Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Laskier
NORTH
AFRICAN
JEWRY IN THE
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
“There have been useful works on North African Jewry before, but none
so meticulously and imaginatively opens the fascinating vein of con
temporary Zionist activities, and the cloak-and-dagger Israeli relationship,
among the Jews of Maghreb. In one fell swoop, Professor Laskier has
brought the history of the Jews of North Africa up to date, and he has
done so both in the originality of his scholarship and the richness of his
human interest material.”
— Howard M. Sachar
Professor of History and International Affairs
The George Washington University
“An important overview of North African Jewry's final decade before its
dissolution as a result of mass emigrations after World War II. Michael
Laskier’s insightful book will be of great interest to scholars and students
alike.”
— Aron Rodrigue
Stanford University
Author of S ep h ard i an d E astern Jew ries in Transition
North African Jewry in
the Twentieth Century
The Jews of Morocco, Tunisia,
and Algeria
Michael M. Laskier
n
New York University Press
NEW YORK AND LONDON
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York and London
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my w ife, Anat,
and to my children, Ron an d S heer
Contents
Illustrations ix
Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
vii
viii Contents
Conclusions 345
Notes 351
Bibliography 385
Index 391
Illustrations
Ouezzan 29
Alfred Valensi 33
Sultan Muhammad V 69
IX
x Illustrations
The Victims of the Oslo Tragedy, with a Photo of Yitshak Allai 276
This book was written between 1990 and 1992 in Chicago during my
association with Spertus College of Judaica, as the Louis Susman Profes
sor of Jewish/Middle Eastern History and director of the Susman Com
munal Studies Program. It was revised during the course of 1992 when I
resettled in Los Angeles and became the executive director of the World
Sephardic Educational Center. The bulk of the research for the book was
carried out during the 1980s when I taught at Tel-Aviv University and
served as a research scholar at that university’s Diaspora Research Insti
tute. The Diaspora Research Institute, in conjunction with the Memorial
Foundation for Jewish Culture, provided me with a major grant to re
search and write this book. The Rosalind Cohn Fund of Chicago enabled
me during 1990-92 to complete it.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the many individuals
and institutions who played direct and indirect roles in this project.
Special thanks are owed to: Yoram Miorek and Dr. Michael Heymann of
the Jerusalem-based Central Zionist Archives; Sarah Cadosh of the Jew
ish Joint Distribution Committee archives in Jerusalem, as well as Den
ise B. Gluck and her wonderful staff at the Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee in New York City; the Tabenkin Institute for Zionist Re
search (Israel); the staff at the Hagana Archive and the Israel Lavon
Archive/Lavon Institute (both in Tel-Aviv); the staff at the Israel State
Archives as well as the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish
People (both in Jerusalem); the staff at the Quai d’Orsay (Nantes and
Paris) and the Public Record Office (London); the staff at the Alliance
Israélite Universelle Archives (Paris); Dr. Yo3 el Raba of Tel-Aviv Univer
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
1
2 Introduction
The archival materials researched for this book are diverse. First, the
archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (Paris) and the Alliance
Israélite Universelle microfilm collection (Jerusalem, Central Archives
for the History of the Jewish People), provide ample data on both the
educational and political functions of that French-Jewish educational
organization on behalf of North African Jewry from its inception in 1860
until the mid-twentieth century.
Second, communal archives and the World Jewish Congress corre
spondence about the social and political welfare issues relevant to the
Jews before and after World War II, including the Jacques Lazarus
collection, also available at the Central Archives for the History of the
Jewish People, present “inside story” information concerning the fears
and instability, hopes and inspirations, of the North African communities
at the time of the Muslim struggle for independence against European
colonialism.
Third, the Public Record Office/Foreign Office archives, London, as
well as the Diaspora Research Institute archives, Tel-Aviv, present vital
perspectives on the political status of Moroccan and Algerian Jewry
before, during, and following World War II.
Fourth, the achives of the Quai d’Orsay (French Ministry for Foreign
Affairs), in Paris and Nantes, contain the bulk of the French Protectorate
archives for Tunisia and Morocco, including data on: French colonial
policies vis-à-vis the local Zionisms and the application of Vichy’s anti-
Jewish laws; large-scale emigration to Europe and caliya (emigration to
Israel); European and indigenous anti-Semitism; Judeo-Muslim relations;
and the Jews in the midst of the struggle between the colonized and the
French colonizers.
Fifth, the archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Commit
tee (New York and Jerusalem) contain invaluable materials on every
aspect of North African Jewish cultural, social, economic, educational,
and political life, from the early 1940s and to the present. Created in
1914 by American Jews of German origins, the functions of the Joint
Distribution Committee included the subsidization of Jewish communal
institutions throughout the world, financing Jewish emigration, and pro
viding assistance, food, and clothing for the impoverished— refugees and
nonrefugees alike. From the 1940s this organization maintained offices
and programs in North Africa and Europe. Its funds were largely derived
Introduction 3
from the United Jewish Appeal, the American Jewish Federations, and
the Jewish Claims Conference against Germany.
From 1947-48, the Joint Distribution Committee assisted many orga
nizations operating on North African Jewry's behalf. Among these were
the ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation through Training) vocational
school network, active in the Third World since 1946; the Oeuvre de
Secours aux Enfants (or OSE) which established clinics in Morocco and
Tunisia; the American-sponsored religious schools of Osâr ha-Tora and
Lubavitch; the French Alliance Israélite Universelle schools; and the
Mossad Le-CAliya Bet (Mossad Le-cAliya hereafter), the organization of
the Yishuv (Jewish community of Palestine) and later Israel responsible
for organizing illegal emigration from Europe after 1939. Starting in
1947, the Mossad Le-cAliya engaged in promoting caliya from the Muslim
world.
Sixth, the Hagana Archive, the Israel Labor Archive, both in Tel-Aviv;
the Ghetto Fighters Museum archives; the Central Zionist Archives and
Israel State Archives (Jerusalem)— all provide the best source material
on the Yishuv's involvement within the North African communities and
on Zionist activity.
The purpose of this book is fourfold. It aims to:
1. Provide a political textbook on North Africa's Jewish communities
that, until the early 1960s, contained one of the largest Jewish popula
tions in the world and, today, influence Israeli society and politics as well
as Jewish life in France and Quebec. Israel’s dynamic demographic
growth since the 1950s would not have been realized without the North
African caliya. The new emigrants strengthened Israel by settling in the
northern and southern border regions, and in development towns, often
becoming the victims of Arab-Israeli conflicts and terrorist activity. Their
contribution and struggles resemble the challenge emigrants from the
former Soviet Union encounter in the Israel of the 1990s. In France,
Jewish life was considerably enhanced by North African Jewish emigra
tion— mainly of Algerians— from the mid-1950s to the 1990s. As a result,
French Jewry grew from 235,000 in 1957 (composed of Jews originating
from Alsace/Lorraine and Eastern Europe) to over 500,000 by 1970. Not
only did the newcomers inject new stimulae into French Jewry, but they
helped transform this now heterogeneous community into the second
largest in the Western world.
4 Introduction
role of the M ossad inside the Jewish communities of Morocco and Al
geria.
The recorded history of North Africa begins with the founding of Car
thage in 813 b . c . e . For 667 years until its fall to the Romans in 146
B .C .E ., Carthage came under the influence of the Jews and Pheonicians
of Palestine.1 The Romans were succeeded by the Vandals, the Vandals
by the Byzantines, and the Byzantines by the Arabs in a . d . 642.
The oldest population group in North Africa, predating the arrival of
the Jews and Pheonicians, was the Berbers— a Mediterranean people,
pagans whose exact origins are yet to be investigated. Embracing Islam
following the Arab conquest of 642, and undergoing linguistic and cul
tural Arabization, they remain a major demographic component to the
present. Several Islamic dynasties, Arab and Berber, controlled North
Africa between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries. After the 1550s,
however, present-day Algeria and Tunisia came under the influence of
Ottoman/Turkish domination, while Morocco was controlled by the Shar-
ifian dynasty, still in power during the early 1990s. When Algeria was
conquered by the French (1830), Arabic had long since replaced or
supplemented the Berber dialects as the common language for most of
the inhabitants. In Algeria, as in Morocco, the French colonists at
tempted, ultimately in vain, to set Berber against Arab, favoring the
former.
The Arabs of modem and contemporary North Africa are descendants
of the early Arab invaders of the seventh to the eleventh centuries. Like
the Islamized Berbers they are Sunnis. O f the Berber tribes in Algeria,
the Kabyles of the Kabyle mountains of northern Algeria form the largest
group. They were the least exposed to France. Because of the isolated
and relatively barren area in which they live, they had made the least
contact with the European settlers (colons and pieds noirs) and had
experienced the minimum of the French administration. On the other
hand, in the twentieth century they form the largest group of migrants to
France— migration in search of work. Other important Algerian Berber
groups include the Chaouias of the Aures mountains in northern Algeria,
6 Introduction
and the Mzabites who live in enclosed bastion cities in the Sahara desert.
The majority of the country’s Muslims are the Arabs; as many as 30
percent are Berbers.
After the French conquest of Algeria from the Turks, real wealth and
power lay in the hands of the European settlers, especially from 1871
when they were able to supplant French metropolitan and military influ
ence to much of the administration in the country. The colon s, both the
powerful and rich, and the “small” and poor (the urbanite pieds noirs)
formed, in effect, a superior class which was “more French than the
French” (although the settlers were sometimes of Spanish or Italian
rather than French origin). This class condemned the natives (indigènes)
and feared that any concession to them could only lead to the eventual
disruption of a structure of which they, the colon s, intended to remain in
control.2
The French carried on a policy, initiated by their Turkish predeces
sors, of making Algeria the base of their rule in North Africa and of
increasing their territory by bringing under Algerian control areas that
had hitherto looked rather to the older-established regimes of Tunisia
and Morocco. A large-scale confiscation of cultivable land following the
crushing of Muslim resistance made French colonization possible. By
1880, the coastal areas had become predominantly Christian areas of
mixed European origin: Spanish in and around Oran; French, Italian,
and Maltese in the center and the east. Each weakening, even tempo
rary, of the French governmental authority led to the increased influence
of the settlers and to a renewed rising and suppression of the Muslims.
On the overthrow of Louis Philippe s regime in 1848, the settlers in
Algeria succeeded in having the territory declared French and the three
former Turkish provinces of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine converted
into départem en ts (French regional administrative units), while coloniza
tion was developed with renewed vigor. Between the 1870s and the
1920s, the Europeans felt free to establish political, economic, and social
domination over Algeria.3
For a long time, the French believed that the Algerian Muslims did
not want independence but rather to merge themselves with France. In
thinking thus, the French were fixing their gaze on the tiny minority
who received a French education and saw the salvation of the mass of
their compatriots in the extension to them of a similar assimilation. But
Introduction 7
the French ignored two other groups. Algerian workers and students
mainly in France, under the leadership of Ahmad Messali Hadj, had
formed the Algerian nationalist movement that, from 1936, took the title
of the Parti du Peuple Algérien. In Algeria itself there came into being
another movement, led by a man of religious leaning, Shaykh Abd al-
Hamld ben Badis; this was the Association of Algerian ‘ Ulama3 (learned
scholars of Islam). Following the political eclipse of Messali’s movement,
his party was superseded by the Comité Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et
TAction (CRUA), later formed into the Front for National Liberation
(FLN), which called for a break with France.4
At the time of the French invasion of Algeria, Tunisia was a province
of the Ottoman Empire but, in effect, autonomous under the Husaynid
dynasty. This dynasty, consisting of Mamlük (Caucasian or Oriental slaves
in Muslim countries) and Turkish officials known as beys, controlled
Tunisia beginning in 1705, pledging allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan.
The Husaynids became an integral part of the Tunisian milieu through
intermarriage and acculturation. Of the various beys between 1705 and
1957 (the latter year marking the end of the dynasty and the creation of
the Tunisian Republic), Ahmad Bey who reigned in 1837-55 was an
avowed Westemizer. Unlike the ruthless Turkish deys of precolonial
Algeria or the conservative Sharifian sultans of Morocco, Ahmad Bey
brought Western advisers, mainly French, to help create a modem army
and navy and related industries. Conscription was introduced to the great
dismay of the peasantry. More acceptable were Ahmad’s steps to better
integrate Arabic-speaking native Tunisians into the government which
had long been dominated by Mamlüks and Turks.
Influenced by the French Revolution, Ahmad abolished slavery and
took steps intended to bring Tunisia more in line with Europe, but he
also exposed his country to Europe’s infinitely greater economic and
political power. Tunisia was bankrupt in 1869, and an international finan
cial commission— with British, French, and Italian representation— was
imposed on the country. One last important attempt to strengthen Tuni
sia internally and thus prevent European domination was made during
the reformist ministry of Khayr al-Dln (1873-77), one of the most impres
sive statesmen of the nineteenth-century Muslim world. All that was
needed for France to establish control over Tunisia was the acquiescence
of France’s principal rival, Britain, and this was obtained in 1881 when
8 Introduction
the French, on the pretext that some Tunisian tribesmen had moved into
Algerian territory, landed troops in Tunisia and established a Protecto
rate over the country.5
The Convention of Marsa (1881) did not call for outright conquest as
was the case in Algeria. The bey remained in theory an absolute mon
arch, two ministers were still appointed, and the framework of the old
government machinery was preserved. There was no confiscation of land;
mosques were not converted into churches; and Arabic remained an
official language. Nevertheless, the supreme authority passed in fact into
the hands of the French resident-general and his functionaries.
Although, in retrospect, none of the North African countries had the
structural capacities to withstand foreign domination, nineteenth-century
Tunisia offered somewhat more favorable prospects for self-sustained
reformation than did its neighbors. With about one and a half million
inhabitants in 1881 (over three million in 1956), in contrast to Morocco’s
four million in 1912 (11,626,000 in 1960), and Algeria’s three million in
1830 (9,500,000 in 1962)— Tunisia was the weakest, most “colonizable,”
and the least pluralistic of the three countries. Why? Tunisia enjoyed one
asset which distinguished it sharply from the rest of the Maghrib. Half of
its population was sedentary, clustered in the ancient cities, towns, and
villages of the sah il, the Tunisian littoral— a population easily exploited
like the peasantry of the Egyptian Nile and hence a stable support for
any government. With the exception of the Krumir tribesmen of the
northwest and a few Saharan tribes, tribal dissidence in Tunisia was not
as intense as in Algeria and Morocco. The Tunisian bey did not need to
organize military expeditions to collect taxes as did the Moroccan author
ities. The people of Tunisia were linguistically homogeneous, Arabic
speaking with the exception of a multilingual Turkish ruling class, the
Jews, and, since the 1870s, a European settler community. The Berbers
of Tunisia constituted less than 2 percent of the population.6
In line with the homogeneity of the Muslim population, a dynamic
nationalist movement emerged in the 1930s under the banner of the
Neo-Destour party.
Similar to Algeria, the Muslim population of Morocco was composed
of Arabs and Islamized Berbers, though the distinction between the two
groups today is more linguistic than racial. Albeit greatly influenced by
Arabic, the Berber language has been preserved in the mountainous
regions. Berber-speaking inhabitants are divided into three ethnolinguis-
Introduction 9
tic groups: the Rifflans of the Rif mountains in northern Morocco; the
Imazighen, Tamazight-speakers of the Middle Atlas mountains; and the
Shluh of the High and Ante Atlas. Arabic-Berber bilingualism among the
Berbers has become common, and the proportion of monolingual Ber
bers does not exceed 25 percent. European colonization brought a French
and Spanish minority, after 1912, whose numbers had reached some
400,000-500,000 in 1956. The French and Spanish languages, which
spread among the urban populations during the Protectorate, are still
spoken today.7
From the sixteenth century until the present, Morocco had been
governed by the hereditary Sharifian dynasty. The dynasty’s govern
ment, known as the m akh zan , was devoted to the extraction of taxes in
specie and in kind, especially in remote regions where central authority
was weak— areas referred to as b le d al-siba as distinct from b led al-
m akhzan under complete government control. The principal justification
of the sultan for collecting taxes was his role as “defender of the faith.” In
order to carry out his duty effectively he needed the wherewithal to
equip and maintain an army for excursions into the b le d — a term used
by the French to describe the countryside and mountainous regions,
applied in this book merely for conciseness— campaigns known as harkas
and m ahgllas. Seldom, however, was his right to collect taxes accepted
without a contest. Alliances of Arabo-Berber tribes, Shurafa3 (plural for
Sharif or descendants of the Prophet), and Muràbitïn (tribal mediators)
would often form in varying combinations to deny the sultan his reve
nues, or, occasionally, to put forth a contender for his title of Amir al-
Mtfminln (Commander of the Faithful).8
The division, in 1912, of Morocco into a large French and a small
Spanish Protectorate followed the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of Fez (30
March 1912), and the Franco-Spanish agreement of November 1912. It
prompted the two European powers to embark on a military pacification
campaign between 1912 and 1934 to ensure the stability of the m akhzan ,
which survived alongside the colonial apparatus, and to consolidate the
economic and strategic status of their newly acquired influence. The
campaign was successful, particularly under the command of the French
resident-general Field-Marshal Lyautey. It led to the demise of the b led
al-sïba. Areas formerly in the siba were now subordinate to both the
traditional qa* ids (rural/tribal governors) and a French military adminis
tration (Bureaux des Affaires Indigènes). In the urban milieu the author-
10 Introduction
Use the ancient ruling cadres instead of dissolving them. Govern with the
mandarin, not against him. We must proceed from this: being always destined to
be a tiny minority, we cannot pretend to substitute ourselves for them, but at
the most to direct and to control. Thus, we must not offend a tradition or change
a single custom; we must say to ourselves that there is in each society a ruling
class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done, and and there is a class
to be governed. We must use the ruling class in our interests.10
Jewish Society
The number of Jews who left Palestine with the Pheonicians after 586
B .C .E ., when the destruction of the Temple occurred, is difficult to
ascertain. It is known, however, that the Jewish population in the Magh
rib— alongside the Berbers— was numerically strengthened in a . d . 70,
the date of the second destruction of the Temple. They were reinforced
in 1492 by the m egôrâshïm (the ones expelled) from Spain and Portugal.
The penetration and consolidation of Islam in North Africa brought
about a comprehensive overhauling of the societal structure. As in all
territories which came under Islamic jurisdiction, the Jews were classi
fied as a “protected people” or dhimmis. The term dhim m i, applied in
12 Introduction
the Sacred Law of the Shari ca and and in the Quran, designates the
Christian and Jewish subjects of any Muslim ruler. Like most of the
Sacred Law, the principles upon which the non-Muslims are to be dealt
with by Muslim rulers evolved in the early centuries of Islam. The
Prophet Muhammad and the first Caliphs were acquainted with five
religions: the Jews, the Christians, the Sabaians, the Zoroastrians, and
the polytheistic cults of Arabia; but the Jews and Christians had a special
place in the Prophet’s concept of the world. Unlike the polytheists, they
at least had books of their own to excuse them for not receiving him and
were thus the “People of the Scripture.” Therefore, it was established
that whereas on the conquest of new territory by Muslims, such as North
Africa, polytheists and pagans (i.e., Berbers) must accept Islam or die,
the “People of the Scripture” would be permitted to practice their reli
gion.11
What did this mean? It outlined the basic tenets under which Jews
and Christians would become tolerated infidels. By the term of his
contract with the dhim m isy the Muslim ruler was supposed to guarantee
their lives, liberty, and property, and was responsible for their freedom
of religious practice. The Shari ca laid down the conditions by which the
Muslim ruler would be willing to protect these minorities. In contrast to
the Muslims the dhim m is undertook to pay the special poll tax known as
jizy a and the land tax called kharâj. Generally speaking, in comparison
with the Muslims, the dhim m is were at a disadvantage legally and judi
cially. For instance, their evidence was not accepted against that of a
Muslim in an Islamic court. The Muslim who killed a dhim m i did not
suffer the death penalty and a dhim m i could not marry a Muslim woman,
whereas a Muslim could marry a dhim m i woman. Though in Tunisia and
Algeria the jiz y a lk h a râ j practice was eliminated during the nineteenth
century, Moroccan Jewry still paid these taxes as late as the first decade
of the twentieth century.
The Jewish communal organizational apparatus underwent profound
changes in the period following Muslim rule in North Africa. The Jews
were granted administrative autonomy over institutions, including the
rabbinic tribunals that deliberated over crucial judicial matters, with the
exception of cases involving legal disputes between Jews and Muslims,
in which case the Shari ca courts took charge. In North Africa most
communities had rabbis who served as spiritual guides and presided over
Introduction 13
the synagogues and rabbinic courts. In some cases the rabbinate was
hereditary. The prominent lay notables, whose power was partly deter
mined by the degree of their wealth, were assembled in councils com
posed of seven to fifteen members elected by the communities.
Delving into the communal structure in the colonial era, it is essential
to examine each country. Since the mid-1840s every major Algerian
community was directed by a consistory (consistoire), as was the case
with the Jewish communities of metropolitan France after 1808. The new
system helped the poor, organized public worship, set up synagogues,
named the rabbis, provided religious instruction, and administered the
Jewish cemeteries. Unlike the preconsistorial period, the communal
leadership now encouraged Jewish youths to enter the productive trades
and accept aspects of European life-styles. In order to make their work
more effective, the consistories of Algeria organized themselves, in April
1947, into a Fédération des Communautés Israélites d'Algérie (FCIA).
Benyamin Heler was elected president, Armand Atali secretary-general,
Joseph Charbit treasurer, and Paul Barkatz, Gaston Saffar, and Joseph
Bensadoun vice-presidents. The board was chosen from the elected rep
resentatives of the consistories of the three départem ents: Algiers, Oran,
and Constantine. One of the principal decisions of the FCIA was to urge
the extension of the work of the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee into Algeria, so as to strengthen the feeble life of the com
munities; to fight against the indifference of the Algerian Jewish middle
socioeconomic stratum to the Jewish question; and to remedy the ab
sence of a network of social agencies, and thus resist the trend toward
assimilation noticeable in the growing number of mixed marriages. Only
in 1957, however, did the American Joint extend its services to Algeria.
Since Algeria was part of France, and the consistories subordinate to
their counterparts in the m étropole, the communities were represented
in the Consistoire Central des Israélites de France, headquartered in
Paris.12
In Tunisia communal leadership frictions were age-old. Although a
federation of Jewish communities had existed since 1948 under the pres
idency of Charles Sacada, president of the community of Sfax, a second,
rival federation was created in May 1953 under the sponsorship of Charles
Haddad, president of the Tunis community. The country's Jewish com
munities were then split into two hostile camps: eighteen communities
14 Introduction
1. Jew s W hose M other Tongue Is Spanish an d /or Judeo-S pan ish. Those
were the Sephardim, descendants of the m egôrâshlm who retained their
Spanish language and culture and transmitted to their children the cul
ture of medieval Spain. In Algeria they mainly settled in the region of
Oran, segments of which migrated there from northern Morocco. In
Morocco, where the Sephardim emerged as a larger group than in Al
geria, they lived mostly in the north (Tangier, Tetuan, Larache, Elksar,
Arcila); their presence was also quite visible in the coastal seaports of
Casablanca, Essaouira, Mazagan, and Safi. The Sephardim were the most
receptive to European ideas and their manners and customs differed
from those of the rest of the Jewish population. They practiced monog
amy, their segment of the populace presented the prime candidates for
banking and trade, and their family names included Nahon, Pinto, El-
maleh, Pariente, Benchimol, Laredo, and Toledano. When speaking
Judeo-Spanish instead of the purer Spanish, the language included a
variety of Hebrew words and biblical verses.16 In Tunisia the Sephardim
who arrived after 1492 were a relatively small force which integrated into
the older Jewish community, known as the Touansa. On the other hand,
an emigration wave of Jewish Sephardi/Portuguese elements to Tunisia
after the latter half of the seventeenth century from Livorno, known as
the Grana (“The People of Leghorn”) caused communal friction between
the indigenous Touansa and the quasi-European, Italian-speaking Grana
Livornese, especially in the city of Tunis. Unity and coexistence among
them did not develop until the twentieth century. For generations these
two Jewish sectors had been represented by two separate communities
in Tunis.17
2. The Ju d eo-A rab G roup. This segment, the most important and largest
Maghribi Jewish population, was divided into two categories. First, the
descendants of the Jews who settled in North Africa after 586 b . c . e . and
A.D. 70. Thus, in Tunisia, for example, this group constituted the bulk of
16 Introduction
the Touansa. They spoke Judeo-Arabic and the local Arabic spoken by
the Muslims. Judeo-Arabic among them was as widespread as Judeo-
Spanish and European languages among the Sephardim. The homily at
their synagogues, both oral and written, was in that language. It was
studded with sayings and passages from sacred writings, which were
translated into Arabic and allowed to be briefly rendered in Aramaic by
the homilists. These usages led to the emergence of a special language, a
mélange of Arabic, Hebrew, and Aramaic. When writing Arabic, the
Jews used Hebrew script.18 In Tunisia this element could be found from
the southern communities of Jerba (the ghettos of Hara Saghlra and Hara
Kabïra) and Gabes to the northern cities of Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse. They
often lived in Jewish districts known as k a ra t al-Yahüd. In Algeria they
were concentrated in the coastal cities of Bone, Algiers, and Oran, and
in Constantine. In the départem en t of Algiers they lived in Orléanville,
Djelfa, Laghouat, Cherchell, and Medea; in the Oranais they populated
Mostaganem, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Tlemcen, Colomb Bechar, Geryville, La-
moncière, and Montagnac; in the Constantinois they lived in Batna,
Sétif, Philipville, Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, El-Oued, Biskra, M’Sila, and
Touggourt. In the Sahara, they settled within the M czab region, the
Mzabite Berber stronghold. As for Morocco, this Judeo-Arab segment
populated the coastal cities of Mazagan, Casablanca, Essaouira (Moga-
dor), as well as the inland communities of the b le d , Fez, Meknès, Mar
rakesh, Oudjda, and Midelt— among other places. It is noteworthy that
the Judeo-Arabs in the urban areas were to a large degree migrants from
the bled. Many Jews throughout Morocco lived in special ghettos and
districts known as m ellâhs.
The second category was made up of the Sephardim of Morocco who
did not settle in the northern part of the country or who had migrated
from there to the inland as well as to the cities of Morocco's Atlantic
coast. They mingled with the Judeo-Arabs and, over time, had forgotten
their Spanish language, assimilating the Judeo-Arabic vernacular. They
did retain such Sephardi family names as Toledano, Serero, Monsonego,
Sarfatl, and Berdugo.
Tabulated data on the various urban and rural Maghribi Jewish popu
lations are presented throughout the book.
As for the social stratification among the Jews, already in precolonial
times the small u p p er and m iddle strata included bankers, businessmen,
urban real estate investors, and large-scale merchants. Consisting largely
Introduction 17
Chief Rabbi Serero of the Ville Nouvelle at Fez in the Serero Synagogue (author s
personal collection).
18 Introduction
era, the consular protection for the few was lifted, with the unique
exception of Tangier.
The low er-m iddle stratum was made up of artisans, grocers, peddlers,
and other small-scale merchants located in the inland and coastal regions,
as well as goldsmiths and fruit and vegetable merchants. Many of the
artisans acquired their profession on a hereditary basis. This stratum
included a segment of the Moroccan b le d stratum which applied to the
Maghrib as a whole. In parts of Morocco's b led Jews actually engaged in
agricultural pursuits. The lower-middle stratum formed the dominant
socioeconomic group of employed Jews in North Africa. Owing to the
efforts of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, or AI U, from the late 1920s
onward and of the ORT vocational schools after 1946, this category of
Jews underwent professional modernization— with many entering trades
such as mechanics, electronics, and television/radio repair.
The p o o r an d unem ployed strata were sizable in the precolonial and
colonial periods. These included settled populations and migrants from
the b led to the urban centers, living off communal charity.
Chapter 1 investigates deeper Maghribi Jewish society during the
colonial period, highlighting sociopolitical modernization and other de
velopments.
Part One
23
24 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
ality had been defined in the basic treaty of 10 September 1857, and in
the Tunisian constitution of 26 April 1861. The treaty provided in Article
4 that Tunisian subjects of the Beylicate (the Husaynid dynasty) be
permitted to practice their religious rites, and in Article 8 that no distinc
tion be made between Tunisian Muslims and Tunisian Jews. The consti
tution also provided for permanent allegiance to the Regency. It stated
that all Tunisians who left the country, for whatever reason, whether or
not they had been naturalized in another country, would become Tu
nisian subjects whenever they returned to Tunisia. All Jews born in
Tunisia and unable to establish a foreign nationality were considered
Tunisian under the law. The only exception to the principle of permanent
allegiance was the provision that a Tunisian could become a citizen of
France upon individual application.1 It was in 1923, under the French
Protectorate, that the Morinaud Law enabled Jews to get French citizen
ship on an individual basis only.
Moroccan Jews, the overwhelming majority of whom remained dhim
m is, were worse off politically than either their Algerian or Tunisian
counterparts. Their status warrants a more in-depth analysis.
Already in 1880, at the Madrid Conference, convened by Morocco
and the European powers to deliberate over Europe's dangerous viola
tions of Moroccan sovereignty, issues of consular protection and foreign
nationality were raised. Regarding the latter, a rather complicated policy
was formulated: “Every Moroccan naturalized abroad who shall return to
Morocco must, after a period of residence equal in time to that which
was legal to obtain naturalization, choose between his complete sub
mission to the laws of the [Sharifian] Empire and the obligation to
leave Morocco.” Nevertheless, a qualification was attached to this: “un
less it was proved that the foreign naturalization was obtained with
the consent of the Sultan. ”2 The sultan, however, was not about to con
sent.
During the Protectorate period when segments of the Jews sought
French citizenship, they encountered stiff opposition from the French
Residency. Albert Saguès, the Alliance Israélite Universelle school prin
cipal from Casablanca, had met with Field-Marshal Lyautey, the resi
dent-general, to discuss this matter. Lyautey asserted bluntly that he
opposed the Crémieux Decree granting Algerian Jewry French citizen
ship in large numbers; at the same time, however, he did not rule out
the possibility of a careful selection process, whereby the new French
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 25
Here is a race which was hermetically sealed in the melldhs without daring to
leave its gates, a race persecuted by the rest of the indigenous population, a race
attached to its ancient traditions and customs. And here we see that same race
today, perfectly assimilated, having been liberated recently after centuries of
setbacks, in an advanced intellectual level, working and dressing in the same
manner as we do. . . . There are those among them who qualify for becoming
French citizens, based on their intellectual level. We can therefore say that the
hour has come to give Moroccan Jews the opportunity to become French.4
This approach was only of benefit to the “liberated,” the most edu
cated. Besides, the description of Moroccan Jewry in de Stahl s assess
ment is on the one hand misleading, and rosy on the other. De Stahl,
like the French Protectorate, did not wish to see large-scale naturaliza
tion and consequently make enemies for the Protectorate among the
Muslims. As Lyautey would argue, large-scale naturalization or a Cré-
mieux-style decree would stir political animosity among Morocco s Mus
lims as it has, over the years, in Algeria. Lyautey and his successors to
the Residency in Rabat also feared that once the Jews of Morocco ob
tained French citizenship, they would be on equal footing with the
European settler community. The latter did not much care for the Jews,
whereas the Crémieux Decree in Algeria helped fuel the flames of Euro
pean discontent and anti-Semitism. The French contended that Mo
rocco, moreover, was not an integral part of Metropolitan France, as was
Algeria, but a Protectorate, and therefore they lacked the authority to
promote large-scale naturalization policies. And they were doubtless
reluctant to challenge the rabbinic courts over judicial matters.
If the French were anxious about these problems, they were equally
apprehensive about adverse reactions from the politically motivated Muslim
intellectuals who eventually emerged as Morocco s nationalists advocat
ing independence. Any policy of divide et im pera was challenged by
these groups from the outset. Part of the opposition to judicial policies
was attributed to French efforts in the post-Lyautey period to temporar
ily deviate from certain aspects of the status quo and remove the Berbers
from the influence of the Shari ca courts. In May 1930 a zahtr was
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 27
Ouezzan: An Important Pilgrimage Site for Muslim and Jewish Religious and
Cultural Celebrations (author s personal collection).
Jew ry, who w ere not particularly encouraged by the P ro tecto rate to
attend F re n ch public schools oth er than the A l lf s .
This last point about M orocco d eserves special attention in my analysis
con cern in g the politics of education. W h ereas in the p re -P ro te cto ra te era
the F re n ch consuls w ent out of th eir way to w elcom e Jew ish youths into
th eir consular schools (as well as to help the AIU expand its netw ork in
M orocco), F re n ch P ro tecto rate officials after 1912 exercised caution in
their policies. In fact, ju st as the F re n ch in M orocco did not recom m en d
granting political/judicial privileges to the Jew s, as late as the m id-1940s
at least the R esidency was equally hesitant to enroll Jewish youths in the
schools intended for the E u ro p ean population— the é c o l e s e u r o p é e n n e s .
Its officials in M orocco thought that m ost Jew s would rem ain loyal to
F ra n ce in any case, with or w ithout receiving special educational and
political privileges. After all, the very existence of the P ro tecto rate of
fered them the kind o f security they had longed for. W anting the Jew s to
progress in the path of F re n ch cu ltu re, the F re n ch nonetheless argued
that the process should take place outside the framework of the é c o le s
e u r o p é e n n e s : through the A IU and o th er special institutions.
30 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
It is perhaps regrettable that the Jews are not assimilating to the European
population. We have no interest in isolating or removing them. But, their
acceptance into the primary-level écoles eu rop éen n es will not be looked upon
favorably in the eyes of the European families and it would arouse the Muslims.
. . , [Moreover], the Jews of Morocco, subjects of the Sultan, are under our
protection as are the Moroccan Muslims. We cannot enable these Jews to reach
a respectable status in the country at the expense of their former masters. If we
will be regarded as those who prefer to develop the education of the Jews or if
we will be in a situation whereby the education of the Muslims would lag behind
it, we will cause harsh demoralization among the Muslims and unrest. . . .
Sooner or later social and economic disequilibrium will occur between the Jew
and the Muslim, and this we would like to delay as much as possible.6
In North Africa as in other parts of the Diaspora, hope for the return to
Zion, the Land of Israel (also known as Eretz Yisrael), has always existed,
a hope that rested on messianic and religious concepts rather than on
political ones; and North African Jewry maintained lines of communica
tion— through correspondence, emissaries, and emigration— with Pal
estine. The evolution toward modern Zionism in the region begins in the
years 1900-1914 with the formation of Zionist associations, sometimes in
conjunction with European Zionists who visited or settled among them.
Beginning with Morocco in 1900, three years after the first interna
tional Zionist Congress that convened in Basle, Dr. Yacakov Berliawski,
a Russian physician, settled in Tetuan and established there the Shivat-
Zion association together with local supporters. At the time a second
association, known as Sha care-Zion, was created in Essaouira— perhaps
the first group to popularize the sh eq el (Zionist membership card ob
tained by payment of fees) in North Africa and to send the Zionist
Federation in Cologne over two hundred sh eqalim y entitling the Essa
ouira association to two representatives at the Zionist Congress; but this
opportunity was not exploited. A third association, Ahavat-Zion, was
founded in Safi.9
In 1908 the Hibbat-Zion society was established in Fez. It engaged in
correspondence with the important Zionist center in Cologne, popular
ized the sh e q ely and expanded its activities to include neighboring Sefrou
and Meknès. During the early period of the Protectorate some of these
associations were dormant or no longer in existence. Yet new ones sprang
up during the 1930s and 1940s. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 33
were far from constituting mass movements and were sometimes dor
mant. This was partly attributed to the fact that most French-educated
Zionists dwelt in the suburbs of Tunis (Ariana, La Goulette, La Marsa)
where Europeans (Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians) resided. These Zion
ist activists were therefore detached from the h arat al-Y ahüd— the home
of the Jewish masses.
O f the active Zionists it was Alfred Valensi and his wife, Marcelle,
together with Joseph Brami and Henri Maarek who strengthened ties to
European Zionism, participated in Zionist congresses, and kept the most
remote Tunisian communities in the inland informed about events in the
Yishuv.
Despite Valensi’s intellectual brilliance— he was a graduate of French
primary and secondary schools and had pursued law studies at Montpel
lier— and Brami’s excellence as an orator and organizer, they failed to
attract large numbers of supporters. Valensi did succeed, however, in
forming the Fédération Sioniste de Tunisie in 1920 which received offi
cial recognition from the French Protectorate administration. As was the
case in Morocco, the FST was created with the clear aim of serving as an
umbrella organization that would unify all existing or newly founded
associations scattered in the coastal, seaport, and inland communities.
But problems emerged from the outset that were destined to plague the
FST, split its membership, and strengthen competing neo-Zionist groups,
several of which espoused more radical ideologies.
What were the main problems that retarded and virtually neutralized
the FS T ’s efforts for some time to come? Most importantly, the departure
in 1926 of Valensi from the Zionist scene, following his decision to settle
in France, was a major setback for the movement. Equally significant
was the sudden death of Brami in 1924. The movement in Tunis, the
FST, and Agudat-Zion thus lost two key figures who had been consistent
in promoting unity among the factions and in coordinating channels of
communications between the FST in Tunis and the associations through
out the country.
Secondly, while the mainstream Zionist FST was in shambles, Ze5 ev
Jabotinsky’s Zionist Revisionist movement began to penetrate its ranks
during the late 1920s in an attempt to fill the leadership vacuum. By
1932-33, the Revisionists set up their own Zionist federation, separate
from the already weakened FST, then headed by two key mainstream
Zionists: Victor Cattan and Simon Bellahsen. The main leaders of the
38 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
Revisionist federation were Elie Luzun of Sfax and Alfred Rossi as well
as Robert Brunschvig of Tunis. The latter, an Alsatian Jew, had been a
p rofesseu r at the prestigious Tunis lycée. He subsequently taught at the
Université d'Alger, becoming one of the most renowned Orientalists. By
1939, Revisionism became the predominant Zionist political trend in
Tunisia with several thousand members supporting its endeavors.
Indeed, Tunisian Jewry's Zionism and political life of the late 1920s
and early 1930s were diverse, a center of Maghribi Jewish factionalism.
The Revisionist trend is one aspect that needs further elaboration. So is
the growth of the youth/young adult movement Union Universelle de la
Jeunesse Juive (UUJJ), and the appearance of ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir and
the JN F Force.
Returning to Revisionism, not only did a Revisionist Zionist federation
come into being, but in 1932 its world youth movement, Betar, was also
introduced in Tunisia. Its promoters were Alfred Rossi, Félix Allouche,
Yosef Ankri, and Ephraim Luzun. They created branches of Betar in
Tunis, Sousse, Sfax, and Gabès; the leader of Betar was Ephraim Luzun
from Tunis. Together they built Betar into a viable force, accentuating
its lines of policy and attracting the World Zionist Organization. In Tunis
a political club was founded by the Betarim where they organized lec
tures and exchanged harsh words with Jabotinsky's leftist opponents.
Betar and the Revisionist movement in Tunisia were reinforced by Zion
ist newspapers, notably Félix Allouche's L e Réveil J u i f (1924-1934/35),
La Voix Ju iv e , Les C ah iers du B éta r (1930s), and La G azette d'Israël
(1938-51). L es C ah iers du B étar was of short duration. However, it was
quite extreme in its methods of attracting the local mainstream Zionists
as well as the Muslim nationalists of Habib Bourguiba's Neo-Destour
movement.16
The Union Universelle de la Jeunesse Juive (UUJJ) was another im
portant starting point in the history of the Zionist and pro-Zionist youth
and scouting movement of Tunisia. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, youth and scouting movements gradually gained worldwide
popularity among youths aged nine to twenty and young adults in their
twenties. In France there emerged in 1920 a scouting movement within
which the Eclaireurs Israélites de France (E IF) was created. For young
people in their twenties French Jewry established the UUJJ, recruiting
students and maintaining cordial contacts with youth centers globally. It
accentuated Jewish values and the necessity for Jewish colonization.
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 39
Oran, where according to the editorial 30,000 Jews dwelt, only 120 were
members of the UUJJ; intermarriage, too, was a widespread phenome-
Despite broad support for the AIU’s educational endeavors among Mo
roccan and Tunisian Jewry, the opposition to, and misgivings about, the
AIU among French-educated Zionists, including AIU alumni, should not
be underestimated. This was especially the case in Tunisia, our main
focus here.
To begin with, it is noteworthy that though most Tunisians and Moroc
can Zionists of the interwar years were not conducting caliy ay this idea
was the ultimate goal of all Zionists. On the one hand, the AIU through
its numerous schools in the Mediterranean basin aspired to transform
and liberate Jews in their respective countries, and to fight for legislative
reform, bringing the Jews closer to France. The Zionists, on the other
hand, called for a greater Zionist cultural education and stressed the
centrality of Palestine as well as the need for the Jews in the Diaspora to
manifest solidarity with the Yishuv— financially, politically, and morally.
This was unacceptable to the AIU for quite some time.
Until the 1930s, and perhaps later, French-educated Tunisian Zionists
viewed the AIU, especially in Tunis, as their chief adversary. Alfred
Valensi, Joseph Brami, and Henri Maarek all sharply criticized the AIU.
The three men were particularly incensed with Albert Saguès, then AIU
school principal for Tunis, accusing him of fomenting anti-Zionism and
falsely depicting Tunisian Zionists as disloyal, anti-French, and British
agents. They were also angry with Sylvain Lévi, then president of the
AIU in Paris, a distinguished scholar at the Collège de France and a
skeptic about the future of the Yishuv. Lévi had made his views quite
clear to the Zionists during the Versailles Peace Conference, much to the
anger and dismay of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World
Zionist Organization. The Tunisian Zionists could not stomach this; they
considered Lévi’s opinions treacherous and associated them with the
overall AIU policy vis-à-vis Zionism.25 In fact, when two pro-Zionist
societies in Tunis— Yoshevet-Zion and Bahure-Zion— refused to re
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 43
all tutelage over our community, enabling it to take destiny into its own hands,
giving it a sense of responsibility, and granting it the power to exercise certain
liberties which otherwise would seem impossible in the future because of the
iniquitous intrusion of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in communal affairs. This
is how we hope to achieve the conquest of the communities which is the first
important stage toward the Zionization of the Jewish populations.29
to urge that Jews be naturalized as French citizens. At the time, they did
not think that large-scale emigration to Palestine would take place from
North Africa. And until such a development took place, they needed
greater political rights as part of their social evolution and in recognition
of their attachment to France. In Morocco, too, local Zionists supported
the possibility of Moroccan Jews taking French citizenship. However, in
Morocco the Zionists supported a modest naturalization process while
the AIU school directors called for larger-scale naturalization. Mean
while, Tunisian Zionists were critical of the 1923 law and called for a
major reform of it. As Félix Allouche asserted in 1925 about the law: “this
law only applies to certain elements of the population. The immense
masses are still sacrificed. . . . If France had the intention of formulating
a [new] Crémieux Decree, to naturalize en bloc our brethren (as in
Algeria), we would have nothing more to say. The Jewish question in
Tunisia would be regulated. But this does not appear to be the case.”32
On the issues of Jewish culture and ties with France, it was Maarek
who suggested in 1926 that it would be a fairly short time before the
Protectorate ceased to be totally misled by the AIU. He praised France
for taking steps, at home, in support of reviving the Hebrew language,
for teaching Hebrew at certain French schools in Egypt, and for the
decision to create a Hebrew Studies Chair at the Ecole Nationale des
Langues Orientales Vivantes. Maarek then concluded happily that:
France is coming around to discover the Jewish people. She has ignored them as
such. . . . She was the first to grant them rights as individuals. . . . As a people,
as a national entity, France has always ignored that the Jews have conserved, for
centuries, the characteristics of a nation and a great civilization. . . . Once she
made the discovery, she was astonished.33
Did these efforts bear fruit? The French did not abrogate or signifi
cantly modify the 1923 naturalization law. Tunisian Jews continued to
obtain French citizenship only through a selective, rather than en b lo c ,
approach. Insofar as the French attitude toward Hebrew is concerned, it
would require a special study to assess progress in France. But in Tuni
sia, with certain exceptions, modern Hebrew did not emerge as a main
language in Protectorate schools. In the AIU schools, on the other hand,
we have no concrete evidence at this stage to show that modern Hebrew
was not taught in them in some form before and after 1920.
46 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
How did the AIU in France and North Africa react to Zionist activity
and to the criticism of its schools and leaders? Generally speaking, the
position of the AIU was not uniform.
AIU teachers and school principals in Morocco and Tunisia often
sharply criticized Zionist political aims regarding Palestine. However,
they sometimes supported Zionist cultural policies, such as the revival of
Hebrew, simply because, it was argued, such a development would be
beneficial to Jewish interests worldwide. Certain AIU officials were clearly
anti-Zionist, others were non-Zionist, merely indifferent to the move
ment s goals. In fact, during the middle and late 1930s, there were pro-
Zionist AIU teachers in Tunisia and Morocco who had lost faith in the
idea of emancipation à la fr a n ç a is e in the wake of the anti-Semitic events
in Europe. Nevertheless, the leaders of the AIU in France and its
delegates on the local level often warned the communities of the dangers
Zionism posed for all Jews.
In France, AIU personalities such as Alfred Berl, editor of the AIU
journal Paix et D roit, and the renowned French-Jewish scholar, Théo
dore Reinach, published articles in 1926-27 highly critical of the Zionists
and their activities in the Diaspora. These angered Zionists in North
Africa as in the days of Sylvain Lévi. Reinach and Berl argued that
Zionism presented a double danger: it would leave the Jews vulnerable
whether it succeeded in achieving its goals or not. If the Zionists did not
succeed in creating a Jewish national home in Palestine, the disillusion
ment might be so overwhelming that the Jewish world could face serious
ideological disorder. Tunisian Zionists interpreted this to mean that po
groms might be organized against the Yishuv. And why might the Zion
ists fail? Reinach and Berl stated that Palestine was not a “no man’s land.”
In addition to 80,000 Christians living there, there were some 700,000
Arab Muslims, and there was no hope that these Arabs could somehow
be persuaded to tolerate expropriation of tracts of land.34
On the other hand, if the Zionists did succeed in their program, then
— as Tunisian and Moroccan Zionists interpreted Reinach and B erl— not
only would a Jewish state emerge, but so would a Jewish embassy in the
heart of Paris, a development that might lead to anti-Semitic outbursts
like those at the height of the Dreyfus Affair.35
Yet, while Reinach and Berl’s statements on Zionism were not always
coherent, and their ideas suffered from inconsistencies, the position of
Jacques Bigart was clear and consistent. Bigart was AIU secretary from
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 47
1892 until his death in 1934. Shortly before he died, he received a letter
from Léon Pinhas, an AIU teacher in Safi in southern Morocco. Pinhas
informed him of the activities of Eliezer Turek, a JN F emissary. The
latter had told audiences at Safi about how Eastern and Central Euro
pean Jews had transformed the desert into an oasis in Palestine; that
Hebrew was spoken there, was an official language of the Mandate along
with Arabic and English, and was no longer merely the language of the
Bible; and that Jews in Romania, Poland, Russia, and Germany had
become zealous converts to Jewish nationalism and were emigrating to
Palestine.36
Pinhas reported to Bigart his unhappiness with Turek’s activity. Al
though we have no evidence to suggest that Turek went beyond the
collection of contributions for settling European Jews in Palestine, Pinhas
deplored what he called an increase in sympathy for Zionist concepts; he
knew of some defections from the AIU, and he argued that clustering
large numbers of Jewish emigrants in Palestine would not be productive.
In the Diaspora, Jews had been under constant pressure to produce,
since just by virtue of being Jewish they had to work harder and compete
more fiercely to succeed in the socioeconomic sphere. In Palestine,
however, a Jewish entity would eliminate such pressure and competition.
Given that the Jews would be “one happy family*’ there, Jewish produc
tivity would inevitably stagnate.37
Responding to this report, Bigart justified the AIU’s indifference to
the Zionist idea:
Can we, who have fought for long years to win the people over to the idea of
complete emancipation for the Jews, adhere to a movement which denies our
efforts? The emancipation from our point of view has been the absolute, complete
adaptation of the Jew to his newly adopted nation [France]; Zionism under its
insincere guise, condemns this adaptation. This is the profound reason which led
the Alliance to remain unfriendly to Zionism, not to mention other objections,
notably the impossibility of establishing in Palestine, one tenth of the Jews who
wish to settle there, the presence of a hostile Muslim population, and the
necessity for England to appease the latter.38
the Jews of Metropolitan France and French North Africa, as well as the
United States, England, and Italy, preferred their pays natal and nothing
motivated them to settle in Palestine. Consequently, a Jewish state
established in Palestine would be populated by a marginal segment of
the Jewish people. Hence, Palestine would not supply a solution to the
Jewish question. Quite to the contrary, such a state would aggravate the
Jewish position: by forming a separate, distinct, and autonomous entity,
the Jewish inhabitants of the Yishuv would further encourage the anti-
Semites in their claim that Jews were opposed to integration into the
societies in which they lived, unwilling and unable to assimilate.41
Turning to the British role, Saguès contended that England’s leader
ship used the Zionist cause to effectively reinforce its imperialist interests
in the Near and Middle East. Thus, when Tunisian Zionists reproached
Saguès for fomenting anti-Zionism by misrepresenting them as disloyal
to France and as British agents,42 their accusations may not have been
far-fetched. He then suggested that in the struggle for Jewish emancipa
tion, the AIU and other non-Zionist Jewish organizations had made
partial progress through political lobbying as well as through the spread
of modern education. Nevertheless, since the battle for a comprehensive
solution to the many problems then facing different parts of the Diaspora
was far from won, the Zionists had seized the opportunity to exploit
desperate situations in order to augment their influence. Ought the AIU
to collaborate with French, Tunisian, and Moroccan Zionists in confront
ing the challenge? Saguès did not think so. He bluntly asserted, “L ’Alli
ance ne pouvait s’y affilier. Y adhérer eut [été] pour elle, un véritable
suicide.’’ (The Alliance could not become affiliated with them. Joining
them would have been sheer suicide for it.)43
In Morocco, Sémach’s position was just as explicit. He was in fact far
more aggressive in confronting the Zionists face to face and often sat in
on the meetings organized by the JN F and J F F emissaries, so as to learn
about their strategies. Prior to 1914, when he was active on behalf of the
AIU in Beirut and Baghdad, Sémach’s views on Zionism had been mod
erate and realistic in the sense that he thought the AIU should not reject
the option of Zionist-AIU coexistence. However, by 1919, when he was
in charge of the AIU schools in Tangier, his attitude toward local Zionists
was less sympathetic, though, at the time, he was not deeply concerned
with Zionist influence on the Moroccan communities. It had very little
appeal then and was far from constituting a serious political current; it
50 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
was a voice in the desert without an echo. Sémach thus concluded that
“Moroccan Zionism does not enjoy . . . today any [level of] importance.
It may become active only if it finds a propagandist capable of placing it
in contact with European Zionism. ’44
Sémach did change his position several years later, when he served as
AIU delegate for French and Spanish Morocco as well as for the Interna
tional Zone of Tangier. From his headquarters in Rabat, also the seat of
the French Protectorate s administration, Sémach visited the Jewish
communities throughout Morocco, both urban and rural. His fear of what
he saw as the ever-increasing strength of Moroccan Zionism was greatly
exaggerated. Before we delve into his fears in order to present his
position on this issue, we must compare the approach of the Moroccan
Zionists with that of their Tunisian counterparts. Unlike the Tunisian
Zionists, those in Morocco refrained from attacking the AIU from the
mid-1920s on, after having criticized it previously. They now sought to
improve their relations with the AIU. They believed that by collaborating
with it in communal reforms, Zionist goals would be better served in the
long run.
First of all, it was quite apparent to the local Zionists that the AIU in
Morocco wielded considerable influence, more than in Tunisia. It had
strong links with the French Residency in Rabat as well as with the
Jewish communities. Since the Zionist organization in Morocco, unlike
its Tunisian counterpart, did not obtain official recognition from the
French authorities, it was merely tolerated during the interwar years.
Therefore, it seemed prudent to seek a rapprochement with the AIU.
Following this approach, the Moroccan Zionists, like the AIU principals,
supported the idea of granting French citizenship to Moroccan Jews. The
Zionists also did not raise the issue of emigration to Palestine before the
1930s, partly because they went out of their way to appease the Resi
dency and its trustworthy ally, the AIU. They declared themselves loyal
to the cause of assisting Moroccan Jews to become Frenchmen. This, of
course, was a tactic in a long-term strategy to accomplish Zionist aims, if
and when the local Jews came to adopt Zionist goals in increasing num
bers. The tactic was a way out of the Zionists’ political isolation in the
1920s.
Yet the lull in the hostility between the AIU and the Moroccan
Zionists, from the mid-1920s to the early 1930s, was a one-way street.
The AIU delegates in French Morocco simply did not recognize or honor
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 51
such a truce before 1930; it seems that during the 1930s the AIU and the
Zionists were in a two-way conflict once again. The Zionists were now
emphasizing Jewish political aims more freely as more and more French-
educated Jews embraced Zionism and understood its ideological implica
tions, and as the French became more tolerant of Zionism.
Looking back at AIU displeasure with Moroccan Zionists from the
mid-1920s to the early 1930s, we see that despite the Zionist search for
an understanding with the AIU, the AIU school principals continued to
be suspicious of Zionist intentions throughout the period. They often
accused the Zionists of using fund-raising activities, the Zionist press,
and speeches delivered by JN F and J F F emissaries from Europe as a
facade for the ultimate goal of laying a basis for emigration to Palestine.
Thus we return to Sémach. In December 1926, he reported to Paris
about the activities of the J F F ’s Dr. Nathan Halpern. Halpern’s functions
included fund-raising and lecture tours in French Morocco. According to
Sémach, Halpern had recently spent three months in Morocco where, in
Casablanca alone, he organized a dozen lectures before large audiences
of young, French-educated Jews, many of them AIU alumni.45
On one occasion, Sémach decided to participate in one of these gath
erings with the clear aim of challenging Halpern in order to expose the
destructive aim of “Zionist agitation’" to the audience. The site was the
Casablanca Jewish community center, the C ercle dU nion. Sémach heard
Halpern compare the policies of two resident-generals of French Mo
rocco, Field-Marshal Lyautey, who had served until 1925, and Théodore
Steeg, his successor. Halpern depicted the first as anti-Zionist and insen
sitive to local Jewish needs, while praising the latter as a political mod
erate. At this point, Sémach intervened. He asserted that both men, like
the French government, had done everything conceivable to afford the
Jews political freedom and improve their socioeconomic conditions. Hav
ing returned from an inspection tour of the Jewish communities of south
ern Morocco, Sémach told the audience and Halpern that even in the
b led of the Atlas mountains, he had come upon zealous French officials
willingly assisting the Jews, seeing them as a trustworthy, pro-French
element. Zionism, he went on, would only prove a poor substitute for
French goodwill, but could lead the French to doubt Moroccan Jewish
loyalty. The Moroccan Jew, Sémach warned the audience, “must evolve,
elevate himself to the French mentality and one day become French.
This is the long-range aim. And to demand of him to be above all a
52 North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century
Zionist, will deter him from his path; political Zionism is a danger and
we will oppose it.”46
Halpern denied that he was encouraging North African Jews to dis
tance themselves from France. He claimed, quite to the contrary, to be
encouraging them to become French, but, simultaneously, to contribute
their moral and financial support to their less fortunate brethren in
Eastern Europe.47 Still, Sémach’s intention was quite clear, as revealed
in his reports from the pre-1930 period: to combat Zionist political influ
ence, otherwise the prestige enjoyed by the AIU in Morocco since 1862
would decline sharply, even among educated AIU alumni. One of the
strategies Sémach thought up in order to counter Zionist propaganda
among the Jews was to disseminate Reinach’s and Berl’s articles in Paix
et D roit.48
It is conceivable that in Tunisia after 1930 and until the outbreak of
World War II, the Zionists, mainly the Revisionist trend, which by then
dwarfed mainstream Zionism in Tunisia, moderated their stance toward
the AIU and may have collaborated with its teachers in the educational
sphere, notably as regards Hebrew studies. In Morocco, on the other
hand, Zionists after 1930 accused the AIU delegation in Rabat of insensi
tivity. In this vein, Abraham Laredo, a leading Zionist, declared at the
1936 Zionist Conference in French Morocco that the AIU ought to be
praised for its social and philanthropic role. Nevertheless, he argued that
it was indifferent to Jewish needs and considered any criticism of its
activities as a sign of ingratitude. Not so, claimed Laredo; the Zionists
and other Jews critical of the AIU should not be viewed as the organiza
tion’s enemies, and they should push for educational reforms in its
schools.49
It appears obvious that the AIU schools and educational personnel
found themselves in a difficult position insofar as the French-educated
elite was concerned. Many of the educated Jews who were challenging
the raison d’être of the AIU were its own graduates, its alumni. Whereas
the majority of the Jews in both French Protectorates supported the
AIU, whether passively or enthusiastically, the elite was vocal and far
from constituting a monolithic pro-AIU voice. In fact, opposition to the
AIU in Tunisia neither came exclusively from Zionists nor did it originate
with them. We find the La Ju stice newspaper representing the opposite
trend, that of assimilationism and ultra-Jewish secularists. Like the Zion
ists, the La Ju stice group portrayed the AIU as an anachronism, but they
North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 53
Algeria and its efforts to emphasize Jewish religious education there, the
Algerian Zionists saw the AIU activists and their educational as well as
extra-educational endeavors as an obstacle to the Zionists’ quest for
influence in the Jewish milieu.
These internal communal conflicts of the interwar years which had
occurred in the shadow of rising anti-Semitism in Europe and among
both North African European settlers as well as Muslim nationalists,
doubtless evoked concern among the politically informed Maghribi Jews.
However, few, if any, of them expected modern anti-Semitism to influ
ence their lives directly quite the same way as it did their European
counterparts. The outbreak of World War II, as the next chapter dem
onstrates, was to change this outlook.
Chapter 2
55
56 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
French and other anti-Semitic elements seized upon the Palestine prob
lem and the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 to portray international Jewry,
including the Jews of North Africa, in a negative way to the Muslims,
many of whom expressed solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs against
Zionism and the British authorities in the Mandate. Nazi propaganda
broadcasts from Berlin and Stuttgart, as well as broadcasts from fascist
Italy, added fuel to the ongoing anti-Jewish campaign.2
One success in the attempt to incite Muslims against Jews took place
in Algeria. In the city of Constantine, Muslims organized a pogrom
against Jews on 3 - 5 August 1934. Although we still do not have all
information on the causes of this event, it appears that the anti-Semitic
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 57
Messali and most of his supporters argued that the Jews weakened
France internally and contributed to her political and moral corruption.
On the other hand, they contradicted themselves by saying that French
Algeria was dominated by the Jews who ruled the country in the name of
France. The Crémieux Decree of 1870, in Messali’s opinion, had trans
formed the Jews into an overprivileged element hostile to the Arabo-
Berber population. Messali’s Parti du Peuple Algérien, operating under
ground after 1939, included activists who later supported the Pétain
government in part because of its anti-Jewish policy.6
In Tunisia, the nationalists were not quite so extreme. True, the Vieux
Destour and the orthodox Islamic Zeituna circles held anti-Jewish atti
tudes, but their hostility was most often passive. However, the secularly
oriented Neo-Destour movement which gradually became the most pop
ular political force in the country, demonstrated greater understanding
toward the Jew s.7
As in the rest of North Africa, the Moroccan nationalist movement was
divided into moderates and radicals. Generally speaking, Spanish Zone
nationalists enjoyed greater freedom to express political views than their
counterparts in French Morocco, particularly after 1937 when French
Morocco's nationalist leaders suffered a strong wave of repression. The
most moderate nationalists of French Morocco, among them Muhammad
al-Kholtl, encouraged a Judeo-Muslim entente in order to enlist Jewish
support for the reforms they meant to request from the French. Al-
Kholtl advocated “une action commune en vue de réformes urgentes à
introduire par la France dans le domaine de la justice, comme dans tous
les autres domaines” (joint action to encourage France to introduce
urgent reforms in the field of justice, as in all other fields). But he added
that Judeo-Muslim solidarity “ne pourrait être durable que si une égalité
complète englobait israélites et musulmans” (could not last without com
plete equality between Jews and Muslims).8
W ere these views promoted following Muslim-Jewish tensions be
tween April and July 1933 aimed at reducing hostilities, especially in
view of the large urban Jewish population concentrations? Was this a
plea to French-educated Jews to support nationalist reformist claims? Or,
did the early nationalists genuinely seek a friendly entente? We have not
been able to reach definite conclusions, although it is noteworthy that al-
Kholtl represented the French-educated stratum in the movement. Those
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 59
Another threat facing the Jews of Morocco during the period immedi
ately preceding the war was tied to the Civil War in Spain and its impact
on Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Zone was under martial law beginning
on 19 July 1936. The Jews were not harassed by the Zone s military
authorities throughout the crisis, but they were pressured to donate
funds and other forms of wealth in support of Franco, as were the local
Spaniards. Albert Saguès, then AIU principal in Tangier and a keen
observer of political developments in northern Morocco, clearly indi
cated that the Spanish authorities went out of their way to maintain
cordial contacts with the Jewish communities. This, however, was not
the case with various political movements and their adherents who ag
gressively pressured the Jews to adopt political positions. According to
Saguès:
Indeed it seems that the responsible authorities are applying a fair approach
toward our coreligionists, but things are not so on the part of organizations with
fascist tendencies, which recruit their members among the Spanish youths. . . .
These organizations are more active in small settlements like Arcila or Chaouen
than in the big centers. I know that Jewish youths fell victims to these organiza
tions in Larache. . . . In any case, the military authorities intervened in many
60 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
M o r o c c o u n d e r V ich y In flu e n c e
France and her possessions. Beginning in the second half of 1940, anti-
Jewish laws were promulgated which inevitably stirred anxiety among
North African Jews. Article 9 of the Law of 3 October 1940, concerning
the status of the Jews, provided that the Law should be introduced in
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia and in France s other colonies, protecto
rates, and mandated territories. The Law was introduced into Morocco
through the zah lr of 31 October 1940. It applied to all Jews by “race,”
which was defined as three Jewish grandparents, as well as all members
of the Jewish faith. Despite its discriminatory passages, the Law ex
pressly authorized the exercise of rabbinic jurisdiction, the practice of
calling in Hebrew court interpreters, and allowed Jews to continue teach
ing at institutions intended solely for Jews. Its provisions were not to
prejudice Jewish institutions, that is, communities.15
The Vichy Law of 2 June 1941 increased the hardships inflicted by the
Law of 3 October 1940 in many respects. It was followed by the zahtrs of
5 August 1941, introducing it into Morocco. These decrees (issued sepa
rately for Moroccan Jews and for European Jews living in the French
Zone) enlarged the list of occupations prohibited to Jews, including
moneylending in any form and the real estate business. They did, how
ever, permit handicrafts and wholesale trading. A penalty was prescribed
for violations of the zah lr regarding personal status. All Jews were re
quired to appear for registration of their persons and occupations, and for
declarations of their property. The Vichy Law of 22 July 1941, concerning
the “Aryanization” of the French economy, was not introduced in Mo
rocco.
According to Article 4 of the 5 August 1941 z ah lr, the following
professions were prohibited to Moroccan Jews:
We do not yet possess adequate data to fully assess the impact of these
restrictions. Which of the zah lrs— and the regulations for their imple
mentation— were adhered to partially, and which fully, by the resident-
62 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
Population Registration 1 —
Tax Bureau — 1
Public Works 1 —
Civil Inspection 2 —
Urban Services 2 —
Hospitals 5 3
Military Administration 2 8
Teaching 3 7
Electric Company 2 2
Posts & Telegraph 7 10
Railroad 3 3
Bus Transportation 6 1
Courts 4 2
Banks _4 _2
T otal 42 39
Source: M .Y., R .S., R.B. (Raphael Benazeraf), Rapport confidentiel:
L’application du statut des juifs et des dispositions raciales à la popula
tion juive du Maroc (Fonds Institut Ben-Zvi), 14.
not even permitted to care for Jewish patients. However, they were
authorized to do so by the Protectorate administration in Tunisia. On the
other hand, new findings in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay seem to
suggest that a region by region survey of the application of the restric
tions would be necessary. Since the number of non-Jewish physicians
was limited during the war and since Jews, mainly among the European
emigrants, were relatively well represented in that profession, Jewish
physicians were often indispensable. In Casablanca, for example, 17
percent of the physicians were Jews. Removing them from the practice
of medicine would have endangered health services for the general pop
ulation. Therefore, apparently, the restrictions were not implemented in
Casablanca.17
Another restriction, dated 22 August 1941, prohibited Jewish subjects
of the sultan from residing outside the m ellàhs, and especially from living
in the European residential quarters constructed by the French for
European settlers and also inhabited by the more affluent Muslims and
Jews. Only specific categories of Jews, essentially war veterans, were
permitted to stay outside the m ellàhs. Moreover, if unable to prove that
their residence in the European residential districts predated 1 Septem
ber 1939, these Jews too were compelled to return to the m eïlàh by 22
September 1941. Article 4 of the regulation indicated that a new ordi
nance would be published, calling for the evacuation of Jews who had
lived in the European districts prior to 1 September 1939. Those who
resisted the new law were to be expelled and required to pay a fine of
between 500 and 10,000 francs. Once again, while we do not have
accurate records as to what extent this policy was implemented, several
hundred Jewish families in the urban centers left or were expelled. The
return of well-to-do Jews back to the m ellàh caused further overcrowding
and hastened the spread of typhoid.18
In a country where Jews had long suffered from a higher rate of
illiteracy than the Jewish communities of Algeria and Tunisia, they were
now further restricted. The number of Jews in the Protectorate s elemen
tary and secondary schools was limited to 10 percent of the number of
non-Jews, and in institutions of higher learning to 3 percent. There is
clear evidence that a quota (num erus clausus) in education was enforced
at least to some extent. While the communal religious schools continued
to function, the heaviest responsibility for providing secular education to
Jewish children throughout Morocco fell on the AIU institutions. Whereas
64 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
emanating from Vallat s men, Darlan and his colleagues may well have
shared the opinion of their adversary General Charles de Gaulle concern
ing the cultural significance of the AIU in North Africa.23
As for other restrictions and hardships, both Muslims and Jews were
disadvantaged in the distribution of rationed foods and most other essen
tial consumer products. Available data presented in table 2 give an
accurate indication of monthly rations during the final months of 1942.
Among other examples: Jews were entitled to a 2 lÆ liter wine ration
whereas the Europeans got ten liters. Jews consumed large quantities of
wine in religious observances and needed more wine than others. Since
sugar was consumed more heavily by Muslims and green tea only by
Muslims, Jews and Europeans were not disadvantaged in these catego
ries. However, whereas the Europeans were provided with three liters
of kerosene, Muslims and Jews had to buy it on the free market at
exaggerated prices, the same holding true for meat.
In French Morocco, a final aspect of persecution was detention and
labor camps. These camps held Jewish inmates, among others. A Vichy
Law of 4 October 1940 had provided for dentention of “foreign nationals
of the Jewish race” in special concentration camps. This Law was not
introduced in Morocco, because a zah lr had already been promulgated
on 2 January 1940. It provided for detentions in designated places of
persons endangering national defense or public security, or unable to
emigrate after having received expulsion orders, or in the country ille
gally. The detainees could be forced to perform labor of use to the
community and for that purpose to be organized in special units. This
66 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
Much of the trade in Tétuan is monopolized by the Jews. Even those Jews not
living in the city are, for the most part, merchants. The Arab merchants of
Tétuan s Muslim quarter are deeply involved in black marketeering to the point
where their reputation has been dreadfully disgraced while the reputation of the
Jewish merchants is far better. They operate more prudently.28
might harass the Jews. The latter were accused by anti-Semitic elements
in the Spanish Zone of manifesting pro-British and pro-American sympa
thies. But no major problems surfaced, either due to the bribes offered
to officials or in line with official policy to protect the Jews. In fact, efforts
by extremist Moroccan nationalists to attack the m ellâh of El-Ksar were
prevented by the Spanish and Muslim authorities.29
Tangier as an international zone posed special problems, some of them
involving Jewish refugees. During 1942-43, there were between 1,500
and 2,000 Jewish refugees in Tangier, many of whom had arrived during
the prewar era. Approximately half were Sephardim; the remainder,
Central Europeans. The Sephardim originated from the Dodecanese
Islands (then under Italy); some had left Rhodes for Italy and France
even before Italy introduced anti-Jewish laws in 1938. Most of these
families had three or more children. The men were craftsmen, shoe
makers, drivers, or small businessmen. They spoke Italian, Spanish,
Turkish, and French. The Central Europeans had come mainly from
Hungary and Poland via Italy, where a number of them lived for two
years before the enactment of the 1938 anti-Jewish laws. As long as
Tangier remained an international zone, refugees were admitted without
difficulty. Nor were there any regulations to prevent them from earning
their living. After the fall of France and Spain s occupation of Tangier in
June 1940, these people were deprived of the right to work. Their
standard of living fell rapidly from that time on. The intervention of the
World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com
mittee (AJDC), and the AIU helped relieve some of their misery; after
April 1944, AJDC spent $12,000 monthly on behalf of these refugees—
funds that were allocated through a local relief committee. This sum was
separate from funds earmarked for school meals at the AIU.30 (See table
4 on the Jewish/non-Jewish populace.)
During the 1939-40 period, the Jewish population of Tangier reached
12,000, refugees included. Most of the Jews were craftsmen, bank clerks
and bank officials, as well as merchants and agents of trading companies.
Despite various restrictions and the Spanish occupation (until 1945),
their political and economic conditions were better than those in French
Morocco under Vichy. The Jews continued to engage in certain lucrative
trades. Whereas Jews in French Morocco were now discriminated against
in the textile trades, Tangier Jewry was still represented in that sector.
Blandin, who conducted a thorough investigation of the situation in
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 69
Tangier during the war, observed rather optimistically that the Jewish
elite, whose members had ties with the new Spanish administration,
enjoyed a stable economic situation. In fact, he added:
The Jew controls the exports to England and the United States of America of
leather goods, eggs, skins and the imports of all the indispensable manufactured
products to Tangier and from the Spanish Protectorate: textiles, automobiles,
furniture, flour, spices— wholesale and retail. . . . But it is largely in banking
that the Tangier Jew specializes and [where he makes the greatest] profit.31
It is possible that this was true insofar as the elite was concerned. It
was certainly not the case for the lower middle class. Their position
under the new administration was precarious. Their businesses were
heavily taxed and new licenses were often refused by the authorities.32
Politically, the Jews faced certain anxieties under the Spanish occupa
tion. The Spaniards dissolved the Legislative Assembly, encouraged the
departure of the last vestige of Sharifian authority in Tangier, the man-
du b (the Sultan’s representative in the International Zone), and enacted
legislation for administrative reform. The zah lr of 15 February 1925,
which had legalized the Jewish community’s council, was abrogated. All
communal activity came under Spanish supervision.33 The Jewish com
munity lost the subsidies previously allocated, as well as the right to
elect its communal leaders who would now be directly appointed by
Spain from a list submitted by the community. The autonomous rabbinic
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 71
The Jews are assembled on the terraces of the m ellàhs of Casablanca and Rabat
to follow the events. There are those who curse the French, even those wounded.
. . . Jewish enthusiasm increases as the Americans advance. . . . Several days
later the Jews join demonstrators from whose ranks emanate the cry “Down with
France!” European women had their faces slapped by Jewish women. In Rabat,
a Jew spits in the face of a decorated Muslim m okhazni [policeman]. . . . In
Casablanca, Jews caught the Secretary of the m akhzan s Grand Vizier and forced
him to cry out “Long live America, Down with France!” This provoking behavior
could lead to serious confrontations between the Muslim masses and the Jews.37
At Beni-Mellal, the local Muslim governor and the French civil con
troller (who was known for his hostility to the Jews) announced that any
72 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
European desiring to settle in town could choose a home from the houses
or apartments occupied by Jewish tenants. Once a residence was chosen,
the family would have to evacuate within forty-eight hours. Several
Jewish families were forced out of their homes during the difficult winter
of 1942-43. They found temporary refuge in local synagogues and com
munity centers.
The Jews’ situation began to gradually improve only after 3 June 1943.
On that date, General de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, in charge of
those French territories in North Africa not under German occupation,
reached an agreement for the creation of a French Committee of National
Liberation. The agreement also marked the end of Vichy influence in
Morocco. On the following day, General Noguès fled to Portugal.
The Law of 3 October 1940 was extended to Tunisia through the edict of
30 November 1940, just as it had been applied to Morocco. It contained
twelve articles outlining the measures in the name of the bey and signed
by the resident-general, Admiral Esteva. The edict restricted Jewish
representation in the public service (Articles 3 and 9), and in educational
institutions and journalism (Article 7). Article 5 stipulated that certain
public functions would be open to Jews provided they could prove the
following: that they had been decorated by France for military service
during World War I; had received Vo rd re du jo u r (army service medal)
in the 1939-40 War; had received the M édaille m ilitaire; were descen
dants of soldiers who had died for France between 1914-18; or were
widows of men who had died in war and had received a pension from the
French government.38
On 9 October 1941, measures were adopted regarding lawyers of the
Jewish faith (avocats défenseurs). Article 3 stipulated that a date would
be announced after which lawyers who were blacklisted would be prohib
ited from providing services.39 Measures were also taken against Jewish
physicians. According to Article 16 of the 6 November 1941 decree,
however, they were still authorized to provide medical care to the Jewish
population and their credentials were supposed to indicate this.40
Some of the measures remained purely theoretical. They were either
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 73
not applied at all or were implemented very slowly and partially. The
Germans, who occupied Tunisia in November 1942, attributed this to
the liberal policies of Admiral Esteva. By the summer of 1941, Moroccan
and Algerian Jewry had begun to feel the effect of the anti-Jewish mea
sures, but Esteva’s Tunisia was considerably less oppressive. As Nahum
Yerushalmi, a Hebrew educator from Palestine active in the Jewish
community of Tunis, observed in June 1941:
Tunisian Jewry was not much harmed by the war. Only a few rich men and
members of the liberal professions, who were harmed by the new French legis
lation, were lowered in their situation. On the other hand, religious and Zionist
enthusiasm increased and contributions for the community and its institutions,
especially for Hebrew education, were given generously.41
I have recently [become aware of] several acts of sabotage which were carried
out especially on military telephone lines in Ariana. Moreover, I received reports
that many among the Jewish population were spreading accusations and propa
ganda against the Axis states, a situation that disturbs public peace and security.
I am inclined to believe that the policy of restraint implemented in this connec
tion toward the Jewish population has not at all been properly understood— I
order you to announce to the Jewish population that any attempt to disturb the
public peace and security will lead to severe punishment. These punishments
will include the death penalty. If I receive one report about activity against the
interests of the Axis states originating within the Jewish population, I will have
several men arrested as hostages in order to have peace prevail.44
There was something special about our group. In the community [in Tunis], they
called us a g rou p e volan ty that is, a mobile group. For the most part, all the
groups were in camps or on the border with . . the front. I was not at the front,
but . . I worked at unloading the airplanes. . . . I will give an example of our
relationship to the Germans. . . . We are working at the airfield and there were
Allied bombings of the airfield. Then we would flee in cars together with the
Germans. We used to immediately leave the airfield and go off some distance.
But since the bombs also fell outside the airfield . . . there were also Jews, not
from my group but from those working outside the airfield, who were killed. Our
group continued to travel to this airfield every day until one day there was a
British bombing by planes that flew in low and destroyed all the planes that were
landing at that time as well as those that were on the airfield. . . . We saw a
frightening sight: The pilots were burnt inside their cockpits. The Germans told
us that there was nothing to unload but that we must gather up the corpses. Also,
several Jews working outside the airfield were killed in that bombing.45
A lg e r ia : R e g r e s s io n in th e J e w s E c o n o m ic
a n d P o litic a l S tatu s
(Art. I) La loi est applicable à l’Algérie, dans les conditions ci-après: En vue
d’éliminer toute influence juive dans l’économie algérienne, le gouverneur gén
éral de l’Algérie peut nommer un administrateur provisoire à: 1. Toute entreprise
industrielle, commerciale, immobilière ou artisanale; 2. Tout immeuble, droit
immobilier ou droit au bail quelconque; 3. Tout bien meuble, valeur mobilière
ou droit mobilier quelconque, lorsque ceux à qui ils appartiennent ou qui les
dirigent, ou certains d’entre eux sont Juifs. Toutefois, ces dispositions ne s’appli
quent pas aux valeurs émises par l’Etat français et le gouvernement général et
aux obligations émises par les sociétés ou collectivités publiques françaises ou
algériennes. E t, sauf exception motivée— aux immeubles ou locaux servant à
l’habitation personnelle des intéressés, de leurs ascendants ou descendants, ni
aux meubles meublants qui garnissent les dits immeubles ou locaux. ((Art.I) The
laws applies to Algeria, under the following conditions: With the aim of eliminat
ing all Jewish influence in the Algerian economy, the governor-general of Algeria
can appoint a provisional administrator to: 1. All industrial, commercial, real
estate, or trade enterprises; 2. All real estate, freehold or leasehold of any kind;
3. All personal goods, stocks and shares, or bonds of any kind, when those to
whom they belong or who manage them, or some among them, are Jews.
However, these arrangements do not apply to securities issued by the French
state and the general government, nor to bonds issued by French or Algerian
societies or public bodies in collective ownership. And, except with justifiable
exceptions— to real estate or premises providing personal habitation for the
interested parties, or for their forebears or descendents, nor to personal belong
ings that furnish the said real estate or premises.)53
In the area of education, the num erus clausus (quota) in Algeria was
enforced with greater severity than in the Protectorates. Whereas in
Morocco and Tunisia, the Jews were somewhat less represented in the
Protectorate-sponsored schools and kept many traditional religious schools,
not to mention the AIU schools, Algerian Jewry had fewer religious
schools. As we have seen, the AIU in Algeria played a marginal educa
tional role, with most Jewish youths attending state schools. Hence,
when Vichy extended its educational restrictions to Algeria in 1941-42,
leaders of the Jewish consistory faced a serious problem: creating school
places for many thousands of youths to be ousted from the state schools,
practically overnight.
In institutions for higher learning, especially the Université d ’A lger,
Jews were limited to 3 percent of the total enrollment. Jewish professors,
who were also ousted, raised the idea of organizing courses in private
forums for the ousted students and those not admitted to the university.
But the authorities would not hear of this and forbade the initiative
through the Law of 31 Decem ber 1941. Simultaneously, in the primary
and secondary schools, the Jewish quota was set at 14 percent of the
total. To enable young people to pursue their education, the authorities
postponed the implementation of the restrictions for several months.
During this interval, the consistories of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine,
in conjunction with Jewish intellectual circles, created classes throughout
Algeria. The one advantage of the new laws, the authorization for Jews to
take the state examinations, demonstrated that the new institutions main
tained high educational standards, as the students performed well on
these examinations. But during the latter half of October 1942, a new
policy restricted Jewish representation in primary and secondary schools
from 14 to 7 percent. (See table 5 on educational statistics.)55
As early as May 1941, Jewish university students, alarmed by the
possibility of quotas, wrote to the French Ministry of Education, empha
sizing that: “la pensée même d un num erus clausus nous semble sacri
lège. Comment concevoir Vidée d une culture parcimonieusement accor
dée aux uns et refusée aux autres, et qui impose un choix, aussi cruel à
ceux qui seront appelés qu’à ceux qui seront exclus?” (the very idea of a
numerus clausus seems sacrilege to us. How can one imagine a culture
parcimoniously bestowed on some and refused others, and which com
pels a choice that is just as cruel for those who will be called as for those
who will be excluded?).56
Table 5. Jewish Representation in Algerian Primary and Secondary Schools
A cadem ic Y ear 1941-1942 A cadem ic Y ear 1942-1943
Q uota: 14% Q uota: 7%
N on-Jew ish Students Je w ish Students Je w ish Students
Type o f School Nov. 5 . 1940 A ccep ted R em oved A ccep ted R em oved
However, the pleas and demands did not change policy. Affluent Jews
subsidized the new community schools. Nevertheless, as time elapsed,
funds were becoming scarce, for the Law of 21 November 1941 pertain
ing to the transfer of Jewish real estate to the adm inistrateurs made it
exceedingly difficult for the elite to provide sufficient financial support.
As Elie Gozlan of the Jewish leadership observed following the American
landing: if the liberation of Algeria had been postponed, it is doubtful
that a proper educational apparatus could have been maintained.5'
Following the liberation, Rabbi Eisenbeth demanded that Governor-
General Yves Châtel totally abolish all anti-Jewish laws. Yet his pleas fell
on deaf ears at the time. Moreover, as in Morocco, not only did the
Americans not interfere in internal French affairs but agreed to the
appointment of Admiral Darlan, one of Pétain's closest collaborators, as
the head of the French nation in French territories not under German
occupation.
In Decem ber 1942, Darlan was assassinated and Henri Giraud, Dar-
lan’s appointee as French military commander for North Africa, inherited
his position. Following Châtel’s departure, Marcel Peyrouton, a partici
pant in the formulation of the 7 October 1940 decree, became governor-
general of Algeria. Only in the wake of protests made by Jewish organi
zations in Algeria and the United States, in the American press and by
Gaullist supporters, did Giraud publish, on 18 March 1943, a decree
calling for the elimination of discriminatory policies. But not all anti-
Jewish measures were abrogated immediately. Significantly, moreover,
Giraud simultaneously issued another edict abrogating the Crémieux
Decree for the second time. If, following the publication of the Law of 7
October 1940, Algerian Jews had lost their citizenship and political rights,
their situation in 1943 was far worse. Giraud’s steps aimed at depriving
the Jews not only of their political rights but also at regression in matters
of personal status, requiring a return to the jurisdiction of the rabbinic
courts which had prevailed prior to the 1870 decree.
General de Gaulle arrived in Algiers at the end of May 1943. He met
with Rabbi Eisenbeth and told him in the name of the French Commit
tee of National Liberation that the Committee had decided to nullify the
Giraud Decree which abrogated the Crémieux Decree. Indeed, on 20
October 1943, the Committee made an official declaration calling for
total abolition of all the discriminatory laws, including the Giraud
Decree.
82 Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace
During the years 1940-42, many Jews joined the Resistance. A segment
of Jewish youth in Algiers was determined to organize self-defense and
underground activity. According to the personal account of Paul Se-
baoun, an underground activist, a group of Jewish young men began, as
early as 1940, to organize clandestinely at the Géo Gras sports club in
Algiers whose owner was a non-Jew. Under the guise of sports activity,
the club served as a facade for self-defense training. These men went out
at night to paint the symbol of Free France and the letter V for victory
on the walls of buildings throughout Algiers. They even purchased weap
ons (pistols and rifles) from Spanish smugglers, which they stored at the
Club Géo Gras. As Sebaoun relates: “Nous utilisions des caches aména
gées dans les murs, les planchers, sous le ring de boxe, tout cela à Tinsu
de notre ami Géo Gras” (We made use of hiding places found in the
walls, in the floors, under the boxing ring, and all that without our friend
Géo Gras knowing about it).58 These activists saw as their main enemies
the militant supporters of the Service d’Ordre Légionnaire (SOL, the
French version of the Nazi SS) and the Parti Populaire Français.
On 22 October 1942, American general Mark Clark arrived secretly at
Cherchell on the coast west of Algiers and negotiated with senior repre
sentatives of the Resistance in order to coordinate their military opera
tions with the American landing in North Africa. The clandestine negoti
ations at Cherchell revolved around two critical, complementary efforts:
(1) the Resistance would be responsible, with the aid of volunteers, for
cutting Vichy communications at zero hour, for arresting pro-Vichy se
nior officials, and for taking over the headquarters of the Vichy chief of
staff for North Africa; (2) the Allied forces would land commando units
before the arrival of regular American troops in order to relieve the
Resistance whose numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Vichy armed forces
would preclude its holding the positions taken indefinitely.59
In order to accomplish the plans negotiated at Cherchell, eight hundred
volunteers would be needed, Sebaoun observed. This emphasized the
importance of local underground movements, such as the Géo Gras
group who had direct and indirect contact with the Resistance leader
ship. Only six hundred men and youths agreed to cooperate with the
Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 83
Resistance operation. And only 377 actually turned up for action. Most of
them were Jews (other sources indicate that of the 377 volunteers, 315
were Jews).60 O f this Jewish majority, 132 were Géo Gras activists,
known as Group B. They constituted the largest and most dynamic unit
of volunteers.61
On the afternoon of 7 November 1942, British radio broadcast the
code phrase: “Hello Robert, Franklin is arriving” (Robert was Robert
Murphy, the special American representative at Algiers; Franklin was, of
course, President Franklin D. Roosevelt). The volunteers and the Resis
tance leadership worked out the final details of their coup d’état at the
home of a local Jewish professor, Henri Aboulker. Weapons were distrib
uted to the volunteers. The operation began on the morning of 8 Novem
ber. The sources agree that due to the active participation of the 377
men of the Resistance, the mission to neutralize the administrative cen
ter of Algiers was accomplished.62 Despite the presence of 11,000 (unpre
pared) pro-Vichy soldiers and thousands of SO L legionnaires, the city
was taken over before the Americans arrived. The activists themselves
were surprised at their success, as Sebaoun indicates: “That 377 men had
been able during nearly one day to hold on to all the strategic points of a
major city like Algiers might seem unbelievable.”63
Did the events of 1940-43 and those immediately preceding the war
convince the Jews that France in p articu lar had disappointed them, the
same France that they had learned to respect since 1830? These issues
are dealt with in chapter 3.
Chapter 3
84
Zionismy Clandestine Emigration 85
mid-1948 the North African Hagana had 650 members and twenty-six
branches divided thus:
Algeria 14 200
Tunisia 6 250
Morocco 6 200
By the time Moroccan Jewry were facing physical dangers (mid-1948) the
self-defense apparatus ceased to exist or emerged weakened due to the
lack of leadership. Be that as it may, in 1948 North African Zionism— in
the federations, youth movements, and political parties— seemed like a
microcosm of the Yishuv. During the 1950s, as subsequent chapters
reveal, all Zionist/Israeli political parties and movements, from Mapai
and ha-Bonlm to Mapam and ha-No car ha-Tsiyoni, were represented in
the communal spectrum.
As for the illegal caliya itself, we noted that the emissaries of the
Mossad Le-CAliya and Jewish Agency organized it clandestinely in 1947-
48 from the Algerian coast. They were assisted inside Morocco and
Tunisia by a local Zionist youth underground and by smugglers, Jews and
non-Jews, who helped the emigrants. Concentrating in this chapter on
Morocco, the underground assisted Moroccan Jews to reach a secret
transit camp in Algeria via the northeastern Moroccan frontier area of
Oudjda. In Algeria, Moroccan Jews bordered ships whose destination
was Palestine. The Mossad Le-cAliya sent three ships between May and
Decem ber 1947. Jews successfully boarded the first two but, upon reach
ing the shores of Palestine, were seized by the British authorities and
held in Cyprus until after Israel attained independence. The third ship
barely escaped being caught by the French Algerian authorities. Instead
of leaving with several hundred emigrants as originally planned, it man
aged to escape with only forty-four. These succeeded in reaching Pales
tine. (On the Jewish population in Morocco in 1936 and 1951, see tables
6 and 7.)
From that point on until the beginning of 1949 Moroccan Jews contin
ued to flee clandestinely and semi-clandestinely— both with and without
the guidance of the Moroccan Zionist underground— across the Moroc-
can-Algerian border at Oudjda. Those caught by the French authorities
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 89
and m akhzan police at the border or on the way to Oudjda, were forced
to return to their homes. Those successfully reaching Algeria (Algiers and
Oran) were assisted by Israeli emissaries there to depart illegally for
Marseilles where, after the birth of Israel, they were cared for by the
Jewish Agency representatives and the AJDC that helped the Jewish
Agency manage the Marseilles transit camps. There were still others who
managed to obtain passports and visas legally or by bribing Moroccan
and French officials. It is not completely clear if clandestine Zionist
forces among Moroccan Jews assisted in the bribing procedure. These
90 Zionism, Clandestine Emigration
It has been written that illegal caliya from Morocco via Algeria, the
creation of Israel, and, perhaps, anti-Semitic agitation by French Protec
torate officials, were catalytic factors contributing to the pogroms carried
out against the Jews of Oudjda and the nearby hamlet of Djérada on 7
June 1948. On that day local Muslims killed forty-seven Jews in both
places, also causing considerable property damage. It has also been
suggested that the pogroms came in the wake of a speech delivered by
Sultan Muhammad V the previous month in which he proclaimed that
the Arab world had to struggle against Zionism because of the creation of
Israel. Though he insisted that his Jewish subjects were loyal and not to
be identified in any way with their “brethren in occupied Palestine/' the
sultan did not succeed in calming tempers among extremists affiliated
directly or indirectly with the Istiqlàl, then the leading nationalist party
that advocated the need for full independence from France.
92 Zionism, Clandestine Emigration
ically that 3Abü Khalïl was a dishonest rabble-rouser and maintained that
Zionism in Morocco was exploited by nationalist extremists to drive a
wedge between Muslims and Jews. He urged the French authorities to
censure future articles with this orientation so as to avert a campaign of
hatred that would result in bloodshed.15
Jewish-Muslim tensions in 1947 and during the first half of 1948
increased, however. Early in June 1948, Francis Lacoste, the French
minister plenipotentiary in Rabat, alerted Juin that the nationalists had
for several months searched for opportunities to stir public opinion against
the Jews in connection with clandestine caliya via Algeria as well as the
Palestine war. By turning the Jews into the scapegoats of the Arab-Israeli
war, the nationalists had hoped to enlist greater numerical support among
the Muslim people which would subsequently be directed against the
French presence in Morocco.16 In other words: the whole campaign
against Zionism and caliya was part and parcel of the goal to fortify the
ranks of the nationalist movement for the eventual anticolonial struggle.
Several days prior to the pogroms at Oudjda and Djérada, nationalist
elements conducted an economic boycott against European and Jewish
merchants throughout French Morocco. The boycott rapidly extended to
movie theatres, pharmacies, and transportation companies. In Fez, the
wife of cAlâl al-Fàsï, an influential Istiqlâli leader, and the wives of other
Muslim notables, organized demonstrations in support of the Arab ar
mies’ war with Israel. Similar activity was reported in Casablanca, where
affluent Muslim women donated their jewelry for the war effort.17
On Monday, 7 June 1948, Juin received a telegram from M. Brunei,
the regional head of Oudjda, informing him that a pogrom had taken
place in Oudjda City after a Jew attacked a Muslim with scissors. Based
on this version, the incident occurred when the two men entered into a
heated discussion concerning the Palestine war. Once the incident be
came known in the Muslim m adtna (the Muslim section of the city),
violence broke out against the Jews. Added to the looting, bodily inju
ries, and killings was damage to Jewish-owned stores and homes in
several integrated neighborhoods. It was also stressed that “the majority
of Oudjda’s Muslims assisted effectively in restoring order.” 18
This report does not suggest that the pogroms and other forms of
violence were preplanned. It does indicate, however, that tensions over
Zionism and the Palestine war served as catalysts to the pogrom. On the
other hand, a report submitted to the Direction de l’Intérieur of the
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 95
unrest and pogroms commenced between 8:00 and 8:25 A.M., the army
did not arrive until 1 1 : 0 0 a . m . During this time span the assailants
dominated the streets of Oudjda.21
Though based on a thorough survey of the events following a fact
finding mission, Weill seems to have contradicted himself by, on the one
hand, noting that the pogroms were directly related to the specific
incident at the Moroccan-Algerian border and then, on the other hands,
hinting that the events were planned in advance.
The pogrom did not end with Oudjda. Based on French Protectorate
data, on the same day, at 7:00 P .M ., rioters from Oudjda drove sixty
kilometers to the phosphate town of Djérada. Upon arrival they spread
false rumors that Jews had attacked Oudjdan Muslims and that Sultan
Muhammad V ordered all good Moroccans to seek vengeance against the
attackers. They then assembled local miners and, accompanied by Djér-
ada’s kh alifa (m akhzan s top official), entered the Jewish neighborhood
— inhabited by 150 people. A systematic massacre took place, with whole
families butchered or severely beaten, for a total of thirty-nine dead and
forty-four wounded. The survivors were evacuated to Oudjda and placed
in temporary housing.22
A similar account about Djérada was presented by Eugène Weill.
Oudjdan nationalists arrived at Djérada and told local miners that Oudj-
da s Jews had set fire to the city s Grand Mosque. According to Weill,
once the riots in Djérada began, the police either ignored the early phase
of the unrest or did not believe it would develop into a pogrom. They
were also short on manpower: only four gendarmes, five police inspec
tors, and several m okhaznis were present on the scene. It was not until
the next day, on the evening of 8 June, that the authorities decided to
evacuate Djérada’s Jewry to Oudjda.23
What was the reaction of the Jews to the pogroms? Jewish leaders in
Oudjda complained that they had no means of defending themselves
throughout eastern Morocco. They lived in constant fear of potential
anti-Jewish violence emanating from Muslims ever since 15 May 1948,
the day the armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq launched the war
against Israel. Their anxiety was partly attributed to the fact that indige
nous Moroccan policemen, many of whom were nationalist sympathizers,
patrolled integrated neighborhoods and did not demonstrate a friendly
disposition toward them .24
Oudjdan and Djéradan Jews also thought that the French authorities
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 97
failed to follow the events leading to the pogroms with great scrutiny.
Brunei was described as one of the main culprits because at the time, on
6 and 7 June, he was away in Tafilalt attending a wedding celebration.
There were those who suspected that he was intentionally absent from
the scene, knowing that an outbreak of violence was imminent. He
probably felt that it may have been wiser to stay away and not be
burdened with the responsibility for the loss of control over a chaotic
situation.2,5 Others considered the possibility that Brunei and the Resi
dency welcomed Muslim anti-Jewish attacks and in fact encouraged them,
the sole aim being to pit Jews against Muslims so as to prove to the world
that the latter were irresponsible and unworthy of their political aspira
tions.26
What was the reaction of the Muslims to the results of the pogroms?
One reliable source reported that “la population arabe dans sa majorité
approuve ce pogrom” (the majority of the Arab population approves of
this pogrom).27 However, m akhzan officials in the region of Oudjda were
astonished and genuinely embarrassed by the conduct of the assailants.
This is best illustrated by their efforts to console the victims’ families to
the extent that they surpassed the gestures made by French functionar
ies. Especially noteworthy was the attitude of Si Muhammad al-HajawT,
the pasha of Oudjda, the Muslim governor who was Brunei's subordi
nate. Known for his pro-French and liberal attitudes, al-Hajaw! met with
every single family victimized. His behavior irritated segments of the
Muslim population. On 11 June, when al-Hajawï attended Friday prayers
at Oudjda’s Grand Mosque, an attempt was made on his life. Suffering
stab wounds he barely survived.28
The nationalists and the communists denied having played any role in
the events. They disclaimed French accusations that their cadres agitated
the miners of Djérada and nearby Khouribga, or that their press ex
ploited anti-Jewish passions during the Palestine war. When the Protec
torate suggested that Moroccan nationalists in collusion with their coun
terparts in the Algerian Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés
Démocratiques (MTLD) masterminded the events on 7 June, several
nationalist groups went so far as to blame the French for the pogroms.29
The Istiqlàl pointed out with some accuracy, however, that there were
Muslims who protected Jews during the pogroms by sheltering them in
their homes.30
Al-cA lam , Istiqlâl's Arabic-language organ, expressed sadness about
98 Zionism, Clandestine Emigration
ready for military service in Israel. Each group of emigrants was made
up of six to seven persons headed by a leader carrying with him large
sums of money. In one specific case, a group leader from somewhere in
central Morocco had 42,000 francs in his possession. The money may
have been provided by the underground. These emigrants originally
boarded a train to Fez. To evade the surveillance of the trains they
proceeded in cabs from Fez to Oudjda before being caught. The French
gen darm erie and agents of the C on trôle Civil established checkpoints
and erected barricades at Saidia, Martimprey, Taza, Moulouya, and
Guercif— the most common routes used by the emigrants from central
Morocco to reach Oudjda.49
The emigrants who successfully reached Oudjda frequently contacted
members of the local Jewish community. According to French sources,
Oudjdan Jews assisted by placing them temporarily with Jewish families
until their departure. While there, the emigrants faced dangerous chal
lenges hitherto unforeseen. For example, if they did not cross the border
independently or with the assistance of different Zionist groups, but
relied on Muslim smugglers, the risks they took were immense. Alge
rians for the most part, the smugglers who lived close to the Moroccan
border, would slip into Morocco with fake Moroccan passports and lais
sez-passer documents to be sold to the emigrants. They then assisted in
smuggling them into Algeria for 2,500 francs per individual. If misunder
standings developed between the two parties over money matters, and
such situations were not uncommon, the smugglers could, and some
times did, turn them over to the French Moroccan authorities, emerging
as heroes in the eyes of the Muslims.50
The French in Morocco relied on a network of informants in the
Jewish communities about would-be clandestine emigrants. Protectorate
sources suggest that Jews of the more affluent stratum and unidentified
communal leaders sometimes informed them concerning plans for caliya.
The informants were hostile toward emigration, fearing that the process
would not only depopulate the communities, but could render them
politically vulnerable before the Muslims.51
As clandestine caliya gained momentum the Muslims continued to
register their complaints before the Residency. Si M’Barek Bekkai, the
pasha of Sefrou, regarded the emigration as open provocation. In the
past, Bekkaï argued, the Muslims of Sefrou could count on the French to
apprehend at least several of the emigrants and impose a one-month
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 105
Francis Lacoste was perhaps the fiercest opponent of the caliya from
Morocco. In a report to Robert Schuman, French minister for foreign
affairs, Lacoste related that many Jewish youths had clandestinely fled
via Oudjda to Algeria and their main objective was to join the Israel
Defense Forces in the fight against the Arabs. According to him, this
emigration was partly military in nature; these young men were usually
physically fit and suited for military service in Israel; moreover, they
were instructed by local underground Zionist organizers and smugglers
as to what to say if captured at the border by the police and interrogated.
This movement had to be stopped.58
By Decem ber 1948, however, the French in Morocco realized that,
despite the numerical fluctuations in the caliy a, the illegal activity could
not be completely stopped. As a result, the Residency was searching for
a way to establish contacts with Jewish organizations in order to end the
underground activities and find a suitable formula for legal or semilegal
emigration under French supervision. Indeed, in December 1948, Marc
Jarblum, a leading French Zionist, visited Morocco. He was affiliated
with the Jewish Agency, the Fédération Sioniste de France, and the
French section of the World Jewish Congress. The purpose of his trip
was twofold: to discuss with the French authorities the prohibition on
Jews leaving Morocco, and to investigate the situation of Moroccan Jewry.
Was Jarblum speaking on behalf of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem or
the Jewish Agency’s office in Paris? He apparently spoke on behalf of
both since he stated that he represented that body and the Mossad
LecAliya. Did he also intend to speak with the French on behalf of the
World Jewish Congress or the Zionist Federation of France? There are
no answers available.
Late in December 1948 Jarblum met in Rabat with Juin. He told him
that he was speaking on behalf of the Jewish Agency and then broached
the issue of the prohibition on Jews leaving Morocco on the assumption
that they were going to Israel. Juin explained that the decision to prohibit
Jewish emigration had been implemented after the sultan’s insistent
requests on the basis of the following argument: Moroccan Jews were
eager to leave Morocco in order to enlist in the Israel Defense Forces
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 107
and fight the Arabs. These Jews, according to Juin’s assessment of the
sultan’s position, did not attempt to conceal their intentions, so that the
Moroccan Muslims felt deeply aggrieved and refused to accept allowing
Jews to leave the country for the purpose of fighting the Muslims in the
Middle East. Moreover, this emigration caused serious incidents and it
was in the best interest of the Jews, the sultan claimed, to keep it quiet.
Consequently, Paris and the Residency, anxious to avert incidents, saw
fit to prohibit Jews from leaving Morocco. But this policy had proved
inoperative.59
Juin’s explanation to Jarblum as to why Jews suddenly sought to flee
Morocco in 1947-48 centered on both emotional and socioeconomic
causes. It was a mystical movement as well as panic that impelled them
to escape their m ellàhs; of the 250,000 Jews throughout Morocco, he did
not think that he was exaggerating when he suggested that 200,000 would
leave for Israel if given the opportunity to do so.60
Jarblum indicated that Juin understood the aspirations of the Jews. In
Morocco they regarded themselves as pariahs, despised and, not infre
quently, mistreated, while in Israel they envisaged the possibility of
freedom. Furthermore, there seemed to be no long-range future for
them in Morocco. A small minority of Moroccan Jews had left the m ellàhs
and dwelt in the European districts of Fez, Meknès, Rabat, Marrakesh,
and Casablanca, where they engaged in the liberal professions or large-
scale commerce. Yet the bulk of them lived in crowded m ellàhs, in a
state of utter physical, material, and moral destitution. The mystic urge
to go to Israel and the desire to escape social and economic misery were
therefore quite understandable.61
Jarblum pointed out to Juin that the ban on leaving Morocco made
matters worse. If these people knew they could leave whenever they
wished, there would be no wild rush, no selling of property at any price,
no clandestine activity. Each individual or family would wait its turn and
it would be possible for the Jewish Agency to organize the emigration
process, select emigrants based on health and social criteria, and arrange
the necessary preliminaries for the journey to Marseilles and then to
Israel.62
Juin admitted these difficulties to Jarblum and suggested that in D e
cember 1948 the Moroccan Muslims were manifesting considerably less
interest in emigration than earlier, for peace in the Middle East was in
sight and it no longer seemed reasonable to claim that Jews were leaving
108 Zionism, Clandestine Emigration
It would not be just to prevent young and healthy Moroccan Jews from emigrat
ing and to confine them to profound social and economic misery in the mellàhs.
The only future they would have for improving their lot would be in Israel, which
we are going to recognize as having the right to become a member of the family
of nations.65
with the Jewish Agency increasingly leaning toward granting any future
role in organizing emigration from Morocco to Israel to the Mossad Le
cAliya. It is also quite obvious that the Residency preferred a non-Zionist
Jewish body to conduct the emigration process. At the same time, the
Residency did not rule out granting the Jewish Agency this role, whether
directly through its own personnel or through its functional agency, the
Mossad Le cAliya.
Additional contacts between the local Zionist Organization, with head
quarters in Casablanca, and the Residency, revealed that the French
were on the verge of reaching an agreement. Commenting on Jarblum’s
request to Juin to allow 30,000 Jews a year to leave Morocco, Spanien
did not think Juin would consent to the departure of more than 18,000 a
year. Furthermore, it seemed likely that the French would not favor the
departure of the ‘'best elem ents,” the educated and the affluent.68 In
fact, both Jarblum and Spanien’s proposed figures for future emigration
were unrealistic. In the final analysis, the French in 1949-50 would not
agree in any circumstances to caliya running between 18,000 and 30,000
per year.
The turning point occurred on 7 March 1949, in the course of a
meeting between Juin and Jacques Gershuni who introduced himself as
a representative of the Jewish Agency in France. The sources describe
him as a personality close to the Mossad Le cAliya in France and its chief
director, Yosef Barpal; an activist within the Fédération Sioniste de
France; and a militant member of the left-wing labor-oriented Po cale
Tsiyon/Mapai. During the meeting, Juin and Gershuni laid the ground
work for a program that would once and for all put an end to illegal
emigration.69 Was there a direct link between the Jarblum/Spanien ini
tiative and Gershuni’s visit? It certainly appears that the previous con
tacts constituted a stimulus for entering into serious negotiations in
March 1949. Yet it is not at all certain that either Jarblum or Spanien was
directly responsible for the final achievement of semi-official or tolerated
caliya from Morocco.
In any case, following the Juin-Gershuni meeting, the latter dis
patched a letter70 to the resident-general which contained the following
stipulations:
office b ranches w ere then established by the early 1950s in the m ajor
Jew ish com m unities (Rabat, Salé, M eknès, M arrakesh, F e z , Essaouira,
and Safi), com posed of local Zionists who assisted the cen tral C asablanca
office in registering potential em igrants. B etw een 1949 and 1 9 5 6 m anage
m ent of the C asablanca office was en tru sted to G ershuni (1949), Sarny
H alevy (1 9 4 9 -5 1 ) who was sent by the M ossad L e cAliya which had
b ecom e responsible for C adim a, Shaul G u etta (1951), Z e5 ev Khaklai
(1 9 5 2 - 5 5 ), and Amos Rabl ( 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 ) — all but the first being Israelis.73
G ershuni and H alevy w ere instructed to p resen t them selves publicly
as d elegates o f the Jew ish A gency and not the M ossad L e cAliya, while
C adim a was registered with the F re n ch in Rabat not only as an organiza
tion providing social services, but as a com pany for distributing books.74
D oubtless, Cadim a, under the supervision o f the Mossad L e cAliya e m
issary, was subordinate to the Jew ish Agency's Im m igration D ep artm en t
in Jerusalem and to its em issaries in F ra n ce . A lter the M ossad L e cAliya
was officially dism antled in Israel (M arch 1952), the local C adim a op era
tion was directly adm inistered by the Jew ish Agency em issaries (Khaklai
and Rabl) until 1 9 5 6 .70 Alongside the C asablanca and o th er branches of
Cadim a, this apparatus included a transit cam p tw enty-six kilom eters
outside the city on the Mazagan Road, which was m eant to provide
Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 113
As noted, beginning in 1948-49, France was one of the main centers for
processing caliya; Italy was another. At the time the Jewish Agency’s
Immigration Department also opened one of its most important opera
tions in Marseilles. Even prior to 1948-49, several major Jewish Agency
and he-Haluts (an apparatus responsible for training Zionist pioneer
youths for life in Israel) branches were created in Paris or Marseilles, or
in both regions. France served as a convenient center for the Mossad Le
cAliya and the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem to maintain contact with caliya
organizations in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. What is more, the emis
saries dispatched to these countries on behalf of their movements in
Israel or the Mossad LecAliya and Jewish Agency, usually arrived in
France first in order to obtain the necessary legal documentation and
visas to operate in the French North African colonial sphere.
Between May and 31 Decem ber, 1948, 39,137 Jews emigrated to
Israel through Marseilles; during 1 January-31 December, 1949, 64,160
emigrated; and between 1 January and 31 December 1950, 17,327 emi
grated— for a total of 120,624 persons, many of them from North Africa.
The Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency in Marseilles in
tended to function as the caliya gate to Israel of North African and
Egyptian Jewry, but also of European Jews, notably from Sweden, France,
Norway, Switzerland, Holland, England, and Belgium. Special caliya
transit and medical treatment camps were established in Marseilles fol
117
118 Morocco*s Struggle for Independence
lowing the end of World War II. In 1949, there were nineteen camps; in
March 1951, only four of the camps were still operating: Grande Arenas,
David, Saint Jerome, and Eilat. Grande Arenas became the most impor
tant transit/medical camp whereas Eilat and David were about to close
down. Until 1951 the AJDC supported the camps financially and admin
istered them in partnership with the Jewish Agency. After January 1951
the AJDC surrendered its financial control of the camps to the Jewish
Agency. The staff at the camps was largely composed of the emigrants
while the camps’ officers, physicians, and teachers were Israelis. The
reduction in the number of transit camps was due to the decline in the
caliya from the European continent and the concentration on North
Africa.1
C a d im a : T h e cA liy a P r o c e s s a n d F r e n c h P olicy
Total $110.07
How did the recruitment and screening process of the would-be emi
grants function in Morocco? According to Ze5 ev Khaklai, Cadima’s direc
Morocco s Struggle for Independence 119
rejected ones often dissolve in tears, fly into fits of rage. As I watched these
scenes, and I attended a dozen such selections, I was moved as never before. It
needs supreme callousness to remain dry-eyed.7
new European residential districts, the majority still dwelt in the m el
làhs. In Taroudant of the Ante-Atlas mountains, 19.4 percent of the ^aliya
candidates during 1952-53 were rejected on the basis of the selection
criteria.8
As time elapsed, the Coordinating Commission in Jerusalem and the
Israel Ministry of Health s physician in Morocco tried to moderate as
pects of the screening/selection policies. For example, severely handi
capped persons within a family or large numbers of the elderly could
make caliya if they were accompanied by more than one employable
young person.9 However, enabling the severely handicapped or persons
afflicted by mild cases of trachoma to leave for Israel was not much of a
compromise, according to Ze’ev Khaklai. Added to the selection policies,
he said, were French Protectorate policies of not tolerating large-scale
caliya as well as Israel’s low monthly emigration quotas. Urging the
Jewish Agency to hasten caliya from Morocco, especially from the villages
of the bled , Khaklai observed in 1953:
[The conditions of the Jews in the villages] are quite precarious. . . . Today law
and order still prevails, yet no one can predict what tomorrow will bring. [The]
Jews live in a state of uncertainty and in fear and they are dependent on the
goodwill of senior and minor French officials. They are being squeezed out from
their professions as the Muslims are learning the trades of [b led ] Jewry [such as]
shoemaking, harness-making, tailoring, goldsmithy, etc., and they are encroach
ing upon the monopoly enjoyed by the Jews in trade.10
Khaklai reiterated his warnings several months later, this time speaking
about both rural and urban Jewry. At a meeting of Jewish Agency emis
saries in Tel-Aviv on 10 January 1954, he stated that large-scale caliya
and drastic reforms in the emigrant screening process had to be imple
mented because time was running out for Morocco’s Jews: “Arab nation
alism is not the same as European nationalism. If the Arab nationalists
will gain power and I say they will reach this goal, then the fate of the
Jews should be evident [to us].” 11
Khaklai’s pleas did not completely fall on deaf ears. The Coordinating
Commission’s members did support the idea of giving preference in
caliya to the Jewish villagers of southern Morocco and were now inclined
to consider Khaklai’s recommendation of evacuating w hole villages in
remote areas. Only “hard social cases”— criminals and the unemployable
— would be left behind. Regarding medical selection, even the very sick
Morocco's Struggle for Independence 123
among the villagers would be taken out as long as they were not afflicted
by contagious diseases. The purpose behind the evacuation of villages
was not limited to potential political and economic problems challenging
the Jews of the bled. It was also because Khaklai convinced the Jewish
Agency that the villagers were “the best elements for Israeli society.”
They were healthier and more robust than their urban counterparts,
productive, and physically capable of engaging in the vocational trades
and agriculture.12
During the summer of 1954, Shlomo Zalman Shragai, the new head of
the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department, visited Morocco and Tun
isia. Though he thought that the conditions of the Jews in Tunisia,
especially the rural inhabitants, were far worse than in Morocco, due to
the very intensive struggle for nationhood led by supporters of Habib
Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour party, he did not underestimate Khaklai’s as
sessment about Morocco. Furthermore, Moshe Kol, head of cAliyat ha-
No car and Moshe Sharett, then Israel’s prime minister, who, like Shra
gai, were members of the Coordinating Commission, argued strongly for
large-scale evacuation from the Moroccan b led and felt that Morocco in
this case deserved priority over Tunisia.13
As we shall see in chapter 8, Shragai’s assessment was accurate.
Although the Jews in Morocco’s b led were in an unstable atmosphere,
until the end of July 1954 the situation in Tunisia was far worse. Nation
alist versus French tensions in Tunisia were reduced only following the
visit there by French prime minister Pierre Mendès-France on 31 July
and his announcement of Tunisian internal autonomy. Accordingly, the
Jews of Tunisia from that point on were in less danger.14 It was not until
the first week of August that the anti-French nationalist struggle in
Morocco became dangerous for the Jews of the rural and urban regions,
surpassing the challenge faced by their Tunisian brethren.
Whether the members of the Coordinating Commission favored evac
uating as many Jews as possible from the rural areas of Morocco and
Tunisia (the majority favored it) or from the urban agglomerations (a
minority supported this suggestion), as late as the end of July/beginning
of August 1954 no practical steps had until then been adopted to imple
ment evacuation. Interestingly, while the Jews of the Moroccan b led
were eager to leave for Israel, until August 1954 their urban counterparts
were losing their enthusiasm for caliya. After 1952, in light of the harsh
screening/selection policies, emigration quotas, housing shortages, and
124 Morocco’s Struggle for Independence
1949 — — — — — 17 69 99 10 63 88 33 379
1950 100 — 30 11 13 24 12 5 48 12 21 31 307
1951 33 19 20 29 46 40 31 36 60 18 45 53 430
1952 53 30 44 55 54 37 55 53 40 104 48 32 605
1953 39 23 95 31 15 69 80 53 43 117 89 91 745
Total 225 72 189 126 128 187 247 246 201 314 291 240 2,466
Source: Note au sujet des émigrants Israélites marocains revenus au Maroc après un séjour en Israël, Rabat, 21 décembre 1954, AAE-Nantes, DL/Section Politique.
Table 9. Official French Statistics on cA liy a from Morocco via Casablanca and France, 17 March 1949-April 1956
Month 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956*
bring back Muhammad V and grant the country autonomy (as was done
in Tunisia in 1955) or complete independence.17 At first the French did
not succumb to the pressure of the diverse nationalist forces and placed
the pro-French Muhammad Ben Mawlây cArafa of the Alawite family on
the throne.
On 3 August 1954, in the town of Petitjean, seven Jews were massa
cred. Until then, and apart from the June 1948 pogroms, the urban Jews
had not been singled out, nor had there been any action of a specifically
anti-Jewish character countrywide in scope. Moreover, the nationalists
in general and the Istiqlàl in particular had seemed anxious to avoid
maltreating the Jews. In August 1954 and throughout 1955, however, the
urban and rural fighters or their adherents, though directing most of
their ire against the French, did not spare the Jews. Serious incidents
took place in the m e llâ h of Casablanca, resulting in the injury of many
Jews. It was generally believed that a mass attack on the Jewish quarter
of Casablanca would have taken place had it not been for the protection
given by the French authorities. Subsequently there were attacks, ha-
rassments, and property damage in the Jewish sections of Safi, Boujad,
Ouezzan, Mazagan, Ourika, and Tiznit. In Safi and Mazagan, these
attacks showed signs of being deliberate and premeditated.18 Several
Jewish community leaders contended that the Jews were victimized by
the struggle between the supporters of the exiled sultan and the cArafists,
the followers of Muhammad Ben Mawlây cArafa. This struggle continued
even after Muhammad V returned triumphantly to the throne in Novem
ber 1955.19
In view of these developments and unconfirmed rumors that the Arab
League sent its agents from Libya to Morocco to stir anti-Jewish senti
ments, the Coordinating Commission and the Jewish Agency debated
the need for much larger emigration quotas. Whether or not Moroccan
ca liy a should receive priority over the rest of North Africa was no longer
the issue, for not only Tunisia quieted down politically in 1954-55, but
in Algeria, the Jews faced no dangers before 1 November 1954, the date
when the FLN launched its revolution against the French. Though no
radical changes were introduced into the screening/selection criteria in
1954-55, the fact that la r g e r e m ig r a t io n q u o t a s were agreed upon helped
expedite the departure of Moroccan Jewry.
Several technical modifications were introduced into the selection
process, however. First, in 1954 special screening teams representing
128 Morocco's Struggle for Independence
The more I visited in these [Berber] villages and became acquainted with their
Jewish inhabitants, the more I was convinced that these Jews constitute the best
and most suitable human elements for settlement in [Israel s] absorption centers.
There were many positive aspects which I found among them: first and foremost,
they all know [their agricultural] task and their transfer to agricultural work in
Israel will not involve physical and mental hardships. They are satisfied with few
[material needs] which will enable them to confront their early economic prob
lems. It is possible to settle them in a mountainous region, in the Negev and
elsewhere. There will be other problems, however: how to train them to utilize
various modem tools which are so vital nowadays.25
The Grande Arenas Transit Camp in the Marseilles Area (courtesy of the Orga
nization of the Former North African Underground Activists in Israel).
side with the Muslims on ce the Muslims would seem to have the upper
hand in the struggle for in dependence. Baudouy had no doubt the Jew s
would then change sid es.41
T he m eeting with L aco ste on 7 M ay was lengthy. H e explained to
Karoz that it was due to his initiative in 1949 that the G ershuni-Juin
accord had brought about the opening of the gates for ca liy a ; and that it
was his efforts that had convinced Foreign M inister Schum an and his
superiors at the R esidency at th e tim e that ca liy a could not be legally
p reven ted and thus six hundred Jew s w ere able to leave m onthly in
1 9 4 9 - 5 0 .42 Though he and his superiors in F ra n ce had not intended to
dism antle C adim a, the new political clim ate com pelled him to red u ce
em igration from over 2 ,0 0 0 to seven hundred; he could not be indifferent
to the m a k h z a n s dem ands. L arge-scale em igration would con tribu te to
the already bloody and chaotic situation.43
Like his line of argu m en t in 194 9 , as expressed in his letters to
Schum an, L acoste reiterated in May 1955 that despite the difficulties
en cou n tered by Jew ish em igrants from M orocco in Israel, the Jew s p re
ferred this alternative to th eir growing political and econom ic insecurity
Morocco s Struggle for Independence 137
officials and emissaries who deviated from the policy of discretion, some
thing Lacoste would not tolerate. Furthermore, French sources confirm
that affluent and influential Jewish notables, disturbed by both écrém age
and French reactions, encouraged the Residency to restrict caliya (in
1952 and 1955). This development dovetailed with the reservations of
the French themselves as to Zionist activity during those periods.
Did the French under Lacoste really see the Jews as an élém ent
d équ ilibre reliably fortifying their position, a source of information about
Muslim nationalist activity? French sources reveal differences of opinion
over this matter among officials. Several officials did indeed see the Jews
in 1954-55, particularly the urban population, as a vital asset for French
interests who h a d to stay in Morocco. Others pointed to the European
population, not the Jews, as the only reliable element. 1 have concluded
that the main reason behind Lacoste’s temporary restrictive measures
was to prevent Cadima and Israel from making the Protectorate appear
vulnerable at the height of the Franco-Moroccan confrontation. The
departure of too many persons for Israel when the French were fighting
for colonial preservation in the midst of terrorism and sabotage could
only demonstrate to Moroccan nationalists and the world that France was
no longer in control; that segments of the population had lost confidence
in French protection. What is more, as Karoz concluded, Lacoste was
apparently worried about a massive departure of Jews triggering the
flight of Morocco’s European residents.
Finally, if the French government was at first supportive of Lacoste’s
measures it no doubt had something to do with the ever-growing pres
ence of Moroccan Jewish emigrants in transit at Marseilles. The question
sometimes raised was: Why did Israel undertake large-scale emigration
in 1955 when it could not immediately and systematically transfer the
emigrants from France to Israel? If Israel could not cope with the absorp
tion of the emigrants, then it may have been irresponsible to organize
large-scale departures.
that in the future youths who were separated from their parents would
not remain as such indefinitely. Many economically disadvantaged par
ents initially agreed to entrust their children to Aliyat ha-No car on the
assumption, and on the basis of promises made by the Mossad Le cAliya,
that they would follow their children to Israel via the general apparatus
of Cadima. Such plans often did not materialize because the parents were
rejected by Cadima in accordance with the screening policies. Paz was
now pressured to inform his superiors in Paris and Jerusalem that priority
in caliya be granted to parents whose children had either been in Europe
for h a ch sh a ra , or were living in Israel.47
It is mentioned in chapter 8 on Tunisia that segments of the youth
caliy a, sent to Israel via Europe, stayed in cAliyat ha-No car*s facilities in
Norway. However, most of them went to France where, near Montpel
lier, two hundred kilometers from Marseilles, they were absorbed into
Cambous,— an area resembling Israel s Galilee. Within Cambous, on
over three hundred acres, cAliyat ha-No car maintained a mansion sur
rounded by five buildings. The mansion included sporting grounds, a
school, a synagogue, vocational training facilities, a clinic, and a movie
theatre. Capable of integrating three hundred children at once, cAliyat
ha-No car’s complex at Cambous also had several homes, or sections, for
religious youths, Dror, ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir, ha-Bonim, ha-No car ha-
Tsiyoni, and Gordonia. Theoretically, the complex at Cambous was de
signed to house youths who opted to settle in these movements’ kibb u t
zim. In reality, many youths arriving in Cambous from Morocco did not
belong to Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir or Dror in Casablanca, Fez, Meknès, or
Marrakesh. They included elements who left troubled homes, as well as
orphans. Impoverished families felt that by handing over their children
to cAliyat ha-No car it would ease their economic hardships. During their
stay in Cambous the youths made the transition from Moroccan to Israeli
society. The AJDC covered two-thirds of the expenses whereas the
Jewish Agency covered the rest. It was not uncommon for the personnel
at Cambous to discover that certain youths were ineligible for emigration
under the aegis o f cAliyat ha-No car, for they were unsuitable for h a ch
sh ara and for life on the kibbu tz or m oshav. The latter were then sent
back to Morocco or they joined those parents who were approved for
caliya by Cadima and awaited them at the Grande Arenas transit camp.48
Back in Morocco, upon recruiting children for caliya, Paz would enlist
local physicians or O SE ’s employees to administer the medical examina-
Morocco's Struggle for Independence 141
Table 11. Youth cAliya from North Africa, October 1955-M arch 1956
M onth M orocco Tunisia A lgeria Total
October 1955 31 34 4 69
November 1955 100 55 2 157
December 1955 67 30 2 99
January 1956 43 1 1 45
February 1956 110 14 4 128
March 1956 60 5 _2 67
T otal 411 139 15 565
Source: N. Menlson to Moshe Kol, Marseilles, 6 April 1956, CZA, L58/409, Hebrew.
The Zionist Federation of Morocco (FSM) and the Zionist pioneer youth
movements cooperated with Cadima and cAliyat ha-No car. Moreover,
following the creation of these two emigration organizations, other Jewish
Agency departments were established in French Morocco between 1949
and 1955. This constellation included the Department for Middle East
ern Jewry (DMO hereafter), the Department of Pioneer Youth Move
ments (No car ve-he-Haluts hereafter), and the Department of Torah
Education in the Diaspora (discussed in chapter 5). Our discussion here
delves into their activities.
Beginning with the FSM , we have already noted that it was not
granted legal and official recognition by the French Protectorate. As was
the case in 1943-47, the FSM continued to collaborate in a highly
discreet fashion with the Jewish Agency from the spring of 1949. Its main
leadership was still composed of veteran Zionists under the chairmanship
of Paul Calamaro, among them J. R. Toledano, Raphael Benazeraf, Solo
mon Cagan, Shmuel Elmaleh, M. Marciano, S. D. Lévy, S. Ohana, and
Zéidé Schulman. They periodically plunged into disagreements over
pressing issues such as selective ‘aliya and the methods for hachshara.
Their ranks were also split by ideological conflicts, for the leadership
represented the diverse spectrum of Zionist/Israeli political movements
ranging from Po cale Tsiyon/Mapai and the General Zionists, to Herut
(Revisionists) and Mizrahi/ha-Po cel ha-Mizrahi.
Paul Calamaro echoed the position of several important Zionists in
Morocco when he advocated “quality ‘a l i y a In a letter to the World
Zionist Organization early in 1949, Calamaro argued that segments of the
Moroccan emigrants arriving in Israel during the illegal phase of 1947-
49 were educationally and socially unprepared for their new surround
ings. Although it was understandable that a Jew sought to leave Morocco,
a country where he was mistreated, the escape to Israel without prior
Zionist educational training led to despair, frustration, and lack of adap
tation. Calamaro believed that unless this anomaly was challenged, many
Moroccan emigrants in Israel would return to their country of origin. He
called upon the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency to
supervise ‘aliya, organize efficient h ach sh ara, define specific health cri
teria for would-be emigrants, and provide Hebrew and Israeli cultural
146 Morocco's Struggle for Independence
We do not plan for one moment to halt this *aliya which is the only hope for
Morocco’s Jews, but it is our duty to first and foremost take into consideration
the state of Israel which needs the help and aid of builders and those ready to
serve her. Our negotiations with the authorities in Rabat over this matter leaves
room for hope that emigration will become legal. . . . As for h ach sh a ra we have
important tasks before us, for it is imperative that our would-be emigrants will
be effectively prepared morally and physically. For this purpose we need emis
saries. . . . We know that in view of the [1948] war our concerns seem secondary
in nature, but we nevertheless hope that once the hostilities end and peace
prevails serious steps will be taken to . . . dispatch suitable emissaries.66
The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization must be the pivot of
large-scale activity in the area of social work, education and h a ch sh a r a , the aim
being to rescue and transfer of the Jewish masses of North Africa [to Israel]. This
goal necessitates the cooperation of the international Jewish organizations: first of
all, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and then the agencies which commenced
their operations in North Africa after World War II— the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, ORT, OSE, the American Jewish Committee and the
World Jewish Congress; all of these [organizations] have taken the initial prepa
ratory steps, and other organizations evince interest in the matter.67
Moroccan Jewry turns its eyes with fervor and hope toward Israel. From there it
expects the salvation. It utters only two words which are terrible in their simplic
ity: M ake h aste! Taking into account the difficulties of absorption in Israel which
we do not underestimate and which necessarily limit the possibilities of ‘aliya,
we do not request a “flying carpet” [as was the case with Yemeni and Iraqi Jewry
in 1950-51] between Morocco and Israel, but we consider it our task to ask for a
monthly quota of 5,000 persons . . . [and] to alleviate the rules of selection
limiting them to contagious diseases and incurable illnesses. . . . You are of
course entitled to wish that emigration from Morocco should be carried through
gradually and distributed over several years. But then you forget the risk that it
may stop.68
As we have seen, the Jewish Agency did recognize the need for larger
quotas. However, the FSM ’s request of 5,000 emigrants per month was
unacceptable to Israel whose officials also dismissed any plea for the
im m ediate and com plete evacuation of Morocco s Jewry.69
Turning to Zionist youths among the movements operating in Morocco
that were affiliated directly or indirectly with the Jewish Agency and the
Mossad Le cAliya, the following were the most noted: ha-Bonim (Mapai/
Ihud ha-Kvutsot ve-ha-Kibbutzim); Dror (until the early 1950s affiliated
with Mapam, Mifleget Po calim Meuhedet, and the United Kibbutz
Movement known as ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad); ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir (the
ultra left-wing Israeli vanguard movement affiliated with the Mapam
party and the Kibbutz ha-3 Arts!); ha-No car ha-Tsiyoni (Liberal Progres
sives); Bne-cAkiva (ha-Po cel ha-Mizrahi); and Betar (Revisionists). Along
side the pro-Israeli Zionist youth movements were the non-Zionist coun
terparts. Several of their members cooperated with the Israeli emissaries
as individuals on matters relating to h ach sh ara and 'aliya. These were
the Eclaireurs Israélites de France (E IF) and the Département Educatif
de la Jeunesse Juive (D EJJ). Furthermore, one of the most important
Zionist youth movements attracting youths from both secular and reli
gious upbringing, functioning mainly in Casablanca, included the afore
mentioned Charles Netter Association whose members collaborated with
the Yishuv’s emissaries in 1944-45 and the Israelis who supervised the
illegal caliya in 1947-49. Its activists constituted the backbone of the
clandestine organization that smuggled Jews to Palestine via Algeria.
From the 1940s the work of the Zionist youth movements was stimu
lated by Israeli emissaries. The movements and their emissaries were
tolerated by the Residency in the wake of the Gershuni-Juin agreement,
148 Morocco's Struggle for Independence
yet the French showed little enthusiasm for their aims and refused to
accord them official recognition. These movements did not attract Jewish
youths en m asse, were elitist, and sought to escape m ellàh culture. For
example, in September 1950 there were four hundred organized Zionist
youths in Tangier; they were members of ha-Bonim, Dror, Bne-cAkiva,
and ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir.70 According to Elie Mouyal, Mapai’s and ha-
Bonim’s Israeli emissary for French Morocco, ha-Bonim’s branch in Ca
sablanca was the largest while another important branch functioned in
Fez. The branch in Casablanca had no more than 150 members but
succeeded nonetheless in sending twenty-eight youths to France for
hachsh ara. As the number of emissaries among ha-Bonim and other
movements was limited before the mid-1950s, Mouyal and his counter
parts trained assistants, known as m adnhtm . The m adrïhtm assisted in
promoting Zionist education and youth camp activities in the Atlas moun
tains.71
Mouyal argued that the Jewish Agency, notably the Nocar ve-he-
Haluts Department with which ha-Bonim in Morocco was affiliated, had
to devote greater attention toward the initial absorption of North African
youth emigrants in N orth A frica rather than in France. In 1949, when
ha-Bonim was in its early organizational phase, Mouyal complained that
the majority of Morocco s urban Jewish youths neither belonged to move
ments nor had a clear-cut perception of modern Zionism. He maintained
that it was still not too late to grapple with the problem, but time was
running out, especially in light of the growing tides of Moroccan nation
alism. He warned Mapai and the Jewish Agency that North African
h ach sh ara had to assume serious dimensions:
If, as [our] colleague David Ben-Gurion said, that the situation today is different
from what it was twenty years ago when the youth movements underwent
h ach sh ara of several years prior to caliya, and that today we do not have the time
just as the emigrants have not the time, it behooves us more than ever to work
quickly and on a large-scale. We must therefore accelerate the pace of education
and h ach sh ara in Morocco and lay the foundation for the implementation of these
tasks.72
nized in Casablanca an exhibition where the maps of Israel from the time
of the twelve tribes until the 29 November 1947 Partition Plan were
displayed; also in the exhibition were photos of the British evacuation of
Palestine, of David Ben-Gurion announcing the creation of the Jewish
state, of kibbutzim and the Israel Defense Forces, and of Israel s major
cities as well as the Negev desert; Israeli flags were hoisted in public.73
Based on ha-Bonim’s reporting, the exhibition was a success, its organiz
ers facing no opposition from the French authorities or the m akhzan. In
all likelihood this is attributed to the fact that even if such events were
politically motivated, they were tolerated by the French once defined as
“cultural events.’*
Who were the members of ha-Bonim in Morocco? In Fez, Meknès,
and Sefrou they were mostly high school students enrolled at the French
Protectorate institutions. In other words: youths coming from well-to-do
families whose members always benefited from the finest education avail
able in Morocco. The less privileged children frequented the AIU schools.
Notwithstanding, by the early 1950s ha-Bonim and other movements
began to attract into their ranks youths from less privileged backgrounds,
including AIU students.74
Like other Zionist pioneer movements, Dror promoted projects that
included summer and winter camps in the Atlas mountains, seminars for
m adrihim , and aspects of h ach sh ara for life in the kibbutz. However,
Dror (like ha-Shomer ha-Tsacir) was more ideologically oriented than ha-
Bonim and committed to attracting youths to the ideas of socialist Zion
ism. Dror was accused of singing the In ternationale in their clubs and of
waving the Soviet flag— intimidating features that stirred resentment in
rabbinic circles, among adherents of ha-Po cel ha-Mizrahi/Bne-cAkiva,
and at the French Residency. Ha-Bonim maneuvered more prudently
and, to avert alienating the traditionalists, its emissaries concealed their
socialist principles and political goals. Moreover, members of Dror and
ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir contributed to their unfavorable image by smoking
in public on the Sabbath and conducting debates over Marxism and
Leninism, even in synagogues or community centers. Interestingly, the
opposition to Dror and ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir emanated also from ha-
Bonim and its emissaries. From 1949-50 onward, ha-Bonim fomented
opposition to these movements as part of Mapai’s competition with Ma
pam, seeking to divert their membership into its movement and further
150 Morocco's Struggle for Independence
Ha-Bonim 313,600
Dror 313,600
Ha-Nocar ha-Tsiyoni 171,500
Ha-Shomer ha-Tsacir 98,000
Total 896,700
Source: Dr. Benzion Benchalom to Pessab Rodnik, 23 May
1954, CZA,S32/No ‘ar ve-hc-Haluts Files.
There is serious concern that some of the emissaries will be forced to leave and it
is possible that the work carried out hitherto in the open, will have to pass to
different rails. The changes may not be immediate, for the [Franco-Moroccan]
negotiations are not final, and hence it would be feasible to work for at least
several months longer. But there is [a state of alert] for the future and this is felt
in all aspects of Zionist work. The aliya is gaining strength and Israel is of major
concern in [Jewish circles].83
The liquidation through caliya of Moroccan Jewry was never intended to become
an immediate process. . . . Their transfer to Israel is the only solution to their
problems. However, this process is continuous and will take place over a period
of many years. . . . As social work and educational endeavors are the best means
to prepare the Jews for caliya, their immediate transfer to Israel, unprepared for
life in the new surroundings[,] will result in disillusionment.87
158
The cAliya from Morocco 159
History 2 2 2 2 —
Geography 1 1 1 1 —
Music — 1 1 1 1
Design I — — — —
Physical
education 2 2 2 2 2
Classical
Arabic 4 4 5 4 6
Moroccan
Arabic — — 1 1 —
Source: Horaires Hébdomadaires des Matières Enseignées avant 1956. E.N.H. For providing me with
the normal school’s program, 1 would like to express my gratitude to the AIU delegate in Casablanca,
Elias Harms.
Hebrew composition — — 1 1 1
Liturgy 1 1 1 1 1
Hebrew penmanship
and grammar — 1 1 — 1
Psychology — — — — 2
Pedagogical theory — — — — 1
Probation (stage) — — — — 2 -4
Source: Horaires Hébdomadaires des Matières Enseignées avant 1956: E.N.H . For providing me with
the normal school's program, I would like to express my gratitude to the AIU delegate in Casablanca,
Elias Harms.
than they had been in the 1950s, the beginnings of reform were already
felt at the AIU schools in the early or mid-1950s.
By 1956 when Morocco achieved its independence, the ENH had
gradually replaced many underqualified rabbi-teachers of Judaic and
Hebrew studies with its own graduates, instituted reforms in Jewish
education, and slowly raised the standards of that education with the
assistance of the AJDC and the Jewish Agency’s emissaries who were
active in Morocco from the late 1940s.
From the early 1950s there were Jewish Agency emissaries teaching
at the ENH itself. The Department of Torah Education in the Diaspora
of the Jewish Agency organized short seminars for educators, helped
principals of religious schools improve their curriculum, and provided
pedagogical guidance for teachers. They contributed significantly to the
work of the 0$àr ha-Torah schools, the teachers’ seminaries, the kinder
gartens, the Hebrew Commission s courses (organized in 1949 by Rouche,
the communities, and the AJDC during evenings, weekends, and vaca
tion), and to the programs of the ENH.
At the end of 1955, as Morocco was moving toward independence, the
Israelis sent by the Jewish Agency to teach in the various schools began
to anticipate difficulties. There were two reasons to justify their concerns.
First, the AIU was anxious to introduce Arabic into the ENH and the
other schools even before being forced to do so by the Moroccan author
ities. Second, the AIU was determined to disassociate itself from the
Israelis in the public eye. cAkiva Kostenbaum, chief emissary of the
Jewish Agency’s Department of Torah Education in the Diaspora, was
informed that Tajouri, chief delegate of the AIU since 1940, had com
plained that the Israelis were giving too many lessons at the ENH and
Moroccan Jewish teachers had to replace them. We have been unable to
determine if such pressure resulted in the withdrawal of Kostenbaum’s
staff from the ENH, or, if so, the precise period of such a withdrawal.
There were other ENH/Israel connections. Since 1950, the Jewish
Agency and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem showed considerable
interest in the ENH and, through these institutions, the ENH instituted
a special certificate, administered by examination from the Hebrew Uni
versity of Jerusalem, known as “the Jerusalem Certificate. ’’ Though cer
tainly not a carte blanche for admission to an Israeli university, the
certificate examination, which tested knowledge of the fundamentals of
Hebrew language and culture, was recognized by the Hebrew Univer
162 The cAliya from Morocco
sity. It exempted applicants who held the certificate from certain en
trance examinations in Hebrew. The certificate aimed at attracting edu
cated emigrants from Morocco to study in Israel.
In addition, for several years the Department of Torah Education in
the Diaspora conducted a special summer seminar in Israel for graduates
and students of the ENH of Casablanca. It was due partly to political
factors and to Moroccan independence that the AIU decided to shift the
seminar to the Orsay school near Paris during the summer of 1956. This
was done in collaboration with the above-mentioned department of the
Jewish Agency and the Eclaireurs Israélites de France (EIF). In subse
quent years such seminars were conducted by the ENH in Laversine,
France.
The ENH curriculum in the 1950s was both demanding and challeng
ing. For example, the history of the Jewish people was taught through
the modern period. According to Rouche:
We taught the future faculty of the AIU schools the history of the Jewish people
until 1860, with the great renaissance of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. From
time to time we taught them about Jewish historical events since 1860, as so
much had happened in the Jewish world by the time World War I broke out.
However, we deemphasized Zionist history. The reasons were that the ENH was
not an ideological center for Zionism, and we did not wish to alienate the French
and Moroccan authorities.2
It is obvious, however, that the ENH teaching staff, and the Israelis who
gave Hebrew lessons, could not avoid altogether discussing matters relat
ing to political Zionism. Even the apolitical bulletin of the ENH student
body, B ikku rlm , occasionally included information regarding Zionist po
litical leaders and events.
Jewish ethics (m üsar), Hebrew literature, and Hebrew were taught;
as Rouche remarked:
We taught [the students] about the Haskala movement . . . and the literature of
Y. L. Gordon, Tshernichovsky, 5Ahad Ha cam and Chaim Nahman Bialik. The
opponents of the AIU were no longer justified in accusing us of dejudaization. A
complete education of both traditional and modem Judaism was provided in the
school. The support for the ENH and the AIU schools in Morocco was gradually
enhanced because of the teachers* training program. Children from the most
remote communities of the Atlas mountains enrolled at the ENH and, in fact,
The cAliya from Morocco 163
one of the most vociferously anti-AIU rabbis, the great Baruch Toledano of
Meknès, sent his grandchild to study at the EN H .3
We would go to our teachers’ homes and spend considerable time with them.
They were extremely encouraging. The work load for us at the school was
enormous, for it meant attending two cou rs com plém en taires at the same time:
one secular and one Jewish. I was able after graduating from the ENH to speak
fluent Hebrew. You cannot imagine the joy and satisfaction we had when my
students at the advanced classes of the Narcisse Leven school in Casablanca
could, after some time, converse with me in Hebrew.4
Until 1955 it was Rouche who guided the ENH programs and Jewish
educational reforms, influencing the AIU primary schools and cours
com plém entaires. David §arfatl, presently the director of the AIU’s Paris
teachers’ training college, and a graduate of the 1951 class of the ENH,
noted that Rouche developed at the school a training program for teach
ers that combined traditional Jewish education and modernity. Following
Rouche’s death in 1983, Sarfatï spoke in his honor, saying that owing to
his efforts, Hebrew as early as the 1950s became a language for conveying
ideas, a langue v éh icu laire, utilized at the ENH as in any Israeli school.
While modern Jewish/Hebrew literature had become familiar to edu
cated Moroccan Jews before the 1940s, it was Rouche who, in only
several years, integrated this component systematically into his school.
Rouche’s knowledge was a model for the ENH student to emulate:
Torah, Mishna, Talmud, and Maimonides cohabitated at the ENH with
Hebrew grammar and language as well as with modem and contempo
rary Jewish literature. Jewish traditional liturgy was taught alongside
modern Israeli poems.5
In the latter half of 1955 Rouche was replaced as ENH director by
Emile Sebban. The exact reasons for his departure are disputed. Accord
ing to one source, at least, though an energetic personality, Rouche was
disliked by some of Morocco’s most powerful rabbis and notables for his
rationalist tendencies, often relying on reason as the basis for establishing
religious truth. While in his native land of Algeria, or in France, such an
164 The cAliya from Morocco
approach would hardly have been questioned, this was not the case in
Jewish Morocco— the cradle of Jewish traditionalism. The AIU was thus
pressured to remove him from his post.6
The toughest component which this researcher encountered when
dealing with the role of the ENH teachers in the AIU’s schools concerns
the method of teaching Hebrew. Was the language taught in the same
way as in Israel— clv rit be-H vrit (Hebrew taught in Hebrew)? During
interviews I had conducted with AIU alumni who studied under ENH
teachers as well as with the ENH educators themselves, the information
obtained was varied, confusing, and inconclusive. Several alumni and
ENH teachers (Issachar Ben-Ami and Albert Hazan, for instance) insisted
that spoken Hebrew was applied in the classroom. Others, like David
Sarfatl, noted that, while Hebrew was utilized as a living language at the
EN H , this was not necessarily the case in other AIU schools, as some
teachers did not conduct classes in Hebrew.
It seems that 7 vrit b e-cIvrit may have been propagated in certain
schools by ENH teachers but certainly not in all of them. Moreover, by
1956 as well as beyond, the AIU was still unable to replace all the
outmoded Judaic studies teachers with their ENH counterparts. There
were hundreds of old-style rabbi-teachers, or semiqualified non-ENH
personnel, who continued to take charge of Jewish education at the AIU.
Though a significant dent had been made in the struggle against educa
tional mediocrity, the task was far from completion and the quality of the
Judaic/Hebrew education as late as 1959-60 was uneven.
W hether or not spoken or modern Hebrew was used extensively
outside the ENH there can be no doubt that ENH graduates taught
Hebrew literature and Israeli songs as late as 1956 and perhaps later,
thus familiarizing Jewish youths at the AIU with aspects of the living
language, as well as laying the groundwork for caliya and integration into
Israeli society. As Sarfatl observed:
The Programs included courses on Jewish tradition and Israeli literature for the
advanced classes, as well as Hebrew language. However, it would be wrong to
think that com plete Hebrew literature courses were taught. On the other hand,
short poems and texts in prose were taught, representing the work of the most
renowned Israeli poets. Israeli songs were an integral part of our Jewish program
at the AIU primary schools. These songs familiarized the youths with aspects of
the contemporary Hebrew language and culture. And 1 think it is accurate to
assert that, the elementary knowledge acquired by our Moroccan students at the
The cAliya from Morocco 165
end of the BEPCS degree level, enabled them to easily manage, once in Israel,
to adjust to spoken Israeli Hebrew.7
E du cation ally, then, the AIU asisted the caliya process. Politically, its
position during the mid-1950s was carefully formulated but nevertheless
quite clear. On the one hand, Cassin held the position that France and,
after 1956, the Moroccans should respect the desire of the Jews to
emigrate. On the other hand, Braunschvig and Tajouri took the position
that aliy a, conducted by Cadima, had to be selective and orderly. Even
if the French intended to impose occasional restrictions on Zionist activ
ity, Moroccan Jewish leaders and Jewish organizations in America had to
avoid attacking the Residency or the French government. Braunschvig
did not think that criticism leveled against the French would necessarily
lift restrictions, or, for that matter, persuade them to increase caliya. The
French, he argued, tolerated Cadima as long as it carried out its pro
grams discreetly.
When Lacoste took initial steps to reduce emigration to seven hundred
per month, Braunschvig, who had known the resident-general, was deeply
concerned that, in view of the nationalist struggle for independence and
the prevalence of general insecurity, caliya might become an early vic
tim. Yet he urged the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs not to pressure
the French by way of American public opinion. He proposed that exten
sive negotiations over this issue be held in the future between the
French and Israeli governments. If additional pressure were to be ap
plied on the French, it would have to be on the initiative of French
Jewry. The French, both Braunschvig and Cassin believed, were ex
tremely sensitive about American pressure and the continued U.S. mili
tary presence in Morocco as factors that might threaten French hege
mony. Besides, since the French subsidized the AIU schools, AIU
representatives in Morocco and France had to be careful not to antago
nize the Residency.8
Tajouri was equally blunt— if not more so. Emigration to Israel, he
said, was a desirable phenomenon. It had to be orderly, with Cadima
making every effort to prevent “la psychose daffolement” (the psychosis
of panic) among the Jews.9 The AIU had indeed adapted to the new post-
1945 political climate in the Jewish world. However, does this mean that
all the Paris leaders or, for that matter, the teachers and school directors
in Morocco supported the Braunschvig-Cassin-Tajouri position? In fact,
166 The cAliya from Morocco
We can and must quite properly discuss with the French government on the
highest level, what their own plans are for the Jews of Morocco. In this respect
the AIU has been the spokesman before government officials and I obtained the
impression reluctantly and sadly that it is more eager to reveal itself as a loyal
and understanding French organization than as an aggressive and militant protec
tor of the Jewish position. The inability of the Jewish population to emigrate
despite lack of economic opportunities in Morocco is something that must be
discussed boldly. There is nothing wrong in an American organization such as
ours in raising the question about emigration opportunities for downtrodden
Jew s.13
This position on the AIU and emigration was not the commonly
accepted policy of the AJDC. During the 1950s, the ties between the
AJDC and the AIU were fortified, if only to collaborate in promoting
educational policies that would prepare Jewish youths for eventual ab
sorption into Israeli society. Even its position on caliya in general was,
after 1949, expressed in moderate tones in order to avoid antagonizing
the French who had unethusiastically permitted the AJDC, an American
organization, to function within the confines of the Protectorate.
Added to its efforts before 1951 to finance the emigration process
conducted by the Mossad Le cAliya and the Jewish Agency, the AJDC
continuously subsidized and promoted Hebrew cultural education and
assisted local Zionists with the obvious goal of preparing the Jews for
caliy a. 14
The position of the AJDC on caliya was strikingly similar to the policies
of the Jewish Agency and the State of Israel. By 1954-55, all agreed that
the economic conditions of the Jews had begun to deteriorate, and, in
the wake of the spreading struggle for independence, the French might
attempt to cement the cracks in the Moroccan edifice by offering eco
nomic and political palliatives detrimental to the status of the Jews. At
the end of May 1955, ten months before Morocco became formally
independent, Moses W. Beckleman and Samuel L. Haber (then AJDC
— Morocco director) shared the position that health and social criteria
should continue to be applied in screening candidates for caliya. This, of
course, did not mean that: (1) in both AJDC and Jewish Agency circles
there was not a definite inclination to increase the yearly quota of emigra
tion while maintaining selectivity; and (2) if and when the Jews might be
in physical danger a rescue operation should be ruled out. As Haber
succinctly put it in 1954:
168 The cAliya from Morocco
We hope we will be allowed a longer period but five years is enough for planning
— a plan which would involve constructive work in the villages so that the young
who, today, cannot be accepted for emigration because of the infirmities or social
conditions of the elders, will be eligible in a few years’ time and will be better
prepared for life in Israel. . . . Israel represents for the vast majority of Moroccan
Jewry, the only haven if the political and economic climate continues to deterio
rate. Under such conditions they will be unable to remain in Morocco, and they
have no other place to go. While time may be running out for Moroccan Jews, it
is reasonable to assume and to hope that we shall not be faced with a rescue or
disaster operation, and that the government of Israel and the Jewish Agency will
have time to plan an orderly evacuation over a reasonable long period of tim e.15
Moshe Sharett, Israel's premier and minister for foreign affairs, he indi
cated that this statement, though obviously not reflecting either Israel or
the Jewish Agency's position, and serving merely as a gimmick for enlist
ing financial support from American Jews, had been widely publicized in
the Moroccan press. It had caused extreme consternation in the Jewish
community and disquiet in French and Muslim circles.19
This did not mean, however, that behind the scenes the W JC was not
reconsidering some of its policies. Following the series of events in which
the nationalists called for returning Muhammad V to the throne from
exile as well as independence, Easterman came to believe that emigra
tion on a larg er scale was inevitable. Comparing the nationalist move
ment in Morocco, the Istiqlàl included, to the secular Neo-Destour
movement in Tunisia, Easterman did not think, given the conservative
nature of Moroccan nationalism, that the Jews, as a large community,
could hope for genuine coexistence with the Muslims.20 Still, he argued
that a reduced Jewish community would always exist there and, there
fore, contacts with the nationalists were essential. Goldmann, too, now
favored increased caliya but, like Easterman, did not think it had to be
accomplished as an evacuation operation. During the August 1955 ses
sion in Jerusalem of the General Council of the World Zionist Organiza
tion, he stated that: “It is perfectly correct that the emigration of North
African Jewry must take place in Israel. But no Zionist program provides
that it must be in 1955!"21
The W JC Moroccan Executive supported the position of the Moroccan
Zionist organization which in 1955 called for an caliya of at least 5,000
persons per month as opposed to the Jewish Agency's quota of approxi
mately 2,000. In this sense, they shared Easterman's position but took it
further. In contrast to their policy of 1953 calling for “quality emigra
tion," they submitted a report on 24 January 1955 to the W JC in Paris
suggesting that: while the possibility that the Petitjean massacre was an
isolated event should not be ruled out, the Jews in the villages of south
ern Morocco were exposed to arbitrary measures adopted by local Mus
lim officials. Although the same was not the case in Casablanca, Marrak
esh, Essaouira, or Fez, since police protection was regularly afforded to
the Jews and European residents, the escalation of violence was bound
to get worse. True, the Jews claimed to be neutral in the Moroccan-
French struggle, but everyone knew that in reality they were pro-French.
Economically, too, the future was not promising. Jewish businessmen
The cAliya from Morocco 171
were being boycotted by Muslims in both small towns and major cities.
Without substantiating its claim, the W JC Moroccan leadership observed
that Muslim merchants and artisans were being encouraged by the na
tionalists to boycott Jewish merchants in order to eliminate “la concur
rence juive” (Jewish competition). Moreover, serious unemployment
prevailed among the Jews: as mentioned earlier, the Americans had
employed many of them in construction, but they no longer needed their
services.22 Hence, in view of the economic and political crises, emigra
tion seemed the most viable alternative.23
The rapid pace of events in Morocco caused further confusion in the
ranks of the W JC. In August 1955, a top-level French-Moroccan confer
ence took place at Aix-les-Bains. It resulted in a compromise providing
for the removal of Sultan Ben cArafa and the formation of a Moroccan
government headed by Si M’Barek Bekkaï, a close confidant of Muham
mad V, a political independent, and the governor of Sefrou. On 16
November 1955, the sultan returned to Morocco from Madagascar, while
further negotiations led, on 3 March 1956, to the abrogation of the
Protectorate Treaty of 1912 and the recognition of Morocco’s indepen
dence. Although the majority of the W JC representatives in North Africa
and Europe supported large-scale caliy a, some, especially younger rep
resentatives in Morocco, now tended to oppose it. This was the case with
Meir Toledano, who ranked among those advocating Jewish integration
and assimilation into the new Morocco.
In September 1955 Toledano published an article in L e M onde, in
which he described the Moroccan nationalist movement as “natural and
irresistible. ” If, he wrote, instead of thwarting a natural and irresistible
movement, France would facilitate the political development of Mo
rocco, the grateful Moroccan people would never be able to contest the
established rights of France in Morocco, the exercise of which was essen
tial to France s role as a great world power. Moroccan Jewry, too, had to
rally behind the idea of a free Morocco.24
What was the actual position of the W JC as an organization on the
eve of independence? The older Moroccan representatives and those
representing the Algiers and European sections, though satisfied that
during the negotiations at Aix-les-Bains Istiqlàli leaders broached the
matter of including a Jewish minister in the first Moroccan cabinet (an
offer made good when Dr. Léon Benzaquen was appointed in 1956 as
minister of posts and telegraphs),25 articulated their arguments through
172 The cAliya from Morocco
support it. More than the W JC and the AJDC, it stressed the need for a
struggle for political rights on the Jews* behalf, since the majority of them
would not settle in Israel for quite some time.
From the outset, the AJC painted a negative portrait of the m akhzan
and the French Protectorate. Shuster and Isenbergh, in fact, grossly
distorted the attitude of the sultan toward his Jewish subjects, although
there were certain elements of truth in their overall assessment. The
sultans of Morocco, they claimed, considered the Jews as guests, individ
uals who, not being nationals of the country, could, however, benefit
from the protection given a guest. Such protection never attained the
level of a right or a legal obligation. It was a favor, a moral obligation,
but not a legal one. Moreover, the Jews were always at the mercy of the
sultan: his whims and will were the only law, and there was no other
legal consideration that would intervene to limit the arbitrariness or
cupidity of the suzerain.29
The French, too, were responsible for the politically unstable position
of the Jews, according to the AJC. The establishment of the French
Protectorate did not bring with it French principles concerning the rights
of man or the French civil code. The rights of the Jews were not men
tioned at all in the Franco-Moroccan Protectorate Treaty of 30 March
1912. Rather, a slow process of social and political evolution had begun
which, in the post-1945 period, was very far from completion. The main
contribution of the French was their guarantee and protection of the
Jews* basic physical security.30
Pointing with great accuracy to the French as the force responsible for
maintaining a policy of “équ ilibré social” (social balance) among both
Muslims and Jews, Shuster and Isenbergh argued that the French had
no intention of undoing the basic legal system prevailing in Morocco
which was based on Quranic interpretations. The French showed defer
ence to the customs, mores, and laws practiced through the centuries by
the Sharifian sultanate. They always emphasized that their aim was to
respect the beliefs and traditions of the indigenous population, whether
they were Muslims or Jews. The French recognized that, for this reason,
Jews could not be chosen to exercise the functions of governors or
administrators within the m akh zan , and owing to the perpetual alle
giance that both Muslims and Jews were required to pledge to the sultan,
the Jews could not acquire French or any other citizenship. Neverthe
less, the French refrained from putting pressure on the Moroccan au-
174 The cAliya from Morocco
The Alliance Israélite is p erson a grata with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is
highly sophisticated and experienced in Moroccan problems. And it maintains
continuous contact in the field. Therefore, our every effort regarding Morocco
should be made in close cooperation with the Alliance. The AJC can contribute
176 The cAliya from Morocco
its international skill, and— in those situations where it is deemed necessary after
due deliberations — its contacts with the U.S. authorities.
We believe it is advisable, therefore, that a committee on Moroccan affairs be
formed in Paris, consisting of the Alliance and ourselves, to serve as a central
planning and coordination board for political action. We feel the Alliance some
times has a tendency to exaggerate French sensitivity regarding Morocco and
thus does not act as often as it should for fear of possible French government
repercussions. Such a committee moreover, should keep close contact with the
efforts of the other Jewish agencies working in Morocco, like the AJDC, because
political, welfare and relief programs interplay so closely in dealing with Moroc
can Jewish affairs.35
cAliya, then, was an issue of secondary importance at best for AJC, the
least salient issue for them of all the organizations active on Moroccan
Jewry's behalf. We have been unable to determine if the AIU and AJC
formed a committee on Moroccan affairs following Shuster s and Isen-
bergh's suggestions. It is known, however, that the AIU and AJC, to
gether with the London-based Anglo-Jewish Association, became part of
the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations (CCJO) which fought
for Jewish rights throughout the world and was represented at the United
Nations as a nongovernmental organization. The AIU also joined with
the W JC in the early or mid-1950s to champion the political rights of
North African Jewry.36
In August 1954, following the Petitjean incident, Shuster met Ya cakov
Tsur at the Israeli Embassy in Paris following conversations he had in
Morocco with the authorities. Tsur reported to Sharett that during their
conversation Shuster seemed convinced that i f Morocco (and Tunisia)
were to obtain independence from France, partially or fully, emigration
might become a suitable option. Yet, as independence was not around
the com er for Morocco, caliya had to be orderly; furthermore, if indepen
dence were granted, the Istiqlàl, sensitive to public opinion in the West,
would not immediately adopt the Arab League s anti-Israel policies in
cluding a ban or restriction on Jewish emigration. The interval of several
years had to be exploited by the Jewish organizations to foster ties with
the nationalists without, of course, the organizations becoming oblivious
to the Jews' best interests.37 By October of that year, the AJC had once
again reverted to its old policy: French colonialism would not endure
much longer, but it would be better to encourage the Jews to remain in
Morocco and to encourage the AIU to teach Arabic, while AJC would be
The cAliya from Morocco 177
During the first half of 1956, it became increasingly evident that the
Cadima operation would have to overcome enormous difficulties in order
to survive. Already, following the August 1955 Aix-les-Bains Conference,
Amos Rabl, who had knowledge about nationalist activities, reported that
the future leaders of Morocco were, in part, young intellectuals who
sought to improve the lot of all Moroccans. Several of them, however,
were pro-Egyptian and encouraged cooperation with the Arab League.
Rabl now seemed less worried about political problems facing the Jews,
a feeling not shared by his other colleagues. He was inclined to believe
that the real issue was not if the nationalists would or would not grant
the Jews equal rights; the issue was that they intended to demand of
them equal dedication to the national interest, a demand most Jews
preferred to ignore. For instance, the proposal, in December 1955, to
create a Moroccan national army caused concern among Jewish youths.
They feared being forced to join it plus the possibility of being sent to
remote parts of Morocco where no one could guarantee their safety
among hundreds or thousands of Moroccan Muslims.39
Regarding caliya, Rabl did not think it was realistic to assume that Si
M’Barek Bekkaï, cAllàl al-Fàsî, or Mehdi Ben Barka, among others,
would continue to tolerate Cadima. The provisional government that was
taking over from the French opposed caliya on the grounds that young
Jews would join the Israel Defense Forces and fight the Egyptians. Only
with American and French diplomatic intervention could caliya con
tinue.40
Indeed, even the moderate Arabic-language organ of the Parti Démo
cratique dTndépendance, al-R a5 y al-cAmm, suggested in an editorial
several days before independence that Rabl be expelled and the Cadima
transit camp shut down:
The people of this institutions and its director should he considered enemies of
Morocco; and it is the duty of Moroccan Jewry to demand energetically the
178 The cAliya from Morocco
closure of this institution and the expulsion of all foreign [emissaries] back to
their country of origin. It is our duty to announce this demand from the columns
of this paper.41
There was also the option to bribe Moroccan officials, including Mu
hammad Laghzaoui, the director-general of national security, and a fer
vent opponent of caliya. N. Ben-Menachem, a representative of the
Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department, believed that Laghzaoui could
be bribed in which case he would influence the Moroccan cabinet to
permit organized emigration to continue. It seems that the governors of
Qasr al-Suq and Midelt were willing to moderate their opposition to
caliya in return for 300,000 francs each, payable by Cadima. Ben-Mena
chem and Cadima s Rabl, Wilner, and Avrahami thought that this oppor
tunity ought not to be missed.45
As we noted, during this period Israel’s Mossad had developed a self-
defense apparatus inside Morocco that had nothing to do with caliya. It
was subordinate to Isser Harel, head of Mossad in Israel, and to a special
operational headquarters for North Africa, situated in Paris and directed
by Shlomo Havilio, a former Israeli army officer. The Mossads operation
for Morocco and the rest of North Africa was called Misgeret (or Frame
work). In light of the problems encountered with the caliya, the Mossad
considered stepping into this domain, too, by laying the foundation for
clandestine emigration. A meeting took place between Isser Harel and
Shragai. In accordance with a secret agreement between them, it was
decided that the Mossad and the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Depart
ment would conduct secret caliya once Cadima could no longer function
inside Morocco. The special caliya apparatus of Misgeret, supplementing
the apparatus dealing with self-defense, was to have three centers: in
Jerusalem, Paris, and Casablanca. The Mossad was entrusted with the
operational aspects of the caliya while the Jewish Agency and its Immi
gration Department were to attend to the political and diplomatic as
pects. That is, as the Mossad attended to organizing emigration, the
Jewish Agency would resort to diverse ways and means of influencing the
Moroccan government to permit freedom of movement.46
Our investigation indicates that the agreement was theoretical in na
ture, for as the Mossad/jewish Agency Immigration Department partner
ship solidified, the defined roles for each organization overlapped. Thus,
the Immigration Department sent emissaries to assist the Misgeret in
caliya whereas the Mossad undertook intricate diplomatic and political
missions to diversify the Jewish Agency’s efforts in influencing Moroccan
policies.
In September 1956 Shragai and Harel agreed that the special appa
180 The cAliyafrom Morocco
ratus would function in the former French and Spanish Zones, in Tan
gier, Gibraltar, and other operational stations. The apparatus would be
responsible for all phases of the secret caliy a, including the transfer of
the emigrants to safe shores such as Marseilles and Naples.47 It appears
that in September 1956 some emigrants had left for Israel via the new
underground apparatus, although the important operations were orga
nized beginning in October that year, with special emissaries represent
ing the different political movements in Israel.
We now return to late spring 1956. During the month of May,48 the
Moroccan authorities announced their intentions to close the Cadima
transit camp. Muhammad Laghzaoui, who either refused to accept bribes
or was not offered any, explained the move as necessary on the basis that:
(1) Cadima was a foreign organization recruiting Moroccan citizens for a
foreign country; (2) Moroccan citizens were thus reinforcing the armed
forces of Israel in the conflict with the Middle Eastern states with whom
Morocco had ties of religion and kinship; (3) Morocco was under pressure
from the Middle Eastern Arab states to prevent this reinforcement; (4)
Morocco could not afford to loose the Jews as an important and skilled
element of its population essential in the economic difficulties which
confronted the new State; (5) having accorded full freedom and equality
to the Jews since March 1956, Morocco expected them to fulfill their
obligations to the State and to assist in its regeneration and upbuilding.49
There were unsuccessful efforts by Baruch Duvdevani, Shragai's dep
uty, to negotiate with the Moroccan authorities— starting in May or June
— the departure of some 60,000 emigrants who could leave immediately.
But he had hoped that, at the very least, the Jews at the Cadima camp
would be allowed to go. Duvdevani was a highly experienced official in
the service of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department. A religious
man, working with Yitshak Raphael, head of the department until 1954,
and with Shragai, Duvdevani devoted an important part of his life to the
North African caliya. He was instrumental in supervising the the emigra
tion agencies in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco during the early and mid-
1950s while heading the Immigration Department's Paris office. It was
partly due to his intercession before Shragai and other Jewish Agency
chiefs, that emigration from Morocco gained strength during the final
two years of French colonial rule.
Whilst in Morocco for the negotiations over the camp, Duvdevani also
The cAliya from Morocco 181
The World Jewish Congress has given the fullest support at its command to the
Moroccan government before and after its establishment. We have the sincerest
intention to continue that support in every way available to us. We are convinced
that this support can be of the greatest assistance to the Moroccan State, and we
would, therefore, address a most earnest appeal decision in respect of Jewish
emigration which might adversely affect our faith, our cordial goodwill, and our
desire to see the progress and consolidation of the Moroccan State as a member
of the United Nations.58
186
The Self-Liquidation Process 187
onstrate complete solidarity with the Muslims. But this appeal made no
impression on many Jews, or caused negative reactions. The latter ex
pressed fear of their future conscription into the army and said that they
did not wish to be obliged one day to fight Israel.2
Various segments of Moroccan Jewry informed the local representa
tives of Jewish organizations that for some time the Muslims would need
them, but as soon as they were able to stand on their feet, they would
dispose of the Jews. Others did not believe they would be granted equal
rights in an independent Morocco. They were inclined to believe in the
sincerity of Muhammad V and several of the political leaders, yet they
feared the hostile attitude of the mass of Muslims: once they had the
upper hand, they would destroy any kind of equality.3
One of the pressing issues in 1956-58 had to do with communal
reforms. The most active proponents of communal discussions and re
forms, as well as social and political integration into Moroccan society,
were young people who intended to neutralize the authority of the old
leadership. In fact, the modernized elite was then divided into three
main schools of thought. The first, influenced by French and European
schooling which in some cases included higher education in France,
emphasized the central importance of European culture in general and
French culture in particular. In general, the members of this group were
not attracted to Zionism, and they eventually settled in France, Canada,
Latin America, and Belgium. The second group included graduates of
the modern schools who, despite the education they received at the AIU,
were influenced by modern secular and religious Zionism. Although
some of its members were physically and culturally remote from the
mellâh, most of them contributed to the emergence of a small but dy
namic Zionist movement in Morocco— alongside the traditional Zionism
of the Jewish masses. Ironically, some of the notable activists within this
elite group never settled in Israel. The third trend, which favored a
Judeo-Muslim entente, emerged during the early and mid-1950s.
The pro -entente Jewish group was by no means homogeneous. It
included radicals with strong leftist tendencies as well as moderate leftists
and conservatives. David Berdugo, for instance, advocated Judeo-Mus
lim integration, with Jews frequenting the same clubs as Muslims and
attending the same schools, in order to bridge the political and intellec
tual gap between the two peoples. Others, though in favor of entente ,
were nevertheless more cautious ragarding a “fusion sacrée” (sacred
188 The Self-Liquidation Process
Settled in our country for more than 2,000 years, we have witnessed great
historical transformations, as did our fathers and ancestors. The Jews, be they of
Berber origin or those who came to [Morocco] in search of refuge, all consider
this country as theirs. There are several strong bonds which attach us to this
land: the mother country, the fertile soil, our families and friends, the climate
and the familiar horizons.4
Bensimhon was convinced that the relations between Jews and Muslims
were bound to improve in the new Morocco where the lines of rap
prochement would be laid on foundations of democracy and freedom.
And he placed great confidence for the realization of this dream in
Muhammad V, saying:
More than the native soil . . . one single sentiment which we cherish in our
hearts is the deep love for Mufiammad V. The Jews of Morocco are eternally
grateful for what their monarch had done for them. Since his ascendance to the
Throne [1927], His Majesty has not for one moment ceased to reveal his paternal
sympathy for us as well as his vigilant protection. At the darkest hours of the
Jewish people when Europe was occupied by the Nazis and France issued its
racial laws at Vichy, it was he and he alone who came to our defense and bravely
resisted the anti-Jewish manifestations in Morocco. Since his return from exile,
Muhammad V had proclaimed total equality between Moroccans, promising the
Jews full liberation from humiliation.5
In other words, while the Jews had to express loyalty to their native soil,
they were nevertheless entitled to a Jewish Vatican, a spiritual center, a
philosophy that had to be inculcated in the minds of the pupils:
An intransigent patriotism and full loyalty toward Morocco does not exclude
faithfulness toward the Holy Land. If we are separated from Israel by citizenship,
Moroccan Jewry is united with world Jewry by a common religious doctrine. Yes,
we are Moroccans, but we are also Jewish. This is something our Muslim com
patriots understand full well. When we speak of integration, this word is à la
mode. . . . In the Larousse dictionary the word in téger signifies to enter into a
whole. If one defines the word as integrating the Jews into a nation, have them
participate in all aspects of national life, and respecting their spiritual values,
then we are wholeheartedly for such an integration. On the other hand, if one
defines integration as the disaggregation of our communities, the scuttling of our
cultural and social institutions, the abandonment of our identity and tradition,
then the answer is no. No one can ask us to relinquish our identity. We believe
in assimilation into the new Morocco but an assimilation with dignity and honor.7
Bensimhon, then, was representing the new thinking of the new elite.
If the Muslim nationalists expected straight answers from the Jews con
cerning loyalty and patriotism, the Jews, too, needed assurances. The
above statement contained an implicit warning: the Muslims would have
to tolerate Jewish sympathies toward Israel, and Jewish institutions must
not be tampered with as part of the price of the Judeo-Muslim entente.
Other prominent supporters of entente included Marc Sabbah, Albert
Aflalo, Armand Asoulin, Meyer cOvadia, and David Azoulay. These and
other radical proponents of integration were active in the Istiqlàl party
and, together with several Muslim colleagues, founded a pro-entente
movement within Istiqlàl known as al-Wifâq (Unity) in January 1956. Al-
Wifaqrs opponents described the society and its most prominent leader,
Marc Sabbah, as exclusivist and having been cut off from the mellâh for
years. Sabbah in fact was portrayed as a slavish acolyte of Mehdi Ben
Barka, the noted leader of Istiqlàl.
Sabbah and the vocal integrationists were extremely critical of the
CCIM , as well as of the separate community council leadership of urban
Morocco. In a major editorial in the French-language organ of Istiqlàl,
al-Istiqlàl, edited by Ben-Barka, Sabbah openly attacked the Jewish
leadership. There was a Jewish mass, he claimed, restless, bewildered,
and misinformed about its own problems because those who retained the
name and privilege of leaders were courageous only when their old
190 The Self-Liquidation Process
Indeed, during the mid- and late 1950s, leaders sharing Sabbah s
political orientation did emerge within the community councils, although
in the course of the time they either moderated their stance (Sabbah in
fact changed some of his views as early as 1957 or 1958 in the wake of
emigration restrictions imposed by the authorities on the Jews) and
remained in positions of authority, or more moderate elements prevailed
(as with the effective emergence of David cAmar). Still, as early as 1956,
even among the integrationists and superpatriots, there was increasing
fear of certain dynamic Istiqlàl political leaders. Whereas Ben-Barka and
Abd al-Rahlm Bü cabîd were acceptable to the integrationists, the latter
were increasingly fearful of cAlàl al-FâsI, the conservative leader of the
Istiqlàl who had strong orthodox Islamic leanings. Abraham Laredo, who
succeeded Jo Hasan as Tangier’s community leader and was active in al-
W ifâq, thought that the future of the Jews in Morocco was uncertain and
intricately bound up with events in the Middle East, particularly follow
ing the October 1956 Suez/Sinai war. Laredo was essentially worried
about al-Fàsï, who had a large following and might ascend to power. Al-
Fàsï, Laredo indicated, was deeply identified with Cairo and Nasser to
whom he felt gratitude for assistance rendered to the Moroccans during
their struggle for independence. In Laredo’s opinion, if al-Fàsî became
premier, the Jews would be in danger.11
In 1958, Arnold Mandel interviewed al-Fàsî concerning the future of
Moroccan Jews. Al-Fàsî optimistically claimed that the Jews welcomed
Arabization and that the artificial separation which had developed be
tween Muslims and Jews during the Protectorate period was giving way
to a healthy symbiosis. However, whereas in the past colonialism consti
tuted an obstacle to this symbiosis, Zionism was the major problem in
independent Morocco. The Zionists, al-Fàsï contended, were recruiting
citizens of one state in favor of another. The Jews had to remain Moroc
cans and thus Zionist influences had to be suppressed. He observed:
very important role they have played in our history. Are we, then, anti-Muslim
because we do not authorize the existence of “Muslim brotherhoods ? In this
sense we are as . . . “anti-Jewish” as we are “anti-Muslim.” 12
Until now it was forbidden for Jews to emigrate to Palestine and return to
Morocco [afterwards] (Order #424/27/9/1956). The Moroccan government de
cided recently not to discriminate between Jews and Muslims in the issuance of
passports, whereby it is the right of every citizen to move freely at his will inside
and outside the country and to obtain passports and identification cards for this
purpose every time he asks for it. . . .
This decision does not suggest that Zionism would be allowed to resume its
activity and to enhance [political] propaganda in Jewish circles. Quite to the
contrary. It is imperative to expose the leaders of the Zionist movement in every
situation in which its activity harms the interest of the State and to bring them to
justice. . . . But it should be permitted to [all] other [Jews] to move freely inside
and outside Morocco.16
ports has been made. Most of these people are afraid to ask for passports,
or are discouraged by the local officials who are turning them away. They
are afraid to appear for a second or a third tim e / 18
What made matters worse were efforts by the emigration officials to
find inconsistencies between the story of the travel plans related to them
by the passport applicant and the information that family and relatives
might provide. The applicants usually said that their destination was
Europe or Algeria— for business purposes or other necessities. By com
ing to the applicants' homes and conducting an investigation the authori
ties hoped to prove that Israel was the final destination.19
needs and rights. He reported that Ahmad Hamiani, the political director
of the Ministry of the Interior, had received a Jewish delegation repre
senting the CCIM . The latter protested in the strongest terms against
the anti-Jewish discrimination in issuing passports, as a violation of the
king s and the government s repeated declarations that the Jews were
equal citizens, and as a breach of the United Nations-sponsored Univer
sal Declaration of Human Rights. The delegation requested the immedi
ate removal of the ban, stating that they were not concerned with emigra
tion to Israel as such, but with the democratic right of freedom of
emigration.21
According to Easterman, Hamiani stated that the minister of the
interior had issued a directive to all local authorities instructing them not
to grant passports to Jews traveling or intending to travel to Israel, and
to refuse readmission to Morocco to Jews who had been to Israel. Hami
ani, moreover, told the delegation that Morocco would not allow Moroc
cans to be exploited by Israel against the Middle Eastern Arab states and
implied that the Moroccan government preferred 250,000 Jews inside
Morocco to seventy million Muslims breathing down its neck over liberal
emigration policies.22
The Jewish delegation reacted to this statement, by declaring that
they would not accept this position. The CCIM, it was said, would take,
officially, strong public action in defense of the Jews' liberties. There
upon, Hamiani sought to mollify the delegation and promised to com
municate their views to the minister of the interior.23
Easterman was delighted by the vigor demonstrated by the delega
tion. In his judgment, this marked a new and highly encouraging turn of
events, not merely in reference to emigration, but also in respect of
general Jewish affairs. The W JC's major difficulty hitherto, Easterman
added, had been the reluctance and timidity of the leading Moroccan
Jews and their organizations to assist by approaching the authorities.24
However, this bold stance and the W JC ’s initiative to convince the
authorities to relax emigration restrictions bore no fruit.25 As these re
strictions were tightened, the W JC, and the Jewish Agency intensified
their contacts with the Moroccans to revive the emigration.26 But after a
long conversation in Morocco between Easterman, Bü cabïd, and Lagh
zaoui (April 1959), Easterman was totally discouraged. He had proposed
to them a plan whereby Jewish application for passports would go through
the local Jewish community councils first and the councils would then
196 The Self-Liquidation Process
the whole atmosphere has deteriorated and Morocco is more under the pressure
of the Arab League. The Arabs’ pressure on the Romanian caliya is, I imagine,
another factor against us. Bü cabïd also referred to the fact that the [new] Ibrahim
government has to face "‘other opposition,” obviously referring to the cAlal al-Fàsï
group of the Istiqlàl and others, and that the government are not likely to give
them the weapon of Jewish emigration with which to attack them.28
depression in the spirit of the Jews. First, they feared that the recently
formed Syrian-Egyptian Union (United Arab Republic) and Morocco’s
support for Nasser s Arab unity schemes would undermine their position.
Second, the Moroccan government under cAbd >Allah Ibrâhîm an
nounced economic policies involving state direction, thus implying even
greater economic controls. Third, the hardening of government measures
restricting emigration included the establishment in 1959 of a special
section of the police to deal with this matter. There were increased
numbers of Jews arrested on mere suspicion of desiring to emigrate.
Fourth, tensions and indecision resulted from the fact that all organiza
tions, Jewish and non-Jewish, had to register their statutes, with some
groups not being accepted and others finding their statutes in doubt as
late as Decem ber 1959. The W JC sections and the United HLAS Service
offices in Morocco (which had been active in the country for some time)
were forced to close down their operations. Finally, anti-Zionist expres
sion was intensified by the political parties as well as the press. Less of a
sharp distinction was made between Zionism and local Jews than previ
ously. One governmental measure was cutting off postal relations with
Israel.30
In 1959 came another political turning point, of which Jewish com
munity leaders and the AJC were aware. During the premiership of cAbd
’Allah Ibrâhîm, a split occurred within the Istiqlàl. The leftists seceded,
led by Mehdi Ben Barka, supported by Bü cabîd and Ibrâhîm. Ben Barka
then founded the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). He
enlisted, temporarily at least, the support of the Union Marocaine de
Travail (UMT), the leftist labor union. There were now two major politi
cal blocs in the country: the conservative Istiqlàl led by cAlàl al-Fàsï and
the UNFP led by Ben Barka. Challenging the Istiqlàl newspapers, the
UNFP activists published al-T ah tir (Liberation). The UNFP launched
attacks against the Palace and against the Istiqlàl, backed, though not
blindly, by the UMT. At the end of 1959, the editors of al-T ahrir were
arrested on suspicion of plotting to assassinate the crown prince, Hasan
II. The paper was temporarily suspended. Early in 1963, Ben Barka,
known for lack of enthusiasm for the monarchy, left Morocco. Two years
later he was apparently assassinated in France by envoys of the mon
archy.
In these tumultuous times, the Jews had little to gain from the split in
the Istiqlàl, from the Palace-UNFP tensions, or from King Muhammad
198 The Self-Liquidation Process
under Ibrâhîm. They, like Muslim businessmen, felt that any declaration
of assets outside Morocco (as required in order to register to vote) would
mean, in the future, loss of control of those assets to the Moroccan
government and possibly the loss of the assets themselves. Whether to
accept this possibility and register, or attempt to hide the assets and have
the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, was their dilemma. As
the AJC report indicated, many of the Jews quietly sought arrangements
to move to France or Spain or, when possible, to other countries. Other
businessmen imagined that they would have to become employees of the
state or simply lose their businesses should the government take over
certain economic activities. Hence, they too were discouraged and wanted
to leave.33
At the lower economic levels, the policy of the government was felt
through the placement service. Jews said they were being discriminated
through the placement service, although that was difficult to prove. What
happened was that a Jewish mechanic or electrician who wanted employ
ment registered for a position. His name was placed on the placement
bureau’s lists. When a position did become available (unemployment was
a serious problem during the late 1950s), the Jew found literally hundreds
of Muslims ahead of him on the waiting lists. It was also quite logical that
there would be scores of Muslim applicants for every Jewish applicant,
given the population ratio. Hence the position of the Jew seemed bad.
Curiously, employers tended to favor Jewish employees because they
were better workers. On numerous occasions the employers notified
particular Jewish mechanics that a job was available and asked for them,
but were sent Muslims by the placement bureau instead.34
It was rumored that Muslims were favored over Jews in government
administration. Certainly the Jews believed this, and they complained
about cases of Jews having been passed over for promotion or for hiring,
even though more qualified than Muslims. On the other hand, Jews
themselves indicated how difficult it was to make a case in this regard,
for thanks to their education, they were well represented in certain
branches of the administration— such as the postal service and banking.
In several regions postal activities stopped on Yom Kippur. There were
cases where government posts were offered to Jews who turned them
down because of low salaries.35
When the AJC delegation met with the American ambassador at
Rabat, to discuss the issue of Jewish organizations such as the W JC and
200 The Self-Liquidation Process
A logical and mentally perceptive person must quickly conclude that we repre
sent an anomaly in a nationalist state. Because [Ben Barka] is a progressive man
the religious argument [that without the AIU in Morocco Jewish education would
be neglected] will have less of an influence on him. Yet no one can predict if this
government will be stable.38
Fears turned into reality in October 1960, when the authorities na
tionalized one-third of the AIU schools. The remaining two-thirds func
tioned under the aegis of the AIU delegation in Casablanca. Referred to
from 1961 as the Ittihàd schools, the AIU in Morocco could be adminis
tered only by local Jews, even though the schools continued to be part of
the French AIU world school network.39
Though no longer a cabinet member in 1959, Dr. Léon Benzaquen
appeared to be as concerned as Braunschvig with the shaping of events.
Having returned to communal service, he observed that 95 percent of
Jewish youths were attending school at the time while scarcely 10 per
cent of Muslim youths did so. Ninety percent of Jewish youths received
medical care (through OSE-Maroc or other sources) against 10 percent of
their Muslim counterparts. Any Jewish child was able to attend the ORT
The Self-Liquidation Process 201
the Jewish candidate of the Istiqlàl, Meir cOvadia, the president of the
Casablanca community.45 Yet this achievement was of little significance
for the overwhelming majority of the Jews.
Six days prior to the local elections, King Muhammad V formed a new
government which he led personally and in which Hasan, the crown
prince, was vested with real authority. Most Jews welcomed the new
government, but the Jewish community as a whole remained vulnerable
to the whims of its anti-Zionism.
In agreement with the W JC and the Jewish Agency, Easterman went
to Rabat in August 1960 to discuss with the new government the poten
tial for liberalizing Jewish emigration. In July when the Easterman visit
was being planned, Shragai requested that Easterman speak with Si
M’barek Bekkaï, then minister of the interior, and with Crown Prince
Hasan. He indicated that there was no need to go into intricate details
but that Easterman should clearly state that, since Morocco had become
independent, Jews had not been allowed to emigrate to Israel in spite of
the promises and statements which Morocco had made.46
The meeting between flasan and Easterman was held on 11 August.
Hasan was deeply serious in insisting on secrecy. This is attested by the
fact that the meeting took place late at night, outside Rabat, in the
private residence of one of his closest friends. Hasan s friendly manner
encouraged Easterman to be open with him. He spoke to him about the
W JC ’s disappointment regarding emigration, the general state of disquiet
in the Moroccan Jewish community, and the position of the W JC in
Morocco whose sections had been closed down the year before. Easter
man did not raise the question of Israel as such, nor did he feel in a
position to refer specifically to the embargo on postal relations with
Israel, though he did comment, in general terms, and as a human prob
lem, on the restrictions on communication between Moroccan Jews and
their relatives and friends in Israel: portraying them as part of the tragedy
of separated families.47
Hasan did not provide Easterman with any concrete answers, but only
the promise of future contact and discussion of these problems. Never
theless, he suggested that during his projected visit to the United States
to lead the Moroccoan delegation at the UN, it would be unwise to upset
him by any hostile Jewish demonstration or by pressure on the part of
American Jewish organizations.48
Easterman later observed that he was well aware of the unreliability
The Self-Liquidation Process 203
A 2,000-year hope pushes Jews to leave by every means and by all roads leading
to Zion and Jerusalem.
We are not alone. All the communities of Israel and the world weep for the dead
and struggle for our rights and our liberties. . . . Do not lose courage. Remain
strong and steadfast! The struggle for our rights and liberties continues!
The tract led to a public outcry, and arrests soon followed, mainly in
Fez, but also in Meknès, Sefrou, Tangier, and Casablanca— the major
Jewish centers. We do not know how widespread these arrests were, yet
it is certain that among those detained were people suspected of dissem
inating the tract. The reaction among Jews to the publication was mixed.
There were those who were impressed by it. However, the suspicious
ness of a community that lived in fear led some to question its authentic
ity. Many argued that it was the work of provocateurs, that it could not
have been done by Jews. Some believed it must have been the work of
the French Deuxième Bureau psychological warfare unit, for reasons of
its own. Some claimed it had been encouraged by the adherents of the
UNFP, the opposition party, which sought to provoke the Muhammad
V/Hasan government and, thus, unfavorable press reaction in the outside
world against the regime.51
Jewish community leaders were placed in a most embarrassing and
difficult position. The CCIM held a special meeting on 12 February and
issued a communiqué denouncing “the diffusion of tracts of unknown
origin whose purpose is to divide and sow discord among Muslim and
Jewish populations.” Yet the CCIM also seized the occasion to denounce
206 The Self-Liquidation Process
the p ersisten ce of a press cam paign hostile to the Jewish population and
expressed “the will o f M oroccan Jew ry to continue to work for acco m
plishing the task of recon struction of the c o u n try .” 52
Distribution o f the tract also gave rise to dangers. T he day after its
distribution th ere was one rep ort that Muslims in M arrakesh had d ecided
to d escend upon the m e ll â h , out of anger at this provocation. In C asa
blanca, Jewish com m unity leaders w ere w orried enough to have five cars
touring the Muslim district for a day or two to see w h eth er the Muslims
would react violently. O ne person associated with the U N F P asserted
that Muslims had co m e to that party's headquarters to ask what action
should be taken against this Jew ish provocation, and had had to be
assuaged and calm ed. In the Istiqlàl, th ere was a feeling that action
should be taken against Jew s and, still according to this sam e source,
th ese advocates of physical action w ere calm ed down only by the top
party leaders. In the M oroccan situation, th erefore, the tract was a
dangerous weapon to u se .53
Am ong those who co rrectly attributed the tract to Zionist groups th ere
w ere also unfavorable reactions. T he basic criticism was twofold: that it
was dangerous and, even m ore, unnecessary. F o r n ever had Jewish
The Self-Liquidation Process 207
with a description of some of the difficulties that had been met in this
regard. The delegation was careful to include the terms of the state
ment made by Bekkaï, in order to get them on record;
3. A request that action be taken to stop the forcible abduction and
conversion of Jewish girls to Islam;
4. A request that the Jewish communities and the CCIM be given a
new, fully legal status, suitable to independent Morocco.57
One of the means of persecuting the Jews is the highway police. There is a special
police force that patrols the roads. If they find Jews traveling on a bus, they force
210 The Self-Liquidation Process
them off and send them home. If they find a Jewish family on the road, this is a
sign that they are on their way to a departure point. There is no protection for
these Jews. . . . Our units from Casablanca move out [to the homes] at two
o'clock in the morning, enter the houses, and immediately leave. The whole
procedure— beginning with registering candidates, getting them in shape, set
ting a date, delivering a passport, transporting them suddenly, because they are
to come at the last moment— is carried out in strict conspiratorial fashion.
Afterwards, there is a problem of coordinating the means of departure. Both
problems are as one— taking people out of the cities: from Casablanca, Meknès,
or Fez, and bringing them to a certain destination point at the very moment that
a ship or fishing boat is to arrive. This is an involved and very complicated
activity. Very many have been arrested.63
At first we looked for the easier routes. The land route was less dangerous, not
from the Moroccan vantage point, but from the standpoint of risk to life. We
exhausted almost every possibility. We transported many thousands of Jews over
the land route with counterfeit passports. They understood our evasions, issued
additional decrees, cancelled exit permits, and placed army guard units on the
land routes. I would like you to know that once Tangier was annexed to the
Moroccan state [in October 1956] . . . there was almost no land border left that
we could cross. On the south was the desert. It was impossible to get from there
to anywhere. The Spanish enclaves were left. But they were small enclaves with
short borders. These borders were closed by the army. Everything was directed
against our activity. What was left was mainly maritime action which was divided
into two: one was taking Jews out over the Moroccan border and bringing them
over to Gibraltar, that is, crossing the Mediterranean; the second way was
smuggling them out in fishing boats and smugglers' boats from the Moroccan
coast near an enclave or on the sea.64
Harel revealed that the Spaniards at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla (annexed by Spain from Morocco in the sixteenth century) were
very helpful, particularly the Catholic religious functionaries, but also
the political and administrative authorities. When asked at the session by
Moshe Sharett if this was done with the knowledge of the Spanish
government, Harel responded that this was definitely the case, even
The Self-Liquidation Process 211
which, for it, was becoming secondary in comparison with the many
other difficult, fundamental problems facing it. This was definitely a
consideration following the sudden death of Muhammad V on 26 Febru
ary 1961; and the emergence of Hasan II as his successor. The latter felt
he had much to gain by the departure of the discontented elements.
Those people who did not consider themselves at home in Morocco, and
hence were a source of friction, had to leave.68 Further, with the collapse
of the Syrian-Egyptian Union in September 1961, the new king exploited
Arab disunity and Nassers decline in prestige, to let the Jews leave
without facing Arab disapprobation.
However, letting the Jews go, in line with the late Muhammad V’s
promise to the Jewish delegation, was hardly a simple matter. The
process of organizing emigration required political negotiations. An
agreement to this effect was reached in the latter half of 1961, worked
out between the Palace, Alex Gatmon (the M ossads man in Morocco),
and the United HIAS Service. Working under the cover of the United
HIAS Service, from November 1961 Israel was able to organize large-
scale and tolerated caliya via Europe. This process, mainly between 1961
and 1964, was known as ‘‘Operation Yakhin,” named for one of the two
pillars in the Tem ple.69 The nature of the negotiations and the magnitude
of this operation are analyzed in the next chapter dealing with the caliya
and self-defense underground.
35,000. Mustafa cAlawï, the editor of Akhbàr al-Dunyâ, had edited al-
Fajr until it closed down in the first half of 1961.
In line with the attacks on Zionism, on 30 August 1961, an editorial in
al-cAlam focused criticism on three Jewish leaders: Marc Sabbah, David
Azoulay, and David cAmar. The paper castigated them for having at
tended the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations and meeting of the W JC
in Geneva on 2 0 -2 3 August. This meeting, stated al-cAlam, did not limit
its program merely to the study of the social conditions of Jews around
the world; but under the chairmanship of that “avowed Zionist,” Dr.
Nahum Goldmann, delegates and guests were urged to support Israel
and defend its existence against external and internal dangers. By their
very presence at the meeting, Sabbah, Azoulay, and cAmar had mani
fested support for the W JC program for Israel. And, since Morocco did
not recognize the existence of Israel and the W JC meeting was Zionist-
inspired, sanctions had to be imposed on those who turned against state
policy, which was to uphold political and moral obligations toward the
Arab world and specifically Palestine: “soil usurped by the Zionists.” The
editorial added that the Jews had placed a barrier between themselves
and all other Moroccans through Zionism, and that, furthermore, they
were guilty of making no sacrifices since 1956 for the sake of Moroccan
growth and development.70
Al-Tahrir made similar observations regarding Sabbah, Azoulay, and
cAmar in connection with the W JC meeting. It suggested that, with few
exceptions, the Jews of Morocco had not tried to integrate into the
Muslim majority. In view of the emigration to Israel, it was clear that
Zionism in Morocco was active and well financed— even though Morocco
was a prominent member of the Arab League. The Jews could not be
citizens of two countries at the same time, particularly when Morocco
considered the foreign policy of Israel to be in total contradiction to its
own. It was thus essential for the Moroccan authorities to observe closely
activities undertaken by Jewish communal leaders.71
The Moroccan Communist party organ stated that it was pointless to
debate whether Jews attended as delegates or observers. The mere fact
that they attended a pro-Zionist meeting was bad enough. The editorial
attributed the creation of Israel to the W JC, and accused the organization
of supporting the combined Israeli, British, and French attack on Egypt
in October and November 1956.72
The press campaign against the W JC and Moroccan Jewish leaders
214 The Self-Liquidation Process
placed Sabbah and Azoulay on the defensive. Upon their return from
Geneva, they responded to the accusations in a letter to al-cAlam, em
phasizing that they had participated in the meeting as observers only;
that David cAmar had not attended the meeting, contrary to press re
ports; and that their presence in Geneva was vital, for they had worked
hard to ensure that only accurate information about the political system,
policies, and developments within the Jewish communities of Morocco
was disseminated. Sabbah and Azoulay also wrote that during their meet
ings with delegates from twenty-six nations, they had corrected miscon
ceptions about Moroccan Jewry and supported the progressive regime of
the “beloved” King Hasan I I.73 More significantly, Sabbah and Azoulay
argued that the Jews of Morocco could not remain indifferent and abstain
from meetings organized by international Jewish organizations. No na
tion, regardless of its regime, could compel the Jews to remain closed
within its physical borders, and deprive them of spiritual and cultural
contacts with their brethren.74
Al-cAlam responded swiftly in an editorial stressing the inevitability of
Jews manifesting solidarity with their coreligionists. It was nevertheless
irksome that Sabbah and Azoulay had participated in a meeting at which
Dr. Goldmann had declared that Moroccan Jews were facing difficult
times and the violation of their human rights. Why, moreover, had the
meeting not adopted a single motion on behalf of the struggle of the
Algerian people for independence? Why had it remained silent about
North African interests in general? Indeed, apart from Sabbah and Azou
lay, Joseph Bitton and Jacques Lazarus of the Algerian Jewish community
were also present at Geneva.75 However the bitterest pill for Sabbah and
Azoulay, both formerly zealous supporters of al-W ifâq, was the following
statement:
When we review the names of those thrown into jails [during the Protectorate
era], the heroes of Morocco’s struggle for independence . . . we cannot find a
single Jewish name. Even though seven years have passed since the inception of
the Algerian Revolution . . . the World Jewish Congress did not publish a single
motion revealing sympathy [for that struggle]. On the contrary President Gold
mann declared that certain Algerian Jews sought to preserve their French citizen
ship, and this at a time when the FLN had declared that the Jews were members
of the Algerian nation.76
Numerous leaflets [they wrote] have been distributed whose language contains
an all-out attack on Morocco. The purpose of this provocation is to increase the
restlessness caused by the activity of the clandestine Zionist organizations and
then heightened by the racist offensive recently undertaken by newspapers like
al-F ajr and the reckless actions of the police against Moroccan Jews. Therefore,
we the undersigned Jews, who are completely aware of our duty to serve the
supreme interests of Morocco . . . » hereby denounce Zionist propaganda, which
is an instrument in the hands of colonialism and separatism used against the
people of Morocco. We protest against the policies of the Zionist troublemakers,
who exploit the emotions of Moroccan Jews and their wish for a happy and secure
life, and who incite them to emigrate to Israel. We, Muslims and Jews, must
unite in our common effort to create the proper conditions for a happy life, to
ensure our democratic institutions, prosperity and security for all citizens. Inas
much as our first and foremost concern is to defend Morocco against slander, we
denounce the full-scale campaign launched by colonialists against Morocco, for
216 The Self-Liquidation Process
The position taken here certainly did not reflect the feelings of the
majority of the Jews, including the integrationists. In addition, it is clear
that in disassociating themselves from Zionism, Moroccan intellectuals
were also motivated by a desire to protect their own interests and privi
leged social status. They undoubtedly felt that large-scale Jewish emigra
tion would render them even more vulnerable and powerless than they
had already become.
In addition to attacking the attitudes and activities of Moroccan Jews,
the Moroccan press was hostile toward Israel and its officials. In Septem
ber 1961, for instance, al-cAlam reported that the Israeli consul to Gi
braltar had visited northern Morocco (Tétuan, Larache, Nador) to trans
mit information and instructions to the leaders of the Zionist network.80
The role of Israel in promoting clandestine operations inside Morocco
was thus an open and, in the opinion of al-cA lam t an irritating page.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Pisces affair, Israeli Foreign Minister
Meir had publicly denounced the Moroccan government for curbing
Jewish freedoms and held it responsible for the tragedy. On 19 January
1961, Meir declared in the Knesset that “the Jews are driven into the
corner of despair, given the discriminatory atmosphere and persecution
which presently reigns in Morocco/ 81
The Moroccan press counterattacked. A l-Fajr accused Meir of making
slanderous comments and misrepresenting the facts, and it denied her
claims that Jews were exposed to constant terror, detentions, and the
nationalization of their schools. It even suggested that Moroccan Jews
lived in a healthier atmosphere in Morocco than did their counterparts
who emigrated and settled in Israel.82
During the second half of 1961, when rumors spread that the authori
ties would consider easing emigration restrictions, the UNFP s al-T ahrir
was as critical of such changes as the rest of the radical press, if not more
so. The UNFP (unlike the Istiqlàl) did not participate in the government
formed by Hasan during the summer of 1961 (just as it had not joined
the Muhammad V/Hasan government in May of 1960). It used its press
The Self-Liquidation Process 217
organ and the emigration question to discredit the new regime and its
supporters. In a major editorial on 16 December 1961, al-T ahrir re
proached the government for authorizing emigration to Israel, and pointed
to stories revealing a large exodus by ships and planes. In Casablanca,
Meknès, Essaouira, and El-Jadida (Mazagan), Jews were selling their
belongings and planning their exit to Israel, a development that would
inevitably reinforce the Zionist state and further weaken the position of
the Palestinian Arabs. The editorial wondered:
Has the Moroccan government modified its position with respect to Palestinian
refugees? What must one conclude when seeking the government’s attitude
toward authorizing the Jews to leave Morocco to go to a country considered as
the enemy of the Arabs and Arabism? The government’s attitude can only be
considered as treason by the popular masses. . . . One wonders whether the
Moroccan government is not being forced by pressure from a foreign state whose
interest it would be to see Morocco s doors open wide to let Zionist aims be
achieved.83
On 20 Decem ber 1961, al-T ah rir once again attacked the government.
Emigration, it declared, had become a mass exodus, and was being
approved by the authorities. How, the paper asked, were the Jews from
humble socioeconomic strata able to leave, and who was financing their
passage? Only a powerful, well-organized Zionist organization within
Morocco could have been responsible for this.84
Chapter 7
218
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin ’ 219
As we have seen before, the Misgeret dealt with self-defense and the
execution of caliya, whereas the Jewish Agency as well as the W JC
handled the diplomatic tasks. With time passing, Jewish Agency emigra
tion envoys entered the scene to assist the Mossad-recruited elements,
just as, in 1961, Gatmon of the Mossad assisted the Jewish Agency in the
diplomatic arena.
Structurally and hierarchically, the Misgeret in Morocco consisted of
five forces: Lav? (or Gonen), in charge of self-defense training and oper
ations within the communities; Makhela (Choir), conducting the caliya;
Ballet, or the Zionist youth movements operating clandestinely, unified
under a single command; Modi cïn, intelligence gathering; and cOref
Tsibüri— the nonoperational force. Each of the five forces was directed
by Israeli coordinators (rakazim) and deputy-coordinators, also Israelis.
Supplementing the command of coordinators the Lav? force, at least,
was subordinate to Israeli regional commanders (mefakdim or mefakdê
snïftm). The main regional branches were Tangier, Casablanca, Fez/
Meknès, Oudjda, Marrakesh, and Essaouira.1 Casablanca emerged as the
center of the Misgeret and had the largest reservoir of activists and
emissaries. The Lav? and Makhela in the various regions were divided
into secret cells and units of local activists, whereby one cell functioned
independently of the other. The cells were overwhelmingly dominated
by Moroccan Jews, usually young men and women aged eighteen and
older, many of whom were former youth movement activists. Quite
frequently, these activists were dispatched by the Misgeret from their
native cities and communities to other communities in order to plant
them in places where their identity would be less well known. Members
of one cell knew each other but, theoretically at least, did not know the
members of other cells. The Israeli coordinators and regional com
manders were determined to prevent arrests and thus the concept of the
autonomous cell (ta? memüdar in Hebrew) became an essential compo
nent of underground life. These cells were led by Moroccan Jewish
mefakdim and madrihim (assistants). Only they had links with Israeli
emissaries and they knew each other. At the very top of the hierarchy
were the heads of the Misgeret (mefakdê ha-Misgeret) who took charge
of the whole operation and were accountable only to Havilio and Ronel.2
Most of the main Israeli emissaries were high-ranking officers in the
Israel Defense Forces, Israel Military Intelligence (Aman)y Israel’s Se
curity Services (Shabak), or members of kibbutzim and moshavim.
220 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
The Israelis usually stood behind a dark curtain when they swore in
new recruits. It is noteworthy that the Moroccan Jewish activists did not
know that the Mossad organized the underground. All they knew, ac
cording to Havilio, is that the Misgeret, and possibly the Jewish Agency,
guided them. After all, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Jewish
Agency’s DMO attempted to organize similar activities.3
The most promising and talented young persons recruited into the
Misgeret received initial self-defense training in Morocco, including rifle/
pistol range practice, and were then dispatched to Europe or even Israel
(into army camps) for advanced training. Unlike the previous under
ground procedures, the training and operations were now quasi-military
in character, with different ranks of commanders given to the local
activists. The formation of top cadres of Moroccan Jews in Europe was
not necessarily inferior to the training in Israel. The trainers in the latter
were usually Israeli officers sent to complete their education in European
universities upon their discharge or retirement from the Israel Defense
Forces.4
The courses and field training in Europe and Israel comprised subjects
like topography, photography, the use of wireless radios, Zionist/Israeli
history, hand-to-hand combat, and handling grenades, submachine guns,
rifles, and pistols. Field trips in Israel were organized for the trainees in
order to strengthen their admiration for the country and to instill in them
Zionist convictions. The more determined these young would-be mefak
dim were about assisting Israel, the better they would function in the
underground upon their return to Morocco.5
Looking into the operations of the Lav?, when Isser Harel visited
Morocco in 1958 he found self-defense regional branches in Casablanca,
Rabat, Tangier, Meknès, Fez, Marrakesh, Essaouira, and Agadir. Not
only were effective caches established by the activists, but these were
well stocked with weapons and explosives. The weapons were smuggled
to Morocco by the Mossad in hollow toys and other devices. Numerous
new recruits joined the Lav? by 1958. O f the 1,200 self-defense activists
throughout North Africa, 600 operated in Morocco; of these, 470 men
and women received training outside Morocco.6
Despite the well-organized work of Lav? in Morocco, the self-defense
apparatus there was not as active as in Algeria where an eight-year-old
struggle for independence against the French had claimed the lives of
many Jews. In fact, it was inactive much of the time since 1959, and
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin” 221
We took the weapons out of the caches: pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades.
. . . With [Menachem] Rak-cOz’s [one of M isgeret's commanders] instructions we
prepared several “Molotov” cocktails. We patrolled the m ellàh s streets using the
M isgeret's vehicles. To our great relief, nothing occurred. Had the Algerians
attempted to harass Jews we would have been able, through rapid recruitment
[of more reservists] to repulse them.8
LavP was once again placed on alert— even considering the possibility of
assassinating Nasser.
Prior to Nasser s arrival in Casablanca, for security precautions, King
Muhammad V decided to provide the Egyptian leader with an elegant
villa outside the city at a remote yet well-guarded beach. The other Third
World dignitaries were to be accommodated in the city s finest hotels.
To have the villa appear presidential, the municipal authorities of Casa
blanca were instructed to renovate it. In charge of this task was Shim con
Keren (“Arsin''), a Jew, who served as the director of the municipality's
maintenance department. Curiously, Keren was affiliated with the Mis
geret. He proposed a plan whereby Nasser's bedroom or several of the
villa's flowerpots would be booby-trapped. The plan was submitted to
the M isgeret and rejected by the M ossad in Israel. It was argued that
Nasser's assassination could imperil the security of Moroccan Jewry, a
heavy price that Israel was unwilling to pay.9
Among the leading Israeli coordinators and deputy-coordinators of
L avi° in Morocco were cEzra Ayalon, Yosef Begev, Hasdai Doron (who
was also the head of the M isgeret in Tangier),10 Itzik Baer, Haggai Lev,
Yona Zabin, Richard Hadjes, and Moshe Kadosh. The LaoP activists on
the local level were given specific instructions regarding safety rules on
storing explosives in caches and the proper handling of plastic explo
sives.11
The M akhela was directed by the following Israeli coordinators over
the years: Shim con and Yehudit Hamel from Kibbutz cAin ha-Natsiv;
Yehudit Friedman-Nesiahu (Efraim Friedman's sister); Moshe Amon
(Hababo) from Kibbutz Regavlm (one of the key coordinators of M akhela
and a former self-defense envoy with the DMO in Tunisia); Zonia Goren
from Kibbutz Sha car ha-cAmaq!m; Ze5 ev Amit; Gad Shahar from Kib
butz Regavlm; and Gad Oren (“Steve”). Shahar and Oren were later
involved in “Operation Y ak h in .'12
What procedure did M akhela follow when organizing caliya? Rein
forced by the Zionist youth movements' members, the activists entered
the villages of the south and the urban m ellàhs to search for and register
would-be emigrants. This action was executed with utmost caution. Peo
ple were contacted after a thorough check on their background and that
of their neighbors. Once the registration process was accomplished and
lists had been prepared, a second group of activists arrived to inform the
people about their departure, the type of baggage they could take along,
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin” 223
the rendez-vous point where they would be picked up, and the type of
vehicles to look for. In most cases the emigrants were not told about the
final station from where they were expected to escape. Sometimes they
were even kept uninformed about the various stations on way to the
border.13
As Isser Harel observed during his visit to Morocco in 1958, the
activists organized the emigrants for the final departure at night. Whole
families left quietly, packed into the Misgeret's cabs and trucks. The first
stop was usually Casablanca, although Marrakesh and Meknès also served
as initial resting points. Upon arrival at these locations, the emigrants
stayed for several hours, before proceeding any further. If the plan called
for the land route, the emigrants were escorted by smugglers from
Tangier or Tétuan across the northern border into the Spanish enclave of
Ceuta. An alternative main land route included the border crossing at
Nador (also in northern Morocco) into the Spanish enclave of Melilla.
The sea routes in the north involved the crossing of the Mediterranean
from a certain point, usually from the Gulf of Rincon near Tétuan, on
small fishing or smugglers’ boats into Ceuta; transporting people from
Tangier to Gibraltar using the ferryboats service; or smuggling them
from the seashore near Nador, also on ferryboats, to Melilla.
Those who left via the land and sea routes, arriving at the enclaves,
were transported by the Misgeret's local representatives on ferryboats to
the Spanish ports of Algeciras and Malaga. From these places they were
brought on buses to the Jewish Agency’s transit camp at Gibraltar. After
a brief period in transit the emigrants were taken to Marseilles on their
way to Israel.14
As suggested, the point from which the emigrants crossed the land
borders or had taken the sea route often required the assistance of
smugglers, employed by the Misgeret. Yet the process of guiding the
emigrants (Makhela) and protecting the convoys (Lav?) were duties
confined to the Misgeret's cadres.
There were other routes used by the underground. One option was to
take the emigrants from their homes and bring them to the port of
Casablanca or that city’s airport with counterfeit Moroccan passports.
They were dressed in fashionable European attire. According to Havilio,
these emigrants were carefully selected for their ability to pass through
the port authorities, for their fluency in French, and for talent in posing
as affluent elements intending to leave for Europe on business. This
224 The Underground and "Operation Yakhin
tactic had its drawbacks, for despite the talents demonstrated, many had
been stopped, exposed as ordinary people, and arrested for carrying
falsified travel documents.15
Other options, applied in the late 1950s or early 1960s, were land
routes from Oudjda to Oran or from Oudjda to Colomb-Béchar— in
Algeria. The emigrants were to reach Algeria by train, an option that had
been carried out by the underground of 1947-49. Owing to contacts
established with the pro-Israeli French prefect of Oran, the French
consul in Oudjda was instructed to permit the Misgeret to smuggle
people into Algeria. Yehudit Friedman-Nesiahu of the Makhela recalled
that the consul provided her with French entrance visas for that country.
She would visit the consul once every ten days, carrying with her one
hundred counterfeit Moroccan passports. The consul knew she was an
Israeli and entrusted her with the official visa stamp. Friedman-Nesiahu
stamped the passports and then the consul signed the visas. He also
alerted her periodically about instructions the Moroccan authorities gave
the police on how to confront illegal emigrants. The consul's contacts
with the Moroccans and his support for the caliya proved advantageous
to the Misgeret. The cooperation between the underground and the
French was partly possible due to the special relations between France
and Israel at the time, and to the fact that Algeria was still under French
rule. Moreover, on Morocco's side of the border, at Oudjda, Friedman-
Nesiahu won over the French consul because both had mutual admira
tion for Martin Buber, whose courses at the Hebrew University she once
attended regularly.16
The Makhela also resorted to "Operation Hiloula." Jews from different
parts of the country would arrive at Nador "to celebrate'' this Moroccan
Jewish festival. Simultaneously, Misgeret-chartered buses brought Jews
from Melilla to Nador to participate in the event. Seizing upon the
confusion of the celebration, and seeing that border patrols on the Mo
roccan side were then not watchful, the activists used the buses that
transported the Melillians to cross over with the Moroccan emigrants
into Melilla, as if they were Melillians returning home. The authentic
Melillians, who willingly collaborated with the underground, were later
picked up by the same buses.17
Finally, Ifni, another small Spanish enclave along the Atlantic coast of
Morocco, was used for a few limited operations. Ifni was the least attrac
tive option to smuggle emigrants. Surrounded by sea and desert, it was
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin' 225
transit camp to the Jewish Agency, but they assisted the Misgeret’s
representatives in Gibraltar in processing the passports and preparing
the emigrants for departure to Marseilles.20
Why did the Spaniards and the British collaborate with Israel? Accord
ing to Havilio, despite their pro-Arab policies, the Spaniards were upset
with the Moroccans for having compelled them to relinquish the Spanish
Zone in Morocco and for the incessant demands by Rabat on Franco to
withdraw from the mineral-rich western Saharan desert. To some de
gree, helping the caliya was Spain s modest way of getting even with
Morocco. The British, on the other hand, collaborated with the French
and Israelis to attack Egypt in 1956. Having lost their influence in Egypt
during the 1950s and considering Nasser as their chief opponent in the
Arab world, the British were willing to support Israeli caliya initiatives.21
There can be no doubt that the Makhela and its assistants encouraged
the Jews to leave Morocco. We have seen it to be the case in February
1961, following the Pisces affair and the dissemination of the tract. Yet
even earlier, in 1959, when emigration became impossible, despite the
denial of this fact by the authorities before Western diplomats, the
Makhela distributed a tract in the synagogues. It urged the Jews not to
despair and to continue their demands for passports. Havilio disclosed
that “We wanted to expose the misinformation of the Moroccan govern
ment which told the Eisenhower administration that passports were
available for the asking, and to reveal to the world the problem of a
people denied freedom of movement. But the Moroccans would not
relent.”22
Inevitably, successes were matched by failures and setbacks. Though
unsuccessful in destroying the Zionist underground,23 the Moroccan se
curity services followed its activities with scrutiny. Not only were Mak
hela and Lavf activists detained, but numerous emigrants, too, were
caught, brought to trial, and forced to return to their communities as had
been the case in 1947-49. This situation posed serious challenges to the
underground. For not only were the emigrants compelled to travel once
again hundreds of kilometers in cramped buses, but upon their return
they found Muslims living in their apartments. They became homeless,
placed at the mercy of Jewish communal institutions and the AJDC. It
was up to the Misgeret to attempt to smuggle them out of Morocco on a
second occasion.24 The activists who were “burned” (identified) by the
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin’ 227
mented the actions of the small boats with the introduction of a mid
sized one. In September that year the Misgeret rented the Pisces from a
certain Thomas Scott in Gibraltar. This boat was renovated and improved
to include new navigational equipment and wireless radio devices. Whereas
the boat’s captain, Francesco Morrilla, and his crew were Spaniards, the
radio operator was an Israeli. The Pisces would come within several
hundred meters of the Moroccan shore near Melilla at the Gulf of Alhu-
cemas. There, the crew would lower a small boat on which the emigrants
were transferred to the Pisces. The Pisces would then leave Alhucemas,
cross the Mediterranean, and head for Gibraltar. Until the end of 1960
the Pisces brought hundreds of people to Gibraltar on twelve missions.
Meir Knafo, who in 1960-61 served as the caliya shore unit commander
(mefaked huliat ha-hôf), recounted the events leading to the thirteenth
and final journey of the Pisces. The Misgeret*s vehicles first brought the
emigrants from Casablanca to an area six kilometers from Alhucemas, a
journey of several hundred kilometers. Each vehicle left Casablanca at
fifteen-minute intervals to avert suspicions. The emigrants were about to
commence their six-kilometer march to the gulf area. The person in
charge of the operation, as always, was an Israeli who maintained radio
contact with the Pisces. In Knafo’s words:
Several of the families involved in the thirteenth journey had already made their
way to the gulf once before but were unable to depart due to bad weather
conditions: snow, blocked roads, and a stormy sea. The M isgeret also sensed that
security problems might arise and decided to postpone the operation until the
night of 9 -1 0 January. [In the past the M isgeret had cancelled or postponed
operations owing to a variety of circumstances.]
The unit that guided the emigrants reached the shore after precautions were
taken and the shore unit patrolled the area for safety purposes. Then the emi
grants with their belongings waited. Their group included infants and the elderly;
one woman was eighty years old. . . . [Suddenly] the Pisces could be spotted at
sea several hundred meters away. Using flashlights, signals were exchanged
between the Israeli in charge and the ship’s crew. The latter sent a small boat
ashore. I entered the water and met two crew members . . . who then helped
load the emigrants. Within a short time the boat reached the Pisces. The forty-
two people came aboard and received life belts, before hiding inside. The Pisces
began to sail from Alhucemas in the direction of Gibraltar. . . . I received word
later . . . that the Pisces foundered at sea due to bad weather conditions.30
The Gulf of Alhucemas: A Strategic Departure Point for Gibraltar in the Clandes
tine cAliya Process (courtesy of Shinuel Segev, “Operation Yakhin,” Tel-Aviv,
1984).
230 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin”
later released and managed to flee the country. Waknin was to pay with
his life.
Born in Casablanca in 1927, Waknin emigrated to Israel before 1948.
Recruited into the Israel Defense Forces, he fought in Jerusalem during
the war of independence, only to return to Casablanca less than two
years later. At the height of Morocco s struggle for independence, Wak
nin joined the M isgeret and trained in Europe. He was regarded as one
of the most valuable m efakdim who participated in several key opera
tions. His arrest occurred in the wake of the tract’s distribution and it
appears that the police gathered ample imformation about his where
abouts and even his deteriorating state of health.
Once apprehended, Waknin was interrogated and tortured. Despite
his failing health and the intensity of the torture, he refused to cooperate
with the interrogators. Concluding that Waknin would not divulge se
crets about Zionist endeavors, the police placed him in a local hospital.
Following King Muhammad V’s death, King Hasan II approved Dr. Léon
Benzaquen’s pleas to transfer Waknin to a private hospital in Paris. It
was there, four months later, that he died. On 11 July 1961 Waknin’s
body was brought to Israel for burial in Giv cat Sha *ül, Jerusalem.
Sixteen years later the State of Israel recognized him as harüg m alkhüt:
one who died in the service of Israel and the Jewish people.33
Those suspected of assisting in the distribution of the tract included
innocent victims. For instance, Yosef Assayag, a resident of Fez, was
picked up by the police on 13 February 1961, accused of carrying incrim
inating documents. Actually, these documents were communal records
on aid to the elderly. When asked about the contents of the records,
written in Judeo-Arabic, Assayag told the truth but failed to convince the
interrogators. After being roughed up, he was placed in solitary confine
ment for several hours and then beaten up some more for over an hour.
Assayag related that later on,
at 6:00 p.m. they requested that I provide the location of meeting places where
Jews assembled for the 'aliya. . . . After I failed to provide the response they
took me to the Troisième Brigade Criminel [and] dragged me to a basement. . . .
When I had nothing to say, twelve policemen picked me up and threw me on the
floor. One of them stuffed my mouth with a sweater while another placed his foot
on my throat and pressed until my eyes were about to pop. . . . Then they
whipped me. . . . Another policeman warned that if I did not cooperate he would
232 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
shoot me. To demonstrate this he pulled his revolver and aimed it to my head.
. . . I had no answers to offer and all I could do is to tell him that he may as well
shoot me. They resumed the beatings directing their fists at my chest and face.
One of them broke two of my teeth. Three hours later they transferred me . . .
to the police station and went on with the interrogations until mid-night. . . . At
3:00 a.m. the following day the investigation resumed. Among the questions
posed: “What do we do at our synagogue?” What does the rabbi say when he
addresses his audience?” I pleaded with them to let me rest. But they wouldn't
listen. . . . Then they flashed a lamp into my eyes. I felt dizzy [and fainted]. . . .
I was not released until 8:30 p.m.34
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin” 233
geret force— the Ballet. One of Ballet’s most important coordinators was
Menachem Gil cad from Kibbutz Kfar-Ruppin. He later became involved
on a separate mission with “Operation Yakhin/’ During his tenure as
Ballet’s coordinator (1957-59), dozens of madrîhïm were trained in Israel
at army and youth (Gadnac) camps. They also spent several weeks in
their movements’ kibbutzim41
As the youth movement clubs no longer operated in the open, under
ground clubs were formed at private homes and rented apartments.
Meetings were organized carefully, behind the facade of card games,
educational tutoring, and Bible sessions. In reality, Zionist education and
Hebrew lessons occupied much of the time at the meetings. In 1959,
Dror had eight clubs, ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir two, ha-Bonim two, ha-No
car ha-Tsiyoni two, and Bne-cAkiva none. Assisting Makhela were forty-
five Ballet members: thirty from Dror, six from ha-Bonim, three from
ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir, and six from Bne cAkiva.42 In June 1961, at the
end of the illegal caliya era, the movements had a combined membership
of 850; fifty from these movements were affiliated with caliya 43
Though heaping praise on these movements, the Mossad and the
Misgeret emissaries in Morocco were far more impressed with the offi
cially non-Zionist D E JJ. Havilio had instructed Shlomo Yekhezkeli, head
of the Misgeret in the formative years, to recruit as many individual D E JJ
members as possible. The Mossad ignored the rumors circulating in
Morocco that D E JJ members were anti-Israel and pro-Wifâq integration
ists. Quite to the contrary, it was argued, they were part of mainstream
Jewish life, functioned legally, and were guided by a leadership that,
intellectually, was superior to its counterpart among the Zionist move
ments. In fact, several leading members of D E JJ joined the Misgeret.44
The Modi cm, or Misgeret’s intelligence force, was formed in 1956-
57. It was coordinated by experienced envoys, notably Moshe Taranto,
who in the past helped shape underground intelligence efforts in other
countries. The intelligence apparatus had multiple functions to perform:
bribing police officials who could offer information on government poli
cies or strategies toward the Jewish community and the caliya; obtaining
data about new and safer border routes where the convoys could pass
without encountering resistance; probing into the reliability of the back
ground information presented to the Misgeret by new would-be recruits;
and furnishing the Makhela with up-to-date weather forecasts prior to
maritime operations.45
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin ’ 235
Reisel with fake travel papers bearing a new identity and drove him in
the official consular car to C e u ta .49
As the top com m anders of th e M is g e r e t took ch arge o f th e operations
and, at tim es, played a prep ond eran t role in influencing even ts, they are
worthy of b rief m ention. They w ere Shlomo Yekhezkeli, Yashkeh E liav,
B enyam in R otem , and Alex Gatm on (né G uttm an). As already intim ated,
Gatm on b ecam e the m ost im portant and successful o f the four. B o m in
Poland in 1926, G atm on joined the Polish underground at age fourteen
to fight the Nazis. H e later fled to H ungary w here he was arrested by
the G erm ans. H aving b een to rtu red in prison and about to be execu ted ,
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin” 237
Gatmon’s life was spared in the wake of the Soviet incursion into Hun
gary. In 1944 he reached Austria where he joined the Hagana which was
then active in the Brikhah: helping Jews escape from Europe and reach
Palestine illegally. During the late 1940s, Gatmon left the Hagana and
joined Menachem Begin s IZL. In 1950 he was recruited into the Israel
air force but also became actively involved in hunting Nazi war crimi
nals.50
Discharged from the air force in the summer of 1960, Gatmon volun
teered to head the Misgeret and arrived in Casablanca at the end of that
year together with his wife, Carmit. The cover arranged for him by the
Mossad was one of a European businessman specializing in industrial
machinery. As part of Gatmon’s new identity, Carmit was to become
known as his mistress while his “real” wife lived abroad. The Gatmons
succeeded in achieving social acceptability and penetrated Morocco’s
“haute société.” They were welcome guests at events organized by the
regime, affluent Muslims, and the Jewish elite. A luxurious villa on the
outskirts of Casablanca was provided for them by the Mossad to enhance
their status.51
Gatmon headed the Misgeret at its most crucial and challenging phase:
from the time of Nasser’s visit and the Pisces affair, until 1963, when
“Operation Yakhin” was in high gear. It has been suggested that, after
the harsh events of early 1961, Gatmon initiated and carried out the
negotiations with a Moroccan government representative, leading to the
resumption of tolerated emigration. According to Shmuel Segev, having
contacted two influential Jewish notables, Sam Benazeraf and Alfred
Cohen, Gatmon prodded them to raise the caliya issue before the Moroc
can government and to tell them that a person, representing the Jewish
underground in Morocco and the Jewish Agency, would like to debate
this issue with their representatives. It was hinted that the Jewish people
in the West would indemnify Morocco for letting its Jews go and for the
damage this exodus might cause to the Moroccan economy.52
Based on Segev’s account, Benazeraf and Cohen carried, separately,
Gatmon’s message to Rabat. The Moroccan response was surprisingly
positive. After some delay, the critical series of discussions were under
way in Europe— beginning in summer 1961— between a senior Moroc
can official and Gatmon. The latter presented himself as Alexander Ben-
David and was disguised with a mustache and beard. Following six
meetings a formula was agreed upon: “the Jews would officially be
238 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
Alex and Carmit Gatmon in Tangier with a Moroccan Friend (courtesy of Carmit
Gatmon).
allowed to em igrate to the U nited States and C anada, but not to Is r a e l/'
T he process of organizing the em igration would be en tru sted to an
Am erican Jew ish organization (U nited HIAS S ervice), and not to the
Jewish Agency. Gatm on agreed that the clandestine ca liy a had to stop
although he m ade it clear that, should M orocco ren eg e on its com m it
m en t, the illegal activities would re su m e .53 M orocco was also prom ised
financial indem nities, a subject that cannot be elaborated upon at this
stag e.54
As noted, “O peration Yakhin” — a com plex plan involving the M o s s a d ,
the Jewish A gency, the U nited HIAS Service, and King Hasan I I —
began in 1961. T he U nited HIAS Service reop en ed its offices and served
as a co v er for the M isg eret's and the Jew ish Agency's personnel to process
the ca liy a . In 1 9 6 1 -6 6 , the Israeli em issaries conducting the operation
included Y osef R egev, Naftali B ar-G iora, M enachem Gil cad, Gad Sha
har, the late M oshe Yuval, Y osef Ronen, Haim Bokboza, M oshe Antébi,
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin ’ 239
M oshe Shuavi, Arye U riel, H ayim Halahm i, Gad O ren, Yona Zabin,
M ichael Gal, G eorges B arbie, David Izwotzki, Shm uel Sharon, and Dan
K ariv.55 They w ere assisted by local activists.
The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior provided collective/family rather
than individual passports. In this regard, they followed the policies o f the
F re n ch P ro tecto rate during the C adim a era. This arrangem ent saved
considerable paperw ork and speeded the d epartu re process. T he first
operation began on 2 7 N ovem ber 1961 and continued until spring 1964.
It req u ired registerin g the em igrants, taking passport photos, evacuating
villages and transfering their Jew ish populations to Casablanca (togeth er
with their belongings), and organizing the transportation to E u ro p e by
planes and ships.
M enachem Gil cad, who in January 1962 retu rn ed to M orocco to help
coordinate “O peration Yakhin,” related that the head of the police and
security services, Colonel Ahmad Oufqir, signed many o f the exit p e r
mits. Though it is not certain that Oufqir received bribes from the
240 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
“Zionists” for his services, other officials did. Paquet, the maritime com
pany that in the past transported Jews from Casablanca to Marseilles,
resumed services with its five ships— L yau tey, K ou tou bia, A zrou, Azem-
m our, and Djenné. Alternatively, other ships were chartered that sailed
from Morocco to Naples. Emigrants were evacuated by chartered planes
from Morocco to France. The journey to Israel was organized through
Israel s navigation company, Zim, or El-Al, the national airline. As we
shall see, Morocco did halt the departure of Jews on several occasions.
To challenge the restrictions, the Israelis may have conducted caliya in
the north through the Straits of Gibraltar, or from Oudjda to to Algeria
using the trains.56
The emigration selection/screening policies were revived during “Op
eration Yakhin,” although our sources do not indicate conclusively that
this applied consistently for the whole period. Based on the criteria
decided upon in Israel, preference in caliya was given to small commu
nities of three-hundred or fewer families. Second preference was granted
to families from rural and inland communities who migrated to the major
centers in 1956-61, awaiting the caliya to resume. Fifty percent of the
emigrants were chosen among urbanites. The selection/screening process
was based on families rather than individuals. A family needed to have a
provider aged eighteen to forty-five. A widow whose children were under
ten years old could not be considered a breadwinner. While health and
social screening criteria in the small and remote communities where
Jews could be vulnerable to Muslim attacks were hardly rigorous, with
the sick, elderly, and disabled approved for ^aliya, strict policies did
apply to families in the major centers.57
The emigration of individual men and women did become an accept
able procedure, provided that these emigrants indicated they could cope
physically and emotionally in Israeli society without their families. If the
head of a family was unemployable, yet the family had unmarried sons
aged eighteen and older, capable of working and physically fit, the family
was allowed to depart. Families that wanted to leave their elderly mem
bers behind were denied caliya. Israel could no longer tolerate a situation
whereby the elderly and communal leaders would blame her represen
tatives for splitting up families.58
O f course, an operation that evacuated eighty thousand people from
Morocco in 1961-64 (see table 15 on the changes in the Jewish map of
Morocco), could not be kept secret. Arab landlords in the m ellàhs, seeing
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin * 241
their best and most reliable tenants suddenly departing, went running to
the authorities or their political parties to ask what was happening. So,
too, did the printer who saw three or four of his best Jewish workers
suddenly disappear from one day to the next. When a Jewish housewife,
haggling over the price of fruit, had trouble with the Muslim fruit ven
dor, she would say “Keep your oranges. I won’t need you where I am
going.” All of a sudden there was a rush for suitcases, cartons, crates.
Unable to take out more than sixty Moroccan dirhams, there was a rush
on silver bracelets and other easily transported valuables.59
The lack of discretion by certain activists and would-be emigrants, in
addition to the already mentioned political pressure from Cairo and local
nationalists, prompted the Palace to temporarily halt emigration. The
longest pause occurred on 20 June 1962. King Hasan had returned from
a visit to Cairo the day before. It was intimated that the Cairo visit and
Arab League pressures had been behind the restriction.60 However, it
soon became clear that orthodox American Jews, led by a certain Rabbi
Abramsky, bribed government officials to allow Jews to leave outside the
242 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
framework of the United HIAS Service and contrary to the secret under
standing worked out in M ay-October 1961. The police detained five
Moroccan officials for accepting the bribes and the United HIAS offices
were closed down. Once Gatmon informed Abramsky that his private
operations hurt the emigration, and subsequent to further negotiations
with the authorities, the operation resumed in the latter half of 1962.61
Whereas King Hasan tolerated emigration much of the time, and
customs and emigration officials cultivated amicable working ties with
the “representatives of H IAS,” there was mounting concern in Jerusalem
that the secret understanding might be violated. On 22 July 1963, Shra
gai raised this issue with Levi Eshkol, Ben-Gurion’s successor as pre
mier. He disclosed that the political opponents to the king, seeking to
overthrow him by using diverse tactics, also accused Hasan of delivering
to Israel the gift of young Moroccan Jews while keeping behind the sick
and elderly. Shragai wondered if Hasan could withstand the pressure
from all directions, and if the caliya had a long-range future.62 The grim
speculations did not materialize, however.
It is true that certain Jewish community leaders still opposed caliy a,
particularly of such magnitude, whereby thousands of people left each
month. But many supported the departure and agreed to assist the
process. As it turned out, David cAmar, the secretary-general of the
CCIM , did in fact cooperate very closely with the Misgeret. His support
for “Operation Yakhin” was unquestionable and he went to Israel to
discuss major issues related to it. Indeed, on 21 February 1964, a meet
ing took place in Jerusalem between cAmar and representatives of “Op
eration Yakhin.” cAmar was prepared to actively assist the caliya of tens
of thousands of Jews provided that he could know in advance if Israel was
truly capable of absorbing them. He said that rumors about ineffective
absorption and integration policies reached Morocco and made it difficult
to continue the operation.63
The Israelis whom cAmar met in Jerusalem, especially Baruch Duvde
vani, were impressed with him. Duvdevani observed that cAmar was a
courageous person, serious, and prepared to confront challenges. His
position on caliya and Israel had changed over the years. While in 1957
he headed a delegation to Paris calling on Israel's ambassador to cease
illegal Zionist activity immediately,64 he had altered this stance since
1958 when Morocco joined the Arab League and cracked down harder
on freedom of movement. Between 1959 and 1961 he befriended several
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin ’ 243
members of the M isgeret, among them Gatmon, and assisted the clandes
tine efforts.65
What were the impressions of the Israeli emissaries connected with
either the M ossad or the Jewish Agency about Morocco, its Jews, and
the political climate? What direction did the caliya take— particularly in
1965-6 7 — once “Operation Yakhin” was essentially over?
Moshe Yuval observed that the political climate in 1962 and 1963 was
more relaxed for the Jews, despite the border dispute between Morocco
and Algeria. However, this did not mean there were no dangers:
Although nowadays, annihilation is not anticipated for the Jews in Morocco, God
forbid, this country remains Muslim and basically anti-Semitic. . . . A Jew might
very easily get stabbed for any reason whatsoever. An incident that took place a
month and a half ago [beginning of July 1963] is characteristic. . . . The whole
port [of Casablanca] was saying that not only were the Jews leaving with all their
baggage, but they were also smuggling weapons. The next day the notorious [a h
T ahrir] wrote about it on the front page.66
Though there was a major Caliya wave in 1961-63, the numbers dropped
considerably between the latter half of 1964 and the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli war. In February 1965, during his visit to Morocco, Yehuda
Dominitz of the Jewish Agency noted that many Jews saw their future in
Morocco. Given the new realities, he recommended that the emissaries
concentrate on encouraging “quality caliya” that included high school and
university students and youth caliya who could constitute a “pull factor”
for brothers, sisters, parents, and relatives; as well as teachers who would
take their families with them.67
Dominitz then called for reducing the number of emissaries from ten
(1 February 1965) to six (effective September 1965) in accordance with
the reduced caliya.GR In September 1966 there were four emissaries
inside Morocco: Shmuel Sharon, Georges Barbie (responsible for caliya
from Casablanca, Rabat, and the south), David Izwotzki (responsible for
caliya from Fez, Meknès, and Tangier), and Dan Kariv (responsible for
special missions).69
The HIAS offices still functioned in 1965-66, although their local
personnel was considerably reduced. The only other temporary halt in
244 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin’
Despite the dimensions of correspondence with Israel, this cannot change any
thing. We have already been acquainted with a number of social cases that refuse
to emigrate to Israel, though we have emigration permits for them in hand. Even
parents who have been requested by their children [in Israel], refuse to emigrate.
A new, even more worrisome phenomenon, is the application by family members
to our office, offering to pay the expenses for return of parents or children. The
question may be asked whether everything possible has been done in Israel to
avoid having Jews leave the country. In the present economic situation, we will
never be able to withstand the arguments of those who leave, and even less—
the arguments of the tourists. . . . The good reputation which we had in the past
among the Jews no longer exists. It would seem that we must not appear here
with a negative image, and that it would be best for us, therefore, to shut down
and withdraw with dignity while we can still do so. . . . The present situation
reinforces the affinity of many for emigration to Canada, and this without the
hesitations that existed in the past.71
In the big cities new businesses have been opened, fine restaurants, all
owned by Jews/ 72 This situation continued until June 1967, but changed
drastically following the 1967 war.
When the June 1967 war broke out, Moroccan Jews were on the verge of
panic. This situation continued for several weeks. That total panic was
averted, that there were no major disasters for the Jews, can be at
tributed to the government and the Palace who protected them.
Political forces both on the left (supported by the UNFP and the
UMT) and the conservative right (Istiqlàl) actively sought to exploit the
fact that the king protected the Jews. Externally, the Moroccan political
establishment could not afford any Jewish praise, lest it seem that they
were turning their backs on the Arab cause. The attacks on Israel were
especially strong in neighboring Algeria, whose radio and press were
quite vehemently anti-Israeli in tone, as much as Radio Cairo. Since
Moroccan-Algerian relations at the time were quite strained over a host
of political issues, and as the king was being subjected to attacks by the
Boumedienne regime of Algeria, any overt sympathy on the part of the
Palace and the government toward the Jews might have caused serious
problems for Hasan with both Algiers and Cairo.73
As we have seen in the last section and as was confirmed by other
reports during and after the 1967 war, it appeared before May 1967 that
the Jews were secure in Morocco. Not only were the days of mass
emigration to Israel over and few were attracted there, but Moroccan
Jews were also reluctant, temporarily at least, to settle in France, Can
ada, and the United States. Early in 1967 the Jewish communities were
not only numerically stable but were in fact slightly augmented as a
result of the traditionally high Moroccan Jewish birth rates. Further
more, unlike the times when restrictive measures were imposed, eco
nomically, and on emigration, the Jews during the mid-1960s enjoyed
freedom of movement while economic conditions were more promising
in Morocco than in France or Israel where the economies could not
provide ample employment or business opportunities. This combined to
make life in Morocco temporarily active, so that Jews did not wish to
uproot themselves and commence anew elsewhere.74
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin ’ 247
The 1967 war and its aftermath introduced, temporarily, a new per
spective. An increasing number of Jews seriously considered leaving
Morocco once again. Their concern was aroused by several phenomena.
There was the Istiqlàl, emphasizing quasi-religious concepts, drawing
much of its political strength from the rural Muslim population that
traditionally supported anti-Zionist campaigns. In June 1967, it seized
upon Nasser’s defeat and Israel’s territorial gains to intensify anti-Jewish
activity. It utilized classic anti-Semitic literature such as the alleged letter
by Benjamin Franklin denouncing the Jews. The Istiqlàl French-lan
guage organ, L ’O pinion, encouraged the Muslim population to publicize
blacklists of Jewish-owned businesses and in fact enjoyed partial success
in that campaign.
Then, there were the more leftist and intellectual forces who, in
addition to their anti-Zionist and anti-Western campaign, were also op
posed to the king. Represented by the UNFP and UMT, and dominant
in certain professional and white-collar circles, they organized a mass
meeting in Casablanca during the first week of the 1967 war and engaged
in precisely the same sort of crowd-inciting themes as the Istiqlàl, against
both Israel and the United States. The leadership of the UNFP and UMT
quietly sought to wrest statements from the Casablanca Jewish commu
nity leaders denouncing Israel and Zionism, and expressed displeasure
when these were not forthcoming.75
Jewish fears were also heightened as a result of statements made in
the Moroccan press, particularly by extremist conservative newspapers
such as a l - M a s a that expressed virulent hatred against them. For in
stance, following the June war, al-M asa3 claimed, in an editorial entitled
“From the People to the Authorities”:
There are no Zionists, only Jews, no more no less. . . . We do not wish the
authorities to harm the Jews. They are on the same footing with the Muslims by
the terms of the constitution. But we want the heads of the Jews if they betray
the Muslims. . . . We do not want the authorities to carry on a war of destroying
everything as did Hitler, for the Islamic religion forbids this; but in the name of
this religion we demand that they punish severely those who betray this religion
that protects them, this country that gives them abode and food, and shelters
them from all fears. . . . W e only want to say this common truth that all men in
Morocco know. The feelings of the Jews do not change. They are upholding the
little state [Israel] with money and none of them fail in this. W e defy anybody
among them to prove the contrary. The emigration from Morocco is very evident
. . . to all. We demand of the authorities that, on this occasion, they protect their
248 The Underground and “Operation Yakhin
citizens from the provocation and defiance of the Jews and that they should not
guard the Jews when the latter organize receptions and festivals to express their
joy [at Israel’s victory] under the guard of the police protecting them.76
The major problem faced by the Jews of Morocco at the time was the
economic boycott. Otherwise, despite the work of the extremists and the
political parties, there were few problems in Jewish-Muslim relations.
True, Muslims often avoided Jews they knew in daily contacts, but in the
schools Jewish and Muslim youths continued to study together.77 Even
insofar as the boycott was concerned, while Jewish merchants found their
wares rejected, the boycott was only partial and in certain regions stronger
and more effective than in others.78 Jewish textile shop owners faced
extremist Muslim youths who encouraged would-be customers not to
buy from them,79 but usually, ordinary Muslims did not take the initia
tive in organizing the boycott. Quite frequently, however, Muslims boy
cotted Jewish products because of pressure imposed by the extremists.
Jewish schools were kept open and Jewish institutions functioned
normally, albeit often under police guard. The Shavûcôt holiday fell on
14 June as knowledge of the Israeli victory filtered in. The Moroccan
government now encountered a serious dilemma. In the first place, it
could not, and did not, permit any but the most innocuous publications
from the Arab world to come into the country, and, it has been rumored,
jammed outside Arab radio stations that expressed violent propaganda
against Jews in general. Secondly, although placing certain Jewish insti
tutions and residential quarters under guard, the government also sought,
for the sake of normalcy, to let Jewish life go on despite the problems.
Consequently, synagogues and Jewish clubs stayed open. Finally, while
maintaining a precarious balance between protection of Jews and allow
ing them to enjoy freedom of movement, the authorities simultaneously
had to act in a way that would not be construed by segments of the
Muslim population as if the government were friendly toward the Jews.
Therefore, the Jews were discreetly urged not to organize celebrations
that might be interpreted as rejoicing at Nassers defeat. Weddings and
circumcisions were limited or postponed. Jews were adjured not to sing
too loudly during normal Sabbath services in the synagogues.80
But, with several exceptions, Jews were free to leave Morocco. This
did not mean, however, that they did not encounter difficulties at the
hands of officials when seeking the necessary documents to emigrate.
The Underground and “Operation Yakhin” 249
down by Israel of Egyptian fighter jets during the 1969 War of Attrition,
and the El-Aqsa Mosque affair (El-Aqsa Mosque was one of two mosques
sacred to Islam in Jerusalem damaged in 1969 by an explosion set off by
a deranged individual) were reported, distorted, and exaggerated in the
Moroccan press. The Arab Summit meeting on the El-Aqsa fire took
place in Rabat. Television provided propaganda coverage of Israelis tor
turing Arab men, women, and children, causing some panic among the
Jews. However, the government took precautionary measures and sta
tioned police guards in front of the large synagogues, thus preventing
incidents.85
Jewish observers make the point that, given the authorities’ alertness
on the Jews’ behalf at times of crisis, the Jews, after 1970, reconsidered
staying and postponed emigration to other lands. The leaders of the AIU
and French Jewry attempted to emphasize the importance of some Jew
ish presence in Morocco. They indicated that the Moroccan government
provided subsidies for the AIU schools and thus were encouraging the
Jews to remain in Morocco. The leaders of the AIU pointed out in 1970
that, with 40,000 Jews remaining in the country, emigration “ne se fera
pas overnight” (won’t happen “overnight”).86 René Cassin, still president
of the AIU in 1970, went as far as to suggest that the presence of Jews in
Morocco was vital for future rapprochement between Israel and Mo
rocco:
no act of violence or persecution has been carried out in the Kingdom against
Moroccan Jews. What is more, although Morocco was directly engaged in the
war [dispatching to the conflict] some of its best sons, knowing the ineluctable
risks of such a [decision], the daily relations between Moroccan Muslims and
their Jewish compatriots [at home] have not been subjected to the slightest
alteration.90
The AIlTs Ecole Normale Hébraïque in the Oasis Suburb outside Casablanca
(author’s personal collection).
As in other societies in the Middle East and North Africa, the expanding
colonial presence in Tunisia alienated a growing segment of the indige
nous elite. This included graduates of the orthodox Zitouna College and
the privileged elements trained at Sadiqi College. Strong signs of dissat
isfaction were evident during the 1920s and 1930s, with the emergence
of the Destour party (1920) which sought a greater participatory role for
Tunisian Muslims in the colonial administrative apparatus as well as
increased civil liberties; the Tunisian labor movement (CGTT), estab
lished in 1924, which advocated improved social conditions for workers;
and the secularly oriented Neo-Destour party (founded in 1934) which
split away from the Destour,1 and was led by French-educated elements.
O f these Habib Bourguiba, president of Tunisia from the late 1950s until
November 1987, was the most outspoken and dynamic figure.
The Neo-Destour, which became the leading movement seeking to
wrest vital political concessions from France, adopted an ambitious plat
form encompassing social and educational reforms. It found a powerful
ally in the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), estab
lished in the 1940s and destined to play a preponderant role alongside
the Neo-Destour in the struggle for independence.
254
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 255
Due to the popular support for the Neo-Destour along the eastern
sâhil (coast or littoral), essentially in Tunis, Sousse, and the Cap Bon
province, the movement was driven underground by the French in 1938
and its leaders arrested. During the German occupation of Tunisia the
Neo-Destour enjoyed a semilegal status; supported by Munsif Bey, it
maintained friendly relations with the Axis powers.2
Following the liberation of Tunisia by the Allies in May 1943, the
movement’s activities were once again temporarily halted. Bourguiba
spent some time in Rome and later in Egypt where he established ties
with the Arab League as well as North African political exiles, before
returning to Tunisia in September 1949.3
Meanwhile, the Neo-Destour, along with the UGTT led by Ferhat
Hached,4 was permitted gradually to reassert its authority. The move
ment demanded the return of nationalist exiles and a host of reforms, but
did not yet resort to a violent struggle. In 1950 its relations with the
Residency actually improved temporarily to the extent that the French
considered granting Tunisians a variety of representational reforms that
could have led to eventual internal autonomy, and the Quai d’Orsay
dispatched Louis Perillier to Tunis as resident-general with the task of
overseeing the reforms.
However, in August 1950, when a new coalition government, com
posed of Tunisians (including members of the Neo-Destour) and French
directors appeared to indicate that the French were conciliatory, the
Neo-Destour insisted on further concessions. They now demanded the
formation of a homogeneous all-Tunisian cabinet. In response, the French
dismissed Perillier and sent the hard-liner Jean de Hauteclocque to fill
the post of resident-general. It now seemed that a Franco-Tunisian com
promise was as remote as ever, and the inevitable outcome was the
outbreak of a protracted, violent struggle for home rule endorsed by
various factions of the Tunisian political spectrum, although they often
denied their participation.
The nationalist struggle for internal autonomy commenced in mid-
January 1952, gained momentum during the summer of that year, and
continued into 1954. It was joined by pro-nationalist forces, most notably
th e fella g h a s— guerrilla fighters active in the south (near the border with
Libya) and in the northwest. The confrontation with the French included
bombings, urban and rural sabotage, and the enlisting of political support
256 Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
O f the 95,000 Jews living in Tunisia during the early 1950s (2.8 percent
of the total population), approximately 72,000 were subjects of the bey,
the rest being French or Italian subjects. During this period the Euro
pean settler community numbered some 150,000. Before and after 1947,
legal authority for Tunisian Jews in matters of personal status— marriage,
divorce, inheritance— had been expressly vested in the rabbinic courts,
composed of rabbis appointed by the state. These courts administered
justice according to mosaic law and were empowered to hand down
rulings which were enforced by the Tunisian government. Cases beyond
the jurisdiction of these courts were tried in Islamic courts if they in
volved Jewish subjects of the bey.
The bulk of the Jewish population was concentrated in Tunis (65,000),
Sfax (4,500), and Sousse (4,000). Other important Jewish centers were in
Gabès, Nabeul, Medenine, and Jerba. The rest of Tunisian Jewry was
scattered in smaller communities— towns and villages— in the southern
258 Tunisia’s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
,
The Jewish Agency the State o f Israel and ,
,
Tunisian Jew ry 1948-1956
1954, 2,651 Jews left for Israel whereas the figures for 1955, 1956, and
1957 were: 6,104, 6,545, and 2,362 (see table 16 for the precise break
down during 1954-57).
When they fled Tunisia in 1947-48, the Jews were assisted locally by
a Zionist underground. Whereas in Morocco the heads of the under
ground were Sam Abotbol and Elie Ohayon, affiliated with the Charles
Netter Association, in Tunisia the leaders of Tseire-Tsiyon/Dror orga
nized the escape. Among them were Nadia Cohen-Franco, ’Ilan Hajaj,
Moshe cAmar, ’Ilan Baranes, and Shoshana and Meir cIdan. The latter
also operated in Algeria to assist the Israeli emissaries in maintaining the
transit centers and attending to the emigrants.
With caliya tolerated by the French during the second half of 1948, a
special office to process emigrants was opened in Tunis on 12 Rue Sidi
Sifiane. It was managed initially by Dr. Leopold Baretvas, a dermatolo
gist of Hungarian origin who, during the German occupation of Tunis,
served as an interpreter from German to French on matters pertaining
to Jewish affairs. He later acted as the chief physician authorized by
Israel to administer the medical examinations for the emigrants. Another
important personality responsible for the creation and maintenance of
the new caliya office was Elie-Eugène Guetta, an attorney from Tunis.
He replaced Baretvas as the caliya representative, enjoying the title of
Chief cAliya Officer (ktsin caliya). He served in this capacity until 1951.33
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 267
favor of Libyan sovereignty; it was this vote that made the difference.
The Libyans responded in kind by closing the caliya office in Tripoli.42
Similar to Khaklai’s argument over Morocco, Dwinger urged the Mos
sad Le cAliya and the Jewish Agency to evacuate as many Jews from the
south as possible. He disclosed that several thousand Jews were scattered
in Arab villages, sometimes only a few dozens, in areas where tens of
thousands of Muslims dwelt. In isolated and remote regions security was
confined to one French army officer and a reduced force of Tunisian
policemen. What made matters worse, the local French officials were
hardly well disposed toward the Jews and Tunisian nationalist sentiments
were rising. Dwinger did not think that the Neo-Destour s Bourguiba,
having recently returned to Tunisia, was particularly sympathetic to
Jewish aspirations and sensitivities. He noted that Jewish women in the
south were raped and young girls kidnapped by Muslims. If the Jewish
Agency failed to rescue the southern Jews, the latter might be massa
cred. It was therefore logical for Israel to impose stringent health criteria
for emigration candidates in the safer urban areas; but the same could no
longer apply to the villages.43
Like Halevy and Khaklai in Morocco or Eliahu Brakha of the Mossad
Le cAliya in Egypt, Dwinger often opposed the limited monthly caliya
quotas. Writing in March 1951 to Chaim 5Ofek, the representative of the
Jewish Agency's Immigration Department in Paris, he was both adamant
and cynical about the policies that originated in Jerusalem:
I am like that Jew who laughs because he can no longer cry. My dear Chaim, it
is enough if I tell you that in Tunis and other urban areas alone I have more than
3,000 families registered for immediate 'aliya. In order to satisfy those from
Tunis who wish to emigrate I need a quota of 1,000 persons per month. Of
course, I am not asking the impossible. On the other hand, you also cannot ask
for the impossible. You instructed me to maintain a monthly quota of 150 persons
including fifty with Youth cAliya and fifty for the m oshavim . . . . So what’s left for
the caliya of ordinary Jews who have been registered several months to a year?
And what about the preference given to Jews in the south whose lives are truly
in danger?44
Gabès 3,500
Gafsa 500
Talmat 50
Sidi Kuzir 70
Timzert 60
Metlaoui 40
Gafta 30
Tozeur 50
Moknine 450
Al-Hamma 150
Kebili 350
Mongerraran 450
Tatouine 500
Zarzis 1,150
Jerba:
Hara Kablra 2,000
Hara Saghira 950
T otal 10,300
Source: S. Batish, Report on My Visit to North Africa
[beginning of 1954], ISA, FM 2388/13, Hebrew.
Tunis and then Israel. They expressed their willingness to assist in the
process, especially in villages where four to five hundred vulnerable Jews
dwelt among 40,000 Muslims.50
Shragai was not the only influential person to advocate increased caliya
from southern Tunisia. Jewish leaders and the Israeli emissaries had
urged the Coordinating Commission to do so since the early 1950s. One
should not forget that most of these pleas, including Shragai’s, were
made prior to Mendès-France's announcement in July 1954 concerning
autonomy. The ceaseless demands by Tunisian Jewish leaders, Zionists
and non-Zionists, for swifter action in this matter were often due to
reasons beyond Zionist or moral convictions. Some did not envisage the
possibility of settling in Israel, but sought to have the Jews of the south,
the poorer socioeconomic strata, emigrate to Israel, in order to relieve
themselves of the responsibilities of attending to these communities.
According to Markuse, and similar to Shragai’s findings, officials of the
French Residency also indicated that the continued presence of Jews in
Tunisia's Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 273
the villages constituted a security burden for them, and they suggested
that the Jewish Agency should do the utmost to evacuate them. On the
other hand, Markuse (unlike Shragai) added that the position of the
French security officials was completely different from that held by the
Residency which saw the situation in another light. The latter urged the
Jewish Agency not to engage in immediate large-scale evacuation.51 We
did not find evidence in the French Protectorate archives corroborating
Markuse’s argument, and are unable to determine its accuracy.
In a report dated three weeks before Mendès-France made his deci
sive announcement, Markuse expressed the belief that physical danger
was imminent in the towns and villages of the south, mainly those near
the border with Libya. In view of the increased activity of the rural
fighters, Charles Haddad and Meir Bellity in Tunis were pressing him to
evacuate these communities immediately.52 Indeed, even if by 1954
violence had spread to the streets of Tunis, it was in the south that Jews,
like Muslims, were vulnerable to the whims of these rural fighters who
pressured them to demonstrate solidarity against the French and ex
torted money from many artisans to finance their struggle.53
Given these trends, Markuse prevailed on Ya cakov Tsur, Israel s
ambassador to France, even to consider a daring rescue operation in the
south. Whereas the severely handicapped and sick would be left behind
to be cared for by the communal federations and the AJDC in the major
cities, the majority had to leave immediately: ‘T believe we are con
fronted with the problem of an immediate rescue operation and we must
find ways of bringing [the Jews of the south] to Israel before it is too late.
The fact that the Jews in the south have not yet been slaughtered does
not mean that emigration is not urgent; we have to learn from the errors
of the past and not to repeat them .”54
However, in tune with the Coordinating Commission’s findings and
his predecessor’s views, when surveying the urban Jewish population
Markuse favored the application of more or less strict selection criteria,
medical and social, to avert the possibility of emigration trends involving
only the lower socioeconomic strata. Since the security problems of the
Jews in areas like Tunis were not as acute as those in the villages, there
was no need as yet to speak of large-scale or rescue emigration. 55
Undoubtedly, there are many ambiguities surrounding Markuse. Was
he consistent in his support of priority to southern Jews after July 1954,
once autonomy for Tunisia was on the agenda? After all, he noted that
274 Tunisia's Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
during the first half of 1955, 70 percent of the Jews registered for emigra
tion were u rban ites,56 a statement in contradiction to his letters to Tsur.
We do know that his (and Shragai’s) recommendation for evacuation in
the south in 1954 was seriously considered in Israel and partially imple
mented. But it does not appear that a vast rescue operation emerged as
the outcome.57 Did the sharp increase in u rban emigration continue
throughout 1955 and 1956? Were families that migrated to Tunis from
the south and other regions classified as urbanites?
We lack answers to these questions. Yet, be that as it may, the major
development is clear: during 1955-56 Jewish emigration in gen eral from
Tunisia in creased though not on a very large scale and, as noted, not in
an atmosphere of panic. Whereas 16,493 emigrated to Israel during the
six-year period between 1948 and 1953, 15,300 arrived during the three-
year period between 1954 and 1956. The increase was partly due to the
cooperation of the French.58 In addition to the Tunisia-Marseilles route,
Markuse supervised the departure via Naples, an alternate route, begin
ning in November 1955.59
However sporadic and inefficiently managed, cAliyat ha-No car in
Tunisia is nonetheless partially consequential and worthy of attention—
particularly given certain tragic developments.
cAliyat ha-No car began its work in Tunisia in mid-1947, when three
hundred Tunisian Jews left illegally for Israel via Algeria and sailed in
the ships Yehuda H alevy and Shivat Tsiyon. Among the ships’ passengers
were numerous youths who were placed under the care of cAliyat ha-No
car. Toward the end of 1948 or beginning in 1949, ‘Aliyat ha-No car
opened an office in Tunis headed by Lydie Gozlan— an Algerian Jewish
woman carrying a French passport. Together with local assistants, Gozlan
organized branches of the organization in several key cities as well as
transportation facilities, with Dwingers help, to cAliyat ha-No car’s h a ch
shara and medical treatment centers in Europe. Between the end of
1948 and April 1950, 250 youths were sent to these centers prior to their
resettlement in Israel.60
As in Morocco, large Tunisian Jewish families, that were financially
desperate, expressed willingness to confine their children to ‘Aliyat ha-
No car. In many instances the parents were separated from their children
for two years until they themselves made caliya. Orphans also swelled
the ranks of youth caliya. Gozlan preferred to send to cAliyat ha-No car’s
homes in Europe youths who had reached the age of thirteen. No one
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 275
over fifteen could be recruited. Other youths left Tunisia with their
parents through the regular caliya apparatus, or with the aid of the
Zionist pioneer movements.61
Starting in 1949-50, cAliyat ha-No car sent its children for medical
treatment and/or h a ch sh ara to France, mainly to Cambous and Villa
Gaby. Their stay in France usually lasted six months. But until the
beginning of 1950, children from Tunisia, especially unhealthy ones,
were also sent to Oslo, Norway, for pre - caliya treatment. cAliyat ha-No
car's work in Oslo became possible following an agreement reached be
tween the AJDC and Norway's Ministry of Welfare. The agreement
stipulated that two hundred places would be reserved for North African
Jewish children in a special health center to be managed by Europahjel-
fen— an affiliate of the Norwegian Red Cross. In April 1949, the first
group of youth caliya arrived at the center, also known as Barnekoloni.
They were cared for by nine Israeli emissaries and teachers.62
A second group composed of youths from Tunis, Sousse, Nabeul and
Moknine, was to arrive in November 1949. On the morning of 20 No
vember, two Dakota planes, chartered by the AJDC and the Jewish
Agency, left Tunis with cAliyat ha-No car for Oslo. Fifty-eight children
were involved in this operation. Among the youth caliya personnel es
corting the children was Suzette Cohen-Coudar, Gozlan's trusted assis
tant. One of the planes landed safely in Oslo. The other plane crashed
thirty kilometers outside Oslo sixteen hours into the flight. Of the twenty-
eight youths on the plane only one eleven-year-old child, Yitshak Allai
from Moknine, survived.63 Among the dead victims were the pilot and
crew members, as well as Suzette Cohen-Coudar.
The tragedy sent shock waves throughout the Tunisian Jewish com
munities and brought the youth caliya issue to the attention of the
Muslims. Paul Ghez and Elie Nataf secured the victims' bodies from the
Norwegian authorities while, within one year, the Norwegians published
their investigation's report on the crash. They concluded that the flight
crew was insufficiently informed about weather conditions and physically
exhausted, having flown long hours the day before to bring Moroccan
Jewish youths from Oslo to Israel.64 To commemorate the Oslo tragedy
the Labor party in Norway raised funds that were subsequently allocated
for youth caliya homes.65
As for Yitshak Allai, the sole survivor, he recovered from his wounds
and returned to Tunisia. In September 1950, he and his parents settled
276 Tunisie s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
LK T R A G I Q U E
M ETTE La G a ze tte I T I M ER A l H E
/
r
Nf«
Ot>
ma
WEN COUDAR
d 'Is ra ë l
no
V
uLjd
m novimiii ihi hebdomadaire f ul l fT T uuKiuti m'4)%
LE JUDAÏSME TUNISIEN
PLEURE SES ENFANTS
The Victims of the Oslo Tragedy, 20 November 1949, with a Photo of Yitshak
Allai, below , as the Only Survivor (courtesy of La Gazette d ’Israël, 24 November
1949).
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 277
Tragedy in Oslo: The Remains of the Dakota Plane after the Crash (courtesy of
La Gazette d ’Israël, 24 November 1949).
December 43 10
January 1953 223 —
February 23 —
March 21 1
April 15 3
May 61 6
June 53 3
July 78 4
August 64 _4
T otal 899 72
Source: Y. Douer to ‘Aliyat ha-No‘ar, Tunis, 21 October 1953, CZA, S32/926,
Hebrew.
by the Oslo tragedy. The fact that people remembered him in Tunis as a
popular and admired emissary from the late 1940s, and being married to
a Tunisian Jewish woman, was of no consequence. Admitting failure in
Decem ber 1952, Douer wrote to David Umansky of cAliyat ha-No car in
Israel, that even the poor families no longer sent their children through
his office. Not only was caliya unattractive at the time, but Jewish orga
nizations such as the AJDC and ORT were helping the poor, providing
their children with meals and tuition-free vocational training. Hence
urbanite Jews, however poor, were in no hurry to leave.68
In August 1953 Douer was informed that cAliyat ha-No car would shut
down its operations in Tunisia effective October the same year. All
matters pertaining to youth caliya were to be handled by the general
emigration office, headed by Markuse. Efforts to revive cAliyat ha-No car
were only attempted once more in the late 1950s. Of the 402 children
that Douer cultivated for caliya, only seventy-two emigrated to Israel
(see table 18 for the numerical breakdown).
A pre-1956 Israeli presence connected with the Jewish Agency was
also felt in Tunisia through the activities of the Zionist political parties
and the DMO.
Politically, several of the emissaries in Tunisia representing youth
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 279
movements were responsible for laying the groundwork for active Israeli/
Zionist parties by 1949-50. Thus, the envoys of Dror and ha-Shomer ha-
Tsa cir represented Mapam, whereas their counterparts involved with
Bne-cAkiva/Bahad/Torah ve-cAvoda emerged as the spokesmen of ha-Po
cel ha-Mizrahi. Curiously, the only movement— both youth organization
and political party— absent from the scene was the dominant force in
Israeli society, namely Mapai.
Reflecting about his first mission to Tunisia in 1949-50 (July 1949-
September 1950) on behalf of Mapai and Gordonia (its youth movement,
also known as ha-Bonim), Yaïr Douer realized that not a single dynamic
spokesmen for Mapai and Gordonia could be found. Though Dwinger
was a member of Mapai, his work with the administrative aspects of the
caliya prevented him from plunging into political activity. Moreover,
Dwinger did not regard himself as an ideologue and had no experience
with youth movements. In order to enlist support for Mapai and intro
duce Gordonia into Tunisia, Douer lost no time in establishing close
contacts with progressive Jewish communal leaders.69
Beginning in summer 1949, Douer spoke to young audiences in Tunis,
Sfax, and Sousse about David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s premier and leader of
Mapai; what Mapai had accomplished in caliya, emigrant absorption,
economic development, and housing; and Gordonia/ha-Bonim— their
flourishing kibbutzim and m osham m . Among the community leaders
assisting Douer were Maître Sauveur Baranes, Meir Bellity, and René
Cohen-Hadria. Together they formed Mapai in Tunisia as an indepen
dent entity. Unlike Mapai in Morocco which was subordinate to the Po
cale Tsiyon movement in France and its Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi
leadership, Mapai in Tunisia was remote from the Po cale Tsiyon, main
taining channels of communication directly with Mapai’s Israeli leader
ship.70
Douer and his supporters, avowed socialists for the most part, reached
many communities. They then laid the foundations wherever the oppor
tunities availed themselves, for Mapai and Gordonia. Considering that
Baranes and Cohen-Hadria were members of the SFIO (the French
Socialist party and its Tunisian branch), they could assist Douer in at
tracting many of S F IO ’s Jewish followers to Mapai. And whereas in
1948-49 Mapam, too, sought to win adherents among SFIO members,
the latter found Mapai to be less ideologically confusing than Mapam,
and more politically pragmatic.
280 Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
Gordonia 3 0 0 -4 0 0
Dror 3 5 0 -4 0 0
Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir 3 0 0 -3 5 0
Ha-No car ha-Tsiyoni 3 0 0 -4 0 0
Bahad/Bne cAkiva 5 0 0 -6 0 0
program again, for what it did in Tunisia hardly differed from the work
accomplished in Morocco. On the other hand, in the area of self-defense,
or m agen, the DMO in Tunisia made an important contribution.
Self-defense training in Tunisia was attempted as early as 1943-44
when Ephraim Friedman (Ben-Hayyim), Yigal Cohen, and Naphtali Bar-
Giora— the Mossad Le cAliya/Jewish Agency emissaries— reached Tuni
sia and collaborated with Tseire-Tsiyon and other Zionist youth groups.
However, the total illegality of their status in Tunisia at the time, the
lack of an official or semi-official cover in the form of a Jewish Agency
setting from within, and lack of time rendered the emissaries' work
incomplete. Still, several Zionist youths swore allegiance in the emissar
ies' presence to the Yishuv’s Hagana organization, and partial training
was provided in the use of knives, firearms, sticks, and in Judo.73 Several
Jewish leaders, among them Maître Albert Bessis, who many years later
became a cabinet minister in Bourguiba’s government, Paul Ghez, and
Dr. Leopold Baretvas, assisted the emissaries in the process. When
rumors circulated at the end of World War II that a pogrom would be
organized in Tunis's h arat al-Y ahü dy the young persons trained in m agen
were organized to defend the ghetto. In the end, a pogrom did not occur.
Magen continued into the late 1940s. However, as Friedman recalls,
in 1947 the self-defense in North Africa as inspired by the model of the
Hagana in Palestine was no longer cohesive. Unlike the pre-1947 period
when magen in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria existed under a unified
command, after 1947 each country had a separate command. Magen in
Morocco was entrusted to Sam Abotbol whereas in Algeria it was headed
by Paul Sebaoun. The command in Tunisia was in the hands of Hanania
5El-cAl. During 1947 North African magen activists underwent advanced
training in Algeria and France. Also, the Religious Zionists organized in
Tunisia their own self-defense organization, known as ha-m agen ha-d ati,
about which we have no information. By 1949, m agen hardly functioned
in North Africa, as several of its key leaders emigrated to Israel leaving
behind the burden of self-defense to the small nucleus of ha-m agen ha-
d ati.74
The efforts to revive the secular m agen were attempted by the DMO
in 1949-50. In Tunisia, the training was conducted by Israeli emissaries,
the most important being Moshe Hababo (Arnon) from Kibbutz Regavlm.
Hababo’s responsibilities extended beyond Tunisia into the Jewish com
munity of Constantine in Algeria. Toward the end of 1950, forty young
282 Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
enemies of all Tunisians: the “reactionary cu/amâ5 and the Zitounists. The
Neo-Destour, Ladgham claimed, was secularly-oriented, reformist, and
unique in the sense that it was friendly to both the Jews of Tunisia and to
the State of Israel.80
Ladgham's objectives, it appears, were twofold: first, to secure indi
rectly Israel's vote at the United Nations in favor of French concessions
to Tunisia; and second, to present the Israelis and American Jewry with
a positive image, perhaps with the aim of utilizing their influence in
Washington. However, the Israelis at the United Nations were con
cerned about the Hafsia crisis. Rafael informed Ladgham that these
events had damaged the otherwise positive image of the Tunisian nation
alists, and that in the future the Neo-Destour supporters within Tunisia,
along with the other movements, would have to restrain various followers
or apolitical groups from intimidating the Jews. Ladgham's response was
that the French were the culprits. For years they adhered to the colonial
policy of divide et im pera with regard to Muslims and Jews, appearing as
the protector of the latter. He added that the Neo-Destour considered
the Arab League as a reactionary, divisive, and powerless organization
and, without raising the issue of bringing the Tunisian question before
the United Nations, Ladgham explained the aims of home rule.81
Israel's voting record shows that it favored a moderate United Nations
draft proposal submitted by the Latin American bloc to the General
Assembly, supporting the pursuance of Franco-Tunisian negotiations.
However, in a later round of voting, Israel rejected a more radical draft
proposal submitted by thirteen Arab and Asian nations calling upon
France to uphold Tunisia’s right to self-determination.82 In addition to
stressing the Hafsia incidents, Rafael hinted to Ladgham during the
meeting that it was Israel's decisive support at the United Nations the
year before which had determined the granting of independence to
Libya. Libya had already revealed its ingratitude to Israel. Would Tuni
sia really behave differently?83
Finally, when asked by Rafael if an autonomous Tunisia would permit
Jewish emigration to Israel, Ladgham observed that the Neo-Destour
appreciated Tunisian Jewish identification with that country’s national
struggle. Yet, in view of the persecution of the Jews throughout history,
it understood that many Tunisians would wish to settle in Israel, and this
the Neo-Destour would not oppose.84
Israeli diplomats often raised the issue of whether links with North
Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 285
African nationalists in general would in the long run benefit both Israel
and North African Jewry. Shmuel Divon, first secretary to the Israeli
embassy in Paris during the early 1950s, favored establishing secret ties
with the nationalists through nonofficial channels, with Marseilles serv
ing as the rendez-vous. The fate of French colonialism had been decided,
he contended, and independence for North Africa was drawing close.
Such contacts behind the back of the French government might help
safeguard the position of nearly 500,000 North African Jews.85
On the other hand, Emile Najar, a leading Israeli diplomat involved
with the questions of Middle Eastern and North African Jewry, took a
different view in response to Divon’s suggestion. He held that behind-
the-scenes talks with the nationalists could very well damage Franco-
Israeli relations, as France was in a constant state of alert regarding its
colonial interests. Moreover, such contacts would probably be exploited
by the nationalists for public relations purposes and Israel would receive
nothing in return. It would be preferable to maintain open links with
some of these forces, as demonstrated by the Ladgham-Rafael meeting.86
While we have no way of determining if secret talks took place be
tween 1952 and 1956, Najar s views were supported by prominent French
Jewish leaders close to the Quai d’Orsay who were probably pressured to
discourage Israel, and Tunisian Jewish intellectuals who supported the
Neo-Destour financially and morally. Not only did they oppose the pos
sibility of secret contacts but several of them criticized Israeli efforts to
meet nationalists in the open, warning the Israeli government that such
a policy would endanger the position of North African Jewry.
An illustrative example is to be found in an urgent message bearing on
the Tunisian question at the United Nations sent by René Cassin, the
president of the AIU, to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett on 13 June
1952. According to Cassin, rumors were circulating that the Arab states
boasted they could gain Israel’s support for the convocation of a special
session on Tunisia in the General Assembly.87
Cassin warned Sharett that North African Jewry would be in a difficult
position if Israel endorsed nationalist claims at the United Nations or
some other international forum. The AIU, he said, having acquired vast
field experience in those communities over many decades— in the edu
cational, social, and political spheres— was their guardian. Cassin criti
cized what he termed the lack of realism prevalent among Americans
who supported Tunisian nationalist claims (he was particularly concerned
286 Tunisia’s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry
with the supporters of the Vieux Destour who in his opinion were
extremists), an example Israel should not follow. If the French were
forced to evacuate parts of North Africa, the position of the Jews could
become impossible. Given the risks involved and the danger of pogroms,
it was the duty of the AIU to sound the alarm and convince Israel not to
back Tunisian claims; otherwise Israel's support would be like “une
opération meurtrière” (a murderous operation) against Tunisian Jewry.88
C h a p ter 9
T h e I m m e d ia te P o s t - I n d e p e n d e n c e E r a — U ntil
F a ll 1 9 5 7
287
288 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
who was none other than Bahi Ladgham. They informed the delegation
that emigration would not be forbidden. However, those Jews who de
cided to remain were expected to demonstrate their loyalty as good
citizens. Bourguiba explained to his visitors that the structure of the
Jewish communities had to be reorganized and directed exclusively by
Jews of Tunisian nationality. He added that representative bodies of the
communities would be able to arrange religious, cultural, and philan
thropic events, and the Jewish organizations— AIU, AJDC, ORT, O SE,
W JC — would maintain their influence. On the other had, the govern
ment would not provide the twenty million francs subvention to the
community federations as the French Protectorate had done, because
these bodies were still dominated by non-Tunisian nationals who could
receive assistance from foreign sources.3
In 1956-57 Bourguiba was quite popular among the Jewish masses.
He reached the zenith of his popularity after calling on the Egyptian
ambassador and protesting against Nasser s policy of expelling Jews from
Egypt in the wake of the October-Novem ber Sinai/Suez Middle East
war. Bourguiba was particularly adamant about the expulsion of Tunisian
Jewish nationals living in Egypt for decades who now became refugees.
Even those Jews who thought that their economic situation in an inde
pendent Tunisia was uncertain still argued that, as long as Bourguiba
remained in power, they had little to be concerned with.4
Continuing to serve as caliya director in 1956-57, Markuse did not
believe that Bourguiba’s positive gestures on Egyptian Jewry’s behalf, or
his cordial relations with Tunisia’s Jews, could be traced merely to hu
manitarian and liberal traditions. Reporting to Shragai on 10 January
1957, Markuse remarked that when Bourguiba visited the United States
several months earlier, he sought to procure loans for Tunisian national
development from international banks and the Eisenhower administra
tion. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
appeared undecided over this issue and Bourguiba’s aides contended that
the reluctance might have been part of a “wait and see” strategy. The
Eisenhower administration wanted to see if Bourguiba would institute
genuine democracy in his country as promised; and whether or not his
domestic opposition as well as exiled opponents in Egypt, among them
Salâh Ben-Youssef, could succeed in undermining the regime. More
over, Eisenhower was not about to alienate the French government with
which Bourguiba was on bad terms at the tim e.5
290 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
guarantees for every passport bearer. The guarantee procedure was meant
to ensure that the Jewish Agency be held responsible for the emigrants.
Should the latter choose to return to Tunisia, Israel or the Jewish Agency,
not the Tunisian government, would bear the brunt of the financial and
welfare matters on their behalf.8
Once it resumed, the caliya declined. The numbers dropped from
6,545 in 1956 to 2,618 in 1957. This sharp decline was partly attributed
to the increased emigration to France. In April 1956 the United HIAS
Service opened its offices in Tunis to assist 1,200 Jews to emigrate to
countries other than Israel.9 The decline in emigration was also due to
the feeling among Jews that Bourguiba had succeeded in consolidating
his power and in neutralizing the Youssefites (Salâh Ben-Youssef s sup
porters) whom they considered as their enem ies.10
The fact that Bourguiba tolerated the presence of the caliya emissaries
and permitted the Jewish Agency apparatus in Tunis and other regions
to function, was a unique phenomenon in the Arab world of the 1950s. It
was also suggested that Bourguiba understood that, had he emulated the
Moroccan example of banning Cadima, the process would have been
organized clandestinely.11 As Markuse remarked:
[The] approach [of the authorities] is pragmatic. The fact of the matter is that
they continue to supply us with passports. In the passport France is entered as
the country of emigration, but they know very well that the passport bearers are
making caliya [via France]. . . . They are compelled to give satisfaction to Arab
pressure in the Middle East and consequently they refrain from stipulating in the
passports that Israel is the emigrants’ country of destination.12
among the Muslims.13 After their interrogations were over Markuse and
Heimon returned to their office to conduct business as usual; the mate
rials confiscated from them, including the funds, were handed back. Dan
Kariv was expelled from Tunisia while Herzberg and his local assistants
were tried and then imprisoned for one month before being expelled
from the country.14
The second incident occurred in August 1957. Two Israeli emissaries,
Ya cakov Hefer representing the Jewish Agency's Department of Torah
Education in the Diaspora, and Gershon Har-Tov of No car ve-he-Haluts,
were summoned by the Tunis police for interrogations. They were beaten,
threatened at gunpoint, and coerced to sign a document attesting they
were not “French spies." The only person who could render some assis
tance to them was Zvi Heitner, Markuse's successor as head of the caliya
office. Not as well connected with the authorities as his predecessor,
Heitner, an Israeli who carried a Belgian passport, nevertheless told the
police commissioner that his men behaved toward the emissaries in a
manner contrary to Bourguiba's policy statements. He said that, should
the emissaries be detained longer or harassed, the Israeli government
would publish articles in the major Western European and American
newspapers to enlighten the public about human rights violations in
Tunisia. The commissioner released the emissaries and promised that
such incidents would not recur.15
How were the emissaries of No car ve-he-Haluts and the Department
of Torah Education in the Diaspora able to organize Zionist youth edu
cational activities? After the Fédération Sioniste de Tunisie ceased to
function in 1956, Zionist youth movements and their Israeli guides car
ried out their programs under the auspices of the Federation of Jewish
Youth in Tunis. Officially non-Zionist, this federation served as a cover
for Zionist action because the authorities recognized its legitimacy in the
Jewish cultural domain.16 Curiously, the federation was administered by
several of the emissaries, among them the aforementioned Dan Kariv
and Dov Foder from Kibbutz Hazor who, like Heitner, was a Belgian
national. According to Kariv, the authorities were aware of the Zionist
orientation of programs under the guise of the federation, but chose to
tolerate this as long as the emissaries and m adnhxm conducted their
affairs with the utmost discretion.17 This freedom of action extended to
other communities. Atereth-Tsiyon in Jerba, founded in 1919, continued
to function well into the late 1950s; it was dissolved by the community.18
From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 293
I told Havilio that I consider his plan to be far too daring for the moment. I
suggested to him to have Israeli officers trained as educators for Hebrew culture
and physical education, so they may provide the youths with moral and physical
training which is indispensable for understanding the [conceptual] significance of
self-defense. But they must desist from its actual application, postponing it to a
later period.21
Golan added that this problem had to be discussed in the upper echelons
of the Israeli government, preferably between Pinhas Lavon, the defense
chief, and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the president of the W JC .22
In the final analysis, Havilio’s recommendations were approved. In an
interview with this author, he admitted that his fears of Tunisian nation
294 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
alists were unfounded. The Tunisians had definitely been sincere. The
main problem was the Algerian factor in Tunisian society, particularly
after Tunisia became independent:
major challenges came to the fore,26 as was very much the case in
Algeria.
who sought to emigrate to Israel were refused passports for at least eight
months.33 It seems that the authorities, as Mestiri told the W JC the year
before, wanted southern Jews to remain for economic reasons. Jewish
Agency sources also claimed that, as the regime s fiercest opponents were
concentrated in the south, and considering that the Jews constituted a
loyal pro-government element, even though only 5,000 of them dwelt
there, their continued presence was encouraged.34 On the other hand,
Jews from Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse easily obtained passports. In order to
circumvent the restrictions for the south, Heitner transported southern
Jews to Tunis. After several weeks they received their passports as if
they were residents of that city. These operations went unnoticed, for so
few emigrants from the south opted for 'aliya.35
Special insights into political and social life in Tunisia in general and
in the Jewish communities in particular are evident in a special report by
Yitshak Yeger, a senior Jewish Agency official who visited the country in
December 1959. Despite Bourguibas optimistic forecasts about Tunisia’s
political future, Youssefites’ opposition in the south led his regime to
adopt repressive measures against them. The jails of the south and the
north were filled to capacity with political opponents, including the
former governor of Jerba. The opposition, moreover, intensified across
the Arab world following Bourguibas decision to challenge Nasser’s lead
ership and to boycott the Arab League, one year after Tunisia joined it.36
Regarding Israel, Yeger was pleasantly surprised by the regime’s be
havior. The government’s semi-official organ, L a P resse, published infor
mation about Israeli society regularly, which included the results of the
1959 elections to the Knesset. On United Nations Day, flags were dis
played in the window of the American Cultural Center, among them
Israel’s flag with the country’s name in both Arabic and English.37 No
other Arab country in the Middle East and North Africa would have
permitted a display of the Jewish state’s national symbols in its midst. It
was also commonplace for Tunisian cabinet ministers to discuss with
admiration Israeli national and economic developments, notably in the
agricultural sector.
These attitudes were welcomed by Tunisia’s Jewish masses, although
their support of the regime was confined to Bourguiba and his personal
ity. They did not adhere to the Neo-Destour party with any special
enthusiasm. When top-ranking party and government officials visited the
h arat al-Y ahüd in Tunis sometime in 1959, only four people showed up
298 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
for a reception in their honor. Jewish leaders panicked. They went into
the cafés and roamed the streets to gather an audience. Only a few
people actually agreed to cooperate. Then, on 1 November 1959, the
date marking the fifth anniversary of Algeria s revolt against the French,
the chief rabbi of Tunis was invited to a reception honoring Algerian
leader Ferhat cAbbas. According to Yeger, the only reason the chief rabbi
accepted the invitation from the Neo-Destour was out of concern that his
absence could have caused a rift between the community and the re
gime.38
Whereas the ordinary Jews supported Bourguiba, even if they were
indifferent to the Neo-Destour party, the Jewish leadership of the late
1950s became suspicious of his intentions concerning their status as
communal heads.39 This attitude on their part was not altogether unjus
tified, given the fact that the government was determined to reorganize
the Jewish communities in 1958-61. Already in April 1958, Ahmad
Mestiri submitted a draft law proposing certain reforms to Tunisian
Jewish leaders. The law called for the establishment of tem porary man
agement committees (Comités Provisoires de Gestion) to become effec
tive— beginning with Tunis— during the second half of that year. When
the law was promulgated in Tunis (1958) and the rest of the country (by
the early 1960s), it dissolved the community councils as well as the
welfare funds. It also restricted the competence of the communal organi
zations to religious matters, religious services and concomitant philan
thropic activities, as well as religious education for the youths. One of
the reasons for the disbandment of the councils was the governments
contention that their leadership, composed of personalities such as Charles
Haddad, was not sufficiently Tunisian in culture and outlook.40 Surpris
ingly, the new management committees, controlled by the more politi
cally acceptable leaders, retained the tem porary status and remained
unaltered until the 1970s.
Without underestimating Bourguiba’s reforms, the possibility of abso
lute loyalty of Jewish leaders to an independent Tunisia was placed in
doubt by certain political forces within the country. No longer was it a
matter of choice between loyalty to colonial rule or to the nationalist
movement. The decision of the Jewish leadership had to be a one-way
street.
Though the newly appointed leadership, willingly or unwillingly, en
dorsed the government’s decision, officials of international Jewish welfare
From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 299
These caliya operations were the only deviations from the M isgeret’s
functions in Tunisia that were in the framework of self-defense. Regard
ing Metuk, he later settled in Israel where he was presented with a
special award for his role in the rescue mission by Yitshak Ben-Zvi,
Israel s president.
Many Jews throughout the country believed that their communal life
had drawn to an end in 1961. According to Jewish sources, there were
further political developments which encouraged Jews to leave in in
creasing numbers. First, Bizerte had accentuated the Jewish problem
because the Tunisians accused the Jews of having been identified with
the French from the start. This had shaken the faith of Tunisian Jewry in
the attitude of their Muslim compatriots. Second, the clashes in Oran
(Algeria) between Jews and Muslims in 1961, at the height of the Alge
rian Revolution, had received ample coverage in the Tunisian press,
showing North African Jewry as a whole in the most unfavorable light.
Consequently, many Jews had reached the conclusion that, since the
press was partially government-controlled, these articles reflected Bour-
guiba’s attitude. Third, following Bizerte, there were indications that
during the early autumn of 1961 Bourguiba adopted a closer approach to
the Arab League and Nasser, after having kept his distance from them in
1959.46
There was some concern over the unfolding of political events among
AJDC and United HIAS Service officials. The position of the United
HIAS was that Tunisia’s Jewry had suffered a serious setback resulting
from the crisis. Yet French nationals (mostly non-Jews) were the main
target of the authorities. The latter were expelled in significant numbers,
picked up by the police at their homes, and escorted straight to the
airport or boats, often without a chance to change their clothes. This
measure, however, was never applied to whole families but only to men
who were either professionals or well-known French activists. As for
emigration, a United HIAS report noted that, except for the restrictions
imposed in Bizerte,
many Tunisian Jews (with their families) have taken advantage of the vacation
season and left for France with tourist visas. Since the Bizerte crisis emigration
to Israel has gained a new impetus. Many Jewish families eager to leave the
country have already left, or will be leaving soon, for Israel. This movement is
working out smoothly and without any interference from the government author
ities. It was said that restrictions were established for the issuance of passports.
302 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
However, the great rush of applications has created a slow-down in the process
ing.47
Bizerte 200 88 55 59 46
Mateur 40 45 45 40 22
Béja 90 90 80 70 59
Suq el-Khemis 11 — — — —
Testour 55 — — — —
Gafsa 97 97 90 80 —
In 1964 the authorities once again placed obstacles in the way of Jews
wishing to emigrate to Israel. To lift the restrictions, Easterman met with
Bourguiba in Switzerland on 2 September 1964. Bourguiba denied that
his office instructed the Ministry of the Interior to curb emigration,
adding:
You know that I have never stood in the way of Jews leaving Tunisia for Israel;
departures are still continuing. I am the only Head of State in the Arab world
who has voluntarily not prevented Jews from emigrating to Israel. I have followed
this practice consistently over the years, sometimes in the face of pressures upon
me to reverse my attitude, and I have not changed.50
Despite the denials, the problems did exist. During the Bourguiba-
Easterman meeting the former contradicted himself and suggested that
if certain obstacles were encountered by Tunisian Jews it was because
“you must realize that it is impossible for me to ignore and detach myself
from events which, in the Arab world, are passionately regarded as of
major importance to the Arab states/ 51
It appears that the main opponent of Jewish emigration in 1964 was
Mongi Slim, Tunisia’s foreign minister, who emerged as a firm advocate
of improved relations with Egypt’s Nasser and the Syrians. Bourguiba
apparently succumbed to Slim’s influence over the emigration issue. The
restrictions were lifted, however. In November 1964 Bourguiba was
reelected president by 96.43 percent of the voting population, which was
generally regarded as strengthening his authority. He dismissed Slim
and appointed his son, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., as foreign minister. By the
end of November the temporary restrictions on the issuance of passports
were withdrawn. These developments served to encourage Tunisian Jews
in the hope that no further discriminatory measures against them would
likely be taken by the new government.52
Until the June 1967 war, Bourguiba s government did not heed the
warnings from Cairo or Damascus to halt Jewish emigration. In March
1965, Bourguiba Jr. informed Easterman that Nasser had been told in
categorical terms that any attempt on his part to exercise pressures or to
influence Tunisia in any direction would not be tolerated.53 Therefore,
Shragai could still boast in 1965 that “despite the hardships confronted
by the Jewish Agency’s office in Tunis, it still functioned and remained
the last Israeli and Zionist address in the Tunisian diaspora.”54 But he
306 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
added that one of the reasons for the limited caliy a, and increased emi
gration to France in recent years, had to do with the description in the
Tunisian media about Israel s socioeconomic difficulties and its uncon
trollable security problems.55
On 28 November 1966, Bourguiba, speaking in an old synagogue in
Jerba, declared, “Our State belongs to all Tunisians without distinction
of race or religion. It is concerned with helping all its Tunisian sons,
whatever their faith. In return, it asks of them only sincerity in their
words and devotion in their deeds/ 56 This declaration was welcomed by
the Jewish communities which had been reduced by then to approxi
mately 25,000, because it assured them that the head of state remained
the guarantor of their rights. However, the clouds of danger hovered
over the Jews nearly six months later with the outbreak of the June 1967
war.
On 5 June, a crowd of Tunisian Muslims, shouting such slogans as
“Down with the Jews/' “Into the Sea with the Jews/' “Let s Bum the
Jew s,” burnt the monumental Star of David adorning the front of the
Great Synagogue of Tunis. Dozens of vehicles were damaged. The dem
onstrators even tried to set fire to the buildings in which the frantic
Jewish population had sought refuge. Jewish stores, including the Bock-
boza kosher winery in the suburbs of Tunis, were looted. Many young
Jews were attacked and beaten.57
Bourguiba did not learn of the incident until late in the evening. In a
televised speech the next day, he called the demonstrators “irresponsible
fanatics who deserve the gallows. ” Eighty of them were arrested, and the
government promised severe punishment for them.58
After the demonstrations, a large-scale polemic began in the French
press. Numerous witnesses asserted that the demonstrations were not
spontaneous, but had been thoroughly organized. Others added that the
police even lent a hand. One Tunisian Jewish observer said privately that
it was “a concerted action, planned in detail in high quarters,” and
added: “This veritable pogrom has left a permanent mark on us.” In
answer to the polemic, the Tunisian government published a commu
niqué, denying that the demonstrations had been organized. Two weeks
later the head of Tunisia’s national police was replaced in recognition of
the fact that intervention by the police had not been rapid and efficient
enough.59
In August 1967 a rumor circulated among Jewish leaders that Bour-
From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 307
guiba faced opposition from Planning Minister Ahmad Ben Salah, a hard
liner in his government. As a result many families left the country in
haste— and this despite Bourguiba s declarations; the imprisonment of
some of the demonstrators; the official apologies to the Chief Rabbi
Nessim Cohen; the manifesto signed by a number of Tunisian intellec
tuals expressing “solidarity with their Jewish fellow citizens”; and the
appointment of a commission that was to appraise the damage to Jewish
merchants so that they could be indemnified. Most of them went to
France.60
After the late 1960s the remaining communities lived in peace. Until
1982 no major conflicts emerged between Muslims and Jews, even dur
ing the 1973 Middle East war. It was after 1982, however, when the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moved its headquarters to Tun
isia, that Judeo-Muslim relations deteriorated, particularly at times of
Israeli military operations inside Tunisia against this force. Still, as long
as Bourguiba seemed in charge, Jewish life was somehow preserved. His
removal from power on 7 November 1987 may have placed the Jews in
danger. Moreover, the growing threat of the Muslim fundamentalists in
North Africa— their gains in Algerian municipal elections in 1990 under
the banner of the Islamic Salvation Front, led by cAbassI al-Madanl and
Ahmad Belhaj; the attempt by similar movements in Morocco to muster
support against the Sharifian monarchy; and their ability to win adherents
in the challenge against secular authority in Tunisia even prior to Bour-
guibas downfall— can only hasten the ongoing communal self-liquidation
process. Only the current peace process may halt it.
Economically, the educational system of the communities— French
mission schools (MUCF), as well as Rabbinic schools, AIU, O RT— could
not provide a bright future for young Jews after the mid-1960s. Several
factors account for this situation. In the first place, economic conditions
in the country had become increasingly unstable since the Bizerte crisis
for Muslims and Jews alike. Secondly, Jewish craftsmen were systemati
cally and progressively eliminated in most fields of endeavor, with the
exception of the jewelers who had entered into the jewelers’ cooperative.
Practically all Jewish artisans, unwilling to become employees or to join
the new socialist-inspired cooperatives, intended to leave the country
sooner or later. Thirdly, gradually but evidently, the number of small
Jewish business enterprises was also decreasing, as Jews sold out to
Muslims or simply abandoned their shops whose position, economically,
308 From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence
310
Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 311
well as meat sales, gifts, and retributions for religious ceremonies such as
marriages and circumcisions. The expenses included salaries for the rab
bis. As in previous years, the consistoires were composed of lay members
from among the people in the communities. They had to be twenty-one
years old or older and residents of their community for not less than
twelve months. The supreme consistorial council members whose ranks
included the chief rabbis, lay presidents and vice-presidents, were elected
by a secret ballot. To become eligible, they had to be at least twenty-five
years old and French nationals. The terms to which they were elected
could not exceed eight years.
As we have seen, in 1947 the communities and their consistories
created the FCIA which served as an umbrella organization to unite the
consistories and other communal bodies. The FCIA was administered
during the late 1940s and early 1950s by a council in which the chief
rabbi of Algeria, the chief rabbis of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, and
the consistorial presidents represented the supreme leadership of Alge
rian Jewry. These leaders, too, were elected officials, usually for a two-
year term, although in practice they served for longer terms. Their work
was supplemented in the mid-1950s by sixty-one community members of
whom twenty-one represented the départem en t of Algiers, twenty-two
the dép artem en t of Oran, and eighteen the départem ent of Constantine.3
The FCIA ’s budget depended on the very same financial resources as
the con sistoires’ budget. A substantial portion of the allocations went to
subsidize the Ecole Rabbinique— created in 1948 at Algiers and admin
istered by Rabbi M. Fingerhut, Algeria’s chief rabbi— which trained the
future rabbinic elite of teachers and spiritual leaders. The students at the
Ecole Rabbinique received the second cycle of secondary education
leading to the baccalau réat examinations. For the first time in 1954-55,
three rabbis completed their six years of training and received their
diplomas. They later performed important religious functions in the
smaller communities where they were needed.4
Educationally, progress in developing Jewish studies was modest,
albeit evident, in the post-W orld War II period. Though many youths
continued to attend French government schools, including the Univer
sity of Algiers, Jewish religious schools on the primary level also enjoyed
partial growth owing to the intensified efforts of the FCIA, the AJDC,
and the Jewish Agency. However, as late as April 1954, only 2,500 youths
frequented talm ûdê tôrah throughout the country, several of which were
Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 313
affiliated with the AIU. The largest of these institutions was in Constan
tine with 1,000 children. Algiers had 250 children in talm ùdê tô ra h ,
whereas Oran and Tlemcen had 350 and 150, respectively. It was the
FCIA s goal to enroll at least 15,000 children in such schools as part- or
full-time pupils, a challenge that could not be met in modern-day Jewish
Algeria. It was feared that the absence of Jewish youths from such
institutions would pose serious problems, for a new generation emerged
that was completely deprived of any Jewish education.5
The major obstacle rendering comprehensive Jewish education incom
plete was attributed to the fact that education at French government
schools in Algeria, as in France, was obligatory; and in principle, all
Jewish children were admitted into these schools. Not only were Jewish
youths in the major cities exposed to secular influences, but the majority
could attend talm ùdê tôrah only during recess periods. The French
educational system consisted of five days of class and two days of recess:
Thursday and Sunday. These two days of recess enabled the children to
rest, for the programs at the French-type government schools were
generally “plus chargés” (more demanding) than those of other countries.
As no courses in religious education were given in the secular govern
ment schools, the consistoires supported the talm ùdê tôrah to bridge the
gap by offering Jewish studies during the two-day recess period and
during summer vacations.6
Other educational initiatives included the efforts of the DMO and the
Department of Torah Education in the Diaspora (DTE hereafter). As in
Morocco and Tunisia, the DMO s endeavors were short-lived. Arye Lie-
berman, one of its representatives who served as a school principal at an
AIU-affiliated talm üd tôrah in Constantine, introduced partial curricular
reforms by adding the teaching of modern Hebrew, Jewish history, and
aspects of Zionism. However, he did not alter the religious curriculum
itself so as to avert a conflict with the rabbis. Lieberman also trained his
Algerian-Jewish staff and prepared them to meet the challenge of teach
ing Israeli-oriented subjects. Like their counterparts in Oran and Algiers,
Jewish pupils in Constantine frequented the French public schools and
came to the AIU-affiliated talm ùd tôrah on Sundays, Thursdays, Chris
tian holidays, and during summer vacations. Still, Constantine Jewry
made certain that most Jewish businesses were closed on Saturdays and
Jewish holidays. Mixed marriages (between Jews and Europeans) in that
community were fewer than in Oran and Algiers, while their support for
314 Algeria’s Political and Social Struggle
Bouchara of Constantine. They raised funds for the JN F and other Zionist
enterprises, organized Zionist cultural programs, and helped promote
caliya.
The Mossad Le cAliya and the Jewish Agency played a predominant
role inside Algeria between 1947 and 1950. First and foremost, during
the clandestine caliya phase of 1947-48, they assisted in transporting to
Israel Moroccan and Tunisian Jews who entered Algerian territory as
transients. Local Zionist leaders such as Elie Gozlan, Eizer Sharqui, Paul
Sebaoun, David and Raphael Zaga, and M. Dadon participated in the
process. Then, in 1949-50, when caliya from North Africa was semilegal,
those Moroccan Jews left behind for medical reasons were placed at
special camps in Algeria. There they received treatment and were reha
bilitated for eventual emigration. Israeli operations from 1950 included
an caliya apparatus and a small cAliyat ha-No car bureau. The emissaries
entrusted with the caliya in the mid- and late 1950s had often risked their
lives. In 1956-58 the leading emissaries were Ya cakov Hasan (head of
the emigration agency and former envoy with Morocco s Cadima), Yo5 el
Arikha, Gabriel Azoulay, cOvadia Bijou (in charge of the screening team),
Raphael Ben-Guera, Moshe Gabay (head of the caliya office branch in
Oran), and Avraham Hovel (responsible for cAliyat ha-No car).n
Considering that caliya from Algeria included both Algerian and Mo
roccan elements, the data in table 24 show how few Algerians regarded
emigration as a serious option. With the exception of Jews from Constan
tine and the M czab, that is, the more traditional or economically disad
vantaged, departure of any significance was directed toward France. This
is explained by the strong attachment of Algeria’s Jews to French culture.
316 Algeria's Political and Social Struggle
From the time Ya cakov Hasan was entrusted with the caliya (Novem
ber 1956) until November 1957, 1,092 Jews left for Israel. The emigrants
in 1956-57 were mostly Moroccan Jews who lived in the départem en t of
Oran for many years, and Algerian Jews from the M czab.12
Turning to political and economic factors, at the end of World War II
prewar Algerian-Muslim/French tensions, obscured or rendered latent
in wartime, were to reappear. The world war had shaken the foundations
of the French colonial empire and opened the way for Algerians to appear
as a force in history. France had been beaten, and once liberated in
August 1944 was no longer in a moral or physical position to behave as a
major power. Indo-China and the Levant had rejected or were challeng
ing France's tutelage. Algeria, although considered part of Metropolitan
France, was as vulnerable as any Arab state to the siren calls of indepen
dence. 13
Muslim Algerians, after the war, found themselves between two worlds:
the modern Western world and the world of their historical Arabo-
Berber past. As David C. Gordon noted, the Muslims, alienated from
both, were now to take the initiative in coming to terms with both. The
Revolution was to be a struggle both for entry into the modern world and
for the revitalization of Islamic values. It was to be a rejection of both the
deadening hand of a corrupted past and of France. All colonial revolu
tions are characterized by this duality, but in the case of Algeria the
duality, or dichotomy, was especially marked— because of the length of
the conquest (since 1830), because of the unusual exposure of its elite to
French acculturation, and because it had lived so long on the edges of
the modern and Western economic and social world of the colons. O f all
the Muslim Arab states, Algeria was the most cut off from its past because
it had gone, even if superficially, so far into the twentieth-century world
of the West. And because the masses of its population had lived in the
traditional world in a state of abject poverty and illiteracy, Algeria had
the furthest to go toward bridging the gap between the past and the
present. The leaders of the Revolution were to call themselves crusaders
(m ujahidün— from jih â d or holy war) and to consider alcohol and tobacco
as symbols of betrayal. Simultaneously, they were to conceive of the
Revolution as progressivist— as a revolution to open to the Muslim
masses the modernity the colons had denied them. And, unlike the
French Protectorate system in Tunisia or Morocco, the very fact that the
European Algerian co lo n s presence was deeply rooted and pervasive
Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 317
meant that Algeria would experience more than any Arab and Berber
people the brutalities and the disruptions of a long and cruel colonial
war. 14
The objective situation of the Muslims was clear enough. Algerian
nationalists had little need to falsify the data they gathered to reveal the
inequalities of the Algerian colon-dominated economic and political sys
tem. In 1954 only 11 percent of the active working population, the
colons, held 42 percent of all industrial jobs; 90 percent of industrial and
commercial activity was in European hands (only 19 percent of those
employed in the nationalized economic sector were Muslims); one Mus
lim child out of ten went to school— almost all Algerian Jewish and
European children did; 94 percent of the men and 98 percent of Muslim
women were illiterate. Only about 7,000 Muslims were in secondary and
685 in higher education.15
Whereas the Jews obtained French citizenship in 1870 and non-French
European settlers could do so by virtue of the French naturalization law
of 1889, it was only after World War II, by the Organic Statute of 1947,
that legal French citizenship was extended to Muslims. Yet the modes of
its application continued to keep them subordinate to the colon s, and
Muslim representation in the Algerian Assembly was limited to the
second college of this bicameral body.16
The month of May 1945 was a crucial turning point in French-Algerian
relations and is considered as a prelude to the 1954 Revolution. On 8
May, clashes between the police and 7 ,0 0 0 -8 ,0 0 0 demonstrators in Sétif
(départem ent of Constantine), calling for the release from prison of Mes-
sali Hadj, incited the police to open fire. The demonstrators dispersed
and then began to attack European settlers and pillage property. Fright
ened and indignant, the police and militia units of armed European
civilians, supported by the communists, struck back. For several days
the region of Constantine lived in a state of terror, jails were opened,
and prisoners shot; helpless civilians were massacred and homes razed
by aerial and naval bombardment. The number of Muslims killed re
mains a matter of dispute, with the most conservative estimate at 1,500
and the most extravagant at 80,000.17
The Muslims were now determined to break with France at any price
and were prepared to resort to violence to achieve their goal. This was
bound to spell trouble for the Jews, according to communal spokesmen,
because in order to maintain their colonial grip, the French would finally
318 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
have to appease the Muslims, even at the Jews’ expense. While Jews
were not victimized by the Sétif massacre, Joseph Fischer, the JN F
French delegate to North Africa, expressed pessimism and said that, as a
result of the immediate post-W orld War II developments, Muslims
would have access to administrative posts and schools; positions usually
held by Jews would be taken over by them as part of France s attempt to
cement the cracks in the colonial edifice.18
The efforts by the French to suppress overt expressions of nationalism
and arrest Muslim leaders drove Algerians to clandestine activity. The
frustrations of 8 May 1945 could not be contained, however. At 1:00 a . m .
on 1 November 1954, the Algerian Revolution against France com
menced with sporadic attacks upon French installations in different parts
of Algeria. The uprising, which caught the French unaware, was then
the work of comparatively few people who formed the Front for National
Liberation (FLN hereafter).19 They called for Algerian sovereignty. Among
its leaders were Muhammad Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ahmad, Ahmad Ben-
Bella, and Lakhdar Ben Tobbal. Whereas Ben-Bella and other key FLN
leaders were arrested by the French in October 1956, the Revolution
that they began in November 1954 continued until the summer of 1962,
and ended with President de Gaulle’s willingness to grant Algeria inde
pendence.
The events in the wake of the Revolution, and the climate of terror
and insecurity which it had produced, led to the disintegration of several
small Jewish communities in the interior and the south, whose inhabi
tants migrated to the larger cities or to France. Until 1956-57 the state
of war was more intense in the interior than in Algiers, insofar as the
Jews were concerned. In the city of Algiers the post-1956 period inaugu
rated the imposition of curfew regulations from midnight until 5:00 a . m .
In several cities the curfew began at 9:00 p . m . Despite their fears, the
Jewish masses supported in a discreet manner the firm action adopted by
the French against the rebels.20
It was during this time that FLN-inspired terrorism and French coun
terterrorism also affected the lives of the Jews. Several unfortunate inci
dents occurred that included an attack on the Jews of Constantine (dis
cussed in this chapter), the burning of the synagogues of Orléanville and
Batna, and the harassment of rabbis and notables at Batna and else
where.21 These were partly attributed to the neutral stance of Jewish
leaders and intellectuals over the conflict and their reluctance to support
Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 319
During the dramatic hour through which we are now passing, when the breach
is steadily growing wider between the different elements of the population, the
Jews of this country— where they lived for over two thousand years, profoundly
grateful to France, to whom they owe so much— intend to remain faithful to the
commandments that bind them to the two other religious communities, Muslim
and Christian. Their firm hope is to continue to live in close friendship with
both.22
The City of Constantine in the 1950s (courtesy of the Organization of the Former
North African Underground Activists in Israel).
scription is partial and unclear; the events of May 1956 warrant a fuller
investigation.
There are, in fact, a few accounts and conflicting dates about the
events. The London Jewish Chronicle reported that on 12 or 13 May a
hand grenade was thrown into a Jewish-owned café in the old Jewish
quarter of Constantine, injuring thirteen people. Then, on 14 May, a
group of Muslims entered another Jewish café. Suspecting a second
attack, several of the Jewish clients pulled out revolvers and killed them
on the spot.24
Another account was published in La Dépêche de Constantine. On 13
May a grenade exploded in the afternoon at a small Jewish cafe on Rue
Sidi-Lakhdar, injuring twelve people. According to this version, the
attack was planned in advance. The authorities stepped in, cleared the
streets, and apprehended several suspects who were later taken to Mosque
Sidi al-Kettani for interrogations. At the same time, the French security
services claimed that the Muslims involved in the café bombing were not
residents of the city. They arrived there without weapons but were
subsequently supplied with grenades and revolvers by women affiliated
with the F L N .25
Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 321
further suggested that for a long time the wholesale cloth and linen
industry was a Jewish monopoly. By 1956-57 that was no longer the
case. If until the end of World War II the Jews played a powerful role as
trade intermediaries between Europeans and the Muslims, this was
altered as Muslims entered business positions. The same was true, they
said, of the small dealer and shopkeeper whose Muslim clientele was
dwindling.33
Fears based on economics were downplayed by Henry L. Levy, ap
pointed in February 1957 as the director of AJDC-Algeria. He thought
that, contrary to the grim assessments, the French poured enormous
sums of money into the country to bolster the economy to everyone’s
benefit. The presence of hundreds of thousands of French troops and
their families, and oil diggings in the Algerian Sahara, was helping Jewish
businessmen. In fact, there was an increase in the amount of money Jews
deposited in saving accounts.34
A similar position was described by Jacques Lazarus, the director of
the W JC North African central bureau headquartered in Algiers. In his
opinion, the Muslim boycott evident in 1956 had virtually ended by
1958. Not only did Jews cease to leave Algeria in large numbers, but
several families had returned from France. Lazarus attributed this phe
nomenon to increased security in the urban centers, Algeria’s apparent
economic stability, and the difficult challenges Algerian Jewish emigrants
encountered in France and Israel. Yet he was somewhat less optimistic
than Henry L. Levy when assessing long-range developments. He warned
that the sharp increase in the Muslim labor force— 60,000 to 80,000 new
workers per year— not to mention that as many as 300,000 Muslim
youths were of school age, would eventually push the Jews out of lucra
tive job s.35
Differences in forecasts notwithstanding, it seems that, as late as 1958,
nearly four years after the start of the Revolution, the Jews were rela
tively well represented in the private and public economic sectors. They
were far better off than Moroccan Jewry and probably in a better eco
nomic situation than their Tunisian coreligionists. O f the four main em
ployment categories in the urban economy,36 Algeria’s Jews were thus
represented:
spoke the truth, for he knew the name of one of the agents who was later
killed in the Sinai during the October 1973 war. One of Ben-Guera’s
sons, Yo5 av, also served in the Sinai during that war and met with the
former agent. The latter told him about his involvement in the search for
his father; his name matched the one given by “Joseph.” Be that as it
may, “Joseph” could not help the Israelis at the tim e.49
However, in 1959 an FLN officer, referred to by “Joseph” as al-cArabï,
surrendered to the French in Oran. Among other things, during his
interrogation in which “Joseph” participated, al-cArabï said that he and
his men ambushed and killed the Israelis when they traveled from Tiaret
to Aflou in a cab driven by an FLN activist. The FLN knew in advance
about the emissaries’ goals, for Hasan and Ben-Guera were apparently
indiscreet, having discussed their plans with the desk clerk at their hotel.
An FLN sympathizer, the latter informed his friends about them.
The ambush of the cab took place on 18 February 1958, at a deserted
road twelve kilometers outside Aflou. In order to confuse the French and
obliterate the evidence, another car was set on fire. The Israelis and a
French Jewish soldier, abducted on another occasion, were later taken to
a spot near the Moroccan border. It was their captors’ aim to leave
Algeria. On their way to Morocco the rebels risked the possibility of
running into French troops and thus, to make the passage smoother,
they decided to murder the three men by shooting them at close range.
Afterwards the bodies were burned.50 “Joseph” did not provide dates
covering the time period from the abduction to the killing.
Hasan’s and Ben-Guera’s disappearance did not prevent the Jewish
Agency from dispatching Shmuel Markuse to Algeria in order to conduct
business as usual. Markuse’s experience in Tunisia and his ability to
establish cordial relations with French officials, were essential necessities
for the caliy a.51
In 1959, but more so in 1960, Jewish leaders in Algeria were becoming
quite concerned about de Gaulle’s intentions. Outwardly neutral, they
quietly supported an A lgérie Française. This time their fears were not
completely unfounded. To the consternation of the French army, de
Gaulle moved increasingly toward coming to terms with the FLN ; and
after his speech of 16 September 1959, the independence of Algeria was
only a question of time. He offered the Algerians three choices: integra
tion, absolute independence, or independence in cooperation with France.
The French bias was obviously toward the third choice.52
328 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
the Celtic cross that was ominously reminiscent of the Nazi swastika. The
CJAES monthly, In form ation Ju iv e , wrote about the 24 January 1960
insurrection:
We must say here that for the Jews the commandment “Remember” should be
imperative. We cannot accept the flaunting, under the pretext of patriotism, of
emblems which evoke for us a past whose meaning we understand all too well.
. . . Remember that when the French Republic and its principles of liberty are
threatened, the security of the Jews is threatened too. History has demonstrated
that. It is for the Republic and for democracy and also— faithful to our law— for
justice and brotherhood that we shall always fight. This we shall do because we
are French, and no disclaimer, no omission can erase more than a century of
history and of loyalty.56
You are an integral part of the Algerian people; you are not asked to choose
between France and Algeria, but to become effective citizens of your true
country. Either you choose to function fully in this country where the future will
inaugurate freedom and democratic principles to be enjoyed by all the nation s
children; or else you accept to live under the reign of contempt and to be content
with a citizenship granted by your oppressors within a context which is in
contradiction even with the most elementary human rights. Such are the terms
of the choice. The so-called economic option, the gamble on a pretentious
prosperous future is no longer the case: the ideal for which numerous Algerian
patriots have died is in no way linked with material facilities.57
The Comité Juif Algérien d’Etudes Sociales . . . points out again that the Jewish
community of Algeria is not a political, judicial, or even geographic entity, and
that there exists no Jewish party or political organization entitled to speak in the
330 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
name of all the Jews of Algeria. The Jewish community is composed of French
citizens who, at the proper time, will in common with other French citizens use
the rights inherent in that status. Nothing and no one can call into question the
obviousness of this factual and legal situation. In stressing anew that the Jews of
Algeria, faithful to their moral and spiritual traditions and to their passionate love
for peace, have always supported respect and justice for the most complete
equality among the various elements of this country, the Comité thinks that the
Jewish community would “live in humiliation” if it renounced a citizenship for
the preservation of which it always fought, to which it remains attached with a
faithfulness that deserves respect, and which inspired it with its dignity and
honor.58
This was not what the FLN wanted to hear at that crucial juncture of
the civil war. On 24 July 1960, an FLN representative in Geneva issued
a warning to Algerian Jewish leaders: either take an active part in the
struggle or risk the deterioration of Muslim-Jewish coexistence.59 Fur
ther, at the end of 1960 the Grande Synagogue of Algiers was sacked by
supporters of the FLN. The situation did not improve in 1961. In Janu
ary, Armand Kaplan of the W JC-France in Paris met with Benjamin
Heler who still served as FCIA chairman. The meeting was attended by
several influential French-Jewish leaders, such as Dr. Vital Modiano,
Léon Meiss, Jacques Orfus, Solomon Schweizer, and André Dreyfuss.
The issue of Algerian Jewry’s French nationality surfaced once again as a
source of concern, for no one doubted that Franco-Algerian negotiations
were inevitable. The participants of the meeting were urged to inform
the Elysée and Premier Debré about the need to make the Crémieux
Decree an essential component of the negotiations. Heler said that, just
as de Gaulle was instrumental in re-enacting the Crémieux Decree in
1943, after Vichy abrogated it in 1940, it was inconceivable now, during
his tenure as president of the Fifth Republic, to adopt a different stance
and jeopardize Algerian Jewish rights.60
Heler estimated that of the 140,000 Jews in Algeria, only 70,000 would
stay should the passing of French Algeria become a reality. He told
French-Jewish leaders that André Narboni, the head of the Algerian
Zionist Union, and the Jewish Agency, laid down a contingency plan for
large-scale evacuation to Israel— if and when the situation should war
rant it. He also warned these leaders that a massive exodus of Jews to
France was not unlikely, a development leading to social problems for
the French-Jewish communities. They had to be prepared for such an
eventuality.61
Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 331
Indeed, in 1961 many Jews were grappling with the issue of whether
or not they ought to remain in Algeria. Yet as Gaston Saffar, president of
the Algiers consistoire explained, salaried employees could leave without
any commitments. They were French citizens and, once in France,
would benefit from government assistance. On the other hand, approxi
mately one-half of Algiers’s real estate assets were owned by Jews— an
exaggeration no doubt— and the owners could neither liquidate these
assets quickly nor make any profit by selling. Therefore, they were
unable to leave immediately.62
Similar fears were echoed by other leaders in 1961. Georges Fahl,
treasurer of the consistoire in Constantine, thought that once Algerian
independence was obtained, nothing could stop the Muslims from ha
rassing Jewish women, girls, and the elderly; and there would be “no
valid economic prospects for us here.** Everything depended on the
results of the Franco-Algerian negotiations and, more importantly, on
how long it would take for the parties to reach an agreement.63
These fears, bordering at times on panic, resulted in the development
of political alignments among the Jews. Until 1961 they either remained
politically neutral or had supported liberal groups among both Muslims
and Europeans. Now they were confronted with an immediate problem
which seemed to promise more harsh consequences for them than for
the European Christians. They feared that the revenge of the formerly
subject Muslim populace would be directed against them, not only as
Europeans but also as Jews and as friends of Israel. Hence many young
Jews slipped bit by bit into the camp of the European u ltras— especially
that of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), an organization made
up of desperate European civilians intent on saving Fren ch Algeria and
of bitter army officers bent on overthrowing de Gaulle at any price, with
Algeria as a means rather than an end. The OAS was never a united
organization, either in fundamental tendency or in leadership. It had no
clear ideology beyond a vague, proto-fascist antirepublicanism.64 But in
1961 it emerged as a popular force among the non-Muslim population,
opposing both the FLN and de Gaulle. The numerous young Jews who
became pro-OAS and sympathized with its leader, General Raoul Salan,
were fully aware that one of the most important elements in the OAS
was the Jeu n e Nation group, influential among the students and young
Europeans, and ardently anti-Semitic. However, these Jews remarked
that they and the OAS had a common goal: the preservation of French
332 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
Algeria. As one pro-OAS Jewish activist noted: “Jeu n e Nation may have
wanted to impose its will on the entire OAS, but it has been brought into
line.”65 “Certainly Jeu n e Nation and other anti-Semites represent a prob
lem. But we have a bigger battle to wage which must come first. We will
settle with anti-Semites later,” said another.66
To prevent de Gaulle from “giving Algeria away” during negotiations,
the preliminary meetings of which were held at Melun and Evian (Swit
zerland) in 1960-61, the OAS reign of armed terror began in the spring
of 1961. It was intensified and extended with catastrophic consequences
for Algerian Jews. As in other parts of North Africa, the Jewish residential
districts often straddled the Muslim and European districts, and there
were many Jewish enclaves in the Arab quarters and the reverse. Attacks
by OAS terrorists evoked prompt Muslim reprisals, and it was naturally
the non-Muslims of the “frontier” areas, the residents of the Jewish
districts, who sustained the first and frequently the only shock. This
resulted in a mutual antagonism between Muslim and Jewish youths. On
the second day of Rosh ha-Shana 1961, in reprisal for the assassination by
some Muslims of a Jew in a Jewish district of Oran, Jewish youths
launched a counterattack which quickly developed into a massacre of
every Muslim within revolver range. W ere these acts committed by pro-
OAS Jewish elements? Was this a repeat performance by the M isgeret’s
youths? We have no answers.67
After these incidents, the FLN issued several directives warning the
Muslim population against letting itself be diverted into a war against the
Jews. All the evidence indicates that the FLN sought to prevent the
development of a fatal chain of pogroms and counterpogroms. It also
sought to influence international public opinion, and especially American
public opinion, in this direction. Unfortunately, the FLN instructions in
this respect, as in others, were not always followed by the impulsive
rebels and masses who supported the struggle. Particularly in Constan
tine in 1961, when the war between the OAS and FLN reached its
height, the large Jewish quarter was subjected to repeated Muslim at
tacks. The complete insecurity of the Jews of Constantine caused large-
scale departures, amounting almost to an evacuation, even before the
exodus of the Jews from other regions began. The OAS exploited the
distress of the Jews of Constantine and even appealed for the aid of
Israeli army officers. The OAS terror had put small Jewish merchants in
the city out of business, while substantial medium-sized Jewish-owned
Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 333
enterprises collapsed under the impact of the continual bombing and the
enormous “taxes” and “retributions” exacted by the OAS terrorists.68
Frightened about the prospect of Constantine Jewry being slaugh
tered, Lazarus alerted the W JC in Europe and warned that, unless this
wave of violence were halted, Algerian Jewish organizations would pub
lish a communiqué inciting Jews to evacuate Algeria. This was a veiled
threat directed at French-Jewish leaders. If an evacuation were to take
place, their communities and government would be saddled with the
responsibility of absorbing tens of thousands of Jewish refugees. Re
sponding to the threat, Easterman, Armand Kaplan, and Dr. Nahum
Goldmann contacted the FLN-dominated provisional government (GPRA)
agents in New York and Tunis, for them to convey to the rebels the
message to cease all forms of violence against Jews. Moreover, the W JC
requested Habib Bourguiba, Jr., to discuss this matter with Muhammad
Yazld who, in 1961, served as the GPRA s minister of information.69 It
appears that outside Jewish intervention helped ease the situation.
The relentless terror and senseless killings organized by the ultras,
and the facts that most of the army generals were beginning to support
de Gaulle, and that Algerian independence was in sight— were to dimin
ish the OAS’s influence. At the beginning of 1962 it became evident that
the apogee of the OAS was past. From that time on European settlers
and the Jews were more hesitant to demonstrate solidarity with this
organization. They feared being singled out by the legitimate French
authorities. Perhaps the best indication of the growing trend toward
caution among the non-Muslim population was the fact that, whatever
may have been their sympathies, people were leaving for France, despite
OAS threats against any who were going. This was done as unobtrusively
as possible. A dentist would book appointments for his patients as if he
intended to treat them as usual, but not show up. A woman would hang
out her washing as a sign of presence, but the washing was never taken
in. A businessman would make a brave show of keeping his business
open, but his family was already packed off quietly to France.70
After nearly two years of periodic contacts and negotiations, a cease
fire and peace agreement were concluded between the French and the
FLN at Evian on 19 March 1962. The agreements were never actually
signed by either party because the French refused to give formal recog
nition to the FLN . The French did not hand over control of the country
directly to the FLN but to a mixed French-Algerian “provisional execu
334 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
The Evian agreement and the transition from French to Muslim rule
hastened the departure of the Jews. Although the Muslims agreed that
the Jews could, after all, preserve their French citizenship rights— a
breakthrough that was achieved under pressure of French Jewry’s AIU
and the W JC — the majority of the Jews, like the European settlers, did
not wish to remain in Algeria. By the fall of 1962 only an eighth of the
800,000 to one million Europeans remained in Algeria. Of the 140,000
Jews, some 10,000 remained by the summer of 1962.72
It is true that France was the main country of emigration for Algerian
Jewry. Only 10,000 of them emigrated to Israel between 1948 and the
early 1960s. While there were very few successes in attracting caliy a,
several rescue operations did take place in 1962, one of which was
organized in the summer of 1962. As the caliya emissaries were about to
leave Algerian soil following the recent developments, a cable arrived at
the caliya office in Algiers from the Jewish Agency. It instructed them to
remain there for the time being because, based on reliable information,
FLN rebels in the south intended to harm the Jews of the Saharan
community of Ghardai'a.73
On 12 June 1962, Duvdevani requested Ben-Tsiyon Cohen, one of the
emissaries in Algiers, to fly to Ghardaïa and warn that community about
the potential dangers. Duvdevani then contacted the French authorities
in the south to inform them about Cohen’s arrival. Upon his arrival
Cohen met with Ya cakov Blocca, Ghardaïa’s community president. Blocca
then convened an emergency meeting of the community council mem
bers in which Cohen prodded them to permit the Jewish Agency to
Algeria’s Political and Social Struggle 335
evacuate the Jews before it was too late. The community leadership gave
its approval.74
Already by mid-June Cohen began to register the families at the local
talm üd tôrah building. O f the 3,000 Jews in Ghardaia, 2,700 agreed to
leave immediately. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency in Europe received
from Cohen precise data on the size of the emigration and the number of
planes needed for the operation. The Grande Arenas camp in Marseilles
was prepared to accommodate the transients. However, the FLN found
out about the operation and was determined to prevent the departures.75
Not wanting to risk lives, especially in light of what happened to
Hasan and Ben-Guera three years earlier, Cohen telephoned the French
governor who himself was about to leave Algeria. The latter sent a
military vehicle with several armed paratroopers to guard Cohen and
accompany him to the local military base for his own protection. Toward
the end of June the French planes chartered by the Jewish Agency
reached Ghardaia s military airport. The emigrants could now take the
twelve-kilometer ride to the airport on buses, guarded by military jeeps
and a helicopter. Algeria was a sovereign nation when the evacuation
process ended successfully in July 1962.76
After the declaration of independence the consistoires in Algiers,
Oran, and Constantine continued to function. The community leaders of
the post-independence period were not drawn from the ranks of those
who had been active in the FLN. They were those who kept their French
citizenship and maintained contact with the French consular authorities.
Contrary to what had been feared, no “parachutist” pro-FLN leadership
imposed itself on the Jewish community. There was no longer any signif
icant pressure on the Jewish leadership to “coordinate” itself politically,
and no demonstrations or declarations of pro-government orthodoxy were
required. When the communities pledged their loyalty in December
1962, their statement made no reference to the ideology of the Algerian
Revolution.77
Jewish cultural activity, such as had existed in the pre-independence
era, was practically nonexistent. When a visitor from France remarked to
some of the community leaders that it would be impossible to discuss
French-Jewish literature in their clubs because it was too closely linked
to Zionism and Israel, he was told: “Oh well, we shall talk about Maimon-
ides.” But in fact there was not much discussion of him either; the
336 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
L ocal Jew ish O rganizations which assisted the indigent with special
needs such as the birth of children, dowries, illness, or death. The
most important was the Société de la Bienfaisance that distributed
m atzoth for Passover, sent youths to summer camps, provided cloth
ing for these youths, and paid their medical costs. The Bikkur Holim
was another agency of some value. Its representatives visited the sick
and the aged at local hospitals and at their homes;
stairs leading to the first and second floors where people were now
housed. Gottfarb’s description of their lamentable conditions is rather
shocking:
When I saw the center, I felt it was a living illustration to [Maksim] Gorky’s
“Night Asylum” and [Charles] Dickens’ “Workhouse”— all human wrecks and
derelicts, alcoholics, beggars, invalids, blind, paralyzed . . . and mental and
cardiac cases, and elderly people living under the most degrading conditions:
without water, ankle-deep in filth and garbage with accompanying smells.82
Algiers ND 2 ,0 0 0 -3 ,0 0 0 ND 400
Constantine 500 2 0 0 -2 5 0 ND 15
Bone 350 2 0 0 -2 5 0 ND 1 2 -1 3
Sétif 140 1 00-120 ND ND
Philipville 20 1 2 -1 5 ND ND
Nemours 50 ND ND ND
Batna 50 20 ND ND
Beni-Saf 50 ND ND ND
Biskra ND 10 ND ND
Bougie (2 -3 families) ND 8 -1 0 ND ND
Tizi-Ouzou ND 20 ND ND
Ghardaia ND ND ND ND
Touggourt ND ND ND ND
Laghouat ND 40 ND ND
Blida ND 2 0 -3 0 ND ND
Rélizane 35 ND ND ND
Bou Sacada ND 9 ND 8
Orléan ville ND 9 ND ND
Tlemcen 350 200 70 50
Oran 1,200 1,200 350 170
Mostaganem 100 70 ND 1 2 -1 5
Aïn Tamouchent 70 6 0 -7 0 25 ND
Sidi-Bel-Abbès 200 50 12 ND
Tiaret 25 ND ND ND
Mascara 100 ND ND ND
La Moricière 15 ND ND ND
Saida 100 ND ND ND
T otal 3,355 4 ,2 2 8 -5 ,3 7 3 457 6 6 7 -6 7 1
Source fo r November 1962: Franco Lévi à Herbert Katzki, 23 novembre 1962, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 50A /56.200.
Source fo r January 1963: Confidential Memorandum on Dr. Franco Lévi’s Visit to Algeria, 2 8 -3 1 January 1963, Arch. AJD C/
Jerusalem, 50A /56.200.
342 Algeria s Political and Social Struggle
quarters of Oran and Algiers no longer existed and the Jews were scat
tered among the general population. Another plausible explanation is
that the French government may have told Houari Boumedienne’s gov
ernment that it did not differentiate between Frenchmen and would not
stand for any injury to Jewish Frenchmen in Algeria.94 The few acts of
harassment included insults, the mistreatment of Chief Rabbi Simon Zini
of Oran, and the expulsion by the authorities of six Jews. Moroccan Jews
living in Algeria felt somewhat insecure as they were not French citizens
like the Algerian Jews and could not count on France to protect them.95
Visiting Algeria in December 1967, Samuel Lévis found a partially
structured communal apparatus in Algiers and Oran. The consistoire of
Algiers faced major financial difficulties, with its leaders pleading before
the central consistoire of Paris for assistance. It was suggested by one
leader that it would be necessary to again reduce the administrative
expenses. Only one rabbi, it was said, should be employed by the
community in Algiers. After the consistoire of Oran organized a fund-
raising campaign to cope with expenses, the leaders in Algiers were
encouraged to follow this example.96
In March 1970 there were fewer than 1,000 Jews in the country— 350
in Oran, 300 in Algiers, and several dozens each in Constantine, Bone,
Blida, Tlemcen, and Mostaganem. They were largely elderly people.
The only remaining talm üd tô ra h , in Oran, was frequented by several
youths and administered by the con sistoire. Other communities had no
rabbis, religious schools, or ritual slaughterers. It was Rabbi Simon Zini
of Oran who, upon request of the different communities, traveled to
perform circumcision and other religious duties.97 For all intents and
purposes, organized Jewish life in Algeria ended during the 1970s.
Conclusions
345
346 Conclusions
Judaization and neglect of Hebrew culture. For, after all, why did the
Zionists in Tunisia refrain from attacking the Protectorate schools, where
the Jews were well represented, and where classes were often conducted
on Saturday? Their suggestion of replacing the AIU com pletely by a
Protectorate-sponsored écoles fran co-israélites network would indicate
that opposition to the AIU stemmed from the Tunisian Zionists’ inability
to neutralize the influence traditionally enjoyed by the AIU in communal
service. This impeded somewhat the pre-1939 Zionist struggle for influ
ence in the Jewish milieu. It appears that the Tunisian Zionists wanted
the AIU out owing to the competition it posed in the struggle for Jewish
leadership and reform.
3. Maghribi nationalist forces, too, expressed displeasure with the
AIU and other international Jewish organizations. In Morocco, national
ist resentment of the AIU was still very much alive in the 1970s. It could
be found in the writings of cAbd al-Qâdir Ben cAbd Allah, an editorialist
for the Istiqlàl party’s V O pinion. Portraying the AIU as an instrument of
both European colonialism and Zionism, he noted in 1976:
Numerous are the Jews who were victims of the operations of this organization
and have consequently felt like foreigners rather than Moroccans. Having lost all
contact with their Muslim compatriots, these Westernized Jews were in fact
overwhelmed by a genuine persecution complex, seeing in the Moroccan Muslim
a potential enemy. By cultivating this feeling of insecurity among the Jews, the
Alliance Israélite paved the way for the exodus of these Jews to Israel. . . . The
departure o f . . . Jews to Israel was planned by the Zionists since the nineteenth
century, the epoch when the schools of the Alliance Israélite began to spread
their influence across Morocco.1
These accusations were partly justified but for the most part inaccur
ate. Even if one accepts the premise that the Jews were victimized by
the AIU, one must look closely at the Jews’ quest for outside help.
Feelings of insecurity and persecution complexes in pre-1830 Algeria and
in the course of Moroccan history were neither figments of Jewish imagi
nation nor were these implanted in Jewish minds by the AIU or the
colonists. It would be difficult, however, to deny that the AIU guided
the Jews in the path of French culture and, from the late 1940s, in the
direction of Hebrew culture, hence aggravating the already existing Ju-
deo-Muslim tensions, cultivating a French-educated elite, and facilitating
caliya. The AIU, then, sharpened divisions culturally, but was not at the
Conclusions 347
root of the conflict, for the Jews w ere separated from the Muslims in
m ellàhs and k a ra t al-Y ahüd long predating the arrival of the AIU and
European colonialism, and in accordance with legislation. Only under
European presence and the œ u vre of the AIU did the Jews begin to
leave the ghettos for the new, integrated urban neighborhoods, built in
the early twentieth century.
4. Some may argue that, with the exception of Algerian Jews, most of
whom emigrated to France rather than Israel, French-type acculturation
for the rest lost its vitality during decolonization and Arabization, and
perhaps even earlier; with the creation of Israel came the wish to make
caliya and to stress Jewish/Hebrew education. In the Tunisian case the
argument is certainly unconvincing, as nearly half of the Jews settled in
France. Adequate knowledge of French thus became indispensable at
the crucial stage of adapting to the new geography. Moreover, in Israel,
many Tunisian emigrants played the role of intermediaries in trade and
cultural exchanges between Israel and France. Their contribution in
these domains was vital, for during the 1950s and 1960s Franco-Israeli
relations were as favorable as American-Israeli relations became in the
1970s and 1980s. The same applied to Moroccan emigrants, though their
exposure to French language and culture was not as comprehensive as
among the Tunisians.
5. Essential components of modernization included social/human ser
vices rendered by the international Jewish organizations and the colonial
authorities. Not only did these initiatives improve the living standards
among the Jews at the time the decolonization process commenced, but
in all likelihood contributed to Jewish population growth. Though the
struggle against disease and overcrowded conditions in the ghettos was
far from over, considerable progress had been achieved by mid-century.
In surveying the demographic changes in the Jewish world, certain
historians remark that the nineteenth century was a period of rapid
increase in population in all European countries. The number of Jews in
the world in 1800 was estimated at two and a quarter million, of whom
some two million lived in Europe. In the 1880s there were about seven
million Jews in Europe. The Jewish rate of increase was twice as fast as
that of the non-Je wish population. The main reasons for this rapid in
crease of population in Europe were the amelioration of sanitary condi
tions and improved medical treatment for the sick. The situation in the
towns, which in previous centuries had been centers of disease and
348 Conclusions
Introduction
1. André Chouraqui, B etw een E ast an d W est: A H istory o f th e Je w s o f N orth
A frica, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968, 7.
2. David C. Gordon, T he Passing o f F ren ch A lgeria, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1966, 6 -1 0 .
3. See note 2 and Clement Moore, Politics in N orth A frica , Boston: Little,
Brown, 1970.
4. Moore, Politics in N orth A frica, 23.
5. See especially L. Carl Brown, T he Tunisia o f A hm ad B ey, 1837-1855,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
6. See note 4 (pp. 22-23).
7. John Waterbury, T he C om m an d er o f the Faithful: T he M oroccan Political
E lite, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 10-11.
8. Ibid., 10-11.
9. Ibid., 3 4 -3 5 , 4 0 -4 1 .
10. Quoted in Elbaki Hermassi, L ead ersh ip a n d N ational D evelopm ent in N orth
A frica — A C om parativ e Study, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1972, 70.
11. Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islam ic Society an d th e W est,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, vol. I, pt. II, 207-208.
12. André Chouraqui, “Algeria,” A m erican Jew ish Y ear B ook, (AJYB hereafter)
56 (1955), 431-432.
13. André Zaoui, “Tunisia,” A JYB, 58 (1957), 348.
14. Henry L. Levy, “Tunisia,” AJYB, 56 (1955), 441.
15. Z. Schuster and Max Isenbergh to John Slawson, Paris, 28 March 1950,
Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 10B/56.308.
16. Manuel L. Ortega, L os H eb reo s en M arru ecos, Madrid 1934, 197.
17. For a less rigid analysis of the composition of Maghribi communities, espe
cially Morocco, see Shlomo Deshen’s important work: T he M eüah Society:
Jew ish Com m unity L ife in Sharifian M orocco, Chicago: Chicago University
351
352 Notes to Chapter 1
Press, 1989. See also Yaron Tsur, F ran ce an d the Jew s o f Tunisia: T he Policy
o f the F ren ch A uthorities tow ard the Je w s an d the A ctivities o f the Jew ish
E lites during the P eriod o f Transition fr o m Muslim In d ep en d en t State to
C olon ial R ule, 1873-1888 x-xii. Ph.D dissertation, The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, 1988, Hebrew.
18. H. Z. Hirschberg, A H istory o f the Je w s in N orth A frica , vol. I: F rom
A ntiquity to the Sixteenth C en tu ry, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974, 155.
19. On this topic see: Michael Abitbol, Tém oins et acteu rs: L es C orcos et l’his
toire du M aroc con tem p orain , Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1977; Michael
M. Laskier, T he A lliance Israélite U niverselle an d th e Jew ish Com m unities
o f M orocco: 1862-1962, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983;
Daniel J. Schroeter, M erchants o f E ssaou ira: U rban Society an d Im perialism
in Southw estern M orocco, 1844-1886, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988; Leland Louis Bowie, T he P rotégé System in M orocco: 1 8 8 0 -
1904, 12. Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University, 1970.
4. Haim Sa cadon, “Ideology and Reality: The Etzel and the Hagana in Tunisia,
1945-1948,” in Benjamin Pinkus and Doris Bensimon (eds.), F ren ch Je w r y ,
Zionism an d the State o f Is ra el, Sdeh-Boker and Be5 er-Sheva, Ben-Gurion
University and the Paris Institut National de Langues et Civilisations Orien
tales, 1992, 3 22-34 0 , Hebrew.
5. Ephraim Friedman at Sym posium on the N orth A frican Jew ish Under-
g rou n d t in pamphlet by the Organization of the Former North African
Underground Activists, July 1987, 9 -1 1 .
6. Ya cakov Krause (Karoz), ha-Mossad Le cAliya to the DMO, Tel-Aviv, 3
February 1949, Hagana Archives (HA hereafter), 14/5 [Hebrew]; The cAliya
Situation in Morocco, Confidential Report of the Mossad Le cAliya, March
1949, no specific date, HA 14/5 [Hebrew]; Marc Jarblum, “Report on My
Visit to North Africa,” Paris, 17 January 1949, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 149B;
Ephraim Ben-Hayyim, “Illegal Emigration from North Africa: The Three
Ships,” in Y. Avrahami (ed.), Shorashim b a-M izrah, I, Ramat-Ef cal, Yad-
Tabenkin and ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1986, 24 1 -3 2 0 , Hebrew.
7. Y. Krause (Karoz), ha-Mossad Le cAliya to the DMO, Tel-Aviv, 3 February
1949, HA 14/5, Hebrew.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. See another study on the Jews of Oudjda by Yvette Katan, O udjda:
Une ville fr o n tiè r e du M aroc (1 9 0 7 -1 9 5 6 ), Paris: L ’Harmattan, 1990.
10. Alphonse Juin à Georges Bidault, Rabat, 20 juillet 1947, AAE-Nantes, Direc
tion de l’Intérieur (DI hereafter)/809.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Abu Khalil, “The Zionist Poison in Morocco,” L e Je u n e M oghrebin y no. 1, 20
July 1947, Arabie.
15. See note 10.
16. Francis Lacoste à Juin, Rabat, 3 juin 1948, AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR. 3, DOSS.
1.
17. Ibid.
18. Brunei à Juin, Telegram, Oudjda, 7 juin 1948, 7:25 p . m ., AAE-Nantes, DI/
CAR. 3, DOSS. 1.
19. J. L ., “Les troubles antisémites du Maroc Oriental,” AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR.
3, DOSS. 1, no date.
20. Ibid.
21. Eugène Weill, “Evénéments du 7 juin 1948 et jours consécutifs à Oudjda et
Djérada,” 30 juin 1948, AAE-Nantes, Cabinet/251.
22. See note 19.
23. See note 21.
24. See note 19.
25. See note 21.
26. Efraim Ben Hayyim [sic] (Friedman), “The Erets-Yisrael Mission to North
Notes to Chapter 3 359
75. As long as the Mossad Le cAliya directed Cadima, its central emissaries were
Sarny Halevy and Shaul Guetta.
76. Michael M. Laskier, “Jewish Emigration from Morocco to Israel: Govern
ment Policies and the Position of International Jewish Organizations, 1 949-
5 6 ,” Middle Eastern Studies, 25, no. 3 (July 1989), 331.
77. Interview with Eliahu Brakha, Mossad Le cAliya emissary to Egypt (1949-
50) and Algeria (1950), Haifa, 18 November 1986, Hebrew.
33. Pessah Shinar to Uri Lubrani, Confidential, 22 June 1953, ISA, FM 2398/
IA, Hebrew.
34. Khaklai to Ben-Gurion, Casablanca, 15 March 1953, ISA, FM 2398/1A,
Hebrew.
o> üi
. Ibid.
<1
. Ibid.
;o oo
brew.
. Ya cakov Karoz to Research Department, Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
h-
^
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Gdalia Paz à Fritz Lichtenstein, Casablanca, 26 avril 1950, CZA, L58/98.
oo
98, Hebrew.
. Blumenfeld to Moshe Kol, Casablanca, 7 May 1950, CZA, L58/98, Hebrew.
to
OIÇ^CR
oj
. Ibid.
iL
62. Ibid.
63. In 1955-56, 1 dollar was the equivalent of 400 francs.
64. N. Menlson to Kol, Marseilles, 6 April 1956, CZA, L58/409, Hebrew.
65. Moshe Kol, Youth Aliya, Present and Future , Jerusalem, 1957, 119.
66. Paul Calamaro to Shlomo Nahon, end of 1948 or beginning of 1949, transla
tion from French into Hebrew, CZA, S20/DMO Files.
67. Dr. Shlomo Nahon, “Judaism and Zionism in North Africa,” Report on visit
to Morocco, Tunisia, and Tripoli in behalf of the World Zionist Organization’s
Executive, June 1948, CZA, S20/DMO Files, Hebrew.
68. Session of the Zionist General Council, 2 3 -3 1 August 1955, Addresses,
Debates, Resolutions, Jerusalem, 1957, cited from Schechtman, On Wings
o f Eagles, 291-293.
69. It is noteworthy that among Cadima’s emissaries at the time there were those
who thought that the dangers confronting the Jews were purely economic
(Muslim nationalists urging the boycott of Jewish merchants and the gener
ally unfavorable economic conditions at times of political upheavals) while
other envoys maintained that the Jews were in physical and political danger.
See for example Shabtai Tevet in ha-A rets , 26 August 1955.
70. Elie Peleg to the DMO, Paris, 4 September 1950, CZA, S20/DMO Files,
Hebrew.
71. Elie Mouyal to Mapai in Tel-Aviv, 3 September 1949, Israel Labor Archives,
The Pinhas Lavon Institute (ILA hereafter), 208IV/4969A, Hebrew.
72. Ibid.
73. “Ha-Bonim” in Casablanca to Ze5 ev Khaklai, 29 December 1949, CZA, S20/
DMO Files, Hebrew.
74. “Ha-Bonim” to Jerusalem, Casablanca, 23 January 1951, CZA, S20/DMO
Files, Hebrew.
75. Ibid. See also “Dror” to Avraham Nadad, 23 March 1951, CZA, S20/DMO
Files, Hebrew.
76. Shlomo Cohen, ha-Bonim’s emissary in the interior, to Jerusalem, Fez, 31
October 1949, ILA 208IV/4969A, Hebrew.
77. Hapoel Hamizrahi du Maroc (Bahad, Bnei cAkiva, Hapoel Hamizrahi), Rap
port des activités pour l’année 5710, 1949-50, CZA, S32/No car ve-he-Haluts
Files.
78. Dr. Benzion Benchalom to Pessah Rodnik, 23 May 1954, CZA, S32/No car
ve-he-Haluts Files, Hebrew.
79. “Ha-Bonim” to “Ihüd ha-No car ha-Kibbutsî” in Tel-Aviv, 20 June 1954,
CZA, S32/No car ve-he-Haluts Files, Hebrew.
80. Ibid.
81. Bne cAkiva/ha-Po cel ha-Mizrahi to Dr. Benchalom, Casablanca, 3 January
1955, CZA, S32/No car ve-he-IJaluts Files, Hebrew; see also William Bein,
AJDC director for Morocco. According to Bein, already in October 1952 the
E IF had a membership of 2,300 while DEJJ had 3,250. AJDC Directors
Conference: Minutes, Paris 1952, 16.
82. AJDC Country Directors Conference , Paris, October 1956, 31.
Notes to Chapter 5 365
83. Avraham Israeli to Dr. Benchalom, 19 December 1955, CZA, S32/No car ve-
he-IJaluts Files, Hebrew.
84. The Department fo r Middle Eastern Jew ry— Reprint From the Report to the
Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 1951.
85. Interview with Eliahu Brakha, Haifa, 18 November 1986, Hebrew; see
report of Mossad Le cAliya/DMO collaboration and tensions in Elie Peleg’s
letter from 28 February 1951 to Ya cakov Zerubavel, ILA 1Q4IV/101H,
Hebrew.
86. See note 84.
87. Elie Peleg to Dr. Avraham Nadad, Paris, 11 January 1950, CZA, S20/561,
Hebrew.
88. Laskier, The Alliance Israélite Universelle and Morocco , 2 16-217.
89. Engleberg, Bitton, Gordon, Zaltz, and Ben-David to Ya cakov Zerubavel,
Paris, 18 December 1950, CZA, S20/575-I, Hebrew.
90. Elie Peleg to Ya cakov Zerubavel, Paris, 7 February 1951, ILA, 104IV/101H,
Hebrew.
91. Ibid.
92. Procès verbal de la réunion du comité du centre social du mellâfiy 22 février
1951, CZA, S20/DMO Files.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
14. Zvi Yehieli to Yosef Bayrak, Paris, 18 March 1952, HA, 14/5A, Hebrew.
15. AJDC Country Directors Conference, 31 O ctober-4 November 1954, 6 8 -
69.
16. During the first WJC North Africa conference held in Algiers, on 7 -1 0 June
1952, the Moroccan delegation, though in support of ‘aliya, thought it essen
tial to educate the would-be emigrants and to create a special Moroccan
office in Israel to lobby for their interests and assist them in becoming better
integrated and absorbed into Israeli society. However, the delegation ex
plained that caliya was just one alternative and did not provide a total
solution to the problem of Moroccan Jewry. See 1ère conférence nord-
africaine du Congrès Juif Mondial/Jacques Lazarus Papers (Arch.CJM/Laza-
rus hereafter), P 164/27.
17. Projet du rapport à présenter à la conférence du Genève, Arch.CJM/Lazarus
P164/5.
18. Assemblée générale du comité central marocain, 15 avril 1956, Arch.CJM/
Lazarus P164/5.
19. A. L. Easterman to Sharett, London, 3 September 1954, ISA, FM 43/8.
20. Ibid.
21. Session o f the Zionist G en eral C ou n cil, 2 3 -3 1 August 1955, A dd resses,
D ebates, R esolutions, Jerusalem, 1957, 2 82-283.
22. Rapport du comité central marocain du CJM sur la situation des juifs au
Maroc présenté par son président à Paris, le 27 janvier 1955, Arch.CJM/
Lazarus P164/5. It is noteworthy that several WJC activists such as Meir
Toledano were ardent integrationists and supporters of Moroccan indepen
dence, anticipating leadership positions once the French had left. They often
criticized the post-1954 modified position of the Moroccan WJC executive on
increased emigration.
23. Ibid.
24. L e M onde, 8 September 1955.
25. On the contacts between the Moroccan nationalists and the WJC over Dr.
Benzaquen’s ministerial appointment, see A. L. Easterman to Zéidé Schul-
man, London, 21 December 1955, Arch.CJM/Lazarus P164/5-5603.
26. Perspectives in Morocco, by Jacques Lazarus, head of WJC Central North
African Office, Algiers, 17 October 1955, Arch.CJM/Lazarus P164/119-120.
27. A. L. Easterman to Walter Eytan (director-general of the Israel Ministry for
Foreign Affairs), 29 November 1955, ISA, FM 2398/1A.
28. Ibid.
29. Z. Shuster and Max Isenbergh to John Slawson, Paris, 28 March 1950,
Report on Morocco, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 10B/56.308.
30. On French policy toward the legal status of the Jews, see Michael M.
Laskier, T he A lliance Israélite U niverselle a n d th e Jew ish C om m unities o f
M orocco: 1862-1962, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983,
chapter 5; André Chouraqui, L a condition ju rid iq u e d e Visraélite m arocain ,
Paris: Presses du Livre Français, 1950.
31. Report by Shuster and Isenbergh, see note 29. On the Jews in French
Notes to Chapter 5 367
Morocco and the controversy over French naturalization, see Laskier, The
A lliance Israélite U niverselle a n d M orocco, 163-171.
32. See note 29.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. The AJC sought to cooperate with the Council of Jewish Communities,
the umbrella organization representing the various communities throughout
Morocco, to have the French grant wider powers to it, thus minimizing
French intervention in local Jewish communal affairs. This issue was not
sufficiently clarified by the AJC.
35. Ibid.
36. Interview with Zachariah Shuster, New York, 3 March 1985; see also my
A lliance Israélite U niverselle a n d M orocco, 187-188.
37. Y. Tsur to M. Sharett, Paris, 20 August 1954, ISA, FM 163/13B, Hebrew.
38. Shmuel Segev, “O peration Y akhin”— T he C lan destin e E m igration o f M oroc
can Je w ry to Is ra el, Tel-Aviv: Defense Ministry Press, 1984, Hebrew, 8 0 -
81.
39. Protocol of Meeting of Jewish Agency Emissaries in Europe and North
Africa, 1 1 -1 2 December 1955, Paris, ISA, FM 191/6, Hebrew.
40. Ibid. Haber of the AJDC in Morocco related that every single responsible
Jewish leader believed that an early victim would be emigration to Israel
and, as a corollary of this, the dissolution of the operations of Cadima. In
December 1955 the most optimistic did not give more than six months for
these developments to take place. Samuel L. Haber to M. W. Beckleman,
Casablanca, 6 December 1955, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 9C/10A/C56.300A.
41. “Cadima,” al-Ra? y al-cA m m , 22 February 1956, Arabic.
42. Baruch Duvdevani, director of the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department
in Paris, to Shragai, 10 May 1956, ISA, FM 2388/6B, Hebrew.
43. S. Z. Shragai, internal report, confidential, 20 May 1956, ISA, FM 2569/3B,
Hebrew.
44. Ibid.
45. N. Ben-Menachem to Shragai, Paris, 26 May 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Pa
pers, Hebrew.
46. See two letters from Shragai to Isser Harel dated 16 and 17 August 1956,
CZA, S59/Shragai Papers; my interview with Shlomo Havilio, Jerusalem, 21
July 1988, in Hebrew; and Eyal Erlich, “The Wounded Pride of the Silent
Agents,” ha-*Arets (Weekly Supplement), 29 May 1987, 6 - 7 , Hebrew.
47. Shragai to Harel, letters dated 16 and 17 August 1956, see note 46.
48. According to Segev, the government of Morocco announced plans to close
the Cadima camp at the end of May (Segev, “O peration Y akhin,” 95).
Easterman contended that emigration was suddenly stopped on 13 May
(W orld Jew ish C ongress: F ou rth P lenary A ssem bly— R ep ort o f th e Political
A ffairs D epartm en t, Stockholm, August 1959, 19).
49. Ibid.
50. Duvdevani to Shragai, Casablanca, 7 June 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Papers,
Hebrew.
368 Notes to Chapter 6
51. Isser Harel to Shragai, 30 September 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Papers, He
brew.
52. S. Z. Shragai to Z. Shazar, Jerusalem, 14 August 1956, ISA, FM 2398/1B,
Hebrew.
53. Segev, “O peration Y akhin ,” 97.
54. N. Krofsoff (Easterman’s Secretary) to Sharett, London, 29 May 1956, ISA,
FM 2398/1B, Strictly Confidential. Sharett was replaced two weeks later by
Colda Meir as minister for foreign affairs.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. World Jewish Congress, Fourth Plenary Assembly, Report o f the Political
Affairs Department, Stockholm, August 1959, 19.
59. J. Gouldin à cAbderrrahïm Bü cabld (then Moroccan ambassador to France),
Paris, 10 juillet 1956, ISA, FM 2398/1B.
60. Ibid.
61. According to Segev (p. 104), while the authorities were inclined to allow the
departure of 6,300 Jews of the 9,000 who had managed to reach the camp,
by September there were as many as 13,000 there. I have been unable to
confirm whether the number exceeded 6,300, since Segev cites no sources
for this information, nor have the available archives confirmed these esti
mates.
62. Duvdevani to Shragai, 6 August 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Papers, confiden
tial, Hebrew.
63. Ibid.
64. Ben-Menachem to Shragai, Paris, 30 July 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Papers,
Hebrew.
65. Duvdevani to Shragai, 29 July 1956, CZA, S59/Shragai Files, Hebrew.
66. See note 62.
67. Shragai to Z. Shazar, Jerusalem, 14 August 1956, ISA, FM 2398/1B, He
brew.
68. Ibid.
69. On Egypt, see my book The Jews o f Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst o f
Zionismt Anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict, New York: New York
University Press, 1992; idem, “From War to War: The Jews of Egypt be
tween 1948 and 1970,” Studies in Zionism, 17, no. 1 (1986), 111-147.
70. See note 67.
71. See S. Z. Shragai to Dr. N. Goldmann, Paris, 27 August 1956, ISA, FM
2398/1B; and A. Harman to S. Bendor, Jerusalem, 10 September 1956, ISA,
FM 2398/1B (both in Hebrew).
29. Z. Shuster and A. Karlikow, Morocco Report, Paris, the AJC Foreign Affairs
Department in New York, 19 December 1959, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 48B/
56.316.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Jules Braunschvig à Eugène Weill, 16 décembre 1958, from the files of the
AIU.
39. See note 29.
40. Speech by Dr. Léon Benzaquen at OSE-Maroc in Casablanca, 19 février
1959, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 48B/56.310D.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 14 (p. 219).
45. “Morocco,” American Jewish Year Book, 61(1962), p. 354.
46. Shragai to Easterman, by diplomatic pouch, 22 July 1960, CZA, Z6/Nahum
Coldmann Files.
47. Easterman to Golda Meir, London, 6 September 1960, CZA, Z6/Nahum
Coldmann Files.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Easterman to Goldmann, London, 19 September 1960, CZA, Z6/Nahum
Coldmann Files.
51. American Jewish Committee, Paris Office, Abe Karlikow, to Foreign Affairs
Department, New York, 21 February 1961, Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem 48B/
C56.316.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. “Les juifs du Maroc sont libres de se rendre dans n’importe quel pays sauf
Israël,” La Vigie Marocaine, 24 February 1961.
60. Minutes of the Mossad le-Te3 üm, Jerusalem, 13 February 1961; Hebrew.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
Notes to Chapter 7 371
. Ibid.
S' ID
©
. Ibid.
© © © © r- r-
. Ibid.
©
. Ibid.
00 © © ^
. Ibid.
. K. H., “The World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Communities of Mo
rocco,” al-cAlam, 17-18 September 1961, Arabic.
. Ibid. Coldmann argued in Geneva that Algerian Jews, who for the most part
r*-
©
had been French citizens since 1870, be given the opportunity to choose
between Algerian and French citizenship. See Le Monde, 25 August 1961.
. cAbd al-Rahmân Saih, “Spanish Aid to Zionism,” al-Fajr, 13 January 1961,
S
Arabic.
0 0© ©
t^ t^ o o
. Ibid.
. “Communiqué by Patriotic Jews,” al-Tahrtr, 17 February 1961, Arabic.
. “The Israeli Consul in Gibraltar Visits the Northern Region of the Country,”
al-^Alam, 6 September 1961, Arabic.
. André Scemama, “Au Maroc les juifs sont acculés au désespoir,” Le Monde,
00
20 January 1961.
. MuçÇafa cAlawï, “Golda Meir Speaks with Malice,” al-Fajr, 20 January 1961,
cc
Arabie.
. “Exodus of Jews to Palestine,” al-Tahrir, 16 December 1961, Arabic.
0000
0 3 ;
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Henry L. Levy, “Tunisia,” A/YB, 56(1955), 440-441.
11. See note 6.
12. G. M. Riegner, Rapport sur la situation en Tunisie: 14-16 juin 1952, stride-
ment confidentielle, Paris, 20 juin 1952, ISA, FM 268/11. Riegner suggested
that the gendarme may have been a Tunisian. Other eyewitness accounts
and the nationalists indicate he was a Frenchman.
13. Ibid.
14. See, for instance, A. Ayalon, Marseilles, to Foreign Ministry, 20 June 1952,
ISA, FM 268/11, Hebrew. Most reports and accounts noted the role of the
Jewish youths in defending the Jewish community by repulsing the attackers.
15. Riegner, Rapport sur la situation en Tunisie.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Première conférence nord-africaine du congrès juif mondial (7-10 juin 1952),
Alger, Arch.CJM/Lazarus P164/27.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. According to Charles Sa'ada, one of the leading Jewish personalities in
Tunisia and president of the rival Sfax federation, his position on reforms in
Tunisia was:
Nous sommes absolument opposés aux réformes telles qu elles ont été présentées par
les Tunisiens, car le jour où la souverainété française viendrait à disparaître, la position
des israélites en Tunisie deviendrait intenable. Il y a bien quelques personalités
israélites tunisiens qui font de la surenchère en faveur des réformes mais il semble
quelles jouent là un jeu dangereux pour la collectivité. (We are absolutely opposed to
the reforms such as they have been presented by the Tunisians, for the day that
French sovereignty disappears, the position of the Jews in Tunisia will become unten
able. There are, of course, some well-known Tunisian Jews who are making a higher
bid in favor of reforms, but it seems they are playing a dangerous game there for the
community as a whole.)
cadon, researcher on North African Jewry, for the use of this letter from his
personal archive.
57. Levy, “Tunisia,” 461-462.
58. cAkiva Levinski, Report on Morocco and Tunisia, Israeli Embassy, Paris, 8
August 1954, ISA, FM 103/13B, English.
59. Henry L. Levy to Herbert Katzki, Tunis, 7 December 1955, Arch.AJDC/
Jerusalem, 20A/0-1022“C.”
60. Interview with Yaïr Douer, Ramat-EPal, Israel, 25 January 1987, Hebrew.
61. Les enfants d ’Oslo, published by Yad-Tabenkin, the Histadrut, and the
Union des Juifs Originaires de Tunisie en Israël, 1989, 5-6.
62. Ibid., 5-6.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 33.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 47.
67. On Yaïr Douer’s work in Egypt, see Michael M. Laskier, The Jews o f Egypt,
1920-1970: In the Midst o f Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Middle East
Conflict, New York: New York University Press, 1992, chapter 4.
68. Yaïr Douer to David Umansky, Tunis, 9 December 1952, CZA, L58/44,
Hebrew.
69. Interview with Yaïr Douer.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Mordechai Beitan, Report on Visit to Tunis, 12 June 1950, ILA, 104IV/101,
Hebrew.
73. Ephraim Ben-Hayyim (Friedman), “The Erets-Yisrael Mission to North Af
rica: The First Phase— 1943-1948/49,” Symposium on the North African
Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv, July 1987, 5, Hebrew.
74. Ibid., 11-13.
75. Israel Geshur to Dr. Avraham Nadad, Paris, 13 November 1950, ILA, 104V/
101H.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Gide con Rafael to Moshe Sharett, New York, 27 June 1952, ISA, FM 2424/
13, Hebrew.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid. It is interesting that Charles Haddad had suggested to Maurice Fischer
how Israel should deal with the Tunisian question at the UN:
Nous devrions donner notre voix à la France dans la mesure où cette voix s’inscrirait
dans une majorité et nous absentir si la thèse française d’incompétence se révélait
perdante. Dans ce dernier cas, M. Haddad pense qu’Israël devrait agir en faveur d’un
projet de résolution qui inviterait la France (1) à affermir son intention d’accorder à la
Tunisie son autonomie interiéure dans le but d’aider son évolution vers l’indépend
ance; (2) à constituter une commission franco-tunisienne paritaire dont la fonction
378 Notes to Chapter 9
serait d'assurer l'exécution du programme affirmé par la France (We should give our
voice to France to the extent that this voice will be registered in a majority and abstain
if the French thesis of incompetence proves to be on the losing side. In the latter case,
M. Haddad thinks that Israel should act in favor of a draft resolution which would
invite France (1) to affirm its intention of granting Tunisia internal autonomy with the
aim of helping its evolution toward independence; (2) to set up a Franco-Tunisian
commission on which both sides would be equally represented and whose function
would be to ensure that the program affirmed by France was carried out.)
Constantine between 1957 and 1962, in: Symposiums on the North African
Jewish Underground, 19 November 1987 and 13 June 1988, 22-23, Hebrew.
28. Ibid., 23.
29. Ibid.
30. Interview with Shlomo Havilio, Jerusalem, 21 July 1988, Hebrew.
31. See note 27.
32. Interview with Shlomo Havilio.
33. Ibid.
34. AJDC Country Directors Conference, Twentieth Annual Meeting, Hôtel du
Rhône, Geneva, 27-30 October 1958.
35. Jacques Lazarus, “Algeria,” A]YB, 61 (1960), 332-333.
36. Henry L. Levy, “Algeria,” AJYB, 60 (1959), 275.
37. See note 13 (pp. 59-61).
38. On Ya cakov Hasan, see Shmuel Segev, “Operation Yakhin”— The Clandes
tine Emigration o f Moroccan Jewry to Israel, Tel-Aviv, Defense Ministry
Press, 1984, 96-97, 104, Hebrew.
39. Ibid.
40. Alex Doron, “The Mystery of the Israelis in the Atlas Mountains,” Macariv,
Weekend Supplement, no. 207, 8 August 1984, Hebrew.
41. Golan to Easterman, Rome, 2 March 1958, CZA, Z6/2211.
42. See note 40.
43. Golan to Easterman, Rome, 2 March 1958, CZA, Z6/2211.
44. See note 40.
45. Golan à Muhammad Yazld, Rome, 22 mars 1958, CZA, Z6/2211.
46. See note 40.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Alex Doron, “The Mystery of the Israelis in the Atlas Mountains,” Ma cariu,
Weekend Supplement, no. 208, 15 August 1984, Hebrew.
50. Ibid.
51. On Markuse in Algeria, see Markuse to Shragai, Algiers, 25 November 1958,
S6/1808, Hebrew.
52. See note 13 (p. 61).
53. Armand Kaplan à Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Paris, 5 avril 1960, CZA, Z6/1756.
54. Ibid.
55. Jacques Lazarus, “Algeria,” AJYB, 62 (1961), 357.
56. Information Juive, 4 February 1960.
57. FLN Document: Les juifs dAlgérie dans le combat pour lindépendance
nationale, édité par la Fédération de France du FLN, février 1960, Arch.CJM/
Lazarus P164/79.
58. See note 55.
59. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, no. 194, 25 July 1960.
60. Armand Kaplan à Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Paris, 24 janvier 1961, CZA, Z6/
1558.
61. Ibid.
Notes to Chapter 10 383
92. Franco Lévi, Rapport sur ïAlgérie, 21 octobre 1964, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem,
50A/56.200.
SSS8
. Ibid.
. Victor Malka, “Algeria," AJYB, 69 (1968), 523.
. Ibid., 524.
. Samuel Lévis to Theodore Feder, Paris, 19 December 1967, Arch. AJ DC/
Jerusalem, 50A/56.200.
97. Victor Malka, “Algeria," AJYB, 71 (1970), 514.
Conclusions
1. cAbd al-Qâdir Ben cAbd Allah, “La politique française à Tégard des juifs
marocains," VOpinion, 29 August 1976.
2. See, for instance, H. H. Bensasson, (ed.), A History o f the Jewish People,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976, 790.
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Index
eAbbâs, Ferhat, 298 25, 27-32, 59-60, 89-90, 93, 144, 149,
Abitbol, 1 154-55, 159-67, 169, 175-77, 187-88,
Abotbol (Avital), Sam, 266, 281 200, 230, 250, 258-59, 265, 285-86,
Aflalo, Albert, 189 289, 307-9, 313-14, 334, 345-47; and
Aflalo, Ora, 221 Zionism, 42-54; and Ecole Normale
Agence Association Juive Suisse, 296 Hébraïque (ENH), 158-65, 253; under
Agudat-Tsiyon (Zionist association in Tuni Vichy, 63-65, 68, 79
sia), 36-37, 43 Allouche, Félix (d. 1978), 38, 43, 45
Agudat Yisrael, 155 Al-Tabrïr, 2, 12, 197, 216-17, 243
Ahavat-Tsiyon (Zionist association in Mo Altun, Vitalis, 168
rocco), 32 cAmar, David, 191, 207, 242-43, 251
Ahmad Bey (d. 1855), 7 *Amar, Moshe, 266
<Aidan, M., 295 American Jewish Committee (AJC), 146,
Ait Ahmad (Mohand), Hocine, 318 172- 77, 194, 196-200
Aix-les-Bains Conference (August 1955), American Jewish Congress, 146
171-72, 177 American Jewish Joint Distribution Com
Akhbâr al-Dunyâ, 212-13 mittee (AJDC), in Morocco, 1-3, 68,
Al-cAlamt 97, 212-13, 216 89, 93, 105, 113, 118, 128-30, 140, 144,
Al-Amïn Bey, Muhammad, 288 146, 150, 152, 154, 160-61, 166-67,
Al-cArabï, 327 173- 76, 194, 226, 249; in Tunisia, 258-
£Alawï, Mawlày Ahmad, 204 60, 268, 273, 275, 278, 282, 289, 299,
cAlawï, Muçtafë, 213 301-4; in Algeria, 312, 314, 323, 336-43
Al-Fajr, 212, 214-15 >Âmir, cAbd al-ÏJakïm (d. 1967), 245
Al-Fâsî, cAlâl (d. 1974), 94, 177, 191-92, Amit, Ze’ev, 222
197 Amsellem, Moïse, 158
Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA), Anglo-Moroccan agreement (1856), 11
324, 333 Ankri, Yosef, 38
Al-Hajawï, Si Mubammad, 97-98 Annijcr, Yitshak, 132
Aliyat ha-No'ar. See Youth caliya Antébi, Moshe, 238
Al-Kifâb al-Wafanï, 212 Arab League, 108, 137, 176-77, 193, 196,
Al-Kissî, cAbbâs, 251 209, 213, 241-42, 296-97, 301
Allai, Yitshak (d. 1987), 275-77 £Arafa, Mawlây Muhammad Ben, 127, 171
Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), 2, 19, Arens, Moshe (“Misha”), 87
391
392 Index
Markuse, Shmuel (d. 1974), 270-74, 278, Narboni, André, 262, 314, 328, 330
289-92, 295, 327 Narkiss, Uzi, 300
Mattan, Eliezer, 128-29, 132 Nasser, Gamal Abdel (d. 1970), 131, 137,
Medioni, Jo (d. 1970), 158 192, 197, 204-11, 222, 248, 289-90,
Megôrâshïm (Jewish Exiles from Spain), 296, 301, 305, 349
11 Nataf, Elie, 263, 275
Meir, Golda (d. 1978), 208-9 Nazi propaganda, 56
Meiss, Léon, 330 Neo-Destour (Tunisian nationalist party,
Mellàh (Jewish residential quarter in Mo founded in 1934), 38, 58, 170, 254-57,
rocco), 14, 28, 63, 68, 71, 107, 121-22, 261-62, 283-85, 287, 297-98
127-28, 142-43, 148, 151, 154, 155, Nessim-Cohen, Chief Rabbi of Tunisia,
157, 174, 187, 190, 206, 221, 240-41, 307
252, 347 Nocar ve-he-ljaluts. See Department of Pi
Memmi, Albert, 40, 264-65 oneer Movements
Mendel, Arnold, 191-92 Noguès, Charles, 62, 72
Mendès-France, Pierre (d. 1983), 256-57, Norwegian Red Cross, 275
264, 272-73, 287, 328 Nos Petits, 259-60
Menuhin, Shlomo, 132, 230 Numerus Clausus, 63
Mestiri, Ahmad, 296-98
Metuk, Maurice, 299-301 October 1956 Sinai/Suez War, 289
Mission Universitaire et Culturelle Fran October 1973 Middle East War, 327
çaise (MUCF), 302, 307 Œuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE), 3,
Mizrahi (Religious movement), 86, 271 128, 140-41, 144, 146, 154, 200-201,
Modiano, Dr. Vidal, 330 258-59, 289, 299
Mollet, Guy (d. 1975), 257, 328 Ofek, Chaim, 269
Morilla, Francesco, 228 Ohana, René, 215
Mossad (Israel's secret-service organiza Ohana, S., 145
tion), 4 -5 , 139-41, 147, 152, 179, 196, Ohave Tsiyon (Zionist association in Tuni
204, 208-12, 218-53, 283, 293-94, sia), 36, 267
299-301, 321-22, 325-27 Ohayon, Elie, 266
Mossad Le-1Aliya Bet: in Morocco, 4, 35, “Operation Har-Sinai,” 300
76, 85, 87-88, 92, 102-3, 106, 109-10, “Operation Hiloula,” 224
112, 117, 121, 139, 153, 166-67, 175, “Operation Jericho,” 300
218; in Tunisia, 267-70, 281; in Algeria, “Operation Moshe,” 300
315 “Operation Yakhin,” 212, 218, 237-46,
Mossad le-Te5um. See Coordinating Com 349
mission Opinion, L\ 346-47
Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Lib Oren, Gad, 222, 239
ertés Démocratiques (MTLD), 97 Orfus, Jacques, 330
Mouyal, Elie, 148 Organic Statute of 1947 (Algeria), 317
Muhammad V, Sultan (d. 1961), 25, 9 1 - Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS),
92, 124, 127, 171, 184, 186-88, 191, 331-34, 337
197, 202-3, 207-12, 222, 231, 349 Organization for Rehabilitation through
Murphy, Robert, 83 Training (ORT), 3, 28, 146, 154-55,
M> zali, Salàh, 256 200-201, 230, 258-59, 278, 289, 307-8
Ortiz, Joseph, 328
Nahon, Shlomo, 146 Or Torah, 259, 308
Najar, Emile, 285 0$ar ha-Tôra (OH): in Morocco, 28, 143-
Namir, Mordechai, 283 44, 154; in Tunisia, 258
398 Index
Shuster, Zachariah (d. 1987), 172-76, 196 Union Marocaine de Travail (UMT), 197,
Sicauld, M., 133 246-47
Slim, Mongi, 305 Union Nationale des Forces Populaire
Smadja, Lucien, 41 (UNFP), 197-202, 205-6, 215-16, 245-
Smolenskin, Peretz, 36 47
Sokolow, Nahum (d. 1936), 36 Union Sioniste Algérienne, 41
Spanien, Ralph, 109-10 Union Universelle de la Jeunesse Juive
Spanish Civil War (1936-39), 59-60 (U UJ J), 38-40, 42, 85
Spanish Morocco (Spanish Zone), 31, 3 4 - United Kibbutz Movement, 85-86, 147
35, 58, 131, 180-81; and Spanish Civil United Nations, 284, 297
War, 59-60, 66 Université d’Alger, 38, 79
Spivacoff, Dr. Zeimig (d. 1932), 34 Uriel, Arye, 239
Stahl, Victor de, 26
Steeg, Théodore, 51 Valensi, Alfred (d. 1944), 33, 37, 42-43
Stillman, Norman A., 1 Vallat, Xavier, 55, 64-65, 77
Svarc, Ivor, 302 Vardi, Dr., 268
Syrian-Egyptian Union (1958-61), 197, Vered, Ya'el, 300
212 Vichy and Vichyites, 40-41, 158, 330,
Szold, Nenrietta (d. 1945), 139 348-49; anti-Jewish laws and policies in
the Maghrib, 55-83, 188; Algerian-Jew-
Tajouri, Reuben (d. 1960), 158, 161, 165 ish underground and resistance, 82-83
Talmùdê Tôrah , 312-13 Villa Gaby, 275
Tangier, International Zone of, 25, 31, 34, Voizard, Pierre, 256
50, 102, 131, 180-81; during World
War II, 68-71 Waknin, Rafi (d. 1961), 230-31
Terahem-Tsiyon (Zionist association in War of Attrition (Israel/Egypt), 250
Tunisia), 36 Weill, Eugène (d. 1981), 95-96
Thabault, Roger (d. 1979), 64 Wcizmann, Dr. Chaim (d. 1952), 42
Thursz, Jonathan (d. 1976), 34 Wilner, Menachem, 131, 179
Toledano, J. R., 145, 168 Women’s International Zionist Organiza
Toledano, Meir, 168, 171, 201 tion (WIZO), 258
Toledano, Rabbi Baruch, 163 World Jewish Congress (WJC): in Mo
Toltshinski, Chaim, 130, 132 rocco, 106, 168-73, 176, 177-85, 192-
Torah ve-cAvoda, 267-68, 271, 279 97, 199-200, 202-3, 208, 213-14, 218-
Tordjman, Madame, 118 19, 251; in Tunisia, 258, 261-64, 289,
Torres, cAbd al-Khallq, 59 293, 296-97, 305; in Algeria, 325, 333-
Touansa (indigenous Tunisian Jewry), 15 34
Tsecire-Tsiyon, 85, 266-67, 281 World Zionist Organization (WZO), 42,
Tsur, Ya'akov, 176, 273-74 93, 145-46, 153
Tubi, Yosef, 1
Tujjàr al-sulfân (“The Sultan’s Mer Yazid, Muhammad, 325-26
chants”), 18 Yeger, Yitshak, 297-99
Turek, Eliezer, 47 Yekhezkeli, Shlomo, 236
Yerushalmi, Nahum (d. 1961), 73
cUlamà\ 7, 262 Yordim (Jews leaving Israel), 124-25
Ultras, 331-32 Yoshevet-Tsiyon (Zionist association in
Umansky, David, 278 Tunisia), 42
Union Générale de Travailleurs Tunisiens Yost, Charles W., 196, 199-200
(UGTT), 254-55 Youssefites, 291, 349
400 Index
Youth caliya: in Morocco, 119, 123, 138- Zaffran, Dr. Ange, 314
45, 150, 152, 166, 169; in Tunisia, 274- Zaga, David, 315
78; in Algeria, 315 Zaga, Raphael, 315
Yuval, Moshe, 238, 243 Zeituna circles, 58, 261
Zeller, Marie-André, 328
Zabin, Carmela, 230 Zini, Chief Rabbi Simon, 344
Zabin, Yona, 222, 239 Zionist Federation of Vienna, 40
W IN N E R O F T H E 1 9 9 4 N A T IO N A L J E W IS H
B O O K A W A R D IN S E P H A R D IC S T U D IE S
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Africa up to date, and he has done so both in the originality of his schol
arship and the richness of his human interest material."
— Howard M. Sachar, George Washington University
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