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 An Orthodox Identity
The Russian Orthodox Church as Russia’s Soft Power
Tool in the Post-Soviet Space: The Case of Moldova

Bachelor Thesis
Russian Studies
Leiden University
30 June 2017

Michiel van de Kamp

Leiden University, s1881345
m.c.van.de.kamp.2@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Table of contents
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................3
2. Historical Context of Russian-Moldovan relations ..................................................4
3. Linkage & Leverage .................................................................................................5
3.1 The concept of linkage and leverage ...................................................................5
3.2 Russian linkage & leverage in post-Soviet countries ..........................................6
3.3 Russian civil society groups.................................................................................7
3.4 Russian Orthodox Church as linkage in the post-Soviet space ..........................8
4. Ties between the ROC and the MOC ...................................................................10
5. Moldovan Orthodox Church and Society ..............................................................11
5.1 The role of the Moldovan Orthodox Church in society ...................................11
5.2 An Orthodox identity .......................................................................................12
5.3 Opposition to LGBT rights .............................................................................13
5.4 Opposition to religious minorities ....................................................................15
5.5 Opposition to the European Union ..................................................................16
5.6 The Moldovan Orthodox Church and politics .................................................17
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................18
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................20

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1. Introduction
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has lost its direct control over the
countries in the post-Soviet space. Other countries and institutions, such as the EU and
the United States, have managed to gain more influence in the region. Many post-
Soviet countries have gradually distanced themselves from Russia; countries that are
considered strategically important to Moscow due to the multiple historic, economic
and political ties with Russia. Moscow views countries in the post-Soviet space as part
of a region where it has ‘privileged interests’ and is therefore suspicious of the activities
of Western organizations in the region (Kramer, 2008). Since the early 2000s, Russia’s
foreign policy has focused largely on protecting Russia’s interests in the region and
defending its status as a strong regional power.

Russia has been very active in creating different tools to defend its sphere of influence
against Western threats. By strengthening linkages with post-Soviet countries and
using tools, such as disinformation, propaganda and the threat of military intervention,
Russia is able to create leverage that can influence domestic politics and pressure
countries to move away from the West. A very effective tool in Russia’s toolkit is the
use of civil society organizations. After Russia acknowledged the influence of Western
civil society organizations in the development of the Colour Revolutions, they
responded with supporting their own civil society organizations abroad. By providing
pro-Russian ideas, promoting Eurasian integration, and feeding anti-EU sentiment,
organizations like NGO’s and Orthodox Churches have become important vehicles for
Russia in influencing the post-Soviet countries.

In this thesis, I have chosen to use the theoretical framework of linkage and leverage,
developed by Levitksy and Way, to research what kind of linkages exists between the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC), and
to understand how these linkages can potentially be used by Russia as a way to gain
more influence in Moldova. My research question is therefore: What are the linkages
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moldovan Orthodox Church?’ By using
academic literature, policy papers, and news articles, I will try to define the ties between
Russia and Moldova, between the ROC and the Russian state, and, ultimately, between
the ROC and the MOC. Literature shows that Russian state leaders and church leaders
from the ROC use a certain narrative where topics, like LGBT-rights, the rights of
religious minorities and the influence of the EU are mentioned very often. According
to scholars, these topics became more important with the appointment of the new
Patriarch of the ROC, Kirill I, in 2009. I have therefore chosen to research how the
MOC is influenced by the narrative of the ROC since 2009, and how these three topics
contribute to that narrative.

First, I have chosen to research this topic, since literature shows that the ROC, as civil
society organization, functions as a geopolitical tool in the hands of the Russian state
and that the ROC is actively promoting and stimulating pro-Orthodox and anti-
Western ideas in several post-Soviet countries. Secondly, I believe that it is important
to research the influence of Russian soft power in Moldova in a comprehensive manner,
considering that Russia is currently trying to shift public opinion in Moldova from a
pro-EU point of view to a pro-Russia point of view. Thirdly, I have chosen to research

3
these civil society linkages between Russia and Moldova, since most of the literature
focuses on identifying Russian civil society linkages in Ukraine and Belarus. There is
research about social linkages, economic linkages, and other linkages between Russia
and Moldova but there is not much academic material written on Russian civil society
linkages in Moldova. Considering this gap in literature, it is therefore important to
research the linkages between ROC and the MOC.

2. Historical Context of Russian-Moldovan relations

The current independent state of Moldova was established after the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The territory that is currently known as the Republic of Moldova was
a part of the Principality of Moldova, a Romanian princedom, and was then known by
the name Bessarabia. The Principality of Moldova, which had existed since the 14th
century, was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire for almost two centuries. During the
turbulent period of the 18th century, Moldova became a region surrounded by wars
between the Ottomans, Russians, and Austrians. Eventually, after the Russo-Turkish
war in 1812, the Russians incorporated the region of Bessarabia into their empire (King,
2000:18). After the annexation of the Bassarabian region by the Russians in 1812, the
thorough process of russification began. In an attempt to change the strong presence of
Romanians in the area, Russia made it possible for Russian, Jewish, and Turkish
(Gagauz) immigrants to settle in the region. Starting from 1826 it became forbidden
to use the Romanian language in schools, public places and Orthodox churches (Calus,
2016: 14). The policy of russification led to the fact that the status of Moldova was
upgraded from an imperial region to a Russian province. This was, according to King,
‘an indication that it [Moldova] formed an inseparable part not only of the Russian
empire but of the Russian heartland itself’ (2000: 23).

After the revolution in 1918, the Bolsheviks created the Moldavian Autonomous
Socialist Soviet Republic (MASSR) in the area that encompasses the right bank of the
river Dniester, modern day Transnistria, and some parts of contemporary Ukraine. The
problem of this area was, however, that only one third of the population was
Moldovan/Romanian. The majority of the citizens in the region were Ukrainians, who
were forced to submit to the cultural transition of a newly created Moldavian identity
(Calus, 2016:14). This Moldovan identity became more important in the period after
1940, when Bessarabia was incorporated in the Soviet Union. A new Soviet republic
was established, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), which merged the
historic Romanian region of Bessarabia with the Slavic region of Transnistria into one
Moldovan state. By using propaganda, the Soviets tried to differentiate between a
Romanian identity and a Moldovan identity. This method eventually led to a social and
cultural split between the Romanian and Moldovan peoples that were living in the area
(King, 2000: 3). While the economy of the Bessarabian region was focused on
agriculture, the Transnistrian region developed itself as an industrial region. During the
first twenty years after the foundation of the MSSR, around 300.000 Russian
immigrants settled in the region of present day Transnistria. In exchange for the
Russian immigrants, half a million Moldovans were deported to Russia or other
countries to work (Van Meurs, 1994: 122). The russification of the Moldovans during
the 19th century and at the beginning of the Soviet Union proved to be effective, since

4
the Russian elites that were living on the east side of the Dniester were dominant actors
in the political and cultural sphere of the SSR (King, 2000: 101).

The importance of this Russian elite became visible during the end days of the Soviet
Union in 1990, when pan-Romanian groups in Moldova attempted to revive the
Romanian identity, and spoke out for reunification with Romania. The first
government of the independent Republic of Moldova was an active supporter of
restoring Romanian as the official language and condemning the annexation of
Moldova by Russia in the 19th century. The plans of the pro-Romanian government
were met with stiff resistance among Russian speakers in most of the regions of
Moldova, but especially in the regions Transnistria and Gaugazia (Calus, 2016:16).
The Russian elites in Transnistria were afraid that the pro-Romanian reforms would
cause a threat to their jobs and to their relationship with Moscow. To secure their
position and to restore their dominance over the region, they decided to revolt against
the government by capturing the cities on the east bank of Dniester, and by declaring
their own state with the Russian name ‘Pridnestrovye’ or Transnistria. In their fight
against Moldovan troops, the Transnistrian separatists received support from the 14th
Russian army that was stationed in Tiraspol. The Russians helped the separatist by
supplying them with ammunition, arms, and manpower (Rogstad, 2016:3). Eventually,
after a short conflict in 1992, the Moldovan troops were defeated and the Moldovan
government was forced to sign a ceasefire. This ceasefire is still in effect, and has caused
the conflict to become frozen. The pro-Romanian government soon lost the support
from the Moldovan citizens. They were replaced a new pro-Russian government, that,
according to Calus was ‘championing the Moldovanist ideas, which came to dominate
the country’s political thought for the next fifteen years’ (2016: 16).

3. Linkage & Leverage

3.1 The concept of linkage and leverage

As mentioned in my introduction, I will use the concept of linkage and leverage as the
theoretical framework for my research. The scholars Levitsky and Way developed the
basis of the concept of linkage and leverage in order to assess the impact of Western
institution on post-communist regimes. They looked at different aspects of democracy
promotion and the ability of Western democracies to gain influence in post-
Communist countries by using linkage and leverage. According to Levitsky and Way,
the concept of leverage can be defined as the vulnerability of authoritarian governments
to pressure from the West. This pressure can exist in different forms: the threat of a
military intervention, diplomatic pressure, and certain economic sanctions. The amount
of leverage that a Western country holds over another country depends on three
different factors: the size of the economic and military force of the target country, the
existence of issues between the countries, and the existence of other strong, regional
power who could provide economic, military, and social support to the target country
(Levitsky and Way, 2005: 21-22).

The concept of linkage can be understood as an density of ties between post-communist

countries and Western countries. These linkages can be categorized in six different

5
groups: economic (trade and investment), intergovernmental (diplomatic and military
connections), technocratic (elites, students with professional networks abroad), social
(migration networks, diaspora communities), communication (internet and television
networks) and transnational (NGO’s, churches, party organizations) (Levitsky & Way
2010: 43-44). Alternatively, scholars such as Tolstrup have argued that the model of
linkage and leverage is just as applicable to autocracy promotion as it is to democracy
promotion. Tolstrup added a new concept in his model, wherein he developed the idea
that the different linkages and ties between countries are dependent on the influence of
gatekeeper elites. These elites have a certain amount of control over the linkages, and
can therefore decide if they want to accept or reject foreign influence. The groups that
can be defined as ‘gatekeeper elites’ are diaspora communities, political groups, civil
society groups, and business elites (Tolstrup 2013: 723-724).

3.2 Russian linkage & leverage in post-Soviet countries

Many of the countries in the post-Soviet sphere are still considered by Russia as part of
their zone of influence. After the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Russian president
Medvedev called the border countries of Russia: ‘a region where it has privileged
interests’ (Kramer, 2008). The reason for this claim can be found in the work of the
scholar Dias, who argues that Moscow finds it very important to act as a strong regional
power and to protect its sphere of influence in order to provide domestic and regional
security. According to Dias, the Russians see the influence of the EU and NATO as
threats to their leverage over the post-Soviet sphere and are therefore willing to interfere
in regional politics and control certain events in the region to defend their interests
(Dias, 2013: 261). Using the linkage and leverage model of Levitsky and Way, we can
identify numerous linkages that tie Russia with their near abroad. I will shortly discuss
these different forms of linkage and leverage in the following paragraphs, and show
what kind of Russian linkage and leverage exists in Moldova.

If we look at the Russian influence in the near abroad, we can see that many of the
Russian initiatives in the region are driven by economic motives. Especially countries
with natural resources or countries who could function as transit countries for oil and
gas export are very valuable economic partners for Russia. According to Gerrits and
Bader, some of these countries are economically dependent on Russia, since the Russian
economy is still the most important one in the region (2016: 300). When we look at
the case of Moldova, we can see that Russia uses these economic linkages as leverage
over Moldova. The fact that Moldova is 100% dependent on Russian gas, and the fact
that many Moldovan migrants work in Russia, gives Russia a tool to put pressure on
Moldova when they would move out of the Russian sphere of influence (Soloviev,
2014:16; Secrieru, 2014:4). Another important aspect of the Russian leverage over
Moldova is the social and intergovernmental linkage, formed by the presence of Russian
minorities (compatriots) in the region. According to the Russian government, the term
compatriot can be applied to descendants from` Soviet citizens, Russian speakers or
anyone who has a spiritual, cultural or legal connection with Russia (Zakem, Saunders,
Antoun, 2015:4). Grigas argues that the concept of compatriots is very important to
understand how Russia is trying to expand their sphere of influence. She writes that
Russia is not necessarily taking the demands of its compatriots seriously, but that they
are only using the compatriots as a tool in their foreign policy strategy (Grigas, 2016:

6
37). We can identify this strategy in the case of the Transnistrian conflict, where Russia
provided the separatists in Transnistria with military aid during the war with Moldova
in 1993, and with diplomatic help during the negotiations that followed. By using the
compatriots and its military presence in Transnistria, Russia has leverage of Moldova.
It can block the negotiations and it can use the threat of military intervention and
economic sanctions to prevent Moldova from making important political decisions and
moving closer to the West (De Jong, Abdalla and Imanalieva, 2017:126).

3.3 Russian civil society groups

Other Russian linkages that we can identify in Moldova are technocratic linkages,
information linkages and civil society linkages. These linkages have become important
parts of Russia’s foreign policy tool kit after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Russia
identified the activities of Western NGO’s in the creation of the Colour Revolutions
as important soft power tools and decided that they also needed to invest in soft power
techniques (Rotaru, 2017: 1-2). Technocratic and information linkages are important
tools in this strategy. Russian universities can contribute in breeding certain pro-
Russian feelings among foreign students and, in that way, influence the highly-
educated elites in the source countries (Rotaru, 2017:31). Russian TV channels are the
most watched TV media in Moldova and are even considered ‘the most important
sources of news for Moldovans’ (Beyer and Wolff, 2016: 342).

But, although the technocratic and information linkages are important tools in the
foreign policy tool kit, the most important linkage remains the civil society linkage. As
I mentioned earlier, civil society groups can be defined as gatekeeper elites, and are
therefore able to influence the different linkages. These civil society groups function as
actors that can define the strength of the external ties (Tolstrup, 2013: 723-724).
According to Bucataru, Moscow developed an alternative set of ideas and values that
could counter the ideology of the liberal West and that could strengthen Russia’s
influence in the region. Multiple civil society organizations, such as GONGO’s
(government-organized-non-governmental-organizations), state-financed NGO’s and
Orthodox churches are, according to Bucataru, used by Russia as a way to actively
promote these set of ideas and values and underline the importance of Orthodox values
and the Russian language (2015:146-147).

According to research, conducted by Lutsevych, different kinds of Russian civil society

groups are present in the region. Lutsevych identified three types of organizations: state
agencies and foundations that fund global and regional projects, local organizations that
closely work together with these state agencies, and organizations that are not linked to
the Russian government but feel related to Moscow’s agenda in the region (2016:10).
Two examples of state agencies that are active in the region, and thus in Moldova, are
the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Russotrudnichestvo. These foundations are funding
special programmes in Moldova, which are aimed at promoting Russian language and
culture, maintaining ties between Russia and its compatriots, and influencing the
Moldovan population (Romashov, 2014:82). Examples of local NGO’s in Moldova
that are funded by these state agencies are: the Recognition Fund and Community
Fund. The activities of these organisations are focused on promoting the accession of
Moldova to the Eurasion Economic Union and influencing public policy agendas and

7
public opinion (Makarychev, 2010; Racheru, 2015). Other civil society groups in
Moldova, which are not officially connected to Russia but can be identified as ‘agents
of the Russian World’, are youth movements and compatriot networks. They are active
in promoting Orthodox values and protesting against NATO, the EU and other
Romanian and Western institutions (Bacaturu: 2015; Lutsevych: 2016).

3.4 Russian Orthodox Church as linkage in the post-Soviet space

Although most of the civil society organizations in the region receive a lot of funding
and support from the Russian state, the most important and most funded civil society
organization remains the ROC (De Waal, 2011; Soroka, 2016). According to
researchers, the ROC has become a soft power tool with the appointment of Patriarch
Kirril I in 2009 (Grigas 2016:32), and can be seen ‘as one of the most efficient
instruments for propagating Russian interests in the regions that Moscow considers
zones of influence’ (Pelnēns, 2010:232). Moscow has regularly used the concept of the
‘Russian World’ or Russkiy Mir in their attempt to unify the compatriots in the near
abroad and to strengthen the ties with Russia. There are many different interpretations
of this concept, varying from a community of Russian-speakers to a community of
Orthodox Christians (Tolz, 2001: 235-260). But while Russian state officials use
different interpretations of the concept, the interpretation that the Russian world is
composed of Orthodox believers has proven very useful for both the Kremlin and the
ROC. This also became visible in 2009, when Patriarch Kirill paid a visit to Kiev to
emphasize the unity between the Orthodox Churches of the Moscow Patriarchate in
the near abroad. During this visit, president Putin remarked that the church is
responsible for unity in the Russian nation and that therefore the unity of the church is
aligned with state policy. According to Curanovic: ‘Vladimir Putin also stressed that
this act [unification ROC, MK] would lay the groundwork for building the unity of
the entire russkiy mir, the core of which is the Orthodox faith’ (2011:136). In return,
Patriarch Kirill I also voiced support for the state and its policies by calling the Putin
government a ‘miracle of God’ in 2012 and by defending the Russian World ideology
of the government in 2014 (Grigas, 2016:32).

But even though the Russian state and the ROC share the concept of the Russian
World, their ultimate goals differ. According to Petro, the state identifies the concept
of the Russian World as a political or cultural concept, and is therefore using the church
to gather influence in the near abroad. The ROC prefers to see the Russian World as
a religious concept, which can help them to defend Orthodox values and stop the
secularization of countries in the near abroad. They are, in turn, using the Russian state
and any other state in the region to complete that objective (Petro, 2015). An important
part of the Russian World interpretation by the ROC is the concept of Holy Rus.
Suslov writes that the concept finds its origin in the days of Kievan Rus, but that it has
recently been used by patriarch Kirill to define the territory in the near abroad where
the ROC has historical ties. Countries like Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are considered
as the core of the concept of Holy Rus, but states like Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan
and even the de-facto state of Transnistria are also seen as part of this territory (Suslov,
2015:45).

8
If we look at the last ten years, we can see that the Russian government has decided to
align more closely with the spiritual concept of the ROC (Petro, 2015). State and
church have developed a common vision, which unites their opposition to Western
values and ideas (Curanovic, 2011:133). In this vision, we can identify three major
themes that are mentioned on a regular basis by church and state leaders: LGTB rights,
religious minorities rights and the influence of Western institutions (Soroka, 2016).
Patriarch Kirill has, for example, often spoken out against homosexuality. Recently, he
said that homosexual marriages can be seen as a threat to family values, in 2016 he
compared homosexual laws with ‘Soviet totalitarianism’ (Moscow Times, 2017) and
underlined the importance of fighting against gay rights. (Hall, 2016). President Putin
has also stressed the importance of defending Russia against the Western view of gay
rights, which he called a ‘genderless and fruitless so-called tolerance’ (Luhn, 2013).
Both the ROC and the state are also very concerned about foreign religious groups in
their canonical territory. They see the influence of other religious practices as threats to
their dominance and are therefore actively trying to defend their cultural superiority.
(Soroka, 2016). Both institutions blame the activities of Western institutions as the
source for these un-Orthodox laws. Putin remarked at a conference from the Valdai
Club in 2013: ‘We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually
rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western
civilization. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national,
cultural, religious and even sexual’ (Kremlin, 2013). Curanovic writes that the state and
the church agree with each other that Russia must act as global power in order to defend
Orthodox values against Western influence. She mentions that both patriarch Alexy II
and Kirill I were warning against ‘Westernization’ and that archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin
argued that the Russian state should develop its military potential in order to be able to
repel any invasion and defend its civilizational separateness, especially from the USA
and NATO’ (Curanovic, 2011:136).

The cooperation between the Russian state and the ROC seems very beneficial for the
state (Petro, 2015). The state benefits from the support of one the most trusted
institutions in Russia (Soroka, 2016). Many churches in the canonical territory of the
ROC are aligned with the Moscow Patriarchate, which is why the ROC ‘is considered
a key partner of the state authorities in plans for the politicization of the “Russian
World” ’(Suslov, 2015:46). Chapnin argues that, from one perspective, it does not seem
very political that the ROC wants to create an ideology that unifies all the Orthodox
believers in the post-Soviet space. But, on the other hand, he admits that the concept
of the Russian World only serves the political interests of the state. He identified that
a new sort of political religion was created by the state, during the time that Kirill was
appointed as patriarch. And Kirill is, according to Chapnin, a ‘Russian World
enthusiast’ (Chanpnin, 2015). Kirill’s vision of the Russian World, is a concept that
‘can be organized in accordance with fundamentally new principles that will be copied
in the future by other countries, just as everyone is now copying the experience of
European integration’ (Suslov, 2015:49). An important part of these principles is the
concept of ‘humanitarian sovereignty’ that is used by the ROC as a way to argue that
Western concepts such as human rights and liberal democracy are fundamentally
different than Russian and Orthodox values (Suslov, 2015:48). Kirill argued that some
human rights can be considered as heresy and that the ROC should fight against these
human rights (Dolgov, 2016). By promoting these Orthodox principles and criticizing

9
Western ideas, the ROC is establishing itself as a defender of Christian, traditional
values on a global stage. This is in line with their own objectives, but also serves the
interest of the Russian state that uses common values as a way to create linkages and
moral differences as a way to distance themselves from other states. Therefore, the
Russian state is eager to support the ROC in their efforts to ‘defend Orthodoxy’
(Dolgov, 2016) and to support their ideas of a ‘new, pan-European civil religion’. In
this way, ‘the ROC and its Russky mir have emerged as the missing spiritual and
intellectual component of Russia's soft power’ (Petro, 2015).

4. Ties between the ROC and the MOC

In the next two chapters, I will first explain how Moldova fits in the narrative of the
ROC and how the MOC is connected to the ROC. Then I will show how the MOC
managed to become the dominant religious institution in the country and what kind of
function Orthodoxy and the Orthodox identity has in Moldovan society. By using three
different topics, the opposition of the MOC to sexual and religious minorities, and the
opposition to the EU, I demonstrate that the MOC is trying to protect Orthodox values
against Western influences. In this attempt, the MOC is using the narrative of the
ROC and in that way also influences Moldovan society in their opinion of the EU and
Russia.

The ROC sees Moldova as an important part of their canonical territory. According to
statements from church leaders like patriarch Kirill, Moldova is part of the territory of
Holy Rus and can therefore be perceived as part of the ‘core’ of the Russian World
(Suslov, 2015:46). In this interpretation of Holy Rus, Kirill does not make any
distinction between the Slavic countries, like Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, and between
the non-Slavic countries, like Moldova and Kazakhstan. According to him, the concept
of Holy Rus can be applied to the countries that are part of the historical land of Rus
(Suslov, 2015: 48). The historical ties between the ROC and the MOC show that the
territory of present-day Moldova has been a part of the canonical territory of the
Moscow Patriarchate for almost three centuries. But, although the Moscow
Patriarchate is currently regarded as the highest authority by Orthodox Moldovans
(Pew Research Center, 2017:30), the ROC has only proven to be this authority for a
relatively short time. Starting from 1812, the Russians managed to place the
Metropolitanate of Moldova, the official Orthodox Church in Moldova, under the
authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. The majority of the Orthodox believers and
clergy in the region spoke Romanian, but Moscow decided to introduce Russian as the
official state language. In their effort to control the territory of Bessarabia, the Russians
used the church as the ‘chief advocate of state-led russification’ (King, 2000: 25).
Church leaders that were aligned with the Moscow Patriarchate were responsible for
destroying Romanian prayer books, for expatriating Romanian clergy, and for closing
down churches where Romanian was spoken. But, though the Metropolitanate of
Moldova was incorporated in the ROC, several priests decided to reject Moscow’s
policies and continue to advocate for Romanian as the official language in the parishes.
Many of the Bessarabian priests were anti-Russian, and were in favour of joining the
Romanian Orthodox Church instead of becoming part of the ROC. Due to pressure
from Orthodox believers in Bessarabia, The Romanian Orthodox Church decided to

10
accept the Bessarabian Metropolitanate as part of their canonical territory in 1919
(Turcescu, Stan, 2003: 446-448).

During the period of the Soviet Union, the Bessarabian Metropolitanate was abolished
and all authority was transferred to the Moscow Patriarchate. (Dragnev, 2012:192-193)
After Moldova gained independence in 1991, the Moscow Patriarchate reclaimed their
authority over Moldova by creating the Metropolitanate of Chisinau and All Moldova.
This Metropolitanate was accepted and recognized by the Moldovan government, in
contrast with the newly formed Metropolitanate of Bessarabia, which falls under the
jurisdiction of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The government could not fully
recognize the Bessarabian Metropolitanate ‘on the grounds that recognizing another
Orthodox church would provoke conflicts within the Orthodox community’. (Panainte,
2006: 95) From 1992 to 2004, the Bessarabian Orthodox Church tried eleven times to
get official recognition from the government. Finally, they were recognised in 2002
after the European Court of Human Rights had forced the Moldovan government to
register it. (Sprinceana, 2014:35) During this time, the MOC prove to be one of the
most outspoken opponents of the recognition of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church,
which they saw as a threat to their privileged position in the country. The MOC
received a lot of support from Communist and Socialist politicians, but also from the
ROC who considered the Bessarabian Metropolitanate as a ‘cult’ and called for the
dissolution of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church in 2002. Finally, the MOC managed
to sign a contract with the government, which gave the MOC an officially, privileged
partnership with the government (Turcuscu, Stan, 2003: 462).

5. Moldovan Orthodox Church and Society

5.1 The role of the Moldovan Orthodox Church in society

Orthodox Christianity serves as an important part of Moldovan society. According to

a recently published survey, conducted by the American fact tank PEW Research
Centre almost 92% of the Moldovan respondents identified themselves as an Orthodox
believer. (Pew Research Center, 2017: 5) And in 2014, the population census showed
that even 96,8% of the respondents aligned themselves with Orthodox Christianity.
(Vlas, 2017) Although Moldova is split between the MOC and the Bessarabian
Orthodox Church, the majority (86%) of the Moldovan Christians would align
themselves with the MOC, while only 11% is part of the Bessarabian Orthodox
Church. (Sprinceana, 2014:36)

Public opinion polls show that the MOC is regarded by the Moldovans as the most
trusted institution in Moldova. Many of the other institutions, like the president’s office
or the Moldovan Parliament, are regarded by the majority of the Moldovan respondents
as ‘unfavourable’, while 67% of the people have a very positive view of the MOC
(Centre for Insights in Survey Research, 2016). But at the same time, this self-
identification with the Orthodox religion and the positive view of the church does not
automatically mean that every Orthodox Moldovan dedicates their time and energy in
carrying out religious deeds. Results from the Pew Research Centres survey show that

11
a majority of the Moldovan respondents believe in God (95%), but that only 15%
attends a church service every week, and that less then half of the respondents attends
the yearly services at Christmas and Easter (2017, 23,70). According to researchers
from the Pew Research Centre, this phenomenon is very common in Central and
Eastern European countries and can be explained with the term ‘believing and
belonging, without behaving’. The term is based on the concept of ‘believing without
belonging’, constructed by the British sociologist Gracie Davie, that referred to
Western Christians who don’t feel connected to the traditional church structures. The
researchers adjusted this term to the specific religious traditions in Central and Eastern
European countries. They write that the majority of the citizens in these countries can
identify themselves as Orthodox Christians and that they feel connected with the
Orthodox Church but that their level of participation in traditional Christian services
remains fairly low (Pew Research Centre, 2017:7).

Still, though church attendance is low, the role of the MOC is clearly visible in the
private life of many Moldovans. Every village has, at the least, one Orthodox Church
and religious symbols are prominently present in public places. The influence of the
MOC is visible at important rituals, like childbirth, a funeral or wedding, which is
always accompanied by an Orthodox priest. Ninety percent of the Moldovans are
convinced that a priest should be present at these rituals and eighty percent thinks that
Church can help them in ‘satisfying individual spiritual needs’ (Sprinceana, 2014: 41).
Apart from these rituals, Moldovans also believe that the Orthodox Church can play a
very important role in society. A majority of the Moldovan respondents in the Pew
Research Centre survey were quite positive in their view of the role of religious
institutions in the public sphere. Fifty-six percent of the respondents saw religious
institutions as way to bring people together and to strengthen social bonds. Fifty-nine
percent saw religious institutions as an important tool to strengthen morality in society
and forty-nine percent as a tool to play an important role in helping poor and needy.
This also corresponds with the view of the majority of the Moldovan respondents (68%)
that the government should finance the dominant church in the country. According to
Pew Research Centre ‘those who say religion is at least somewhat important in their
lives are significantly more likely than others to favor public funding of their country’s
dominant church’ (Pew Research Centre, 2017: 101).

5.2 An Orthodox identity

The strong connection between the Moldovan people and the MOC proves to be a
good basis for the ROC to promote their narrative of an ‘Orthodox identity’ and the
Russian World. Due to their role as spiritual authority, the Moscow Patriarchate is able
to influence the MOC and its clergy. Many of the priests who are active in the MOC
were educated at the seminary of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchy in Moscow. This
institution is a powerful tool in the russification process of the Orthodox priests, and
contributes in advocating the concept of Russia as the ‘Third Rome’. (NATO,
2016a:25) The fact that Moldovan clergy are educated in Russia leads to a policy were
many of the concepts and narratives that are propagated by the Moscow Patriarchate
are being repeated by clergy from the MOC. Muntaunu writes, for example, that ‘the
image of Russia as the sole guardian of true Orthodoxy is strongly promoted by the
Moldovan Church and its Moscow headquarters’ (Muntaunu, 2015:60). One of the

12
most outspoken bishops of Moldova, bishop Marchel Mihaescu of Balti, voiced this
sentiment in an interview with The New York Times. According to him, the liberal
values of the West can cause the Orthodox people to turn away from God, and also
from ‘mother Russia’. He said that ‘the voice of the church and the voice of Russian
politicians — not all, but the overwhelming majority of Russian politicians — are the
same. For me, Russia is the guardian of Christian values (Higgins, 2016). In the survey
that was conducted by the Pew Research Centre is visible that this particular narrative
proves to be widely accepted among Moldovan citizens. Results show that a majority
of the Moldovan respondents (63%) agreed with the statement that ‘Russia has a
obligation to protect Orthodox Christians outside its borders.’ This percentage is fairly
similar with the number of respondents from other Orthodox countries that also agree
that Russia should take a lead in defending Orthodox believers in other countries (Pew
Research Centre, 2017: 31).

At the basis of this unity between Orthodox believers in different countries, and the
strong ties between Orthodox believers and Russia, lays the concept of a traditional,
Orthodox identity that can form an alternative to an immoral, Western way of living.
By promoting different kinds of Christian values and by using different kinds of
spiritual concepts, the MOC is trying to show that Orthodoxy cannot be combined
with some liberal Western values (Munteanu, 2015: 60). Many Moldovans agree with
the view of the MOC that there are fundamental differences between Western values
and Orthodox values. The Pew Research Centre survey results show that 71% of the
respondents from Moldova are convinced that there is conflict between the Moldova’s
traditional values and the values of Western countries. Most of the people who agree
with this statement are also convinced that Russia can act as a buffer to protect Moldova
against Western attempts to gain more influence in Moldova (Pew Research Centre,
2017:37). The MOC is, in that way, following the strategy that the ROC under
patriarch Kirill had set in motion. The MOC and other Orthodox groups in Moldovan
society are often defending the Orthodox values that, according to Kirill, are
incompatible with Western doctrines. At the same time, they are attacking Western
values and Western institutions because they are convinced that these values and
institutions are in conflict with their Orthodox values and Orthodox institutions
(NATO, 2016a: 25-26). Important topics that are being targeted by the MOC and the
Orthodox groups are the rights of sexual and religious minorities and the influence of
Western institutions like the EU in Moldova. In the next paragraphs, I will show how
the MOC is using these concepts as a way to underline differences between an
Orthodox culture and a Western culture. With the support of influential left-wing
politicians and with the support of the Moscow Patriarchate, the MOC is using
different methods to ensure their monopoly in the country and to strengthen the
connection with the ROC.

5.3 Opposition to LGBT rights

Homosexuality and the rights of LGBT’s in Moldova have been among the main topics
of concern for the MOC. There have been many occasions during the last ten years
where the MOC or certain affiliated Orthodox groups have voiced their opposition to
laws that give sexual minorities more freedom. Statements from Orthodox leaders on
LGBT issues have ranged from describing homosexuality as ‘perverse behaviour’ to

13
addressing LGBT people as carriers of the HIV virus (Ticudean, 2013; Muntaunu,
2015:60). Many Moldovans hold negative views of LGBT people, which are provoked
by the statements of the Orthodox Church who describe homosexuality as ‘depravity,
sin and sexual immorality (COWI, 2010:4; Orthodox Church Moldova, 2013). Results
from different surveys show that only a small number of Moldovans think positively of
LGBT people. A 2014 survey shows that the vast majority does not want to have a
homosexual as their neighbour (83%), that 92% does not want a homosexual person
teaching their children, and that even some people believe that homosexuality must be
punished by imprisonment or deprivation of rights (Moldovan Politics, 2016). The Pew
Research Centre survey about homosexuality, which was conducted in 2016, shows that
Moldova has the highest number of LGBT opposition among Orthodox countries.
92% of the Moldovan respondents view homosexuality as morally wrong, and only 5
percent of the respondents are in favour of legalizing same-sex marriages (Pew Research
Centre, 2017: 107-108).

The Law on Equal Opportunities that was adopted in 2013 became a symbol of the
Orthodox Church’s opposition to LGBT rights. The law was, and still is, fiercely
opposed by clergy of the MOC and by several Orthodox groups. It was created to
enforce rights to sexual minorities and the Roma community, and was part of a deal
that the Moldovan government made with the EU in order to liberalize visa criteria for
Moldovan citizens. Many of the Orthodox Moldovans were afraid that the law would
lead to the legalization of same-sex marriage, and were therefore actively protesting
against it (Calus, 2016: 70). After the law was passed in June 2012 the ROC have tried
to pressure the government to revoke the law. Patriarch Kirill wrote to the Moldovan
government to ask them to reject the law. (Diaconu, Ticudean, 2012). The Holy Synod
of the ROC described the law as ‘attempts to promote sexual perversions [and] immoral
behaviour’ and called for an amendment of the law (OCP, 2012). In a statement that
was released in 2013, the MOC leaders echoed the narrative of the ROC. They used a
similar kind of vocabulary, but went even further by threatening to call for national
protests, to excommunicate political leaders and bar them from taking part in
communion if the Law on Equal Opportunities would not be revoked (MOC, 2013).

In 2016, 4 years after the adoption of the law, the rights of LGBT’s don’t seem to have
improved. LGBT representatives described in a survey conducted in 2016 that they
often face physical and verbal abuse on the street. Many police officers or other law
enforcement officials won’t take their claims seriously, and in some occasions, they even
reject registration. Most Moldovan people won’t testify in these cases, because they are
convinced that aggression is needed to show the LGBT people that they are wrong.
Therefore, many LGBT people won’t show their sexual orientation in public out of fear
of consequences (UN, 2016). For Orthodox Church leaders and Orthodox groups, the
need to revolt against the acceptance of LGBT rights is still very important. Recently,
Metropolitan Vladimir of Chisinau called for the abolition of the equality law since ‘it
protects homosexuals and it is offensive for 98% of Orthodox Christians to be equal to
2% of LGBT people and their supporters’ (Gender and Transformation Workshop,
2016). This same sentiment was also visible during a LGBT march that was held in
Chisinau in 2016. During the march, where LGBT representatives walked together
with non-LGTB representatives, Orthodox priests were chanting prayers, cursing the
homosexuals and poured holy water on the attendees. (Higgins, 2016) The 2016

14
Moldova Country Report of the US State Department mentioned that several
Orthodox groups threw eggs at the attendees and these groups tried the break through
the cordon that the police had set up. The report described a tensed situation where
‘police were able to prevent clashes and serious incidents’ (US State Department, 2016).

5.4 Opposition to religious minorities

From a legal perspective, religion is officially independent from the state in Moldova.
This is stated in art.15 of the Law Of Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion.
But this same law also states that the MOC forms a primary role in Moldovan society
and culture (Bordian, 2012: 42). A 2016 country report by the NGO ACN describes
the particular role of the MOC as the ‘de facto state religion’ of Moldova and shows
that clergy from the MOC receive privileges from government officials. The report also
mentions that other religious groups are often being discriminated by government
officials and by clergy from the MOC (ACN, 2016). Sprincenea argues that the MOC
doesn’t want to share its symbolic dominance over Moldova, and is therefore trying to
discredit other religious groups (Sprincenea, 2014:44). The MOC follows the
ideological line of Kirill, who argues that the MOC must remain the highest authority
of the country. He mentions that ‘the Orthodox church of Moldova is the key to the
preservation of the national identity and cultural independence of the Moldavian
people’ (Portal-Credo.ru, 2013).

Representatives of religious groups mentioned to the Special Rapporteur of the UN,

who visited Moldova in 2016, that they were concerned about the dominance and the
influence of MOC in society (OHCHR, 2016). The non-Orthodox religious groups
that face the most discrimination are Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and
Pentecostals. According to the 2015 International Religious Freedom Report by the
US State Department, these religious minorities in Moldova have ‘reported cases of
verbal abuse, property destruction, and media discrimination as well as discrimination
by MOC priests’ (US State Department, 2015). But apart from non-Orthodox
religious groups, members of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church also report cases of
abuse by members of the MOC. As was mentioned in chapter 3, there are considerable
historical and political differences between the MOC and the Bessarabian Orthodox
Church. These differences have led to the creation of a two separate Orthodox centres
in Moldova. The latest numbers from 2014 show that 86 percent of Moldovan
Orthodox believers are part of the MOC and that 11 percent are part of the BOC.
Alignment to one of the Orthodox churches is not only religious; it also shows what
kind of geopolitical views the community has. Historical roots define that the
Bessarabian Orthodox Church is part of the Bucharest Patriarchate and that it therefore
has a pro-Romanian standpoint, while the MOC is more closely connected to Russia.
This has also influence on their standpoint when it comes to European integration: the
Bessarabian Orthodox is pro-Europe, while the MOC is against the integration of
Moldova into the EU (Sprinceana, 2014:36-37).

Curanovic argues that the differences between the two churches can be seen as a dispute
between the Slavic and Romance culture, and it is therefore in the interest of the ROC
‘to hinder a “Romanization” of Moldova’s cultural sphere’ (Curanovic, 2012: 184). To
remain the highest authority in Moldova, the MOC has been trying to obstruct the

15
activities of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church by using intimidation campaigns, by
destroying church property and by using violence against priests from the BOC.
According to a survey that was conducted among Orthodox believers that were aligned
to the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, some of their members faced discrimination from
government officials. They say that clergy from the MOC are responsible for
promoting negative attitudes towards the Bessarabian Orthodox Church among their
members (Cojacaru, Sintov, 2010:239).

5.5 Opposition to the European Union

In 2009, a coalition of government parties formed a pro-European block to stimulate

the integration of Moldova with the EU. A majority of the Moldovan people (65%)
held positive views about the EU at that time, and were therefore supportive of this
new coalition. In their attempt to block Russia’s influence in the region, the ruling
coalition made deals with the EU to prepare for an Association Agreement. But, in the
years that followed, the support for the EU among the Moldovan population dropped.
Corruption, the alternative of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, propaganda
by Russian media and opposition against the ‘liberal’ laws of the EU were reasons that
caused for a widespread distrust of the EU. In 2015, one year after signing of the
Association Agreement with the EU, only 32% of the Moldovan people were in favour
of European Integration (Calus, 2016:67). The Pew Research Centre rapport shows
that 43% of the respondents agree that it is more important have strong ties with Russia,
while only 15% agree that this is the case with the EU (Pew Research Centre, 2017:130)
Other polls show that the majority of the Moldovans are actually more in favour of a
integration with the Eurasian Economic Union then a stronger partnership with the
EU (Cenusa, 2016).

With constructing a fierce opposition to the rights of sexual and religious minorities,
the MOC has also been opposing the integration of Moldova with the EU. According
to them, the EU is an institution that is responsible for introducing contra-Orthodox,
liberal views in Moldova. Metropolitan Vladimir of the Moldovan Metropolitanate
stated in an interview that ‘the EU is trying to impose on us its European laws, which
are alien to our spiritual and moral traditions’ (Sprincenea, 2014:37). During the time
when Moldova was in the process of signing the Association Agreement with the EU,
the MOC was trying to influence the Moldovan population by inciting fear for the EU
in their local parishes (Calus, 2016:70). Many Orthodox Christians came to see
fundamental differences between their Orthodox values and the human rights that the
EU promoted. A Moldovan news article mentions that Alina Andries, a member of the
‘Alliance of Christian Associations’, said that she saw the Christian values in Moldova
become ‘endangered by the aggressive promotion of European values’ (IPN, 2015).
This sentiment is explained by Calus, who mentions that one of the problems of the
Moldovan integration in the EU, is ‘that the EU had consistently promoted a certain
worldview and pushed for cultural changes that were perceived as controversial in
Moldova’ (2016:70). According to him, the Eurasian Economic Union is therefore
perceived by the Moldovans as a good alternative to the EU since the model of EEU is
similar to that of the EU but, ‘in contrast to the EU, closer to Moldova culturally and
religiously (…)’ (Calus, 2016: 69).

16
5.6 The Moldovan Orthodox Church and politics

For the MOC, the political arena proves to be very important in their attempts defend
their standpoints in public discussion about controversial subjects and to defend their
‘canonical territory’ against influence from religious foreign groups. The cooperation
with influential politicians gives the MOC a strong tool to counter certain pro-
European and contra-Orthodox laws and regulations (Sprinceana, 2014:37). Vice versa
is the support of the MOC and the identification with the Orthodox tradition also
beneficial for the left-wing parties. These parties, the Communist party, the Socialist
Party and the Democrats, are considered as very conservative when looking at their
opposition to sexual minorities, and in their cooperation with the MOC in defending
Orthodox values. According to Calus, these parties receive a lot of financial and political
support from Moscow, and can therefore be perceived ‘as instruments of its policy
towards Moldova’. He argues that these parties are closely aligned with Moscow’s
strategy in the region, and that they are actively seeking a stronger cooperation with
Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. (Calus, 2016: 30-31)

One of the most vocal supporters of Orthodox values and of a partnership with Russia
has been the recently elected president Igor Dodon. He regularly mentions that
Moldova is an Orthodox country and the government must preserve its Orthodox
identity. An important part of his viewpoint is that he is strongly opposed to ‘European
values’ and LGBT rights. He said in an interview that he is ‘against any LGBT in this
country and she [his opponent Maia Sandu, MK] supports it. We are an Orthodox
country’ (Nemtsova, 2016). Recently, during an event that was planned as a
counterdemonstration for a LGBT march, the Moldovan president even caused a
commotion by saying: ‘I have never promised to be the president of the gays, they
should have elected their own president’ (RFE/RFL, 2017a). To counter the influence
of Western values in Moldova and to reach unity in the country, Dodon is convinced
that only a strategic partnership with Russia will reach these goals. According to him,
Moldova will never be a part of the EU (RFE/RFL, 2017b). In line with the rhetoric
of the MOC and the ROC, he mentions that an integration of Moldova into NATO
is unacceptable, and that the Orthodox faith and a partnership with Russia are points
that are non-negotiable (Pravoslavie, 2017). During his meeting with Patriarch Kirill
in March 2017 Dodon expressed his conviction that Moldova needs cooperation with
Russia and the ROC. He said: ‘I believe that without the Orthodox faith, without our
traditions, Moldova has no future. Moldova needs a partnership with Russia; Moldova
absolutely needs to preserve and strengthen our Orthodox Church’ (The ROC, 2017).

Although involvement in politics is officially illegal for clergy from religious groups,
many priests and church leaders have voiced their political preference and supported
pro-Russian and pro-Orthodoxy political parties in election times and during major
events in the country (Grigas, 2016:112). This was visible, for example, in the period
before the signing of the Law for Equal Rights where priests of the MOC became part
of the Party of Communist in order to protest against the law (NATO, 2016:22).
Recently, this was also visible during the presidential election of 2016, where the church
leaders of the MOC were responsible for publicly backing Igor Dodon and Socialist
Party, and deriding the faith and sexual orientation of Maia Sandu, his opponent.
(Recknagel, 2016) According to the 2017 Freedom House report of Moldova, the

17
Orthodox Church played a significant role in this election, which, according to the
organisation, was ‘perhaps the dirtiest in Moldovan political history’ (Gotisan, 2017:4).
By endorsing Igor Dodon in sermons and news conferences, Metropolitan Vladimir of
Chisinau and several other influential church leaders supported the campaign of the
Socialist party in the presidential elections (Recknagel, 2016).

The cooperation between politicians and the MOC shows that, although the Church
is separate from the state in legal perspective, it is not separate from politics. A
declaration from 2010 shows that the MOC is convinced that they have a right to
participate in the political arena if they need to (Sprinceana, 2014: 37-38). In this way,
the MOC is using politics to spread their message and to block certain laws that are
opposed to Orthodox values, while political parties are using the narrative and the
concepts of the MOC to gather support among the Moldovan population. By
underlining the importance of an Orthodox identity, the opposition to Western values
and the concept of the Russian World, both politicians and clergy are working together
to establish a stronger connection with ROC, and therefore also with the Russian state.

6. Conclusion
By strengthening linkages with post-Soviet countries and by constructing a wide range
of soft-power tools, Russia has tried to block Western influence in the region. In this
thesis, I have shown that linkages have led to a situation where Russia has certain
leverage over post-Soviet countries and that several linkages, such as information
linkages, technocratic linkages and civil society linkages, are being used by Russia as
important soft power tools. From all of Russia’s soft power tools in the region, one of
the most effective one has been the ROC. Although their goals seem to differ, the
Russian state and the ROC have worked closely together to promote Orthodox values
and the concept of the Russian World in post-Soviet countries. In this cooperation, the
state is using the church to gain more influence in its near abroad, and the church is
using state support to block the secularization in its canonical territory. Literature shows
that state and church have created a narrative that promotes an Orthodox identity and
that they have used moral differences, like LGTB rights, religious minority rights and
the influence of Western institutions, as a way to underline that Western ideas like
human rights and liberal democracy cannot be incorporated into this Orthodox
identity. Both state and church have used media and Orthodox churches to promote
this narrative in several post-Soviet countries.

In my case study, I’ve tried to answer the research question: ‘What are the linkages
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moldovan Orthodox Church?’ The examples
that are mentioned in this thesis show that there are strong connections between the
ROC and the MOC. Due to the fact that the MOC is subordinate to the Moscow
Patriarchate, the ROC is able to influence the MOC and its clergy with its ideology
and religious concepts. If we look at the narrative that the ROC promotes, we can see
that the MOC is using a similar narrative to oppose certain Western ‘human rights’ and
the influence of Western institutions in Moldova. Topics, like LGBT-rights, the rights
of religious minorities and the influence of the EU, are often mentioned by clergy from
the MOC. Together with the help and the public support of the ROC, the MOC is

18
able to promote the message that Western laws, like the Law On Equal Opportunities,
are unfit for an Orthodox culture and that the EU is an institution that wishes to impose
these contra-Orthodox laws on a country as Moldova.

If we look at the literature that I have mentioned and the examples that I have shown,
we can conclude that it is beneficial for the Russian State and the ROC to strengthen
the linkages with the MOC. Results from different surveys show that the majority of
the Moldovans support the narrative of the MOC and that they agree that Moldova
must seek a closer cooperation with Russia instead of the EU, because they see that
only Russia can protect Moldova against Western influence. Although these linkages
suggest that Russia has potential leverage over Moldova, this does not necessarily mean
that the ROC or the Russian state, can control the MOC or Moldovan politics. Both
the Russian state and the ROC, as well as the Moldovan state and MOC, have their
own objectives and every institution is using each other to accomplish those objectives.
Other factors, like the division in society between East and West, also shows that
Western linkages are also present, which can obstruct Russian linkages. Recent
diplomatic tensions between Russia and Moldova, for example, show that Moldova is
still divided between pro-European and pro-Russian groups (Aljazeera, 2017). But,
concluding from previous examples, we can see that Russia’s response to Western
initiatives in the region will likely be to continue their efforts in supporting Orthodox
churches, and promoting an Orthodox identity. By supporting institutions that can
discredit European values and organizations, like the ROC and the MOC, Russia is
using the levers of religion and culture to legitimize itself as the ‘defender of Orthodox
Christians’, to promote Russian initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union and to
challenge the Western influence in Moldova and its near abroad.

19
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