Parliamentarized Presidentialism: A New Model in Executive-Legislative Relations

Parliamentarized Presidentialism:
A New Model in ExecutiveLegislative Relations
by
Miguel Centellas
Department of Political Science
3303 Friedmann Hall
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008
miguel.centellas@wmich.edu
The Bolivian executive is selected by the legislature, moving the nominally

presidential system closer to a parliamentary model. Reinforced by the electoral
and party systems, the model differs significantly from the “hybrid presidential”
model. A better understanding of this model sheds light not only on the role of
institutional design in new democracies, but also calls into question some of the
assumptions drawn from the traditional dichotomy between presidential and
parliamentary systems.
Prepared for delivery at the 23rd International Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association, Washington, D.C., 69 September 2001. I thank Emily Hauptmann, Liesl Haas, and
Mark Jones for their comments and advice.
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Parliamentarized Presidentialism
Introduction
The third wave of democracy coincided with the rise of the “new institutionalism” and a
renewed interest in studies of political institutions and institutional design. Much of this
literature focused on electoral and party systems and on executivelegislative relations. There
was—and continues to be—great interest in the role that formal institutions played in
democratization and democratic consolidation. New institutionalists challenged previous
explanations for the failure of democracy in Latin America, arguing that it was weak or poorly
designed institutions that plagued regional attempts at democracy. Similarly, “constitutional
engineering” became popular as scholars sought formulas for reforming and strengthening
democratic institutions.
Juan Linz, who argued that presidentialism was inherently flawed and posed serious
obstacles to democratic consolidation, launched one of the most influential critiques of Latin
American institutions. While Linz did not directly propose that new democracies adopt
parliamentary systems, the antipresidential argument did argue that parliamentarism is more
likely to lead to democratic stability and consolidation than presidentialism is. A wide variety of
authors have since agreed with Linz’s basic argument: presidentialism is plagued by problems
associated with dual legitimacy and rigidity. Others, such as Guillermo O’Donnell, blamed
Latin America’s presidential systems for the emergence of “delegative democracy,” a new
system marked by strong executives who defy (or dissolve) their legislatures.
Despite the widespread academic debate over the merits of presidentialism, no Latin
American state has adopted a parliamentary system. Instead, presidentialism seems as deeply
entrenched in the region today as it has been at any other time in Latin America’s turbulent
political history. Likewise, scholars seem to have accepted presidentialism as a fait accompli and
merely seek means to alleviate or blunt the system’s inherent weaknesses. Constitutional
reforms have recently focused on electoral laws in hopes of providing greater governability or
stability and to avoid delegative democracy (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Nohlen and
Fernández 1998; Jones 1995).
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Since no parliamentary systems exist in Latin American, Linz’s hypothesis—that
parliamentary systems are more likely to lead to democratic consolidation than presidential
ones—has not been directly tested in the region. The Bolivian case, however, offers the
possibility of testing Linz’s hypothesis. Although nominally a presidential system, Bolivia’s
electoral system uses a single fused ballot that combines legislative and executive elections into
a single vote choice for voters. Similarly, although a simple majority can directly vote the
president into office, when no simple majority exists, the Bolivian executive is selected by the
legislature. Multipartism, reinforced by use of proportional representation, has ensured that
Bolivian presidents are chosen by the legislature after intense coalition building negotiations.
These “parliamentary” features make the Bolivian system a unique hybrid referred to by
René Antonio Mayorga (1997) as “parliamentarized presidentialism.”1 Further, several authors
credit Bolivia’s unique political system for democratic stability under very difficult conditions
(e.g. Mayorga 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992; Gamarra 1997b, Valenzuela 1993). Comparing
Bolivia to presidential systems, such as Ecuador and Peru, suggest that Linz’s hypothesis is
correct—presidential systems are less likely to lead to consolidated democracies than
parliamentarized systems.
While many scholars point to Bolivia as a “special case” (Linz 1990b; Linz 1994; Sartori 1994;
Jones 1995), it has received very little attention in the academic literature. In part, this paper is
an effort to explore the implications of the Bolivian case only hinted at by previous authors. A
study of the Bolivian case accomplishes two different, but related goals. First, evidence from
Bolivia highlights the importance of simple institutions that balance the need for flexibility and
stability. Second, learning from the successes (and failures) of Bolivia’s democratization may
provide a model for future constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening democratic
institutions in the region.
A study of the Bolivian model emphasizes two important points. First, the use of a fused
ballot is the key variable in Bolivia’s political system. This subtle difference distinguishes
parliamentarized presidentialism from other “hybrid” or “mixed” systems. Bolivia’s system is
1 Eduardo Gamarra uses the term “hybrid presidentialism” to describe Bolivia’s political system
(Gamarra 1997a; Gamarra 1997b; Gamarra 1996). Matthew Shugart and John Carey use the term
“assemblyindependent” (Shugart and Carey 1992, 26, 7885). The term “parliamentarized
presidentialism,” however, more clearly describes the system than does “assemblyindependent” and
distinguishes it from other dissimilar “hybrid” systems. Hence, I adopt the term coined by Juan Linz
(Linz 1994, 8586 n91) as used by René Antonio Mayorga.
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thus parliamentarized, unlike 193273 Chile (which also allowed the legislature to elect a
president in the absence of a majority). Bolivia’s system is also still more presidential than post
1996 Israel (in which prime ministers are elected by direct popular election).2 That a subtle
difference, such as ballot structure, can have profound consequences for the political system
implies that constitutional engineers may achieve substantive system changes with only minor
institutional changes. Second, Bolivia’s system functions to a large degree on the basis of
informal coalitionbuilding rules. Political élites have adopted a set of informal rules that have,
since 1985, produced stable ruling coalitions.
Evidence from the Bolivian case is extremely relevant for other Latin American democracies.
Bolivia demonstrates that a presidential system can be modified to limit some of the problems
typically associated with presidentialism while avoiding the political instability that might
follow a more dramatic switch to “pure” parliamentarism. The inclusion of parliamentarized
presidentialism into our typology of democratic systems both enriches our understanding of
(formal and informal) political institutions and provides constitutional engineers with more
reform options. After nearly two decades in operation, the Bolivian model may now be mature
enough to serve as a model for other new democracies —especially those seeking to modify
their presidential constitutions and avoid the “perils” of presidentialism.
Juan Linz and Presidentialism
The recent debate over the merits of presidential democracy was sparked by Juan Linz’s
essay “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” which was
circulating in manuscript form as early as 1985. The basis of Linz’s argument was the
observation that presidential democracy had a high rate of failure or “breakdown.” Along with
this came the parallel observation that most longstanding democracies were parliamentary, not
presidential (with the notable exception of the United States). Although the argument appears
2 Chile’s system was not fully “parliamentarized” since it did held separate elections for the
executive and the legislature. The ability of the legislature to elect a president did not eliminate the
problem of dual legitimacy and did not offer strong coalitionbuilding incentives. Israel’s parliamentary
system is also not fully “presidentialized” despite the separate election of the executive. The Israeli
prime minister is still subject to a vote of confidence. Bolivia’s system is substantially different from
both of these, as subsequent sections of the paper will illustrate.
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on the surface to be a condemnation of presidentialism tout court in favor of parliamentarism,
Linz is careful to point out that he “[does] not argue that any parliamentary system is ipso facto
more likely to ensure democratic stability than any presidential system” (1990b, 84).
Linz’s argument is based on a dichotomous contrasting of presidentialism and
parliamentarism, especially with regards to their correlation with stability and consolidation.
This leads him to subsequently develop the two idealtype systems he later evaluates. Several
scholars (e.g. Valenzuela 1993; Fabbrini 1995; Stepan and Skach 1993) joined Linz in
condemning presidentialism. Other scholars (e.g. Horowitz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart
1997b; Shugart and Carey 1992) have criticized Linz for oversimplifying the dichotomy between
presidentialism and parliamentarism and for exaggerating the dangers of presidentialism while
too readily dismissing problems with parliamentarism. Some of Linz’s critics point out that
differences between and among presidential systems are significant and that other variables—
especially electoral systems—have dramatic consequences for the way presidential democracies
operate (e.g. Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fernández 1998).
Essentially, Linz argues that the historically poor performance of presidentialism as a
regime type—the observation that most longstanding democracies are not presidential—is
based on the central characteristics of presidentialism itself. He defines a presidential system as
one in which “an executive with considerable constitutional powers … is elected by the people
for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence” (1990a, 52).
Elsewhere, Linz characterizes presidentialism by its two most prominent features: (a) “dual
legitimacy” and (b) “[temporal] rigidity” (1994, 6). Presidentialism is marked by dual legitimacy
because both the executive and the legislature are elected independently, giving each a claim to
direct democratic legitimacy. Presidentialism is also marked by rigidity because terms of office
are set for a specific length of time, during which the executive cannot dissolve the legislature
and the legislature cannot easily remove the executive. Linz argues that these two
distinguishing characteristics of presidentialism are weaknesses by themselves and lead to other
structural problems that make democratic stability and consolidation more difficult. Although
democratic stability and democratic consolidation are not synonymous, it is clear that stability
—the durability of democratic norms such as elections, among other things—is a necessary
condition for consolidation.
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First, the direct election of the executive and the separate election of the legislature gives
each a competing claim to legitimacy. Since each is popularly elected, “no democratic principle
can decide who represents the will of the people” (Linz 1994, 7). Linz further argues that the
singleperson nature of the presidential office makes presidents more likely to see themselves as
representing the nationatlarge, while viewing the legislature as representing “special” or
“parochial” interests. Presidents are more willing to challenge legislatures and use decree
powers using their popular “mandate” as political leverage. Thus, presidentialism is based on
executivelegislative conflict, which is very dangerous for new democracies. This conflict
“systematically contributes to impasses and democratic breakdowns” (Stepan and Skach 1993,
19). A crucial danger is that, in countries that desperately need effective governments, the
military may decide to act as “poder moderador” (Linz 1994, 7). Another danger, however, is that
presidents rely on their decree powers to brush aside legislative opposition, producing what
Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) termed “delegative democracy.” In contrast, parliamentarism has
only one source of legitimacy since “the only legitimate institution is parliament … [and] the
government’s authority is completely dependent upon parliamentary confidence” (Linz 1990a,
52).
Second, the fixed terms of office of both the executive and the legislature, coupled with their
mutual independence from each other, introduces the problem of temporal rigidity. This
“breaks the political process into discontinuous, rigidly demarcated periods, leaving no room
for the continuous readjustments that events may demand” (Linz 1990a, 54). Linz further argues
that this lack of flexibility is especially problematic during periods of transition to democracy
and consolidation (1994, 9). Presidentialism is “rigid” because it does not allow for early
elections when new governments are needed or demanded. What is more, most presidential
systems have proscriptions against presidential reelection. Governments that are popular and
effective cannot constitutionally extend their mandates; voters are forced to choose new
leadership. In contrast, parliamentary regimes can more easily replace ineffective governments
without producing a political crisis and they can extend the mandates of effective governments.
Third, Linz argues that the divided nature of power in presidential systems and the lack of
reelection make both accountability and identifiability more difficult. Identifiability, the ability
for voters to predict what cabinets will look like, is limited since presidents are free to select
their cabinets, making it difficult for voters to make a priori calculations about government
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teams. Accountability suffers because “there is no way to hold accountable a president who
cannot be presented for reelection” (Linz 1994, 12). Accountability also suffers because
presidentialism encourages executives and legislatures to play the “blame game” (Linz 1990b,
89). Presidents are also not accountable to their own parties or the legislature, since there is no
vote of confidence (Linz 1994, 1314). In contrast, parliamentary systems provide greater
degrees of identifiability since voters can often recognize potential government “teams.”
Accountability is reinforced both by making executives subject to a vote of confidence and
greater cooperation between executives and legislatures —they rise or fall together.
Fourth, presidentialism has majoritarian and “winnertakeall” tendencies. By its very
nature, the office of the president is a oneperson office, which “raises the stakes in presidential
election … and inevitably increases the tensions and the polarization” (Linz 1994, 19).
Subsequently, the oneperson office of chief executive reduces presidential politics to a “zero
sum game” and encourages winners to exaggerate their mandates. This majoritarian tendency
produces a lessthandemocratic “style” of politics marked by few cooperative strategies and
authoritarian presidents. In contrast, parliamentary systems rely on collegial cabinets and
encourage more “consociational” democracies (Lijphart 1999; Linz 1994).
Fifth, presidentialism is marked by an increase personalization of politics and the increased
probability that political “outsiders” will win office. In delegative democracy, presidential
elections tend to become highly personalized affairs divorced from party programs or identities.
This is especially problematic for new democracies, where party identities and policy platforms
are still not fully formed, making voters more susceptible to populistic appeals. The logic of the
oneperson office of president also encourages candidates to campaign independently of
political parties and to present themselves as “above politics.” Presidents come to power with
very little support from their own party or without a political party to speak of. Presidents who
win election on the basis of their own individual charisma are less willing to deal with political
“insiders” and more prone to see themselves as messianic, national saviors. The consequence is
delegative democracy. In contrast, parliamentarism is less personalized and relies on strong
party discipline and identity.
Linz’s argument consists of two distinct parts: (a) the negative evaluation of presidentialism
as a regime type and (b) the positive evaluation—and subsequent recommendation—of
parliamentarism as more likely to lead to democratic consolidation. Both arguments have been
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criticized. Most of the criticism has been against Linz’s condemnation of presidentialism (e.g.
Horowitz 1990; Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a). Although often accepting many of
Linz’s criticisms of presidentialism, several scholars criticized Linz’s argument that
presidentialism is necessarily inimical to democratic consolidation. They point out that
presidential systems are quite varied, that different combinations of formal and informal rules
radically alter the prospects for democratic consolidation, and that presidentialism (qua ideal
type) should not be blamed for democratic failures. In short, the bulk of the criticism is simply
that Linz relies on an idealtype of presidentialism and does not adequately differentiate
between different types of presidential systems. Other critics also point out to weaknesses in
parliamentarism that make the system problematic for new democracies. Such scholars do not
promote parliamentarism, but rather other institutional solutions, such as changing electoral
laws, to “renovate” presidentialism (e.g. Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fernández 1998). Finally, even
some scholars who agree with Linz’s condemnation of presidentialism are hesitant—for a
variety of reasons—to recommend that new democracies adopt parliamentarism (e.g. Sartori
1997; Sartori 1994; Lijphart 1999).
The Perils of Presidentialism?
Although many of the defenses of presidentialism have been halfhearted, some scholars
have pointed to advantages presidential democracy has over parliamentarism (e.g. Mainwaring
and Shugart 1997a; von Mettenheim 1997). Most, however, accept many of Linz’s criticisms of
presidentialism and recognize that idealtype or “pure” presidentialism should be blunted by
other measures. Still, some scholars have focused on the methodological weakness of Linz’s
argument against presidentialism (e.g. Horowitz 1990; Nohlen 1998b). Other scholars have
called attention to other important variables—mostly electoral laws and the executive’s
legislative powers—that influence presidentialism’s democratic character and performance (e.g.
Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fernández 1998; Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox and Morgenstern 2001).
Some of the sharpest criticisms against Linz’s argument are methodological. Donald
Horowitz (1990) and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart (1997a) point out that much of the
antipresidential literature is prone to selection bias. Presidentialism has been most common in
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regions with little history of democracy, poorly institutionalized political party systems, and
low levels of socioeconomic development. In contrast, parliamentarism has been most common
in Europe, with its longer experience with and slow evolution towards democracy, more
institutionalized party systems, and (perhaps most importantly) higher levels of socioeconomic
development. In short, the breakdown of democracies in developing countries could be
accounted for by any of several variables other than presidentialism. The presidential systems
that broke down shared too many other features in common. Horowitz also points out that the
history of parliamentarism has also been spotted in Europe. Both the Weimar and the prewar
Italian parliamentary democracies collapsed. Democracy in both countries was restored only
after their fascist governments were defeated and the Western Allies imposed new democratic
constitutions. They also criticize Linz for failing to account for the failures of parliamentarism
before the Second World War (in Europe) and after (in the developing world).
Dieter Nohlen (1998b) raises a parallel methodological criticism. He points out that Linz’s
argument rests on the use of “counterfactuals” that hypothesize what “might have” happened
and lead to a “methodologically weak argument, departing from the belief that parliamentarism
would have led to something different, [and] faults presidentialism for what happened” (1998b,
88). Nohlen also points out that Linz does not adequately deal with anomalous cases—such as
Venezuela, Colombia, or Costa Rica—in which presidential democracy survived the turbulent
1960s and 1970s. Nohlen instead offers the hypothesis that the success of parliamentarism in
Europe after the Second World War—and of presidential democracy in Venezuela, Colombia,
and Costa Rica—was a result of “political learning” and not of any systemic features. The
collapse of democracy and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe taught political élites and
voters important lessons about the dangers of parliamentary politics. Subsequently, both élites
and voters (but especially élites) overcame the shortcomings of their political system by
adopting consociational strategies. Similarly, Nohlen looks at the recent history of Latin
America and the widespread survival of presidential democracy with optimism and suggests
that presidential democracies are also able to provide venues for “political learning.”
Other scholars argue that Linz unfairly misrepresented presidentialism by focusing on the
American “prototype.” Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern (2001) argue that Linz’s argument
suffers from the use of idealtypes and does not distinguish between the variety of subtypes of
presidentialism currently in practice. Differences between presidential systems are significant
10
and make discussion of any “idealtype” of presidentialism problematic since claims developed
from one type are not generalizeable to the category as a whole. Matthew Shugart and John
Carey (1992) call for the development of more careful typologies of presidential systems. They
demonstrate that most presidential systems bear little resemblance to the American version
from which Linz bases much of his criticism. Working from these more differentiated
typologies, subsequent works such as those by Mark Jones (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart
(1997b), and Carey and Shugart (1998) demonstrate that some forms of presidentialism may be
less problematic than others.
Most scholars, however, agree with the main thrust of Linz’s criticisms of presidentialism—
especially the issues of dual legitimacy and rigidity. Those who criticize Linz, however, argue
that the problems produced by dual legitimacy and rigidity are not inevitable. Rather, they
depend on other factors such as electoral systems, party systems, and the mix of legislative and
executive powers. The problems of dual legitimacy and rigidity are most acute when
governments are headed by presidents without legislative majorities or nearmajorities. Under
such circumstances, democracy suffers from lack of effective governance. The outcomes may be
diverse. Some states may “muddle through,” as Ecuador has done for the last two decades
(Isaacs 1996; Barczak 1997). Other states, however, may develop more authoritarian tendencies,
or “democradura,” such as Peru under Alberto Fujimori. Still, the probabilities of divided
government and ineffective governance can be blunted through institutional reforms.
Jones (1995) demonstrates that electoral systems have a significant effect on producing
executives with legislative majorities or nearmajorities. Rather than radical reforms to
“parliamentarize” Latin American democracies, Jones recommends electoral systems designed
to encourage moderated multipartism. Such measures include plurality elections for the
president (rather than secondround runoff formulas), mediumsized multimember districts
with proportional representation, and concurrent legislative and presidential elections.
Similarly, Shugart and Mainwaring argue that “the nature of the party system, in particular the
number of parties, makes a fundamental difference in how presidential systems function” (1997,
394). The success of presidential democracy depends in great part on the degree of party system
fragmentation and party discipline, just as parliamentary democracies rely on stable and
disciplined party systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) also argue that electoral systems are a
crucial factor in determining the success or failure of presidential democracies. Like Dieter
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Nohlen (1998a), these scholars argue for smallerscale institutional changes that would
“renovate” presidentialism by adopting electoral systems that help reduce polarized
multipartism and produce legislative majorities.
Finally, several scholars have taken Linz to task for his claim that the “style” of politics is
significantly different (i.e. less “democratic”) in presidentialism than in parliamentarism. Grace
Ivana Deheza (1998) takes up Linz’s charge that presidentialism encourages winnertakeall
strategies. She points to evidence that South American presidential democracies have significant
consociational tendencies; in a study of nine South American presidential systems, 56 percent of
governments were coalition governments (1998, 156). Deheza also discovered that coalition
parties are awarded significant shares of ministerial and cabinet posts in comparison to the
president’s party. She concludes that the ability of presidential systems to build stable and
effective coalitions depends more on “the institutional combinations, the party systems, the
relationships established by the parties forming the government” and that “the formation of
accords and coalition governments in multiparty systems reduce the conflicts that can emerge
among the parties, generating cooperative forms of government” (1998, 169).
Other scholars have pointed out that presidentialism does not necessarily suffer from
“winnertakeall” politics, as Linz contends. One of the criticisms of presidentialism is that its
divided government often leads to governments that rule by executive decree rather than
through the legislature. There is evidence, on the contrary, that presidential systems are no
more prone to use executive decrees than are parliamentary systems (e.g. Carey and Shugart
1998b; Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Carey and Shugart (1998a) argue
that decree powers should be more carefully disaggregated and considered among their
different dimensions—especially differentiating between reactive and proactive decree powers.
Carey and Shugart (1998a) point out that presidential systems vary significantly on the different
types of decree and other “legislative” powers available to executives. Interestingly, Della Sala
and Krepel (1998) point out that in Italy—one of the signature parliamentary systems—
executives routinely use decree powers to enact legislation.
The Virtues of Parliamentarism?
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The second half of Linz’s argument, that parliamentarism is a system better suited for
democratic consolidation, has also not gone uncriticized. As Giovanni Sartori (1994) points out,
even if presidentialism is not wellsuited for new democracies, it does not necessarily follow
that parliamentarism must be better suited. Like Sartori, Horowitz (1990) points out that Linz’s
argument rests on the counterfactual argument that parliamentary systems would have
performed better where presidentialism failed. Horowitz and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a)
point out, however, that a look at the historical evidence of all democratic systems—not just the
successful ones—reveals that parliamentary systems failed just as often as presidential systems
do. This is especially the case in underdeveloped countries with little previous experience with
democracy. Horowitz also points out that only twentyfive years ago scholars advanced the
argument “that the inherited Westminster style of parliamentary democracy was responsible for
much of the authoritarianism then emerging in Englishspeaking Africa” (1990, 74).
The criticisms that Horowitz raises still fundamentally agree with Linz’s primary reasons to
criticize presidentialism. Like nearly all participants in the institutionalist debate, Horowitz
agrees that democratic stability is desirable. Simply standing the test of time is not a sufficient
condition for democratic consolidation, but it is a necessary condition. Without a repeated
pattern of elections and the other “formalities” of democracy, it is impossible to establish any
deeper sense of democracy. Horowitz also agree that it “is right to worry about winnertakeall
outcomes and their exclusionary consequences” (Horowitz 1990, 79). Extreme winnertakeall
majoritarianism and zerosum politics only hinder democratic consolidation. Critics point out
that parliamentarism itself is highly majoritarian; for example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a)
point out that parliamentary systems have a tendency towards powerful executives who head
legislative majorities. In such cases, “a disciplined majority party leaves the executive virtually
unconstrained between elections. Here, more than in any presidential system, the winner takes
all” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 453).
The “advantages” of presidentialism that Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) and von
Mettenheim (1997) point out offset the weaknesses of parliamentarism. Mainwaring and
Shugart argue that presidentialism offers voters a greater variety of choices since they can vote
for both the executive and the legislature. Contrary to Linz, Mainwaring and Shugart also argue
that presidentialism offers voters a greater degree of identifiability and accountability, since it is
much more difficult for voters in parliamentary systems to hold parties accountable when they
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are members of grand coalitions—let alone to predict what kind of coalitions are possible. Such
a problem would be more acute in new democracies. Finally, they argue that legislative
independence in presidentialism makes the system more stable and effective than
parliamentarism, since legislators “can act on legislation without worrying about immediate
consequences for the survival of the government, issues can be considered on their merits rather
than as matters of ‘confidence’” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 462). Von Mettenheim also
points to several advantages presidentialism has over parliamentarism. For one, the separation
of powers doctrine “provide[s] both moral grounds and institutional settings for reconciling
plebescitarian, populist, and nationalist appeals” since separately elected executives and
legislators must balance different political demands. More fundamentally, von Mettenheim
argues that the “separation of powers theory” is still relevant today and should be more
carefully included in analysis of institutional design.
Arend Lijphart is critical of majoritarian tendencies in both parliamentary and presidential
systems. Lijphart is especially critical of the “Westminster” style of parliamentarism because it
too is clearly majoritarian—perhaps even more majoritarian than most presidential systems. He,
of course, prefers to distinguish between consociational and majoritarian democracies (e.g.
Lijphart 1984; 1999). Consociational systems revolve around grand coalitions that include all or
nearly all relevant political groups and actors. These coalitions are based upon informal
agreements between political élites, rather than on formal institutional rules. These informal
rules, however, were often adopted only after decades of conflictual and unstable politics; they
were not created overnight. Because these systems are based on informal, rather than formal
institutions, consociationalism is also possible in presidential democracies. Lijphart has often
pointed to Colombia and Venezuela as examples of Latin American presidential systems that
adopted consociational rules. Subsequently, although Lijphart (1994b) joins Linz in condemning
presidentialism for being prone to majoritarianism, he argues that not all presidential systems
are necessarily majoritarian nor that all parliamentary systems escape the same vice.
It is important to briefly note that consociationalism also suffers from its own weaknesses.
As a regime type, consociationalism is prone to rigidity if coalitions are fixed too concretely and
allow governments to remain in the same hands over time. Similarly, the fixed, grand coalitions
of consociationalism can damage the legitimacy of democracy both if new groups are excluded
and if elections become essentially meaningless. If voters know that changes (even large ones)
14
in election results do not alter governments, they may become cynical and lose faith in the
practice of democracy. Even if this is not important in established democracies (but the example
of Austria suggests that it is), the practice of meaningful elections is crucial in new democracies.
In countries with histories of manipulated or façade elections (or with no history of elections at
all), consociational practices many not be clearly distinguishable from the authoritarian past.
Citizens in new democracies need to learn to value democratic elections as a means for political
(and policy) change. Finally, in newly established democracies, the relevant groups and actors
may not yet be established. A premature consociational pact could also lock in some group(s)
dominant in the early stages of democratization as the price for electoral democracy. 3 Thus,
consociationalism could actually serve a conservative function in new democracies and may
unnecessarily prolong the influence of hardliners or authoritarian élites.
Lijphart’s proposal in favor of consociationalism comes close to making institutions
essentially meaningless; it is also much more élite driven. If successful democratic consolidation
rests on élite consensus, and if consensus is possible in any institutional framework (from
parliamentarism to presidentialism), then the debate over which system to adopt is no longer
critical. Lijphart still sees formal institutional design as playing a significant role in democratic
consolidation, however (e.g. Lijphart and Waisman 1996). Incentives must be sought that
encourage coalition building. Lijphart’s 1994 article in the Linz and Valenzuela volume, The
Failure of Presidential Democracy, essentially argues that parliamentarism is—on the whole—
more amenable to consociational democracy than is presidentialism.
Perhaps the best argument for rejecting parliamentarism for new democracies comes from
Sartori (1997, Ch. 6). Despite joining Linz in criticizing presidentialism, Sartori (1994) rejects
parliamentarism as a solution for new democracies. Instead, he recommends a mixed system
similar to that of the French Fifth Republic. Sartori’s criticism of parliamentarism rests mainly
on the system’s dependence on “parliamentary fit” parties. These types of party systems are
lacking in Latin America. Parliamentary fit parties are strongly institutionalized and disciplined
political parties that are able to “hold together in supporting the government (generally a
3 For example, both Colombia’s “National Front” and Venezuela’s “Punto Fijo” bipartisan power
sharing accords essentially locked in the two dominant parties in each country at the expense of later
groups. The development of the guerrilla war in Colombia and Venezuela’s recent political instability
has been blamed on these consociational strategies that guaranteed that no other social groups or
political parties could challenge the status quo. See Gaviria (1998), Hartlyn and Dugas (1999), Hoskin
and Murillo (1999), Levine and Crisp (1999), McCoy (1999).
15
coalition) that is their appointee” (Sartori 1997, 102). Without parliamentary fit parties, a switch
to parliamentarism could easily lead to unstable and shortlived governments. Such a situation
is clearly dangerous for new democracies, where citizens and élites alike may not easily
distinguish between a government and a regime crisis, as Horowitz (1990) demonstrates. More
to the point, in an underdeveloped country with no history of democracy there may not be a
difference between these two distinct forms of crisis.
Sartori’s argument that Latin America (and other new democracies) lack parliamentary fit
parties is crucial. As S. M. Lipset (2000) points out, political parties are “indispensible” for
democracy. Democracies need strong disciplined parties for various reasons. Disciplined parties
with clear ideologies and policy platforms make electoral politics more identifiable and
accountable. Voters can more clearly predict government teams and policies when parties are
disciplined and adopt predictable policies. Disciplined parties also allow for depersonalization
of politics since parties develop long term strategies and seek to develop future party leaders.
Conversely, legislators from disciplined parties have greater incentives to work with executives
since their future electoral success depends on collective efforts to successfully implement
policy. Without disciplined parties, voters cannot easily hold governments accountable in
future elections.
Hybrid Systems and the French Model
Because presidentialism and parliamentarism are both open to criticism, some scholars have
recommended “hybrid” or “mixed” systems instead. Sartori (1994) begins his criticism of Linz
by emphasizing that parliamentarism and presidentialism do not exhaust the universe of types
of democratic systems. Pointing to cases such as Bolivia and France, Sartori points out the
possibility of constitutional designs that are “neither presidential nor parliamentary.” Still,
Sartori obviously has the French system in mind and he only discusses Bolivia’s system in
passing. Since the French system is markedly different than Bolivia’s system of
parliamentarized presidentialism, it should be briefly discussed.
The French system of can be described as a twinengine model. Also known as “premier
presidentialism” (Shugart and Carey 1992), this system is both presidential and parliamentary
16
marked by a dual executive. The head of government is the premier or prime minister, selected
by the parliament. The head of state is the president, chosen by direct popular election. In
theory, the two “engines” of premierpresidentialism are able to switch on and off as needed to
provide the stability of presidentialism while maintaining the greater flexibility of
parliamentarism. Critics of this system (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Suleiman 1994), however,
point out that it is prone to many of the same shortcomings that plague pure presidential
systems.
The separate election of the head of state means that the system also suffers from the
problem of dual legitimacy. Similarly, because the president is elected for a fixed term, the
system is no more immune to rigidity than pure a presidential system. In new democracies,
especially, these problems can become accentuated. More importantly still, premier
presidentialism is a more complicated system than either presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Citizens in countries with little experience with democracy may not be able to understand
clearly a political system with two separate engines, each of which can take over the direction of
government and each of which has separate a basis of legitimacy. Similarly, in countries with
weak party systems, the struggles between the president and prime minister could just as likely
lead to delegative democracy as could struggles between the executive and the legislature in
presidential systems. Finally, the different claims to power of each engine can prove
destabilizing. Under such conditions, the role of the military as poder moderador is dangerously
likely.
Premierpresidentialism has been adopted by many East European countries, such as
Russia, to less than promising results. Russia’s political system has been dominated by its
president, both under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Sartori himself recognizes that if the
Russian system is a premierpresidential system, “it is an ill conceivedone” (1997, 139 n. 9). The
Russian experience—along with that of other East European premierpresidential systems—
suggests that new democracies are illsuited for this type of system. If premierpresidentialism
in new democracies operates like a presidential system, with strong executives who use decree
powers to overcome parliamentary opposition, then proposing premierpresidentialism as a
solution to the “perils” of presidentialism seems unpromising.
Part of the problem may lie in the nature of premierpresidentialism itself. Suleiman (1994)
actually considers the French system a “presidential” system and argues that the “success” of
17
premierpresidentialism had less to do with the system itself than with other factors. He argues
that the “dual executive system does not function in a predetermined way” and can lead to
either “cohabitation” (when president and prime minister get along), moderated conflict, or
even “competing legitimacies” (Suleiman 1994, 139). The separate, independent democratic
legitimacy each executive has can lead to divisive political struggles if the president and the
prime minister represent different political parties or coalitions. Even in the French system, the
division of powers between both branches of government are rather unclear. In the hands of
strongwilled executives (such as a Yeltsin), the power to disband the cabinet and rule by decree
would be a strong temptation. Under such conditions, premierpresidentialism is just as prone
to delegative democracy (and for the same reasons) as presidential systems in which strong
executives lack legislative majorities. In sharp contrast to Sartori’s optimism, Suleiman warns
that “the 1958 French constitution is a delicate instrument that should be emulated with
extreme caution” (1994, 160).
I agree with the argument that mixed systems may serve new democracies better than
“pure” systems. But I also hold that a key element necessary for successful democratic
consolidation is simplicity. The virtues of simplicity include transparency and ease of operation.
Voters can quickly “learn” how to govern themselves via their representatives if they can clearly
see how their votes translate into governments and policies. The French system, for all its
advantages, is a complicated system and may prove unwieldy if adopted by new democracies.
If hybrid systems offer the best possibility to balance the needs for stability and flexibility, we
should look to the case of Bolivia, which offer another model of a mixed political system. The
study of Bolivia’s system of parliamentarized presidentialism does more than merely help us fill
in the gaps in our typology of political systems and regime types. The Bolivian model is
instructive because it led to democratic consolidation in a leastlikely scenario. Parliamentarized
presidentialism balances the need for stability and flexibility without the bulkiness of two
engines that must somehow cohabitate.

The Bolivian Model
Since democratization Bolivia’s political élite have employed the system of parliamentarized
18
presidentialism. This system is as substantially different from premierpresidentialism as it is
from pure presidentialism or parliamentarism. The system is defined by a combination of
formal institutions and informal rules whose three key features are: (a) fusedballot list
proportional representation, (b) legislative election of the executive, and (c) informal
consociational rules that produce majority legislative coalitions. The first two features are
formal institutional frameworks, although only the legislative election of the executive is clearly
stipulated in the constitution (Article 90). This system is clearly not fully “presidential” due to
the fused ballot and election of the executive by the legislature. Neither is the system fully
“parliamentary,” since the legislature cannot call for a vote of confidence. Once elected, the
president tends to act like a prime minister—even though nominally holding formally
presidential powers.
First, the backbone of parliamentarized presidentialism is the electoral system. The
combination of list proportional representation (PR) with a fused ballot is the key institutional
constraint defining Bolivia’s political system. It is commonly understood that PR electoral
systems are associated with—and tend to reinforce—multiparty systems (Duverger 1954;
Lijphart 1994a). Subsequently, legislative seats in countries with PR systems tend to be divided
among several parties, with none gaining a majority. For this reason, critics of presidentialism
point out the dangers of combining independent elections for the executive with proportional
representation elections for the legislature since they tend to produce executives without
legislative majorities.
The Bolivian case is an exception, however, because of its fused ballot. The highly simple
structure of the Bolivian ballot fuses the election of the executive and legislature into one
singular vote choice, resembling ballots in “pure” parliamentary systems. When voting,
Bolivian citizens receive a simple “multicolor, multisign” ballot that has the name of each
presidential candidate along with the names, signs, and colors of their party. Voters are then
given a pencil and simply asked to mark the box for their presidential candidate. Seats in the
lower and upper chambers of the legislature are then given out in proportion to vote shares for
this single vote choice. If a candidate wins a majority of the vote, he or she is automatically
chosen as president.
Second, if no presidential candidate wins by direct popular vote, the newly elected
legislature meets to elect the president as stipulated in Article 90 of the constitution. Before
19
1994, the Congress chose from among the top three candidates; after 1994, Congress now
chooses from among the top two. This provision, of course, was originally meant to apply only
if no candidate wins a clear, absolute majority. The realities of Bolivia’s multiparty system,
however, have meant that this provision has been used to select every president since 1982 (a
total of five). There is no indication that any presidential candidate will win an absolute
majority in future elections.4
Third, during the congressional election stage, informal coalition rules play a pivotal role.
The electoral system constrains voters and politicians by reinforcing a competitive multiparty
system. Article 90 provides a selection rule if no candidate wins by direct election. But this
provision does not stipulate how the legislature should select a president. After all, the
legislature could merely elect a compromise candidate, producing a president with no
legislative majority. Since 1985, however, Bolivia’s political parties have adopted coalition
building strategies used to select presidents. In exchange for votes for their presidential
candidate, parties receive cabinet positions and concessions to adopt specific policy platforms,
along with a general share in the government agenda and state patronage. These coalitions are
also loosely “consociational” in the sense that member parties use the cabinet—or even
paraconstitutional bodies5—from which to set policy jointly, often after intense intracoalition
negotiations. These coalitions, however, are also not consociational in the sense that Lijphart
would use; they are not so inclusive that they eliminate the important role of a democratic
opposition or eliminate competition from the political system.
Finally, it seems clear that voters understand the informal rules used by political élites to
form coalition governments—although this requires further empirical evidence. Over time, two
clearly marked “poles” have formed marked by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
(MNR, National Revolutionary Movement) on the one hand and a firm alliance between Acción
Democrática y Nacionalista (ADN, Democratic National Action) and Movimiento de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left). Other parties have emerged to play
4 The largest vote share for any candidate (38.7%) was won by Siles Zuazo’s UDP in 1980. Since
then, vote shares have been spread between the largest parties. In 1997, Bánzer Suárez’s ADN was the
frontrunner with only 22.3%.
5 For example, the 198993 MIRADN “Acuerdo Patriotico” (AP) coalition government was
governed primarily through the Comité del Acuerdo Patriotico (Committee of the Patriotic Accord). Jaime
Paz Zamora (head of MIR) was president of the republic; Hugo Bánzer Suárez (head of ADN) was
chairman of the committee and was often referred to as the “copresident.”
20
“kingmaker” roles, although some have consistently aligned themselves to one of the major
parties.
Although the 1994 constitutional reforms introduced important changes to the political
system, there is no indication that they significantly affected parliamentarized presidentialism.
Since 1994, Congress is now restricted to selecting the president from among the top two (rather
than three) candidates. The practice of building coalitions has gone largely unaffected; the
reform may instead have helped streamline the process. The changes to the electoral system,
introducing a Germanstyle multimember proportional system (MMP), also do not seem to
have affected the dynamics of parliamentarized presidentialism. Scholars recognize that this
electoral system is fundamentally a type of proportional representation (Lijphart 1999; Jones
1995a). Although multimember proportional systems allow for direct, firstpastthepost
election of representatives for half of the lower house in singlemember districts, the system is
still a proportional representation system since the other half of the seats in the lower house are
apportioned to reflect total votes. A final change was the extension of the electoral cycle to five
years from four. As with the other changes, there is no indication that it significantly altered the
dynamic of parliamentarized presidentialism.
Because the Bolivian model uses a fused ballot from which both the legislative and the
executive offices are filled, the system does not face the problems of dual legitimacy. Just as in
pure parliamentary systems, parliamentarized presidentialism produces an executive whose
basis of legitimacy is intimately connected to that of the parliament. The system retains
presidential aspects, however, since the types of powers each branch of government hold are
substantively separated. The president does not have the constitutional power to dismiss the
legislature; the legislature, for its part, does not have the ability to call a vote of confidence.
Subsequently, the set term limits for both branches of government—which are concurrent—give
the system a degree of stability that might not have been possible if Bolivia had adopted a pure
parliamentary system.
The system has positively affected Bolivian political life and contributed to democratic
consolidation. Since 1982, the highly fragmented party system has given way to a more
moderate multipartism. At the same time, other stipulations of the electoral law have combined
to encourage and help enforce party discipline and the institutionalization of the current party
system. Bolivia’s electoral law stipulates that legislative seats belong to party members, not to
21
individuals. This helped parties enforce discipline over their members, since renegade
legislators could be legally removed from their seats by their parties simply by being dismissed
from the party. Such provisions, reinforcing the system of parliamentarized presidentialism,
have helped consolidate not only Bolivia’s democracy, but its party system as well. Bolivia’s
political parties are now more disciplined and “parliamentary fit” than they were in 1982.
Parliamentarized Presidentialism in Practice
The difficulty of the transition process demonstrates the importance of political learning.
While the formal institutional structure of parliamentarized presidentialism remained the same,
it took Bolivia’s political élites from 1978 until at least 1985 to fully understand the importance
of informal coalitions rules. One could argue, of course, that Bolivia’s political élites could have,
in time, learned to use any system. One could also argue that some other political system might
have functioned better from the beginning. Such criticisms are as difficult to deflect as they are
to test. I argue, however, that parliamentarized presidentialism has served Bolivia better, in the
long run, than any of the three other systems. Both pure presidentialism and premier
presidentialism would have been plagued by dual legitimacy, while the uncertainties of the
transition era would have led to unstable parliamentarism. In the final analysis,
parliamentarized presidentialism supported democratic consolidation under extremely hostile
conditions.
Bolivia made its democratic debut in 1982. Although several civilian governments ruled
throughout its history, none of these would qualify as democracies using Robert Dahl’s criteria
for polyarchy (Dahl 1971). The constitution this first democratic government inherited had been
written in 1967 during the military government of René Barrientos, though it had never been
implemented. The transition to democracy began as early as 1978, when thendictator Hugo
Bánzer Suárez stepped down in favor of elections. Although elections were held in 1978, 1979,
and 1980, no presidential candidate won a majority; this set off a period of extreme political
crisis that lasted until the last military junta was replaced in 1982.
The unwillingness of politicians to select a president after the 1979 and 1980 elections—
largely due to Bolivia’s political élite failure to use the 1967 constitution’s provision for
22
congressional election of the president—proved costly. Military hardliners used the political
confusion as excuse to launch coups (often with the help of congressional factions) against the
fragile interim civilian governments. Much of the learning process involved politician’s
recognizing and exploiting the implications of Article 90 of the constitution, which calls for the
legislature to elect the president if no candidate wins a simple majority. Since Bolivia’s
democratic history began with a highly fragmented multiparty system and a fusedballot list
proportional representation electoral system, no presidential candidate was able to (or has yet)
won an absolute majority of votes. It was not until 1982, however, that congressional election of
the chief executive was formally instituted.6
The 1979 and 1980 elections failed to produce a majority, even though the Unidad
Democrática y Popular (UDP, Democratic and Popular Union) won a plurality each time. When
civilian government was finally restored in 1982, Congress chose to elect the plurality winner.
The UDP, however, was a loose preelectoral coalition and did not bargain with other
parliamentary parties. Subsequently, while Siles Zuazo faced a divided opposition, he lacked a
legislative majority with which to effectively govern. As the economic crisis of the early 1980s
spiraled out of control, the UDP front began to unravel. Finally, in 1985, Siles Zuazo—faced
with no legislative support and unable to govern effectively—called for early elections.
The 1985 general election was a turning point in Bolivia’s political history. Not only did it
mark the first peaceful transition of power by ballot, it marked the beginning of presidentialized
parliamentarism. Bánzer Suárez’s Acción Democrática y Nacionalista (ADN, Democratic and
Nationalist Action) won a plurality of votes (32.8 percent) in the popular ballot but was unable
to gain a majority of the seats in the National Congress. Most political actors were uneasy about
allowing the former dictator to hold presidential power so soon after the return to democracy.
The potential stalemate was ended peacefully when Congress implemented Article 90 and
chose the secondrunner, Paz Estenssoro as president. Knowing that no other parties would
support the ADN candidate, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement) campaigned to gain the support of the other parties in the legislature
for its candidate, Paz Estenssoro.
6 The election of Siles Zuazo in 1982 was substantively different than the congressional election of
the caretaker governments of Walter Guevara Arce (1979) and Lydia Gueiler Tejada (1980). Both of the
later were elected explicitly to oversee new elections, not to govern as chief executive. It was not until
1982 that Bolivia’s political élite agreed to elect the chief executive in parliament.
23
Shortly after his election, however, Paz Estenssoro made a political pact with the ADN. This
pact, known as “Pacto por la Democracia” (“Pact for Democracy”) ensured the new president a
legislative majority. In exchange, Paz Estensorro’s government adopted most of the economic
policies favored by the ADN. This coalition lasted the four years of Paz Estenssoro’s
government and ensured the implementation of the government’s orthodox economic program.
Although the 198285 Siles Zuazo government was a “coalition government” of sorts, the MNR
ADN government was the first true coalition government. The UDP was a loose electoral
alliance of leftofcenter parties and lacked any sort of party discipline. As the economic crisis
deepened, Siles Zuazo’s coalition disintegrated in the legislature, leaving him without the
ability to govern. In contrast, both Paz Estenssoro and Bánzer Suárez were able to discipline
their parties and maintain the uneasy MNRADN alliance.
The next political regime was installed in 1989 after the candidate of the Movimiento de la
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left), Jaime Paz Zamora, was
chosen over frontrunner Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) and runnerup Bánzer Suárez
(ADN). Bánzer Suárez threw his party’s support behind the third place MIR to prevent MNR
from taking the presidency for a second consecutive term. In exchange, ADN was granted
several cabinet and ministerial posts. The two parties signed the “Acuerdo Patriotico” (AP,
Patriotic Accord) which outlined their cogovernment.
At first, the MIRADN alliance seemed strange. The ADN was a rightofcenter party, while
MIR was the Bolivia’s last important leftofcenter party. Conventional wisdom would have
suggested another alliance between ADN and the centrist MNR, or between MNR and MIR. But
the MIRADN alliance soon developed into what now seems to be perpetual alliance between
the two parties. Since 1989 ADN and MIR have consistently joined together as either opposition
or government. At the end of their first cogovernment, the two parties formed a new single
electoral front (AP) for the 1993 general elections. Results of the 1993 electoral configuration
were dismal, suggesting that partisans in both parties preferred to retain their own independent
identities. Nevertheless, both parties continue to work closely together. Although both parties
differ on the lefttoright spectrum, they agree on the new key issues of centralization and
nationalization of the economy. While the MNR has, since 1985, embraced more “pluralist” or
decentralized policies, ADN and MIR have jointly continued to embrace the more traditional
direction of Bolivian domestic and foreign policy.
24
The 1993 general elections returned the MNR to the presidency when Sánchez de Lozada
gained the parliamentary support of two new parties: the Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS,
Solidarity Civic Union) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL, Free Bolivia Movement). The
199397 MNRled government was the first indication of a new balance of power in Bolivian
politics. Campaigning against Bánzer Suárez, the ADNMIR candidate, the MNR formed a
formal coalition with the indigenous Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación
(MRTKL, Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation). This MNRMRTKL electoral
front presented Bolivia with the first significant Aymara candidate, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, for a
major political party. As with the MIRADN alliance, this new pluralist pole seems to hold
MNR, MRTKL, and MBL together. The MNRMRTKL alliance is the strongest, since the two
have since campaigned together as one electoral front in the 1997 elections (although MRTKL
still campaigns independently in local elections).
Bánzer Suárez was elected after the 1997 general elections. A dramatic rise in support for the
two new populist parties, UCS and Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA, Conscience of the
Fatherland), spread the vote into five fairly even blocks. Bánzer Suárez’s coalition government
(known as “la Mega”) was a supermajority comprising of ADN, MIR, UCS, CONDEPA, and the
small Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR, New Republican Force).7 The Mega has proved unwieldy,
however, since as many as five political parties must coordinate against an opposition
dominated by the large MNR, which is still closely supported by MBL. Within a year, tensions
within la Mega caused a crisis as CONDEPA and UCS demanded more power within the
coalition.8 In his August 1998 stateoftheunion address, Bánzer Suárez formally dismissed
7 NFR was part of the official ADNNFRPDC electoral front. The small Partido Democrático
Cristiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) has not campaigned independently since 1985. Since then it
has been incorporated de facto (when not explicitly) into the ADN electoral lists. The NFR is headed by
the popular alcalde (mayor) of Cochabamba (Bolivia’s third largest city), Manfred Reyes Villa. Villa was
a onetime member of ADN, but formed his own personalist party to become Cochabamba’s alcalde.
Despite being a small preelectoral ally, NFR has special privileges with la Mega.
8 CONDEPA was the more troublesome of the two. Posturing for greater power within the
government coalition, CONDEPA voted against the government proposal to eliminate the Bono
Solidario (BONOSOL), the national pension plan created by the Sánchez de Lozada government, less
than a month before the 6 August 1998 stateoftheunion address. Tensions were even high shortly
after the election when CONDEPA demanded the prefecture of Santa Cruz, Bolivia’s most
economically dynamic department, as part of the coalition agreement. This resulted in mass protests
from cruceños, since CONDEPA had gained only 2.13 percent of the departmental vote. Another source
of tension was the election of the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. ADN and MIR
had agreed, as senior coalition partners, to alternatively hold these positions. Both UCS and CONDEPA
25
CONDEPA from the government coalition. Subsequently, the ADNled government no longer
holds a supermajority in the Chamber of Deputies. The shortlived grand coalition of 199798
might have taught Bolivia’s political élites a valuable lesson. The power of a supermajority to
enact legislation is diminished if intracoalition disputes prevent the development of a coherent
government program. The smaller version of la Mega is now more able to implement policy
with a legislative majority.
Parliamentarized Presidentialism and Democratic Consolidation
Parliamentarized presidentialism was perhaps the most important contributing factor in
Bolivia’s democratic consolidation. While other variables, such as political will, are also
important, the institutionalist argument—that political institutions shape incentives and
significantly affect outcomes—is a powerfully convincing one. Glancing at two countries with
similar conditions, Ecuador and Peru, we can more clearly see how the unique institutional
design of parliamentarized presidentialism helped Bolivia avoid the problems that continue to
plague its two Andean neighbors.
The Bolivian model also provides opportunities for what I term “political learning.” By
increasing accountability and identifiability, reducing the negative effects of multipartism, and
encouraging moderated competition, parliamentarized presidentialism allowed Bolivia’s
citizens and political élites to quickly learn the operation of their democracy. The central
features distinguishing parliamentarized presidentialism, fused ballot proportional
representation and formal separation of the executive and legislature with concurrent, fixed
terms, also combine to reduce the chief dangers of pure parliamentarism and presidentialism.
Fused ballots eliminate the problem of dual legitimacy found in presidential (and premier
presidential) systems. The development of fixed terms and the lack of a legislative vote of
confidence provision avoids the instability that could accompany a switch to pure
parliamentarism. Instead, Bolivia’s political system of parliamentarized presidentialism
encourages bargaining and a style of coalition building flexible enough to provide broad basis
of legitimacy to governments, while also providing incentives for coalitions to hold together
demanded that their candidates be considered for these important positions.
26
and govern effectively for full terms.
Bolivia’s party system has moved away from the polarized, fragmented party system of the
past. Today, Bolivia has fewer political parties than in the hectic 197885 period. These parties
have also developed a remarkable degree of discipline. Party leaders have been able to enforce
coalitions, due greatly in part to the laws regulating political parties. These stipulate that parties
hold legislative seats, not individuals. Subsequently, legislators who decide to vote against their
party can be easily removed from office by simply being officially expelled from the party. In
such cases, their partydesignated “suplente” (alternate) takes the vacant seat. The electoral
system also encourages a more moderate form of multipartism. As predicted by Jones (1995),
the use of mediumsized district magnitudes has reduced the number of relevant political
parties by introducing a high effective threshold. In the process, extremist parties have been
marginalized to the point where many no longer campaign in national elections—though they
often still campaign in local elections. Thus, the extreme left and right of the political spectrum
has been truncated, leaving only “centrist” parties.
The reduction in the number of parties, and especially the virtual elimination of extremist
parties, has also contributed to moderated competition and a reduction of zerosum politics.
The normalization of coalitionbuilding strategies has meant that parties recognize the need to
tone down campaign rhetoric in anticipation of seeking potential coalition partners immediately
after the election. As politics has become centripetal, parties have developed cohesive policy
platforms that seek to distinguish each other from competitors. At the same time, parties have
learned to develop amicable relations with one another; friendly relations make alliances more
likely. With increased party discipline, party leaders are also better able to enforce coalition
voting, thus also increasing levels of trust between parties. Parties that are unreliable coalition
partners may be rejected in future coalition agreements in favor of parties that demonstrate
more discipline and loyalty.
Bolivian political coalitions are formed at two levels: preelection and postelection. Some
parties have formed perpetual alliances during elections. These have usually involved smaller
parties such as MRTKL (allied to MNR) or PDC (allied to ADN) which have simply merged into
the larger party’s electoral lists and formally aligned themselves to the larger parties. Of course,
these parties still retain their individual identities and campaign separately for local offices.
Postelectoral coalitions are made after election between parties (or groups of parties) agreeing
27
to share power in government. The adoption of the Germanstyle multimember proportional
electoral system may introduce a new level of coalition bargaining. Since voters can now vote
for the traditional party list and the new singlemember district representative, the same type of
electoral campaign arrangements and strategies developed there might soon also be more
formally adopted in Bolivia. If so, this could only reinforce cooperative behavior between
parties.
The adherence to cooperative behavior among moderately competitive and disciplined
parties has increased accountability and identifiability in Bolivia’s political system. Since parties
are closely disciplined, voters are able to easily place blame or praise for policy outcomes.
Similarly, Bolivia’s political parties have developed more “depth,” hoping to develop future
leaders. The major parties have especially developed second tiers of leadership within their
parties. Up and coming party members are given highly visible ministerial posts or other
positions from which to develop both expertise and visibility. These are expected to replace
outgoing party leaders and stand as future presidential candidates. Since reelection (to any
office) is prohibited, parties have developed future candidates groomed for succession.
Although no such candidate has yet to win an election, it was often clear from the very early
days of the government administration who these candidates would be. The end result is that
voters are easily able to identify potential government “teams” from within the party itself and
from the subsequent coalitions. Voters who cast a ballot for ADN, for example, must be aware
that their party will most likely make an alliance with MIR, but not MNR. Subsequently, voters
can anticipate as easily as in a parliamentary system the identities of potential ministers and top
level bureaucrats who will be chosen if their presidential choice was elected.
Although it is difficult to directly test the claim that Bolivia’s institutional design
significantly contributed to democratic stability and consolidation—or the converse claim that
another institutional design would have hindered democracy—a consideration of two similar
cases, Ecuador and Peru, provides strong counterfactual evidence. These two Andean countries,
like Bolivia, are among the most underdeveloped in South America and lack any real history of
democracy. Both are also members of the “third wave” and began their democratization
experience (197880) with multiparty systems and PR electoral systems. The different paths that
these countries have taken help demonstrate the unique advantages of the Bolivian model.
Both Ecuador and Peru use a majority runoff formula to elect their president instead of
28
congressional election, as in parliamentarized presidentialism. The combination of a second
round runoff for the president combined with a separate election for the legislature meets Linz’s
expectations for presidential systems. Both regimes are plagued by problems of dual legitimacy
and the manufactured majorities for presidents. In Peru, this combination led to the election of a
political outsider, Alberto Fujimori, who was unable to cooperate with an opposition
dominated legislature. Shortly after his election, Fujimori simply disbanded the legislature with
support from the military—introducing the term “presidential coup” to our political
vocabulary.
In Ecuador, on the other hand, democracy has managed to survive (though only barely)
despite the lack of effective governments. Ecuadorian presidents are elected with little party
support, which soon disintegrates due to lack of party discipline. Coalition governments are
very difficult to implement, since party discipline is so low that a soccer term “cambio de
camisetas” (change of shirts) is commonly used to describe how politicians change parties while
in office (Barczak 1997). Finally, the addition of midterm elections means that Ecuadorian
presidents must try to cobble together piecemeal coalitions every two years or on an issueby
issue basis. That Ecuadorian democracy has managed to limp along for two decades is, in my
opinion, nothing short of a miracle. I suggest, however, that adoption of a form of
parliamentarized presidentialism would dramatically improve Ecuador’s chances of building
effective governments and finally consolidating its democracy. If Bolivia had a presidential
system, there is no reason to believe that the outcome would have been similar to Ecuador (less
likely) or Peru (more probable).
Similarly, I argue that a parliamentary system would have been an obstacle to democratic
consolidation in Bolivia. With newly emerging political parties, parliamentarism would have
been extremely chaotic. The use of a vote of confidence would have been further debilitating.
Evidence from Bolivia’s 311 municipal governments is instructive. The electoral system used for
municipal governments is similar to that used for national elections. Voters choose from party
lists headed by the party’s choice for alcalde. From this single vote, the municipal council’s seats
are proportionally distributed among parties. In the event that no party wins a majority,
coalition governments are formed. Municipal governments, however, do use a constructive vote
of confidence. The use of the constructive vote of confidence (which is a mild form of the vote
confidence) has proved problematic in Bolivia’s municipal governments (Rojas Ortuste 1998).
29
Many of the more “parliamentarized” municipal governments have been unstable, as they
change alcalde on a yearly basis. We can expect that the introduction of a vote of confidence
(constructive of otherwise) might lessen democratic stability and effective governance.
Conclusion
We must, of course, be careful in drawing overly broad conclusions about Bolivia’s

democratic consolidation from the little evidence we have about its political institutions. We
need more research and data on the development of Bolivia’s political system and its operation.
There is no reason to believe that Bolivia’s model of parliamentarized presidentialism was
either the cause of democratic consolidation or that it made consolidation inevitable. Democratic
consolidation is a complicated process that involves several variables. If anything, the
Ecuadorian case demonstrates that political will—the sheer desire to make democracy work and
maintain civilian government—can go a long way. The Bolivian case does suggest, however,
that those seeking to reform presidential constitutions should at least seriously consider
parliamentarized presidentialism. Countries with little experience with democracy and weakly
institutionalized party systems would, I believe, benefit from such a constitutional system. The
Bolivian system is simple to operate, and requires few drastic changes away from either a
presidential system or a parliamentary one. Countries that currently use a presidential system
could be easily parliamentarized by adopting congressional election of the president and a
fused ballot.
It is also important to distinguish the Bolivian model as a general “type” and as a “species.”
Although Bolivia offers us the only operating example of parliamentarized presidentialism, I do
not expect that all of its specific institutional features are essential to parliamentarized
presidentialism as a type. What is most important are legislative election of the executive (the
“parliamentary” element) and the lack of a vote of confidence (the “presidential” element).
Thus, we see that the Bolivian system is a true “hybrid,” unlike premierpresidentialism, which
is rather a subtype of presidentialism, as Suleiman (1994) argues. I do not wish to argue that all
of the particular specifics of the Bolivian system should be adopted by other new democracies.
Different countries have different needs that must also be considered. What this paper offers is
30
merely the suggestion of a “frame” upon which to build the machinery of democratic
institutions.
Finally, it is important to remember that parliamentarized presidentialism, in a multiparty
context, requires adopting informal coalition building rules. I do not claim that these informal
arrangements follow necessarily (or even easily) from the institutional framework of
parliamentarized presidentialism. After all, it took Bolivia’s political élites several years to learn
how to work together to build government coalitions that could effectively govern. But a further
lesson that the Bolivian case provides is a lesson in coalition building for future democracies. If
other new democracies adopt parliamentarized presidentialism, I hope they can avoid similar
costly mistakes.
31
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