LIST OF CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

First Semester, School Year 2014-2015

ATTY. JOSEPH BENEDICT G. GESMUNDO

Article II
Sec. 1
 People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
 Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113
 In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June
29,1992
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
 Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Authority vs.
Confederation of Union in Government Corporations and Offices, 30
SCRA 649
 Republic vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 SCRA 660
 Maquera vs. Borra, 15 SCRA 7
Sec. 10
 Tondo Medical Center Employees vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167324,
July 17, 2007
Sec. 12
 Pierce vs. Society of Sister, 69 L.ed. 1070
 Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Sec. 16
 Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792
 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110120, March 16, 1994
Sec. 19
 Garcia vs. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990
Sec. 26
 Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Article VI
Sec. 1
 Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111230, September 30,
1994
 Eastern Shipping Line vs. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, 166 SCRA 533
 Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730
 Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor, 108 SCRA 757
 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Secretary Drilon, 176 SCRA 24
 Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90
  Employees Confederation vs. National Wages Commission, G.R. No.
96169, September 24, 1991
 Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782,
December 11, 1991
 People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
 Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 1
 Chiongbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253
 Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659
 Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660
 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
 United States vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 56
 Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251
 Philippine Coconut Producers vs. Republic, 663 SCRA 514
 Belgica vs. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013
 Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Sec. 3
 Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 161658,
November 3, 2008
Sec. 5 (2)
 Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6,
2000
 Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
 Ang Bagonn Bayani vs. COMELEC, 147589, June 25, 2003
 Banat vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009
 Atong Panglaam, Inc. vs. COMELEC, 649 SCRA 477
Sec. 5 (3)
 Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
 Mariano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
 Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995
 Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
Sec. 6
 Gallego vs. Vera, G.R. No. L-48641, November 25, 1941
 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18,
1995
 Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
 Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
 Co vs. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
 Bengzon vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 14284, May 7, 2001
 Valles vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Sec. 7
 Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991
 Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

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Sec. 8
 Codilla vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002
Sec. 9
 Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004

Sec. 11
 People vs. Jaloslos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
 Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
 Antonino vs. Valencia, G.R. No. L-26526, May 27, 1974
 Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1
Sec. 13
 Liban vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Sec. 14
 Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 31
Sec. 16 (1)
 Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
 Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
Sec. 16 (2)
 People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Sec. 16 (3)
 Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863
 Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, August 10, 1996
 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
 Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636
Sec. 16 (4)
 United States vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729
 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347
 Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714
 Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
 ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

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 ARTICLE VI

Sec. 17 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman

 Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134 (c/o Jen Navarro)

 Abbas vs. Senate, 166 SCRA 651 (c/o Jen Navarro)

 Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991 (c/o Jen
Navarro)

 Guerrero vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

Facts: The petitioner is seeking for the disqualification of Fariñas. Alleges that
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that its jurisdiction over
the case of Fariñas had ceased upon his assumption of office as representative for the
first district of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Jurisdictional Boundaries separating the Comelec and the HRET

Ruling: Once a member has been, proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office, the
jurisdiction of HRET begins.

 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, August 12,
1999

Facts: Petition of quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of a Congressman (for not
being a natural born citizen). But the petitioners didn't initially pay the fees required
in Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of HRET. (which provides that in addition to filing fees,
a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a 500php deposit to the
tribunal)

Issue: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET.

Ruling:No. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on a well-founded and

factual legal basis, no abuse of discretion can be imputed.
 Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489,
November 29, 2002

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 Facts:Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize, reconstitute
and reconfigure the HRET and the CA to include party-list representatives.

Issues:
a)Whether or not the present composition of the HRET and Commission on
Appointments, violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation.

b)Whether or not the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to
include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

a) No.The petitioners are bereft of any allegations because they simply refrained
from participating in the process. They didn't possess the personal and substantial
interest required to confer them with locus standi (the right to bring an action,to
be heard in court).
b) No. There is no grave abuse of discretion. The HRET and the CA are bereft of
any power to reconstitute themselves.

 Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007

Where the candidate has already been proclaimed, remedy of the petitioner is to file
an electoral protest with the HRET. • Unico was proclaimed winner and had already
took oath. Petitioner raised an issue on the canvassing of returns and alleged
invalidity of Unico’s proclamation.

ISSUE: WON the court shold take cognizance of Chato's election protest. WON civil
action for certiorari will prosper.

RULING: No, the jurisdiction is with HRET. Should the Court decide on this case, it
would take over the jurisdiction of the HRET as mandated by the Constitution. •
Essential requisites for special civil action for certiorari (SC): 1) tribunal acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion and 2) no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Since these
elements were not present, the civil action will not prosper.

 Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, April 1, 2009

Limkaichong v. Comelec GR no. 178831-32, April 1, 2009

Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her
rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though

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Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During
the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day
came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival
Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2
days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified
candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation
disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance
withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall
be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petitioned arguing that since she is now the
proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

- Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second

Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,
Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The
use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members.

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Sec. 18 There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission
shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

 Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (c/o Angelica Pascual)

 Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377

FACTS:
Petitioner Ana Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representative
under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine
(9) congressmen. Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced twelve
congressmen (11 from majority, 1 from minority). Congresswoman Ana Coseteng
and her party KAIBA filed a petition praying that the court declare the election of
respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of CA members null and void on the theory
that in violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
ISSUE:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
HELD:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political
question but because revision in House representation in CA was based on
proportional representation. Her endorsement from 9 other congressmen is
inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical
endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano – Yap.

 Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992

FACTS:
In May 11, 1992 elections the Political Parties LDP, NPC,LAKAS-NUCD and LP-
PDP-LABAN had agreed to use the traditional formula to suffice the requirement of
having 12 representatives in CoA.Tanada, Sen. Tolentino rounded off the result
which Guingona—a member of LAKAS-NUCD opposed on the grounds that it was
against proportional representation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the

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 CoA.

HELD:
It is a violation of the Section 18 of Article VI because it does not lead to a
proportional representation anymore. . A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2
duly elected senators-members in the CoA. In order to resolve the issue, the parties
may coordinate with each other to come up with a proportional representation

Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.

Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved
and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited
by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.

Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected

 Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. L-89914, November 20, 1991
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Bengzon, et al., petitioners
-vs-
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, intervenor

FACTS:
(1) Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was accused for an alleged anomalous sale of
several government corporations, involving petitioner Benzon’s Law Office and the
Lopa Group of Companies, as owned by the brother-in-law of then, Pres. Aquino;
(2) By virtue of a privilege speech, Sen. Enrile urged the Senate to investigate such
alleged anomaly. The parties of Romualdez and Lopa were subpoenaed to appear
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) to testify as to the acquisitions in
question;
(3) Lopa refused to testify before the Committee for he may “unduly prejudice the
pending civil case against him”, while Benson likewise refused to give a statement,
thus invoking his right to due process. After the hearing, Lopa sent a letter to Enrile
denying the allegations against him for maliciousness and lack of basis;
(4) Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against the intervention of the
Committee, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or injunctive

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 relief, claiming that the SBRC is in excess of the jurisdiction and constitutional rights
vested upon it;

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee inquiry has a valid purpose in
aiding the legislation.

RULING:
No. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was
conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act. Such matter appears to lie more appropriately within the province of
the courts rather than the legislature. To add, the civil case was involving Lopa is
already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe, and inquiry into
the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain
of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be
investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry
to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal. Moreover, the Court held that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, as ordained by the Constitution.

 Sabio vs. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced

Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous
losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006,
Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to
be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance
of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio
hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

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 HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

 Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
Standard Chartered Banks Vs Senate Committee on Banks

Facts:
Senator JPE accused SCB of violating the Securities Regulation Code (R.A.8799) for
selling unregistered foreign securities. This has led the committee to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation. Petitioner SCB refused to attend the investigation
proceedings on the ground that criminal and civil cases involving the same issues
were pending in the courts.

Issue:
Whether the Senate Committee on Banks can conduct investigation against SCB
despite criminal and civil cases against the latter pending in courts

Held:

No. Petition is Denied

Citing Bengson Jr vs Senate Blue Ribon Committee, the petitioners claim that since
the issue of whether or not SCB illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is
already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the
committee by investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in
the courts.

 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760,

July 29, 2003 (Karizsa Hatab)

 Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 25 (c/o Rod Anthony)

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  Senate vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (c/o Kerwin Burayag)

 Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, 549 SCRA 771

549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department –

Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter
to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. The SBRC cited
Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process

only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the

President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a

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 member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, 564 SCRA 152

Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

FACTS: On September 26, 2007, Neri appeared before the respondent committeesand
testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National BroadbandProject,
a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner thereindisclosed that
when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos toapprove the project, he
informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him NOT TO ACCEPT THE
BRIBE. However when he was probed further on PGMA’s andpetitioner’s
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,invoking exec
privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: whether ornot PGMA
followed up the NBN Project; whether or not PGMA directed him toprioritize it;
whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it. Hence, Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to the petitioner was issued. The petitioner did not appear before the
respondent committees upon orders of thePresident invoking exec privilege. He
explained that the questions asked of him arecovered by exec privilege. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees andan order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and givehis testimony.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

WON respondent committee committed a violation againstSec. 21 or Article VI in the
Constitution.

Held:
Respondents violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, requiringthat the
inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” Thisrequires
the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governinginquiries in
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before itor after it. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate are therefore procedurally infirm. The language of Sec.
21 Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry beconducted in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. Itshould likewise be stressed
that not all orders issued or proceedings conductedpursuant to the subject Rules are
null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that therationale for the publication is to protect
the rights of witnesses as expresses in Sec.21 Art. 6 of the Constitution.

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Sec. 22 The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions,
but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

 Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (c/o Krizzia
Calvelo)

 Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

(c/o Liz Lorenzo)

Section 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.Sec. 24 The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.
Sec. 24 All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way
“the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul

13
 Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that
such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR.
Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

Sec. 25 (2)
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by
the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget
shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

14
 Garcia vs. Mata, 65 SCRA 517
Garcia vs. Mata

Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status.
He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to
active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which
prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has
no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item
therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600
fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation
law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental
governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of
reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN

APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be
expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

Sec. 25 (5)
 Demetria vs. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
Demetria vs. Alba

148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to
Realign Funds

FACTS: Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa

sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This

15
 Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

 Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

(c/o Des Alfaro)

 Sanchez vs. Commission on Audit, 552 SCRA 471 (c/o Des

Alfaro)

 Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 (c/o Imlani)

Sec. 26 (1)
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final

16
 form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.
 Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (c/o Maan
Leyva)

 Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, G.R. No. 105371,

November 11, 1993 (c/o Maan Leyva)

 Tan vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994

Facts:
The case is about the constitutionality of RA No. 7496 amending certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293. Petitioner contends that the
title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of RA No. 7496 is a misnomer, or atleast,
deficient for being merely entitled “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the
Self-Employed and Professionals Enagaged in the Practice of their Profession.
Issue:
W/N RA No. 7496 violates the provisions of Constitution Art. VI, Sec.26 (Every Bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall expressed in the title
thereof.)
Ruling:
No. The objectives of Art. VI, Sec.26 have been sufficiently met.
1. To prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature
who favor any one of the unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act
2. To avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature
3. To fairly apprise the people

 Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479

Facts:
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no
inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and
commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress.

The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-
SIX:
Issue:
Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter
expressed in the act.

17
 Ruling:
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of
necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical,
construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that
general subject.
SC conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the
subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 26,
Article VI of the Constitution.

 Insular Lumber Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA

710 (c/o Neil Garen)

Sec. 26 (2)
 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994 (c/o Neil
Garen)

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of
Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way
“the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul
Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that
such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR.
Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

18
Sec. 27 (2)

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be

presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
185 SCRA 329 (c/o Net Gasmin)

 Gonzales vs. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990

 Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.

113105, August 19, 1994

 Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133

Sec. 28

1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress

shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

19
 3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
 Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Case: Gerochi v.Department of Energy ( Article VI Section 28)
Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power IndustryReform Act of
2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of
electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and took
effect in 2001.

Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of
the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard
and be represented.

Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.

Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise
of the State’s police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from
Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding
electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for
which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the country’s
electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objectives

If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental,

the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.

The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind
the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-
being of the people.

 Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992

(c/o Paula Salas)

 Systems Plus Computer College vs. Caloocan City, G.R. No.

146382, August 7, 2003 (c/o Paula Salas)

20
  Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992 (c/o Rajiv Saber)

 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 124043, October 14, 1998 (c/o Rajiv Saber)

 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Santos, G.R. No. 119252, August 18, 1997
G.R. No. 119252 August 18, 1997
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City; ANTONIO M. MARCO; JEWELRY
BY MARCO & CO., INC., and GUILD OF PHILIPPINE JEWELLERS, INC.,
respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Of grave concern to this Court is the judicial pronouncement of the court a quo that
certain provisions of the Tariff & Customs Code and the National Internal Revenue
Code are unconstitutional. This provokes the issue: Can the Regional Trial Courts
declare a law inoperative and without force and effect or otherwise
unconstitutional? If it can, under what circumstances?
There is no doubt in the Court's mind, despite protestations to the contrary, that
respondent judge encroached upon matters properly falling within the province of
legislative functions. In citing as basis for his decision unproven comparative data
pertaining to differences between tax rates of various Asian countries, and
concluding that the jewelry industry in the Philippines suffers as a result, the
respondent judge took it upon himself to supplant legislative policy regarding
jewelry taxation. In advocating the abolition of local tax and duty on jewelry
simply because other countries have adopted such policies, the respondent judge
overlooked the fact that such matters are not for him to decide. There are reasons
why jewelry, a non-essential item, is taxed as it is in this country, and these
reasons, deliberated upon by our legislature, are beyond the reach of judicial
questioning.
What we see here is a debate on the WISDOM of the laws in question. This is a
matter on which the RTC is not competent to rule.
Theory that the tax rates of other countries should be used as a yardstick in
determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country.

 John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24,
2003
G. R. No. 119775 October 24, 2003
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, et al.Petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, Respondents.

21
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts:
By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, "CREATING AND DESIGNATING a
portion of the area covered by the former Camp John [Hay] as THE JOHN HAY
Special Economic Zone pursuant to R.A. No. 7227."
R.A. No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY
RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS
PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," which
was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate
the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former
military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their
extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the
City of Baguio.1
Issue:

1) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and

local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay
Special Economic Zone
2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with
the local autonomy of Baguio City
Held:
The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus
contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which provides that "No
law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress."

It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has
full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation.
This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption
and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the
Constitution.
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over
Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject to certain limitations
provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of the John
Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it
has been granted.
The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay
as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation.51 The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City government to

22
 such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted
resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had been
proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.

 Abra Valley College, Inc. vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning
duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of
Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was
issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial
court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding
that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential
purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational
purposes
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is
neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The
test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that
half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived
from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased)
and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).

Sec. 29

23
 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government.
 Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991 (c/o
Redentor Tirana)

 Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960

"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit,
derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular
enterprise."

FACTS: Governor WenceslaoPascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory

relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for
public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in
the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the
government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the
streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax,
and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the

24
 general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public.

 Gaston vs. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626

Gaston vs. Republic Planters Bank
Facts: Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed a MANDAMUS
to implement the privatization of Republic PlantersBank, and for the transfer of the
shares in the government bank to sugar producers and planters. (because they are
allegedly the true beneficial owners of the bank since they pay P1.00 per picul of
sugar from the proceeds of sugar producers as STABILIZATION FEES)
The shares are currently held by Philsucom / Sugar Regulatory Admin.
The Solgen countered that the stabilization fees are considered government funds and
that the transfer of shares to from Philsucom to the sugar producers would be
irregular.

Issue: What is the nature of the P1.00 stabilization fees collected from sugar
producers? Are they funds held in trust for them, or are they public funds? Are the
shares in the bank (paid using these fees) owned by the government Philsucom or
privately by the different sugar planters from whom such fees were collected?

Held: PUBLIC FUNDS. While it is true that the collected fees were used to buy
shares in RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of sugar producers. The
stabilization fees were charged on sugar produced and milled which ACCRUED TO
PHILSUCOM, under PD 338.
The fees collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX., which is within the power
of the state to impose FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY.
They constitute sugar liens. The collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is
levied not purely for taxation, but for regulation, to provide means TO STABILIZE
THE SUGAR INDUSTRY. The levy is primarily an exercise of police powers.
The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute
them as STATE FUNDS, even though held for a special purpose. Having been levied
for a special purpose, the revenues are treated as a special fund, administered in trust
for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance will be transferred to the general funds of gov’t.
It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in PNB, not in the National
Treasury.
The sugar planters are NOT BENEFICIAL OWNERS. The money is collected from
them only because they it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of
funds derived from it. The investing of the funds in RPB is not alien to the purpose

25
 since the Bank is a commodity bank for sugar, conceived for the sugar industry’
growth and development.
Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used purely for private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the
benefit of the ENTIRE SUGAR INDUSTRY, and all its components, stabilization of
domestic and foreign markets, since the sugar industry is of vital importance to the
country’s economy and national interest.
To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues
derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of
the entire sugar industry, "and all its components, stabilization of the domestic
market," including the foreign market the industry being of vital importance to the
country's economy and to national interest.
WHEREFORE, the Writ of mandamus is denied and the Petition hereby dismissed.
No costs.
This Decision is immediately executory.

 Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

Araullo vs. Aquino
GR No. 209287, 01 July 2014

FACTS:
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was created under the administration
of President Benigno Aquino III to facilitate funding requirements of government
projects in response to the World Bank’s advise for the national government to come
up with a stimulus plan. Funds from slow moving projects and unprogrammed funds
from the General Appropriations Act (GAA) were declared as savings and were
realigned to other priority projects. Apparently, non-Executive projects were also
funded by DAP. Senator Jinggoy Estrada also claimed that he and other senators
received P50 million from the President as incentive for voting against then Chief
Justice Renato Corona in the latter’s impeachment trial.

Various petitions (which includes this one filed by Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) were filed before the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of DAP contending that said program violates Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution and transgress the “power of the purse” exclusively
granted to the legislature.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

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 IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:
I. No. There are no additional funds withdrawn from the Treasury. Funds used in
DAP are already provided for under the GAA.
II. No. DAP involves transfer/realignment of funds, not impoundment or restriction
of funds.
III. No. The President is allowed to make realignments within the Executive branch
only. Cross-border realignments are prohibited under the Constitution. Further,
funding of projects with no appropriations in the GAA, even if within the Executive,
is unconstitutional.
IV. No. There was no certification from the National Treasurer that revenue
collections have already exceeded revenue targets, hence, unprogrammed funds
cannot be used for DAP.
V. Yes. DAP has helped stimulate the economy through funding of numerous
projects. DAP effect can no longer be done. Beneficiaries who received funds from
DAP in good faith can no longer be asked to return the same. However, this doctrine
should not apply to the implementers, authors and proponents of DAP if they were
found in an appropriate tribunal to have not acted in good faith.

 Osmena vs. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993 (c/o Sarah
Tanduyan)

 Philippine Coconut Producers vs. Republic, 663 SCRA 514

Facts:
- The declaration of martial law in September, 1972 saw the issuance of several
presidential decrees (PDs) purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund particularly PD 755, 961, and
1468. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA.
- PCA entered into an Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the
Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. Under par. 8 of the 2nd
agreement, PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the First United Bank (FUB)
shares purchased to such coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND receipts
on equitable basis
- Then came the revolutionary government by the then President Corazon C. Aquino,
one of their priorities was the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by
the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and associates. The PCGG
instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit against petitioners. As found by
the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the
purchase. Petitioners COCOFED et. al. And Ursula uniformly scored the
Sandiganbayan for abusing its power of judicial review and wrongly encroaching
into the exclusive domain of Congress when it declared certain provisions of the

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 coconut levy laws and PCA administrative issuances as unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether the coconut farmers may own the coconut levy fund which was reclassified
into private fund through PD 755, 961 and 1468.
Decision:
No. the coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase share of stock to be given for
free to private individuals. Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by
judicial fiat the conversion of special fund for the benefit of private individuals.
To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a
general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in
accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if there
be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be
transferred to the general funds of the government. If only to stress the point, PD
1234 expressly stated that coconut levies are special funds to be remitted to the
Treasury in the General Fund of the State, but treated as Special Accounts.

 Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485

(c/o Maricris Caluag)

Sec. 30 No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

 Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Teresita Fabian
vs
HonorableAnianoDesierto& Nestor Agustin

I. Facts

- Fabian, a stockholder anf President of PROMAT Construction Development

Corporation, engaged in a Construction deal with Agustin who is at present, the
District Engineer of FMED.
- Fabian filed an administrative case against Agustin when the latter exerted
harassment, intimidation and threat against the former.
- In 1996, the court decided against Agustin, guilty of grave misconduct and order
for the dismissal from the service.
- When the Ombudsman learned that the respondent’s counsel was his former
classmate, he inhibited himself, then led the case to the Deputy Ombudsman,
respondent, who absolved Agustin in the case.
- Fabian then appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

II. Issue

W/N Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman violates Sec. 30 of the 1987 Constitution?

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 III. Decision

- It cannot validly authorize an appeal to SC from decisions of the office of the

Ombudsman in an Administrative Disciplinary Cases.
- Sec. 30 of the 1987 Constitution gives court a measure of control over cases filed
under its appellate jurisdiction.

Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people
can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters thereof.

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