SECOND DIVISION

WILSON GO and PETER GO, G.R. No. 140862

Petitioners,
Present:
*
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus- CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ANITA RICO, in substitution of the Promulgated:

late Pilar Rico,
Respondent. April 25, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us for resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Resolutions dated August 16, 1999 and November 25, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 53342, entitled WILSON GO and PETER GO, petitioners,
versus ANITA RICO, in substitution of the late PILAR RICO, respondent.

On August 28, 1997, Wilson Go and Peter Go, petitioners, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 40, Quezon City a Complaint
for Ejectment[1] against defendants Pilar Rico (now deceased), mother of Anita
Rico, respondent herein, Catalina Pablico, Violeta Medrano,
Elmer Molit, Osmando Pagdanganan, Bobby Marquisas, Alexis Leynes, and all
persons claiming rights under them. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
18315, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 170475 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City,
located at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, same city; that on the land is an existing
building with several units leased to the said individual defendants; that the lease
contracts had already expired, thus their continued stay in the leased premises is on
a month-to-month basis; that on March 30, 1997, being in dire need of the property
for their exclusive use, they (petitioners), through their lawyer, sent letters to the
defendants, informing them that their respective monthly lease contracts are being
terminated and that they must vacate the leased premises on July 15, 1997; and that
despite notice, the defendants refused to do so.

In their respective answers, they averred that petitioners do not own the
premises, part of the estate of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura; that the estate
is the subject of the probate proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
95, Quezon City, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q94-20661; that the defendants have
been the lessees of Felisa Tamiode Buenaventura dating back in 1988; that their
lease contracts have not been terminated; that Bella A. Guerrero, then
special administratrix of the estate, in her personal capacity, without approval of the
probate court and in conspiracy with the petitioners, sold to the latter the leased
premises; that by reason of such fictitious sale, the probate court removed Bella
Guerrero as special administratrix and appointed in her stead Resurrecion Bihis; that
as the new administratrix of the estate, Bihis renewed the lease contracts with the
defendants; and that in view of these circumstances, petitioners have no right
whatsoever to evict them from the premises.

On July 10, 1998, the MeTC rendered a

Decision[2] ordering inter alia the ejectment of the defendants, including respondent
herein. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the:

a. defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate

the property of the plaintiffs designated as 161-H; 161-E; 161-
D; 161 Kanlaon Street; 161-F; Unit Kodak/Dunkin/Smokeys,
 all at Retiro Street, Quezon City and restore possession thereof
to plaintiffs.

b. defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as and for

attorneys fees;

c. defendants to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

The MeTC held:

The evidence on record readily discloses beyond any shade of doubt that
plaintiffs are the registered owners of the property as (shown) by the Transfer
Certificate of Title (Annex A); that the defendants are possessors of the property
by mere tolerance of the plaintiffs; that necessarily, defendants, who are mere
possessors by tolerance, are bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the
property upon demand by its owner, and plaintiffs have every right to recover
possession thereof when actual need arises, as in the instant case. The refusal of the
defendants without lawful cause to vacate the property, notwithstanding demands
made on them, constitutes unlawful detention of the property, thus entitling the
plaintiffs to eject the defendants in accordance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule 70,
Rules of Court.

xxx

It should be borne in mind that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their
pleadings (De Luna vs. CA, 212 SCRA 276). As correctly pointed out by the
plaintiffs, x x x even without including the estate of the late FelisaTamio de
Buenaventura as party-defendant, there can be a valid and final determination of
this case. After all, the defendants in this case have nothing to do with the cases
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 92, Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-32515 (for reconveyance).[3]

Only the respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 222, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q98-35559, assigning these
errors:

1. The lower court erred in setting aside the issue of ownership as

indispensable in resolving the issue of possession.
 2. Granting that only the issue of possession must be resolved, the lower court
likewise erred in ignoring the fact that plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-
interest were not in prior and actual possession of the property.

In its Decision[4] dated July 10, 1998, the RTC reversed the MeTC Decision
and dismissed petitioners Complaint. It ruled:

x x x, defendant-appellant has been able to produce the lease contract it had

with the late Felisa Buenaventura and more significantly that which now exists
between the defendant-appellant and the estate of Felisa, thru the
new administratrix, Resurrecion Bihis x x x.

Plaintiffs cannot deny that their predecessor Bella Guerrero herself declared
the leased property as part of the estate of Felisa in the settlement proceedings (p.
247, Record), x x x. And the glaring situation to date is that there is a pending action
for reconveyance filed by the estate of Felisa against the Gos for the alleged
unlawful or fictitious transfer of the property in their favor. What is palpably clear
from the record is that the right of Bella Guerrero, from whom plaintiffs allegedly
derived their interest to the subject property, is still debatable.

Although it has been consistently held that mere allegation of ownership of

the property in dispute by the defendant or the pendency of an action
for reconveyance of title over the same property is unavailing in an ejectment suit,
the rule is not without exception. Thus, where the question of de facto possession
cannot be determined properly without settling that of de jurepossession and
ownership because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, the court will be
constrained to give importance to the issue of title (De la Santa vs. Court of
Appeals, 140 SCRA 44). This court looked into all the supporting evidence of the
defendant-appellant, and all the foregoing pose prejudicial question to the
resolution of the suit for unlawful detainer against herein appellant so that, in the
meantime, she should not be disturbed from her peaceful possession and occupation
of the leased premises.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioners, on July 6, 1999, filed with the Court of

Appeals a Petition for Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53342. However, in its
Resolution[5]dated August 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the
petition for failure of the petitioners to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping in accordance with par. 2, Section 2 in relation to Section 3, all of
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, considering that a reading
of the certification shows that it is the counsel for the petitioners who has executed
the same instead of the petitioners.

Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, counsel for petitioners, filed a Motion for

Reconsideration (with Compliance)[6] alleging inter alia that she was compelled to
sign the certification against forum shopping because petitioner Wilson Go left for
the United States to attend to his ailing father, while petitioner Peter Go was
in Cebu for an important business commitment; that if she waited for any of the
petitioners to sign the certification, the period to file the petition could expire; and
that at any rate, she has a Special Power of Attorney wherein petitioners authorized
her to represent them during the pre-trial and hearing of Civil Case No. 18315
for ejectment. Petitioners attached to their motion the certification against forum
shopping signed by petitioner Wilson Go.

However, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution[7] dated November 25,

1999 still denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course
to their petition. They assert that it should have applied the Rules on certification
against forum shopping liberally in their favor.

Respondent vehemently opposed the petition and prayed that it be

dismissed and that the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals be

affirmed.

We agree with the respondent.

Section 5, Rule 7,[8] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal

party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting
a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b)
 if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable

by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Section 2 (second paragraph), Rule 42[9] of the same Rule states:

Sec. 2. Form and contents. x x x

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under
oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must
state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or thereof
within five (5) days therefrom. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of the same Rule 42 further mandates:

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the

petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket fee and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (Underscoring supplied)

Evidently, the above-quoted provisions stress the mandatory requirements in

filing the certification against forum shopping.
 Here, petitioners admit that neither of them signed the certification against
forum shopping. Only their counsel did.

It bears stressing that a certification by counsel and not by the principal party
himself is no certification at all. The reason for requiring that it must be signed by
the principal party himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than
anyone else, whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or
tribunals.[10]Clearly, the subject petition suffers from a fatal defect warranting its
dismissal[11] by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolutions.

We are not convinced by petitioners plea that the Rules must be relaxed since
they subsequently complied with the requirements. Firstly, petitioners filing of a
belated certification against forum shopping did not cure the defect considering that
it should have been filed simultaneously with the petition.[12] Secondly, they failed
to show justifiable cause for their failure to personally sign the certification. Their
lawyers explanation that they were out-of-town at the time
their petition was filed with the Court of Appeals is bereft of basis. That explanation
is an afterthought as it was not alleged by counsel in her certification against forum
shopping. Thirdly, the

Special Power of Attorney dated November 5, 1997 executed by petitioners in favor

of their counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, is merely for the latter to represent them
during the pre-trial and subsequent hearing of Civil Case No.
18315 for ejectment before the MeTC, Branch 40, Quezon City. Such Special
Power of Attorney is not a substitute for the required certification against forum
shopping duly signed by the petitioners.

While we have ruled time and again that litigants should have the amplest
opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause free, as much as possible,
from the constraints of procedural technicalities however, equally settled is the rule
that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules
is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice,[13] as in this case.

In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53342 are
AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
 Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

MEDISERV, INC., G.R. No. 161368

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS (Special Promulgated:

Former 13th Division) and
LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT April 5, 2010
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari to nullify the September 16, 2003
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Petition for Review of private
respondent Landheights Development Corporation and the November 7, 2003
Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The facts are as follows:

On September 20, 1994, petitioner Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate

mortgage in favor of China Banking Corporation as security for a loan. The
mortgage was constituted on a 500-square meter lot with improvements located
at 926 A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 205824 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila. Mediserv
defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the real estate mortgage was
foreclosed. At the public auction sale, private respondent Landheights Development
Corporation emerged as the highest bidder with a bid price of P17,617,960.00 for
the subject property.

Sometime in April 1998, Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila an Application for Possession of Real Estate Property Purchased
at an Auction Sale under Act No. 3135.[3] On September 21, 1999, the title of the
property was consolidated in favor of Landheights and the Register of Deeds for the
City of Manila issued TCT No. 242202 in its favor. On March 13, 2000,
Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the subject property, filed a verified
complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 166637.

On October 12, 2000, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 15, rendered a

decision[4] in favor of Landheights, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby entered in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter and all persons
claiming rights under said entity to VACATE the premises situated at 926 A.H.
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and to PAY plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as
attorneys fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Mediserv appealed[5] the decision to the RTC of Manila docketed as

Civil Case No. 00-99395. On June 14, 2002 the RTC rendered a
Decision,[6] the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
15, Manila, dated October 26, 2000, is hereby reversed and set aside; and the
Complaint for Ejectment is hereby ordered to be dismissed.

Further, on the Counterclaims, the plaintiff-appellee is hereby directed to pay the

defendant-appellant, the sum of Php 50,000.00 for actual damages and another sum
of Php 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.
 With costs against plaintiff-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

On September 16, 2002, Landheights motion for reconsideration[7] was likewise

denied. [8]

Accordingly, Landheights filed a Petition for Review[9] with the Court of Appeals,
which however dismissed the petition in a Resolution[10] dated December 12, 2002,
to wit:
It appearing that the written authority of Dickson Tan to sign the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint and
answer, are not attached to the petition, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration[11] on December 26,
2002 and subsequently submitted a Secretarys Certificate[12] dated January 13,
2003 executed by its Corporate Secretary, Ms. Polly S. Tiu, stating that the Board of
Directors affirms the authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file the Petition for Review.

On March 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [13] granting
Landheights a new period of ten (10) days within which to correct and rectify the
deficiencies in the petition. On April 1, 2003, Mediserv filed a motion for
reconsideration[14] praying that the March 19, 2003 Resolution be set aside and the
December 12, 2002 Resolution, which dismissed the petition, be reinstated. On even
date, Landheights filed its Manifestation of Compliance.[15]

On September 16, 2003, the appellate court issued the first assailed resolution
reinstating the petition for review, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
With the subsequent compliance of the petitioner with the requirement of the rules
and in the interest of substantial justice, We now consider the petition reinstated.

Respondent is hereby directed to file its comment on the petition within ten (10)
days from notice and petitioner may file its reply within five (5) days from receipt
of the comment.

SO ORDERED.
Mediserv filed a motion for reconsideration[16] on October 3, 2003, while
Landheights filed its comment[17] thereto on October 14, 2003.

On November 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed resolution,
the significant portion of which states:

However, again, in the interest of justice, we shall consider the belatedly filed
Secretarys Certificate as a subsequent compliance of our March 19,
2003 Resolution.

WHEREFORE, this Courts Resolution dated September 16, 2003 is

hereby REITERATED. The petition is hereby REINSTATED and the
respondent is directed to file its Comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice.

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, petitioner
is now before us via the present recourse. Petitioner faults the appellate court as
follows:
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ACTED WITHOUT AND/ OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REINSTATING THE PETITION DESPITE THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE
RULES AS WELL AS THE JURISPRUDENCE AS LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT CALLING FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAID
PETITION.[18]

Petitioner argues that from the beginning, the Court of Appeals found the petition
filed before it to be defective for failure to comply with the rules. It points out that
there is no showing that the respondent corporation, through its board of directors,
had authorized Mr. Dickson Tan to file the petition for review in its behalf and to
sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping. However, instead of
upholding the dismissal of the petition, the Court of Appeals allowed private
respondent to rectify its deficiency, which is contrary to jurisprudence.

Petitioner also cites Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which provides that failure to comply with the requirements on
certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the
case. Petitioner thus asserts that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the petition
for review filed by respondent corporation.

We are not persuaded.

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.[19] A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.[20] The party need not sign
the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows
the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. [21]

On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification

under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.[22]

The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the mandatory
directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical
persons.[23] A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of
directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing
of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.[24]

In the case of Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[25] the

certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the petitioner corporations
counsel; hence, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to comply with
Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as amended.[26] Petitioner corporations
motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court absent any compelling
reason for petitioners failure to comply, at the first instance, with [the circular] .... On
appeal, this Court denied the petition in this wise:

In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the
certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it
shown any compelling reason for us to disregard strict compliance with the
rules.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[28] petitioner Shipside

Incorporated filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
which was, however, dismissed for failure to attach proof that the one (1) who signed
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, its Manager Lorenzo
Balbin, Jr., was authorized to institute the petition in petitioners behalf. Shipside
Incorporated filed a motion for reconsideration to which it attached a certificate
issued by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days before the filing of the petition,
its board of directors authorized Balbin, Jr. to file it. The Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration, so the petitioner sought relief from this Court. In
granting the petition, this Court explained:

It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioners Resident

Manager Balbin filed the petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin
was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification
therein, as a consequence of which the petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, attaching to said motion a certificate issued by its board secretary
stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin
had been authorized by petitioners board of directors to file said petition.
The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of
a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24,
2000, 336 SCRA 419). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form
of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act
on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may thereby be served.
 On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally
not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner
to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said
signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the
belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA
477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the
filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement.
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the
Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the
petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for lack
of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it
subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit
certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there
were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the
relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum
shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in
regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to
the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the
instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so.
That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that Balbin
was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this
oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-
forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted
too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of
forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical
rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial
justice is an even more urgent ideal.[29] (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that

Landheights has substantially complied with the verification and certification
requirements. We have held in a catena of cases[30] with similar factual
circumstances that there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Court when
there is a belated submission or filing of the secretarys certificate through a motion
for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari.

In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,[31] this Court acknowledged that it

has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of
these certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under
justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification. It also
conceded that if this Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification against
forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings, with more reason should
it sanction the timely submission of such certification though the proof of the
signatorys authority was submitted thereafter.

The Court is aware of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping

in filing petitions for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65,
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. When
the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a
natural person to whom the power to execute such certification has been validly
conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority.[32]

However, we must make a distinction between non-compliance with the

requirements for certificate of non-forum shopping and verification and substantial
compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has
allowed the belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act
constitutes substantial compliance. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA,[33] the Court
allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the dismissal of the
petition. In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[34] the Court reinstated a petition on
the ground of substantial compliance even though the verification and certification
were submitted only after the petition had already been originally
dismissed. In Havtor Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC,[35] we acknowledged
substantial compliance when the lacking secretarys certificate was submitted by the
petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the
original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such
requirement.
 In the present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr.
Dickson Tans authority to sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping
on its behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted to the Court
of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement
of the petition itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances,
we deem it more in accord with substantive justice that the case be decided on the
merits.

It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations

where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes
at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to
help secure substantial justice.[36]

Finally, we note that the instant petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires the existence of grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is
performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[37] No such grave
abuse of discretion exists in this case to warrant issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The September 16,

2003 and November 7, 2003 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is
hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in light of the foregoing
discussion with DISPATCH.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice