THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2014

sample case problems in evidence

5% PER ITEM.

CASE PROBLEM NO. 1.

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[i][4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989, [ii][5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of

Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government.[iii][6] Petitioner -- a Filipina --
and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.[iv][7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
as “single” and “Filipino.”[v][8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.[vi][9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[vii][10]

in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[viii][11] He contended that his first marriage
to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia
in 1989;[ix][12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.”[x]
[13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.[xi][14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.
[xii][15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[xiii][16]
After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.
[xiv][17]
 Question: Respondent contends that (1) the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. (2) Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion. Are these contentions (1) and (2) correct? Why?

ANSWER:

The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”[xv][41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.[xvi][42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
[xvii][43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.[xviii][44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.(Garcia v. Recio, GR
138322, Oct. 2, 2007).

CASE PROBLEM NO.2.

Plaintiffs-appellants, with co-plaintiffs-appellants Leonora Prietos and Luzviminda Antig who

were lessees of the apartment units, filed a case for damages against defendants-appellees
Harry John Viloriam [sic], Margarita Milagros Viloria, and John P. Young. The complaint
alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the construction workers
and employees of the defendants-appellees, the bunkhouse or workers' quarters in the
construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by
plaintiffs-appellants. Due to the negligence of defendants-appellees which resulted in the
fire, plaintiffs-appellants suffered actual damages representing the value of the buildings and
other personal properties.

Defendant-appellee John Young, the building contractor, in his answer, contended that he
can not be held responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the employees for
he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his workers. Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action against him. As counterclaim,
defendant-appellee Young sought for moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, and
exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Defendants-appell[ees] Harry and Margarita Viloria also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants
had no cause of action against them. The fire court not have been caused by gross
negligence of their workers for they did not have any worker in the construction of their
building. The said construction was being undertaken by the independent contractor, John
Young, who hired and supervised his own workers. The newly constructed building was
partially destroyed by the fire. As counterclaim, defendants-appell[ees] prayed for moral
damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's
fees of P20,000.00.

One of the documentary evidences offered is the Fire Investigation Report, duly signed by
the officer of the day. Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report[xix][21] by an
official of the Cebu City Fire Station should have been admitted in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of the Fire
Investigation Report (Exhibits “A,” “A-1” to “A-4” inclusive). The record discloses that the
officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P. Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the
request of and testified in open court for petitioners. He identified the Report, which
petitioners offered in their Offer of Exhibits[xx][25] as:

(1) Part of the testimony of Major Eduardo P. Enriquez;

(2) To prove that an impartial investigation has determined that the "fire started at the
generator ... within the construction site" (Exhibit "A-3").

Private respondents objected to Exhibits “A,” “A-1” to “A-4,” inclusive, for being “hearsay and
incompetent evidence.”[xxi][26] The trial court then denied their admission “for being
hearsay, this fact admitted by witness himself, F/Maj. Eduardo Enriquez, as part of whose
testimony said exhibits were offered.”[xxii][27]

Question: Is the Court correct in not admitting the Fire Investigation Report for being
hearsay and incompetent? What is the applicable rule on the matter ? if Major Enriquez was
not presented to testify on his report, would your answer be different?.

ANSWER: In light of the purposes for which the exhibits in question were offered, as
aforestated, the trial court erred in rejecting all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez
himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of the
report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the
Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer, may then
be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of
the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof. It has been said that:
“Where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact.”[xxiii][28]

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and
made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed
from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this
section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official
record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
explained in Antillon v. Barcelon:[xxiv][29]

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in
which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering their deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials
would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity
is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge
their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in
discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a
degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to
testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would have been
ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said
report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The
statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official
information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give
the statements for record.(Rodriguez v. Viloria, GR 121964, JUNE 17, 1997)

CASE PROBLEM NO. 3.

On May 21, 1982, petitioner Dumez Company, a French company, through petitioner Trans-
Orient Engineers, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, engaged the services of private respondent Veronico Ebilane as carpenter for
one of its projects in the Middle East, with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as his place of actual
employment. The parties executed and signed a one-year overseas employment agreement
embodying the terms and conditions of private respondent's employment.

Private respondent commenced performance of said contract on July 3, 1982. On August

31, 1982, while at the job site, private respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain
and rushed to the Riyadh Central Hospital were appendectomy was performed on him.
During his confinement, he developed right-sided weakness and numbness and difficulty of
speaking which was found to have been caused by Atrial Fibrillation and CVA embolism.

In a letter dated September 22, 1982, petitioners formally terminated private respondent's
employment effective September 29, 1982, up to which time petitioners paid private
respondent his salaries under his employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982,
private respondent was repatriated to Manila.

On November 23, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners. Such complaint was filed with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA.

In deciding the case in favor of respondent, the POEA took judicial notice of Social Insurance
Law of Saudi Arabia.

Question: is the POEA correct in taking judicial notice of the Social Insurance Law of Saudi
Arabia, which was not duly proved during the hearing? Explain.

ANSWER: The POEA Administrator, in finding petitioners liable to private respondent for
medical benefits accruing to the latter under the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, took
judicial notice of the said law. To this extent, the POEA Administrator's actuations are legally
defensible. We have earlier ruled in Norse Management Co. (PTE) vs. National Seamen
Board[xxv][12] that evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which a mere quasi-judicial
body is not strict about. Although in a long line of cases, we have ruled that a foreign law,
being a matter of evidence must be alleged and proved, in order to be recognized and
applied in a particular controversy involving conflicts of laws, jurisprudence on this matter
was not meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies in the light of
the well-settled rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by
technical rules. (Dumez Company v. NLRC, GR 74495, July 11, 1996)

CASE PROBLEM NO. 4.

 Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing
to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran
with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State
intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising,
in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish
to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner
to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former
placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has
no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. 4

The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, and appreciated the documents
annexed to the records but which were not offered by the Solicitor General.

The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court assigning as error: that the appellate
court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision.
Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of
paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.

Rule on the assigned error: was it correct for the CA to appreciate evidence not
formally offered?

ANSWER: Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering
the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on
the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value,"[1][12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[2][13] of the Rules of Court
which provides that -

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily
in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision
in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[3][14]
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving
for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.(Ong Chia
v. Republic, GR 127240, March 27, 2000)

CASE PROBLEM NO. 5.

Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and
transporting "balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A. to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel
J. Salazar (hereinafter "Manuel") managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a
business registered in his name with principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon
City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar (hereinafter "Mario") handled the U.S. side of the
forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S. International, Inc., a corporation with
principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

According to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., Mario tried to convince him to invest some money in the said business.
Mario had allegedly represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust and
administered by both him and his brother for the exclusive use of their forwarding and
transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario promised him a return on his
investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for one month, at the end of which, his
money plus interest earned shall be returned to him.

When petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to part
with his money under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private
respondents’ representations and assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount
of US $34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in
the U.S.A. Thus, petitioner issued several personal checks made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo,.
or to "Calfed", or payable to cash. Except for California Federal Check No. 322 which was
encashed by Mario himself, private respondents received the proceeds of the above checks
through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August 1989.

Meanwhile, Mario encountered serious liquidity problems that prompted him to petition the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts on September 27, 1990. He was ordered
"released from all dischargeable debts" by the said court on January 25, 1991.

Upon the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded from
Mario in the States and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his financial investment
and/or the return of his capital plus interest earned. At the outset, private respondents
avoided their obligation to petitioner by making various excuses but after persistent
demands by the latter, Manuel finally admitted that their shipments had encountered some
problems with the Bureau of Customs. Thus, on January 29, 1990, Manuel executed a letter
authorizing the petitioner to withdraw documents to assist in the release of their shipments
from the Bureau of Customs. However, when petitioner attempted to secure the release of
the "balikbayan" boxes from the Bureau of Customs, he discovered that the same had
actually contained smuggled goods and were accordingly seized and forfeited in favor of the
government.

To prove that the money was not in trust, but a loan, the respondents offered as evidence its
previous transactions of loan with other friends in the U.S. . Manuel offered in evidence
copies of the contracts of loan entered into between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee
Tanzo, which are contracts of loan and not trust agreements.

Petitioner object to the admissibility of said evidence, as they are irrelevant to the contract
of trust agreements that was entered between him and Mario.

Rule on his contention.

ANSWER: The contention is wrong. The Supreme Court rules: “We agree with the petitioner
that these loan contracts do not by themselves prove that his agreement with the private
respondents was also a loan. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, he is not a party to
these contracts that clearly stipulate "Liwayway Dee Tanzo" as creditor and "M.J.S.
International represented by its General Manager, Mario J. Salazar" as debtor.

These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary value in support of Manuel's claim
that the agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with Liwayway
Dee Tanzo. Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.[4][13]

Elaborating thus, we have held that:

[C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when

there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact
offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar
acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit,
because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into
such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.
[5][14] (Underscoring supplied). S-jcj

The series of transactions between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo were
entered into under similar circumstances as those surrounding the contract between
petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement between petitioner and Mario,
the loan contracts between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the
creditors shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the latter in its business
operations.[6][15] Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks to Liwayway Dee
Tanzo for investment in private respondents' business. This shows that private respondents
were transacting directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that they conduct
business, that is the loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents'
modus operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S. International
was to borrow money from willing investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of
things, that private respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established business
practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner” (Tanzo v. Drilon, GR 106671,
March 30, 2000).

PROBLEM NO. 6.

In a land dispute, the parties appeared before the barangay council,which rendered a
decision of the conflicting claims which they presented before said council.Said barangay
decision was contained in a document termed as Administrative Case No. 4,
 During trial said documentary exhibit was offered, which the court admitted and
appreciated in deciding in favor of the appellants.In their first assignment, appellants assail
the admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant of Exhibit "3." This exhibit is a
decision in favor of the defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura,
by the council of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative Case No. 4, for
the settlement of ownership and possession of the land.

Question: Is Exh. 3 admissible as evidence in court?

ANSWER: The decision of the Barrio Council of San Pascual, Tuba, Banguet, in its
Administrative Case No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of the land in
question is ultra vires because barrio councils, which are not courts, have no judicial powers
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio
Charter). Said administrative order if presented as exhibit is inadmissible in a judicial
proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership and
possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court). (MIGUEL V. Catalino [G.R. No. L-23072.
November 29, 1968.])

PROBLEM NO 7.

How would you state your objections to the following:

A) : “You stated in your last testimony that you saw A driving the car, why are you now
insisting that A was not driving”, when what the witness had merely said was that he had
seen A seated on the front seat of the vehicle.

B) : Does ABC or did ABC produce the goods that your company was intending to buy?

C) “Tell us in your own words, what happed?”

d) “How is it that you can recollect a date as long ago as that and you cannot remember the
day of the week?”

E) : “Did you know that the accused had been beating his wife nightly?:, when there is no
prior evidence that such was the case. Or if the accused is the one asked: “When did you
stop beating your wife?”, when there is no evidence that he had been beating his wife.

Answers: A)Objection, Your Honor, the question is misleading.”

B)“Objection, Your Honor, it is compound question”.

C)“Your Honor, the question calls for a narrative answer”.

D)“Objection, Your Honor, the question is argumentative. ”or“Objection, Your Honor, the
question is harassing the witness.”

E)“Objection, Your Honor, the question assumes facts not in evidence.

Problem no. 8:

What is a judicial admission? When is it mandatory? Discretionary? And when is hearing

necessary?

ANSWER: Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments
of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
(1a)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (2a)

PROBLEM NO. 9.
When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public
office, how would you prove its contents?

ANSWER: Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. —

When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. (2a)

PROBLEM NO. 10.

Who are the persons under the rules of evidence who cannot testify because of a
“Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.”?

ANSWER: Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would
blacken the reputation of the patient;

(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
PROBLEM NO. 11.

When is “Previous Conduct as Evidence” admissible and when is it not admissible?

ANSWER: 4. Previous Conduct as Evidence

Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (48a)

Section 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or property. (49a)

PROBLEM NO. 12.

Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their children were Thelma, Nerissa,
Arnel and Gerry Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and children
executed on August 22, 1977 a notarized Deed of Partial Partition (Exhibit 2) by virtue of
which each one of them was given a share of several parcels of registered lands all situated
in Taytay, Rizal.

The following day, August 23, 1977, the same mother and children executed a Memorandum
Agreement (Exhibit H) which provided:

“That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following
registered real properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines, x x x.

xxx

That sometime on August 22, 1977, a Deed of Partial Partition was executed among us
before Atty. Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the Province of Rizal, per Doc. No.
1776; Page No. 14; of his Notarial Register No. XLIX, Series of 1977;

xxx

That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned
and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her;

That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale
of their respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among
themselves and by these presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall
share alike and received equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted
to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition.’
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting
parties herein up to and until the last lot covered by the Deed of [P]artial [P]artition above
adverted to shall have been disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided
and their respective shares received by each of them.”

This Memorandum Agreement was registered and annotated in the titles of the lands
covered by the Deed of Partial Partition.

Subsequently, the same parties caused the consolidation and subdivisions of the lands they
respectively inherited from the late Delfin I. Cruz per Deed of Partial Partition. After that,
they registered the Deed of Partial Partition and subdivision plans and titles were issued in
their names. In the case of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, the following titles were issued to her in
her name: TCT No. 502603 (Exhibit A), TCT No. 502604, (Exhibit B), TCT No. 502605 (Exhibit
C), TCT No. 502606 (Exhibit D), TCT No. 502608 (Exhibit E), TCT No. 502609 (Exhibit F), TCT
No. 502610 (Exhibit G), hereinafter called the lands in question. Naturally, the annotation
pertaining to the Memorandum Agreement was carried in each of said seven (7) titles and
annotated in each of them.

Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil Case No. 31231 against the
spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a sum of money. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI (Quezon City) rendered a decision of June 1, 1981 in favor of
Eliseo and Virginia condemning the spouses Nerissa and Nelson Tamayo to pay them
P126,529.00 with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint plus P5,000.00
attorney’s fee. After the finality of that decision, a writ of execution (Exhibit J) was issued on
November 20, 1981.

Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question. On June 29,
1983, these properties were sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the spouses
Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. Accordingly, the sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K)
over –

‘… all the rights, claims, interests, titles, shares, and participations of defendant spouses
Nerissa Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo..’

Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period
and so the final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands in question to
spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give
them the owner’s duplicate copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she
refused. The couple moved the court to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register
of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. This was granted on September 7, 1984. But Nerissa was
adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the court and so the Malolos couple asked
the court to declare said titles as null and void.
During the trial of the civil case, some of the documentary evidence presented were
mortgage and sale transactions entered by the other sisters and brothers of Nerissa
Tamayo.Said evidence were objected for being immaterial and irrelevant.

The trial court that these pieces of evidence are applicable under the res inter alios acta rule
and the principle of independent and relevant statements. Do you agree? What do you
understand concerning the said principles?

ANSWER: Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that
tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that
he has done a similar as act at another time.[xxvi][24] Evidence of similar acts or
occurrences compels the dependant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the
complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the
attention of the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule
guards against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial
and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.[xxvii][25]

The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral facts
may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the
circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.[xxviii][26] Evidence of similar acts
may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it
sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person’s; it provides insight into such
person’s motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.[xxix]
[27]

In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land they
entered into, in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that
the parcels in issue are not co-owned. The court is not persuaded. Evidence of such
transactions falls under the exception to the rule on the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is
admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence
already received.[xxx][28] The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature
of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots on question since they
are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in
fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be
treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the
evidence in dispute manifests petitioners’ common purpose and design to treat all the
parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.
[xxxi][29]

Under the principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership of the
lands in issue. In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has introduced another to
act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or
course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.[xxxii][30] It further bars him
from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation of law, become settled by
the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself,
either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pairs.[xxxiii]
[31]

In their transaction with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered by
the same MOA are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence of a co-ownership
over such properties. Thus, they are estopped from claiming otherwise because, by their
very own acts and representations as evidenced by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they
have denied such co-ownership. (CRUZ V.MALOLOS, GR126713, JULY 27, 1998)

PROBLEM NO. 13

A) In a land dispute, the defendants offered to compromise the case by offering P20,000
cash for the dismissal of the case. The plaintiffs did not agree, and so the case for recovery of
possession pushed through. During trial, the plaintiff testified about the offer of
compromise. The defendant objected to its admissibility. As judge would you admit said
testimony?

B) In a criminal case for malicious mischief, the accused offered to pay 5,000 pesos to pay for
the broken bottles of beer, and asks for the dismissal of the criminal case. During the trial,
the offer was used as evidence to prove the criminal liability of the accused. Is said evidence
admissible as an implied admission of guilt? Would your answer be the same is the crime
charged is reckless imprudence resulting to homicide?

c) In a physical injuries case, the accused offered to pay the medical and hospital expenses.
Can this be considered as proof of civil or criminal liability of the accused?

ANSWER: Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror.

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those

allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense,
is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an

injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
PROBLEM NO. 14.

Some examples of the exceptions to the hearsay rule are the following:

Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made underthe
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
(31a)

Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to
be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against
third persons. (32a)

Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a)

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books
or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (34a)

Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting
marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in
public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. (35)

Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae. (36a)

QUESTION: State the other five exceptions, and explain each.

ANSWER: Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time
of transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (37a)

Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)

Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein. (39)

Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of

history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession
or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition

of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)

Problem No. 15:

The general rule is that leading questions are not allowed during trial. State some exceptions
to the rule.

ANSWER: Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the
witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed,
except:

(a) On cross examination;

(b) On preliminary matters;

(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;

(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or

(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.

PROBLEM NO. 16.

In a criminal case for murder, a thumbmarked affidavit was presented as evidence. The
affidavit was not testified in court by the affiant. The affidavit runs (excerpt) as follows:

Q: Do you believe in GOD?

A: Yes.

Q: What is your name?

A: Paulino Baquiran, Jr.

Q: What happen (sic) to you:

A: I was shot.

Q: Who shot you?

A: Cpl. Tuting Ugaddan.

Q: When?

A: At about 9:00 o’clock, January 27, 1991.

Q: Where?

A:: At the Geraldine (sic) Canteen, Lingaling, Tumauini, Isabela.

Q: How do you feel?

A: So painful.”[xxxiv][17]

QUESTION: Is such affidavit admissible to prove the guilt of the accused? Why?

ANSWER: The defense simply failed to offer any piece of evidence attributing to said
prosecution witness any foul motive to falsely accused and incriminate a fellow officer in so
grave a crime.[xxxv][23] Absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating said witness
of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no such motive existed and, thus, his
credibility is strengthened[xxxvi][24] and his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
[xxxvii][25]

Dying declaration though generally hearsay are admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 130.[xxxviii][26] The above declaration under the
factual milieu of this case, has the vestiges of the accepted elements for the admissibility of
a dying declaration which are:

-- the declaration must concern the crime and sorrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;

-- it was made at a time when the declarant was under the consciousness of an
impending death;

-- the declarant would be competent to testify;

-- the declaration is offered in any case in which the decedent is the victim.[xxxix][27]

Said declaration pertains to the identity of the declarant’s assailant and the instances that
transpired concerning what happened to him. At the time that declaration was made, the
declarant was hospitalized, wounded on the throat, and was very weak.[xl][28] Combining
these circumstances with the victim-declarant’s aversion of pain creates upon the latter
impression that his death is imminent and immediate. The enigma of contemplating of a
death-at-hand produces the most powerful consideration that impels and induces the mind
to speak the truth – “a situation so solemn and awful as to be considered by law as creating
an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.”[xli][29]

On his competency to testify, there is no allegation nor evidence on record which would
support the slightest impression that the declarant would have been incompetent to testify
had he survived. At the time of his death he was a member of the police force and is
presumably capable of perceiving, retaining what has been perceived and expressing what
has been retained. These circumstances suffice to sustain the presumption of his
competency to testify at the material time.(UGADDAN V. CA, 124914, July 2, 1997).

PROBLEM NO. 17

What is an “interlocking confession”? What is its significance in the admissibility of

evidence?

ANSWER: Extrajudicial confessions which are independently made without collusion,

identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other are called
interlocking confessions. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual
participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented
that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the
crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession
and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.”(SANTOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
71523, Dec. 8, 2000)

PROBLEM NO. 18.

Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove

conveyance of title to a property?

ANSWER: In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax
declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of
inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the
original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In
the absence of the said document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of
said deed of sale must fail. (EBREO V. EBREO, 71523, DEC. 8, 2000)

PROBLEM NO. 19.

What do you understand by the “totality of circumstances test”, and how is it related to
“out-of-court identification”?

Answer: In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[xlii][25] the Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identification. It listed the following ways of identifying the suspects
during custodial investigation: show-ups, mug shots and line-ups. The Court there ruled:

“x x x. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru

show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification.
It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time: (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.” (PEOPLE V. TIMON,GR NO. 97841-42,
NOV. 12, 1997)
PROBLEM NO. 20.

Can a birth certificate be both an evidence of fact of birth and filiation? Explain.

Answer: While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the
record of birth appearing in the civil register,[7][80] yet the rule is where the birth certificate
presented was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be
accepted as evidence of the alleged filiation. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[8][81] we held:

x x x Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its
execution: the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be
considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be
signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. x x x[9]
[82]

In Angeles v. Maglaya, we refused to give evidentiary weight to the birth certificate as proof
of filiation in a case for settlement of estate to support a claim of legitimacy because the
same was unsigned by the alleged father. With more reason we should not accord value to
the birth certificate in this case considering that its effect would be to increase the penalty
to be imposed on the appellant. This is a criminal case wherein an interpretation
unfavorable to the accused is generally unacceptable.

The Solicitor General cites this Court’s pronouncement in Heirs of Cabais v. Court of Appeals,
[10][83] that “[a] birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of
filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth
contained in such public document.”[11][84] The pronouncement is not applicable to this
case. It was made merely as an elucidation of the limited evidentiary value of a baptismal
certificate in this jurisdiction vis-à-vis a birth certificate. In that case, presented was the
baptismal certificate of the person whose filiation was sought to be established. The birth
certificate itself was not presented. In the case at bar, the birth certificate of AAA was
presented.

We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her
birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not
AAA’s biological father.(PP V. DELANTAR, 169143, Feb, 2, 2007)