouraged by civil servants who have
been persuaded of the belief that a pilot is merely an adviser and that the master of the vessel is in control of
all aspects of his vessel’s operation which includes navigation in compulsory pilotage waters. The perception
currently being promulgated is that the pilot stands to one side of the master and that he advises him should
he believe that he may be doing something wrong. What happens in reality is that the master of the vessel,
because he is obliged to by law, hands over the charge of the navigation to the pilot, barring certain stipulated
exceptions (Royal Naval vessels etc). He duly does this following a briefing based on the pilot’s passage plan
which has already been formulated by the pilot prior to boarding, drawing on his unique knowledge of the
tidal situation and the quirks of wind and current that may subsequently affect the passage of the vessel in his
charge up until it reaches the safety of its final berthing place.
The erroneous perception that the pilot is merely an adviser has been fostered by those who seek to diminish
the true responsibilities of the pilot’s position and therefore his status. This misconception has led to the current
downgrading of the UK pilot’s status in employment and a reduction in his resulting entitlement to a proper
remuneration under the 1987 Act.
What the general public does not know, and that includes the government, is that the pilot has a very difficult
and complex job. He must be both mentally and physically fit in order to deal with the many problems he will
encounter in his daily task of safely navigating the vessels in his charge. He alone has to make on the spot
decisions involving millions of pounds of equipment and most of all the lives of those people both on board
his ship and those on other vessels which he will pass at close quarters. One mistake on his part can lead to a
catastrophic situation whereby multi-million pounds of pollution and loss of life is the end result. One of the
reasons why he needs to be physically fit is that he is frequently required to journey out to the boarding point
via a small launch in all weather conditions both day and night before he has to negotiate a climb up a rope
ladder which can be as much as 10 metres in height. When this is done in bad weather (of which the UK gets
its fair share) and at night it can be extremely dangerous as the vessel can be rolling or pitching with the effect
of the sea. Making the right judgement as to when to make the jump from launch to ladder can be the difference
between a safe ascent or ending up in the water. Even more difficult to judge is the descent from a vessel on
to the safety of the deck of the launch.
The pilot, on safely boarding the vessel then has to ascend numerous decks in order to arrive at his place of
work ie the ship’s bridge. My own experience has been that few of the larger vessels are equipped with lifts
and the ascent has to be made by staircase. I encountered 99 steps on one particular vessel. Now the pilot has
arrived on the bridge he is met by the master who is usually extremely pleased to see the man who is
subsequently going to relieve him of his apprehensions about how his vessel is going to safely negotiate this
passage. An exchange of passage plans thus takes place—if indeed the master is fully aware of what is about
to happen to his vessel. The pilot will then direct the passage of the vessel both in its speed and direction
employing, if felt needed, tugs for the final part of the berthing, directing the tugs as to how they tow the
vessel with the use of a hand held radio. This operation requires a high degree of concentration in controlling
the engine movements to govern the speed of the vessel, the giving of orders to the helmsman as to the direction
of the vessel and instructions to the tugs as how they assist the berthing. The pilot is also communicating with
the shore by radio indicating which lines are required for the final mooring position.
All this is a sea mile away from the pilot being an adviser.
Comments
Relaxing the rules on the granting of Pilotage Exemption Certificates should be viewed with extreme caution
and issues of safety should be paramount in any final decisions.
Pilots should have a greater say in the affairs governing their profession and should not be relegated to just
another department of the CHA where frequently they have been left to wither on the vine.
The UK Government should publicly recognise the importance of pilots and support them in their daily role
of protecting the UK shores from pollution and the loss of life.
(Please see the dvd “A Day In The Life Of A Liverpool Pilot”.)
Post Script
I apologise for exceeding the number of pages recommended but I would have liked to have written a lot
more and have condensed my evidence as best I can.
September 2012
Written evidence from John H Bryant BA MNI ( Retired Trinity House and Port of London Authority
pilot) (MP 08)
The following issues are the most significant for marine pilotage in 2012 and beyond.
(1) Recruitment (Recruitment of marine pilots, difficulties and suggestions for the future)
(2) Maintaining standards (The effect of technology on training and safety)
(3) Vessel Traffic Services (Misunderstandings about the role of a VTS)
(4) The legal position. (The legal position of pilotage and VTS)
1. Recruitment
Traditionally in UK and Europe pilots are recruited from the pool of experienced seafarers available in each
region. In the main, pilots in major UK and European ports are qualified to command all classes and sizes of
ships and many have command experience. This qualification (Master Mariner) takes some 10 years to obtain
and requires a degree level education. In many cases a master Mariner will also hold a degree in Nautical
Science. Before becoming a marine pilot it is likely that he or she will have about another five years experience
of watchkeeping and will the take four years to qualify as a First Class Pilot in a major port. A total of 19 years.
Thirty or more years ago this level of experience and education was common among seafarers in UK; this
is no longer the case. The training and experience is difficult and onerous to obtain and more lucrative
opportunities are available. Pilots are for the most part reasonably well paid as you would expect after 20 years
of training and experience, however remuneration now is proportionately considerably less than 30 years ago.
Pilotage is no longer considered an enviable occupation by seafarers. As an example a cruise ship master can
expect to earn over £100,000 pa tax free working six months of the year whereas a pilot will likely earn
£70,000 pa taxable and have about 30 days annual leave. A pilot with a masters certificate is certainly capable
of becoming a cruise ship master and not surprisingly many do.
The solution is to offer marine pilots a career in port management. Many will prefer to stay working as
pilots but others will take the opportunity to progress and the port industry will benefit enormously. When
pilots are recruited they should be offered a career path from pilot to Chief Executive if that is what they want
and they are suitable. This may mean that harbour masters may need to be pilots before they progress to
harbour master but this is a progressive step and the port industry will benefit from more experienced and
more confident harbour masters. Of course this progression happens now but it is not encouraged.
2. Maintaining Standards
Pilotage skills have changed in the last 50 years, mainly because of the continual advances in technology:
radar, gps, ais, vts, towage and communications. It is easy to assume that these advances have brought more
safety to the industry, resulting in fewer collisions and groundings.
This is not the case. Unfortunately Pilotage skills have not improved despite the increase in technology.
Pilotage is essentially the ability of a pilot to use his local knowledge together with his experience in
shiphandling to bring a ship safely to her berth even when working within very fine tolerances. The tolerances
have undoubtedly been reduced over the last several decades but shiphandling skills have not improved. It is
likely that increased use of technology while bringing some benefits will not outweigh the decline in
shiphandling skills. The use of technology in shiphandling seems to have the effect of making people believe
that the natural elements (wind and tide) can be “over powered” by the brute force of ever more powerful tugs
and machinery. This is a dangerous misunderstanding and is now being taught in shiphandling and towage
simulators everywhere.
Pilots are best trained by learning with other pilots. This has always been the case and any attempt to reduce
this practical training should be restrained. We can think of many other industries which have more recently
learned the benefits of this way of training.
In the future it may be necessary to review the recruitment of pilots because traditional sources of manpower
may disappear. However it would be foolish to think you can take graduates and make them into pilots with
just a few years training. The consequences of this lack of experience might be very expensive. I suggest the
solution is for the port industry and self employed pilots to work together to devise a training scheme with
sponsored training at sea, in port and in towage together with graduate entry standards. I suggest that a pilotage
appointment should not be made until the trainee is 30 years of age. Such schemes have existed in the past
and have succeeded in South Africa and the UK.
3. Vessel Traffic Services
Vessel Traffic Services have come to play an important part in UK and European ports over the last 30 or
more years. VTS cannot replace pilotage. Many uninformed and inexperienced people in the port and shipping
industries fail to understand this point. VTS provides services to ships transiting a port area, it provides up to
date navigational information, though with today’s technology there is no reason why this information should
not be transmitted directly to the ship in data form rather than using telecommunications. For many years there
has been a rather cynical campaign to make people believe pilotage can be done from the shore in a VTS. Of
course this is an attractive proposition given the expense of providing a pilot and the opportunities available
for a VTS to charge for this service. The two services are separate and distinct, both operationally and legally.
A pilot provides services to the master of the ship and is employed by the master when engaged in piloting.
His duty is to the ship. A VTS is not employed by the ship or the master and a VTS has a duty to the port. A
VTS may have a duty to the ship in the sense that it is not to give false information but that is all.
4. The Legal Position
The legal position of a pilot is clearly stated in law. Briefly, a pilot is someone who has the conduct of the
ship but is not a member of the crew. His duty therefore is to the ship. A pilot can be criminally indicted for
failure to enact this duty to a good standard. There is no shortage of Case Law with regard to pilotage.
The legal position of a VTS is unclear and to my knowledge has never been tested in Court. There have
been many cases of a VTS being involved in groundings and collisions, either by giving false information or
by becoming involved in the decision making on board. To my knowledge these cases have never involved the
Courts and in many cases the involvement of the VTS has been obscured. Worldwide, these incidents have not
necessarily occurred in port limits, the Singapore Straits are a particularly contentious area at the moment.
VTS has grown from the signal stations of the 19th and 20th Century and now has ambitions to control
shipping , this is a dangerous development and either the law must catch up or VTS must be told to be
less ambitious.
September 2012
Written evidence from Stephen Chapman (MP 10)

I would first of all like to state that there are many issues affecting marine pilotage and the remit given is
too vague. I could say that the UK having a mixture of private ports and trust port affects pilotage; the draft
of the ship could affect pilotage. But I believe you are looking to the future of pilotage in the UK. I can see
two major issues that affect pilotage and will continue to do so:
1. The standard of ships crews
The implementation of STCW was meant to raise the levels of training and the standards of
ships crews. As a serving pilot I see many crews, who have all the right certificates and bits of
paper but are still well below standard. I cannot see this altering in the foreseeable future as
ship owners push for the cheapest crewing options available on the world market. This fact
means that the UK government should continue to support all UK ports to provide a well
trained pilot service.
This leads to my next point.
2. Where are the new pilots coming from?
Traditionally pilots have been recruited from the Merchant Navy since the demise of some pilot
services to have an apprentice scheme. That option has been reducing for many years; the
British Merchant Navy is practically nonexistent. If the Government and Port Authorities
method of dealing with this problem is to look at foreign nationals as the new UK pilots, then
enough said as far as I am concerned. I will not be party to training such replacements when
there are enough young talented persons in the UK. In my view what is required is a national
ports qualification which could lead to pilotage/VTS/Harbourmaster as dictated by the
candidate’s skills and preference. The Port of London and I understand ABP Humber has started
this in a style of training, but more needs to be done. I am not sure of the average age of UK
pilots but it would not surprise me to be over 50 years , with a large group of pilots all due to
retire at the same time . So something needs to be done in the near future to fill the void left.
September 2012
Written evidence from John Clandillon-Baker FNI (MP 16)

1. What is a pilot?
The following definition was established by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which states that: “Pilot means
any person not belonging to a ship who has the conduct thereof.”
2. What does a pilot do?

Basically the pilot is a seafarer who has detailed knowledge of a port approach or dangerous navigational
area and who uses that knowledge to ensure the safe passage of a vessel through the pilotage district.
3. What is the difference between a Captain and a pilot?

The Captain (Master) always has command of the ship and thus has ultimate responsibility for the safety of
the ship, its cargo and crew. The pilot has the conduct of the ship in the pilotage district and upon boarding a
vessel agrees a passage plan for the transit with the master but is then responsible for directing the course and
speed of the vessel to execute the passage plan.
4. Two Court cases have defined the term “conduct”

The Tactician (1971): In this case the judge considered the meaning of the word “conduct”. And stated: “it
is a cardinal principle that the Pilot is in sole charge of the ship, and that all directions as to speed, course,
stopping, and reversing, and everything of that land, are for the Pilot”.
The Mickleham (1918): This case also considered the meaning of the word “conduct” and again concluded
that if a ship is to be conducted by a pilot it “does not mean that she is to be navigated under his advice: it
means that she must be conducted by him”.
5. Why is a pilot required

Ships are designed to proceed fast and efficiently on passages between ports so when operating in a port
they are operating in an environment for which they weren’t designed.
Likewise, ships’ Captains and officers are trained and qualified to navigate ships between ports but cannot
be trained for every port so in a port and its approaches they are working in an environment for which they
haven’t been trained.
6. The 1987 Pilotage Act

In the UK all pilots operate under the 1987 Pilotage Act which established each UK port as a Competent
Harbour Authority (CHA) and granted these CHA’s full control of pilotage. This effectively granted powers
without accountability to the CHA’s, a factor that was highlighted by the Marine Accident Investigation
Investigation Branch (MAIB) enquiry into the Sea Empress grounding in 1996 (http://www.maib.gov.uk/
publications/investigation_reports/1990_to_1998/sea_empress.cfm ) which states:
“The Pilotage Act 1987 gave CHAs the absolute right to determine the standards of training and
authorisation of their pilots, whether or not those responsibilities were delegated, with no mechanism
to challenge their judgement of what those standards should be. This is quite unlike the training and
certification of ship’s officers where minimum national and international standards do exist. This is
not a satisfactory situation, when inadequacies in the training and experience of the pilots might
only be detected after an accident has happened”.
Despite this finding, nothing has changed.
7. Lack of an Appeal procedure

Section 3 of the Pilotage Act grants CHA’s total powers regarding the selection and authorisation of pilots
and also the power to remove that authorisation. Several cases have occurred of pilots being de-authorised and
subsequent employment tribunals have failed because the Act doesn’t contain any clause granting a right of
appeal by a pilot against a CHA’s action. This needs to be rectified.
8. Pilot Training
The training of UK pilots is the responsibility of the CHA. Again quoting from the Sea Empress report:
“There are no national or international standards for the training and authorisation of marine
pilots. At the 1993 United Kingdom Pilots Association (Marine) (UKPA(M)) Delegate Conference, a
resolution to lay down appropriate general standards was agreed. This resolution was followed by
a survey of all UKPA(M) pilotage districts which revealed significant differences in both methods
and standards of training. A brief policy document on the recruitment and training of marine pilots,
based on the survey results, was then prepared and distributed in 1995 to many organisations. A
Resolution inviting IMO to consider developing such standards was adopted at the 1995 Standards
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Conference (STCW). It was considered by the Sub-
committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping in September 1996 and placed on that
Subcommittee’s list of forthcoming work, so the development of international standards can be
expected in the future.”
Despite this finding 16 years ago there still isn’t a pilotage qualification. Work was undertaken by the now
named United Kingdom Maritime Pilots Association (UKMPA) with the sub group of the DfT, British Ports
Industry Training (BPIT) back in 2000 and a set of standards were agreed and a standards document produced
(www.portskillsandsafety.co.uk/skills/standards_and_qualifications/nos_units?category=36 ). This document
(now owned by BPIT’s successor Port Skills and Safety) has been ready for incorporation into the Port Marine
Safety Code for over a decade but this has never taken place because incorporation has been resisted by some
parties. Likewise work, supported by the MCA, has been undertaken by the UKMPA to produce a pilotage
qualification but again resistance from some stakeholders has prevented agreement on this issue being reached.
In Europe a similar set of standards for pilots have been produced but again these have not been adopted by
the UK.
9. Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC)

This code provides “best practice” guidelines for port operations but without any underpinning legislation
seems to be an ineffective document.
10. Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PEC)
There is currently a clause proposed for inclusion in the draft Marine Navigation Bill that seeks to remove
the requirement contained in the Pilotage Act for a PEC only to be issued to the Master or “bona fide” first
Mate of a ship in favour of “any person”. Pilotage is a highly skilled occupation and such skills can only be
obtained through considerable experience. The only reason for downgrading eligibility requirements is
commercial expediency and therefore must be resisted at all costs.When in port limits, ships and pilots are
frequently operating at the limits of the vessels’ parameters and this element of a ship’s voyage is recognised
by insurers as the time of highest risk. Also, many pilotage districts transit the highest rated environmentally
sensitive areas designated as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Marine Environmental High Risk
Areas (MEHRA). With a zero tolerance from the media and general public to any maritime incident, the
potential risks of any deregulation of the existing PEC regime are unacceptable.
11. Conclusion
Statistics reveal that 93% of the world’s trade involves shipping at some stage and every day pilots around
the world handle thousands of ships in the challenging environments unique to their particular port. The
considerable skills required to safely achieve this are generally ignored and therefore unapreciated. Pilotage is
essential to the safety of shipping and the coastal environment and must therefore be regarded as an asset to
be valued rather than a cost to be cut. It should be of deep concern to this select committee’s members that,
over 16 years after the Sea Empress disaster, the shortcomings of the 1987 Pilotage Act with respect to training
and accountability have not been rectified.
September 2012
Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (MP 17)
The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (“the Institute”) is a professional institution
embracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for both
passengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government and
administration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principal
concerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far as
possible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widely
disseminated and adopted.
The Institute has a specialist Ports and Maritime Forum which contributed to this submission.
Pilotage acts around the United Kingdom vary considerably and consist of anything from entering a harbour
direct from sea and berthing within a very short distance and time frame to many hours passage up a river
and entering a dock or mooring at a tidal jetty. Other vessel movements and navigational hazards may also
differ widely.
In addition deep sea pilotage is carried out to/from sea to/from British and Continental ports and directly
between ports.
Successful pilotage depends upon many elements for safe and efficient prosecution and include, but are not
limited to, expert local knowledge of geographical features, buoyage, hydrographical conditions, anomalies,
customs and practise, emergency procedures, vessel traffic services, by-laws, harbour regulations, prevailing
weather conditions, tidal information, other vessel movements and communications.
Under normal circumstances this expert knowledge lies within the responsibility of a fully qualified local
pilot who has carried out training and completed examination by the duly appointed Competent Harbour
Authority. The Pilot carries out his/her duties and updating regularly within that district. They board ships
which are bound by compulsory pilotage regulations.
Masters and Mates on certain classes of ships trading on a regular basis to the same port may be given the
opportunity by the Competent Harbour Authority to be examined for a Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC). A
certain number of trips in and out per year by the holder of the PEC is required along with an annual review
or examination. The PEC is only valid for the ship or ships detailed on the certificate whilst the holder is
signed on that vessel in the capacity of Master or Mate.
Regardless of whether a local pilot is employed or a PEC holder other than the Master is conducting the
pilotage the Master would still be expected to be on the navigation bridge as the ultimate responsibility for the
safety of the passengers, crew and ship rests with the Master.
The Mate qualifies to apply for a PEC as the second in command of the ship should anything untoward
happen to the Master. A Junior Mate who regularly relieves as the Mate may, in certain circumstances, also
apply for a PEC. However with more than two PEC holders onboard, depending on the number of trips
required, keeping all PECs valid on a particular vessel may, along with the hands on experience of conning of
a vessel through a district, be difficult . Any consideration to allow junior Mates, other than those relieving the
Chief Mate, is fraught with problems.
Further reduction in standards directly within some Pilotage Authorities is in allowing candidates with less
than 1st or 2nd class Certificates of Competency to apply and become fully qualified pilots.
At a time when the safety of life, and the protection of property and the environment is, quite rightly, being
recognised as of paramount importance any consideration to water down the standards of experience, training
or qualifications of those conducting pilotage is contrary to the principles of best practise to ensure the
commitment to safety of life, and the protection of property and the environment.
September 2012
Written evidence from Captain Rod Lewis (MP 18)

Background
I am a serving Authorised UK Marine Pilot employed by a major UK ports group (ABP) a large part of my
job is now managerial, having taken on the role of Pilot Manager and Deputy Harbour Master for the ABP
South Wales region.
I am a member of both the UKMPA and the UKHMA but am writing this totally independently of my
employer and the associations that I am a member of.
I started my career at sea around the time of the inception of the 1987 Pilotage act, a time where few UK
shipping companies where investing in the marine professionals of the future.
I attained my first command in 1995 and signed off my last ship in 2005 to start a new career as a Pilot. I
attained unrestricted Authorisation as a South East Wales Pilot in 2008. In 2010 I took up my present role.
While most certainly not unique, I consider myself to have reasonable experience of UK Pilotage from the
standpoints of a serving Master, an authorised Pilot and a Pilot Manager. Perhaps of note is the fact that all
my experience is in the 1987 act era and all my experience in senior positions coming in the era of Marine
Safety Management.
The CHA and the Port Marine Safety Code

The most recent significant changes to Pilotage regulation in the UK where brought about by the 1987
Pilotage act, its purpose in essence, to remove some of the rigid regulation of the Pilotage service whilst
consolidating the Pilotage acts of 1913 and 1936 along with the Pilotage provisions of the 1979 Merchant
Shipping Act. Pivotal to this primary aim was the designation of Competent Harbour Authorities (CHA’s) the
designation of the CHA also served to remove a divided authority, in most cases transferring the responsibility
for Pilotage to the Statutory Authority within which the Pilotage district fell. No doubt, this transition has had
its challenges.
In 1998 the Department for Transport, in light of the “Sea Empress” disaster, undertook a review of the
1987 Pilotage act. The review concluded that “Pilotage should rightly remain the responsibility of the CHA’s
and become integrated with other port marine activity under the management and responsibility of one
Statutory Authority”.
Several recommendations also came from this review, the principle one being the Port Marine Safety Code
(PMSC) that was first published in 2000.
The DfT owned “Code” and the Stakeholder owned “Guide”, while not mandatory, are underpinned by
legislation. It may not be an actual offence to not be compliant with the code but a serious breach of the code
would almost certainly be in breach of relevant legislation. Perhaps more importantly, the Code is the national
standard, and in being so is the standard by which Port Authorities would be judged.
First published in 2000 with a major revision in 2009 the PMSC and associated Guide to good practice serve
very well people such as I who have responsibility for formulating and putting into practice marine procedures,
plans and policies.
The Pilot’s Role in Marine Safety Management

Marine Pilots are recognised as perhaps the most significant risk mitigation measure available to the Statutory
Authority. As such it is important that the knowledge and experience of the Authorities Pilots is put to best
use, in a coordinated manner that is consistent with the Authorities broader safety management responsibilities.
From my experience of managing Pilots and from formulating and implementing marine Safety Management
systems I consider it is of vital importance that pilots are considered ( by themselves as importantly as by the
Statutory Authority) inclusive in the Authorities marine safety management systems .
Pilot’s knowledge and experience should be considered an asset by their authorising Authority, especially
when considered along with their frequent situation of being first point of contact between the Ship and the
Port Authority.
From experience, I have seen safety and operational benefits in Pilots greater involvement in the general and
safety management of ports, a situation that should be encouraged.
Port Management and Pilotage have traditionally been separate career paths. National Occupational
Standards and qualification frameworks for both Pilots and Harbour Masters would appear to offer a
convergence route between the previously distinct disciplines.
Pilotage Recruitment
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing Pilotage in the UK is recruitment. A whole generation of pilots that
came into the service in the late 80’s and 90s are now retiring; the generation that should be replacing them
appears to be missing from the ranks of UK seafarers and marine professionals that one would expect to
replace them.
Notwithstanding this apparent black-hole where potential pilots should be, it seems that seafaring as a
profession is not as attractive a profession as it once was, with many UK seafarers leaving the sea at a very
early stage in order to take up shore positions.
The development of the National occupational standards for marine Pilots (NOS) and the development of a
Pilotage qualification framework, when considered with the CHA’s duty to determine the qualification of the
pilots it authorises, would appear to offer the industry the potential to secure its future pilots .
The PMSC guide to good practice acknowledges the NOS as the standard for initial and continued
authorisation of UK Marine Pilots. The NOS, along with the PMSC Guide to Good Practice, reference IMO
resolution A960 on Pilotage standards.
The NOS and qualification framework appear to offer the potential for individual CHA’s to recruit and train
their potential Pilots based on the needs and requirements of their specific areas of jurisdiction while ensuring
that the CHA determined standard is an appropriate one.
September 2012
Written evidence from Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee (MP 19)
I write in my capacity of Chair of the London Insurance Market’s Joint Hull Committee.
You may be familiar with the work of the Committee: it is an influential body that represents the interests
of marine insurers operating in the London international market, in particular those underwriters that insure
vessels and their associated risks on a global basis, including ships that call at UK ports.
The market we represent comprises both Lloyd’s and Insurance Company underwriters with a global market
share for hull and machinery risks of approximately 18%, the most significant market by premium volume,
with the next largest individual market being Norway at 14%.
The role of the Joint Hull Committee is principally one of research on behalf of the London market, providing
technical guidance and advice where appropriate. The Committee also liaises with outside bodies in order to
contribute to relevant maritime debate and represent the interest of hull insurers in a number of areas.
My purpose in writing is to express London hull insurers’ concern over the proposed amendment to the
1987 Pilotage Act through application of the Marine Navigation Bill 2012.
In recent months we have witnessed the withdrawal of the UK’s Emergency Response Vessel service and a
reduction in coverage by Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres. Marine insurers consider that both of these
developments create more risk to shipping, passengers and seagoing personnel, cargo interests and to the UK
Coastline. The proposed amendment to the Pilotage Act would, in our opinion, amount to a dumbing down of
pilotage capability within the UK’s compulsory pilotage areas and once again further heighten risk in UK
coastal and restricted waters.
HMG’s policy objective is to increase efficiency through more flexibility in managing Pilotage Exemption
Certificates. However by definition, compulsory pilotage areas require the highest standards of skill and the
current regime, which allows a qualified Master or First Mate to hold a pilotage exemption certificate, is well
tested, understood and clear in its obligations.
Aside from legal considerations and whether such an amendment would contravene UK common law or
international law, from a practical point of view underwriters often experience cases where groundings or
collisions occur in restricted waters due to poor bridge procedure and a lack of clarity and communication.
This amendment proposes to de-regulate the existing system to such an extent where we believe bridge
procedure may on occasion be compromised, thereby creating more risk.
Clearly, today’s economic climate demands a degree of pragmatism and paradigms may need to be
challenged to secure long term benefits. However, there are operational elements which as part of that drive
for efficiency, should not be compromised. We believe that maintaining the highest level of expertise to navigate
and maneuver sophisticated vessels that are carrying high value and sometimes hazardous cargo in difficult
and often stressful conditions should be a paramount consideration for operators and policymakers alike.
I realise that our representations to the Select Committee are rather late in the PMB process but we would
be most grateful if the select committee can take account of marine insurers’ real concerns during your debate
and ultimately your policy decision.
November 2012
The Stationery Office Limited

03/2013 027606 19585

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House of Commons

Ordered by the House of Commons

Published on 7 March 2013

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the

Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair)

List of unprinted written evidence

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w1

Ev w2 Transport Committee: Evidence

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w3

Written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03)

The Historical Position

Ev w4 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Modern Law

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w5

The Policy of the Department for Transport

Ev w6 Transport Committee: Evidence

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w7

The Role of the Shipping Ministers

Ev w8 Transport Committee: Evidence

Appendices not published.

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03A)

With my thanks for the proper concerns of the Select Committee.

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE PREPARED 28 DECEMBER 2012 AND AUTHORISED

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w9

Q100 Chair: You are still in support of [Resolution A.960]?

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 3B)

Ev w10 Transport Committee: Evidence

Marine Navigation (No. 2) Bill

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w11

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03C)

Written evidence from Terence Crowe (MP 04)

Ev w12 Transport Committee: Evidence

8. The Next Step

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w13

Ev w14 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Dave Devey MNM (MP 07)

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w15

What does a Pilot do?

Ev w16 Transport Committee: Evidence

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w17

3. Vessel Traffic Services

4. The Legal Position

Ev w18 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Stephen Chapman (MP 10)

Written evidence from John Clandillon-Baker FNI (MP 16)

2. What does a pilot do?

3. What is the difference between a Captain and a pilot?

4. Two Court cases have defined the term “conduct”

5. Why is a pilot required

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w19

6. The 1987 Pilotage Act

Despite this finding, nothing has changed.

7. Lack of an Appeal procedure

9. Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC)

10. Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PEC)

Ev w20 Transport Committee: Evidence

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w21

Written evidence from Captain Rod Lewis (MP 18)

The CHA and the Port Marine Safety Code

The Pilot’s Role in Marine Safety Management

Ev w22 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Stationery Office Limited