BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE

FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION, defendant-appellant.
GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the “Iglesia ni Cristo”, had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop
provision which reads as follows: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.”
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the employer was not precluded
“from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.” On June 18,
1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA
875, as follows: “xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter
to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service because he was resigning from
the Union as a member. The Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee
could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.
The Union invoked the “union security clause” of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350
and contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor
unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution
of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the “right” to form or join associations. A right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal
restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second,
power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association;
and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and
even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time. The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining
any union. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which
the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. By
virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his
religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the
collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed
and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced an exception,
when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: “but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization”. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage
of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they
are not members of the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members
of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty
to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of
employing only Union members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was
indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is
general. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the
Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances,
the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special
application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the
common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the
general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional
right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own
life and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee
from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new
source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a
third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection – the collective
bargaining relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can
make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. The Constitution
even mandated that “the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relation between workers and employers.”
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain
citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity
due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of
the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the
effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and
indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply
provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership
in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious
sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing
from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No.
3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act-to exercise the
right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on
his part.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.
Cantwell v. Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. A Jehovah’s Witnesses was convicted on a charge of breach of the peace for playing
a phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the street.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State may proscribe speech if it amounts to a breach of the peace, which
encompasses not only violent acts, but also acts and words likely to produce violence in others.

Facts. Jesse Cantwell (Cantwell), a Jehovah’s Witnesses, was convicted on the charge of breach of the
peace for playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic religion to persons he
encountered on the street. His intent was to proselytize his listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no
evidence that Cantwell’s deportment was noisy or offensive. Moreover, although the message on the
record was offensive, it was only played to persons who voluntarily agreed to listen.

Issue. Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for violating the common law offense of breach of the
peace violate his constitutional rights of free speech under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes. The lower court is reversed.
Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is obvious that the principles of freedom of speech
and religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is equally obvious that a State may not
unduly suppress free communication of views under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions. With
these considerations in mind, we note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening
of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive, indecent remarks directed to the person of
the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwell’s actions resulted in a breach of the peace or an
incitement to a breach thereof.

Discussion. By ruling that the facts of this case, speaking to an audience hostile to ones message, does
not amount to a breach of the peace, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) gives
insight into the degree of public disorder it requires to permit a government to regulate free expression
on those grounds.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts:
· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898
· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with
the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout
the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances
for operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the
permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and
license fees under protest
· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances
2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales
tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the
Ordinances in question
· Trial Court dismissed the complaint
· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO
· Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in
any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and
license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated
· However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or
occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax
P5.00
· Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or
tax said business, trade or occupation.
· 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is
empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including
importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some
other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers
and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified
into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities,
and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where
commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the
owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by
ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
· The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license
fee that a retail dealer has to pay per annum
· As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these
freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this
Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray
the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied
and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is
almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.
· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make
its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who
do not have a full purse
· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,
Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from
any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
· The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit
higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged
in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible
Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO
A.SANGUTANG.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIÑO-AQUINO,
J.:
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by thepublic school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem andrecite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265
(An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions)
of July 11, 1955 , and by DepartmentOrder No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All EducationalInstitutions)
dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught
their children not to salute the flag,sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give
to anyoneor anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the
State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledgetranscends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of theintellect and spirit which
the Constitution protect against official control..Issue:Whether or not school children who are
members or a religious sect may be expelledfrom school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and
Department Order No. 8Held:No.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highestpriority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves therelationship of man to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any otherlegitimate public interest, that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from
the schools is not justified.(Teehankee) The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part
in the compulsoryflag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend
theircountrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of theflag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show theirrespect for the right
of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Sincethey do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Wisconsin v. Yoder
Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to send their
children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school until the age
of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion.
Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public
or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after
completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked variance
from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs
and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object
to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in
not only great psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order
Amish church community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to provide an
equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is subject to a balancing test
when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not deny
the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. This Court
determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict
with the compulsory school attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. Second, education
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these
propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an additional one or two years of formal high
school would do little to serve those interests. Such education may be necessary for preparation for
the modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish
faith.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be protected
by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social
unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its
position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish community. This argument
is highly speculative on the record, and the practical agricultural training and habits of industry would
support children that did choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed to not
only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms,
Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish children than for
children generally.
The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s substantive
right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae. On this
record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s are preventing children who
wish to further their education from attending school.
Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the State.
The children also have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the decision is to
impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future of the student, not the
parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of the two children in question were not
canvassed, and should be on remand.

Discussion. The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would violate Constitutional
rights if the children wanted to pursue further education, but found that such a decision was
unnecessary because no such claim was made on the record. The dissent suggested that the cause
should be remanded to determine the desire of the children.
Sherbert v. Verner
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that South Carolina
may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in
order to deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on
Saturday.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its
unemployment compensation scheme so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions
respecting the day of rest.

Facts. The Appellant, Sherbert (Appellant), a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment
benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays. Specifically, her claim for
unemployment benefits was denied because the state compensation law barred benefits to workers
who failed, without good cause, to accept “suitable work when offered.”� She refused to take a job
that required her to work Saturdays. The highest state court sustained the denial of benefits.

Issue. Whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of Appellant’s
religion?
Whether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement of Appellant’s First
Amendment constitutional right?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The
consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect
result of welfare legislation within the state’s general competence to enact. Here, not only is it apparent
that Appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits solely derives from the practice of her religion, but
the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
Appellant for her Saturday worship. Therefore, the disqualification for benefits imposes a burden on
the free exercise of Appellant’s religion.
No. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The state’s
asserted interest is no more than a possibility of the filing of fraudulent claims by people feigning
religious objections to Saturday work. Here, no justifications underlie the determination of the state
court that Appellant’s religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits. South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in order to
deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday.
Therefore, there are no compelling state interests that justify the substantial infringement of
Appellant’s First Amendment constitutional right.

Dissent. In no way did the state did not discriminate against the Appellant on the basis of her religious
beliefs or that she was denied benefits because she was a Seventh-Day Adventist.
Concurrence. It is the Supreme Court’s duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between
religion cases.

Discussion. In the wake of this holding, religious objectors to general regulations repeatedly came to
the Court invoking Sherbert’s strict scrutiny in claiming constitutionally mandated exemptions.
Although the Court typically adhered to the Sherbert analysis in form, it quite frequently rejected the
religious objector’s claims in fact.
Wallace v. Jaffree, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 4, 1985, ruled (6–3) that an Alabama
statute that authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or voluntary
prayer” violated the First Amendment’s establishment clause.
The complaint, which did not initially mention any statute, was filed in May 1982 by Ishmael Jaffree on
behalf of his three children, all of whom attended public schools in Mobile county, Alabama. He sought
a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the defendants—members of the county’s school
board, various school officials, and the children’s three teachers—from “maintaining or allowing the
practice of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious observances.” The complaint
stated that the children had experienced acts of religious indoctrination and that teachers led their
classes in saying daily prayers, despite Jaffree’s repeated requests that the religious activities be
stopped. The following month, the complaint was amended to include more defendants. In addition, it
contested the constitutionality of three state statutes—the first (1978) of which created a minute of
silence for meditation; the second (1981), and the one that drew the most legal attention, added the
option of voluntary prayer; and the third (1982) authorized teachers to recite a prayer with “willing
students.”
During an evidentiary hearing before a federal district court, the prime sponsor of the 1981 statute,
State Sen. Donald G. Holmes, openly stated that the bill was meant to return voluntary prayer to public
schools in Alabama. Upon reexamining the establishment clause, however, the court found that it did
not prohibit the state from establishing a religion. Thus, the 1981 bill, as well as the other two, were
ruled constitutional. A court of appeals also found the 1978 bill constitutional. However, it overturned
the lower court’s decision concerning the other two statutes, finding them in violation of the First
Amendment.
The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on December 4, 1984. The Supreme Court stated
that the federal district court had mistakenly concluded that the establishment clause did not prohibit
state officials from establishing a religion and that the court of appeals had correctly reversed this
misinterpretation. In rendering its judgment, the court applied the so-called Lemon test in evaluating
whether the statutes violated the establishment clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the court held
that, first, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, finally, a statute must not foster “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.” If a statute lacks an obvious secular purpose, the second or
third points do not need to be reviewed. In applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court found that the
1981 statute did not have a secular purpose and instead was enacted for the sole purpose of endorsing
school prayer at the start of every school day, in violation of the established principle of government
neutrality toward religion. Using similar reasoning, the court also struck down the 1982 statute,
whereas the 1978 bill was ruled constitutional. The decision upheld the appellate court’s ruling.
Goldman v. Weinberger
United States Supreme Court
475 U.S. 503 (1986)

Facts
S. Simcha Goldman (plaintiff) was an ordained rabbi who was stationed at a military base in California.
Goldman was formally reprimanded for wearing a religious yarmulke in violation of a military regulation
that prohibited headgear from being worn while indoors on the military base. Goldman brought suit
against Weinberger (defendant), the secretary of defense of the United States, arguing that the
prohibition of the yarmulke violated Goldman’s right to free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. The district court found in favor of Goldman, and Weinberger appealed. The court of
appeals reversed, finding that the appropriate level of scrutiny for a military regulation was a
deferential standard. Goldman appealed, arguing that the military regulation should be reviewed under
a higher standard. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Petitioner, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, was ordered not to wear a yarmulke while on duty and
in uniform as a commissioned officer in the Air Force at March Air Force Base, pursuant to an Air Force
regulation that provides that authorized headgear may be worn out of doors but that indoors
"[h]eadgear [may] not be worn . . . except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."
Petitioner then brought an action in Federal District Court, claiming that the application of the
regulation to prevent him from wearing his yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment freedom to
exercise his religious beliefs. The District Court permanently enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the
regulation against petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to
petitioner, even though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious
beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a
yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations.
Here, the Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that
which is not, and the challenged regulation reasonably and evenhandedly regulates dress in the interest
of the military's perceived need for uniformity. Pp. 506-510
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
Brief Fact Summary. Smith (Respondent) was denied unemployment benefits because he uses peyote
as part of his religion.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Free exercise of religion does not preclude adherence to valid,
nondiscriminatory laws and regulations.

Facts. Oregon prohibits possession of controlled substances without a prescription. Peyote is on the list
of controlled substances. Respondent, a member of the Native American Church was fired from his job
for using peyote as part of a religious ceremony. Respondent then filed for unemployment benefits but
was denied because of his “misconduct.”�

Issue. Can the state criminally prohibit the religious use of peyote under the Free Exercise Clause?
Held. Yes. The law is applied to all citizens equally regardless of religious belief. It was not designed to
impede upon the religious practice of the Native American Church.

Dissent. The majority narrowly defined free exercise. The fact that Respondent’s religious ceremony
has been outlawed is an unconstitutional restraint on his right to practice his religion.
Concurrence. This state law is tied to a legitimate, compelling state interest in eliminating illegal drug
use and its secondary criminal effects. This goal outweighs any incidental religious ceremonial use of
peyote.

Discussion. Free exercise of religion includes the right to believe whatever religion one chooses. The
state may not prohibit acts simply to eliminate a particular religion. On the other hand, religious beliefs
do not excuse individuals compliance with the law. The state must have the power to generally enforce
laws regardless of religious beliefs or else it will lead to the development of an elaborate scheme of
exceptions with no rule.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

Facts of the case

The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria
used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except
during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the
establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances
addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter,
with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
Question
Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion
Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances
had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that
interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The
ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than
was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The
ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict strutiny.

Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal

Facts of the case
O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal
court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during
religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in
the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca.
The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the
government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a
substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's
argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the
government had failed to "narrowly tailor" its prohibition of the drug.
Question
Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation,
distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress
has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision,
and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government
had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the
Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote,
the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions
to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.
The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty.
The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an
exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations
and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The
Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest
standard.
EN BANC
RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC
EMPLOYEES IN THE
DIFFERENT COURTS IN Present:
ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE
In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they
be allowed to enjoy the following privileges.
1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;
2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the
entire calendar year.
Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge
Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m.
to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he expressed some misgivings
about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
during the entire calendar year.
In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 291[1] as
amended by P.D. No. 322[2] enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of
P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of
our national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 322, provides that the following are
recognized Muslim holidays:
a. Eid-ul-Fitr (Hariraya Puasa) - which falls on the 1st day of the lunar month of Shawwal
commemorating the end of the fasting season;
b. Eid-ul-Adha (Hariraya Haj) - which falls on the 10th day of the 12th Lunar month of Zul Hajj;
c. Mauledan Nabi - Birthday of Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H), which falls on the 12th day of the 3rd
Lunar month of Rabbiol-Awwal;
d. Lailatul Isra Wal Miraj - (Ascension) which falls on the 27th day of the 8th Lunar month of Rajjab;
e. Muharram (Ashura) - which falls on the 10th Lunar month of Muharram; and
f. Amon Jaded (New Year) - which falls on the 1st day of the 1st Lunar month of Muharram.
Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in
order that they may be able to properly observe them.
Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that:
Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national
government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty
in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution
of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.
(b) Regulations for the implementation of this section shall be issued together with the implementing
directives on Muslim holidays.
Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277 dated
November 13, 1981 which states in part:
2. During Ramadan the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8 oclock
to 12 oclock and 1 oclock to 5 oclock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. without noon break
and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime;
3. During Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10 oclock in the morning
to 2 oclock in the afternoon.
Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January 26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term Friday
in the above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to all
Fridays of the calendar year. However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5,[3] Rule XVII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292[4] which enjoins civil servants to render
public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week, the CSC prescribes the adoption
of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims Friday Prayer Day subject to certain
conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later than
7:00 p.m.[5]
In the Resolution dated October 1, 2002, the Court required the Court Administrator to study the
matter. In compliance therewith, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that the
Muslim employees in the Judiciary be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without break during the month of Ramadan. Further, that they be excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. However, to compensate for
the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working schedule which should start from
7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday. In that way, the working hours
mandated by the civil service rules is complied with.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim
employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during
the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as
amended by P.D. No. 322, which categorically states that [d]uring the fasting season in the month of
Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours
from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch
break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages ...
The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim
employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend
the Muslim Prayer Day. As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Dio, Chief, Office of the Court Attorney, in
her Report dated May 13, 2005, the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in Resolution No.
81-1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly
issued pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two
decrees mention Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day as one of the recognized holidays.
The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause.
The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause)
embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.[6]
Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge
his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject
any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize
or deny the immortality of his soul in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he
has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot
prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom,
like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the
rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.[7]

The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to
the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in
the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the
month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is
no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer
Day, during the entire calendar year.
On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce
them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying
Section 5,[8] Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the
general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday
through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render
public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the
prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less
than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other
religious denominations to request for similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other
religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of
religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law,
including civil service laws.
In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from work
from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask
Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed
government working hours.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours from 7:30
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential
Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; and
2. DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be excused
from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar
year.
SO ORDERED.
Zubik v. Burwell
Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, is
among the counsel on an amicus brief by the Scholars of Religious Liberty, Sarah Barringer Gordon, et
al., in support of the respondents in this case.
Zubik v. Burwell was a case before the United States Supreme Court on whether religious institutions
other than churches should be exempt from the contraceptive mandate, a regulation adopted by the
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that requires
non-church employers to cover certain contraceptives for their female employees. Churches are
already exempt under those regulations.[1] On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of
Appeals ruling in Zubik v. Burwell and the six cases it had consolidated under that title and returned
them to their respective courts of appeals for reconsideration.
Holding: Because both the Obama administration and the religious non-profits, colleges, and schools
challenging the accommodation offered to those who object to complying with the Affordable Care
Act’s birth control mandate confirm that contraceptive coverage could be provided to the challengers’
female employees, through the challengers’ insurance companies, without any notice from the
challengers, the decisions of the courts of appeals rejecting the challenge are vacated and remanded.
Given the gravity of the dispute and the substantial clarification and refinement in the positions of the
parties, the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going
forward that accommodates the challengers’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that
women covered by the challengers’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including
contraceptive coverage.
Judgment: Vacated and remanded in a per curiam opinion on May 16, 2016. Justice Sotomayor filed a
concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined.
On May 23 the Supreme Court returned two additional cases back to their respective Courts of Appeals
for reconsideration in light of the filings in Zubik: Catholic Healthcare System v. Burwell (Second Circuit
Court of Appeals) and Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals).[36]
On July 21 the Obama administration asked the Courts of Appeals considering the Zubik cases to allow
65 days for the government to seek advice from third parties on all aspects of the legal dispute, from
technical and practical implementation issues to religious and legal insight.[37] It published a general
appeal for comment and advice from "all interested stakeholders" in the Federal Register the next day.