CRITIQUE OF KANT ON ANALYTIC JUDGMENTS AND

SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

In the Introduction1 of the Critique of Pure Reason,2 the transcendental idealist3

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) holds that only synthetic a priori judgments are truly scientific, not

1
Cf. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason (1787 second edition), Introduction, trans. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn,
Britannica Great Books of the Western World (vol. 42), Chicago, 1952, pp. 14-22.
2
Studies on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: N. K. SMITH, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,
Macmillan, London, 1930 ; H. J. PATON, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols, Macmillan, New York, 1936 ; A. C. EWING, A Short Commentary on Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen, London, 1938 ; C. G. GARNETT, The Kantian Philosophy of Space, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1939 ; T. D. WELDON, Introduction to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1945 ; G. MARTIN, Kant’s Metaphysics and Theory of Science, Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1955 ; G. BIRD, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962 ; R. P.
WOLFF, Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963 ; N.
ROTENSTREICH, Experience and Its Systematization: Studies in Kant, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965 ; J.
BENNETT, Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966 ; D. P. DRYER, Kant’s Solution for
Verification in Metaphysics, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966 ; H. HEIMSOETH, Transzendentale Dialektik: Ein
Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 4 vols., Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1966-1971 ; J. HARTNACK,
Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1967 ; M. S. GRAM, Kant, Ontology, and the A
Priori, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968 ; T. K. SWING, Kant’s Transcendental Logic, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1969 ; S. J. AL-AZM, The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1972 ; A. MELNICK, Kant’s Analogies of Experience, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1973 ; A. LLANO, Fenómeno y trascendencia en Kant, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1973 ; L. BECK (ed.), Kant’s
Theory of Knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974 ; J. BENNETT, Kant’s Dialectic, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1974 ; W. H. WALSH, Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975 ;
T. E. WILKERTON, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976 ; R. VERNEAUX, E.
Kant: ‘Critica della ragion pura,’ Japadre, L’Aquila, 1979 ; J. N. FINDLAY, Kant and the Transcendental Object:
A Hermeneutic Study, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981 ; J. V. BUROKER, Space and Incongruence: The Origin
of Kant’s Idealism, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981 ; K. AMERIKS, Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the
Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982 ; J. N. MOHANTY and R. W. SHAHAN
(eds.), Essays on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1982 ; R.
WALKER, Kant on Pure Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982 ; R. B. PIPPIN, Kant’s Theory of Form:
An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1982 ; H. E. ALLISON,
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1983 ; G. NAGEL, The Structure of
Experience: Kant’s System of Principles, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983 ; R. E. AQUILA,
Representational Mind: A Study of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1983 ;
K. ASCHENBRENNER, A Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic,
University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1983 ; P. GUYER, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1987 ; A. T. WINTERBOURNE, The Ideal and the Real: An Outline of Kant’s Theory
of Space, Time, and Mathematical Construction, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988 ; P. FAGGIOTTO,
Introduzione alla metafisica kantiana della analogia, Massimo, Milan, 1989 ; F. O’FARRELL, Per leggere la
‘Critica della ragion pura’ di Kant, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Rome, 1989 ; R. E. AQUILA, Matter in Mind:
A Study of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989 ; P. KITCHER, Kant’s
Transcendental Psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990 ; V. MELCHIORRE, Analogia e analisi
trascendentale. Linee per una nuova lettura di Kant, Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1991 ; S. GARDNER, Kant and the
Critique of Pure Reason, Routledge, London, 1999 ; E. WATKINS, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 ; J. V. BUROKER, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006 ; G. BIRD, The Revolutionary Kant: A Commentary on the Critique
of Pure Reason, Open Court La Salle, IL, 2006 ; J. LUCHTE, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Reader’s Guide,

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Continuum, London, 2007 ; D. BURNHAM and H. YOUNG, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Edinburgh
Philosophical Guide, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007 ; E. WATKINS, Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason: Background Source Materials, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009 ; O. HÖFFE, Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason: The Foundations of Modern Philosophy, Springer, Dordrecht, 2010 ; P. GUYER (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010 ; J.
O’SHEA, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation, Routledge, Abingdon, 2014 ; M.
FERRARIS, Goodbye, Kant!: What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason (Suny Series in Contemporary Italian
Philosophy), SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 2014 ; L. J. KAYE, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories:
Unity, Representation, and Apperception, Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2015.
3
John J. Toohey gives us a gnoseological critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism and synthetic a priori
judgments in his Notes on Epistemology (1952) as follows: “The theory of Kant offers no escape from the scepticism
of subjective idealism and undermines its own foundation.
“Proof of Part I: The theory of Kant offers no escape from the scepticism of subjective idealism.
“That theory which limits all our knowledge to phenomena (appearances) in the thinking subject offers no escape
from the scepticism of subjective idealism. But the theory of Kant limits all our knowledge to phenomena in the
thinking subject.
“Therefore the theory of Kant offers no escape from the scepticism of subjective idealism.
“Major: It is a matter of no consequence whether we call the objects of our knowledge ideas or phenomena, so
long as we confine our knowledge within the thinking subject; in either case we are driven into scepticism as
regards the world outside of us. Kant sought to overthrow the scepticism of Hume, but his own system is as
profoundly sceptical as that of Hume.
“The Minor is evident from the constantly reiterated assertion of Kant that we cannot go beyond the phenomena
of sense to the thing-in-itself; the thing-in-itself, is in the theory of Kant utterly unknown to us.
“Proof of Part II: The theory of Kant undermines its own foundation.
“That theory which pronounces as unknowable the principle on which it is based undermines its own foundation.
“But the theory of Kant pronounces as unknowable the principle on which it is based.
“Therefore the theory of Kant undermines its own foundation.
“The Major is evident.
“Minor: The principle on which the theory of Kant is based is the universal reception by mankind of, the
conclusions of mathematics and physics. He rejected all previous systems of metaphysics because none of them had
met with universal reception. Because of the universal reception of the truths of mathematics, and physics he
declared that the judgments of these sciences were the types to which all scientific judgments should conform. But
by his theory he is compelled to doubt the existence of mankind of all men except himself; for the only things he
can know are the phenomena within himself; everything else is unknowable. Hence the existence of mankind is
unknowable to Kant, and therefore the principle which his theory is based is unknowable, namely, the universal
reception by mankind of the conclusions of mathematics and physics.
“Note. Kant says that the judgments of mathematics and physics are certain, and that they are synthetic a priori.
But there are no judgments which are certain and also synthetic a priori in the Kantian sense, and we prove it as
follows:
“A judgment in which the mind has not adequate evidence of what it assents to is not a certain judgment.
“But the Kantian synthetic a priori judgments are judgments in which the mind has not adequate evidence of
what it assents to.
“Therefore the Kantian synthetic a priori judgments are not certain judgments.
“Minor: The synthetic a priori judgment, in the Kantian sense, is a judgment in which the synthesis or union of
the predicate with the subject is effected independently of all experience, that is, by means of a subjective form or
category; and it is only after this subjective form is applied that there is an object which the judgment can assent to.
The application of the category of Reality constitutes an object of affirmative judgment; the application of the
category of Negation constitutes an object of negative judgment (cf. 7). Since there is no object for the mind to
assent to till the category is applied, and since the category is applied independently of the mind’s perception, and
since Kant gives no reason why in any given case the category of Reality should be applied rather than the category
of Negation, it follows that in the Kantian synthetic a priori judgment the mind has not adequate evidence of what it
is going to assent to. One man would make the judgment, “Two plus three are equal to five,” because the category of
Reality had been applied; another man could just as easily and with just as much warrant make the judgment, “Two
plus three are not equal to five,” because the category of Negation had been applied.

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judgments that are purely analytic a priori (which he considers to be purely tautological and
sterile, characteristic of rationalism),4 nor judgments that are synthetic a posteriori (purely
synthetic), characteristic of empiricism, which, although extensive and fecund, being judgments
extending our knowledge beyond the subject, they are nevertheless not endowed with the
universality and necessity characteristic of scientific analytic a priori judgments, since the reason
for attributing a foreign predicate to the subject is solely a subjective actual fact of experience.
For Kant, “a judgment is called analytic when the predicate repeats and develops the formal
content of the subject; for example, the judgment that ‘body is an extended substance.’ A
statement of this sort is but a tautology; it is sterile and incapable of helping science to progress.
Moreover, it has no other value than the concept itself, which does not suffice, in his view, to
express a true item of knowledge. For these reasons, the analytic judgment is not scientific. In
other words, this judgment is but the application of the principle of non-contradiction to a
particular concept. This principle is the most general form of analysis, and plays uniquely but a
negative role in our judgments in the sense that every judgment implicating a contradiction is
necessarily erroneous, while the absence of all contradiction does not suffice that a judgment be
called true or scientific. For the concept, even upon analysis, contains no truth at all.

“A judgment is called synthetic when the predicate is foreign to the formal content of the
subject, and is attributed to it for another reason than merely the analysis of its content. In this
sense, every judgment, except total or partial definitions,5 is synthetic. Thus, not only in
affirming that ‘every man is a musician’ but also in stating that ‘every being is intelligible,’ one

“It is Kant’s contention that we can know nothing about the things-in-themselves, that the only objects we can
know are phenomena, and that all synthetic a priori judgments are concerned with phenomena. But we have just
shown that, on Kant’s theory, even the synthetic a priori judgments about phenomena are uncertain judgments. This
practically reduces the theory of Kant to the status of universal scepticism.”(J. J. TOOHEY, Notes on Epistemology,
Fordham University Press, New York, 1952, chapter 9, nos. 11-13).
4
“Among necessary propositions, there are some, Kant says, in which the analysis of the subject makes us see the
predicate; the predicate is therefore contained in the essential comprehension of the subject. These are his analytic
judgments, e.g. man is an animal endowed with reason. But these judgments, he continues, are purely explicative
and they tell us nothing new. They are therefore tautological, without any scientific interest.”(D. MERCIER,
Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London, 1938, p. 373). In
his critique of Kant’s views on analytic a priori judgments, Mercier writes: “There are, it is true, some judgments
that teach us nothing new, but it is false to say that they are all purely explicative. Let us take, for example, the
proposition, ‘Man is a rational animal.’ If we consider that the subject ‘man’ signifies the specific essence of the
individuals called men, it is evident that this proposition is purely tautological, and teaches us nothing. But this is
not the obvious and natural meaning of the subject ‘man.’ Terms of language are spontaneous creations which have
for their object not the specific essences of beings but certain sensible properties belonging to them. Thus the word
‘man’ brings up primarily the idea ‘a subject standing erect,’ ‘a subject capable of speech.’ Our proposition then
means: ‘This subject standing erect, capable of speech, is an animal endowed with reason.’ It is obvious that in this
case there is no tautology, although the language implies a necessary relation with rational animal.
“…Kant’s definition of the analytical judgment is too limited. A judgment is not the apprehension of the two
terms but the apprehension of a relation between these two terms. Consequently the analysis of the terms of an
analytic proposition has not always the purpose of showing one term to be contained in the other, but it is enough if
it reveals how the simultaneous consideration of the two terms implies the necessity of the relation enunciated. In
other words, an analytic proposition is a proposition ‘in necessary matter.’ From the fact, therefore, that in some
primary propositions the subject does not include the predicate, we have no right to conclude that these principles
are not analytic.”(D. MERCIER, op. cit., p. 374-375).
5
That is, if the definition is taken in the strict sense, in which the notes constituting the idea of the subject are
simply made explicit by the predicate without adding any. Thus, man definable as a reasonable animal, but not as a
sociable animal.

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pronounces a synthetic judgment; in the latter example the notion of intelligibility is derived
from the special factor of intelligence which is not necessarily required by the notion of being.
From this it follows the synthetic judgment has the advantage over pure analysis by being
extensive. It can enrich and advance science; for, instead of remaining in the purely ideal order of
the concept, it always appeals, in some fashion or another, to the real order of intuition or of
experience.

“Kant distinguishes two types of synthetic judgments: a) Purely synthetic judgments

(synthetic, a posteriori judgments) are those in which the reason for attributing a foreign
predicate to a subject, is solely the actual experience; for example, ‘my teeth are hurting me,’ or
‘this water is cold,’ or ‘this stone is falling’ (in the sense that the fact is simply and actually
certified). These judgments are in no wise scientific, for they are purely subjective, valuable only
for him who utters them. Such judgments are content with presenting a simple, sensible intuition
in the form of a judgment, just as the purely analytic judgment expresses a simple concept. They
lack the universality and necessity required for the judgments of science.

“b) Synthetic, a priori judgments are those in which the reason for attributing a foreign
predicate to a subject, is more than sensible intuition; it is rather a presupposed condition,
independent of experience, added to reason in order to clothe it with necessity and universality.
For example, take the judgment, ‘every contingent being has a cause.’ The notion of
contingency, or of indifference to exist or not to exist, does not imply the notion of a cause or of
a perfect and really distinct being on whom another depends for existence; nor does the reverse
situation hold, if one holds to the purely formal signification of concepts. In order to assert and to
certify that these two notions agree, one must refer to experimental reality, or to the intuition
which, in Kant’s view, is always of the sensible order.

“At the same time, even if a sensible experience is repeated throughout the centuries and
becomes rooted in us by an hereditary habit, it cannot explain and justify the necessity and the
universality which belong to the principle of causality and which make it scientific. With good
reason, Kant believed that Hume’s empiricism destroyed all true science. This double trait of
universality and necessity must, then, be explainable by an a priori condition which is
presupposed with the spirit and thus dominates experience. Of such a sort are the synthetic a
priori judgments which are scientific; for, in being synthetic, they enrich and further science,
and, in being a priori, they are necessary and universal.”6

Answer to Kant: What are Analytic A Priori Propositions and Synthetic A Posteriori
Propositions?

In his Science of Correct Thinking, Celestine N. Bittle gives us a scholastic explanation

of analytic a priori propositions and synthetic a posteriori propositions, as follows: “These are
the general types of proposition. 1. ‘Quality’ gives us affirmative and negative propositions; 2.
‘quantity’ gives us universal, particular, singular, collective, and indefinite propositions; 3. the
necessary or contingent ‘relation’ between subject and predicate gives us analytic and synthetic
propositions…From the standpoint of the relation between subject and predicate, propositions

6
F.-J. THONNARD, A Short History of Philosophy, Desclée, Tournai, 1956, pp. 657-659.

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will be either necessary or contingent. When the relation is in a necessary matter, the subject is
always contained in the comprehension of the predicate, or vice versa; hence, an analysis of the
one will reveal the other and thereby reveal the truth of the proposition. But when this relation is
in a contingent matter, neither subject nor predicate is contained in the comprehension of the
other, and an analysis of the one will not reveal the other; since this relation is based on a
contingent fact, we can prove the truth of the proposition only by experience. The necessary
proposition is, therefore, analytic, while the contingent proposition is synthetic; the former is
called ‘a priori’ and the latter ‘a posteriori.’”7

“The third general division of propositions is based on the relation between subject and
predicate. Of course, the subject and predicate of every proposition have the relation of
agreement or disagreement among themselves; but this relation between the two may be either
necessary or contingent. By this we mean that the connection between both terms is either
absolutely necessary and unchangeable or it is contingent and changeable. A few examples will
show the difference. Consider these statements: ‘Man is rational,’ ‘Man is an animal,’ ‘Two and
two are four,’ ‘A square is a quadrangle,’ ‘The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,’
‘The whole is greater than its part,’ ‘The square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is
equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides,’ ‘Living beings are substances,’ ‘Man is
capable of speech.’ And now consider these statements: ‘The Germans were defeated in the
World War,’ ‘Some men are learned,’ ‘Iron is heavy,’ The Hawaiian Islands belong to the United
States,’ ‘France is a republic,’ ‘Gold is precious.’ It takes but a glance to perceive the great
difference between these two sets of statements. We can know the truth of this last set only by
experience; we perceive that the predicate actually belongs to the subject, but not necessarily. In
the former set we know that the predicate actually belongs to the subject, and we also perceive
that it must belong to it, independent of experience; the relation between the two terms is
necessary and unchangeable under all circumstances. Why this difference?

“The difference lies in the fact that the first set of propositions involves something
essential, while the second set contains only accidental attributes. By ‘essential’ we here mean
the whole or part of the essence (species, genus, differentia) or something necessarily resulting
from the essence (property). In other words, in the necessary (essential) proposition the relation
between subject and predicate is such that the one is the species or genus or differentia or
property of the other; the one is contained in the comprehension of the other. Hence, an analysis
of the one will always reveal the other as contained in it, without the need of appealing to
experience to prove its truth. Take the first example: ‘Man is rational.’ What is ‘man’? ‘Man’ is a
‘substance which is bodily, living, sentient, rational.’ Here we see how the analysis of the
subject ‘man’ reveals the predicate ‘rational’; the predicate is contained in the very
comprehension of the subject, because ‘rational’ is the differentia of ‘man.’ Take the example:
‘A square is a quadrangle.’ A ‘quadrangle’ is a ‘plane figure with four sides,’ and a ‘square’ is a
‘plane figure having four equal sides with four right angles.’ A ‘quadrangle,’ therefore, is the
genus of the ‘square’ and is contained in its comprehension; the analysis of the ‘square’ reveals
the predicate ‘quadrangle’ as part of the comprehension and essence of the subject ‘square.’ Now
take the example: ‘Man is capable of speech.’ Here the case is different; analyzing ‘man,’ the
predicate ‘capable of speech’ is not contained in the comprehension of the subject ‘man,’ who is
defined as a ‘rational, sentient, living, bodily substance.’ But let us analyze the predicate. By
7
C. BITTLE, The Science of Correct Thinking, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, pp. 116-117.

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‘speech’ we understand ‘vocal sounds which express ideas.’ Now, only an ‘animal’ is capable of
‘vocal sounds,’ and only a ‘rational being’ can ‘express ideas.’ But a ‘rational animal’ is ‘man.’
Here, then, by analyzing the predicate I find the subject contained in the comprehension of the
predicate.

“In the second set, neither the subject is contained in the comprehension of the predicate
nor the predicate in the comprehension of the subject. The relation between the two is one of fact
only, and this fact is a contingent fact, i.e., it is actually so, but it could be otherwise. That the
predicate actually belongs to the subject is true; the truth of the statement, however, cannot be
known and shown from an analysis of subject and predicate, but by an appeal to fact and
experience. Take, for example, the statement ‘The Germans were defeated in the World War.’
This is true; but it is not necessarily true; it simply happened to be that way, and it could have
been different. The idea of a ‘defeat in the World War’ is not contained in any way in the
comprehension of ‘Germans’ as ‘Germans,’ and therefore an analysis of the idea ‘Germans’ will
never reveal the idea ‘were defeated in the World War.’ Only an appeal to experience and fact
can prove the truth of the statement. So, too, in the statement ‘Some men are learned’ the
attribute ‘learned’ does not belong to the comprehension of ‘man,’ otherwise all ‘men’ would
have to be ‘learned,’ since all men have the same comprehension. That ‘some men are learned’ is
a contingent fact, and ‘learnedness’ is a mere accident which may or may not be found in ‘man.’
In all such instances, therefore, we have a synthesis of a subject and an accidental (contingent)
attribute; and an accident, of course, is never necessary. This is the reason why these
propositions are called synthetic while the others are styled analytic.

“If the relation of subject and predicate is necessary and unchangeable, the proposition is
analytic; if this relation is contingent and changeable, the proposition is synthetic. Analytic
propositions are also called ‘necessary,’ ‘essential,’ ‘a priori’; and the synthetic propositions go
also by the same ‘contingent,’ ‘accidental,’ ‘a posteriori.’

“The terms ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ need explanation. As the words indicate, ‘a priori’
refers to something that ‘comes first,’ and ‘a posteriori’ to something that ‘comes after.’
Knowledge is said to be ‘a priori’ when it is obtained by reasoning from the whole to the parts,
from the cause of the effect, because the ‘whole’ is ‘prior’ to the ‘parts’ and the ‘cause’ is prior
to the ‘effect.’ When this knowledge is obtained by reasoning from the parts to the whole, from
the effect to the cause, it is ‘a posteriori,’ because ‘parts’ and ‘effects’ are posterior to (later than)
the ‘whole’ and the ‘cause.’ Now, in an analytic proposition the mere analysis (unfolding) of the
subject or predicate as a ‘whole’ or ‘cause’ will reveal the other term as a ‘part’ or ‘effect,’ and
such a proposition will therefore be ‘a priori.’ In the synthetic proposition the essence of the
subject or predicate does not contain the other, and an analysis (unfolding) of the one will not
disclose the presence of the other; in this case, knowledge is obtained by observation and
experience, but not from an examination of the essence of subject and predicate, and such
knowledge is therefore ‘a posteriori.’ Hence, every analytic judgment (and proposition) is ‘a
priori,’ while every synthetic judgment (and proposition) is ‘a posteriori.’ Therefore:

“An analytic (or necessary, essential, a priori) proposition is one in which either the
predicate is contained in the comprehension of the subject, or the subject is contained in the
comprehension of the predicate.

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 “A synthetic (or contingent, accidental, a posteriori) proposition is one in which neither
the subject nor the predicate is contained in the comprehension of the other.

“The phrase ‘or the subject is contained in the comprehension of the predicate,’ stated in
the definition of the analytic proposition, should be carefully noted. It is important. When should
a judgment or proposition be called analytic? Evidently, when the relation between subject and
predicate is necessary and when this relation can be discovered by a mere analysis of subject and
predicate. It should, therefore, make no difference whether the predicate is contained in the
comprehension of the subject, or the subject is contained in the comprehension of the predicate,
as long as an analysis of the one reveals the presence of the other. This is plain reasoning, and it
is based on the very idea of ‘analysis.’ But now, in cases where the predicate represents a
‘property’ of the subject, the predicate will not be found in the comprehension of the subject, but
the subject will be found in the comprehension of the predicate.

“We had an example of this relation in the proposition ‘Man is capable of speech.’ Since
‘speech’ means ‘vocal sounds which express ideas,’ a being ‘capable of speech’ must have an
‘animal’ nature, since only an ‘animal’ can emit ‘vocal sounds’; and since only a ‘rational’ being
can ‘express ideas,’ a being that is ‘capable of speech’ must be a ‘rational animal,’ which is
precisely the definition of ‘man.’ Here, then, we have a necessary relation between subject and
predicate; but in this case the predicate is not contained in the comprehension of the subject, but
the subject, as the analysis shows, is contained in the comprehension of the predicate. The
proposition ‘Man is capable of speech’ must therefore also be classed as a true analytic
proposition.

“Another example. The simple proposition ‘2 and 3 are 5’ contains a necessary relation
between the subject ‘2 and 3’ and the predicate ‘5.’ No amount of analysis, though, will disclose
the presence of ‘5’ in the subject ‘2 and 3.’ Nevertheless, this is not a synthetic, but an analytic
judgment. Here the predicate is not contained in the comprehension of the subject, but an
analysis will reveal the fact that the subject ‘2 and 3’ is contained in the comprehension of the
predicate. What is ‘5’? It is ‘1+1+1+1+1.’ What is ‘2’? It is ‘1+1.’ And ‘3’? It is ‘1+1+1’
Therefore, the subject ‘2 and 3’ is identical with ‘1+1 and 1+1+1,’ and this found in the predicate
‘5’ which is ‘1+1+1+1+1.’ The truth of the judgment is disclosed by an analysis of the predicate
in its relation to the subject, and this makes the proposition analytic. This will always be the case
when the predicate is a ‘property’ of the subject, since a ‘property’ does not belong to the
definition of the subject and still results necessarily from the essence.

“It is well to bear this in mind, since Kant (1724-1804) defines these two types of
propositions differently. He defines the analytic proposition as ‘one in which the predicate is
contained in the definition of the subject’; and the synthetic proposition as ‘one in which the
predicate is not contained in the definition of the subject. This definition is entirely too limited.
According to this explanation, only those propositions can be styled analytic in which the
predicate is found in the subject. This is an arbitrary restriction. Surely, any proposition whose
necessary truth can be shown by a mere analysis of the subject and predicate should be called
analytic, whether the predicate be contained in the subject or the subject in the predicate. The
latter has just as much right to be called an analytic proposition as the other. Now, as has just
been shown, we can prove the necessary truth of propositions based on ‘property’ by an analysis

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of subject and predicate, since in this case the subject is contained in the comprehension of the
predicate. Hence, these propositions are genuinely analytic, and are not ‘synthetic a priori,’ even
though the predicate here is not contained in the definition of the subject. The attitude here of
Kant is therefore incorrect and unwarranted.”8

Answer to Kant’s Transcendental Idealist Need for Synthetic A Priori Judgments in

Order to Have Scientific Judgments Possessed with Universality and Necessity as a
Response to the Sensist Skepticism of Hume: the Universal Can Come from Experience by
Way of Moderate Realist Abstraction

We answer Kant’s transcendental idealist assertion, that we need synthetic a priori

judgments in order to have universal and necessary scientific judgments as a response to the
sensist skepticism of Hume, as follows: the universal can indeed come from experience by way
of moderate realist abstraction.9 Guido Berghin-Rosè observes that “il sistema di Kant non è

8
C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 111-116.
9
For explanations of moderate realism on the process of abstraction, see: R. E. BRENNAN, Thomistic Psychology,
Macmillan, New York, 1941, pp. 169-209 ; G. P. KLUBERTANZ, The Philosophy of Human Nature, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, New York, 1953, pp. 158-204 ; H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate
Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, pp. 173-191 ; P. J. GLENN, Psychology, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, pp. 302-325
; H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 157-162 ; H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to
the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 (Psychology), B. Herder, St. Louis, 1956, pp. 104-138 ; H. REITH, An
Introduction to Philosophical Psychology, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1956, pp. 151-177 ; G.
BERGHIN-ROSÈ, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 4 (Psicologia), Marietti, Turin, 1960, pp. 168-215 ; J. E. ROYCE, Man
and His Nature, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961, pp. 117-120 ; R. VERNEAUX, Psicologia: Filosofia dell’uomo,
Paideia, Brescia, 1966, pp. 89-130 ; J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and Gnoseology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome,
1987, pp. 221-241 ; J. J. SANGUINETI, Introduzione alla gnoseologia, Le Monnier, Florence, 2003, pp. 83-146.
Joseph Thomas Barron writes: “Moderate Realism. Distinction Between the Senses and the Reason. Introspection
clearly evidences the distinction between our higher and lower cognitional powers. Through the senses we become
aware of particular things. For example, through the sense of sight I see this or that particular object, possessing a
certain size, shape, and color, existing in this place at this time. If we touch an object, the resistance we encounter is
this resistance, and if we strike it we hear this sound. Whenever we sense a reality, it is always endowed with
individuality – it always has specific individuating notes. But reflection tells us that we have another kind of
knowledge which differs widely from sense knowledge. It is not a knowledge of the particular and concrete, but of
the general and abstract. I can, for example, think of a book which is totally different from this book I now sense,
and which has none of its individuating characteristics. This new thought is no longer bound up with this particular
book. It is applicable, as I can see by reflection, to any number of individual books. Its object is not a particular
object but a universal object. Furthermore my senses do not tell me what things are; they do not apprehend the
essence or whatness of things. But I seemingly do know what things are; I know not only the qualities of things but I
also know what things are in themselves; I know their natures. Thus my senses alone do not tell me this is a book.
They report color, size, shape, etc., but I know it is a book, proving thereby that I have a kind of knowledge which is
not sense knowledge.
“Again, I know what is meant by such notions as justice, hope, causality, knowledge, none of which I can sense.
None of these can be perceived through a sense organ, yet I can and do know them. Moreoever, the senses have not
the power of reflection. They cannot make their data the objects of their own examination. But the power of
reflection is a fact, and this points also to a difference between sense knowledge and a higher kind of knowledge.
Then there are our judicial and ratiocinative powers. These cannot be allocated in the senses. From a comparison of
the conceptual, judicial, and ratiocinative aptitudes of the intellect with the functioning of the senses we see that
there is a radical difference between the senses and the intellect.
“But while we differentiate the one from the other, and while we see they are irreducible to each other, we must
not think that though distinct they are separate. Intellect and sense do not function separately and apart from each
other. In actual concrete experience we cannot divorce the operation of the lower faculty from that of the higher. In
our adult experience the sensuous and intellectual elements are closely interwoven. A sensation is hardly, if ever,

8
given without an accompanying intellection. Continuity and solidarity are always present between them. So closely
are they interwoven that it is often difficult to discriminate between the purely sensory elements in our knowledge
and those which are the result of higher factors. We must not forget that the knowledge-process is complicated, and
that sensation, perception, retention and reproduction, conception, judgment, and reasoning, all intermingle with one
another, and that all have an integral part in the process of cognition.
“The existence of rational concepts has been established. The formation of concepts depends on and begins with
sense knowledge, but it is completed by the intellect. The process whereby concepts emerge from precepts demands
an exposition.
“The Origin of Concepts. Since our concepts are not a priori (or prior to sense experience) and since
introspection shows us that in our judgments we identify these concepts with the data of sense, the intellect must
apprehend them in some way in the data of sense (we are constantly making judgments in which we identify the data
of sense with our concepts, e.g., ‘This is a book’). There is no other explanation. The intellect gets all its data or
objects in and through sense perception – and self-consciousness. This does not mean that the intellect can conceive
only what the senses perceive, i.e., only the physical or material. This is the sensistic interpretation of this principle.
The principle means that while the intellect gets its data from sense perception it nevertheless has the power of
apprehending modes of being which transcend sense perception. For example, it can form such concepts as ‘being,’
‘quality,’ ‘change,’ ‘thought,’ none of which objects can be the objects of the senses. Again, the intellect can reflect
on its own activities and form concepts such as ‘intellect,’ ‘cognition,’ which are concepts of realities unperceivable
by the senses. Our theory of moderate realism, therefore, which holds that the thought-objects of the intellect are
somehow apprehended in the data of sense is not sensistic.
“The Theory of Abstraction. Since the thought-objects of the intellect are apprehended in sense data, the obvious
question arises: How is the concept derived from the percept – or sense data? How can we bridge the gap between
sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge? The answer is: by the process of abstraction. An extramental object
produces an impression on one or more of the senses. Through this impression the mind becomes cognizant of a
concrete object. This impression evokes the activity of the intellect. In every object there are certain qualities or
attributes which may or may not belong to the object without any substantial or essential difference being made in
the nature of the object; e.g., the height, weight, and clothing of any individual may all be different from what they
are and he would still be a man. There are other attributes, however, the absence of which would destroy the
character of the object and cause it to be other than it is. If we did away with either the rationality or the animality of
a man he would no longer be a man. The functioning of the intellect at this juncture is abstractive. Abstraction is the
concentration of the intellect on these latter elements to the exclusion of the former. It is the withdrawal of the
attention of the mind from what is accidental and the fixing of it on the essential. It is the act whereby the intellect
abstracts or selects from an object that portion which is essential and neglects the rest. The result of this abstraction
is the concept which expresses in the abstract the essence of the object. The concept is not the representation of a
single, particular object; it is universal and abstract because, as we shall see, it is capable of being realized in an
indefinite number of objects. In a word, the intellect conceives what the senses perceive but in a different way.
“The term ‘abstraction’ as descriptive of the conception process has given rise to much misunderstanding. Some
have understood it as connoting the taking away of something from the concrete object. Such a view is a travesty on
the nature of abstraction. The essence or nature which is said to be abstracted is an attribute of the object and it never
ceases to be such. Abstraction is a purely mental process. It does not take away the physical essence of the object.
Just as the eye can see an object, so does the intellect represent to itself the object without changing in any way its
physical reality. Abstraction does not change the nature of the object but rather the nature of our awareness of the
object. In brief, abstraction simply means the representation of the essence of an object in the intellect.
“The Universality of Concepts. The fact that concepts are devoid of the individuating characteristics which are
always found in sensed objects has two implications.
“(1) The thought-object considered in itself is neither universal nor particular (cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 4). The
concept considered in this abstract condition is said to be the direct or potential universal, and as such it is
fundamentally real, i.e., its basis is in the object independently of the work of the mind. We are warranted in
claiming objectivity for the direct or potential universal since the mind finds the content of the concept in the object.
The mind does not create the content of the universal by its own activity but it discovers the content objectively
existing.
“(2) After the direct universal has been generated the intellect sees that the thought-object is not only in this
object and predicable of it, but that it is capable of indefinite repeated realizations in an indefinite number of other
similar objects. It thus formally universalizes the concept. When by reflection a concept is seen to be universally
predicable of all the objects of a class it is said to be a formal or reflex universal. Thus at first one forms the concept

9
necessario. L’unica sua ragion d’essere, costantemente invocata dall’Autore, è l’impossibilità di
spiegare in altro modo che con la sintesi a priori l’origine dei giudizi scientifici, sopratutto
perchè: nulla di universale può venire dall’esperienza. In realtà invece l’universale può venire
dalla esperienza per astrazione. Dunque il sistema di Kant non ha alcuna base.”10 Berghin-Rosè
states: “La dimostrazione di Kant. – Kant cerca la spiegazione delle nostre idee e
particolarmente dei nostri giudizi scientifici con i loro caratteri di novità e di universalità-
necessità. Nega che si possano spiegare con l’analisi a priori perchè questo processo non dà
novità. Nega che si possano spiegare con l’esperienza di un oggetto reale: nulla di universale può
venire dall’esperienza. Rimane dunque che sorgano per sintesi a priori, cioè che quanto vi è in
essi di universale venga dal soggetto. Ma questo è idealismo (parziale, da cui logicamente si
raggiunge quello assoluto). Dunque l’universalità e necessità dei nostri giudizi provano
l’idealismo.

“L’argomento è, speculativamente e storicamente, una ricerca di superamento dello

scetticismo cui giunse, in Hume, l’empirismo che, interpretando la conoscenza come un puro
specchiare, rendeva impossibile ogni universale. Kant ritiene che l’unica via per uscirne sia
l’idealismo. Si tratta dunque di una prova per esclusione, che quindi avrà valore se veramente
quella proposta è l’unica soluzione possibile.

“Giudizio. – Il centro dell’argomento Kantiano, riguardo alla dimostrazione

dell’idealismo, sta nella critica alla conoscenza a posteriori. Infatti, anche ammesso che i giudizi
analitici siano fecondi,11 rimarrebbero sempre da spiegare i primi universali da cui si inizierebbe
tutta la conoscenza: se questi possono venire a posteriori, può sostenersi il realismo; se ciò non è
possibile, si dovrà ammettere l’idealismo. Tutta la questione dipende dunque da questa
domanda: dall’esperienza può venire l’universale?

“Ora a questa domanda si deve rispondere di sì: la dottrina dell’astrazione può render
conto dell’universale pur ammettendo che il suo contenuto venga totalmente dall’esperienza
sensitiva. L’intelletto agente, spiritualizzando in modo transeunte il fantasma, produce
nell’intelletto passivo una «species impressa» priva di materia e perciò contenente solo l’essenza
dell’oggetto in stato di universalità. Il contenuto dell’idea, pur provenendo da un oggetto

of man as a rational animal. This is a direct universal. By an act of reflection the concept ‘rational animal’ is seen to
be predicable of all men, past, present, and future – it is formally universalized (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3
; De Anima, 2; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2).
“The universalizing is the work of the intellect. Hence universals, as universal, exist in the mind alone. The
concept of the nature or essence which is universalized has its basis in the object of sense, but the universality and
abstractness which characterize the concept are the work of, and are in, the intellect. There are universal thought-
objects but no universal objects. Whatever is real, i.e., in the real or objective order, is individual. But individual
things, while they do not constitute one reality, have similar natures. Because of this the intellect can apprehend this
similarity of nature and form a concept, which it may universalize, and which is predicable of the various different
but similar individuals. This predication of the same attribute to different individuals does not imply that they are the
same reality. They are distinct and separate individuals, but because of their similarity of nature the same essence
can be predicated of them. Similarity is not a real identity – it is a mental identity.”(J. T. BARRON, Elements of
Epistemology, Macmillan, New York, 1936, pp. 86-92).
10
G. BERGHIN-ROSÈ, Elementi di filosofia, vol . 5 (Critica), Marietti, Turin, 1958, p. 57.
11
Come attesta con evidenza l’intera matematica e gran parte della filosofia. Il giudizio analitico non è
necessariamente un giudizio tautologico, ma un giudizio in cui la connessione dei termini (anche se diversi) risulta
dalla sola analisi dei termini stessi, senza ricorso all’esperienza.

10
singolare, può dunque essere universale…Cade dunque la necessità dei giudizi sintetici a priori.
Anche questa via non prova l’idealismo.”12

Mondin’s Critique of Kant on Synthetic A Priori Judgments

Battista Mondin critiques Kant’s synthetic a priori judgments as a solution to Hume’s

assertion that nothing universal can come from experience as follows: “Il principio basilare
dell’epistemologia kantiana secondo cui tutto quello che viene dall’esperienza ha puramente
valore empirico, sembra falso e contrario alla testimonianza immediata della nostra coscienza,
che attribuisce ai concetti venuti dall’esperienza valore universale. Per spiegare l’universalità del
conoscere Kant ha elaborato la dottrina dei giudizi sintetici a priori, quando la dottrina
aristotelica dell’astrazione è in grado di spiegare come i concetti astratti dall’esperienza non
abbiano valore solamente empirico ma universale. Ignorando la dottrina dell’astrazione, anziché
concepire l’universalizzazione dei concetti come eliminazione degli elementi particolari, egli
l’ha concepita come imposizione d’una forma universale agli elementi empirici, particolari.

“Le conseguenze sono gravi; mentre, infatti, la dottrina di Aristotele è in grado di

salvaguardare l’oggettività della conoscenza, quella di Kant conduce alla soggettività del
conoscere per il sovrapporsi del soggetto all’oggetto e il ridimensionamento di questo secondo le
esigenze di quello. Questa concezione dell’attività conoscitiva porta all’assorbimento dell’essere
nel pensare, alla risoluzione della metafisica nella gnoseologia, aprendo la via all’idealismo.”13

Toohey’s Critique of Kant’s Views on Analytic Judgments and Synthetic A Priori

Judgments14

12
G. BERGHIN-ROSÈ, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
13
B. MONDIN, Corso di storia della filosofia, vol. 2, Massimo, Milan, 1993, pp. 357-358.
14
John J. Toohey’s Critique of Kant’s Doctrine on the Propositions of Pure Mathematics: “It is the thesis of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason that the propositions of pure mathematics are not analytical, but synthetical as well as a
priori, and that the propositions of physical science are not a posteriori, but a priori as well as synthetical. The
Critique is directed towards the solution of the question. How are synthetical judgments or propositions a priori
possible? It is, therefore, a matter of life and death to Kant to prove that the propositions of pure mathematics and
physical science are synthetical a priori. The purpose of the present chapter is to show that he has not succeeded in
this attempt. In order to keep the chapter within due bounds, the discussion shall be limited to the propositions of
mathematics; but we shall have to prepare the way for the discussion by removing one or two ambiguities which
have heretofore seriously confused the subject.
“In this discussion it will be convenient to adopt the procedure of Kant as it is indicated in the following
sentence: ‘I speak of affirmative judgments [or propositions] only, the application to negative ones being easy.’
Again, for the sake of avoiding the frequent repetition of qualifying phrases, we shall commonly understand by the
word ‘proposition’ a categorical proposition which is known to be true, and by ‘judging’ we shall understand
judging correctly.
“When we judge, we learn, that is, we come to know. The object about which we learn something is called the
subject of the judgment, and it is this object which is denoted by the subject term of a categorical proposition. The
subject term, considered apart from the rest of the proposition, stands for the object as it was known to us before we
made the judgment; the subject term, the copula and the predicate term combined stand for the object as it is known
to us after the judgment has been made; the copula and the predicate term combined stand for what we have learned
about the object which is signified by the subject term.
“To obviate misconstruction, a note should perhaps be added in explanation of the preceding paragraph. When
we use a term which denotes an object, all that we commonly expect other people to understand by it is what has
been fixed by convention, and this may be called its conventional connotation. But our own understanding of the
term is not always limited to the conventional connotation; it includes this, but goes beyond it, and often very far

11
beyond it. Everything that we know about the object over and above the conventional connotation may be called the
personal or private connotation of the term. When, therefore, we say that the subject term stands for the object as it
was known to us before we made the judgment, we are referring to the personal connotation along with the
conventional. By this we do not mean that all the items of information which we possess about the object are
actually before us when we use the term, but that none of them is excluded as though it did not form part of our
knowledge of the object. What we learn about the object by an act of judging is something in addition to the items of
information which were already in our possession. Again, when we speak of examining or analyzing the subject of a
proposition or a judgment, we are not referring merely to the conventional connotation of the term; we mean that all
the relevant items of information which we already possess about the object and which we recall at the moment are
being submitted to examination.
“It is one thing to judge; it is a very different thing to utter a proposition. To judge is to learn; to utter a
proposition is to express what one has learned by the act of judging.1 [1 There does not seem to be any need to take
into consideration here such propositions as A is A and A is not not-A.] We do not repeat a judgment we have once
made, for by that judgment we have learned something, and we do not learn again what we have already learned,
unless, indeed, we have forgotten it. We may by means of a proposition exhibit to others what we have learned, and
we may do this a thousand times, but in so doing we are not learning the same thing over again, and therefore, we
are not making a judgment. Again, by an analytical judgment we learn something in a particular way, which way
shall be considered later; and by an analytical proposition we express, not an analytical judgment—for the
proposition does not express an act of learning—but what we have learned by an analytical judgment.
“It was a failure to note the two points we have just mentioned which was responsible for the controversy on the
question whether a synthetical judgment is not an analytical judgment ‘in the making.’ The controversy involved a
twofold confusion. First, the word ‘judgment’ was used in the sense of judging or making a judgment, and again in
the sense of the information which is gained by the judgment. It is the information gained by a judgment that is
expressed by a proposition, not the act of judging itself; and yet the proposition was said to express a judgment. The
second confusion was a consequence of the first. Because a proposition expresses the information gained by a
judgment, it was supposed that a repetition of the proposition involved a repetition of the judgment in the sense of an
act of judging. The disputants were continually speaking of ‘making the judgment again,’ and debating whether,
upon being repeated, the judgment did not change from a synthetical judgment into an analytical. But a given
judgment, in the sense of an act of judging, is never repeated, unless the information we have gained by it is utterly
lost from memory. We do not acquire again information which is already in our possession, though we may see a
fresh reason for clinging to it. We may recall what we have learned, and we may compare it with our previous:
knowledge, and we may communicate it to others, but we do not repeat the act of learning it.
“If there be dissent from this position, let the two following points be considered: First, it will be generally
agreed that, when we judge, we come to a decision. The decision is that something is so and so. Do we come to the
same decision more than once upon the same matter unless we have forgotten or revoked our decision? Doubtless
we may happen upon additional evidence to confirm us in our decision. But being confirmed in a decision is: not the
same thing as coming to a decision.
“Secondly, when we put forth a proposition which we know to be true, we state something which we have
learned by an act of judging. What test are we to apply in order to determine whether that proposition is analytical or
synthetical? There is no test except to consider how we learned what is expressed by the proposition. Suppose, then,
that we make the judgment a second time. There is general agreement, again, that every correct judgment is either
analytical or synthetical. Now if the test, and the only test, by which we can decide whether a judgment is analytical
or synthetical is the manner in which we gained information by it, then any act to which that test cannot be applied is
neither an analytical nor a synthetical judgment. Well, that test cannot be applied to a so-called repeated act of
judging, for by the repeated act we should not gain any information. How are we going to differentiate a repeated act
of judging from an act of recollection? Certainly a recollection is never called analytical or synthetical.
“Recollection enables us to apply the test to a proposition; for by recollecting the original act of judging, we
observe how we gained information by it. No matter how often the proposition is repeated, we must go back to the
original act of judging, and not to any repeated act, in order to decide whether the proposition is analytical or
synthetical.
“Kant’s account of the analytical judgment or proposition may be abbreviated as follows: ‘The judgment [or
proposition] is called analytical when the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained (though
covertly) in the concept A. Such a judgment might be called an illustrating, as opposed to an expanding judgment,
because in it nothing is added by the predicate to the concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into its
constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within it, though confusedly. If I say, for instance,

12
‘All bodies are extended,’ this is an analytical judgment [or proposition]. I need not go beyond the concept
connected with the name of body, in order to find that extension is connected with it. I have only to analyze that
concept and become conscious of the manifold elements always contained in it, in order to find that predicate. . . .
Our knowledge is in no way extended by analytical judgments. . . . Analytical [judgments] are no doubt very
important and necessary, yet only in order to arrive at that clearness of concepts which is requisite for a Safe and
wide synthesis.’
“Since in judging we learn something which we did not know before, there is inconsistency or, at least, confusion
in the foregoing, account of the analytical judgment. By the act which Kant calls an analytical judgment we either
learn something or we do not. If we do not learn anything, we do not make a judgment at all. If we learn something,
we expand our knowledge. Kant says that by the analytical judgment something that was confused has become clear
to us. But the only way in which a thing can become clear to us is by our observing something about, it which we
did not observe before, and observing something which we did not observe before is exactly what is meant by
expanding our knowledge. Our knowledge cannot be expanded in any other way. Hence, if what Kant calls an
analytical judgment is a judgment at all, it expands our knowledge. Kant himself acknowledges this, almost in so
many words: ‘I need not go beyond the concept connected with the name of body, in order to find that extension is
connected with it.’ To find is to discover, and to discover is to come to know what one did not know before, that is,
to expand one’s knowledge.
“It will be noticed that we have confined our remarks to Kant’s comment upon his example, and we have said
nothing about the example itself. The example is not a happy one. It comes close to being what the logician would
call a: nominal definition or a synonymous proposition, and synonyms are learned from experience. It is also from
experience that we learn the conventional connotation of a term. Hence, a proposition in which the predicate is
intended to express in whole or in part the conventional connotation of the subject term is an a posteriori
proposition.
“The difference between an analytical and a synthetical proposition consists in the difference of ground by which
we have come to know the one or the other to be true. If a proposition is true, and it has been discovered to be true
without recourse to experience, it is analytical. If it is true, and it has been discovered to be true by recourse to
experience, it is synthetical. Kant quarrels with these definitions, and contends that many propositions which
correspond to our definition of analytical should properly be called synthetical, and he bases his contention mainly
upon his alleged proof that the propositions of pure mathematics are not analytical and upon the fact that these
propositions are discovered to be true without recourse to experience. We shall see present1y that this alleged proof
of Kant’s is not a proof at all; but first let us call attention to the unsatisfactory character of his account of an
analytical proposition or judgment.
“Kant remarks as follows: ‘In [the analytical judgment] nothing is added by the predicate to the concept of the
subject, but the concept is only divided into its constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within
it, though confusedly.’ Now an analytical judgment does not mean one in which we have picked the predicate out of
the subject, as is suggested by Kant’s description. It certainly never means that we have picked out something which
was already known to qualify the subject. That would not be a judgment. There is no judgment where there is no
addition to our knowledge. An analytical judgment does not mean one in which an examination of the subject has
revealed to us what the predicate is. This often happens, but it need not happen. The suggestion of the predicate may
have come from a source entirely distinct from an examination of the subject, as it does in the case of a student of
geometry. The suggestion of the predicate does not come to him from an examination of the subject of the
proposition, but from his teacher or his textbook. But once the predicate has been suggested to us and we know what
it means, then our proposition is analytical if an analysis or examination of the subject shows us that the suggested
predicate belongs to it. A proposition is constituted analytical or synthetical, not by where we had to look to find the
predicate, but by where we had to look to find the justification for attaching the predicate to the subject. If the
justification was furnished by the subject, and not by experience, the proposition is analytical or a priori; if the
justification was experience, the proposition is synthetical or a posteriori.
“In the case of an analytical judgment, we examine the object signified by the subject term, and in so doing we
do not look beyond the object as it was already known to us before we made the judgment; and it is the object as it
was known to us which informs us that the predicate belongs to it; so that we now see that the object could not in
itself be such as we knew it to be without also being qualified by the predicate. It generally happens that, in
examining the object, we have to recall some information about it which is not conventionally expressed by the
subject term. If, in such a case, we wish to prove or make clear to another person the truth of the proposition, we
shall be obliged to employ an additional term, technically called the middle term. But so far as we ourselves are

13
concerned, the middle term does but express information which was not only already in our possession, but which
was actually before us when we were examining the object signified by the subject term.
“The conclusion of every deductive process is the result of an analysis of what was already known about the
subject of the conclusion. Proving is essentially an appeal to something which does not itself require proof on the
part of the person we are addressing. Our appeal is either to something which he already knows to be true or it is to
something which he sees to be true as soon as it is stated. What we are doing for him is to direct his attention to
various items of information, nearly all of which are already in his possession, but which it has never occurred to
him to piece together in this particular way. Once these items are brought home to him in combination, he sees
immediately that the conclusion is true; in other words, he sees that the subject of the conclusion is qualified by an
attribute which he did not notice in it before.
“In discussing the argument by which Kant attempts to prove that the propositions of pure mathematics are not
analytical, we shall deal first with that part of it which is occupied with geometrical propositions, because this is
more easily disposed of than the part which has to do with the propositions of arithmetic.
“Kant has this to say on the propositions of geometry: ‘Nor is any proposition of pure geometry analytical. That
the straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept of straight contains
nothing of magnitude (quantity), but a quality only. The concept of shortest is, therefore, purely adventitious, and
cannot be deduced from the concept- of the straight line by any analysis whatsoever.’
“This argument of Kant’s calls for three remarks: First, the only thing which his argument proves—and it did not
need his proof—is that we cannot get short out of straight or straight out of short, and hence, that neither of the
following propositions is analytical: ‘What is straight is short’; ‘What is short is straight.’
“Secondly, Kant overlooked the presence of the word ‘line’ in the proposition. Even were it true that the ‘concept
of straight contains nothing of magnitude’—and it is not true, for there is magnitude in everything that is straight—
nevertheless a straight line essentially contains magnitude. There cannot be a line without magnitude. If we are
thinking about a line at all, we are thinking about something that has length, and length is magnitude.
“Thirdly, we do not profess to ‘deduce the concept of shortest from the concept of the straight line.’ The word
‘shortest’ shows that there was more than one line present to the mind when it made the judgment. The superlative
degree of an adjective is never employed unless the mind has more objects than one before it and is comparing these
objects together. No one would dream of saying, except as a joke, that the Hudson River is the widest river between
New York and Jersey City, since the Hudson River is the only river between those cities. Moreover, the subject of a
proposition is not determined by its position in the proposition. Sometimes it is first, and sometimes it is last. It is
last in the proposition, ‘Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.’ The subject of a proposition is that about which
the proposition directly purports to convey information, and it can often be determined by considering the question
to which the proposition is an answer. Every proposition may be regarded as an answer to a question or, at least, as
forestalling a question. To which of the following questions is the proposition we are discussing an answer? (1)
‘What is a straight line?’ or (2) ‘What is the shortest line that can be between two points?’ Obviously it is an answer
to the second question. If it were an answer to the first, the man who put the question would have to take the word of
his informant for the truth of the proposition; for he would be learning for the first time the meaning of the term
‘straight line’; whereas, if the proposition is an answer to the second question, the truth of the proposition is self-
evident: and it is to be noted that when this proposition is referred to in works on mathematics it is called an axiom,
i.e., a self-evident truth. Consequently, if we place the subject first, the proposition will read: ‘The shortest line that
can be between two points is a straight line.’ Now a man cannot recognize that proposition as true unless he has
several lines before his mind when he is considering the subject, (as is evident from the word ‘shortest’), and unless
the straight line is one of those lines. Therefore, the proposition, ‘The shortest line that can be between two points is
a straight line,’ is an analytical proposition.
“If it be insisted that ‘straight line’ belongs in the subject position, then ‘straight line’ is not the full expression of
the subject, and it still remains true that the proposition is not an answer to the question, ‘What is a straight line?’
The proposition does not purport to give information about the straight line considered in itself, but about the
straight line considered in relation to other lines. If ‘straight line’ belongs in the subject position, the proposition is
an answer to the question, ‘How long is a straight line as compared with other lines?’ The logical order of the
proposition will then be: ‘The straight line, as compared with other lines, is the shortest that can be between two
points.’ No matter how the proposition is worded, if the subject is given in full, it will be seen that an analysis or
examination of the subject: is essential in order to obtain a justification for attaching the predicate to the subject, and
it is futile to look elsewhere for any justification. We are dealing, therefore, with an analytical proposition.

14
 “And now as to the propositions of arithmetic. Before taking up this part of Kant’s argument, one or two general
remarks should be made on the meaning and use of symbols, since this will enable us to simplify the discussion
considerably. We proceed, then, as follows:
“Terms and symbols are conventional signs, and they get their signification from agreement among those who
employ them. The purpose of using them is to direct attention to something to direct it so far and no farther. When
we see the word ‘seven’ or the symbol 7, our attention is directed to certain units and no farther. The expression,
‘what the term or symbol stands for,’ or ‘what the term or symbol means,’ is the same as the expression, ‘what the
term or symbol is intended to direct our attention to’; and what the term or symbol is intended to direct our attention
to is learned from convention and from that alone.
“7 + 5 may be called a symbol or a combination of symbols, according to the context. Strictly speaking, 5 does
not stand for or signify, but replaces, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 +1. One numerical symbol does not signify another. The symbol
5 and the symbol 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 are alternative expressions which stand for the same objects or units.
“Numbers are symbols which stand for objects merely so far as they are distinct from each other, that is, without
reference to the kind of objects they are. The individual objects, so far as they are symbolized by numbers, are called
units: at least, this is the sense in which the word ‘unit’ is employed in this chapter. If the only numerical symbol in
our possession were the symbol 1, we should have to symbolize five units thus: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. But this cumbrous
symbol is now unnecessary, because we have the symbol 5. The same thing is true, mutatis mutandis, of the other
numerical symbols, such as 12 and 7.
“After we have learned what the various numerical symbols signify, we can deal with the symbols alone. The
study of arithmetic consists largely in determining the equivalence of various symbols, and especially the
equivalence of simpler and less cumbrous to more cumbrous symbols. In the propositions, 7 + 5 = 12, 7 - 5 = 2, 7 x
5 = 35, 35/5 = 7, the symbol to the right of the sign of equality is simpler and less cumbrous than the one to the left.
The proposition, 7 + 5 = 12, might be interpreted in this way: ‘The use of the symbol 12 is equivalent to the use of
the symbol 7 + 5.’
“We may do as we please with symbols, provided our operation with them is consistent with what they signify;
but the objects which are symbolized are not in our power to manipulate. We may arrange and group symbols in a
variety of ways, but in doing so we do not arrange or group the objects or units for which the symbols stand.
“In Kant’s argument it is not always clear whether he is referring to the operation of symbols or to the units
which the symbols signify. We shall be obliged, therefore, to consider his statements in the light of both
interpretations. His argument on the propositions of arithmetic sets out as follows: ‘At first sight one might suppose
indeed that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is merely analytical . . . . But, if we look more closely, we shall find that the
concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing beyond the union of both sums into one, whereby nothing is told us
as to what this single number may be which combines both. We by no means arrive at a concept of Twelve, by
thinking that union of Seven and Five.’
“Notice that Kant employs the words ‘look’ and ‘find,’ which are the same as ‘observe’ and ‘discover’
respectively. Notice, again, that he calls 7 + 5 = 12 a proposition. Now a proposition is made up of terms or
expressions, not of ‘concepts.’ If Kant has in mind here the operation of symbols, the second sentence of the
quotation should run thus: ‘If we look more closely, we shall find that the expression 7 + 5 contains nothing beyond
the union of both sums into one, whereby nothing is told us as to what this single number or symbol may be which
combines both [i.e., which is equivalent to both].’ In the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, the expression 7 + 5 is not intended
to tell us ‘what this single symbol may be which combines both.’ We only know the proper symbol from our
previous acquaintance with numerical symbols. If we were unacquainted with the symbol 12, we should not know
what symbol to put down in the proposition. The reason why we are able to apply the symbol 12 correctly in the
present instance is because we recollect what men intended to direct attention to by the use of this symbol.
“If Kant has in mind, not the operation of symbols, but that which the symbols stand for, the second sentence of
the above quotation should read: ‘If we look more closely, we shall find that, when we observe what is symbolized
by 7 + 5, we observe nothing beyond the union of both sums into one, and, in observing the union of both sums into
one, we do not observe what this single symbol may be which stands for both sums combined into one.’ Of course
we don’t. We do not even observe the symbol 7 + 5 in that which is symbolized by 7 + 5. We do not look at an
object in order to discover in it the symbol or term which men have agreed shall stand for the object.
“In the third sentence of the above quotation Kant says: ‘We by no means arrive at a concept of Twelve, by
thinking that union of Seven and Five.’ We are not supposed to arrive at a ‘concept’ of Twelve. What we are
supposed to arrive at is the correct simple symbol to replace the complex symbol 7 + 5; and we cannot do this unless
we are already acquainted with the symbol 12 and with the signification which has been attached to it. If in the
foregoing sentence Kant is referring, not to the operation of symbols, but to what they signify, the sentence should

15
be changed as follows: ‘We by no means come to observe the objects or units which the word ‘twelve’ stands for by
observing the units which are signified by the word ‘seven’ together with the units which are signified by the word
‘five.’’ On this interpretation the statement is palpably false.
“Kant continues his argument as follows: ‘I first take the number 7, and taking the intuition of the fingers of my
hand, in order to form with it the concept of the 5, I gradually add the units, which I before took together, to make
up the number 5, by means of the image of my hand, to the number 7, and I thus see the number 12 arising before
me.’ In the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, the subject is 7 + 5. Observe that Kant throughout is examining or analyzing the
subject. He is guided solely by the subject in all that he does and says. The words, ‘I take the number 7,’ mean ‘I
observe the symbol 7’ (or ‘what the symbol 7 signifies’). The words, ‘taking the intuition of the fingers of my hand,’
mean ‘observing the fingers of my hand.’ Now why did Kant take only five fingers, unless he was guided by the
symbol 5 in the subject of the proposition? And why did he confine himself to the symbol 5? If it was necessary to
look at his fingers in the case of the symbol 5, it was just as necessary to look at more of them in the case of the
symbol 7. ‘I gradually add the units....to the number 7.’ The only units he has mentioned are the fingers of his hand.
Hence, his sentence ought to read: ‘I gradually add the fingers of my hand to the number or symbol 7.’ ‘And I thus
see the number 12 arising before me.’ No: he does not see the number or symbol 12 arising before him. What he
sees arising before him is the symbol 7 and the fingers of his hand. On his account of it, the proposition should not
read ‘7 + 5 = 12’; it should read ‘7 + 5 = 7 + the fingers of Kant’s hand,’ or ‘7 + 5 = 7 + these five units.’ Kant may
examine and manipulate the subject 7 + 5 as long as he pleases, and he may call to his aid every intuition
imaginable; he will never learn by this means that 12 is the correct symbol to put in the predicate of the proposition.
He can only know this from his previous acquaintance with the symbol 12 and from his previous knowledge that
men have decreed that this symbol, shall stand for so many units and no more.
“It is true that men often use fingers or pebbles when doing a sum in arithmetic. This is merely an aid to
concentration. But what they are concentrating on is units in general, not the particular units which are the fingers or
the pebbles. Otherwise the result would not be a proposition of universal application; it would not be ‘7 + 5 = 12,’
but ‘This 7 + this 5 = this 12’ or ‘These 7 units + these 5 units = these 12 units.’ Most of us are doubtless familiar
with the story of the little boy who was undergoing an examination in arithmetic. The examiner asked him: ‘Robert,
supposing you had one watermelon, and your uncle gave you two more, how many watermelons would you have?’
The little boy replied: ‘Oh, we haven’t got as far as watermelons; we’ve only got as far as potatoes.’ Obviously
Robert had not been learning arithmetic.
“What we have to determine in arithmetic practically amounts to this: Given our acquaintance with the various
numerical symbols and with such signs of operation as +, -, x, ÷, what is the correct symbol to replace the several
symbols which are connected by any of these signs? For example, 19 + 42 + 67 + 93 = what? In order to determine
the correct symbol, the only expedient at our disposal is to examine the signification of the several symbols in their
relation to the sign or signs by which they are connected. But in doing this we are analyzing the subject.
“We ought to allude here to a passage in Kant’s Theory of Knowledge by Professor H. A. Prichard. This work is a
criticism of the whole theory of Kant, and the criticism is in general so excellent that one is surprised to find the
author putting forth such statements as the following: ‘Kant is obviously right in vindicating the synthetical
character of mathematical judgments. In the arithmetical judgment 7 + 5 = 12 the thought of certain units as a group
of twelve is no mere repetition of the thought of them as a group of five added to a group of seven. Though the same
units are referred to, they are regarded differently. Thus the thought of them as twelve means either that we think of
them as formed by adding one unit to a group of eleven, or that we think of them as formed by adding two units to a
group of ten, and so on. And the assertion is that the same units, which can be grouped in one way, can also be
grouped in another’ (pp. 6-7).
“Unless we suppose that Professor Prichard entertains the view that an analytical judgment does not increase our
knowledge, it is difficult to understand why he set down the foregoing lines. What interpretation can be put upon the
words, ‘no mere repetition,’ except that the predicate of an analytical proposition is here considered to express
something which was known to belong to the subject before the judgment was made? We have touched upon this
point in a previous paragraph. It is not correct to say that ‘though the same units are referred to, they are regarded
differently.’ They are not regarded differently; they are merely symbolized differently. Again, the following
comment is inaccurate: ‘The assertion is that the same units which can be grouped in one way, can also be grouped
in another.’ It would be closer to the mark to say: ‘The assertion is that the same units which can be symbolized in
one way, can also be symbolized in another.’ We do not group units when we are engaged upon a sum in arithmetic,
nor are the units grouped for us. We group the symbols, or some of them, but not the units for which the symbols
stand. The symbol 12 does not signify a group of units. It signifies certain units, whether they be gathered into a
group or scattered over all creation.

16
 Vanni Rovighi’s Critique of Kant on Analytic Judgments and Synthetic A Priori
Judgments

Sofia Vanni Rovighi critiques Kant on analytic judgments and synthetic a priori
judgments in the first volume of her three-volume Elementi di filosofia (1962) as follows: “Chi
abbia qualche conoscenza del pensiero kantiano si sarà già reso conto che ponendoci il problema:
Come è possibile scoprire un nesso fra essenze? ci ponevamo, in altri termini, il problema
kantiano: Come sono possibili giudizi sintetici a priori? Ossia: come sono possibili proposizioni
che arricchiscano la nostra conoscenza pur essendo necessarie ed universali?

“Kant ritiene che la verità di tali proposizioni non sia tale che il negarla implichi
contraddizione, perchè secondo lui una proposizione la cui negazione è contraddittoria è
tautologica, non fa progredire la nostra conoscenza; analitico si identifica, per Kant, con
tautologico.

“Quali prove porta egli di tale affermazione?

“Le prove kantiane consistono nell’addurre esempi di proposizioni necessarie e tuttavia

non tali che il negarle implichi contraddizione. «I giudizi15 matematici – dice Kant – sono tutti
sintetici. Questa proposizione pare sia sfuggita sinora all’indagine di quanti hanno analizzato la
ragione umana…Infatti, poichè si trovava che le deduzioni dei matematici procedono tutte
secondo il principio di contraddizione (richiesto dalla natura di ogni certezza apodittica), così si
credeva che anche i principi fossero conosciuti in virtù dello stesso principio di contraddizione; e
in ciò sbagliavano; perchè una proposizione sintetica può sempre esser conosciuta secondo il
principio di contraddizione, ma solo a condizione che si presupponga un’altra proposizione
sintetica, dalla quale possa esser dedotta; non mai in se stessa».16

“Facciamo subito un’osservazione: Kant ammette che le conclusioni dimostrate, i

teoremi matematici, derivino dagli assiomi per via analitica, secondo il principio di
contraddizione, dunque ammette che un procedimento analitico possa ampliare la nostra
conoscenza, poichè evidentemente colui che sa tutti i teoremi contenuti in un trattato di

“But the essential point of the whole discussion is this: What is it that decides for us that 12 is the symbol we
ought to put in the predicate of the proposition? Certainly Kant has not proved that the deciding factor is anything
besides the subject. However, that the passage we have quoted from Professor Prichard is the result of the particular
interpretation he has put upon the term ‘analytical judgment,’ and that he is, after all, in substantial agreement with
the contention of this chapter, would seem to be brought out by the following statement: ‘The essential distinction
[between ‘Three-sided figures, as such, are three-angled’ and ‘This man is tall’) is that in the universal judgment the
predicate term is apprehended to belong to the subject through our insight that it is necessitated by the nature of the
subject term’ (pp. 157-8).
“So far as we can see, this is only another way of saying that an analysis of the subject is our justification for
attaching the predicate to it. One further remark is suggested by Kant’s example, and it is one which has a bearing
on the so-called Logic of Relatives. In the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, 12 is only part of the predicate; the other part is
bound up with the sign of equality. If we call 7 + 5 a complex symbol, there is an immense class of complex
symbols which are equal to 12; for example, 15 - 3 = 12, 48 ÷ 4 = 12, 6 (3 - 1) = 12, and so on. Without the sign of
equality, the proposition could be written in this way: ‘7 + 5 is a member of the class of complex symbols which are
equal to 12.’”(J. J. TOOHEY, op. cit., chapter 10).
15
Si tenga presente che Kant usa il termine giudizio nel senso di proposizione.
16
I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, trad. Gentile-Lombardo Radice, vol. 1, p. 48.

17
matematica, sa più di colui che conosce soltanto gli assiomi contenuti nella prima pagina. Cade
dunque l’obiezione kantiana che le proposizioni analitiche sono pure tautologie e non aumentano
le nostre conoscenze.17

“Vediamo ora se i principî della matematica siano sintetici nel senso kantiano, ossia tali
che il negarli non implichi contraddizione. Kant sceglie per l’aritmetica la proposizione 7 + 5 =
12 e per la geometria la proposizione: ‘la retta è la linea più breve fra due punti.’ Cominciamo
dal primo. «Veramente a prima vista si dovrebbe pensare che la proposizione 7 + 5 = 12 sia una
proposizione semplicemente analitica, risultante pel principio di contraddizione dal concetto di
una somma di sette e di cinque. Ma, se si considera la cosa più da vicino, si trova che il concetto
della somma di 7 e 5 non racchiude altro che l’unione di due numeri in uno solo, senza che
perciò venga assolutamente pensato qual sia questo numero unico che raccoglie gli altri due. Il
concetto di dodici non è punto pensato già pel fatto che io penso semplicemente quella unione di
sette e di cinque, e finchè io analizzerò il mio concetto di una tale possibile somma non vi
troverò contenuto il dodici. Bisogna oltrepassare questi concetti, ricorrendo all’intuizione
corrispondente ad uno dei due numeri, come, ad. es., alle cinque dita della mano, o (come Segner
nella sua aritmetica) a sinque punti, e aggiungendo successivamente al concetto di sette le unità
del numero cinque date nell’intuizione…

“«Tanto meno è analitico un principio qualunque della geometria pura. Che la linea retta
sia la più breve fra due punti, è una proposizione sintetica. Perchè il mio concetto di retta non
contiene niente di quantità, ma solo una qualità. Il concetto della più breve è dunque interamente
aggiunto, e non può essere ricavato con nessuna analisi da quello della linea retta. Qui deve
perciò chiamarsi in aiuto l’intuizione, mediante la quale è possible la sintesi».18

“Kant, dunque, a proposito del 7 + 5 = 12, osserva: 1) che il concetto di somma in

generale non contiene quello di dodici; 2) che per trovare il predicato ‘dodici’ dobbiamo
ricorrere ad una intuizione.

“Sul primo punto siamo perfettamente d’accordo con Kant: il concetto di somma in
generale non contiene quello di ‘dodici’ il concetto però di ‘somma di sette e di cinque’ contiene
quello di dodici. Per ottenere il concetto di dodici non ho che da applicare il concetto generale di
somma ai casi particolari sette e cinque.

“Kant stesso riconosce, nei Prolegomeni, che un giudizio può essere analitico anche se il
soggetto è un concetto empirico, come, p. es., il giudizio «l’oro è un metallo giallo; perchè, per
saper ciò, non ho bisogno di alcuna esperienza che si estenda fuori di quel mio concetto di oro,
che comprenda questo corpo come giallo e come metallo».19

“Ora, le regole dell’aritmetica non sono altro che l’applicazione dei principî logici a
contenuti astratti dall’esperienza. Quando affermiamo che le proposizioni matematiche sono
analitiche, non pretendiamo affatto che esse siano dedotte dal solo principio di contraddizione, e
riconosciamo che, se l’esperienza non ci facesse conoscere delle molteplicità e delle quantità,

17
Cfr. I. KANT, Prolegomeni, trad. Carabellese, P. B. F., Laterza, p. 21.
18
I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, trad. cit., vol. 1, pp. 48-49.
19
I. KANT, Prolegomeni, traduz. Carabellese, p. 23.

18
noi non sapremmo nulla di matematica; ma vogliamo dire che, date, per astrazione dagli oggetti
dell’esperienza, le essenze matematiche, noi possiamo scoprire dei caratteri appartenenti a
queste essenze e quindi formulare delle enunciazioni che non possono essere negate senza
contraddizione.

“Quanto al secondo punto, e cioè la necessità di una intuizione sensibile per arrivare
all’enunciazione 7 + 5 = 12, osserviamo: L’intuizione sensibile è certo necessaria per far sorgere
la nozione di molteplicità, ma una volta ottenuto per astrazione questo concetto ed averne visto
realizzato nell’esperienza qualche esempio, possiamo poi formulare delle proposizioni sui
numeri la cui verità è evidente in base all’essenza del numero e non in base ad una esperienza.
Ad es. non si può certo controllare sperimentalmente la verità della proposizione 275 + 188 =
463, perchè non è possibile intuire sensibilmente o immaginare nè 275, nè 188, nè 463 unità.

“Per le verità matematiche l’intuizione sensibile è necessaria psicologicamente, per dar

quasi un appoggio ai concetti, ma non è necessaria per stabilire il nesso fra le essenze concepite,
non è begründend, come osserva Husserl,20 ossia non serve per dar valore alle enunciazioni.
Tanto è vero che se un matematico o un geometra anzichè scriver numeri e disegnar figure su
una lavagna reale, vedesse numeri e figure in una allucinazione, le sue conclusioni non ne
sarebbero affatto infirmate, mentre se un fisico sperimentale o un biologo nel suo laboratorio
soffrisse di allucinazioni non si potrebbe più fidarsi di quel che essi ci dicessero. Se la
descrizione del processo di divisione cellulare mi fosse fatta da un biologo allucinato, essa non
avrebbe alcun valore, mentre la soluzione di un’equazione non perderebbe alcun valore se fosse
fatta da un matematico che invece di scrivere le formule col gesso e con la penna le vedesse in
una allucinazione.

“Lo stesso si dica per la proposizione ‘la retta è la linea più breve fra due punti.’

“Ora guardiamo brevemente quale sia la risposta kantiana al problema «Come sono
possibili giudizi sintetici a priori?», per vedere se essa sia al riparo dalla critica mossa da Kant ai
giudizi analitici.

“La condizione alla quale sono possibili giudizi sintetici a priori è, secondo Kant, questa:
«Le condizioni della possibilità dell’esperienza in generale sono a un tempo condizioni della
possibilità degli oggetti della esperienza».21

“Il che vuol dire: gli oggetti dell’esperienza (ossia gli oggetti della scienza, che fanno poi
da soggetto nei giudizi sintetici a priori) non sono cose in sè, nè sono semplici dati di
sensazione, ma sono fenomeni. E fenomeno in senso kantiano è il prodotto dei dati di sensazione
e certe forme della sensibilità e dell’intelletto umano, certe funzioni unificatrici che trasformano
il dato delle sensazioni in oggetto. Quando pronunciamo delle proposizioni scientifiche noi
enunciamo dell’oggetto di esperienza certi caratteri che gli competono proprio in quanto oggetto
di esperienza. Ma l’oggetto di esperienza l’abbiamo costruito noi, quindi, esprimendo i caratteri
che gli competono in quanto tale, noi esprimiamo delle esigenze del nostro stesso intelletto, delle
esigenze che valgono quindi a priori, che valgono necessariamente ed universalmente.

20
E. HUSSERL, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, prgr. 7, p. 17.
21
I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, trad. cit., vol. 1, p. 172.

19
 “Questa è la soluzione kantiana. Domandiamoci ora se essa risolva l’obiezione che Kant
ha mosso contro la fecondità dei giudizi analitici.

“Ci sembra di no. Infatti il soggetto dei giudizi sintetici a priori kantiani è già un
fenomeno; la sintesi fra dati di sensazione e forme a priori è già compiuta prima che io pronunci
il giudizio, è già entrata a costituire, p. es., il mio concetto di ‘retta’ o di ‘cangiamento’ e quando
io pronuncio i giudizi ‘la retta è la linea più breve fra due punti’ o ‘tutti i cangiamenti avvengono
secondo la legge del nesso di causa ed effetto,’22 io attribuisco alla retta e al cangiamento dei
predicati senza i quali retta e cangiamento non potrebbero essere oggetti di esperienza, ossia dei
predicati senza i quali retta e cangiamento non sarebbero, poichè l’essere di un fenomeno
consiste appunto nel suo essere oggetto. Ma un predicato senza il quale il soggetto non sarebbe,
è un predicato che non si può negare del soggetto senza contraddirsi, dunque anche il giudizio
sintetico a priori kantiano è, in fondo, un giudizio analitico.

“Per riassumere: Kant afferma che i giudizi analitici sono tutti tautologici. Abbiamo
osservato: a) che questa affermazione è ingiustificata; b) che se essa avesse valore anche i
giudizi sintetici a priori kantiani dovrebbero essere tautologici, poichè anch’essi sono tali che il
negarli implica contraddizione.”23

Vanni Rovighi critiques Kant’s theory of analytic judgments and synthetic a priori
judgments in her Gnoseologia (1963) as follows: “Data l’importanza del concetto di sintetico a
priori in Kant dovremo cominciare di qui la nostra riflessione critica sulla gnoseologia kantiana.

“Kant afferma l’esistenza di giudizi sintetici a priori come condizioni del valore della
scienza: se esiste una scienza con valore, essa deve fondarsi su giudizi sintetici a priori, atqui
una scienza con valore esiste, ergo etc. La «scienza» di cui Kant ammette senz’altro il valore è la
meccanica newtoniana, la quale si esprime in termini matematici, e suppone quindi il valore
della matematica. Della matematica e della meccanica Kant ammette il valore senza discussione,
in base alla loro riuscita. E questo è il primo presupposto ingiustificato, acritico. Il secondo
presupposto implicito nella posizione kantiana del problema della conoscenza è che matematica
(geometria e aritmetica) e fisica (meccanica) siano al medesimo livello epistemologico,
appartengano cioè al medesimo tipo di sapere, e precisamente che le proposizioni della
matematica e della fisica abbiano il medesimo tipo di necessità, siano ugualmente necessarie.
Locke, Leibniz e Hume, in questo più spregiudicati di Kant, avevano invece assegnato a due
diversi tipi epistemologici la matematica e la fisica: per loro le proposizioni della matematica
sono (analiticamente) necessarie, quelle della fisica esprimono semplici generalizzazioni di fatto.
Kant non può ammettere che le proposizioni della fisica siano giudizi sintetici a posteriori
perché ha un certo feticismo per la fisica newtoniana, dato che è affascinato dalla riuscita della
nuova fisica. Ma la riflessione kantiana sulle proposizioni o leggi della fisica, stimolata dalle
critiche di Hume al principio di causalità, doveva portarlo alla conclusione che la necessità delle
leggi fisiche non si fonda sull’identità di soggetto e predicato, che le leggi fisiche non sono
analitiche. L’affermazione che certi effetti sono connessi a certe cause, per esempio che la
variazione nello stato di quiete o di moto di un corpo dipende da una forza, e che la forza è causa
di accelerazione, non si può certo ricavare dall’analisi del concetto di moto locale. D’altra parte

22
Seconda analogia dell’esperienza nella Critica della ragion pura, trad. cit., vol. 1, p. 196.
23
S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 1, La Scuola, Brescia, 1962, pp. 175-177.

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Hume aveva fatto dipendere dalla conoscenza dei nessi fra certi particolari effetti e certe
particolari cause la possibilità di affermare il principio tutto ciò che incomincia è causato. Il
riconoscimento della non analiticità delle leggi fisiche portava dunque Kant a negare anche
l’analiticità del principio tutto ciò che incomincia è causato.

“Ma Kant eredita da Hume anche il motivo per cui questi nega l’analiticità del principio
tutto ciò che incomincia ecc. Il motivo – ricordiamo – era che tutto ciò che è distinguibile è
separabile, che a due idee distinte debbono corrispondere due realtà distinte. Abbiamo già
criticato questo principio parlando di Hume: qui aggiungeremo l’osservazione che Kant trae da
questo principio la sua logica conseguenza: se ogni proposizione in cui il predicato è distinto dal
soggetto è tale che si può negarla senza contraddizione, ossia non è analitica, neppure i principi
della matematica sono analitici.

“Riassumendo: il culto per la nuova meccanica porta Kant ad attribuire rigorosa necessità
(carattere a priori) ai principi della fisica, l’eredità humiana del principio ciò che è distinguibile
è separabile, lo porta ad affermare che tutti i giudizi analitici sono tautologici e quindi ad
affermare il carattere sintetico della matematica: così fisica e matematica vengono a trovarsi sul
medesimo piano epistemologico che non è né quello dei giudizi analitici né quello
dell’esperienza (giudizi sintetici a posteriori) ma è una indebita contaminazione dei due, il piano
del giudizio sintetico a priori.

“Abbiamo già criticato, parlando di Hume, il principio che tutti i giudizi analitici siano
tautologici, ma vogliamo fermarci un momento sull’applicazione che Kant ne fa alla matematica.
Logica applicazione, abbiamo detto, ma proprio per questo tale da mettere in luce la falsità della
premessa da cui parte. Kant ammette infatti che le dimostrazioni della geometria sono tutte
«secondo il principio di contraddizione», ma nega che i principi della matematica siano
«conosciuti in virtù dello stesso principio di contraddizione».24 Ossia ammette che, dati dei
principi (assiomi, postulati) sintetici a priori, si possano, applicando a questi assiomi il principio
di contraddizione, dedurne per esempio i teoremi della geometria. Il procedimento deduttivo è
anche per Kant, analitico, gli assiomi sono giudizi sintetici a priori. Dunque Kant ammette che
un procedimento fondato sul principio di contraddizione possa ampliare la nostra conoscenza, e
non sia quindi tautologico, poiché, evidentemente, colui che sa tutti i teoremi contenuti in un
trattato di geometria sa più di colui che ne conosce soltanto gli assiomi. La nostra conoscenza si
estende, dunque, anche a forza di analisi e non è vero che giudizio analitico equivalga a
tautologia.

“Ora se si pone il problema della conoscenza delle verità necessarie non in termini di
giudizi sintetici a priori ma in termini di giudizi analitici, è ovvio che si arrivi a conclusioni
diverse da quelle di Kant. Il concetto di fenomeno in Kant è infatti in funzione di quello di
giudizio sintetico a priori, come abbiamo cercato di mostrare nell’esposizione. Il concetto di
oggetto dell’esperienza come fenomeno, sintesi di intuizioni empiriche e di forme a priori, nasce
per l’esigenza di superare la soggettività delle intuizioni empiriche senza andare a finire
nell’innatismo o nella teoria della visione delle cose in Dio, teorie che sembrano a Kant (e qui
siamo d’accordo con lui) in contrasto con la finitezza del nostro intelletto e con la sua
dipendenza dalla sensibilità. L’intelletto con le sue categorie (e già in parte le intuizioni pure)
24
I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, I, p. 48.

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oggettiva, unificandolo e legandolo in stabili rapporti, il molteplice delle intuizioni empiriche.
Sebbene, infatti, Kant chiami intuizione la conoscenza sensibile, questa è intuizione come lucus
a non lucendo, poiché è soltanto affezione, modificazione soggettiva.

“Ma la persuasione della soggettività della conoscenza sensibile è un pregiudizio

ereditato dalla tradizione, la tradizione della filosofia da Cartesio in avanti. Se uno concepisce la
sensibilità non come affezione, ma come una prima apprensione conoscitiva degli enti corporei –
come intuizione in senso proprio – si pone diversamente anche il problema della conoscenza
intellettiva, e concepisce l’intelletto come un intuire in modo diverso lo stesso oggetto della
conoscenza sensitiva. Kant ha visto perfettamente che il problema del valore delle verità
necessarie – se esse valgano solo per le cose come appaiono o per le cose in sé – si risolve nel
problema se esista una intuizione intellettuale, ma ha scartato senz’altro la possibilità di una
intuizione intellettuale. E ciò in primo luogo in funzione della sua teoria dell’intuizione
sensibile. Se l’intuizione sensibile non è in realtà intuizione, non coglie l’oggetto, non potrà essa
fornire la base per una intuizione intellettuale. E allora, se mai una intuizione intellettuale c’è,
essa dovrà essere totalmente indipendente dalla sensibilità, analoga a quella di un Intelletto
creatore. Ora non c’è nulla di più lontano dall’effettivo modo in cui procede il sapere umano di
queste intuizioni intellettuali independenti dalla sensibilità. D’altra parte Kant non ha mai preso
in considerazione la possibilità di una intuizione astrattiva. Di qui l’aut-aut che egli stabilisce fra
concetti empirici e concetti puri. I primi, i concetti astratti dall’esperienza sensibile, non possono
mai essere veri concetti, sono combinazioni di sensazioni, come il concetto di oro, e non ci
dicono affatto che cosa sia l’oggetto, ma solo come noi lo sentiamo. I secondi, per essere
concetti, devono essere puri, non debbono essere astratti dai dati sensibili. Ma siccome tali
concetti puri gli appaiono poi necessariamente legati alla sensibilità, li concepisce come le forme
in cui il materiale delle intuizioni deve essere calato per diventare intelligible. Non rivelazione
della intelligibilità degli enti, ma imposizione del nostro intelletto al materiale della sensibilità.

“Dall’aut-aut si esce ammettendo una intuizione intellettuale, astrattiva, imperfetta,

capace di cogliere gli aspetti più universali della realtà, quello di essere e quelli che gli sono
connessi, che lascia quindi aperta all’esperienza la ricerca sul modo specifico di agire dei singoli
enti. Si esce, insomma, ammettendo che ci siano per l’uomo due tipi di sapere: uno intuitivo-
deduttivo, ma limitato all’essere o, per il mondo dei corpi, agli aspetti quantitativi; ed uno rivolto
agli aspetti più specifici del mondo corporeo, ma sempre, almeno nel suo punto di partenza,
induttivo. Kant ha sperato per la metafisica una determinatezza di conoscenza, che essa non
raggiunge, e per la fisica una rigorosa necessità, una apriorità, che essa non può avere. Ne è
venuto fuori l’ibrido concetto di una metafisica della natura che erige a leggi della ragione
simpliciter, le leggi a cui è arrivata in quel momento la ricerca sperimentale.”25

Jolivet’s Critique of Kant on Analytic Judgments and Synthetic A Priori Judgments

Régis Jolivet critiques Kant on analytic judgments and synthetic a priori judgments as
follows: “Si chiama analitico un giudizio in cui l’attributo è, sia identico al soggetto (questo è il
caso della definizione ‘l’uomo è un animale ragionevole’), - sia essenziale al soggetto ‘L’uomo
è ragionevole’), - sia proprio del soggetto ‘Il cerchio è rotondo’). Si chiama sintetico un giudizio

25
S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Gnoseologia, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1963, pp. 188-192

22
in cui l’attributo non esprime nulla di essenziale né di proprio del soggetto: ‘Quest’uomo è
vecchio,’ ‘Il tempo è chiaro.’26

“I giudizi analitici, dipendendo da uno dei tre modi di attribuzione per sé, sono dunque a
priori. I giudizi sintetici sono a posteriori.

“Il problema dei ‘giudizi sintetici a priori’. Seguendo Kant, un gruppo di logici moderni
considerano come analitici solo i giudizi in cui il predicato è contenuto nella nozione del
soggetto, sul tipo della proposizione A è A (considerata giustamente dagli Scolastici come una
pseudo-proposizione). In realtà, sono analitici tutti i giudizi in cui la sintesi del predicato e del
soggetto è necessaria in virtù delle sole esigenze dell’oggetto. Kant, avendo ridotto le analitiche
ai giudizi puramente tautologici, considera tutti gli altri giudizi necessari (per esempio: 7 + 5 =
12, - ciò che comincia ad essere ha una causa) come sintetici a priori, cioè come delle sintesi
operate fuori da ogni esperienza; da ciò egli deduce la sua teoria delle forme a priori
dell’intelletto e della sensibilità.27 Ma questa teoria si fonda, come si vede, su di uno pseudo-
problema, in quanto i giudizi sintetici a priori realmente non esistono.

“Se si esaminano gli esempi offerti da Kant, si vede che essi si riconducono al secondo
modo di attribuzione per sé (o a priori). Nel giudizio 7 + 5 = 12, 12 non è contenuto nella
nozione di 7 + 5, ma costituisce una proprietà di 7 + 5. Così è pure del principio di causalità:
l’idea di ‘essere causato’ (predicato) non è inclusa nella nozione di ‘ciò che comincia ad essere’
(soggetto), ma appartiene necessariamente a questa nozione a titolo di proprietà. Questi due
giudizi sono dunque analitici.”28

For Kant, “l’universo che io percepisco è un universo ordinato, sottomesso alla

giurisdizione delle intuizioni di spazio e tempo e delle categorie della ragion pura. Ora queste
categorie, grazie alle quali l’universo forma un sistema e un sistema di sistemi, non possono in
alcun modo, dichiara Kant (postulato nominalistico), provenire dall’esperienza, che ci offre solo
puri fenomeni singoli e contingenti, e mai ciò che è assoluto e necessario. Sono dunque dei
concetti puri, cioè a priori, dell’intelletto, risultanti dalla funzione logica di quest’ultimo, o, in
altri termini, dalla nostra struttura mentale. Questi concetti ci servono per organizzare il dato
fenomenico e per costruire la scienza. La natura, cioè l’universo in quanto organizzazione
intelligibile, è dunque un prodotto dello spirito. Questa è la dottrina che Kant ha definita come
idealismo formale (o trascendentale).

“Kant dà come prova (che egli giudica assolutamente decisiva29) di questa dottrina i
giudizi da lui detti sintetici a priori, cioè i giudizi nei quali il predicato aggiunge alcunché alla
nozione del soggetto (attua una sintesi), ma in una maniera puramente a priori. Kant offre come

26
La logica medievale non si serve dei termini “analitico” o “sintetico”: essa parla di proposizioni in materia
necessaria, contingente e impossibile, a seconda che esse enuncino una cosa che non può essere diversamente - o
che può essere diversamente - o che non può essere. (Necessario e impossibile corrispondono a analitico;
contingente e possibile corrispondono a sintetico).
27
Cfr. I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, tr. it., 2 voll., Bari, 4a ed., 1949. Introduzione, § 4-6.
28
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 1 (Logica), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1958, no. 59.
29
Cfr. I. KANT, Critica della ragion pura, Dialettica trascendentale, 9a sezione, IV: «Ciò che potrebbe toccare di
più molesto a queste ricerche, è che qualcuno facesse questa scoperta inattesa, che non esiste affatto conoscenza a
priori e che non può esservene. Ma non vi è, sotto questo aspetto, alcun pericolo».

23
esempi: «tutto ciò che comincia ad essere ha una causa»; «tra due punti, la linea retta è la più
breve»; 7 + 5 = 12». In questi giudizi, dice Kant, non è l’intuizione che rende possibile la sintesi
del soggetto e del predicato, poiché l’esperienza è sempre singolare, mentre questi giudizi sono
universali e necessari. Bisogna concludere che essi sono effetto della nostra struttura mentale.

“Abbiamo mostrato in logica (I, 59) che non ci sono giudizi sintetici a priori. L’errore di
Kant sta nel limitare il giudizio analitico al primo modo di attribuzione per sé (I, 45), in cui il
predicato forma sia l’essenza (l’uomo è un animale ragionevole), sia una parte dell’essenza
(l'uomo è un essere ragionevole) del soggetto. Ora i giudizi nei quali il predicato è una proprietà
del soggetto devono anch’essi essere ritenuti come analitici, nel senso che queste proprietà
implicano necessariamente il loro soggetto (secondo modo di attribuzione per sé). Così se non si
può trarre la nozione di «essere causato» dalla nozione «ciò che comincia ad essere», né la
nozione di 12 da quella di 7 + 5, vuol dire che le nozioni di «essere causato» e di 12 sono
proprietà essenziali di «ciò che comincia ad essere» e di 7 + 5, il che significa che queste nozioni
sono collegate tra loro in maniera necessaria e il loro legame è percepito proprio in virtù delle
esigenze dell’oggetto.30”31

30
Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1: «Licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est
causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea quae sunt de eius ratione; quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens
sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse quin causatum, sicut nec homo quin sit
risibilis. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non
causatum».
31
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 4 (Metafisica I), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1959, no. 116.

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