CA: held that by accepting another office.
Sevilla in effect voluntarily
Appointment (Permanent or Temporary)
Sevilla v CA 209 SCRA 195 (1991)
DOCTRINE: An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good
only until another appointment is made to take its place
FACTS:
 Petitioner was appointed as Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City
and later on he was designated as Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan
City by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
 Aug. 18, 1986- Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara, appointed
Nerito L. Santos as the new city engineer of Cabanatuan City. Santos
assumed the position.
 On the same day, a memorandum was addressed to Sevilla informing
him of Santos' appointment as city engineer of Cabanatuan City. Anita
de Guzman, administrative officer of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) unit in Cabanatuan City received the notice for
Sevilla who was on leave on that time.
 Nov. 14, 1986- petitioner-appellee Sevilla was designated by then
Minister Rogociano Mercado of the MPWH as acting district engineer
of Pasay City. Petitioner-appellee Sevilla served in that capacity until
he was removed from that office of the new Secretary of the DPWH on
February 3, 1987.
 Mar. 27, 1987- Sevilla filed a petition for quo warranto against Santos.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: Sevilla argued that, being the presidential
appointee, he could not be removed from office by an OIC mayor. And, even
supposing that the OIC mayor had such authority, his separation from office
was illegal because none of the grounds for the separation/replacement of
public officials and employees set forth in Executive Order No. 17 is present
RTC: rendered a decision reinstating Sevilla as acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City with right to payment of vacation and sick leaves for the
duration of his absence
surrendered his former office, and was thereby precluded from maintaining a
quo warranto action against Santos. When he accepted the position in Pasay
City, he lost his right to the position in Cabanatuan City. The Court ruled that
Santos' appointment was valid because it as confirmed by Minister Rogaciano
Mercado of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in not considering his appointment as acting city engineering
of Cabanatuan City as a specie of permanent appointment covered by civil
service security of tenure
RULING: NO
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only until
another appointment is made to take its place (Austria vs. Amante. 79 Phil.
784). Hence, petitioner's right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of
Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City on August 18,
1986.
Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan City when he was
designated as Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City. There is a difference
between an appointment an appointment and a designation. Appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of an office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition of additional duties, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment or election.
A mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in
the position or office which he occupies in an "acting" capacity only.
Consequently, the designation of petitioner as Acting City Engineering of
Cabanatuan City merely imposed upon him the additional function of the City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City on top of his regular duties as City Engineer of
Palayan City. He may claim security of tenure as City Engineer of Palayan City
but he may not lay such a claim to the position of City Engineering of
Cabanatuan City for he holds no appointment to the latter office.
 Appointment (By President)
Velicaria-Garafil v Office of the President G.R. No. 203372 (2015)
DOCTRINE: President exercises only one kind of appointing power. The
constitution allows the President to exercise the power of appointment during
the period not covered by appointing ban.
FACTS:
 This case involves 4 consolidated petitions. All petition question the
constitutionality of EO 2.
 President Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to
various positions in several government offices.
 Under Art. VII sec. 15 “2 months before the next presidential election, a
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service xxx”
 Thus, for the purpose of 2010 election, March 10, 2010 was the cut-off
date for valid appointment and the next day March 11, 2010 was the
start of ban of midnight appointment.
Summary of appointments made by Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo:
 On June 30, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III took his oath of
office as the 15th President of the Republic of the Philippines. On
August 4, 2010, Malacañang issued E.O. No. 2 whose salient portions
read:
SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. - The following appointments
made by the former President and other appointing authorities in departments,
agencies, offices, and 'instrumentalities, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments:
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all
appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the
appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on
or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety as may be determined by the
appointing authority.
(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said
date or appointments to office that would be vacant only after March
11, 2010.
(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in violation of Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight Appointments.
Midnight appointments, as defined under Section 1, are hereby recalled,
withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or otherwise affected are
hereby declared vacant.
SECTION 3. Temporary designations. - When necessary to maintain efficiency in
public service and ensure the continuity of government operations, the
Executive Secretary may designate an officer-in-charge (OIC) to perform the
duties and discharge the responsibilities of any of those whose appointment
has been recalled, until the replacement of the OIC has been appointed and
qualified.
ISSUE:

W/N the appointments of petitioners were midnight appointments within the

coverage of EO 2

RULING: YES

The court held that all of petitioner’s appointments are midnight appointments
and are void for violation of Article VII sec. 15, and EO 2 being constitutional.

The facts in all these cases show that “none of the petitioners have shown that
their appointment papers have been issued before the ban. The dates of receipt
of MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal
of the appointment papers by Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates falling during
appointment bans. Thus, all the appointments is in violation of Sec. 15 Art. VII
of 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Additional info.

Aytona v Castillo is the basis of Art. VII sec. 15. The Consti. Commissioner
Hilario Davide Jr. referred the ruling in Aytona and stated his proposal seek to
prevent the President, whose term is about to end, from preempting his
successor by appointing his own people to sensitive position.

The ponencia holds that the following elements should always concur in the
making of a valid appointment: (1) authority .to appoint and evidence of the
exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment and evidence of
the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of the appointment; and (4)
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

There is no valid appointment if the process is lack even 1 step.

 It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To
Appointment (Remedies to Question Title)
uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the
courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient
Tarrosa v Singson 232 SCRA 553 (1994) operation of the governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. Pr.
108, 23 N.Y. 218).
DOCTRINE: Quo warranto as a special civil action can only be commenced by
the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses.
position unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Rules of Court, Rule 66) Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of
public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be
FACTS:
enjoined.
 This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer,"
questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as
Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
 The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the
performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent
Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from
disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner may bring the action for quo warranto against respondent

RULING: NO

The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the
ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del
Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can only be
commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another".

Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held that
the question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto
proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary
to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be
the one entitled to occupy the said office.

By Election (Right to Office)
CSC v Magnaye G.R 183337 (2010)
DOCTRINE: 2(3), Article IX-B "no officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
FACTS:
 Mayor Roman H. Rosales appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the
Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE).
 After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal
Planning and Development Office.
 In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul
L. Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30, 2001.
 Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the
OEE.
 Mayor Bendaña served him a notice of termination from employment
effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of
capacity.
 Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the
ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a position to effectively
evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-
half months after his (Mayor Bendaña’s) assumption to office. He
added that his termination was without basis and was politically
motivated.
 Thereafter, Magnaye filed a complaint with the regional office of the
Civil Service (CSCRO-IV).
CSCRO-IV: dismissed Magnaye’s complaint for lack of merit. It upheld his
dismissal from the service on the ground that Mayor Bendaña’s own
assessment, together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted
sufficient and reasonable grounds for his termination.
CA: ruled in Magnaye’s favor, mainly on the ground that he was denied due
process since he was not informed of what constituted the alleged
unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity that led to his termination.
The CSC, in arguing that Magnaye’s termination was in accord with the Civil
Service law. Civil Service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during his
6-month probationary period. It submits that an employee’s security of tenure
starts only after the probationary period. Specifically, it argued that "an
appointee under an original appointment cannot lawfully invoke right to
security of tenure until after the expiration of such period and provided that
the appointee has not been notified of the termination of service or found
unsatisfactory conduct before the expiration of the same."
ISSUE:
W/N the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws
and the rules.
RULING: NO
The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself.
Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers
not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted
activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and
a living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is
emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause
as provided by law after due process."
Our Constitution, in using the expressions "all workers" and "no officer or
employee," puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or
regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent
employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of
tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be
dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees.
The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to
both those in the career and non-career service positions, and the cause under
which an employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some
relation to the character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge
of the functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which the
employment was extended. 9 Further, well-entrenched is the rule on security of
tenure that such an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he
acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected
not only by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2,
paragraph (3)] and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and
hearing.10
While the CSC contends that a probationary employee does not enjoy security
of tenure, its Omnibus Rules recognizes that such an employee cannot be
terminated except for cause. Note that in the Omnibus Rules it cited, 11 a
decision or order dropping a probationer from the service for unsatisfactory
conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary
period "is appealable to the Commission." This can only mean that a
probationary employee cannot be fired at will.
CASES WHERE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE IS UNAVAILING:
- In Orcullo Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, it was ruled that the right is
not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and co-terminous in nature. Such employment is
characterized by "a tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or that which is coterminous with the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made."
- In Amores M.D. v. Civil Service Commission, it was held that a civil
executive service appointee who meets all the requirements for the
position, except only the appropriate civil service eligibility, holds the
office in a temporary capacity and is, thus, not entitled to a security of
tenure enjoyed by permanent appointees.
Magnaye’s appointment is entirely different from those situations. From the
records, his appointment was never classified as co-terminous or contractual.
Neither was his eligibility as a Utility Worker I challenged by anyone.
While unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity are valid causes that may be
invoked for dismissal from the service, the CA observed that the Memorandum
issued by Mayor Bendaña terminating Magnaye’s employment did not specify
the acts constituting his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. It merely
stated that the character investigation conducted during his probationary
period showed that his employment "need not be necessary to be permanent in
status."
An official who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be
dropped from the rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or
employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not later than the
fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve
his performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his
separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information
which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.
Magnaye asserts that no performance evaluation was made between March
2001 when he was hired by Mayor Rosales until August 14, 2001 when his
services were terminated by Mayor Bendaña. It was only on July 29, 2003, at
Mayor Bendaña’s behest, that his two supervisors prepared and submitted the
evaluation report after the CSCRO-IV directed him to file an answer to
Magnaye’s appeal.
This has not been rebutted. It being not disputed, it was an error on the part of
the CSCRO-IV to rely on such belated performance appraisal. Common sense
dictates that the evaluation report, submitted only in 2003, could not have been
the basis for Magnaye’s termination.
Besides, Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment of Magnaye’s performance could not
have served as a sufficient basis to dismiss him because said mayor was not his
immediate superior and did not have daily contacts with him. Additionally,
Mayor Bendaña terminated his employment less than one and one-half months
after his assumption to office. This is clearly a short period within which to
assess his performance.
Inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of
sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months for the
respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is
inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his
immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This
condition, however, was not observed in this case.
The court also held that Magnaye was denied procedural due process when he
received his notice of termination only a day before he was dismissed from the
service. Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to defend
himself from the charge that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that his
conduct was unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the CSCRO-IV, he was
not furnished with the submissions of Mayor Bendaña that he could have
opposed. He was also denied substantive due process because he was
dismissed from the service without a valid cause for lack of any factual or legal
basis for his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.