Rule 120 Judgment

FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.L-66132 June27,1988
DR.FELIX ABAY,SR.ANDFELIX ABAY,JR.,petitioners,

vs.
TheHON.FELINOA.GARCIA,ActingCity Judge,City ofBacolod(nowMunicipalTrialCourt);
PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,Representedby theCity Fiscal,BacolodCity,RAMIRO
GARQUE andTHE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,SECONDSPECIALCASES DIVISION,
respondents.
MEDIALDEA,J.:
This is apetitionfor reviewunder Rule45oftheRules ofCourtofthedecisionoftheIntermediate

AppellateCourt(nowCourtofAppeals) datedApril15,1983,affirmingthedecisionoftheCourtof
FirstInstance(nowRegionalTrialCourt) atBacolodCity,dismissingthepetitionfor certiorariwhich
soughttoannulandsetasidetheorder oftheCity CourtatBacolodCity,datedJuly 1,1977,in
CriminalCaseNo.29688.
Thefollowingantecedentfacts areundisputed:
OnMay 21,1973,CriminalCaseNo.29688for directassaultuponanagentofapersonin

authority was filedagainstFelix Abay,Sr.,Felix Abay,Jr.,andtwoother accused.AccusedFelix
Abay,Sr.andFelix Abay,Jr.wereduly arraignedonMay 27,1975,andbothpleadednotguilty.
TrialcommencedonJuly 26,1976,withRamiroGarquetestifyingondirectexaminationandpartly
oncross-examination.Thetrialwas transferredtoSeptember 14,1976.Butagainthecross-
examinationwas notterminatedsothecasewas resettoJuly 1,1977.
AtthecontinuationofthetrialonJuly 1,1977,bothaccusedappearedwithouttheir counsel.The

trialfiscal,AssistantFiscalAngelLobaton,was present,butthecomplainant,Garquewhowas still
tobecross-examined,failedtoappear despiteduenotice.Theprivateprosecutor,Atty.Henry
Trocino,alsofailedtoappear.Whereupon,City JudgeFelinoGarciaverbally ordered,motu
proprio,thedismissalofthecase.FiscalLobatondidnotobjecttothedismissal.Bothaccused
remainedsilentandlater leftthecourtroom after thejudgedictatedtheorder ofdismissal.
Atabout10:00o'clock inthemorningofthesameday,Atty.Trocino,together withGarquearrived

incourtanduponlearningthatCriminalCaseNo.29688was ordereddismissed,verbally moved
tohavetheorder ofdismissalsetaside.
InthepresenceofspecialcounselNavarro,Atty.Trocinowas allowedtopresentevidencein
supportoftheverbalmotionfor reconsiderationandtoexplainthefailureofGarquetoappear on
time.Inhis writtenorder ofJuly 1,1977,JudgeGarciagrantedtheverbalmotionfor
reconsiderationandsetasidetheverbalorder ofdismissal.Hefurther orderedtheresettingofthe
casefor hearingonanother date.
Subsequently,theaccused,throughcounsel,filedamotionfor reconsiderationoftheorder ofJuly

1,1977,invokingdoublejeopardy,claimingthattheverbalorder ofdismissal,evenifprovisional,
was renderedwithouttheexpress consentoftheaccused.Themotionfor reconsiderationwas
denied,after whichtheaccusedfiledapetitionfor certiorari,whichsoughttoannulandsetaside
theorder oftheCity CourtdatedJuly 1,1977,withtheCourtofFirstInstanceatBacolodCity,with
JudgeJoseL.Coscolluela,Jr.,presiding.
OnOctober 13,1981,JudgeCoscollueladismissedthepetition.Thejudgeupheldthequestioned
writtenorder ofJuly 1,1977onthegroundthattheearlier verbalorder ofdismissalwas notfinal,in
fact,was ineffective,becauseitleftsomethingtobedoneinlinewiththedecisionofthis Courtin
Cabarroguis vs.SanDiego,L-19517,November 30,1962,6SCRA866.This Courtinsaidcase
ruled:
Petitioner's pretenseis untenable.Theverbalorder ofdismissalofsaidcasewas withdrawnor set

aside,as soonas itwas dictatedby respondentandbeforeitcouldbereducedtowritingand
signedby her.As amatter offact,itwas never putinwriting.Muchless was itever signedby
respondent.For this reason,respondentcontendedthatsaidorder ofdismissalwas incomplete
anddidnothavetheeffectofacquittingtheaccusedbeforeitwas withdrawn.Indeed,pursuantto
section2ofRule116ofheRules ofCourt,"thejudgment" — andtheorder ofdismissalinquestion
had,itcompleted,sucheffect—"mustbewritten...personally anddirectly preparedby thejudge,
andsignedby him....— Thecases *citedby hereinpetitioner involvedwrittenorders ofdismissal,
whichweresignedby thecorrespondingjudges.Hence,saidcases arenotcontrollingintheoneat
bar.
OnApril15,1983,therespondentCourtofAppeals,inaffirmingthedecisionrenderedby Judge
Coscolluela,said:
Itis arguedby appellants thattheverbalorder ofdismissal,nothavingbeenbasedonthemerits of

thecase,butonthefailureofthecomplainanttoappear,therulingintheSanDiegocaseis not
applicable,consideringthattheterm 'judgment'as usedinsection1,Rule120oftheRules of
Courtmeans theadjudicationby thecourtthatthedefendantis guilty or is notguilty oftheoffense
charged,andtheimpositionofthepenalty providedfor by lawonthedefendant,whopleads or is
foundguilty thereof.ButitmustberememberedthatintheSanDiegocase,theSupremeCourt
throughtheponente,JusticeRobertoConcepcion,didnotdistinguishas towhether thejudgment
was basedonthemerits or not.
Wefully agreewiththefindings oftherespondentcourt.Wherethereis avalidinformationandthe

accusedhas beenarraigned,anorder ofdismissalissuedby thecourt,motuproprio,inthecourse
ofatrialofacriminalcase,whether basedonthemerits or for failureofprosecutionwitnesses to
appear,has theeffectofajudgmentofacquittalanddoublejeopardy attaches.Theorder is also
immediately executory.However,this order ofdismissalmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,
personally anddirectly preparedby thejudgeandsignedby him conformably withtheprovisions of
Rule120,section2oftheRules ofCourt(nowRule120,section2ofthe1985Rules onCriminal
Procedure).Intheinstantcase,itis very clear thattheorder was merely dictatedinopencourtby
thetrialjudge.Thereis now?showingthatthis verbalorder ofdismissalwas ever reducedto
writingandduly signedby him.Thus,itdidnotyetattaintheeffectofajudgmentofacquittal,so
thatitwas stillwithinthepowers ofthejudgetosetitasideandenter another order,nowinwriting
andduly signedby him,reinstatingthecase.
ACCORDINGLY,thepetitionis DENIED;theappealeddecisionoftheCourtofAppeals is hereby

affirmed.Costs againstthepetitioner.
This decisionis immediately executory.
Narvasa,Cruz,GancaycoandGriño-Aquino,JJ.,concur.
——!
SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.93219.August30,1990.]
MARCELINOG.RIVERA,JR.,Petitioner,v.THE PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES andHON.

MARCELINOF.BAUTISTA,JR.,PresidingJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourt,BranchIII,Baguio
City,Respondents.
Tomas B.Gorospefor petitioner.
RE S OLUTION
PARAS,J.:
Theinstantpetitionseeks toannulandsetasidetheOrder datedMarch28,1990issuedby

respondentJudgeinCriminalCaseNo.6201-R.ThesaidOrder sets asidetheverbalorder earlier
dictatedinopencourtdismissingthecasefor failuretoadduceevidenceonthepartofthe
prosecution.
Thefollowingpertinentfacts arenotdisputed:chanrob1es virtual1awlibrary
OnDecember 16,1988,petitioner MarcelinoG.Rivera,Jr.was arrestedanddetainedfor he

allegedly was abouttotransportmarijuanatoManila.Consequently,onDecember 20,1988acase
for violationofSection4,Art.IIofRA6425was filedagainsthim withtheRegionalTrialCourtof
BaguioCity,BranchIIIpresidedover by respondentJudgeMarcelinoF.Bautista.
Petitioner was arraignedonFebruary 20,1989.Hepleadednotguilty tothecrimecharged.
OnApril5,1989,thefirstwitness for theprosecutionCpl.VictorioAfallapartially testifiedondirect

examinationandreservedtherighttoidentify themarijuanaspecimenallegedly confiscatedfrom
thepetitioner.Thehearingwas thus re-settoMay 3,1989andJune6,1989.Butduetothe
absenceofany prosecutionwitness despitenoticeandthenon-availability oftheallegedly
confiscatedmarijuanaspecimen,thehearings setfor May 3,1989andJune6,1989were
postponedtoJune8,1989.chanrobles lawlibrary :red
OnJune8,1989,for thesamereasons,thehearingwas re-settoFebruary 27,1990.
OnFebruary 27,1990,Capt.LinaSarmiento,theForensic Chemistwhowillpresentthemarijuana

specimen,despitenoticefailedtoappear.Petitioner throughcounselthenmovedfor thedismissal
ofthecase.This was deniedby respondentJudgeandthehearingwas re-settoMarch28,1990.
OnMarch28,1990,whenthecasewas calledatabout8:30a.m.Capt.LinaSarmientodespite
notice,was notaroundthereby necessitatingasecondcall.Whenthecasewas calledfor the
secondtimeataround9:00a.m.Capt.Sarmientowas stillnotaround.Hence,Atty.Tomas
Gorospe,inbehalfofpetitioner orally movedfor thedismissalofthecaseinvokingtherightto
speedy trialas thepetitioner stands confinedandthattheGovernmentfailedtoprosecuteor
adduceevidenceduetothenon-appearanceofavitalprosecutionwitness.
TherespondentJudgeverbally grantedthemotionandorderedtheimmediatereleaseofthe
accused.
Whilethesubsequentcalendaredcases setfor thatday was inprogress,andinless thananhour
after pronouncementoftheverbalorder ofdismissal,Capt.LinaSarmientoarriveddirectfrom
QuezonCity.Uponasatisfactory explanation,therespondentJudgeissuedhis nowassailedOrder
settingasidehis previous verbalorder ofdismissalandre-schedulingCrim.CaseNo.6201-Rfor
continuationoftrial.
Allegingthattheverbalorder ofdismissalmadeinopencourtamountedtotheacquittalof
petitioner andwhichorder is immediately finalandexecutory,therespondentJudgecouldno
longer setitasidewithoutviolatingpetitioner’s constitutionalrightagainstdoublejeopardy.
Thepetitionshouldbedenied.Theearlier verbalorder ofdismissalwas notfinal,infact,was

ineffective,becauseitleftsomethingtobedoneinlinewiththedecisionofthis Courtin
Cabarroguis v.SanDiego,L-19517,Nov.30,1962,6SCRA866.This Courtinsaidcase
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner’s pretenseis untenable.Theverbalorder ofdismissalofsaidcasewas withdrawnor set

aside,as soonas itwas dictatedby respondentandbeforeitcouldbereducedtowritingand
signedby her.As amatter offact,itwas never putinwriting.Muchless was itever signedby
Respondent.For this reason,respondentcontendedthatsaidorder ofdismissalwas incomplete
anddidnothavetheeffectofacquittingtheaccusedbeforeitwas withdrawn.Indeed,pursuantto
section2ofRule116oftheRules ofCourt,`thejudgment’— andtheorder ofdismissalinquestion
had,ifcompleted,sucheffect— ‘mustbewritten...personally anddirectly preparedby thejudge,
andsignedby him ....’Thecases citedby hereinpetitioner involvedwrittenorders ofdismissal,
whichweresignedby thecorrespondingjudges.Hence,saidcases arenotcontrollingintheoneat
bar."cralawvirtua1awlibrary
This doctrinewas re-echoedinthecaseofAbay,Sr.v.Garcia,No.66132,June27,1988,162

SCRA665wherethis Courtruled—
"Wherethereis avalidinformationandtheaccusedhas beenarraigned,anorder ofdismissal

issuedby thecourt,motuproprio,inthecourseofatrialofacriminalcase,whether basedonthe
merits or for failureofprosecutionwitnesses toappear,has theeffectofajudgmentofacquittal
anddoublejeopardy attaches.Theorder is alsoimmediately executory.However,this order of
dismissalmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,personally anddirectly preparedby thejudge
andsignedby him conformably withtheprovisions ofRule120,section2oftheRules ofCourt.In
theinstantcase,itis very clear thattheorder was merely dictatedinopencourtby thetrialjudge.
Thereis noshowingthatthis verbalorder ofdismissalwas ever reducedtowritingandduly signed
by him.Thus,itdidnotyetattaintheeffectofajudgmentofacquittal,sothatitwas stillwithinthe
powers ofthejudgetosetitasideandenter another order,nowinwritingandduly signedby him,
reinstatingthecase." (162SCRA,pp.667-668).
ACCORDINGLY,thepetitionis DENIED.Thecaseis remandedtothecourtoforiginfor farther

proceedings.
Melencio-Herrera(Chairman),PadillaandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
Sarmiento,J.,is onleave.
SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.Nos.110817-22.June13,1997]
THE PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARCELINOA.BUGARIN,accused-

appellant.
DE CIS ION
MENDOZA,J.:
This is anappealfrom thedecision,[1]datedFebruary 11,1993,whichtheRegionalTrialCourt,

Branch97ofQuezonCity renderedinCriminalCases Nos.Q-92-28785to86andQ-92-31157to
31160,findingaccused-appellantMarcelinoBugaringuilty offour counts ofconsummatedrapeand
onecountofattemptedrapeandsentencinghim as follows:
WHEREFORE,this Courtfinds theaccusedGUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtas chargedof

multiple(3Counts) rapeandonecountofattemptedrape,andinaccordancewithArticle335of
theRevisedPenalCodesentences him toprisonterms as follows:
1) For eachofthefour counts oftheaboverape,reclusionperpetua.
2) For theattemptedrape,two(2) years andfour (4) months intheminimum penalty tofour (4)
years inthemaximum periodandtoindemnify theprivatecomplainantintheamountof
P50,000.00as moraldamages andexemplary damages ofP50,000.00todeter sexualcrimes of
thesortcommittedby accused.
SOORDERED.
Thecomplainant,MaryjaneBugarin,is thedaughter ofaccused-appellant.OnFebruary 22,1992,

accompaniedby her mother,ReginaBugarin,andher maternalaunt,NenaPadecio,she
complainedtotheCentralPoliceDistrictCommandthatshehadbeenrepeatedly rapedby
accused-appellant.Inher swornstatementsherelatedhow,onninedifferentoccasions between
November 1989andJanuary 17,1992,her father enteredthecommonsleepingareaoftheir
houseinPayatas,QuezonCity and,after holdingher knees andspreadingher legs,succeededin
insertinghis penis intoher vaginaandkissedher breasts.Sheclaimedthat,onJanuary 17,1992,
her father molestedher by kissingher vaginaandthatonly by repeatedly kickinghim didhedesist
from molestingher any further.
Complainantwas examinedonthesamedateby EmmanuelI.Aranas,PNPMedico-LegalOfficer,

whofoundthatshewas innon-virginstatephysically.[2]OnFebruary 25,1992,shereturnedtothe
policestationtofileformalcharges againsther father.Thecasewas referredtotheOfficeofthe
QuezonCity Prosecutor whichfoundprobablecauseandaccordingly filedcharges for
consummatedrapeandattemptedrapeby means offorceandintimidationcommittedon
December 23,1991andJanuary 17,1992againstaccused-appellantMarcelinoBugarin.Nobail
was recommendedconsideringthattheevidenceofguiltoftherespondentis strong.Thecases
weredocketedas CriminalCases Nos.Q-92-28785andQ-92-28786andraffledtoBranch88of
theQuezonCity RegionalTrialCourt.
OnMay 7,1992,four morecharges for rapeby means offorceandintimidationcommittedon

November 1989,May 1990,June1990,andMarch14,1991werefiledagainstaccused-appellant.
Docketedas CriminalCases Nos.Q-92-31157to31160,theadditionalcases wereraffledto
Branch97ofthesamecourt.Thesecases wereeventually consolidatedandassignedtoBranch
88.
Theinformations inthesix cases allegedas follows:
Crim.CaseNo.92-31157
Thatonor aboutthemonthofJune1990inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccusedby means
offorceandintimidation,didthenandthere,wilfully andfeloniously havecarnalknowledgeofthe
undersignedMARYJANE BUGARINy ASUNCION,aminor,15years ofage,withouther consent
andagainsther will,tothedamageandprejudiceofthelatter.
Thecrimewas attendedby theaggravatingcircumstanceofrelationship.
Thatonor aboutthemonthofNovember,1989inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccused,by
means offorceandintimidation,didthenandthere,wilfully andfeloniously havecarnalknowledge
withtheundersignedMARYJANE BUGARINy ASUNCIONwithouther consentandagainsther
will,tothedamageandprejudiceofthelatter.
Thatonor aboutthe14thday ofMarch,1991inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccused,by

means offorceandintimidation,didthenandthere,wilfully andfeloniously havecarnalknowledge
oftheundersignedMARYJANE BUGARINy ASUNCION,aminor,15years ofage,withouther
consentandagainsther will,tothedamageandprejudiceofthelatter.
Thatonor aboutthemonthofMay 1990inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccusedby means of

forceandintimidation,didthenandtherewilfully andfeloniously havecarnalknowledgeofthe
undersignedMARYJANE BUGARINy ASUNCION,aminor,15years ofage,withouther consent
andagainsther will,tothedamageandprejudiceofthelatter.
Thatonor aboutthe17thday ofJanuary,1992,inQuezonCity,MetroManila,Philippines,and

withinthejurisdictionofthis HonorableCourt,theabove-namedaccused,withlewddesigns andby
means offorceandintimidation,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously commence
thecommissionofthecrimeofRapedirectly by overtacts,by thenandtherekissingthenipples
andthevaginaoftheundersignedMARYJANE BUGARINYASUNCION,aminor,andabouttolay
ontopofher,allagainsther will,however,thesaidaccuseddidnotperform alltheacts of
executionwhichwouldhaveproducedthecrimeofRapeby reasonofsomecauses other thanhis
ownspontaneous desistance,thatis,undersignedcomplainantpushhim away,tothedamageand
prejudiceoftheundersignedinsuchamountas may beawardedtoher under theprovisions ofthe
NewCivilCode.
Thatonor aboutthe23rdday ofDecember,1991,inQuezonCity,MetroManila,Philippines,and

withinthejurisdictionofthis HonorableCourt,theabove-namedaccused,withlewddesigns andby
means offorceandintimidation,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously havesexual
intercoursewiththeundersignedMARYJANE BUGARINYASUNCION,aminor,withouther
consentandagainsther will,toher damageandprejudiceinsuchamountas may beawardedto
her under theprovisions oftheNewCivilCode.
Uponarraignment,accused-appellantpleadednotguilty ineachcase,after whichtrialensued.
Under questioningby theprosecutor,MaryjaneBugarinnarratedhowher father sexually assaulted
her intheir familys commonsleepingareawhilenoonewas athomeandthreatenedher ifshetold
anyoneaboutwhathappened.
Accused-appellantdeniedthecharges againsthim.HeclaimedtobeGodfearingandmorally
uprightandthathis wife,ReginaBugarin,musthaveinducedtheir daughter tofilethecomplaints
againsthim becausehis wifeblamedhim for financially neglectingtheir family since1989.
Inrebuttal,theprosecutionpresentedReginaBugarinwhotestifiedthatagoodmother wouldnot
exposeher childtohumiliationjusttogetback ather husband.Shefurther claimedthather
daughter,whohadbeenraisedproperly andtaughttobehonest,couldnothavefabricatedthe
charges againsttheaccused-appellant.
Inatwo-pagedecision,promulgatedonFebruary 11,1993,thetrialcourt,after givingasummary

ofthetestimonies ofthecomplainantandaccused-appellant,laconically ruled:
Theissueis simple.Is theprivatecomplainantcredibleinher story ofhowshewas raped?The

answer ofthis Courtis anundoubtfulandadefiniteyes.
Accused-appellantquestions thetrialcourts decisiononthegroundthat:(1) thetestimony of

MaryjaneBugarinis notcredible;(2) theelements offorceandintimidationhadnotbeenproved;
and(3) thedecisionofthetrialcourtdoes notstatethefacts andlawuponwhichitwas based.
Ontheother hand,theSolicitor General,representingtheprosecution,contends thatcomplainant,

whowas only 15years oldwhenshereportedthecrime,was notlikely toconcoctcharges against
her father andthatthemoralascendancy ofthefather over her took theplaceofforceand
intimidationinrape.
Wetakeupfirstaccused-appellants chargethatthedecisionofthetrialcourtdoes notstatethe

grounds therefor.Indeed,theConstitutionprovides inpartinArt.VIII,14thatNodecisionshallbe
renderedby any courtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly anddistinctly thefacts andthelawon
whichitis based.This requirementis reiteratedandimplementedby the1985Rules ofCriminal
Procedurewhichprovides inRule120,2:
Sec.2.Form andcontents ofjudgment.- Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,

personally anddirectly preparedby thejudgeandsignedby him andshallcontainclearly and
distinctly astatementofthefacts provedor admittedby theaccusedandthelawuponwhichthe
judgmentis based.
Ifitis ofconviction,thejudgmentshallstate(a) thelegalqualificationoftheoffenseconstitutedby

theacts committedby theaccused,andtheaggravatingor mitigatingcircumstances attendingthe
commissionthereof,ifthereareany;(b) theparticipationoftheaccusedinthecommissionofthe
offense,whether as principal,accomplice,or accessory after thefact;(c) thepenalty imposedupon
theaccused;and(d) thecivilliability or damages causedby thewrongfulacttoberecoveredfrom
theaccusedby theoffendedparty,ifthereis any,unless theenforcementofthecivilliability by a
separateactionhas beenreservedor waived.
Incaseofacquittal,unless thereis aclear showingthattheactfrom whichthecivilliability might

arisedidnotexist,thejudgmentshallmakeafindingonthecivilliability oftheaccusedinfavor of
theoffendedparty.
Thedecisionofthetrialcourtfalls shortofthis requirementinatleastthreerespects.First,itdoes

notcontainanevaluationoftheevidenceoftheparties andadiscussionofthelegalquestions
involved.Itdoes notexplainwhy thetrialcourtconsideredthecomplainants testimony credible
despitethefactthat,as accused-appellantpoints out,complainantcouldnotremember thetimeof
theday whenshewas allegedly raped.Itdoes notexplainwhy accused-appellants lickingof
complainants genitalconstitutedattemptedrapeandnotanother crime.Second,thecomplainant
testifiedthatshehadbeenrapedfivetimes,towit,inNovember 1989,onDecember 24,1989,in
June1990,onMarch14,1991,andonDecember 23,1991,andthatonce,onJanuary 17,1992,
shewas molestedby her father wholickedher privatepart,for whichreasonsix informations were
filedagainsthim,butthedecisionfoundtheaccused-appellantguilty ofonly four counts ofrape
(whichthetrialcourterroneously saidthreecounts) andonecountofattemptedrape,without
explainingwhether accused-appellantwas beingacquittedofonechargeofrape.Third,the
decisionis socarelessly preparedthatitfinds theaccused-appellantguilty ofthreecounts of
consummatedrapebutsentences him tosuffer thepenalty ofreclusionperpetuafor eachofthe
four counts of...rape.
MaryjaneclaimedshehadbeenrapedonDecember 24,1989,buttheinformationinCriminal
CaseNo.Q-92-31160is for rapeallegedly committedinMay 1990.Itmustbefor this reasonthat
thetrialcourtconvictedaccused-appellantofonly four counts ofrape,insteadoffive.Butthetrial
courtshouldhaveexplainedso,ifthis was really thereason,andexpressly acquittedtheaccused-
appellantofthechargeunder this information.
Therequirementthatthedecisions ofcourts mustbeinwritingandthatthey mustsetforthclearly

anddistinctly thefacts andthelawonwhichthey arebasedserves many functions.Itis intended,
amongother things,toinform theparties ofthereasonor reasons for thedecisionsothatifany of
them appeals,hecanpointouttotheappellatecourtthefindings offacts or therulings onpoints of
lawwithwhichhedisagrees.Morethanthat,therequirementis anassurancetotheparties that,in
reachingjudgment,thejudgedidsothroughtheprocesses oflegalreasoning.Itis,thus,a
safeguardagainsttheimpetuosity ofthejudge,preventinghim from decidingby ipsedixit.
Vouchsafedneither theswordnor thepurseby theConstitutionbutnonetheless vestedwiththe
sovereignprerogativeofpassingjudgmentonthelife,liberty or property ofhis fellowmen,the
judgemustultimately dependonthepower ofreasonfor sustainedpublic confidenceinthe
justness ofhis decision.Thedecisionofthetrialcourtinthis casedisrespects thejudicialfunction.
Wewouldnormally remandthis casetothetrialcourtfor compliancewiththeconstitutional

requirementfor decisions.Butthis casehas beenpendingfor sometimeandfurther delay canbe
avoidediftheCourtsimply reviews thewholeevidence.After all,therecords ofthetrialcourt
containthetranscriptofstenographic notes,thecomplainants swornstatementdatedFebruary 22,
1992,theresolutionoftheprosecutor,andthestatementofthearrestingofficer,onthebasis of
whichtheCourtmay properly decidethecase.[3]For this reasontheCourthas decidedtoreview
this casedespitethefailureofthetrialcourttomakedetailedfindings offacts andastatementof
thereasons underlyingits decision.
Nowitis settledthatwhenthecomplainantinarapecase,moresoifsheis aminor,[4]testifies

thatshehas beenraped,shesays,ineffect,allthatis necessary toprovethecommissionofthe
crime.[5]Caremustbetaken,however,thather testimony is crediblefor aconvictiontobejustified
basedonher testimony alone.[6]Inthis case,MaryjaneBugarintestifiedonNovember 25,1992[7]
as follows:
Q- OnNovember 1989,was your father residingwithyouor was helivingwithyou?
A- Yes,sir.
Q- Now,onNovember,1989doyouremember any unusualincidentthathappened,ifany?
A- Yes,sir,whenheenteredtheroom.
Q- Whenyousay he,areyoureferringtoMarcelinoBugarin?
A- Yes,sir.
Q- IfMarcelinoBugarinis presenttoday,wouldyoubeabletoidentify him?
A- Yes,sir.(witness is pointingtoamanwearingagreent-shirtwhoanswers by thename

MarcelinoBugarinwhenaskedby theCourt).
Q- OnNovember 1989,youwerementioningthathe,referringtotheaccused,enteredyour room,

what happened?
A- (witness crying) Whenheenteredtheroom,heembracedmeandtouchedthedifferentparts of

my body andheinformedmethatwhenIgrowup,Iwouldnotbecomeinnocent.
Q- Whatdoyoumeanby thosewords thathetoldyouthatwhenyougrowupyouwouldnotbe

innocent?
A- SothatwhenIgrowupIwillknowwhathewillbedoing.
Q- Whatdidhedo?
A- Hetouchedmy knees andspreadthem outandthenholdingmy breastandheputhis sex

organinsideme.
Q- Whenyousay insideme,whatdoyoumean?
A- His sex organenteredmy what,Iam fertile.
Q- Whatdoyoumeanby what?
A- My sex organ,sir.
Q- Whatdidyoudowhenyour father triedtoputhis sex organtoyour sex organ?
A- Iwas tryingtopushhis body away from me,andIsaidtohim,father,Idontlikeit,ayokopo.
Q- Despiteyour pleas,whathappenednext?
A- Hestillcontinuedwhatheis doing,andwhenIfainted,hesuddenly movedback.
Q- After hemovedback,whattranspiredafterwards?
A- HewentoutandIwas leftcrying.
Q- After this firstincident,werethereany other similar incidentwhichhappened,ifany?
A- Thereare,sir,butIcantrecallwhen.
Q- Howmany times moreor less?
A- Aroundfour (4) times.
Q- After November 1989?
A- IncludingNovember 1989.
Q- HowaboutonDecember 24,1989,doyouremember whereyouwere?

A- Yes,sir.Iwas inour house.
Q- Doyouremember any unusualor extraordinary incidentthathappenedonDecember 24,1989?
A- Yes,sir.Itis thesamethingthathedidtome.
Q- Pleaseexplainwhatthesamethinghedotoyou?
A- Heembracedandkissedmeonmy cheek,my neck andalsomy breast.
Q- Whathappenednext?
A- Hewas spreadingmy legs.
Q- Then,after spreadingyour legs,whatdidtheaccuseddo?
A- Helethis sex organtouchedmy sex organ.
Q- After that,whathappenednext?
A- Icriedagain.
Q- Whenyoucriedagain,whatdidyour father do,ifany?
A- His facebecamescaring.
Q- Now,after December 24,1989incident,doyouremember whereyouweresometimeinJune

1990?
A- Iwas inour house.
Q- Specifically,inJuneof1990,doyouremember any unusualincidentthathappened?
A- Thesamethinghappened,over andover.
Q- Whatdoyoumeanby thesamethinghappened,over andover?
A- Hewouldembracedmeandthenkissedmeandtouchedmy breastandkissedmy nipples.
Q- And,besides inembracing,kissingandkissingyour nipples,whatelsedidyour father doon

June1990?
A- Hekissedalsomy sex organ.
Q- Besidekissingyour sex organ,whatelsedidhedo,ifany?
A- Heplacedinsidemy sex organhis sex organ.
Q- InMarch14,1991,wherewereyou?
A- Iwas alsoinour house.
Q- Doyouremember whathappened,ifany,OnMarch14,1991?
A- Thats itagain,Iwas intheroom andagainheembracedmemademeliedownthenkiss my

sex organandthen,heplacedagainhis sex organinsidemy sex organ.
Q- HowaboutDecember 23,1991,doyouremember whereyouwere?
A- Iwas alsointhehouse.
Q- Whathappened?
A- Iwas lyingdownandheliedtherebesidemeandtoldmetoaccedetohis desire.
Q- Whatdoyoumeantoaccedetohis desire?
A- Hewantedtousemeagain.
Q- Then,heactually usedyou?
A- Yes,sir.
Q- Now,onJanuary 17,1992,doyouremember whereyouwere?
Q- Wouldyoukindly tellwhathappenedinyour houseonthis day?
A- Helickedmy sex organ.
Q- After that,whatdidhedonext?
A- Hewas threateningme.
Q- Whatdidyoudowhenhethreatenedyou?
A- Iwas soafraid.(witness is crying)
Q- Whatdidtheaccusedtoafter threateningyou?
A- Hewas doingnothing.Hewas justwalkingbesideme.
Q- Whathappenedafter yousawhim walkingjustbesideyouonthatdate?
A- None,sir.Iwas justcrying.
Theaccused-appellantclaims thatMaryjanes testimony contains inconsistencies whichindicate

thatthecharges againsthim werefabricated.Hepoints tothefailureofcomplainantoncross-
examinationtostateinsomeinstances theexactdateandtimeshewas allegedly raped,andto
thefactthatittook complainanttwoyears beforereportingtheincidents andthattheprosecution
didnotpresentthemedico-legalofficer whoexaminedthecomplainant.Accused-appellantalso
claims thatnoevidencewas adducedtoprovethattherapewas committedby forceand
intimidation.
Thefailureofthecomplainanttostateinsomecases theexactdateandtimeofthecommissionof
rapeis aminor matter andcanbeexpectedwhenawitness is recountingthedetails ofa
humiliatingexperiencewhicharepainfulanddifficulttorecallinopencourtandinthepresenceof
other people.[8]Indeed,this Courthas ruledthatcomplainants failuretorecallsomedetails ofthe
crime,insteadofsuggestingprevarication,precisely indicates spontaneity andis tobeexpected
from awitness whois oftender ageandunaccustomedtocourtproceedings.
Besides,thedateofthecommissionoftherapeis notanessentialelementofthecrime.[9]The
precisetimeofthecrimehas nosubstantialbearingonits commission,[10]especially sinceinthis
casethedateandtimeofthecommissionofthecrimeis notmaterialtotheaccused-appellants
defense.Indeed,accused-appellants contentionis only thathecouldnothaverapedhis daughter
inthecommonbedroom atnighttimebecausetheplacewherethey sleepis shutofffrom therest
oftheir houseby acurtain.
Sufficeittostatethatlustis norespecter oftimeandplace.[11]Our cases recordinstances ofrape

committedinsidefamily dwellings whenother occupants areasleep.[12]Inthecaseatbar,
Maryjanetestifiedthattheaccused-appellantwas abletorapeher by sendingouther siblings to
play withtheir neighbors children,andwhileher mother was atwork from 3p.m.to11p.m.
Complainantexplainedher apparentinability torecalltheexactdates oftheassaults uponher,
thus:
Q- Madam witness,youmentionedthatyouwererapedsometimeNovember 1989,June1990,

December 24,1989,March14,1991,December 23,1991,howcomethatyouknewvery wellthe
dateas December 24,March14,December 23;or rather,howcomethatyour complaintis only
sometimeintheearly partof1991?
A- Iremember becausethatwas closedtothebirthday ofmy brother.
Q- HowaboutMarch14,howcomeyouknewvery wellthatyouweremolestedby your father?
A- Becauseatthattime,our class willalmostendandweweregivenclearances.
Q- Whatday is your lastschoolday?
A- Icannotremember,sir.
Q- Is itusualthatyouknewvery wellMarch14,andyoudonotknowvery wellyour lastday of

your schoolday?
A- BecauseMarch14is our clearance.
Neither does thedelay inmakingacriminalaccusationimpair thecredibility ofawitness ifsuch

delay is satisfactorily explained.[13]InPeoplev.Coloma,[14]wherethecomplainantwas alsoonly
13 years oldwhenfirstmolestedby her father,theCourtadvertedtothefathers moralandphysical
controlover theyoungcomplainantinexplainingthedelay ofeightyears beforethecomplaint
againsther father was made.Inthis case,Maryjanemusthavebeenoverwhelmedby fear and
confusion,andshockedthather ownfather haddefiledher.After all,shehadbeenvery closeto
him.Shealsotestifiedthatshewas afraidtotellher mother becausethelatter mightbeangered,
sothatshefinally confidedtoher aunt.Indeed,asurvey conductedby theUniversity ofthe
Philippines Center for Womens Studies showedthatvictims ofrapecommittedby their fathers took
muchlonger inreportingtheincidents totheauthorities thandidother victims.Many factors
accountfor this difference:thefactthatthefather lives withthevictim andconstantly exerts moral
authority over her,thethreathemightmakeagainsther,thevictims fear ofher mother andother
relatives.
Nor is itentirely truethatnoevidenceofforceandintimidationhadbeenadducedduringthetrial.

Maryjanetestifiedthatshetriedtoresisther fathers advances but,onseveraloccasions,shewas
overpoweredby him.Shewas embracedandthus preventedfrom escaping.[15]Atother times she
was intimidatedby menacinglooks castonher[16]andby threats ofharm.[17]Indeed,evenif
therewas noviolenceor forceemployedagainsther,themoralinfluenceofaccused-appellant
over thecomplainantsufficedtomakethecrimerape.[18]
Nor is amedicalexaminationanindispensableelementinprosecutions for rape.[19]Thatthe
prosecutiondidnotpresentthemedico-legalofficer is,therefore,notanobstacletoafindingof
guiltinthis case.
Wethink theevidenceinthis caseproves beyondallreasonabledoubtthatMaryjanehadbeen

rapedonfour occasions by accused-appellant:November 1989,June1990,March14,1991,and
December 23,1991.Complainanthas nomotivetoincriminateher father.Tothecontrary,she
testifiedthatshewas closetohim.Theabsenceofamotivelends greater credencetoher
testimony.[20]Neither does her mother haveany reasontofalsely accuseMarcelinoBugarin.
ReginaBugarinsuspectedher husbandofhavinganaffair withher sister in1980andconfronted
him,butshecontinuedtolivewithhim.This factmakes itunlikely thatshewoulduseher daughter
todestroy her husbandmorethantenyears later.Amother wouldnotexposeher childtopublic
trial,ifthecharges shemakes arenottrue.[21]
Wefindnoevidence,however,tofindaccused-appellantguilty ofthechargeinCriminalCaseNo.
Q-92-31160for allegedrapecommittedinMay 1990.Thereis noevidencetoprovethataccused-
appellantrapedcomplainantonthatdate.Her testimony is totheeffectthatshewas rapedon
another date,December 24,1989.Butaccused-appellantcannotbeconvictedfor this as no
complaintwas formally filedregardingit.Accused-appellantmustaccordingly beacquittedofthe
chargeinCriminalCaseNo.Q-92-31160.
Nor dowethink thataccused-appellantis guilty ofattemptedrapecommittedonJanuary 17,1992

as thetrialcourtheld.Maryjanetestified:
Q- Now,onJanuary 17,1992,doyouremember whereyouwere?
Q- Wouldyoukindly tellwhathappenedinyour houseonthis day?
A- Helickedmy sex organ.
Q- After that,whatdidhedonext?
A- Hewas threateningme.
Q- Whatdidyoudowhenhethreatenedyou?
A- Iwas soafraid.(witness is crying)
Q- Whatdidtheaccusedtoafter threateningyou?
A- Hewas doingnothing.Hewas justwalkingbesideme.
Q- Whathappenedafter yousawhim walkingjustbesideyouonthatdate?
A- None,sir.Iwas justcrying.
Theintenttocommitrapeis notapparentfrom theactdescribed.Itcannotbeinferredfrom this act

(lickingcomplainants genital) alonethathis intentionwas tohavesexualintercoursewithher
becauseithas notbeenshownthathehadatleastplacedhimselfontopofthecomplainant.[22]
Theactimputedtohim cannotbeconsideredapreparatory acttosexualintercourse.[23]Accused-
appellantis insteadguilty ofacts oflasciviousness.Itcanatleastbeinferredfrom his actofkissing
thegenitalofthecomplainantthathewas movedby lewddesigns.[24]
Althoughrelationship,as anaggravatingcircumstance,is allegedonly inCriminalCases Nos.
Q-92-31157to31160,this circumstancewas nonetheless provedduringthetrialinCriminalCase
No.Q-92-28785and,therefore,shouldalsobeappreciatedinthatcasetojustify theimpositionof
thepenalty inits maximum period.
WHEREFORE,thedecisiondatedFebruary 11,1993oftheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity is
SETASIDE andanother oneis RENDEREDfindingaccused-appellantMarcelinoBugarinGUILTY
offour counts ofconsummatedrapeinCriminalCases Nos.Q-92-28786,Q-92-31157,
Q-92-31158,andQ-92-31159andSENTENCEDtoreclusionperpetuaandORDEREDto
INDEMNIFYthecomplainantMaryjaneBugarinintheamountofP30,000.00indamages for each
countofrapecommitted;andofacts oflasciviousness inCriminalCaseNo.Q-92-28785,for which
heis SENTENCEDtosuffer imprisonmentfrom 6months ofarrestomayor,as minimum,tosix 6
years ofprisioncorreccional,as maximum.
InCriminalCaseNo.Q-92-31160,accused-appellantis hereby ACQUITTED.
SOORDERED.
Regalado,(Chairman),Romero,Puno,andTorres,Jr.,JJ.,concur.!
ENBANC
[G.R.Nos.131384-87.February 2,2000]
PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ELEGIONADERA,JR.YSADSAD,

accused-appellant.
DE CIS ION
MENDOZA,J.:
Thesecases arebeforeus onautomatic reviewofthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch

40,Calapan,OrientalMindoro,findingaccused-appellantElegioNadera,Jr.guilty offour counts of
rapeofhis minor daughters,Oleby andMaricris Nadera,andsentencinghim tosuffer thepenalty
ofreclusionperpetuafor onecountofrapeanddeathfor eachoftheremainingthreecounts.
Accused-appellantwas alsoorderedtoindemnify complainants Oleby Naderaintheamountof
P150,000.00andMaricris NaderaintheamountofP50,000.00,withoutsubsidiary imprisonmentin
caseofinsolvency.MENDOZAJ
Reversalofthedecisionis soughtonthesolegroundthat-
THE TRIALCOURTGRAVELYERREDINACCEPTINGACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
IMPROVIDENTPLEAOFGUILTYTOACAPITALOFFENSE ANDINFAILINGTOCONDUCTA
SEARCHINGINQUIRYTODETERMINE WHETHERTHE ACCUSEDFULLYUNDERSTOODTHE
CONSEQUENCE OFHIS PLEA.[1]
Thefacts areas follows:
Accused-appellantElegioNadera,Jr.has four childrenby his wifeDaisy,namely:Oleby,bornon

October 2,1982;Maricris,bornonMarch16,1984;MarchAnthony,bornonJanuary 8,1986;and
Sherilyn,bornonSeptember 27,1987.[2]
OnSeptember 22,1991,Daisy leftfor ajobinBahrain,andcamehometothePhilippines for

vacationonly inJuly 1993.Shethenleftagainfor BahraininSeptember 1993anddidnotreturn
untilSeptember 12,1995.[3]
OnApril28,1996,Oleby andMaricris,assistedby aneighbor,LitaMacalalad,toldtheir mother

thatthey hadbeenrapedby their father,hereinaccused-appellant.Thereupon,they wenttothe
policeauthorities ofNaujanandfiledacomplaintagainstaccused-appellant.[4]
After preliminary examination,onJune6,1996,four informations chargingaccused-appellantwith

rapeonvarious dates werefiledintheRegionalTrialCourt,Calapan,OrientalMindoro.
InCriminalCaseNo.C-4982,theinformation[5]alleged-
Thatonor aboutthe17thday ofMay,1992,ataround10:00o'clock intheevening,atBarangay

Bayani,Municipality ofNaujan,ProvinceofOrientalMindoro,Philippines andwithinthejurisdiction
ofthis HonorableCourt,theabove-namedaccused,motivatedby lustandlewddesign,andby
means offorceandintimidation,wilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously didlieandsucceededinhaving
carnalknowledgewithhis daughter,OLEBYNADERA,nine(9) years ofageatthattimeagainst
thelatter's willandconsent.
InCriminalCaseNo.C-4983,theinformation[6]charged-
Thatonor aboutthe17thday ofApril,1995atBarangay Bayani,Municipality ofNaujan,Province

ofOrientalMindoro,Philippines andwithinthejurisdictionofthis HonorableCourt,theabove-
namedaccused,motivatedby lustandlewddesign,andby means offorceandintimidation,
wilfully,andunlawfully andfeloniously didlieandsucceededinhavingcarnalknowledgewithhis
daughter,OLEBYNADERA,twelve(12) years ofageatthattimeagainstthelatter's willand
consent.
InCriminalCaseNo.C-4984,theinformation[7]stated-
Thatonor aboutthe24thday ofApril,1995,sometimeintheevening,atBarangay Bayani,

Municipality ofNaujan,ProvinceofOrientalMindoro,Philippines andwithinthejurisdictionofthis
HonorableCourt,theabove-namedaccused,motivatedby lustandlewddesign,andby means of
forceandintimidation,wilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously didlieandsucceededinhavingcarnal
knowledgewithhis daughter,OLEBYNADERA,twelve(12) years ofageatthattimeagainstthe
latter's willandconsent.
InCriminalCaseNo.C-4985,theinformation[8]recited-
Thatonor aboutthe3rdday ofMarch1996ataround8:00o'clock intheevening,atBarangay

Bayani,Municipality ofNaujan,ProvinceofOrientalMindoro,Philippines andwithinthejurisdiction
ofthis HonorableCourt,theabove-namedaccused,motivatedby lustandlewddesign,andby
means offorceandintimidation,wilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously didlieandsucceededinhaving
carnalknowledgewithhis daughter,MARICRIS NADERA,eleven(11) years ofageagainstthe
latter's willandconsent.
Therecordshows thatathis arraignmentonJuly 23,1996,accused-appellant,assistedby Atty.

ManoloA.BrotonelofthePublic Attorney's Office,pleadednotguilty tothecharges filedagainst
him.[9]However,onAugust5,1997,after theprosecutionhadpresentedDr.CynthiaS.Fesalbon,
accused-appellantpleadedguilty tothecrimechargedinalltheinformations.
Theprosecutionpresentedfour witnesses,namely:Dr.CynthiaFesalbon,Oleby Nadera,Maricris

Nadera,andDaisy Nadera.
Dr.CynthiaS.Fesalbon,MedicalOfficer IV oftheOrientalMindoroProvincialHospital,who
conductedthemedicalexaminationofbothcomplainants,submittedareportontheresultofOleby
Nadera's examinationas follows:[10]
PHYSICALEXAMINATION:
- Nosignofexternalphysicalinjuries as oftimeofexamination.
- Breastdeveloped
- Abdomen:flat,softnon-tender.
EXTERNALGENITALIA
- Minimalpubic hair
- Healedincompletehymenallacerations at5,7,12o'clock positions.
- Nobleeding.
INTERNALSPECULUM EXAMINATION
- Vaginaadmits 2fingers withease.

- Cervix small,firm,closenon-tender (-) bleeding.
- Uterus notenlarged.
- Adnexaenegative
LABORATORYEXAMINATION:
- Smear for thepresenceofspermatozoarevealedpositiveresult.
Shetestifiedthatthehymenallacerations may havebeencausedby theinsertionofahardobject,

thepatient's history ofgenitalic insertions,astraddleinjury,or sittingonhardwood.Shecouldnot
determinewhentheselacerations weresustainedbecausethey hadhealedover aperiodbeyond
sevendays.[11]
Dr.Fesalbonlikewiserenderedareport[12]onthemedicalexaminationofMaricris Nadera,the
pertinentparts ofwhichstate:
PHYSICALEXAMINATION:
- Nosignofexternalphysicalinjuries as oftimeofexamination.
- Abdomen,flat,soft.
EXTERNALGENITALIA:
- Absenceofpubic hair healedhymenallacerations,incompleteat1,5,8,11o'clock positions.
INTERNALEXAMINATION:
- Vaginaadmits 1finger withease.

- Cervix small(-) bleeding
- Uterus notenlarged.
-Adnexae(-).
LABORATORYEXAMINATION
- Smear for thepresenceofspermatozoarevealedNegativeresult.
InthecaseofMaricris Nadera,Dr.Fesalbonexplainedthatthehymenallacerations couldhave

beencausedby penetrationsuchas throughinstrumentationor insertionofanobjectinsidethe
vagina.They couldalsohavebeencausedby thepenetrationofthepenis.Uponinquiry from the
court,Dr.FesalbonstatedthatthefactthatMaricris hadmorehymenallacerations thanOleby
couldbeduetothedifferenceintheimpactofpenetration.Sheaddedthatthenumber oftimes
eachofthegirls hadsexualintercoursecouldnotbeascertainedmerely from thehymenal
lacerations,althoughitcouldbeconcludedthatanobjecthadbeeninsertedinthevagina.[13]
Oleby Naderatestifiedabouttherapes committedby her father againsther as follows:
OnMay 17,1992,ataround10o'clock intheevening,whileDaisy was away workingas a

domestic helper inBahrain,accused- appellantpulledOleby,thennineyears ofage,towards a
bed,removedher panties andshorts andorderedher tokeepquiet.Hethenplacedhimselfontop
ofher andinsertedhis penis intoher vagina.Heproceededtomakeanupanddownmotionwhile
ontopofhis daughter.Allthewhile,Oleby was crying,pleadingwithher father,"Huwagpo!",
"Huwagpo!" Accused-appellantagainorderedOleby tokeepquietlesther brother andsisters
wereawakened.Afterwards,accused-appellanttoldOleby toputonher panties andshorts andto
gotosleep.Oleby wenttothebedwhereher brother andsisters weresleepingandcried.
Onanother occasion,onApril17,1995,accused-appellantsentSherilynandMaricris tothesari-

saristorewhileheaskedMarchAnthony togather firewood.WhileOleby was leftaloneinsidetheir
houseinBarangay Bayani,Naujan,OrientalMindoro,accused-appellantagainrapedher.Oleby
was 12years oldatthattime.Accused-appellantclosedthedoor andwindows,removedOleby's
panties andshorts andsatdown.Whilesittingdown,accused-appellantplacedOleby's legs onhis
thighs andinsertedhis penis intoher vagina.Later on,hetoldOleby toputonher panties and
shorts andtoldher tofetchher brother andsisters.
Oleby was rapedby her father for thethirdtimeonApril24,1995.Thatevening,shewokeupto
findher father ontopofher,takingoffher shorts andpanties andinsertinghis penis intoher
vagina.As her father was takingoffher clothes,Oleby criedandpleaded,"Huwagpo!Huwagpo!"
Insteadofdesisting,accused-appellanttoldher tokeepquietsoas nottoawakenher brother and
sisters,andthreatenedher withharm ifshemadeany noise.Accused-appellantthenmadea
pumpingmotion,consummatingthesexualactwithhis daughter.[14]
After Oleby's directexaminationhadbeenfinished,Atty.Brotonel,accused-appellant's counsel,did

notconductany cross examinationonthegroundthathewas convincedOleby was tellingthe
truth.[15]
Onthatsameday,Maricris alsotestified.Sherelatedhowshewas rapedby her father onMarch3,

1996,theyear before,whenshewas 11years old.Atabouteighto'clock intheeveningofsaid
date,whileher brother andsisters weresleeping,shewas pulledby her father towards his bedand
toldtoliedown.Accused-appellantthenplacedhimselfontopofMaricris andinsertedhis penis
intoher vagina.Maricris pleaded"Papa,huwagpo,maawanamankayosaamin." Ignoringhis
daughter's pleas,accused-appellantcontinuedrapingher by makingapumpingmotionand
threatenedtokillallofthem ifshecried.Accused-appellantafterwards askedMaricris toputonher
shorts andpanties andreturntobed.HetoldMaricris nottocry soas nottoawakenher siblings.
Shedidnottellanyonewhatbefellher becauseshewas afraid.Aneighbor,namedLitaMacalalad,
askedher ifOleby hadbeenrapedby their father.ItturnedoutOleby hadtoldher ordealtoLita
Macalaladwhilethey werewashingclothes andtalkingaboutOleby's parents.Oleby alsotoldLita
MacalaladthatMaricris hadbeenrapedby their father as well,afactrelatedtoOleby by Maricris.
[16]
Daisy Nadera,accused-appellant's wife,alsotestifiedfor theprosecution.Her testimony focused

onthedates ofbirths ofher childrenandthefactthatshewas outofthecountry whenthealleged
rapes occurred.Shetestifiedthatsheandher daughters filedacomplaintfor rapeagainst
accused-appellantafter discoveringhis hideous acts.Thereafter,her childrenweresubjectedtoa
medicalexamination.[17]
OnAugust12,1997,theprosecutionformally offeredits documentary evidenceandrestedits case

thereafter.
Accused-appellantdidnotpresentany evidenceinhis defense.
OnAugust27,1997,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentfindingaccused-appellantguilty offour
counts ofrapeagainsthis daughters.Thedispositiveportionofits decision[18]reads:
ACCORDINGLY,theCourtfinds accusedElegioNadera,Jr.,guilty beyondreasonabledoubt,as

principal,ofthecrimeofRape[4counts]withthequalifyingcircumstancethatthevictims areunder
18 years ofageandtheoffender is aparent.Heis hereby sentencedtosuffer thepenalty of
ReclusionPerpetuarangingfrom 20years and1day to40years for therapecommittedonMay
17,1992andthreeDEATHPENALTIES for therapecommittedonApril17and24,1995and
March3,1996,together withtheaccessory penalties providedby law.Heis alsoorderedto
indemnify victim Oleby NaderathetotalamountofP150,000.00inCriminalCaseNos.C-4982,
C-4983andC-4984andMaricris Nadera,theamountofP50,000.00inCriminalCaseNo.C-4985,
withoutsubsidiary imprisonmentincaseofinsolvency,andtopay thecosts.
S OORDE RE D.
As already stated,accused-appellant's loneassignmentoferror is thatthetrialcourtacceptedhis

pleaofguilty toacapitaloffensewithoutmakingasearchinginquiry todeterminewhether he
understoodtheconsequences ofhis plea.Insupportofhis contention,accused-appellantinvokes
therulinginthecaseofPeoplev.Dayot[19]inwhichthis Courtruledthat,incriminalcases,the
judgemustbeconvincedthattheaccused,inpleadingguilty,is truly guilty.This couldbedoneby
requiringhim tonarratetheevents leadingtothecrime,makinghim reenactit,or askinghim to
supply missingdetails.Thejudgemustsatisfy himselfthat:(1) theaccusedis voluntarily pleading
guilty,and(2) heis truly guilty andthereis arationalbasis for afindingofguiltbasedonhis
testimony.
Wefindmeritinaccused-appellant's allegations.Inaddition,wefindthattherewas inadequate

representationofhis caseincourt,thus necessitatingtheremandofthis casefor further
proceedings.
I.
Rule116oftheRules onCriminalProcedureprovides:
SEC.3.Pleaofguilty tocapitaloffense;receptionofevidence.- Whentheaccusedpleads guilty to

acapitaloffense,thecourtshallconductasearchinginquiry intothevoluntariness andfull
comprehensionoftheconsequences ofhis pleaandrequiretheprosecutiontoprovehis guiltand
theprecisedegreeofculpability.Theaccusedmay alsopresentevidenceonhis behalf.
Under this Rule,threethings areenjoineduponthetrialcourtwhenapleaofguilty toacapital

offenseis entered:(1) thecourtmustconductasearchinginquiry intothevoluntariness oftheplea
andtheaccused's fullcomprehensionoftheconsequences thereof;(2) thecourtmustrequirethe
prosecutiontopresentevidencetoprovetheguiltoftheaccusedandtheprecisedegreeofhis
culpability;and,(3) thecourtmustask theaccusedifhedesires topresentevidenceonhis behalf
andallowhim todosoifhedesires.[20]
Whatconstitutes asearchinginquiry,as explainedinPeoplev.Alicando,[21]is thatthepleaofguilt

mustbebasedonafreeandinformedjudgment.Hence,asearchinginquiry mustfocus on:(1) the
voluntariness oftheplea,and(2) thefullcomprehensionoftheconsequences oftheplea.
Inthecaseatbar,therecorddoes notshowwhatexactly transpiredatthere-arraignmentof

accused-appellant,for whatreasonhechangedhis pleafrom "notguilty" to"guilty," andwhether
hefully understoodtheconsequences ofhis guilty plea.Theonly indicationintherecordthat
accused-appellantchangedhis pleatoguilty is theCertificates ofRe- Arraignment,datedAugust5,
1997,inCriminalCaseNos.C-4982toC-4985.[22]Onwhatexactly accused-appellantsaidin
enteringhis pleaofguilty andwhatexactly hehadbeentoldby thetrialjudge,therecords shedno
light.Thereis thus noevidencetoshowthataccused-appellant's guilty pleawas voluntarily made
or thathehadfully understoodtheconsequences ofsuchplea.
Inits decision,thetrialcourtdescribedthemanner inwhichtheaccusedpleadedguilty,thus:
Uponarraignment,accused,assistedby Atty.ManoloA.BrotonelofthePublic Attorney's Office,

pleadednotguilty tothecrimecharged.However,onAugust5,1997,whenthesecases were
calledfor pre-trialandtrial,counselfor theaccusedmanifestedthattheaccused,realizingthe
futility ofenteringintotrialandconsideringthatheactually committedtheacts complainedof,
intimatedhis intentiontoenter apleaofguilty totheabove- mentionedcharges.Theaccusedwas
thenaskedby this Courtifhewas awareoftheconsequences ofapleaofguilty toacapital
offense:thatfor therapehecommittedonMay 17,1992againsthis daughter,Oleby Nadera,who
was 9years oldatthetime,hewouldbesentencedtoreclusionperpetuaandfor thethreeother
counts ofrapecommittedonApril17and24,1995[bothagainstOleby Nadera]andonMarch3,
1996 [againstMaricris Nadera,11years oldatthetime],hewouldbesentencedtodeathby lethal
injection.After havingbeeninformedofthis,heinsistedthatheis willingtoenter apleaofguilty to
thecrimes chargedandis ready tofacetheconsequences thereof.[23]
Thewarnings givenby thetrialcourtinthis casefallshortoftherequirementthatitmustmakea

searchinginquiry todeterminewhether accused-appellantunderstoodfully theimportofhis guilty
plea.As has beensaid,amerewarningthattheaccusedfaces thesupremepenalty ofdeathis
insufficient.[24]For moreoftenthannot,anaccusedpleads guilty uponbadadviceor becausehe
hopes for alenienttreatmentor alighter penalty.Thetrialjudgemusterasesuchmistaken
impressions.[25]Hemustbecompletely convincedthattheguilty pleamadeby theaccusedwas
notmadeunder duress or promiseofreward.Thejudgemustask theaccusedthemanner the
latter was arrestedor detained,andwhether hewas assistedby counselduringthecustodialand
preliminary investigations.Inaddition,thedefensecounselshouldalsobeaskedwhether he
conferredwiththeaccusedandcompletely explainedtohim themeaningandtheconsequences of
apleaofguilt.Furthermore,sincetheage,educationalattainmentandsocio-economic status of
theaccusedmay revealinsights for aproper verdictinthecase,thetrialcourtmustask questions
concerningthem.[26]Inthis case,absentany showingthatthesequestions wereputtoaccused-
appellant,asearchinginquiry cannotbesaidtohavebeenundertakenby thetrialcourt.
Whatthetrialcourtdidinthis case,as describedinits decision,is similar towhathappenedin

Peoplev.Sevilleno.[27]Inthatcase,theaccusedwas chargedwiththerapeandhomicideofa
nine-year oldgirl.Theaccusedpleadedguilty whereuponthejudgeaskedhim questions:(1) Do
youunderstandyour pleaofguilt?and(2) Doyouknowthatyour pleaofguiltcouldbringthedeath
penalty?This Courtheldthatthesequestions didnotconstituteasearchinginquiry.
. . . Inevery casewheretheaccusedenters apleaofguilty toacapitaloffense,especially where

heis anignorantpersonwithlittleor noeducation,theproper andprudentcoursetofollowis to
takesuchevidenceas areavailableandnecessary insupportofthematerialallegations ofthe
information,includingtheaggravatingcircumstances thereinenumerated,notonly tosatisfy the
trialjudgehimselfbutalsotoaidtheSupremeCourtindeterminingwhether theaccusedreally and
truly understoodandcomprehendedthemeaning,fullsignificanceandconsequences ofhis plea.
[28]
Clearly,thepleaofguilty ofaccused-appellantinthis casewas madeimprovidently.
II.
Convictions basedonanimprovidentpleaofguiltaresetasideonly ifsuchpleais thesolebasis of

thejudgment.Ifthetrialcourtreliedonsufficientandcredibleevidencetoconvicttheaccused,the
convictionmustbesustained,becausethenitis predicatednotmerely ontheguilty pleaofthe
accusedbutonevidenceprovinghis commissionoftheoffensecharged.[29]
As already stated,theprosecutionevidenceconsistedofthetestimonies ofOleby andMaricris

Nadera,theresults oftheir medicalexaminations,andthetestimonies oftheir mother,Daisy,and
thephysicianwhoconductedthemedicalexaminationofthetwogirls,Dr.CynthiaFesalbon.
Certaincircumstances presentinthis case,however,persuadeus thataremandofthis caseis
necessary.
First.Aperusalofthedecisionofthecourtreveals thatthetrialjudgefailedtostatethefactualand
legalreasons onwhichhebasedaccused-appellant's conviction.Exceptfor thenarrationofthe
prosecution's evidenceandabarerecitalofR.A.No.7659,amendingArt.335oftheRevisedPenal
Code,thereis nothingelsetoindicatethereasonfor thedecision.Thereis noevaluationofthe
evidenceandnoreasongivenwhy thecourtfoundthetestimonies ofthewitnesses credible.Rule
120 ofthe1985Rules onCriminalProcedureprovides:
Sec.2.Form andcontents ofjudgment.- Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,

judgmentis based.

commissionthereof,iftherebeany;(b) participationoftheaccusedinthecommissionofthe
theaccusedby theoffendedparty,iftherebeany,unless theenforcementofthecivilliability by a

theoffendedparty.
InPeoplev.Bugarin,[30]westated:

them appeals,hecanpointouttotheappellatecourtthefindingoffacts or therulings onpoints of
Second.Thecavalier attitudeofaccused-appellant's counsel,Atty.ManoloA.BrotonelofthePublic

Attorney's Office,cannotgounnoticed.Itis discerniblein(a) his refusaltocross examineOleby
Nadera;(b) themanner inwhichheconductedMaricris Nadera's cross examination;and,(c) his
failurenotonly topresentevidencefor theaccusedbutalsotoinform theaccusedofhis righttodo
so,ifhedesires.
Only faithfulperformanceby counselofhis duty towards his clientcangivemeaningand

substancetotheaccused's righttodueprocess andtobepresumedinnocentuntilproven
otherwise.Hence,alawyer's duty,especially thatofadefensecounsel,mustnotbetakenlightly.It
mustbeperformedwithallthezealandvigor athis commandtoprotectandsafeguardthe
accused's fundamentalrights.
InthecaseofPeoplevs.Bermas,[31]noless thanthreePAOlawyers werefoundby theCourtto

havefailedinperformingtheir duties totheir client,anaccusedchargedwithrapinghis daughter.
Thefirstlawyer inexplicably waivedthecross examinationoftheprivatecomplainantandlater
askedtoberelievedofher duties as counseldeoficio.Asecondlawyer appointedby thecourt
missedseveralhearings duringthetrialandcouldnolonger belocated.ThethirdPAOlawyer
appointedby thetrialcourtacceptedhis duties reluctantly andlater ceasedtoappear for the
accused.This Courtheldthat:
Therighttocounselmustbemorethanjustthepresenceofalawyer inthecourtroom or themere

propoundingofstandardquestions andobjections.Therighttocounselmeans thattheaccusedis
amply accordedlegalassistanceextendedby acounselwhocommits himselftothecausefor the
defenseandacts accordingly.Therightassumes anactiveinvolvementby thelawyer inthe
proceedings,particularly atthetrialofthecase,his bearingconstantly inmindofthebasic rights of
theaccused,his beingwell-versedonthecaseandhis knowingthefundamentalprocedures,
essentiallaws andexistingjurisprudence.Therightofanaccusedtocounselfinds substancein
theperformanceby thelawyer ofhis swornduty offidelity tohis client.Tersely put,itmeans an
efficientandtruly decisivelegalassistanceandnotasimpleperfunctory representation.
Measuredby this standard,thedefensecounsels conductinthis casefalls shortofthequality of

advocacy demandedofhim,consideringthegravity oftheoffensechargedandthefinality ofthe
penalty.Aglaringexampleofhis manifestlack ofenthusiasm for his client's causeis his decision
nottocross examineOleby Nadera,as revealedinthefollowingportionoftherecords:
COURT:
.......Any cross?
ATTY.BROTONEL:
.......IfYour Honor please,wearenotconductingany cross-examination,becausethis

representation,from thedemeanor ofthewitness,Iam convincedthatsheis tellingthetruth.[32]
Itmay besothatdefensecounselpersonally foundOleby's testimony tobebelievable.

Nonetheless,hehadtheboundenduty toscrutinizeprivatecomplainant's testimony toensurethat
theaccused's constitutionalrighttoconfrontandexaminethewitnesses againsthim was not
renderedfor naught.
Itbears pointingoutthatinrapecases,itis oftenthewordofthecomplainantagainstthatofthe

accused,thetwobeingtheonly persons presentduringthecommissionoftheoffense.Whilethe
lonetestimony ofthevictim is sufficienttoconvicttheaccused,suchtestimony mustbeclear,
positive,convincingandconsistentwithhumannatureandthenormalcourseofthings.
Complainant's testimony cannotbeacceptedwithprecipitatecredulity withoutdenyingthe
accused's constitutionalrighttobepresumedinnocent.[33]This is wherecross examination
becomes essentialtotestthecredibility ofthewitnesses,exposefalsehoods or half-truths,uncover
thetruthwhichrehearseddirectexaminationtestimonies may successfully suppress,and
demonstrateinconsistencies insubstantialmatters whichcreatereasonabledoubtas totheguiltof
theaccusedandthus togivesubstancetotheconstitutionalrightoftheaccusedtoconfrontthe
witnesses againsthim.For unless provenotherwisetobeguilty beyondallreasonabledoubt,the
accusedis presumedtobeinnocent.[34]
Indeed,cross examiningOleby Naderabecomes indispensableifher testimony is viewedtogether

withtheresults ofher medicalexamination.Oleby Naderaclaimedthatshewas lastrapedby her
father onApril24,1995.[35]Yet,themedicalexaminationconductedonher onApril30,1996[36]
revealedthepresenceofspermatozoainthevaginalcanalonthatdate.This was ayear after the
lastrapeallegedly committedby her father.This evidentdiscrepancy leads toonly onenatural
conclusion:Oleby engagedinsexualintercourseafewdays beforeshewas examined.This raises
anumber ofquestions thatbear uponthecredibility ofOleby as awitness andupontheguiltof
accused- appellant.This may notnecessarily meanthatshewas lyingwhenshesaidthatonApril
24,1995shehadbeenrapedby accused-appellant,butitdoes indicateanecessity-thatofcross
examiningher inorder toferretoutthetruth.
Thesamemay besaidofdefensecounsel's treatmentofMaricris'testimony.Whileshewas cross

examinedby defensecounsel,theexaminationwas atbestahalf-heartedattempttocomply witha
lawyer's obligation,lackingtherigor andzealrequiredconsideringthataman's lifeis atstake.The
cross examinationcenteredonwhatMaricris didor didnotdowhileshewitnessedher sister being
raped,andonher failuretoreporttheallegedly incestuous rapes againstthem.Saidcross
examinationdidnoteventouchuponthespecific details concerningtherapecommittedagainst
her.Containingluriddetails as itmay be,itwas nonetheless importanttoprobeMaricris'testimony,
especially sinceitwas substantially similar tothefirstincidentofrapenarratedby her sister,and
thus raisedthepossibility thatitwas arehearsed,ifnotconcocted,story.
Lastly,notonly diddefensecounselfailtoobjecttothedocumentary evidencepresentedby the

prosecution,accordingtothetrialcourt's decision,heevenexpressedhis conformity tothe
admissionofthesame.Neither didhepresentany evidenceonbehalfofaccused-appellant.[37]
Worse,nowhereintherecords is itshownthataccused-appellantwas informed,either by his
counselor by thecourt,ofhis righttopresentevidence,ifhesodesires.
Atty.Brotonel,as counseldeoficio,hadtheduty todefendhis clientandprotecthis rights,no
matter howguilty or evilheperceives accused-appellanttobe.Theperformanceofthis duty was
allthemoreimperativebecausethelifeofaccused-appellanthangs inthebalance.His duty was
noless becausehewas counseldeoficio.
Inviewoftheforegoing,wefinditnecessary toremandthecasefor theproper arraignmentand

trialoftheaccused,consideringnotonly theaccused's improvidentpleaofguiltbutalsohis
lawyer's neglectinrepresentinghis cause.Anewtrialhas beenorderedincriminalcases onthe
groundofretractionofwitnesses,negligenceor incompetency ofcounsel,improvidentpleaof
guilty,disqualificationofanattorney deoficiotorepresenttheaccusedinthetrialcourt,andwhere
ajudgmentwas renderedonastipulationoffacts enteredintoby boththeprosecutionandthe
defense.[38]
WHEREFORE,thedecision,datedApril27,1997,oftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch40,Calapan,
OrientalMindoro,is hereby SETASIDE andCriminalCaseNos.C-4982,C-4983,C-4984and
C-4985areREMANDEDtoitfor further proceedings inaccordancewiththis decision.Thetrial
courtis enjoinedtoconducttheproper trialofaccused-appellantwithalldeliberatespeedupon
receiptoftherecords ofthecases.
SOORDERED.2/28/009:29AM!
SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.130683.May 31,2000]
ELIGIOMADRID,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS,REGIONALTRIALCOURTandPEOPLE
OFTHE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DE CIS ION
MENDOZA,J.:
This is apetitionfor reviewoncertiorariofthedecision[1]oftheCourtofAppeals affirmingthe

convictionby theRegionalTrialCourt,Branch9,Aparri,Cagayan,ofpetitioner EligioMadrid[2]and
his co-accusedArsenioSunidoofthecrimeofhomicide,for thekillingonMay 21,1992ofAngel
SunidoinBuguey,Cagayan.
Theinformationagainstthem charged
Thatonor aboutMay 21,1992,inthemunicipality ofBuguey,provinceofCagayan,andwithinthe

jurisdictionofthis HonorableCourt,thesaidaccused,ArsenioSunidoy Silos andEligio(Melencio)
Madrid,armedwithasharppointedinstrument,conspiringtogether andhelpingeachother,with
intenttokilldidthenandtherewilfully,unlawfully andfeloniously attack,assaultandstabone
AngelSunidoandinflictinguponhi[m]stabwounds onhis body whichcausedhis death.
CONTRARYTOLAW.
WhenarraignedonOctober 6,1992,petitioner andArsenioSunidopleaded"notguilty" tothe

crimecharged,[3]whereupontrialensued.Theprosecutionpresentedthreewitnesses,namely:
Remedios Sunido,wifeofthevictim;MerdelynSunido,thevictims daughter;andDr.Teddy Unida,
medico-legalexaminer.
Remedios Sunidoadoptedas her testimony ondirectexamination,theaffidavitexecutedby her at

theBuguey PoliceStationonJune1,1992.Insaidaffidavit,shenarratedthatArsenioandAngel
Sunidowerebrothers who,previous toMay 21,1992,hadaquarrelover afightingcock which
Arsenioclaimedwas his.Ataround12noonofMay 21,1992,AngelSunidoandJerry Escobar had
drinks intheformers house.Under theinfluenceofalcohol,AngelprovokedafightwithArsenio.As
aresult,as Angelwas walkingback tohis houseafter takingEscobar home,hewas stoppedby
Arsenioandtwocompanions,oneofwhom was petitioner.Arsenios companions heldAngelby the
arms as Arseniostabbedhim severaltimes ondifferentparts ofthebody.Arsenioandhis
companions afterwards fledusingpetitioners tricycle.[4]
Remedios Sunidowas cross-examinedonthebasis ofher affidavit.ShetestifiedthatArseniodid

notpass by their houseonMay 21,1992.Onfurther questioning,however,shetestifiedthat
Arseniocametotheir houseataroundsevenoclock inthemorningofthatday as Angelandsome
friends werehavingdrinks.Itwas duringthatvisitthatAngelprovokedaquarrelwithArsenio
concerningthefightingcock.[5]Onre-directexamination,itwas stipulatedthatthefamily ofAngel
incurredP4,000.00as expenses for his death.[6]
MerdelynSunidoalsoexecutedanaffidavitbeforethepoliceonJune2,1992.[7]Shestatedthat
her father,her uncleArsenio,andsomevisitors weredrinkingintheir houseonMay 21,1992.The
brothers quarrelledover afightingcock whichsheclaimedArseniotook from their yard.Angelthen
accompaniedJerry Escobar tohis home.Becauseofthebadbloodbetweenthebrothers,onhis
way back from Escobars house,Angelwas attackedby ArsenioSunido,withthehelpofpetitioner
andanunidentifiedman,andstabbedAngeltodeath.[8]Onthewitness stand,Merdelyntestified
thatataroundnoonofMay 21,1992,her father Angelandthelatters friends,Jerry Escobar anda
certainRudy,wereintheir househavingdrinks.[9]At12noon,Angeltook Jerry Escobar home.
Either ontheway toor back from Escobars house,Angelwas stoppedby ArsenioSunidowhowas
withpetitioner andanother person.Petitioner andhis companionheldAngels hands,raisingthem
upwards,withpetitioner holdinghim by therighthand,whilehis companionheldAngelby theleft
hand.Andthen,ArseniostartedattackingAngelwithaknife.After seriously woundingArsenio,the
threefled.Merdelynsaidshewitnessedtheincidentbecauseshewas justapproximately five
meters away from theplacewhereithappened.[10]
Theother witness for theprosecutionwas Dr.Teddy A.Unida,municipalhealthofficer ofBuguey,

whoconductedtheautopsy onthebody ofAngelSunido.His findings wereembodiedinamedical
certificate,[11]whichshowedthefollowingwounds sufferedby AngelSunido:
DIAGNOSIS:
1. Incisedwound- 6cm.inlength- 1cm.deep,locatedatthelefttemporalregion.
2. Stabwound- 3cm.inlength,8cm.deep,locatedatrightanterior lower thorax.
3. Stabwound- 4cm.inlength- 6cm.deep,locatedatrightanterior lower thorax.Direction-

Antero-posterior.
4. Stabwound- 3cm.inlength- 6cm.deep,locatedatleftanterior lower thorax.Direction-

Antero-posterior.
5. Stabwound- 6cm.inlength- 6cm.deep,locatedattherightupper [quadrant]oftheabdomen-

anterior.Direction- Antero-posterior.
6. Stabwound- 3cm.inlength- 6cm.deep,locatedatleftupper [quadrant]oftheabdomen-

anterior.Direction- Antero-posterior.
7. Stabwound- 1cm.inlength- 3cm.deep,locatedattherightsideoftheabdomen-lateral.

Direction- Righttoleft.
8. Stabwound- 2cm.- 5cm.deep,locatedatleftlower [quadrant]oftheabdomen.Direction-

Anterocaudal.
9. Stabwound- 2cm.inlength- 8cm.deep,locatedattheleftsideoftheabdomen-lateral.

Direction- Lefttoright.
Dr.Unidatestifiedthatbasedonthesewounds,itcouldbeconcludedthattheassailantwas in
frontofthevictim andthatheusedasharp-edgedinstrument,likeabolowithapointedtip,in
killingthelatter.Itis possiblethateither theassailantandthevictim wereinastandingposition
facingeachother or thevictim was lyingonthegroundwithhis faceupwards.Stabwoundnos.2,
3,4,5,6,7and8werefatalinjuries causingthevictims deathintheabsenceofmedical
attendance.As tohowmany assailants wereresponsiblefor thewounds,hesaidthatjudgingfrom
thevarianceinthesizeandshapeofthewounds,itwas possiblethattherewas morethanone
assailantor thatmorethanoneweaponwas used.However,Dr.Unidastressedthattherewas no
certainty as tothis becausetheelasticity oftheskinmakes itdifficulttoconcludeexactly whattype
ofinstrumentwas usedonthebasis ofthelengthofthestabwounds alone.[12]
Ontheother hand,thedefensepresentedas witnesses Jerry Escobar,[13]petitioner,Arsenio

SunidoandAlipioValdez.
Jerry Escobar was thepersonwho,accordingtothewifeanddaughter ofthevictim,thelatter took

homeafter havingdrinks intheir house.Jerry testifiedthathedroppedby thehouseofAngel
Sunidobetweensix andsevenoclock inthemorningofMay 21,1992,onhis way tobuy chicken
feeds.AccordingtoJerry,heandAngelhaddrinks until12oclock noonwithanother persons
whom Angelintroducedas guests from theIlocos province.Ataround10oclock inthemorning,
ArsenioSunidoandpetitioner arrivedinArsenios houseinaTamarawvehicle.Angels housewas
locatedbehindthatofArsenio,approximately 10meters away.Uponseeinghis brother andhis
companion,AngelprovokedArseniotoafightover afightingcock whichAngelclaimedbelongedto
him.Hedrewalineonthegroundwithhis knifeas hecontinuedtoprovokeArsenio.Thetwo
brothers thengrappledwitheachother andfelltotheground.Arseniowas abletolandontopof
Angelandfrom this vantagepointwas abletowresttheknifewithwhichhestabbedAngelseveral
times.Jerry saidhethenranaway.Petitioner was near theTamarawvehicleatthetimeofthe
incident.Jerry deniedRemedios Sunidos claim thatAngelaccompaniedhim (Jerry) tohis house.
HesaidAngelwas toodrunk tohavedoneso.Hefurther beliedRemedios claim thatpetitioner
heldAngelby thearm whileArseniostabbedAngel.Jerry saidthathewas botheredinhis
conscienceby allegations ofother witnesses thatAngeltook him home.[14]Whencross-examined,
Jerry clarifiedthatneither Arsenionor petitioner drank liquor withthem.Heonly sawArsenioand
petitioner ataround10oclock inthemorningwhenthey wenttoArsenios houseontheir way to
haulpalay.Itwas thenthatAngelchallengedArseniotoafightas Angeltook outhis knife.Several
peoplewitnessedthefightbetweenthetwobrothers,butnooneintervenedbecauseoffear.Jerry
further clarifiedthatpetitioner rantotheTamarawvehiclewhenthebrothers startedfighting.Jerry
saidthathedidnotreportwhathewitnessedtoanyonebecausehewas notdirectly involvedinthe
case.Buthedecidedtotestify andrelatewhathewitnessedas his consciencebotheredhim.[15]
Petitioner testifiednext.Hesaidhewas abusinessmanwithsevenchildren,allofwhom finished

college.His business consistedofthreericemills,onelocatedinMaddaleroandtwoin
Cabanbunan,Gonzaga.Themanager oftheMaddaleroricemillwas ArsenioSunido.OnMay 21,
1992,ataround10oclock inthemorning,Arsenioinformedhim thatthey neededtobuy palay,for
whichreasonthey gotintohis Tamarawjeep,withArseniodriving.They proceededtoArsenios
houseinMaddalero.Arsenioparkedthevehicleinfrontofhis house.WhenArsenioalightedfrom
thevehicle,Angelrantowards him withaknife.Whenhesawthis,petitioner saidheranaway from
thesceneandtowardthefarm.Whileinhiding,heheardthebrothers arguing.Petitioner denied
thatheheldAngels hands as ArseniostabbedAngel.[16]Duringcross-examination,petitioner
explainedthatheonly knewAngelas thebrother ofArsenio.Hereiteratedthatheranaway
becausehewas frightenedby thesightoftheknife.Henever sawwhathappenedtothebrothers.
Nor didheinquireabouttheincident.Hejustheardfrom other peoplewhathadhappenedsincehe
didnotreturntoMaddalerountilamonthlater.[17]
Theother defensewitness was ArsenioSunido,whotestifiedthathemanagedthericemillof

petitioner inMaddalero,Buguey,Cagayan.OnMay 21,1992,ataround10oclock inthemorning,
helefthis housetoseepetitioner.Henoticedseveralpersons,includingAngel,drinkinggininthe
yardoutsidethelatters house.Angelsawhim andbeganchallenginghim toafight.Itappears that
Arseniohadlostafightingcock abouttwoweeks before.Heclaimedthatthefightingcock in
Angels yardbelongedtohim.Despiteprovocationfrom his brother,Arseniosimply wentabouthis
way andleftthehousetofetchpetitioner inGonzaga,Cagayanwherethelatter was residing.
Uponarrivinginpetitioners house,Arsenioinformedhim thatthey neededmoney tobuy palay.For
this reason,petitioner dispatchedhis Tamarawjeepney andaccompaniedArseniotoSta.Teresita
wherethey boughtpalay.They thenproceededtoArsenios houseinMaddalero,arrivingthereat
around11to12oclock noon.They weremetby AngelSunidowhowas drunk.Armedwithaknife,
Angelrushedtowards Arseniowithintenttokillthelatter,saying"Iwillkillyounow." WhenAngel
was aroundtwometers away from him,Arsenioalightedfrom thevehicleandchargedtoward
Angel.
Oncross-examination,Arseniotestifiedthathedidnotseepetitioner anymoreduringtheincident
becausethelatter ranaway.After alightingfrom theTamaraw,Arsenioslippedandfell.Astruggle
ensuedandArseniowas abletowresttheknifeaway from Angel.ArseniothenstabbedAngel
severaltimes.Whenherealizedwhathedid,Arseniodroppedtheknife,wantingtoembracehis
deadbrother for henever really intendedtokillhim.Heimmediately surrenderedtoAlipioValdez,
thevicemayor,whobroughthim tothepoliceprecinctofBuguey.[18]Onfurther cross-
examination,Arsenioexplainedthatthemisunderstandingbetweenhim andhis brother aroseout
ofafightingcock theninAngels possession.Heclaimedthatthefightingcock,abreeder,was his
buthenolonger paidany attentiontohis brothers claim,beingawareofthelatters temperament.
However,onthedateinquestion,Angelchallengedhim toafightas hewas leavinghis house.
WhenArsenioreturnedtohis house,together withpetitioner,Angelmetthem andthreatenedtokill
Arsenioas thelatter was abouttoalightfrom thevehicle.Withhis back againsttheTamaraw
jeepney,Arseniolosthis balanceandfelldown.Angeljumpedonhim.After takingtheknifeaway
from his brother,ArseniostabbedAngel.Angelrantowards amangotreeanddiedthere.Arsenio
thenwenttoViceMayor Valdez houseandtoldValdez thathestabbedhis brother.Uponrequest
ofArsenio,ViceMayor Valdez accompaniedhim tothepolicestation.Onre-directexamination,
Arsenioreiteratedthathis brother was anex-convict,havingbeenconvictedofrapewithhomicide.
He,ontheother hand,hadnever beenchargedofany crimebeforethepresentcase.[19]
AlipioValdez,vicemayor ofBuguey,Cagayan,testifiedthatArseniowenttohis houseonMay 21,

1992,informinghim thathestabbedsomeone.SinceArseniowas willingtosurrender himselfto
theproper authorities,hence,ViceMayor Valdez accompaniedhim totheBuguey Police
Department.[20]Whencross-examined,Valdez repeatedthatArsenioaskedfor his protectionand,
thus,hepersonally accompaniedhim tothepolicestation.[21]
For purposes ofrebuttal,Remedios SunidodeniedArsenios claim thattheknifeusedinkilling

Angelbelongedtothelatter.Sheexplainedthatitcouldnothavebeenher husbands knife
becauseAngeldidnotcarry aknifewhenheaccompaniedJerry home.[22]
After trial,thelower courtrenderedadecisionconvictingArsenioSunidoandEligioMadridofthe

crimeofhomicide.Thedispositiveportionreads:
WHEREFORE,theCourthereby finds theaccusedguilty beyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeof

homicide,thepenalty for whichis reclusiontemporal(Art.249,RevisedPenalCode) attendedby
evidentpremeditation,abuseofsuperior strengthandavailmentofmeans toweakenthedefense
(Art.14,pars.13and15,R.P.C.).Thereis morethanampleevidencetoestablishconspiracy.
Therefore,theactofoneis theactofall(Peoplev.Noguero,Jr.,218SCRA85,96).Theaccused
arehereby sentencedtoserveimprisonmentofnineteen(19) years;seven(7) months;andnine
(9) days totwenty (20) years ofreclusiontemporalmaximum,includingallits accessory,penalties.
They arefurther directedtoindemnify theheirs ofthedeceasedjointly andseverally P50,000.00
for thelatters death;P25,000.00for moraldamages;andP50,000.00for exemplary damages,
therebeingmorethanoneaggravatingcircumstanceandconsideringthemanner thecrimewas
committed,toserveas deterrenttoothers,withprejudicetothegrantofparoleor pardon.
Costs againsttheaccused.
SOORDERED.[23]
Petitioner appealedtotheCourtofAppeals whichrenderedadecision,datedSeptember 17,1997,

affirmingthetrialcourts decision,subjecttomodifications,viz.:
WHEREFORE,foregoingconsidered,theappealeddecisionis hereby AFFIRMEDwiththe

followingmodification:
1. Theaccused-appellantArsenioSunidois sentencedtosuffer theindeterminatepenalty ofsix (6)

years andone(1) day ofprisionmayor,as minimum,tofourteen(14) years,eight(8) months and
one(1) day ofreclusiontemporal,as maximum,withthemitigatingcircumstanceofvoluntary
surrender appreciatedinhis favor thus offsettingtheaggravatingcircumstanceofuseofsuperior
strength;and
2. Theaccused-appellantMadridis sentencedtosuffer theindeterminatepenalty ofsix (6) years

andone(1) day ofprisionmayor,as minimum,toseventeen(17) years,four (4) months andone
(1) day ofreclusiontemporalas maximum withtheaggravatingcircumstanceoftheuseofsuperior
strengthconsideredagainsthim.
Theappealeddecisionis AFFIRMEDinallother aspects.
SOORDERED.[24]
Petitioner assigns thefollowingissues inhis petition:
1. DidtheCagayanRTCboltsofar from SCbearings
(a) innotsatisfyingtheconstitutionalstandardofclear anddistinctarticulationofthefacts andlaw

intrialcourtdecisionwriting?
(b) innotcorrectly interpretingSec.1,Rule132oftheRevisedRules onEvidenceby sayingit

heardtheprosecutionwitnesses testimonies evenwhenalltheprosecutionofferedfor Remedios
andMerdelyns directexaminationweretheir affidavits andinsettingasidetherequirementoforal
testimony for directexamination(which,unlikeaffidavits,gives occasionfor judicialobservationof
witness deportment?
(a) infailingtoapply theSCs timegaptest?
(b) indisregardingtheSCs naturaltendency rule?
(c) inglossingover theSCs unacceptableidentificationtest?
(d) inignoringtheSCs commonexperiencestandard?
(e) inpassingover theSCs motivetest?
(f) nneglectingtherelatives contra-testimony testpointedoutby theSC?
(g) innotmakingastatementversus physicalevidencecomparisonordainedby theSC?
(h) innotapplyingtheSCs chronology test?
(i) inoverlookingthenohide,noappearance,nosurrender factors pointedoutby theSC?
(j) inslightingthevictim ofidentificationby associationpossibility singledoutinaSCdecision

before?
(k) innotapplyingtheSCs equipoisetestinfavor ofpetitioner?
(l) innotadheringtotheSCs searchfor truthstandard?
(m) innotrecognizingtheoperativelegaleffectofapleaofself-defenseby co-accusedArsenio

Sunidointhathealoneowneduptothekilling?
2. DidtheCourtofAppeals sofar sanctionallthose15departures by theCagayanRTCas tocall

for theSupremeCourts exerciseofthepower ofsupervision?[25]
As is oftenthecase,thequestionhereis whether theprosecutionevidenceis sufficienttoprove

beyondreasonabledoubtpetitioners guilt.Ingeneral,weadheretotheprinciplethatthe
assessmentmadeby thetrialjudgeofthecredibility ofwitnesses willnotbedisturbedonappeal.
[26]Havingheardthetestimony ofthewitnesses andobservedtheir demeanor onthewitness
stand,thejudgeis inabetter positiontodeterminetheissueofcredibility.[27]However,where
thereis ashowingthatsomefacts or circumstances ofweightandsubstancewhichwouldhave
affectedtheresultofthecasehavebeenoverlooked,misunderstoodor misapplied,wewillnot
hesitatetomakeour ownevaluationoftheevidence.[28]Suchis thecasehere.
First.Thetrialcourts decision,for allits length- 23pages - contains noanalysis oftheevidenceof

theparties nor referencetoany legalbasis inreachingits conclusion.Itcontains nothingmorethan
asummary ofthetestimonies ofthewitnesses ofbothparties.Theonly discussionoftheevidence
is befoundinthefollowingparagraphs:
Their testimony convincedtheCourt.Ontheother hand,accuseds evidencebears theindiciaof

fabrication.Defensewitnesses from their demeanor,manner oftestifyingandevasiveanswers
werefar from credible.
From theevidenceonrecord,theCourtbelieves andsoholdthattheprosecutionhas satisfactorily

provedtheaccused[guilty]beyondreasonabledoubt.Prosecutions witnesses testifiedina
straightforwardmanner.
Consideringthecircumstances immediately prior tothecommissionofthecrime,andthemanner

thesamewas committed,theCourtbelieves thattheaggravatingcircumstances ofevidence
premeditationandabuseofsuperior strength,as wellas availmentofmeans topreventthe
deceasedfrom defendinghimselfweresufficiently established.Theseverality,locationand
severity oftheinjuries inflictedas wellas their nature,provedthatthereweremorethanone
assailants.Murder shouldhavebeentheproper offensecharged.However,wecanonly convict
theaccusedfor homicide.[29]
Thedecisiondoes notindicatewhatthetrialcourtfoundinthetestimonies oftheprosecution

witnesses toconsider thesame"straightforward" when,as willpresently beshown,they areinfact
contradictory andconfused.Nor does thedecisioncontainany justificationfor theappreciationof
aggravatingcircumstances againsttheaccused,muchless somebasis for findingconspiracy
amongthem.
Inviewoftheweightgiventoits assessmentofawitness credibility onappeal,thetrialcourt

shouldexertefforttoensurethatits decisions presentacomprehensiveanalysis or accountofthe
factualandlegalfindings whichwouldsubstantially address theissues raisedby theparties.
Art.VIII,14oftheConstitutionprovides:
Nodecisionshallberenderedby any courtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly anddistinctly the

facts andthelawonwhichitis based.
Nopetitionfor reviewor motionfor reconsiderationofdecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue

courseor deniedwithoutstatingthebasis therefor.
Inthesamevein,Rule120,2oftheRules ofCriminalProcedureprovides:
Form andcontents ofjudgments.-- Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,

judgmentis based.

commissionthereof,ifthereareany;(b) theparticipationoftheaccusedinthecommissionofthe
theaccusedby theoffendedparty,ifthereis any,unless theenforcementofthecivilliability by a

theoffendedparty.
Thedecisionfails tocomply withtheseconstitutionalandstatutory requirements.As wesaidinour

decisioninPeoplev.Bugarin:[30]

them appeals,hecanpointouttotheappellatecourtthefindingoffacts or therulings onpoints of
Second.TheCourtofAppeals sustainedpetitioners convictiononthestrengthofthetestimonies

givenby Remedios andMerdelynSunido.Noindependentevidence,however,incriminating
petitioner onthedeathofArsenioSunidohas beenpresentedby theprosecution.Althoughthey
claimedthatpetitioner heldthevictims righthandwhileArseniostabbedhim,their testimony
shouldhavebeengiventhestrictestscrutiny inviewofthefactthatRemedios andMerdelyn
Sunidoarethewifeanddaughter,respectively,ofthevictim.[31]
Infact,MerdelynSunidogavecontradictory accounts ofhowher father was stabbedby Arsenio

whilepetitioner allegedly heldthevictim.Thesecontradictions raisedoubts onwhether shereally
witnessedtheincidentandonthepartallegedly playedby petitioner.Morespecifically,the
contradictions andinconsistencies relatetothefollowingquestions:DidArseniogotothevictims
houseinthemorningofMay 21,1992?Didthevictim provokehis brother Arseniointoaquarrel?
Was thereor was therenotaquarrel?Whenwas thevictim attackedby Arsenioandthelatters
companions,whichallegedly includedpetitioner,whileallegedly takingJerry Escobar tohis house
or after hehaddonesoandthevictim was returningtohis house?After theincident,whatvehicle
didtheassailantusewhilefleeing,Arsenios Tamarawvehicleor atricycle?
Inher affidavitbeforetheBuguey policewhichformedher directexamination,Merdelynstated:
Q04- Why didyour uncleArsenioSunido,stabyour father?
A- Beforetheincidentmy uncleArsenioSunido,cametoour houseandforcibly took therooster

(fightingcock) insideour poultry andtherewhenmy father AngelSunidoarrivedmy mother told
him thathis rooster place[d]insideour poultry was takenby his brother Arsenio,soonMay 21,
1992,my father anduncleArsenioandsomevisitors havedrinkingsessionatour residenceand
therenotlongafter,my father inquiremy uncleregardingtherooster whichwas takenby my uncle
whichbeguntheir quarrelandafter thedrinkingspree,my father accompaniedhis friendJerry
Escobar tohis houseandwhenmy father returnthatwas thetimewhenwhen(sic) Melencio
Madridandonecompanionholdmy father whileuncleArsenioSunidostabbedseveraltimes that
causes his deathalongtheroadnear thehouseofmy uncle.[32]
However,Merdelynalsotestifiedandher testimony is shotthroughandthroughwithcontradictions

andinconsistencies,as thefollowingportions ofthetranscriptofstenographic notes show:
Q:Letus makeitclear,yousaidthatyour father accompaniedJerry Escobar totheir house,in
whosehousedidyour father camefrom?
A:From our house,sir.
Q:Now,whenyour father accompaniedJerry Escobar totheir house,whathappenednext?
A:Hewas metby MelecioMadrid,acompanion.
Q:Andyousaidthey metyour father,whatdidtheseMelecioMadridandacompaniondo?
A:They heldmy father,sir.
Q:Howdidthey holdyour father?
A:Witness raisedher botharms.
Q:Now,yousaidthese2persons namingMelecioMadridandacompanionheldthehands ofyour

father,whathandwhenthis MelMadridheld?
A:Lefthand,sir.
Q:Whathandalsodidthe[companion]ofMelecioMadridhold?
A:Righthand,sir.
Q:Whenthese2persons MelecioMadridandacompanionheldthehands ofyour father upward,

whathappenednext?
A:My unclestabbedmy father,sir.
Q:Was your father hit?
A:Yes,sir.[33]
Butwhenoncross-examination,Merdelyntestified:
Q:Yousaidawhileagothatwhileyour father [was]accompanyingGerry Escobar ingoinghome,

twopersons onewas MelecioMadridandunidentifiedpersonaccostedyour father,am Icorrect?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Thatwas thetimewhenthey werestillgoingtothehouseofGerry Escobar as allegedby youa

whileago,am Icorrect?
A:No,sir.
....
Q:Didyouever seeyour uncleArsenioSunidobetween7:00oclock inthemorningand

immediately beforetheallegedstabbingincident?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Wherewas your uncleatthetimewhenyousawhim?

A:Outsidetheir house.
Q:Didyour father doanythingwhenyousawyour uncleArsenioSunido?
A:Therewas,sir.
Q:Whatdidyour father do?
A:Heinquiredaboutalostchicken.
Q:Then,whatdidyour father doafter askingArsenioSunidoaboutalostrooster?
A:Nothing.
....
Q:Hedidnotevenprovokehis brother ArsenioSunido?
A:Hedidnotsir,heonly inquiredalostchicken.
Q:Youwanttoimpress theCourtthatyour father didnotprovokeArsenioSunido,is thatwhatyou

mean?
A:Yes,sir.[34]
Onwhether Arseniowenttothevictims houseinthemorningofMay 21,1992andthebrothers

hadanaltercation,Merdelynmadestatements evenmoreirreconcilablefrom theprevious ones
shemade,manifestingatendency toimproviseandembellishher story whenconfrontedwithher
inconsistencies.Toquote:
Q:Consideringthatyouinsistthatyour uncleArsenioSunidowas presentinyour houseinthat

morningofMay 21,1992,as appearinginyour affidavitandyoualsoinsistduringthedirectand
cross-examinationthatyour uncleArsenioSunidowas nottherepresent,whichis correctnow,
your statementinyour affidavitor your statementinthedirect-examinationandinthecross-
examination?
A:My statementintheaffidavit,sir.
Q:Sowhatis correctthenwas theoneincorporatedintheaffidavitandyouconfirmedthatthe

brothers ArsenioSunidoandyour father quarrelledeachother?
A:Hejustinformedhim something,sir.
....
COURT:
Q:Didthey quarrel?
A:No,sir.
ATTY.BULSECO:
Q:Soyouareagainchangingyour answer inyour affidavitparticularly as appearinginparagraph

8 thatyour unclequarrelledwithyour father?
A:No,sir.
Q:Whichis correctthen,they quarreledor they didnotquarrel?
A:They quarrelled,sir.
Q:Howlongdidyour father andyour unclequarreleachother?
A:Alongwhile,sir.
Q:YousaidthatGerry Escobar andoneRudy stayedinyour housefrom 6:00oclock inthe

morningupto11:00oclock onMay 21,1992,butthey only starteddrinkingat11:00oclock inthe
morningis thatcorrect?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Andfrom thatperiodoftime,was your unclepresent?
A:Hewas nottherepresent,sir.[35]
Thus,inher affidavitdatedJune2,1992,[36]Merdelyntestifiedthather uncle,ArsenioSunido,

joinedAngelSunido,Jerry Escobar andacertainRudy indrinkingliquor atAngels house.But,
severaltimes duringher cross-examination,Merdelyntestifiedthather unclewas notpresent
duringher fathers drinkingsessionwithhis friends.[37]Whenconfrontedwiththediscrepancy in
her affidavitandher testimony,Merdelynansweredthather statementinher affidavitwas thetruth,
thather unclewas indeedintheir houseinthemorningofMay 21,1992,[38]only todeny later that
her unclewas intheir housefrom six oclock to11oclock inthemorning.[39]Thatwas nottheend
ofher answer tothequestion.Inthenextbreath,Merdelynassertedher unclewas presentatthe
drinkingsession,althoughhestayedfor ashortwhileonly ataround10:30inthemorningofthat
date.[40]
Merdelynshowedthesametendency tovacillatebetweentwocontradictory statements with

regardtothequarrelwhicharosebetweenher father andher uncle.Inher affidavit,Merdelyn
statedthatduringthedrinkingsession,her father inquiredabouttherooster whichArseniohad
taken,thus provokingaquarrelbetweenthetwobrothers.[41]Butwhenaskedlater whether her
father andunclehadanaltercationover thesamesubjectmatter,Merdelyndeniedthatthey had.
Whenaskedagainwhether her father andunclequarrelled,Merdelynlater repliedthatthey,infact,
quarrelledfor alongwhile.[42]
Eventhevehicleallegedly usedby ArsenioSunidoandpetitioner infleeingfrom thesceneofthe

crimeis uncertain.Merdelynnarratedinher affidavitthatafter theincident,petitioner took atricycle
toescape.[43]However,nowhereinher testimony didshementionthetricycle.Instead,shesaid
shesawpetitioners Tamarawjeepney parkedinfrontofArsenios house.[44]Consideringthat
Merdelyntestifiedthatshewas only fivemeters away from theplacewhereher father was
allegedly stabbed,[45]shecouldnothavefailedtonoticethatpetitioner alightedfrom ajeepney.
Evenmoretellingis theinconsistency inMerdelyns testimony whenArsenioSunido,allegedly with

theassistanceofpetitioner andanother companion,attackedAngel.Inher affidavit,Merdelyn
narratedthather father was attackedwhilereturningtotheir houseafter accompanyingJerry
Escobar home.[46]However,onthestand,Merdelynchangedher story andtestifiedthatitwas on
theway toJerry Escobars housethather father was assaulted.[47]Severaltimes moreafter this in
her testimony,Merdelynvacillatedas totheactualtimeher father was attacked,whether beforeor
after Angelallegedly broughtJerry Escobar home.[48]
Inconsistencies onnegligibledetails donotdestroy thetruthofawitness testimony,solongas they

refer only tocollateralor incidentalmatters.Butby nomeans cantheinconsistencies and
contradictions inMerdelyns testimony becharacterizedas trivialor insignificant.Her propensity to
makecontradictory statements reflects her ownuncertainty as totheactualevents leadingtoher
fathers death.Itis clear thatshespeaks notfrom memory or experience.Shecannotevengivea
definitechronology oftheevents thattranspiredbeforeher father was killed.Weareconvinced
thatshewas simply fashioningher story andmakingspur-of-the-momentimprovisations inan
attempttorender her testimony credible.Insteadofsodoing,sheexhibitedadispositionto
fabricatethatmakes her testimony unworthy ofbeliefandcredence.
Wehaveheldthatswornstatements executedbeforepoliceofficers areusually incompleteand,

therefore,contradictions intheswornstatementofawitness andher testimony arefrequently
brushedasideas inconsequentialsolongas they refer tominor andreconcilablematters.Butthis
ruledoes notapply whenthediscrepancies touchonsubstantialmatters as inthecaseatbar.[49]
Further erodingMerdelyns testimony is her recitalofpetitioners participationinthekillingofher

father.Sheclaimedthatpetitioner andanother personheldthevictim by raisinghis arms,with
petitioner holdingtherighthandwhilehis companionheldthelefthandofthevictim.[50]Petitioner
is anoldman,almost64years old.[51]Ittaxes ones credulity tobetoldthatpetitioner couldhold
themuchyounger victim sothatthelatter couldbemoreeasily attackedby Arsenio.Itis
noteworthy thatnoattemptwas evenmadetoidentify thethirdpersonwhoallegedly heldtheother
arm ofthevictim tofacilitatetheattack by Arsenio.Merdelyndidnotevendescribehis appearance.
Indeed,theinformation[52]only mentions ArsenioSunidoandEligioMadridas havingconspiredto
killAngelSunido.Nomentionwas madeofthis mysterious man,evenas aJohnDoe,leadingus to
think thatheexists only as afigmentofMerdelynandRemedios Sunidos imagination.
Evidence,tobebelieved,mustnotonly proceedfrom themouthofatrustworthy witness butmust

likewisebecredibleinitself.Whilethereis nohardandfastruletodeterminethetruthfulness of
ones testimony,thatwhichconforms,however,tothequotidianknowledge,observationand
experienceofmanis oftendeemedtobereliable.[53]
Nor canthetestimony ofRemedios Sunidobegivencredenceany morethanMerdelyns testimony

canbebelieved.Inlieuofdirectexaminationincourt,theprosecutionpresentedtheaffidavitwhich
Remedios executedbeforethepoliceonJune1,1992.[54]Insaidaffidavit,Remedios stated:
Q- Why saidArsenio[Sunido],your brother in-lawstabhis brother,your husbandwhichcausedhis

death?
A- They haveamisunderstandinginconnectionwithachickenonly.
Q- Whenandwherethis incidenthappened?
A- OnMay 21,1992,at12:00oclock noonmoreor less atBrgy.Maddalero,Buguey,Cagayan

particularly attheroadeastofour house.
Q- Willyounarrateinbrief[surrounding]circumstances howtheincidenthappened?
A- Thatprior totheincident,my husbandandhis brother Arsenio[Sunido]haveaquarrel

regardingtothechickenwhichweplacedinsideour poultry,becausemy brother in-lawArsenio
[Sunido]claimedtobetheowner,however,onthatday they juststop[their]quarrel,butonMay 21,
1992,wehaveavisitor andhaveadrinkingspreeandthereafter my husbandAngel[Sunido]is
under the[influence]ofliquor hemadeprovocationtohis brother Arsenio[Sunido]andtherethey
begun[their]quarrel.
Q- After thatwhathappenednextifany?
A- After they havefinishedtheir drinkingspreewith[our]visitor hewentandaccompaniedhim in

their [residence]andtherewhenmy husbandcameback thatwas thetimethatmy brother in-law
Arsenio[Sunido]together withhis companiontook holdandstabmy husbandseveraltimes
causinghis death.
Q- DoyouknowthecompanionofArsenio[Sunido]atthattime?
A- Oneonly ofthem whom Iknowhis nameMELENCIOMADRIDwhiletheother Idontknowhis

name,butthey arebothresident[s]ofCasiitan,Gonzaga,Cagayan.
Q- Whatwas theparticipationofthecompanionofArsenio[Sunido]atthattime?
A- They took holdofmy husbandwhereArsenio[Sunido]stabmy husbandseveraltimes,onthe

differentparts ofhis body.
Q- After thatwhathappenednextifany?
A- Isawhim rideonthe[tricycle]ofMelecioMadridandthey wentaway.[55]
Butduringher cross-examination,Remedios Sunidotestifiedas follows:
....
ATTY.BULSECO:
Q:Yousaidinyour affidavitthatonMay 21,1992,your husbandandvisitor haveadrinkingspree,

andyousaidthatArsenioSunidowas notthere,howdidheprovokeAngelSunido?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Andyoualsosaidthatthey beguntheir quarrelthere,is thatcorrect?
A:Yes,sir.
COURT:
Q:Whendidyour husbandprovokeyour brother-in-law?
A:Itwas May,sir.
Q: What date?
A:May 22,sir.
Q:Areyousurethatyour husbandwas stabbedonMay 21,1992inwhatoccasion?
A:Therewas nooccasion,sir.
Q:Is itnotafactthatatthetimeofthedrinkingspreeyour husbandprovokedyour brother-in-law?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Therefore,your brother-in-lawwas alsopresentinthedrinkingspree?
A:No,sir.Hewas intheir househedidnotparticipateinthedrinkingspree.
Q:Inwhatparticular placedidyour husbandprovokeyour brother-in-law?

A:Inour backyard,sir.
Q:Andthis was after thedrinkingsession?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Why your husbandprovokedyour brother-in-law?
A:Becauseofthechicken,sir.
Q:Whenyour husbandprovokedyour brother-in-law,wereyour visitors stillaround?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Whowas thatvisitor?
A:Cousin,sir.
Q:Whatis thename?
A:Jerry Escobar andonecompanion,sir.
....
ATTY.BULSECO:
Q:Youstatedinyour affidavit,thatoneoftheaccusedEligioMadridallegedly heldyour husband

whentheaccusedArsenioSunidostabbedyour husband,is itnotafactthatimmediately prior to
thestabbingincident,yousawMelencioMadridandArsenioSunidoinsideatamaraojeepney?
A:No,sir.
Q:Howfar wereyouwhenyousawEulogioMadridheldyour husbandandArsenioSunido

allegedly stabbedyour husband?
A:7to10meters away,sir.
Q:Andyouwerebesideyour houseatthattime,is itnot?
A:No,sir.
Q:WillyoupleasetelltheHonorableCourtthenwherewas theaccusedallegedly camefrom

beforethestabbingincident?
A:From their house,sir.
Q:For howlongatimedidyoulearnthatyour latehusbandprovokedArsenioSunido?
A:Ididnotwitness,sir.[56]
Whenfurther questionedduringher re-directexamination,Remedios Sunidorelated:
FISCALMIGUEL:
Q:Inyour answer toquestionNo.8,thattherewas aquarrelbetweenyour husbandandyour

brother-in-lawregardingwithachicken,whenwas thequarrelstarted?
A:May 21,1992,sir.
Q:Whattime?
A:Icannotremember,sir.
Q:Was itbeforeyour husbandstarteddrinkingor after?
A:After,sir.
Q:Howmany times didyour husbandprovokeyour brother-in-law?
A:Only once,sir.
Q:Yousaidthatthequarrelstartedinconnectionwithachicken,whatwas thechickenallabout
thatstartthequarrel?
A:My brother-in-lawclaimedthatthechickenwas his own,sir.
QAndwhenyour brother-in-lawclaimedthatthechickenwas his own,whatdidyour husbandtell

him if[you]know?
A:Hetoldmewhy hetook his chicken,sir.
Q:Andthis confrontationbetweenyour husbandandyour brother-in-lawwas inMa[y]21,1992?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Andthis startedwhatyoucalledtheprovocationinthepartofyour husband?
A:Itwas notaprovocation,sir.
Q:Whatdoyoumeanthen?
A:Heinsistedclaimingthechicken,sir.
COURT:
Q:Whoinsisted?
A:My husband,sir.[57]
As canbeseen,Remedios Sunidos testimony,likethatofher daughter Merdelyn,is repletewith

inconsistencies andcontradictions thatrender its veracity doubtful.Her answers oftentimes arenot
responsivetothequestions propoundedtoher.Sheevencommittedamistakeas tothedatewhen
theprovocationwas madeby her husband,statingadatewhichis aday after hedied.
Moreover,inher affidavit,shestatedthatpetitioner took atricycleinescapingafter theincident.

But,as statedearlier,ithas already beenproventhatpetitioner usedaTamarawjeepney for
transportation.ConsideringthatRemedios testifiedthatshewas only sevento10meters away
from theplacewhereher husbandwas attacked,shecouldnothavefailedtonoticewhattypeof
vehiclepetitioner was usingifsheactually witnessedtheevent.Remedios dubious narrativeofher
husbands killingfails toconvinceus.Thetenor ofher testimony suggests thatitis basednoton
whatsheremembers butmoreonwhatsheimagines tohaveoccurredatthetimeher husband
was killed.InPeoplev.Lucero,weheldthattheunnaturalandcontradictory testimony ofa
witness,coupledwithsubstantialdiscrepancies betweenhis testimony andhis swornstatement,
makes him unreliableas awitness.[58]
Likewise,theconsiderablelengthoftimewhichlapsedbeforeMerdelynandRemedios Sunido
madetheir statements beforethepoliceputs intoquestiontheclaim thatthey actually witnessed
thekillingofAngelSunido.Itis truethatdelay inreportingacrime,ifadequately explained,is not
sufficienttocastdoubtonthetruthfulness ofawitness testimony as,for instance,thedelay may be
explainedby thenaturalreticenceofmostpeopleandtheir abhorrencetogetinvolvedinacriminal
case.[59]
Buttheeyewitnesses involvedinthis casearethewifeanddaughter ofthevictim.Onewould

naturally expectthatthey wouldnotbeanxious tohelpthepolicearrestthepersonor persons
responsiblefor thekillingoftheir lovedone.Insteadofdoingso,however,Remedios andMerdelyn
Sunidoonly madetheir statements tothepoliceonJune1,1992[60]andJune2,1992,[61]
respectively,morethanoneweek after theincidentthey allegedly witnessed.This factis made
evenmorestrangeby thestatements ofRemedios andMerdelynSunidothatnotlongafter the
incident,Barangay CouncilmanAmor delos Santos arrivedfollowedby members oftheBuguey
Police.[62]Inasimilar casewhereadaughter delayedinreportingtotheproper authorities who
was responsiblefor her fathers death,theCourtheld:
. . . Shehadavery early opportunity todosobecausethepoliceofficers ofthetownwerethereat

thesceneofthecrime,whereshewas also,justtwohours after her father was shotandkilled.The
mostnaturalreactionofawitness tosuchanincident,indeedares gestae,wouldhavebeentotell
her mother aboutit,andsubsequently thepoliceauthorities,whohad,as earlier advertedto,
respondedtothesummons for helptwohours after thereportedmurder.Humannaturewould
havecompelledher todeclarethatshehadseen,andinfact,couldidentify,theassailantofher
father.Butshewithheldthatvitalinformationfrom everybody for anunreasonablelengthoftime(at
leastfour days after thecommissionofthecrime,by her ownstatement),whichmakes her
testimony suspect.Teresitas testimony smacks offabricationand,therefore,cannotsupporta
conviction.[63]
Thetestimonies ofMerdelynandRemedios Sunidodonotprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthat

petitioner participatedinthekillingofAngelSunido.Wecannotacceptsuchtestimonies as
establishingtheguiltofpetitioner.As wesaidinPeoplev.Comesario:[64]
. . . Anaccusedenjoys thepresumptionofinnocence.Heneednotprovewhatis legally presumed.

Ifhesodesires hemay presentevidenceonhis behalf,butnomatter howweak itis,hestill
deserves anacquittal.This is becausetheprosecutionmustnotrely ontheweakness ofthe
evidencefor thedefensebutonthestrengthofits ownevidence.Unless theprosecutionhas
overturnedthepresumptionofinnocence,acquittalis inevitable.
Indeed,ArsenioSunidoadmittedthathewas solely responsiblefor thedeathofhis brother Angel

Sunido.Thus,hetestified:
Q:WhattimedidyouarriveinMaddaleroparticularly onMay 21,1992?
A:Between11:00oclock to12:00oclock.
Q:Whatunusualincidentifany thattranspiredjustimmediately after youarrivedatMaddalero,

Buguey,Cagayanbetween11:00to12:00ofMay 21,1992?
A:Atthattimewearrivedtheplace,wenoticedthedeceasedalready provoking.
Q:Towhom was heprovoking?
A:Anybody thatpasses-by atthattime.

Q:Andwhenyounoticedthathewas provokinganybody thatpasses-by,whathappened?
A:Becausehewas very near wherewewere,hemetus withtheintentionofstabbingus withhis

knife.
Q:Weretherepersons presentwhenheattemptedtostabyou?
A:Therewereother peoplesir,oneis Jerry Escobar whowas withhim indrinking.
Q:CanyoutelltheCourttheidentity or names oftheother persons presentwhenthedeceased

attemptedtostabyou?
A:Icannamesomeofthem,sir.
Q:Canyounametothis HonorableCourt?
A:Rudy whois from Ilocos;Gerry Escobar;Icannotidentify theothers.
Q:Howfar wereyouinrelationtoAngelSunidoatthefirsttimeheattemptedtostabyou?
A:Four (4) meters away from me,sir.
Q:YousaidyoudrovetheTamarawjeepney,wheredidyoupark theTamarawjeepney inrelation

tothehouseofAngelSunido?
A:Near my yard,sir.
Q:Andhowfar thatpassenger jeepney inrelationtoyouwhenAngelSunidoattemptedtoinflict

injuries toyou?
A:Aroundfive(5) meters only.
Q:Andwhatdidyoudowhenheattemptedtostabyou?
A:Bothofus withEligioMadridalightedfrom theTamaraw.
COURT:
Q:Whatdidhethreatenyouwith?
A:"Immuco" knifewith8inches moreor less long.
....
Q:Youdemonstratehowhethreatenedyouwiththatknife?
A:Witness demonstratedrushingtowards me(CourtInterpreter) saying"Iwillkillyounow"

patayenkatatta,withtheknifeswininginanupwardmotion(Witness assumingthatheis Angel
Sunido).Andwiththeknifewithhis righthandindownwardmotiondirectedtowards me(Court
Interpreter).
APPMIGUEL:
Q:Howfar didthedeceasedreachyou?
A:Abouttwo(2) meters.
Q:Now,whenhereachedtwometers away from you,yousaidyoualightedfrom theTamaraw

jeepney,is thatright?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Youalightedtowards him or away from him?
A:WhenIalightedfrom theTamarawjeepney Imovedback.
Q:Does theTamarawjeepney haveadoor?
A:Its anopendoor.
Q:Youjumpedusingthatopendoor whilestoppeddriving?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Andnecessarily your movementwas towards thedeceasedor whenyoualightedfrom the

Tamarawjeepney your directionwas towards thedeceased?
A:Yes,sir,Ihavenoother choice.
....
COURT:
Cross-examination?
....
ATTY.BULSECO,JR.:
Q:Atthatprecisemoment,whenyoualightedfrom theTamarawjeepney wherewas EligioMadrid

seated?
A:Attherightside.
Q:Youwanttoimpress theCourt,beforehealightedhewas seatedrightbesideyou,is thatright?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Whathappenedafter youalighted?
A:IdidnotseeMr.EligioMadridbecauseheranaway.
Q:My pointis,yousaidthatyoualightedfrom theTamarawjeepney whenthedeceasedwas going

towards youwithaknife,after alightingfrom thatTamarawjeepney,whathappenednext?
A:WhenIwas retreatingIkeptmy watchonhim.
COURT:
Q:Youretreatedtowards theTamarawjeepney,is thatright?

A:Yes becauseIwas encircledandafter thatI[slipped]andfell.
Q:Andafter youfelldownfacingupward,whathappenednext?
A:WhenIfell,Ikeptonanticipatingwhatmovewouldhedonextandthatwas thetimeIwas able

to[grab]him,sir.
Q:Was hedr[u]nk atthattime?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Now,whenyouwereanticipatingtheattempt,whathappenednext?
A:After wrestedpossessionoftheknifefrom him,Ilostmy cool.Ihaveamentalblock-outand

stabbedhim.
Q:Howmany times didyoustabhim?
A:Icannotrecallanymore.
Q:Now,whenyoufirststabbedhim,was heontopofyouor youwereontopofhim?
A:Hewas ontop,sir.
Q:Andhewas very drunk?
A:Thats whatInoticed,sir.
Q:Didyounotpushhim whenyouwereabletowrestlepossessionoftheknife?
A:Ididnotknowhowmany times Istabbedhim becauseIhaveamentalblock out.
....
COURT:
Q:Now,wereyoulyingdownatalltimes whenyoukeptonstabbingyour brother?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Therewas never anytimethatyouwerestanding?
A:None.WhenIgotback my senses Idroppedtheknife.
Q:My questionis,inallthesenine(9) stabwounds thatyouinflicted,was thereany timethatyou

werestanding?
A:NonethatIknow,ofthesewhereIstabbedmy brother whileinstandingposition.
ATTY.BULSECO,JR.:
Q:Andafter recoveringyour senses,whatdidyoudoifany?
A:After stabbingmy brother Iwantedtoembracehim for thereasonthatIdidnotreally intendto

killhim.
Q:Andwhathappenednext?
A:After droppingtheknifeIimmediately surrenderedmyselftoVice-Mayor AlipioValdez.
COURT:
Q:Onthatsamedate?
A:Yes,sir.[65]
ArsenioSunidos testimony is credible.Therewas animosity betweenhim andthedeceased

concerningtheloss ofafightingcock.Thedeceasedprovokedhim andhereactedby stabbingthe
victim.Thequarrelwas thus betweenbrothers.Thereis nothingintherecordtosuggestthat
petitioner hadany partinthatquarrel.Hewas Arsenios employer.Hehadnoreasontofeel
aggrievedby theloss ofthefightingcock.Andif,as theprosecutiontriedtoprove,Arseniohad
merely beenprovokedby thedeceasedwhowas thendrunk,howcouldArsenioandpetitioner
haveconspiredtocommitthecrime?Thefactis thatpetitioner andArseniohappenedtodropby
Angels housebecausethey werebuyingpalay tomill.Petitioner was theowner ofthreericemills,
andArseniowas themanager ofoneofthericemills.Whatever business ties existedbetween
Arsenioandpetitioner havenobearingonthefightbetweenthebrothers AngelandArsenio.Not
havingparticipatedinany manner inthefightbetweenthebrothers,petitioner cannotbeheld
responsiblefor Angels death.
WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals is hereby REVERSEDandpetitioner is hereby

ACQUITTEDofthecrimeofhomicide.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,(Chairman),andBuena,JJ.,concur.
Quisumbing,andDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,onleave.
FIRSTDIVISION
[G.R.No.113006.November 23,2000]
ONGCHIUKWAN,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS,andthePEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.
DE CIS ION
PARDO,J.:
Whatis beforetheCourtfor considerationis thedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals affirmingthe

convictionofaccusedOngChiuKwan,for unjustvexation.[1]
OnJanuary 31,1991,AssistantCity Prosecutor Andres M.BayonaofBacolodfiledwiththe

MunicipalTrialCourt,BacolodCity aninformationchargingpetitioner withunjustvexationfor
cuttingtheelectric wires,water pipes andtelephonelines ofCrazy Feet,abusiness establishment
ownedandoperatedby MildredOng.[2]
OnApril24,1990,ataround10:00inthemorning,OngChiuKwanorderedWilfredoInfanteto
relocatethetelephone,electric andwater lines ofCrazy Feet,becausesaidlines posedas a
disturbance.[3]However,OngChiuKwanfailedtopresentapermitfrom appropriateauthorities
allowinghim tocuttheelectric wires,water pipeandtelephonelines ofthebusiness establishment.
[4]
After duetrial,onSeptember 1,1992,theMunicipalTrialCourtfoundOngChiuKwanguilty of

unjustvexation,[5]andsentencedhim toimprisonmentfor twenty days.[6]Thecourtalsoordered
him topay moraldamages,findingthatthewrongfulactofabruptly cuttingofftheelectric,water
pipeandtelephonelines ofCrazy Feetcausedtheinterruptionofits business operations during
peak hours,tothedetrimentofits owner,MildredOng.Thetrialcourtalsoawardedexemplary
damages tocomplainantas adeterrenttotheaccusednottofollowsimilar actinthefutureandto
pay attorneys fees.[7]Thetrialcourtdisposedofthecaseas follows:
INVIEWTHEREOF,this Courtfinds theaccusedguilty beyondreasonabledoubtoftheoffenseof

unjustvexationprovidedunder Article287par.2oftheRevisedPenalCodeandsentences him to
suffer apenalty ofimprisonmentoftwenty (20) days andtopay privatecomplainantthefollowing:
P10,000.00- moraldamages
P5,000.00- exemplary damages
P5,000.00- attorneys fees andtopay thecostofthis suit.
SOORDERED.
BacolodCity,Philippines,September 1,1992.
(SGD.)RAFAELO.PENUELA
Judge[8]
OnappealtotheRegionalTrialCourt,BacolodCity,thelatter courtinadecisiondatedDecember
8,1992,simplistically adoptedthedecisionofthelower courtintoto,withoutstatingthereasons for
doingso.[9]
OnApril22,1993,by petitionfor review,OngChiuKwanelevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals.

[10]OnAugust16,1993,theCourtofAppeals promulgatedits decisiondismissingtheappeal,[11]
agreeingwiththelower courts findingthatpetitioner was guilty beyondreasonabledoubtofunjust
vexation.
Hence,this petitionfor review.[12]
TheCourtnotes thatinthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtwhichtheCourtofAppeals affirmed

peremptorily withoutnoticingits nullity,theRegionalTrialCourtmerely quotedthedecisionofthe
MunicipalTrialCourtinfullandaddedtwoparagraphs,thus:
This Court,inaccordancewiththerules,requiredtheparties tosubmittheir corresponding

memorandum or brief.Theprosecutionfiledits memorandum,andalsowiththedefense.
After acarefulperusaloftherecordofthecaseandevaluatingtheevidencetheretoandexhibits
thereof,this Courtfinds nogroundtomodify,reverseor alter theabove-stateddecisionandhereby
affirms thedecisionofthelower courtintoto.[13]
TheConstitutionrequires that[N]odecisionshallberenderedby any courtwithoutexpressing

thereinclearly anddistinctly thefacts andthelawonwhichitis based.[14]The1985Rules of
CriminalProcedure,as amended,provides that[T]hejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficial
language,personally anddirectly preparedby thejudgeandsignedby him andshallcontain
clearly anddistinctly astatementofthefacts provedor admittedby theaccusedandthelawupon
whichthejudgmentis based.[15]
Althoughamemorandum decisionis permittedunder certainconditions,itcannotmerely refer to

thefindings offactandtheconclusions oflawofthelower court.Thecourtmustmakeafull
findings offactandconclusions oflawofits own.[16]
Consequently,thedecisionoftheregionaltrialcourtis anullity.Very recently,speakingofa

similarly wordeddecisionofaregionaltrialcourt,wesaid:
[I]tis starkly hallow,otiosely written,vacuous inits contentandtriteinits form.Itachievednothing

andattemptedatnothing,notevenatasimplesummationoffacts whichcouldeasily bedone.Its
inadequacy speaks for itself.[17]
Judges similarly disposedtopay lipservicetotheir work mustrethink their placeinthejudiciary or

seriously takerefresher courses ondecisionwriting.Wewarnthem ofstiffsanctions for such
lackadaisicalperformance.
Consequently,thecasemay beremandedtothelower courtfor compliancewiththeconstitutional

requirementofcontents ofadecision.However,consideringthatthis casehas beenpendingfor
sometime,theends ofjusticewillbefully servedifwereviewtheevidenceanddecidethecase.
Petitioner admittedhavingorderedthecuttingoftheelectric,water andtelephonelines of

complainants business establishmentbecausetheselines crossedhis property line.Hefailed,
however,toshowevidencethathehadthenecessary permitor authorizationtorelocatethelines.
Also,hetimedtheinterruptionofelectric,water andtelephoneservices duringpeak hours ofthe
operationofbusiness ofthecomplainant.Thus,petitioners actunjustly annoyedor vexedthe
complainant.Consequently,petitioner OngChiuKwanis liablefor unjustvexation.
Regardingdamages,wefindtheawardofmoralandexemplary damages andattorneys fees tobe

withoutbasis.Moraldamages may berecoveredifthey weretheproximateresultofdefendants
wrongfulactor omission.[18]Anawardofexemplary damages is justifiedifthecrimewas
committedwithoneor moreaggravatingcircumstances.[19]Thereis noevidencetosupportsuch
award.Hence,wedeletetheawardofmoraldamages,exemplary damages,andattorneys fees.
WHEREFORE,thedecisions ofthelower courts areREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Inlieuthereof,

accusedOngChiuKwanis hereby sentencedtopay afineofP200.00,andthecosts.Theaward
ofmoralandexemplary damages andattorneys fees is hereby deleted.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Puno,Kapunan,andYnares-Santiago,JJ.,concur.
SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.151931.September 23,2003]
ANAMERSALAZAR,petitioner,vs.THE PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES andJ.Y.BROTHERS

MARKETINGCORPORATION,respondents.
DE CIS ION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
This is apetitionfor reviewoncertiorariunder Rule45ofthe1997Rules ofCriminalProcedureof

theOrder[1]oftheRegionalTrialCourt,5thJudicialRegion,LegazpiCity,Branch5,[2]dated
November 19,2001,andits Order[3]datedJanuary 14,2002denyingthemotionfor
reconsiderationofthedecisionofthesaidcourtonthecivilaspectthereofandtoallowher to
presentevidencethereon.
OnJune11,1997,anInformationfor estafawas filedagainsthereinpetitioner Anamer D.Salazar

andco-accusedNenaJaucianTimariowiththeRegionalTrialCourtofLegazpiCity,docketedas
CriminalCaseNo.7474whichreads as follows:
ThatsometimeinthemonthofOctober,1996,intheCity ofLegazpi,Philippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthis HonorableCourt,theabovenamed-accused,conspiringandconfederatingwith
eachother,withintenttodefraudby means offalsepretenses or fraudulentacts executed
simultaneously withthecommissionofthefraud,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfully and
feloniously,onthepartofaccusedNENAJAUCIANTIMARIO,drewandissue[d]PRUDENTIAL
BANK,LEGASPICITYBRANCHCHECK NO.067481,datedOctober 15,1996,intheamountof
P214,000.00infavor ofJ.Y.BROTHERS MARKETINGCORPORATION,representedby its
BranchManager,JERSONO.YAO,andaccusedANAMERD.SALAZARendorsedandnegotiated
saidcheck as paymentof300cavans ofriceobtainedfrom J.Y.BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION,knowingfully wellthatatthattimesaidcheck was issuedandendorsed,Nena
JaucianTimariodidnothavesufficientfunds inor creditwiththedraweebank tocover theamount
calledfor thereinandwithoutinformingthepayeeofsuchcircumstance;thatwhensaidcheck was
presentedtothedraweebank for payment,thesamewas consequently dishonoredandrefused
paymentfor thereasonofACCOUNTCLOSED;thatdespitedemands,accusedfailedandrefused
andstillfailandrefusetopay and/or makearrangementfor thepaymentofthesaidcheck,tothe
damageandprejudiceofsaidJ.Y.BROTHERS MARKETINGCORPORATION.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[4]
Uponarraignment,thepetitioner,assistedby counsel,enteredapleaofnotguilty.Trialthereafter
ensued.
TheEvidenceoftheProsecution
OnOctober 15,1996,petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased300cavans ofricefrom J.Y.Brothers

MarketingCorporation,throughMr.JersonYao.As paymentfor thesecavans ofrice,thepetitioner
gavetheprivatecomplainantCheck No.067481drawnagainstthePrudentialBank,LegazpiCity
Branch,datedOctober 15,1996,by oneNenaJaucianTimariointheamountofP214,000.Jerson
Yaoacceptedthecheck uponthepetitioners assurancethatitwas agoodcheck.Thecavans of
ricewerepickedupthenextday by thepetitioner.Uponpresentment,thecheck was dishonored
becauseitwas drawnunder aclosedaccount(AccountClosed).Thepetitioner was informedof
suchdishonor.ShereplacedthePrudentialBank check withCheck No.365704drawnagainstthe
SolidBank,LegazpiBranch,which,however,was returnedwiththewordDAUD(DrawnAgainst
UncollectedDeposit).
After theprosecutionrestedits case,thepetitioner filedaDemurrer toEvidencewithLeaveof

Court[5]allegingthatshecouldnotbeguilty ofthecrimeas chargedfor thefollowingreasons:(a)
shewas merely anindorser ofthecheck issuedby NenaTimario,andArticle315,paragraph2(d)
onestafapenalizes only theissuer ofthecheck andnottheindorser thereof;(b) thereis no
sufficientevidencetoprovethatthepetitioner conspiredwiththeissuer ofthecheck,NenaJaucian
Timario,inorder todefraudtheprivatecomplainant;(c) after thefirstcheck was dishonored,the
petitioner replaceditwithasecondone.Thefirsttransactionhadthereforebeeneffectively
novatedby theissuanceofthesecondcheck.Unfortunately,her personalcheck was dishonored
notfor insufficiency offunds,butfor DAUD,whichinbankingparlancemeans drawnagainst
uncollecteddeposit.Accordingtothepetitioner,this means thattheaccounthadsufficientfunds
butwas stillrestrictedbecausethedeposit,usually acheck,hadnotyetbeencleared.
Theprosecutionfiledits comment/oppositiontothepetitioners demurrer toevidence.
OnNovember 19,2001,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentacquittingthepetitioner ofthecrime

chargedbutorderingher toremittotheprivatecomplainanttheamountofthecheck as payment
for her purchase.Thetrialcourtruledthattheevidencefor theprosecutiondidnotestablishthe
existenceofconspiracy beyondreasonabledoubtbetweenthepetitioner andtheissuer ofthe
check,her co-accusedNenaJaucianTimario,for thepurposeofdefraudingtheprivate
complainant.Infact,theprivatecomplainant,JersonYao,admittedthathehadnever metNena
JaucianTimariowhoremainedatlarge.As amereindorser ofthecheck,thepetitioners breachof
thewarranty thatthecheck was agoodoneis notsynonymous withthefraudulentactoffalsely
pretendingtopossess creditunder Article315(2)(d).Thedecretalportionofthetrialcourts
judgmentreads as follows:
WHEREFORE,premises considered,theaccusedAnamer D.Salazar is hereby ACQUITTEDof

thecrimechargedbutis hereby heldliablefor thevalueofthe300bags ofrice.AccusedAnamer
D.Salazar is thereforeorderedtopay J.Y.Brothers MarketingCorporationthesum of
P214,000.00.Costs againsttheaccused.[6]
Withinthereglementary periodtherefor,thepetitioner filedamotionfor reconsiderationonthecivil

aspectofthedecisionwithapleathathebeallowedtopresentevidencepursuanttoRule33of
theRules ofCourt.OnJanuary 14,2002,thecourtissuedanorder denyingthemotion.
Inher petitionatbar,thepetitioner assails theorders ofthetrialcourtclaimingthatafter her

demurrer toevidencewas grantedby thetrialcourt,shewas denieddueprocess as shewas not
giventheopportunity toadduceevidencetoprovethatshewas notcivilly liabletotheprivate
respondent.Thepetitioner invokes theapplicability ofRule33oftheRules ofCivilProcedurein
this case,contendingthatbeforebeingadjudgedliabletotheprivateoffendedparty,sheshould
havebeenfirstaccordedtheproceduralreliefgrantedinRule33.
ThePetitionIs Meritorious
AccordingtoSection1,Rule111oftheRevisedRules ofCriminalProcedure
SECTION1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.(a) Whenacriminalactionis instituted,thecivil

actionfor therecovery ofcivilliability arisingfrom theoffensechargedshallbedeemedinstituted
withthecriminalactionunless theoffendedparty waives thecivilaction,reserves therightto
instituteitseparately or institutes thecivilactionprior tothecriminalaction.
Thereservationoftherighttoinstituteseparately thecivilactionshallbemadebeforethe
prosecutionstarts presentingits evidenceandunder circumstances affordingtheoffendedparty a
reasonableopportunity tomakesuchreservation.
Whentheoffendedparty seeks toenforcecivilliability againsttheaccusedby way ofmoral,

nominal,temperate,or exemplary damages withoutspecifyingtheamountthereofinthecomplaint
or information,thefilingfees therefor shallconstituteafirstlienonthejudgmentawardingsuch
damages.
Wheretheamountofdamages,other thanactual,is specifiedinthecomplaintor information,the
correspondingfilingfees shallbepaidby theoffendedparty uponthefilingthereofincourt.
Exceptas otherwiseprovidedintheseRules,nofilingfees shallberequiredfor actualdamages.
Nocounterclaim,cross-claim or third-party complaintmay befiledby theaccusedinthecriminal

case,butany causeofactionwhichcouldhavebeenthesubjectthereofmay belitigatedina
separatecivilaction.
(b) Thecriminalactionfor violationofBatas PambansaBlg.22shallbedeemedtoincludethe

correspondingcivilaction.Noreservationtofilesuchcivilactionseparately shallbeallowed.
Uponfilingoftheaforesaidjointcriminalandcivilactions,theoffendedparty shallpay infullthe

filingfees basedontheamountofthecheck involved,whichshallbeconsideredas theactual
damages claimed.Wherethecomplaintor informationalsoseeks torecover liquidated,moral,
nominal,temperateor exemplary damages,theoffendedparty shallpay additionalfilingfees
basedontheamounts allegedtherein.Iftheamounts arenotsoallegedbutany ofthesedamages
aresubsequently awardedby thecourt,thefilingfees basedontheamountawardedshall
constituteafirstlienonthejudgment.
Wherethecivilactionhas beenfiledseparately andtrialthereofhas notyetcommenced,itmay be

consolidatedwiththecriminalactionuponapplicationwiththecourttryingthelatter case.Ifthe
applicationis granted,thetrialofbothactions shallproceedinaccordancewithsection2ofthis
Rulegoverningconsolidationofthecivilandcriminalactions.
ThelastparagraphofSection2ofthesaidruleprovides thattheextinctionofthepenalaction
does notcarry withittheextinctionofthecivilaction.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedondelict
shallbedeemedextinguishedifthereis afindinginafinaljudgmentinthecriminalactionthatthe
actor omissionfrom whichthecivilliability may arisedidnotexist.[7]
Thecriminalactionhas adualpurpose,namely,thepunishmentoftheoffender andindemnity to

theoffendedparty.Thedominantandprimordialobjectiveofthecriminalactionis thepunishment
oftheoffender.Thecivilactionis merely incidentaltoandconsequenttotheconvictionofthe
accused.Thereasonfor this is thatcriminalactions areprimarily intendedtovindicateanoutrage
againstthesovereignty ofthestateandtoimposetheappropriatepenalty for thevindicationofthe
disturbancetothesocialorder causedby theoffender.Ontheother hand,theactionbetweenthe
privatecomplainantandtheaccusedis intendedsolely toindemnify theformer.[8]
Unless theoffendedparty waives thecivilactionor reserves therighttoinstituteitseparately or

institutes thecivilactionprior tothecriminalaction,therearetwoactions involvedinacriminal
case.Thefirstis thecriminalactionfor thepunishmentoftheoffender.Theparties arethePeople
ofthePhilippines as theplaintiffandtheaccused.Inacriminalaction,theprivatecomplainantis
merely awitness for theStateonthecriminalaspectoftheaction.Thesecondis thecivilaction
arisingfrom thedelict.Theprivatecomplainantis theplaintiffandtheaccusedis thedefendant.
Thereis amerger ofthetrialofthetwocases toavoidmultiplicity ofsuits.
Thequantum ofevidenceonthecriminalaspectofthecaseis proofbeyondreasonabledoubt,

whileinthecivilaspectoftheaction,thequantum ofevidenceis preponderanceofevidence.[9]
Under Section3,Rule1ofthe1997Rules ofCriminalProcedure,thesaidrules shallgovernthe
proceduretobeobservedinaction,civilor criminal.
Theprosecutionpresents its evidencenotonly toprovetheguiltoftheaccusedbeyond

reasonabledoubtbutalsotoprovethecivilliability oftheaccusedtotheoffendedparty.After the
prosecutionhas restedits case,theaccusedshalladduceits evidencenotonly onthecriminalbut
alsoonthecivilaspectofthecase.Attheconclusionofthetrial,thecourtshouldrender judgment
notonly onthecriminalaspectofthecasebutalsoonthecivilaspectthereof:
SEC.2.Contents ofthejudgment.Ifthejudgmentis ofconviction,itshallstate(1) thelegal
qualificationoftheoffenseconstitutedby theacts committedby theaccusedandtheaggravating
or mitigatingcircumstances whichattendedits commission;(2) theparticipationoftheaccusedin
theoffense,whether as principal,accomplice,or accessory after thefact;(3) thepenalty imposed
upontheaccused;and(4) thecivilliability or damages causedby his wrongfulactor omissionto
berecoveredfrom theaccusedby theoffendedparty,ifthereis any,unless theenforcementofthe
civilliability by aseparatecivilactionhas beenreservedor waived.
Incasethejudgmentis ofacquittal,itshallstatewhether theevidenceoftheprosecution

absolutely failedtoprovetheguiltoftheaccusedor merely failedtoprovehis guiltbeyond
reasonabledoubt.Ineither case,thejudgmentshalldetermineiftheactor omissionfrom which
thecivilliability mightarisedidnotexist.[10]
Theacquittaloftheaccuseddoes notpreventajudgmentagainsthim onthecivilaspectofthe

casewhere(a) theacquittalis basedonreasonabledoubtas only preponderanceofevidenceis
required;(b) wherethecourtdeclaredthattheliability oftheaccusedis only civil;(c) wherethecivil
liability oftheaccuseddoes notarisefrom or is notbaseduponthecrimeofwhichtheaccused
was acquitted.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedonthedelictis extinguishedifthereis afindingin
thefinaljudgmentinthecriminalactionthattheactor omissionfrom whichthecivilliability may
arisedidnotexistor wheretheaccuseddidnotcommittheacts or omissionimputedtohim.
Iftheaccusedis acquittedonreasonabledoubtbutthecourtrenders judgmentonthecivilaspect

ofthecriminalcase,theprosecutioncannotappealfrom thejudgmentofacquittalas itwouldplace
theaccusedindoublejeopardy.However,theaggrievedparty,theoffendedparty or theaccused
or bothmay appealfrom thejudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewithintheperiodtherefor.
After theprosecutionhas restedits case,theaccusedhas theoptioneither to(a) fileademurrer to

evidencewithor withoutleaveofcourtunder Section23,Rule119oftheRevisedRules of
CriminalProcedure,or to(b) adducehis evidenceunless hewaives thesame.Theaforecitedrule
reads:
Sec.23.Demurrer toevidence.After theprosecutionrests its case,thecourtmay dismiss the

actiononthegroundofinsufficiency ofevidence(1) onits owninitiativeafter givingtheprosecution
theopportunity tobeheardor (2) upondemurrer toevidencefiledby theaccusedwithor without
leaveofcourt.
Ifthecourtdenies thedemurrer toevidencefiledwithleaveofcourt,theaccusedmay adduce

evidenceinhis defense.Whenthedemurrer toevidenceis filedwithoutleaveofcourt,theaccused
waives his righttopresentevidenceandsubmits thecasefor judgmentonthebasis ofthe
evidencefor theprosecution.
Themotionfor leaveofcourttofiledemurrer toevidenceshallspecifically stateits grounds and

shallbefiledwithinanon-extendibleperiodoffive(5) days after theprosecutionrests its case.The
prosecutionmay opposethemotionwithinanon-extendibleperiodoffive(5) days from its receipt.
Ifleaveofcourtis granted,theaccusedshallfilethedemurrer toevidencewithinanon-extendible

periodoften(10) days from notice.Theprosecutionmay opposethedemurrer toevidencewithina
similar periodfrom its receipt.
Theorder denyingthemotionfor leaveofcourttofiledemurrer toevidenceor thedemurrer itself

shallnotbereviewableby appealor by certioraribeforethejudgment.
Incriminalcases,thedemurrer toevidencepartakes ofthenatureofamotiontodismiss thecase

for failureoftheprosecutiontoprovehis guiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Inacasewherethe
accusedfiles ademurrer toevidencewithoutleaveofcourt,hethereby waives his righttopresent
evidenceandsubmits thecasefor decisiononthebasis oftheevidenceoftheprosecution.Onthe
other hand,iftheaccusedis grantedleavetofileademurrer toevidence,hehas therightto
adduceevidencenotonly onthecriminalaspectbutalsoonthecivilaspectofthecaseifhis
demurrer is deniedby thecourt.
Ifdemurrer is grantedandtheaccusedis acquittedby thecourt,theaccusedhas therightto

adduceevidenceonthecivilaspectofthecaseunless thecourtalsodeclares thattheactor
omissionfrom whichthecivilliability may arisedidnotexist.Ifthetrialcourtissues anorder or
renders judgmentnotonly grantingthedemurrer toevidenceoftheaccusedandacquittinghim but
alsoonthecivilliability oftheaccusedtotheprivateoffendedparty,saidjudgmentonthecivil
aspectofthecasewouldbeanullity for thereasonthattheconstitutionalrightoftheaccusedto
dueprocess is thereby violated.As weheldinAlontev.Savellano,Jr.:[11]
Section14,paragraphs (1) and(2),ofArticleIII,oftheConstitutionprovides thefundamentals.
(1) Nopersonshallbeheldtoanswer for acriminaloffensewithoutdueprocess oflaw.
(2) Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshallbepresumedinnocentuntilthecontrary is
proved,andshallenjoy therighttobeheardby himselfandcounsel,tobeinformedofthenature
andcauseoftheaccusationagainsthim,tohaveaspeedy,impartial,andpublic trial,tomeetthe
witnesses facetoface,andtohavecompulsory process tosecuretheattendanceofwitnesses and
theproductionofevidenceinhis behalf.However,after arraignment,trialmay proceed
notwithstandingtheabsenceoftheaccusedprovidedthathehas beenduly notifiedandhis failure
toappear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudenceacknowledges thatdueprocess incriminalproceedings,inparticular,require(a)

thatthecourtor tribunaltryingthecaseis properly clothedwithjudicialpower tohear and
determinethematter beforeit;(b) thatjurisdictionis lawfully acquiredby itover thepersonofthe
accused;(c) thattheaccusedis givenanopportunity tobeheard;and(d) thatjudgmentis
renderedonly uponlawfulhearing.
Theaboveconstitutionalandjurisprudentially postulates,by nowelementary anddeeply imbedded

inour owncriminaljusticesystem,aremandatory andindispensable.Theprinciples finduniversal
acceptanceandaretersely expressedintheoft-quotedstatementthatproceduraldueprocess
cannotpossibly bemetwithoutalawwhichhears beforeitcondemns,whichproceeds upon
inquiry andrenders judgmentonly after trial.[12]
This is sobecausewhentheaccusedfiles ademurrer toevidence,theaccusedhas notyet

adducedevidencebothonthecriminalandcivilaspects ofthecase.Theonly evidenceonrecord
is theevidencefor theprosecution.Whatthetrialcourtshoulddois toissueanorder or partial
judgmentgrantingthedemurrer toevidenceandacquittingtheaccused;andsetthecasefor
continuationoftrialfor thepetitioner toadduceevidenceonthecivilaspectofthecase,andfor the
privatecomplainanttoadduceevidenceby way ofrebuttalafter whichtheparties may adducetheir
sur-rebuttalevidenceas providedfor inSection11,Rule119oftheRevisedRules ofCriminal
Procedure:
Sec.11.Order oftrial.Thetrialshallproceedinthefollowingorder:
(a) Theprosecutionshallpresentevidencetoprovethechargeand,intheproper case,thecivil

liability.
(b) Theaccusedmay presentevidencetoprovehis defenseanddamages,ifany,arisingfrom the

issuanceofaprovisionalremedy inthecase.
(c) Theprosecutionandthedefensemay,inthatorder,presentrebuttalandsur-rebuttalevidence
unless thecourt,infurtheranceofjustice,permits them topresentadditionalevidencebearing
uponthemainissue.
(d) Uponadmissionoftheevidenceoftheparties,thecaseshallbedeemedsubmittedfor decision

unless thecourtdirects them toargueorally or tosubmitwrittenmemoranda.
(e) Whentheaccusedadmits theactor omissionchargedinthecomplaintor informationbut

interposes alawfuldefense,theorder oftrialmay bemodified.
Thereafter,thecourtshallrender judgmentonthecivilaspectofthecaseonthebasis ofthe

evidenceoftheprosecutionandtheaccused.
Inthis case,thepetitioner was chargedwithestafaunder Article315,paragraph2(d) ofthe

RevisedPenalCode.Thecivilactionarisingfrom thedelictwas impliedly institutedsincetherewas
nowaiver by theprivateoffendedparty ofthecivilliability nor areservationofthecivilaction.
Neither didhefileacivilactionbeforetheinstitutionofthecriminalaction.
Thepetitioner was grantedleaveofcourttofileademurrer toevidence.Thecourtissuedanorder

grantingthedemurrer onits findingthattheliability ofthepetitioner was notcriminalbutonly civil.
However,thecourtrenderedjudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecaseandorderedthepetitioner to
pay for her purchases from theprivatecomplainantevenbeforethepetitioner couldadduce
evidencethereon.Patently,therefore,thepetitioner was deniedher righttodueprocess.
INLIGHTOFALLTHE FOREGOING,thePetitionis GRANTED.TheOrders datedNovember 19,

2001 andJanuary 14,2002areSETASIDE ANDNULLIFIED.TheRegionalTrialCourtofLegazpi
City,Branch5,is hereby DIRECTEDtosetCriminalCaseNo.7474for thecontinuationoftrialfor
thereceptionoftheevidence-in-chiefofthepetitioner onthecivilaspectofthecaseandfor the
rebuttalevidenceoftheprivatecomplainantandthesur-rebuttalevidenceoftheparties ifthey opt
toadduceany.
SOORDERED.!
ENBANC
G.R.No.103567 December 4,1995
PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCOSALLE,JR.YGERCILLA@"KANONOY," RICKYMENGOTE YCUNTADO@"KA
RICKY/KALIZA/KAJUN," andTENJOHNDOES,accused.
FRANCISCOSALLE,JR.,YGERCILLAandRICKYMENGOTE YCUNTADO,accused-appellants.
RE S OLUTION
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
For resolutionis theenforceability oftheconditionalpardongrantedtoaccused-appellantRicky

Mengoteduringthependency inthis Courtofhis appealfrom his convictionby thetrialcourt.
Inthedecision1dated18November 1991ofBranch88oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC) of
QuezonCity inCriminalCaseNo.Q-90-11835,theaccused-appellants werefoundguilty beyond
reasonabledoubtas co-principals ofthecompoundcrimeofmurder anddestructivearsonand
wereeachsentencedtosuffer thepenalty ofreclusionperpetuaandtopay,jointly andseverally,
anindemnity inthesum ofP50,000.00totheheirs ofthevictim.2
Theappellants seasonably filedtheir NoticeofAppeal.On24March1993,this Courtacceptedthe

appeal.On6January 1994,however,appellantFranciscoSalle,Jr.filedanUrgentMotionto
WithdrawAppeal.TheCourtthenrequiredhis counsel,Atty.IdaMay La'ooftheFreeLegal
AssistanceGroup(FLAG) toverify thevoluntariness oftheaforesaidmotion.
Inher ManifestationwithMotiontoWithdrawAppeal,Atty.La'oinformedthis Courtthather

verificationdisclosedthatSallesignedthemotionwithouttheassistanceofcounselonhis
misimpressionthatthemotionwas merely abureaucratic requirementnecessary for his early
releasefrom theNewBilibidPrison(NBP) followingthegrantofaconditionalpardonby the
Presidenton9December 1993.Hewas dischargedfrom theNBPon28December 1993.She
further informedtheCourtthatappellantRicky Mengotewas,onthesamedates,granteda
conditionalpardonandreleasedfrom confinement,andthatheimmediately leftfor his province
withoutconsultingher.Shethenprays thatthis CourtgrantSalle's motiontowithdrawhis appeal
andconsider itwithdrawnuponhis acceptanceoftheconditionalpardon.
Untilnow,Mengotehas notfiledamotiontowithdrawhis appeal.
Intheresolutionof23March1994,this CourtgrantedSalle's motiontowithdrawhis appealand

consideredthis caseclosedandterminatedinsofar as heis concerned.
On3June1993,AssistantDirector Jesus P.VillanuevaoftheBureauofCorrections submitted

certifiedphotocopies oftheconditionalpardongrantedseparately toSalle3andMengote4andof
their certificates ofrelease.5Thesaidcopies oftheconditionalpardonstate,amongother things,
thatitis uponacceptanceofthepardonthattheappellants willbereleasedfrom confinement.But
thereis nothingtoshowwhentheappellants acceptedthepardon.
Inits Commentof17August1994,theOfficeoftheSolicitor Generalassertedthatwiththeir

acceptanceoftheconditionalpardon,theappellants impliedly admittedtheir guiltandaccepted
their sentence,andhence,theappealshouldbedismissed.6
After takingintoconsiderationSection19,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides thatthe
Presidentmay,exceptincases ofimpeachmentor as otherwiseprovidedintheConstitution,grant
pardonafter convictionby finaljudgment,this Courtresolvedtorequire.
1. TheOfficeoftheSolicitor Generalandthecounselfor theaccused-appellants tosubmit,

withinthirty (30) days from noticehereof,their respectivememorandaontheissueofthe
enforceability oftheconditionalpardon;and
2. ThePresidentialCommitteefor theGrantofBail,Releaseor Pardontoinform theCourt,

withinten(10) days from noticehereof,why itrecommendedtothePresidentthegrantofthe
conditionalpardondespitethependency oftheappeal.7
InaCommentsubmittedonbehalfofthePresidentialCommitteefor theGrantofBail,Release,or
Pardon,AssistantChiefStateProsecutor NiloC.Marianoavers thattheSecretariatassistingthe
Committeehas astandingagreementwiththeFLAGandother humanrights organizations thatit
willrecommendtothePresidentialCommitteefor conditionalpardonby thePresidentofconvicted
persons whomay havebeenconvictedofcrimes againstnationalsecurity andpublic order or of
commoncrimes whichappear tohavebeencommittedinpursuitoftheir politicalobjectives;and
thatwherethesaidconvictedpersons havependingappeals beforetheappellatecourt,the
lawyers ofthesaidorganizations,particularly theFLAG,willtakecareoffilingtheappropriate
motions for thewithdrawaloftheir appealconsideringthatpresidentialpardonmay beextended
only tothoseservingsentenceafter finalconviction.Notwithstandingthatagreement,beforeit
recommends totheCommitteethegrantofconditionalpardon,theSecretariatalsochecks withthe
BureauofCorrections thecarpetaor records ofrecommendees whether they havepending
appeals sothatthoseconcernedmay beproperly advisedtowithdrawthesame.Marianofurther
contends thatper informationgiventotheSecretariatby AssistantDirector Villanueva,Mengote's
carpetaor prisonrecorddoes notshowthathehas apendingappealwiththeCourtofAppeals or
theSupremeCourt.For thatreason,theSecretariatwas notabletoadvisethoseconcernedto
takeappropriatesteps for thewithdrawaloftheappealbeforeitrecommendedtotheCommittee
thegrantofconditionalpardoninfavor ofMengote.Marianothenassures theCourtthattherewas
nointentiononthepartoftheSecretariatandtheCommitteetoviolateSection19,ArticleVIIofthe
Constitution,andthatwhathappenedwas aclear misappreciationoffacts duetotheincomplete
records ofMengote.
Inits Memorandum filedfor theAppelleeon15December 1994,theOfficeoftheSolicitor General

maintains thattheconditionalpardongrantedtoappellantMengoteis unenforceablebecausethe
judgmentofconvictionis notyetfinalinviewofthependency inthis Courtofhis appeal.
Ontheother hand,theFLAG,throughAtty.La'o,submits thattheconditionalpardonextendedto

Mengoteis validandenforceable.CitingMonsantovs.Factoran,Jr.,8itargues thatalthough
Mengotedidnotfileamotiontowithdrawtheappeal,hewas deemedtohaveabandonedthe
appealby his acceptanceoftheconditionalpardonwhichresultedinthefinality ofhis conviction.
Thepivotalissuethus raisedis theenforceability ofapardongrantedtoanaccusedduringthe

pendency ofhis appealfrom ajudgmentofconvictionby thetrialcourt.
This calls for areviewofthePhilippinelaws onpresidentialpardons.WeshallstartwiththeJones

Law.9Section21thereofprovidedinpartas follows:
Sec.21. Thatthesupremeexecutivepower shallbevestedinanexecutiveofficer,whose

officialtitleshallbe"TheGovernor-GeneralofthePhilippineIslands."...Heis hereby vestedwith
theexclusivepower tograntpardons andreprieves andremitfines andforfeitures....
Thencamethe1935Constitution.Paragraph6,Section10,ArticleVIIthereofprovidedas follows:
(6) ThePresidentshallhavethepower tograntreprieves,commutations,andpardons,and
remitfines andforfeitures,after conviction,for alloffenses,exceptincases ofimpeachment,upon
suchconditions andwithsuchrestrictions andlimitations as hemay deem proper toimpose.He
shallhavethepower tograntamnesty withtheconcurrenceoftheCongress.
This provisiondifferedfrom thatoftheJones Lawinsomerespects.Thus,inPeoplevs.Vera,10

this Courtheld:
Under theJones Law,as atcommonlaw,pardoncouldbegrantedany timeafter thecommission

oftheoffense,either beforeor after conviction(VideConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,Art.II,sec.
2;InreLontok [1922],43Phil.293).TheGovernor-GeneralofthePhilippines was thus
empowered,likethePresidentoftheUnitedStates,topardonapersonbeforethefacts ofthecase
werefully broughttolight.Theframers ofour Constitutionthoughtthis undesirableand,following
mostofthestateconstitutions,providedthatthepardoningpower canonly beexercised"after
conviction".
Therequirementofafter convictionoperatedas oneofthelimitations onthepardoningpower of

thePresident.Thus:
Itshouldbeobservedthattherearetwolimitations upontheexerciseofthis constitutional

prerogativeby theChiefExecutive,namely:(a) thatthepower beexercisedafter conviction;and
(b) thatsuchpower does notextendtocases ofimpeachment.11
The1973Constitutionwentfurther by providingthatpardoncouldbegrantedonly after final

conviction.Section14ofArticleIX thereofreads as follows:
ThePrimeMinister may,exceptincases ofimpeachment,grantreprieves,commutations,and

pardons,remitfines andforfeitures,after finalconviction,and,withtheconcurrenceoftheNational
Assembly,grantamnesty.(emphasis supplied)
The1981amendments tothe1973Constitution,however,removedthelimitationoffinal
conviction,thereby bringingus back totheaforementionedprovisionoftheJones Law.Section11,
ArticleVIIofthe1973Constitution,as thus amended,reads:
ThePresidentmay,exceptincases ofimpeachment,grantreprieves,commutations andpardons,

remitfines andforfeitures and,withtheconcurrenceoftheBatasangPambansa,grantamnesty.
Butthesaidlimitationwas restoredby thepresentConstitution.Section19,ArticleVIIthereof

reads as follows:
Exceptincases ofimpeachment,or as otherwiseprovidedinthis Constitution,thePresidentmay

grantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfines andforfeitures,after convictionby
finaljudgment.
Heshallalsohavethepower tograntamnesty withtheconcurrenceofamajority ofallthe

Members oftheCongress.(emphasis supplied)
Wherethepardoningpower is subjecttothelimitationofconviction,itmay beexercisedatany

timeafter convictionevenifthejudgmentis onappeal.Itis,ofcourse,entirely differentwherethe
requirementis " finalconviction," as was mandatedintheoriginalprovisionofSection14,Article
IX ofthe1973Constitution,or "convictionby finaljudgment," as presently prescribedinSection19,
ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution.Insuchacase,nopardonmay beextendedbeforeajudgment
ofconvictionbecomes final.
Ajudgmentofconvictionbecomes final(a) whennoappealis seasonably perfected,(b) whenthe

accusedcommences toservethesentence,(c) whentherighttoappealis expressly waivedin
writing,exceptwherethedeathpenalty was imposedby thetrialcourt,and(d) whentheaccused
applies for probation,thereby waivinghis righttoappeal.12Wherethejudgmentofconvictionis
stillpendingappealandhas notyetthereforeattainedfinality,as intheinstantcase,executive
clemency may notyetbegrantedtotheappellant.
Wearenot,however,unmindfuloftherulingofthis CourtinPeoplevs.Crisola13thatthegrantof
executiveclemency duringthependency oftheappealserves toputanendtotheappeal.Thus:
Thecommutationofthepenalty is impressedwithlegalsignificance.Thatis anexerciseof

executiveclemency embracedinthepardoningpower.AccordingtotheConstitution:"The
Presidentmay,exceptincases ofimpeachment,grantreprieves,commutations andpardons,remit
fines andforfeitures and,withtheconcurrenceoftheBatasangPambansa,grantamnesty." Once
granted,itis bindingandeffective.Itserves toputanendtothis appeal.
Itmust,nevertheless,benotedthattheconstitutionalprovisionquotedis thatofthe1973
Constitution,as amended,whichauthorizedtheexerciseofthepardoningpower atanytime,either
beforeor after conviction.Also,inMonsantovs.Factoran,14this Courtstatedthattheacceptance
ofapardonamounts toanabandonmentofanappeal,renderingtheconvictionfinal;thus:
The1981amendments haddeletedtheearlier rulethatclemency couldbeextendedonly upon

finalconviction,implyingthatclemency couldbegivenevenbeforeconviction.Thus,petitioner's
unconditionalpardonwas grantedevenas her appealwas pendingintheHighCourt.Itis worth
mentioningthatunder the1987Constitution,theformer limitationoffinalconvictionwas restored.
Butbethatas itmay,itis our viewthatinthepresentcase,itis notmaterialwhenthepardonwas
bestowed,whether beforeor after conviction,for theresultwouldstillbethesame.Having
acceptedthepardon,petitioner is deemedtohaveabandonedher appealandher unreversed
convictionby theSandiganbayanassumedthecharacter offinality.
This statementshouldnotbetakenas aguidingrulefor itis nothingbutanorbiter dictum.

Moreover,thepardoninvolvedthereinwas extendedon17December 1984or under theregimeof
Section11,ArticleVIIofthe1973Constitution,as amended,whichallowedthegrantofpardon
either beforeor after conviction.
ThereasontheConstitutionalCommissionadoptedthe"convictionby finaljudgment" requirement,

revivingineffecttheoriginalprovisionofthe1973Constitutiononthepardoningpower,was,as
expoundedby Commissioner NapoleonRama,topreventthePresidentfrom exercisingexecutive
power inderogationofthejudicialpower.15
Indeed,anappealbrings theentirecasewithintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheappellatecourt.A
becomingregardfor thedoctrineofseparationofpowers demands thatsuchexclusiveauthority of
theappellatecourtbefully respectedandkeptunimpaired.For truly,hadnotthepresent
Constitutionadoptedthe"convictionby finaljudgment" limitation,thePresidentcould,atany time,
andevenwithouttheknowledgeofthecourt,extendexecutiveclemency toany onewhom he,in
goodfaithor otherwise,believes tomeritpresidentialmercy.Itcannotbedeniedthatunder the
Jones Lawandthe1981amendments tothe1973Constitutiononthepardoningpower whichdid
notrequireconviction,thePresidenthadunimpededpower tograntpardonevenbeforethe
criminalcasecouldbeheard.Andunder the1935Constitutionwhichrequired"conviction" only,the
power couldbeexercisedatany timeafter convictionandregardless ofthependency ofthe
appeal.Ineither case,therecouldbetherisk notonly ofafailureofjusticebutalsoofafrustration
ofthesystem ofadministrationofjusticeinviewofthederogationofthejurisdictionofthetrialor
appellatecourt.WherethePresidentis notsopreventedby theConstitution,notevenCongress
canimposeany restrictiontopreventapresidentialfolly.16Hence,nothingbutachangeinthe
constitutionalprovisionconsistingintheimpositionof"convictionby finaljudgment" requirement
canchangetherule.ThenewConstitutiondidit.
Hence,beforeanappellantmay bevalidly grantedpardon,hemustfirstask for thewithdrawalof
his appeal,i.e.,theappealedconvictionmustfirstbebroughttofinality.
Accordingly,whilethis Court,inits resolutionof21March1991inPeoplevs.PedroSepada,17

dismissedtheappealfor havingbecomemootandacademic inviewoftheparolegrantedtothe
appellant,itexplicitly declaredthenecessity ofafinaljudgmentbeforeparoleor pardoncouldbe
extended.Thus:
CONSIDERINGTHE FOREGOING,theCOURTRESOLVEDtoDISMISS theappealfor having

becomemootandacademic.Toavoidany possibleconflictwiththejudicialdeterminationof
pendingappeals,theCourtfurther DIRECTEDtheBoardofPardons andParoletoadoptasystem
whichenables ittoascertainwhether asentencehas becomefinalandexecutory andhas,infact,
beenexecutedbeforeactingonany applicationfor paroleor pardon.TheCourtAdministrator shall
coordinatewiththeDepartmentofJusticeonhowthis may bebestachieved.(Emphasis supplied).
Recently,inits resolutionof31January 1995inPeoplevs.Hinlo,18this Courtcategorically

declaredtobe"inclear violationofthelaw" the"practiceofprocessingapplications for pardonor
paroledespitependingappeals." This Courtresolvedthereinas follows:
INVIEWOFTHE FOREGOING,inorder toputastoptothepracticeofprocessingapplications for

pardonandparoledespitependingappeals whichis inclear violationofthelaw,theCourt
Resolvedto:
(1) REQUIRE Atty.ConradoH.Edig,counseldeparteofaccusedBernardoHinlo,Catalino

Capin,MartinHinloandCecerioOngco,whoweregivenpardon,tosecureandfilethewithdrawal
oftheappeals ofsaidaccusedwithintendays from receiptofthis Resolution;
(2) CALLtheattentionofthePresidentialCommitteetoobservetheproper procedureas

requiredby lawbeforegrantingbail,pardonor paroleincases beforeit;and
(3) REMINDtheBoardofPardons andParoleabouttheCourt's directiveinthePeoplev.

Sepadacase.(Emphasis supplied).
Theabovepronouncements ofthis CourtinSepadaandinHinlomay stillbeunheeded,either

throughdeliberatedisregardthereofor by reasonofanerroneous applicationoftheobiter dictum
inMonsantoor oftherulinginCrisola.Hence,theneedfor decisiveactiononthematter.
Wenowdeclarethatthe"convictionby finaljudgment" limitationunder Section19,ArticleVIIofthe

presentConstitutionprohibits thegrantofpardon,whether fullor conditional,toanaccusedduring
thependency ofhis appealfrom his convictionby thetrialcourt.Any applicationtherefor,ifoneis
made,shouldnotbeacteduponor theprocess towardits grantshouldnotbebegununless the
appealis withdrawn.Accordingly,theagencies or instrumentalities oftheGovernmentconcerned
mustrequireprooffrom theaccusedthathehas notappealedfrom his convictionor thathehas
withdrawnhis appeal.Suchproofmay beintheform ofacertificationissuedby thetrialcourtor
theappellatecourt,as thecasemay be.Theacceptanceofthepardonshallnotoperateas an
abandonmentor waiver oftheappeal,andthereleaseofanaccusedby virtueofapardon,
commutationofsentence,or parolebeforethewithdrawalofanappealshallrender those
responsibletherefor administratively liable.Accordingly,thoseincustody oftheaccusedmustnot
solely rely onthepardonas abasis for thereleaseoftheaccusedfrom confinement.
Andnowontheinstantcase.ConsideringthatappellantRicky Mengotehas notfiledamotionto

withdrawhis appealuptothis datetheconditionalpardonextendedtohim shouldnothavebeen
enforced.Nonetheless,sincehestands onthesamefootingas theaccused-appellants intheHinlo
case,hemay befreedfrom thefullforce,impact,andeffectoftherulehereinpronouncedsubject
totheconditionsetforthbelow.This ruleshallfully bindpardons extendedafter 31January 1995
duringthependency ofthegrantee's appeal.
WHEREFORE,counselfor accused-appellantRicky Mengotey Cuntadois hereby giventhirty (30)
days from noticehereofwithinwhichtosecurefrom thelatter thewithdrawalofhis appealandto
submitittothis Court.Theconditionalpardongrantedthesaidappellantshallbedeemedtotake
effectonly uponthegrantofsuchwithdrawal.Incaseofnon-compliancewiththis Resolution,the
Director oftheBureauofCorrections mustexertevery possibleefforttotakeback intohis custody
thesaidappellant,for whichpurposehemay seek theassistanceofthePhilippineNationalPolice
or theNationalBureauofInvestigation.
Letcopies ofthis ResolutionbefurnishedtheOfficeofthePresident,theDepartmentofJustice,

theBoardofPardons andParole,andthePresidentialCommitteefor theGrantofBail,Release,or
Pardon.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Feliciano,Padilla,Regalado,Romero,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,
Francisco,Hermosisima,Jr.andPanganiban,JJ.,concur.

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FIRSTDIVISION

DR.FELIX ABAY,SR.ANDFELIX ABAY,JR.,petitioners,

This is apetitionfor reviewunder Rule45oftheRules ofCourtofthedecisionoftheIntermediate

OnMay 21,1973,CriminalCaseNo.29688for directassaultuponanagentofapersonin

AtthecontinuationofthetrialonJuly 1,1977,bothaccusedappearedwithouttheir counsel.The

Atabout10:00o'clock inthemorningofthesameday,Atty.Trocino,together withGarquearrived

Subsequently,theaccused,throughcounsel,ﬁledamotionfor reconsiderationoftheorder ofJuly

Petitioner's pretenseis untenable.Theverbalorder ofdismissalofsaidcasewas withdrawnor set

Itis arguedby appellants thattheverbalorder ofdismissal,nothavingbeenbasedonthemerits of

Wefully agreewiththeﬁndings oftherespondentcourt.Wherethereis avalidinformationandthe

ACCORDINGLY,thepetitionis DENIED;theappealeddecisionoftheCourtofAppeals is hereby

This decisionis immediately executory.

MARCELINOG.RIVERA,JR.,Petitioner,v.THE PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES andHON.

Tomas B.Gorospefor petitioner.

Theinstantpetitionseeks toannulandsetasidetheOrder datedMarch28,1990issuedby

Thefollowingpertinentfacts arenotdisputed:chanrob1es virtual1awlibrary

OnDecember 16,1988,petitioner MarcelinoG.Rivera,Jr.was arrestedanddetainedfor he

Petitioner was arraignedonFebruary 20,1989.Hepleadednotguilty tothecrimecharged.

OnApril5,1989,theﬁrstwitness for theprosecutionCpl.VictorioAfallapartially testiﬁedondirect

OnJune8,1989,for thesamereasons,thehearingwas re-settoFebruary 27,1990.

OnFebruary 27,1990,Capt.LinaSarmiento,theForensic Chemistwhowillpresentthemarijuana

Thepetitionshouldbedenied.Theearlier verbalorder ofdismissalwas notﬁnal,infact,was

"Petitioner’s pretenseis untenable.Theverbalorder ofdismissalofsaidcasewas withdrawnor set

This doctrinewas re-echoedinthecaseofAbay,Sr.v.Garcia,No.66132,June27,1988,162

"Wherethereis avalidinformationandtheaccusedhas beenarraigned,anorder ofdismissal

ACCORDINGLY,thepetitionis DENIED.Thecaseis remandedtothecourtoforiginfor farther

THE PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARCELINOA.BUGARIN,accused-

This is anappealfrom thedecision,[1]datedFebruary 11,1993,whichtheRegionalTrialCourt,

WHEREFORE,this Courtﬁnds theaccusedGUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtas chargedof

1) For eachofthefour counts oftheaboverape,reclusionperpetua.

Thecomplainant,MaryjaneBugarin,is thedaughter ofaccused-appellant.OnFebruary 22,1992,

Complainantwas examinedonthesamedateby EmmanuelI.Aranas,PNPMedico-LegalOfﬁcer,

OnMay 7,1992,four morecharges for rapeby means offorceandintimidationcommittedon

Theinformations inthesix cases allegedas follows:

Thecrimewas attendedby theaggravatingcircumstanceofrelationship.

Thecrimewas attendedby theaggravatingcircumstanceofrelationship.

Thatonor aboutthe14thday ofMarch,1991inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccused,by

Thecrimewas attendedby theaggravatingcircumstanceofrelationship.

Thatonor aboutthemonthofMay 1990inQuezonCity,Philippines,thesaidaccusedby means of

Thecrimewas attendedby theaggravatingcircumstanceofrelationship.

Thatonor aboutthe17thday ofJanuary,1992,inQuezonCity,MetroManila,Philippines,and

Thatonor aboutthe23rdday ofDecember,1991,inQuezonCity,MetroManila,Philippines,and

Inatwo-pagedecision,promulgatedonFebruary 11,1993,thetrialcourt,after givingasummary

Theissueis simple.Is theprivatecomplainantcredibleinher story ofhowshewas raped?The

Accused-appellantquestions thetrialcourts decisiononthegroundthat:(1) thetestimony of

Ontheother hand,theSolicitor General,representingtheprosecution,contends thatcomplainant,

Wetakeupﬁrstaccused-appellants chargethatthedecisionofthetrialcourtdoes notstatethe

Sec.2.Form andcontents ofjudgment.- Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofﬁciallanguage,

Ifitis ofconviction,thejudgmentshallstate(a) thelegalqualiﬁcationoftheoffenseconstitutedby

Incaseofacquittal,unless thereis aclear showingthattheactfrom whichthecivilliability might

Thedecisionofthetrialcourtfalls shortofthis requirementinatleastthreerespects.First,itdoes

Therequirementthatthedecisions ofcourts mustbeinwritingandthatthey mustsetforthclearly

Wewouldnormally remandthis casetothetrialcourtfor compliancewiththeconstitutional

Nowitis settledthatwhenthecomplainantinarapecase,moresoifsheis aminor,[4]testiﬁes

Q- OnNovember 1989,was your father residingwithyouor was helivingwithyou?

Q- Now,onNovember,1989doyouremember any unusualincidentthathappened,ifany?

A- Yes,sir.(witness is pointingtoamanwearingagreent-shirtwhoanswers by thename

Q- OnNovember 1989,youwerementioningthathe,referringtotheaccused,enteredyour room,

A- (witness crying) Whenheenteredtheroom,heembracedmeandtouchedthedifferentparts of

Q- Whatdoyoumeanby thosewords thathetoldyouthatwhenyougrowupyouwouldnotbe

A- Hetouchedmy knees andspreadthem outandthenholdingmy breastandheputhis sex

A- His sex organenteredmy what,Iam fertile.

Q- Whatdidyoudowhenyour father triedtoputhis sex organtoyour sex organ?

A- Iwas tryingtopushhis body away from me,andIsaidtohim,father,Idontlikeit,ayokopo.