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Wonjai Lee B3
Research Question:
To what extent have traditional Japanese belief systems influenced contemporary Japan?
(Philosophical Lens)
before the International Congress of Orientalists in Paris. Arguing against the prevalent opinion
that there is no originality in Japanese philosophy, Inouyé insists that “although the first impulse to
philosophizing came from abroad, being given by Confucianism and Buddhism, the treatment and
further development of these great philosophical and religious movements were carried on in an
independent way and produced original thinkers in Japan” (Carus 273). Nearly after a century after
Inouyé stood the International Congress of Orientalists, F. Perez Ruiz writes in the Monumenta
Nipponica that the “reflection on the problem of cultural contacts is widespread and undoubtedly is
one of the most characteristic aspects of present-day philosophical thought in Japan” (Ruiz 138),
echoing the words of his unknown predecessor. Both Inouyé and Ruiz struggle with a fundamental
question challenging all of contemporary Japanese philosophy to the present day: to what extent is
contemporary Japanese philosophy Japanese, and to what extent is it Western? Put in other words, to
what extent have Japanese belief systems (e.g. Shintoism, Buddhism, etc.) influenced contemporary
Japanese philosophy? Ruiz, for one, writes that Japan’s diverse cultures are “aspects of life within the
one society, and this in two senses: in the sense that in this society each cultural pattern has its living
representatives; and in the still more complex sense that the same individual in his own life
incorporates elements which are culturally heterogeneous” (Ruiz 139). In other words, Ruiz suggests
that the nature of contemporary Japanese philosophy is twofold; that of preservation and
reconfiguration. As such, we are inclined to believe that traditional Japanese belief systems
This is evidenced by the continued existences of the Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto
traditions and the emergence of the Kyoto school. However, we must also note that much
of this Japanese core has embraced the parameters of Western academic philosophy.
Preservation
The first key aspect of contemporary Japanese philosophy is the continued strength of
traditional Japanese belief systems within philosophical discourses. Whether it be the Buddhist,
Shinto, or Confucian traditions, native Japanese beliefs have been well preserved in the character of
contemporary Japanese philosophy. Modern Japanese Buddhism, for instance, has evolved to
address contemporary issues, in the same manner that the Christian and Jewish religions adapted to
the modern era in the Western world. The comprehensive volume “Japanese Philosophy: A
Sourcebook” notes that “the notion of ‘original enlightenment’ is one of several ideas that we still
find at the center of debates in twentieth-century Japanese Buddhism” (Heisig 49). The prominent
names of modern Japanese Buddhism prove to be further evidence of the vibrancy of the tradition,
whether it be Ishizu Teruji asking “what mode of being religious experience calls for in our time” or
Tamaki Koshiro “[offering] a typology based on meditative experience to rethink major turning
points in philosophical thinking” (49). In particular, the Pure Land strain of Japanese Buddhism,
having had a “deep impact on Japanese thought from the very moment Buddhism arrived…[being]
no less true after Western philosophy began to seriously impact intellectual discourse,” possesses
influence over contemporary Japanese philosophy, accounting for around 60% of the Japanese
population in the 21st century (235). Similarly, the Shinto tradition in Japan continues to enjoy
modern relevance, as the “magical take on language [of Mabuchi, Mitsue, and Takamasa] was
inherited by the many Shinto sects that drew on Native Studies ideas, while prewar state orthodoxy,
whose principal heir today is shrine-centered Shinto, preferred the historical, ‘scientific’ approach of
Norinaga and Atsutane” (465). Finally, Confucianism maintains a strong legacy in Japan, whether it
be in the well-educated nature of Japanese society or in “the Japanese view of language and
meaning as real” (298). For example, in “The Confucian Roots of Business Kyosei,” Calvin M.
Boardman and Hideaki Kiyoshi Kato argue that “the historical connection between the Confucian
philosophical principles on which kyosei is based and its adaptation and application to sixteenth
century Japan. Kyosei emerges as a significant descriptor of corporate behavior in Japan and the
rest of the world during and near the end of the twentieth century” (1). Clearly, traditional Japanese
belief systems are alive and well, continuing to serve as a vital part of the core of contemporary
Japanese philosophy.
Reconfiguration
The second key aspect of contemporary Japanese philosophy is the modern trend of
reconfiguring Japanese and Western elements to create new modes of philosophical thought. This
characteristic has evolved because of the widespread acknowledgement (most famously by Kitaro
Nishida) of the fact, as Ruiz puts it, that “culturally heterogeneous elements have already become so
deeply imbedded in the Japanese world that it is no longer possible to pry them out and return to
the purity of a culture with a more pattern of thought” (Ruiz 140). This shift in thinking has led to
the most prominent development in contemporary Japanese philosophy to date: the emergence of
the Kyoto School. Towards the end of the Meiji period, the philosopher Nishida Kitaro wrote A
Study in Good (1911), in which he “tried to reflect upon the internal world of self as a member of the
civil society established under the conditions of imperialist Japan, deepen the understanding of it by
the religious experience of Zen Buddhism, and intensify it by the logic of modern Western
philosophy” (Yamazaki Saito 40). In other words, Kitaro attempted to create a Japanese philosophy
that enhanced, rather than rejected, the contributions of Western philosophical thought. As James
Heisig notes in “Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School,” the Kyoto school
marked “a watershed in intellectual history. Not only does this group of philosophers represent
Japan’s first sustained and original contribution to western philosophical thought, they do so from a
distinctively eastern perspective” (Heisig 3). After Nishida came “the counterfoil of [Hajime]
Tanabe’s thought and the creative enlargements of [Keiji] Nishitani” (7), developing an entire
school of thought around Nishida’s revolutionary ideas. The age-old Western philosophical question
“What is being?”, asked by Western philosophers as far back as Aristotle in his discussions of
epistemology and ontology, was brought to a new light by the Kyoto School. The Kyoto School
philosophers instead asked “What is nothingness?”, bringing about the signature concept of
“absolute nothingness.” Absolute nothingness, of course, was no new idea; it drew its roots to the
East Asian Buddhist Schools of Zen and/or Pure Land (Davis). But in this instance and countless
others, Nishida and his disciples were able to bring East and West together, drawing upon Eastern
ideas to answer Western questions. Ultimately, the “philosophers of the Kyoto school have given us
a world philosophy, one that belongs as rightfully to the inheritance as much as the western
philosophies with which they wrestled and from which they drew their inspiration” (Heisig 9).
Westernization
newer Western layer in which Japanese philosophy has taken on a distinct new nature. Western
influences on Japanese philosophy stretch back all the way to the late 19th century, when Japan was
first introduced to the cultural palette of the West. As Dave Riepe notes in his chronology of
Japanese philosophy, “[Western] philosophy at first was taught by American, British, and German
professors; later by Japanese who had studied in the United States or Europe” (259). Many attribute
this embrace of Western ideas as being motivated by “efforts to make Japan into a modern state…
especially those of England and France which were the most radical and modern at that
time” (Yamazaki 39). In other words, the Westernization processes that took place during the Meiji
period influenced even the philosophical world of Japan, by England and France in the former half
of Meiji and by Germany in the latter half. During these cycles several notable Western concepts
were added to the Japanese philosophical inventory. Riepe notes that “logic was introduced at this
time through Fowler's Deductive Logic and Mill's System of Logic” (259). Ruiz points out that “the
concept of person is considered as something new in Japan and its origin is usually sought for in the
'Enlightenment' and in the influence of Christianity” (149). Moreover, it was not only Western ideas
that were incorporated into Japanese philosophy, but also methods of formulating and presenting
philosophical concepts in an academic manner. For instance, the aforementioned Meiji period also
saw the introduction of the first philosophical journal in Japan, the Meiji Sixth Journal (Riepe 259).
Masakazu Yamasaki and Sumie Saito note that “philosophical study became academic and
technical towards the close of the Meiji era..being taken up as the purely academic study in
philosophical seminars all across the country” (40). Overall, it is clear that Western ideas and
methods have changed Japanese philosophy to the extent that one can safely say that contemporary
Conclusion
Many have long wondered whether Japanese thought can be categorized as “philosophy” at
all. The intellectual category of “philosophy,” after all, is a Western concept. When Western thought
was imported into Meiji Japan, Japanese philosophers “were puzzled by these categories, for which
there were no Japanese equivalents (Godart 71). It is important for any academic of philosophy to
know that “the general problem of whether Eastern thought constitutes philosophy or not” is not
unique to the Japanese context, but rather reflective of the fact that “the Eastern studies that exist
are treated in other faculties as historical or literary but not as philosophical problems” (Ruiz 155).
Therefore, it may be more useful to analyze contemporary Japanese philosophy not as a philosophy
at all, but rather as an amalgamation of multiple historical trends that have resulted in a complex
trends, all of which have been briefly addressed in this essay. Traditional Japanese belief systems
have been preserved within the modern intellectual discourse. Other Japanese philosophical strands
have been reconfigured as to be compatible with Western ideas. And still other elements of Japanese
philosophy have merely taken on a Western look, adopting the parameters of academic Western
philosophy. Together, they form the infinitely rich and eternally wide intellectual tradition that is
Boardman, Calvin M., and Hideaki Kiyoshi Kato. “The Confucian Roots of Business
Kyosei.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 48, no. 4, 2003, pp. 317–333. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/
stable/25075188.
Carus, Paul. “PHILOSOPHY IN JAPAN.” The Monist, vol. 9, no. 2, 1899, pp. 273–281. JSTOR,
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27899032.
Davis, Bret W., "The Kyoto School", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kyoto-school/>.
Godart, Gerard Clinton. “‘Philosophy’ or ‘Religion’? The Confrontation with Foreign Categories in
Late Nineteenth Century Japan.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 69, no. 1, 2008, pp. 71–
91. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30139668.
Heisig, James W., et al., editors. Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook. University of Hawai'i Press,
2011. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wqg76.
Heisig, James W. Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School. University of Hawai'i Press,
2001. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wr20v.
Ruiz, F. Perez. “Philosophy in Present-Day Japan.” Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 24, no. 1/2, 1969, pp.
137–168. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2383766.
Yamazaki, Masakuzu, and Sumie Saito. “Modern Japan in its Philosophical Development.” Revue
Internationale De Philosophie, vol. 28, no. 107/108 (1/2), 1974, pp. 36–48. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/23943193.