provide any other proof of acts of dominion over the
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds
Review 2016
Atty. Israelito P. Torreon
New Case re: Section 14(1) of PD 1529
Republic v. Lualhati
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
Facts:
Emeteria Lualhati filed with the RTC an application for
original registration covering Lots 1 and 2. She
essentially maintains that she, together with her
deceased husband and their four children have been in
possession of the subject lands in the concept of an
owner since 1944.
In support of her application, she submitted the
following:
a) Blueprint of the survey plan and the tracing
cloth plan surveyed at the instance of Andres
Lualhati and approved by the Director of Lands
in October 1957, the certified true copy of the
surveyor's certificate;
b) The technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2;
c) Tax Declaration No. 26437 issued in the name
of Andres Lualhati, which states that the tax on
the properties commenced in 1944;
d) The real property tax register evidencing
payment of realty taxes on the subject
properties from 1949 to 1958;
e) Certifications from the DENR, CENRO, that no
public land application/land patent covering
the subject lots is pending nor are the lots
embraced by any administrative title; and
f) A letter from the Provincial Engineer that the
province has no projects which will be affected
by the registration.
The RTC granted her application and the CA affirmed.
The Republic posits that Lualhati did not present any
evidence to show that the land sought to be registered
is alienable and disposable land of public domain. It
cited Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.
Second, the Republic asserts that Lualhati failed to
present sufficient evidence proving her claim of
possession and occupation over the entire portion of
the subject properties. Contrary to the findings of the
courts below, respondent's planting of fruit-bearing
trees, at best, constituted a mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land which can hardly become sufficient
basis for a claim of ownership. Other than planting
trees and constructing their home, Lualhati failed to
subject land such as enclosing the property or
constructing other improvements thereon considering
the vastness of the same.
In addition, the Republic points out that apart from a
single tax declaration, there is nothing in the records
which evince Lualhati’s religious payment of real
property taxes.
Held: Petition is meritorious.
Section 14(1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. – The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in the
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, all lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as disposable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
Lualhati’s reliance on the CENRO certification is
misplaced as it is insufficient.
In the oft-cited Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, it was
held that it is not enough for the CENRO or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) that a parcel of land is alienable and
Page 1 of 24
disposable as certifications issued by the CENRO, or
GROUNDS Evidence is insufficient to justify the
specialists of the PENRO, as well as Survey Plans
decision or final order
prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the
- The findings or conclusions of the
subject lots are alienable, do not constitute judgment or final order which are
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the not supported by evidence or are
presumption that the property sought to be registered contrary to law must be specified,
belongs to the alienable land of the public domain. making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary
Rather, this Court stressed the importance of evidence or to the provisions of
alienability by presenting a copy of the original law alleged to be contrary to said
findings or conclusion
classification of the land approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal AGAINST
custodian of the official records. WHOM TO
FILE?
Thus, as it now stands, an application for original
registration must be accompanied by: WHEN IT * A second motion for
(1) CENRO certification; and CANNOT reconsideration is not allowed.
(2) A copy of the original classification of the land BE FILED?
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
2. NEW TRIAL

WHEN CAN Within 15 days from the final

REMEDIES IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IT BE FILED? judgment (accompanied with
Affidavit of Merits)
BEFORE DECISION is rendered:
WHERE TO The Land Registration Court which
Prior to decision, if a person want to participate, file a FILE? rendered the decision
Motion to Lift Order of General Default and if lifted, file
an Opposition, except: WHO CAN Applicant or Oppositor
(Pael vs CA 371 SCRA 587) FILE?

GROUNDS 1. FAME
AFTER DECISION Fraud: Possessor deliberately not
included in the Petition
Accident: failure of counsel to
1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION attend because of lack of
notice
WHEN CAN Within 15 days from the final 2. Newly Discovered Evidence
IT BE judgment A. New evidence was discovered
FILED? • The 15 days required for a after the trial
decree to attain finality is B. Evidence could not have been
counted from the date of discovered and produced
receipt of the notice of at the trial even with the
judgment. exercise of reasonable
• The court does not have diligence
jurisdiction to extend period
C. Evidence is material and not
to file MR/motion for new
merely cumulative,
trial (Rule 41 Section 3)
corroborative, or
impeaching; and is of such
WHERE TO The Land Registration Court which weight that if admitted,
FILE? rendered the decision will probably alter
judgment.
WHO CAN Applicant or Oppositor
3. Insufficiency of Evidence
FILE?

Page 2 of 24
 cases, the court deems it practical to allow a fresh
AGAINST
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
WHOM TO
FILE? appeal in the RTC counted from the receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
WHEN IT * A second motion for new trial may
CANNOT BE be filed if it is based on a ground
FILED? NOT existing nor available at the tile
when the last motion was made 4. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

WHEN CAN Within 60 DAYS from knowledge of

3. APPEAL IT BE judgment but not more than 180
FILED? days or 6 months after entry of
judgment or decree
WHEN Within 15 days from the notice of
CAN IT BE judgment - With Affidavit of Merits showing
FILED? the FAME relied upon and the facts
*execution pending appeal is not constituting Petitioner’s good and
applicable in Land Registration cases. substantial cause of action or
Innocent purchasers for value may defense as the case maybe.
be misled into purchasing real
property upon reliance on a WHERE TO MTC-MTC
judgment which may be reversed on FILE?
appeal. RTC-RTC

WHO CAN 1. Prejudiced applicant

WHERE TO CA or SC 2. Prejudiced oppositor
FILE? FILE?
*From CA to SC: Petition for Review 3. Prejudiced adjoining owner
on Certiorari
GROUNDS 1. FAME
WHO CAN 1. Oppositor as a
FILE? private person
2. SolGen on behalf of AGAINST
the State WHOM TO
(Oppositor in LR FILE?
cases but
Petitioner in WHEN IT 1. When the judgment has not
Cadastral cases) CANNOT become final and executory
BE FILED? *If petition for relief is denied =>
-if SolGen is not a party to the case,
cannot file an appeal subject to appeal and in the course
thereof, a party may also assail the
- Receipt by SolGen of judgment judgment on the merits upon the
binds the State ground that it is not supported by
evidence or is contrary to law
GROUNDS
2. If filed beyond the 6month period
after entry of judgment
AGAINST
WHOM TO 3. If the decree of registration has
FILE? been issued
4. When the party had already filed a
WHEN IT 1. When the party did not: timely motion for new trial
CANNOT A. Challenge the application for which has been denied (the
BE FILED? registration 2 remedies are exclusive of
B. Participate in the each other)
Proceedings
C. File an Adverse Claim
1. When the property involved
belongs to the public domain

5. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT
NEYPES VS CA (SEP 14, 2005)
WHEN CAN After the expiration of 6 months
IT BE from the entry of judgment and
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules FILED? BEFORE the decree of registration
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their has been issued.
Page 3 of 24
 Q: Ferdie donated a piece of property belonging to
WHERE TO The Land Registration Court which
Meldy. Cory, the donee, was able to register the deed
FILE? rendered the decision
of donation and secure a title. Is the title valid? Why?
WHO CAN 1. The government
FILE? 2. Prejudiced Private Person A: No. Because a donor cannot lawfully convey what
does not belong to him. If at all, Cory merely holds the
GROUNDS Actual Fraud property in trust for the true owner. While the land
registration proceeding is a proceeding IN REM and
AGAINST binds the whole world, the simple possession of a
WHOM TO certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
FILE?
necessarily make the holder the true owner of the
WHEN IT If the property has been transferred property described therein. Registration does not vest
CANNOT BE to an innocent purchaser for value title. It is a mode of acquiring ownership. (DE
FILED? GUZMAN VS CA 156 SCRA 701)

Q: Who is a buyer in good faith and for value?

A: He is one who buys a property of another without 6. REVIEW OF DECREE OF REGISTRATION
notice that some other person has a right to or interest
WHEN Within one (1) year from the actual
in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
CAN IT BE date of entry of the decree by the
same at the time of the purchase of before he has FILED? Administrator of the Land
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in Registration Authority
the property (SANTOS VS CA SEPT 13, 1990)
WHERE TO The RTC in the City or province where
BQ: A stole the title of B and then forged the latter’s FILE? the land lies
signature. He was able to transfer the title under his
name. In case B discovers such act, can he file an action WHO CAN Any person including the government
FILE? and the branches thereof deprived of
for the recovery of property?
land or of any estate or any interest
therein
A: Yes, for as long as it is still under A’s name because -Not only an aggrieved party may file
said title is void.
-Those who were deprived of an
opportunity to be heard in the
registration case.
Q: Can A interpose the defense that a title has already -Need not be an oppositor in the
been issued in his name? registration proceeding or the
A: No. A title does not provide a shield for the original claimant who filed an answer
commission of a fraudulent or illegal act. in a cadastral proceeding. There is no
need to lift an order of general
default.
Q: Suppose A has already sold the land to C, a buyer in -No need for affidavit of merits
good faith and for value, can B still recover the land? Ramos vs Rodriguez 294 SCRA 418 AS
A: No because of the protection afforded to C, a buyer long as a final decree has not been
entered by the LRA and 1 year has
in good faith and for value. Since the title of A appeared
elapsed, the title is not finally
to be clean, then C had to rely on the face of the title. adjudicated and the decision on the
Even on the assumption that A’s title is void, it can be registration proceeding continues to
the root of a valid title the moment it passes to the be under the control and sound
hands of a buyer in good faith and for value. To require discretion of the court rendering it.
him to look beyond the title is to defeat the objective
GROUNDS 1. Actual Fraud
of the Torrens System. (GSIS VS CA 1/30/95) 2. Fatal infirmity of the decision for
lack of due process
Exception: When the buyer has actual knowledge of 3. Lack of jurisdiction e.g. land is a
the facts and circumstances that would him impel him forest land
as a cautious man to make an inquiry. (EMBRADO VS
CA JUN 27, 1994)

Page 4 of 24

AGAINST
WHOM TO
FILE?
WHEN IT 1. Petitioner does not claim the
CANNOT land to be his
BE FILED? 2. Property has been transferred to
an innocent purchaser for value
3. Oppositor abandoned his
opposition
4. Oppositor who had notice of the
claim but did not oppose
What are the distinctions between a Decision in a land
registration from that of a Decree of registration?
The distinctions are:
a) A Decision is rendered by the court; a
decree of registration is issued by the
Land Registration Court;
b) A Decision contains statement off acts;
c) A Decision is signed by the Judge; a
decree, one year after issuance;
d) Grounds for review of a Decision are
found in Rule 37 or 38 of the Rules of
Court.
e) The ground for review of a decree is
fraud and it must be filed within one
year from issuance.
What is the effect of the expiration of the Period for
review? The decree of registration and certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible.
What is the available remedy of a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered in another’s
name? An ordinary action in court for reconveyance
provided a period of 10 years has not prescribed.
Is a collateral attack on the decree and the title
allowed? No. the validity of the certificate of title can
be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the
purpose. It is not correct to say that the issues of fraud
and ownership raised in a counterclaim partake of the
nature of an independent complaint which may be
pursued for the purpose of assailing the validity of the
TCT. A counterclaim in an answer is a direct attack.
(LEYSON VS BONTUYAN FEB 18, 2008)
An action for recovery of possession of property and
damages is not a direct but a collateral attack.
(DE PEDRO VS ROMASAN FEB 28, 2008)
Is an action for quieting of title a direct attack?
YES.
Leonardo v. Bonifacio
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015.
SC found untenable the contention that the action
instituted by petitioners is a prohibited collateral
attack on the certificate of title of respondents over the
subject land.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title
is direct or indirect, the relevance of the object of the
action instituted and the relief sought therein must be
examined.
Leonardo v. Bonifacio
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015.
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the
object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title,
and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object
of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Leonardo v. Bonifacio
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015.
The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct
attack on a certificate of title to real property. In their
complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically
pray for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation
of respondents’ TCTs. The relief sought by petitioners
is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to
quiet title, as provided under Article 476 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove,
invalidate, annul, and/or nullify “a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.”
Page 5 of 24
Distinction between a Direct Attack and a Collateral
Attack What is sought here is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully registered in another
Direct Attack Collateral Attack person’s name. The property registered is deemed to
be held in trust for the real owner by the person in
Made through an action Made when, in another whose name it is registered. Although the decree is
or proceeding the main action to obtain a
object of which is to different relief, an recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to
annul, set aside, enjoin attack on the judgment review, the registered owner is not necessarily held
the enforcement of (title) is made as an free from liens.
such judgment if not yet incident in said action.
carried into effect or if This is proper only when
the property has been the judgment on its face What is the legal basis for reconveyance?
disposed of, the is null and void as where
aggrieved party may it is patent that the Sec 55 Act 496 as amended by Act 3322 states that “ in
sue for recovery court which rendered it all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner
has no jurisdiction. may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however,
to the rights of any IPV of a certificate of title” (LOPEZ
VS ENRIQUEZ JAN 21, 2005; TABIA VS CA FEB 22, 2007)
7. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

WHEN CAN After the lapse of one year from the What is the nature of an action for reconveyance?
IT BE FILED? issuance of decree of It is an action in personam. An action in personam is
registration up to: directed against specific persons and seek personal
1. 4 years from the discovery of the judgments, while an action in rem is directed against
fraud the thing or property or status of a person and seek
2. 10 years when it is based on judgments with respect thereto against the whole
constructive trust world.
WHERE TO Any ordinary RTC
FILE?
Is an action for reconveyance a collateral attack?
WHO CAN Person deprived of his property by NO.
FILE? fraud, whether actual or
constructive, and who is not at fault
Case Update: HORTIZUELA V. TAGUFA, G.R. NO.
GROUNDS Actual or constructive fraud 205867, FEBRUARY 23, 2015
AGAINST Against the person who committed
WHOM TO the fraud Petitioner assails the decision of the CA that the action
FILE? for reconveyance filed by her was not the proper
remedy on the ground that it constitutes a collateral
WHEN IT If the property has been transferred attack on the validity of the subject certificates of title.
CANNOT BE to an innocent purchaser for value The SC however ruled that it is not unmindful of the
FILED? principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC
Action for Reconveyance and the CA, however, the complaint of petitioner was
not a collateral attack on the title warranting
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has dismissal.
been wrongfully registered in another’s name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, but respecting As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a
the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to
review, to bring an action in the ordinary course of a person whose property has been wrongfully
justice for reconveyance provided the property has not registered under the Torrens system in another’s
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not
value. sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the
decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no
Page 6 of 24
longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey
the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner.
BQ: Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a
parcel of land in Quezon City. One year later, Rachelle,
the legitimate owner of the land, discovered the
fraudulent registration obtained by Rommel. She filed
a complaint against Rommel for reconveyance and
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the
certificate of title issued to Rommel. Rommel invokes
the indefeasiblity of his title considering that one year
has already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the
cancellation of the lis pendens. Will Rachelle’s suit
prosper? May the court cancel the notice of lis
pendens even before final judgment is rendered?
Explain.
Yes, Rachelle’s suit will prosper because all elements
for an action for reconveyance are present namely:
1. Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the
same land
2. Rommel procured his title by fraud
3. The action was brought within 4 years from
discovery of fraud and not later than 10 years
from the date of registration of Rommel’s title
4. Title to the land has not passed into the hands
of an IPV.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasiblity of his title if
Rachelle had filed a petition to reopen or review the
decree of registration. But Rachelle filed an ordinary
action for reconveyance. In the latter, indefeasibility is
not a valid defense because in filing such action,
Rachelle is not seeking to nullify not to impugn the
indefeasibility of Rommel’s title. She is only asking the
court to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as
she is the legitimate owner.
Alternative Answer: Yes. The property registered is
deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered. The Torrens
system was not designed to shield one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds
title in bad faith. (WALSTROM VS MAPA, JAN 29, 1990)
2. A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled even before
final judgment upon proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse
party or that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary
to protect the right of the party who caused it to be
registered. (Sec 77 PD 1529)
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate
owner of the land in question. It can be said therefore
that when she filed her notice of lis pendens, her
purpose was to protect her interest in the land and not
just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to record the lis
pendens to protect her interest because if she did not
do it, there is a possibility that the land will fall into the
hands of an IPV and in that event, the court loses
control over the land, making any favorable judgment
thereon moot and academic.
Period of Filing:
1. If based on fraud, four years from the discovery of
the fraud.
• Registration of an instrument in the office of
the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice to the whole world and therefore the
discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken
place at the time of registration. (Villagonzalo
vs IAC 167 scra 535) or from the issuance of the
original certificate of title (ENDOZO VS BUCK
OCT 19, 2007)
2. If based on implied constructive trust, 10 years
• An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy
granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully registered in another’s name
but the action must be filed within 10 years
from the issuance of the title since such
issuance constitutes constructive notice.
(Declaro vs CA 288 scra 287, Retuerto vs Bars
372 scra 712)
3. Imprescriptible when based on a void contract.
The right to file an action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was obtained by
means of a fictitious deed of sale is, virtually an action
for the declaration of its nullity, which action does not
prescribe. Hence, the fact that the alleged deed of sale
took place in 1971 and the action to have it declared
void or inexistent was filed in 1983 is of no moment. To
reiterate, an action for reconveyance based on a void
contract is imprescriptible. (Lacsamana vs CA 288 scra
287 in relation with Villarino vs Avila sep 26, 2006)
Rule: Prescription and laches may bar an action to
enforce an implied trust.
Exceptions:
Page 7 of 24
1. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust if brought by the registered owner or their
children is not barred by prescription (Alzona vs
CApunitan 4 Scra 450). An action to compel a trustee
to convey the property registered in his name in trust
for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe
(Manalang vs Canlas 94 Phil 776)
 An action to convey will not prescribe as long
as the property stands in the name of the
trustee. To allow it would be to permit a
trustee to acquire title by prescription as
against his principal and co-owner.
 BUT an action for recovery of title, the ground
for which is a fraudulent deed of sale, is
virtually an action for the annulment of the
deed by reason of fraud which should be filed
within 4 years after the discovery of the fraud,
or from the date of the registration of the deed
of reconveyance.
 If the property has been sold to an IPV = file an
action for damages against the person who
perpetuated the fraud within 4 years after the
discovery of the deception.
2. A co-heir who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining
a certificate of title in his name, to the prejudice of his
co-heirs is deemed to hold the land in trust for the
latter. The excluded heirs’ action is imprescriptible.
(Vda de jacinto vs Vda de Jacinto 5 Scra 371)
3. Where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance
which is in effect an action to quiet title, is in possession
of the land in question, prescription cannot be invoked.
( Almarza vs Arguelles 156 scra 718). But, the
possession must be in the concept of an owner (Heirs
of Olriga vs CA 227 SCRA 330)
4. Express trust: provided that the trustee still holds the
property but not against 3rd persons who do not occupy
the same fiduciary capacity (Joaquin vs Cojuangco 205
scra 769)
Escobar vs Locsin 74 Phil 86
Complaint for reconveyance alleges that plaintiff is the
owner of the land and being illiterate, she asked
Sumangil to claim the same for him in a cadastral
proceeding but SUmangil committed a breach of trust
by claiming the lot for himself such that it was
adjudicated in his favor.
Held: Reconveyance will prosper. The one year period
does not apply in this case. The estate of Juan Ringor is
duty bound to execute a deed of reconveyance of this
lot to the cestui que trust, the plaintiff. A trust such as
that which was created between the Plaintiff and
Sumangil is sacred and inviolable. The Torrens system
was never calculated to foment betrayal in the
performance of a trust.
5. VOID contract except when the property has passed
to an IPV.
 Hence it is important to allege that the
defendant was a purchaser in bad faith or has
notice of the defect in the title of his vendor.
Absent such allegation, defendant is presumed
to be an IPV.
BQ: What if the guilty trustee is a father who already
died and the children became the owners of the
acquired land? Can the land be reconveyed?
A: No. they are not liable. (Rosario vs Rosario 101 Phil
972)
Children may even be regarded as 3rd persons with
respect to certain deals by their own father if they
acquired the property, not through succession but
through a deed of sale, the authenticity and due
execution of which is not assailed. In accordance with
the principle that a contract does not bind 3rd persons
who did not intervene therein, the daughter is a total
stranger to any previous transaction entered into by
her father respecting the same property but without
intervention on her part. ( Estrada vs America May 6,
1968)
BQ: More than 1 year had elapsed since the issuance of
the final decree of registration when A discovered that
his land had been fraudulently registered in the name
of his caretaker B. What right of action if any, does A
have against whom? Explain
A: The only remedy of A is to bring an action for
reconveyance against B, or for damages if the property
has passed on to the hands of an IPV. Such a complaint
would not seek a review of the decree or the reopening
of registration case which is already incontrovertible,
but be for the enforcement of a trust. Section 96 of PD
1529 provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed
as to deprive any party of any action which he may have
against any person for loss or damage or deprivation of
land or any interest therein. It may also be stated that
an action against B to compel him to convey the
property held in B’s name to A, as the beneficiary, does
not prescribe. ( CAladiao vs Blas 119 Phil 969)
Page 8 of 24

Case Update: Zacarias v. Sps. Revilla, G.R. No.
190901, November 12, 2014
Facts: Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla
spouses) are the owners in fee simple of a 15,000
square meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 7971.
In 1983, the Revilla spouses faced financial
difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo Revilla's travel to
Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money
from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada). By way of
security, the parties verbally agreed that Amada would
take physical possession of the property, cultivate it,
then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the
loan and realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan,
Amada would return the property to the Revilla
spouses.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a
fictitious document entitled “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa” before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. This
document was executed on March 19, 1979 with the
Revilla spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the
property.
On August 25, 1984, Amada sold the property to the
Spouses Adolfo and Elvira Casorla (Casorla spouses) by
“Deed of Absolute Sale—Unregistered Land.” Tax
Declaration No. 30411-A was later issued in the name
of the Casorla spouses.
In turn, the Casorla spouses executed a deed of
absolute sale dated December 16, 1991 in favor the
spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses).
In December 1994, Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi
Arabia. He asked Amada why she had not returned
their tax declaration considering their full payment of
the loan. He then discovered that the property's tax
declaration was already in the name of the Sun
spouses.
The Revilla spouses filed before RTC Tagaytay a
complaint for annulment of sales and transfers of title
and reconveyance of the property with damages
against Amada, the Casorla spouses, the Sun spouses,
and the Provincial Assessor's Office of Cavite.
On August 3, 2006, the RTC found the “Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa” to be a fictitious document, and ruled
in favor of the Revilla spouses.
Zacarias appealed. The CA dismissed the appeal and
denied her MR. Hence, this petition.
Zacarias argues that the Revilla spouses' claim is barred
by laches since they allowed 16 years to lapse, with
petitioner having possession of the property, before
filing suit.
But there was no delay by the Revilla spouses in
asserting their rights over the property. They first
learned of the existence of the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa” in February 1995 when they were served a copy
of the pleading in the land registration case instituted
by the Sun spouses. They filed their complaint within
the same year, specifically on November 17, 1995. The
lapse of only nine (9) months from the time they
learned of the questionable transfers on the property
cannot be considered as sleeping on their rights.
Case Update: Heirs of Narvasa v. Imbornal , G.R. No.
182908, August 6, 2014
Facts:
Basilia Imbornal had four children: Alejandra, Balbina,
Catalina, and Pablo. Catalina’s husband is Ciriaco Abrio.
Ciriaco Abrio applied for a homestead patent over a
riparian land. As alleged by Francisco and Pedro (sons
of Alejandra), and Petra (daughter of Balbina), the
funds that Ciriaco used to apply for the patent were the
proceeds of another parcel of land which used to be
owned by Basilia. They alleged that Ciriaco and Catalina
had urged Alejandra and Basilia to sell the said land,
and in exchange therefor, Ciriaco would hold the
riparian land in trust for the Imbornal sisters.
The northern portion of the riparian land was occupied
by Ciriaco and his heirs and the southern portion by the
heirs of Pablo.
Eventually, there were accretions to the same riparian
land. The first accretion was registered in the name of
Victoriano, son of Pablo, and the second accretion in
the name of all the heirs of Pablo.
The OCT to the riparian land/Motherland was obtained
on December 5, 1933.
The OCT to the First Accretion was obtained on August
15, 1952.
The OCT to the Second Accretion was obtained on
November 10, 1978.
Page 9 of 24
On February 27, 1984. Francisco, Pedro and Petra filed
an Amended Complaint for Reconveyance, alleging
that:
1. Ciriaco only holds the Motherland in trust for
the Imbornal sisters;
2. Through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, Victoriano and the
respondents collectively, illegally registered
the First and Second Accretions respectively,
notwithstanding that they were not the
riparian owners.
Issue:
1. Whether heirs of Ciriaco are the exclusive
owners of the Motherland;
2. Whether heirs of Victoriano are the exclusive
owners of the First Accretion;
3. Whether heirs of Pablo are the exclusive
owners of the Second Accretion.
Held:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
3. Yes.
Reasoning of the Court:
1. With respect to the Motherland and the First
Accretion, the action is barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance based on implied
trust prescribes in 10 years, the reference
point of which is the date of registration of the
deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. (This prescriptive
period applies only if the claimant is not in
possession of the property; if he is in
possession of the property, the action is
imprescriptible.) Francisco, et.al. brought the
action only on February 27, 1984, thus, it was
filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary
period.
2. But the main thrust of Francisco, et. al.’s
Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen
between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and
Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland.
This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that
the proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property—
an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal
sisters—were used for the then pending homestead
application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As
such, Francisco, et. al. claim that they are effectively
co-owners of the Motherland together with Ciriaco’s
heirs.
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed
intention of the parties, but by operation of law, in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and
to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that “[i]f property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.”
The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the
party asserting its existence, and such proof must be
clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust
and its elements. While implied trusts may be proven
by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy
and received by the courts with extreme caution, and
should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is
required because oral evidence can easily be
fabricated.
In this case it cannot be said merely on the basis of the
oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al, that the
Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently
registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be
said either that he was merely a trustee of an implied
trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the
Imbornal sisters or their heirs.
Consequently, as Francisco, et.al. failed to prove their
ownership over the Motherland, their cause of action
with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the
Second Accretion, must likewise fail.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states that rule on
accretion as follow: “[t]o the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.”
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs
to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that
the owner of the adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system; otherwise the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
Page 10 of 24
In this case, Francisco et al, and now their i.e., herein material. If there is an actual need to reconvey the
petitioners, are not the riparian owners of the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the
Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, action for reconveyance based on implied trust
hence they cannot assert ownership over the First prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference point being
Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had the date of registration of the deed of the issuance of
merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have the title. On the other hand, if the real owner of the
no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they property remains in possession of the property, the
able to show that they acquired these properties prescriptive period to recover title and possession of
through prescription as it was not established that they the property does not run against him and in such case,
were in possession of any of them. the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of
a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Therefore, whether through accretion or Recovery of Damages
independently, through prescription, the discernible
conclusion is that Francisco et al and/or petitioners
claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had 8. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties
cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially WHEN CAN IT Within 10 years from the
so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents BE FILED? issuance of the decree
armed with a certificate of title in their names covering
the First and Second Accretion coupled with their WHERE TO Any ordinary RTC
FILE?
possession thereof, both of which give rise to the
superior credibility of their own claim. Hence , WHO CAN Prejudiced person when the
petitioners action for reconveyance with respect to FILE? property has been transferred to
both accretions must altogether fail. an innocent purchaser for value

GROUNDS
Case Update: Heirs of Julao v. Sps. De Jesus, G.R.
No. 176020, September 29, 2014 AGAINST Against the person who
WHOM TO registered the property through
FILE? fraud
In an action to recover, the property must be
identified. Article 434 of the Civil Code states that “[i]n WHEN IT
an action to recover, the property must be identified, CANNOT BE
and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title FILED?
and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.”
The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly
identify the land sought to be recovered, in accordance The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has
with the title on which he anchors his right of been wrongfully registered in another’s name after one
ownership. year from the date of the decree, is not to set aside the
decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible
It bears stressing that failure of the plaintiff to establish and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary
the identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case. action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the
In this case, petitioners failed to identify the property property has passed into the hands of an IPV.
they seek to recover as they failed to describe the
location, the area, as well as the boundaries thereof.
No survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove Damages are not recoverable from the Assurance Fund
that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the when they can be recovered from the person who
70-square meter portion of petitioner’s property. caused the loss.

Case Update: Santos v. Gran and ROD of Marikina
City, G.R. No. 197380, Oct. 8, 2014.
To determine when the prescriptive period
commenced in an action for reconveyance, the
plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is
Q: What must be established before an action against
any person for damages for the wrongful deprivation
of land can prosper?
1. That the person is in reality wrongfully
deprived of his land by the registration in the
Page 11 of 24
 name of another of the land by actual or
constructive fraud
2. That there was no negligence on his part
3. That he is barred or in anyway precluded from
bringing an action for the recovery of land or
interest therein
4. That the action for compensation has not
prescribed
Q: Is the right of an heir or another person deprived of
his lawful participation to file an action to recover
property or damages limited to the 2 year period
prescribed in Sec 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of court?
A: No. such period refers only to the institution of a
special proceeding for the administration and
settlement of estates of deceased persons but not to
an ordinary action for the recovery of property or
damages which falls under the general law of
prescription.
The said rule does not deprive an heir of his
participation in the estate.
> After 1 year from the date of decree and if
reconveyance us not possible since the property has
passed to IPV, the aggrieved party may bring an
ordinary action for damages only against the applicant
or persons responsible for the fraud or were
instrumental in depriving him of the property. This
prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. (Dino vs CA 198 scra 434,
Ybanez vs IAC 194 scra 743)
Action against the Assurance Fund
9. ACTION AGAINST THE ASSURANCE FUND
WHEN CAN Within 6 years from the time the
IT BE FILED? right to bring such action first
accrued
WHERE TO RTC
FILE?
1. Those who have been
WHO CAN
FILE? wrongfully deprived of their land
2. Innocent Purchasers for
value
GROUNDS
1. National Treasurer
AGAINST
2. Register of Deeds
WHOM TO
FILE? 3. Other employees
4. Other Persons
WHEN IT
CANNOT BE
FILED?
Assurance Fund is the special fund created by PD 1529
( Sec. 94 and 97) under the custody of the National
Treasurer, to compensate, when proper, a person who
sustains loss or damage or is deprived of land or any
estate or interest therein by reason of the operation of
the Torrens System.
 This may be availed of in case of insolvency of
the party who procured the wrongful
registration. (PP vs Cainglet 16 Scra 749)
 What are the components of the assurance
fund?
 It consists of ¼ of 1% of the assessed
value of the real estate on the basis of
the last assessment for taxation
purposes to be paid by the Register of
Deeds as contribution to the assurance
fund.
 When does the ROD pay to the Assurance
Fund?
1. Upon the entry of the certificate of title in the
name of the registered owner
2. Upon the original registration of the certificate
of title of a building or other improvements on
the land covered by said certificate.
 If the land has not been declared for taxation
purposes, its value shall be determined by the
sworn declaration of 2 disinterested persons to
the effect that the value fixed by them is tot
heir knowledge a fair valuation.
 The Solicitor General or any of his
representatives are duty bound to appear and
defend all such suits with the aid of the Fiscal
of the province or the city where the property
is situated.
 Nothing in the decree shall be construed to
deprive the plaintiff of any right of action
which he may have against any person for such
Page 12 of 24
 loss or damage or deprivation without joining
the national treasurer as party defendant.
 In cases when there are other defendants aside
from the National treasurer and the Register of
Deeds, and judgment is entered for the
plaintiff, execution shall first issue against such
defendants.
If the execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part, and the officer returning the same certifies that
the amount due cannot be collected from the land or
personal property of such other defendants, only then
shall the court, upon proper showing, order the
amount of the execution and costs or so much thereof
as remain unpaid to be paid by the National Treasurer
through the Assurance Fund.
 The plaintiff cannot recover more than the Fair
market value of the land at the time he
suffered the loss, damage, or deprivation
thereof.
 The National Treasurer shall make up for the
deficiency from any funds available in the
Treasury that is not otherwise appropriated.
 The Government of the Philippines shall be
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff as
against other parties or securities. The
National Treasurer shall endorse said rights
and the amount recovered shall be paid to the
account of the Assurance Fund.
What conditions must concur to justify the payment of
damages from the Assurance Fund?
1. The party claiming to have suffered loss or
damage by reason of the operation of the
Torrens System has a title or interest over the
property.
2. That he is in reality wrongfully deprived of his
land by registration in the name of another by
actual or constructive fraud.
3. That the remedies provided by law are no
longer available i.e., he can no longer exercise
his right to have the decree reviewed on the
ground of fraud or that he cannot have the
certificate of the forger transferee cancelled
because the latter has conveyed the property
to an IPV; that he cannot have the property
Cancellation Suit
conveyed to him by the party causing the loss
or damage.
4. That he is not guilty of negligence or laches.
5. That the action has not prescribed.
6. That the loss is not caused by breach of trust,
whether express, implied, or constructive,
committed by any registered owner, who is a
trustee.
7. That the loss was not caused by the improper
exercise of any sale in mortgage foreclosure
proceedings.
8. That the loss was not caused by a mistake in
the re-survey or subdivision of registered land
resulting in the expansion of the area in the
certificate of title.
 The action should be instituted in six years
from the time the right to bring such action
accrued PROVIDED that the right of action
herein provided shall survive to the legal
representative of the person, sustaining the
loss or damage, unless barred in his lifetime.
 The 6 year period is counted from the date of
the issuance of the Certificate of Title ( Sesuya
vs Lacopia)
 If the person entitled to bring an action was a
minor, is insane, imprisoned, or under legal
disability, such person or anyone claiming
from, by or under him may bring the proper
action at any time within 2 years after such
disability has been removed, notwithstanding
the expiration of the original period of six
years.
10. CANCELLATION SUIT
WHEN CAN IT
BE FILED?
WHERE TO RTC
FILE?
WHO CAN FILE? The person who has the older
title in case of a double title
Page 13 of 24

Q: Can an action for “Annulment of Judgment and
Cancellation of Decree and Titles” be considered as a
Cancellation suit over which the RTC has jurisdiction?
A: RTC has jurisdiction. The body of the pleadings
determines the nature of the action and not the title or
the heading. The case is for cancellation of void titles
and not for annulment of judgment. (Eagle Realty vs
RP July 4, 2008)
Martinez vs CA (Jan 28, 2008)
An action for declaration of nullity of title is different
from action of reversion of title to the State. Director
of Lands need to be impleaded in this case. The
difference between them is the character of ownership
of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an
action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit ownership of the disputed
land; hence, the only person entitled to relief would be
the Director of Lands. In an action for the declaration
of nullity of the title, the Plaintiff is already the owner
of the contested lot prior to the issuance of the patent,
hence, he is the real party in interest to institute the
action.
Estate of Yujuico vs Republic ( Oct 26, 2007)
An action for reversion for titles issued by the RTC
effective July 1, 1997 ( 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which incorporated Rule 17 in relation with PD 1529) is
lodged with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the filing of
the reversion suit with the Paranaque RTC should have
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is only actions
for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead
patents or free patents based on transfers and
conveyances in violation of CA 141 which is filed by the
OSG with the RTC.
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Syllabus: Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary
in nature, contemplating corrections, or insertions of
mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues.” Banguis's opposition to the
petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial
issues involving her claimed ownership and the
hereditary rights of Adrian...However, evidence of
ownership is irrelevant.
Facts: Adriano M. Tabuyat (Adriano) and respondent
Wenifredo Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda) were
married. During their marriage, Adriano acquired
several real properties, including a 700-square meter
parcel of land located in Bulacan (the subject property).
The deed of sale over the said property was signed by
Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses
to the deed of sale was petitioner “Rosario Banguis.”
When TCT No. T-145321 covering the subject property
was issued, however, it was made under the name of
“ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS.”
Adriano died intestate.
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT No.
T-145321. She alleged therein:
1. That she was the surviving spouse of Adriano;
that TCT No. T-145321 was erroneously
registered and made in the name of “ADRIANO
M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS;”
2. That per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis
was still married to Nolascio;
3. That Banguis could not have been married to
Adriano;
4. That the issuance of the title in Banguis's name
as Adriano's spouse was due to an “insiduous
machination by her and the person who
brokered the sale of the subject property,
allegedly a cousin or relative of hers”; and
5. That consequently, she suffered damages.
Rosario filed her Opposition to the petition for
cancellation:
1. She denied specifically that the subject
property was acquired by Adriano and
Wenifreda during their marriage;
2. She claimed that, on the other hand, she alone
bought the subject property using her personal
funds;
3. She and Adriano were married and thereafter
lived together as a married couple;
4. The union produced a son;
5. The trial court has no jurisdiction over the
petition for cancellation, which is merely a
summary proceeding—considering that a
thorough determination would have to be
made as to whether the property is conjugal
or exclusive property and since she and
Adriano have a child whose rights will be
Page 14 of 24
 adversely affected by any judgment in the
case.
RTC Decision:
1. Directing the Register of Deeds to
cancel TCT No. T-145321 and in lieu
thereof to issue a new certificate of
title in the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Wenifreda
Balcom-Tambuyat;
2. Directing the defendant Rosario
Banguis Nolasco to surrender to the
Register of Deeds the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-145321
within 5 days from receipt of this
Order, failing which the Register of
Deeds should proceed with the
cancellation of said TCT.
CA AFFIRMED the RTC with the modification that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs of suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat
be deleted.
Hence, this Petition.
Banguis insists on her original position that Section 108
of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the contentious and
controversial nature of her opposition to the petition
for cancellation, which can be threshed out only in a
separate proper proceeding where the court sits not
merely as a land registration court, but as a court of
general jurisdiction.
Respondent stressed that the distinction between the
trial court acting as a land registration court, on one
hand, and its acting as a court of general jurisdiction,
on the other, has been removed with the effectivity of
PD 1529; thus, trial courts are no longer fettered by
their former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to
grant relief in land registration cases only when there
is unanimity among the parties, or when none of them
raise any adverse claims or serious objections.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the
erasure, alteration, or amendment of the a certificate
of title may be resorted to in seven instances:
(1) when registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; and
(2) when new interests have arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the
certificate;
(3) when any error, omission or mistake was made
in entering a certificate of any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate;
(4) when the name of any person on the certificate
has been changed;
(5) when the registered owner has been married,
or, registered as married, the marriage has
been terminated and no right or interest of
heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
(6) when a corporation, which owned registered
land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed
the same within three years after its
dissolution; and
(7) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.
The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the
Registrar of Deeds committed an error issuing TCT No.
145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married
to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda—and not Banguis—is Adriano's
lawful spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in
nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of
mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues.” Banguis's opposition to the
petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial
issues involving her claimed ownership and the
hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her
son by Adriano.
11. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
(SECTION 9(2) BP 129)
WHEN CAN
IT BE FILED?
WHERE TO The Land Registration Court which
FILE? rendered the decision
WHO CAN Applicant or Oppositor
FILE?
Page 15 of 24

GROUNDS Available ONLY when the ordinary
remedies of new trial, Petition for
Relief, or the appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no
fault of the Petitioner. (Lintog vs CA
291 SCRA 309)
AGAINST
WHOM TO
FILE?
WHEN IT
CANNOT BE
FILED?
Lis Pendens
Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. – No action to recover
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or
other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting
the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding
to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect
upon registered land as against persons other than the
parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice
stating the institution of such action or proceeding and
the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the
date of the institution thereof, together with a
reference to the number of the certificate of title, and
an adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered.
Lis Pendens is a Latin term which literally means, Lis
pendens is a Latin term which literally means, “ a
pending suit or pending litigation” while a notice lis
pendens is announcement to the whole world that a
real property is in itigation, serving as a warning that
anyone who acquires an interest over the property
does so at his/her own risk, or that he/she gambles on
the result of the litigation over the property. It is a
warning to prospective buyers to take precautions and
investigate the pending litigation.
What is the purpose of a notice of lis pendens?
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to protect the
rights of the registrant while the case is pending
resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens
duly recorded and remaining un-cancelled, the
registrant could rest secure that he/she will not lose
the property or any part thereof during litigation.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of
public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to
keep the subject matter of the litigation within the
Court’s jurisdiction until the judgment or the decree
have been entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or
decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of
execution.
Lis Pendens
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK v. FELONIA
GR No. 189477, February 26,2014
Facts:
Asuncion Feloni and Lydia De Guzman were the
registered owners of a parcel of land consisting of 532
square meters with five bedroom house, covered by
TCT No.T-402 issued by the register of deeds of Las
Piñas City.
Sometime in June 1990, Felonia and De Guzman
mortgaged the property to Marie Michelle Delgado to
secure the loan in the amount of P1,655,000.00.
However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the parties
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with an Option to
Repurchase.
On 20 December 1991, Felonia and De Guzman filed an
action for Reformation of Contract (Reformation Case).
On the findings that is “very apparent that the
transaction had between the parties is one of a
mortgage and not a deed of sale with right to
repurchase,” the RTC, on 21 March1995 rendered a
judgment favorable to Felonia and De Guzman.
Aggrieved, Delgado elevated the case to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC decision. On 16 October 2000, the CA
decision became final and executory.
In spite of the pendency of the Reformation case in
which she was the defendant, Delgado filed a “Petition
for Consolidation of Ownership of Property with an
Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a New Certificate
of Title” (consolidation case) in the RTC of Las Pinas, on
20 June 1994. After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC
ordered the issuance of a new title under Delgado's
name.
By virtue of the RTC decision, Delgado transferred the
title to her name. Hence TCT No. T-402, registered in
Page 16 of 24
the names of Felonia and De Guzman, was canceled
and TCT No. 44848 in the name of Delgado, was issued.
Aggrieved, Felonia and De Guzman elevated the case
to the CA through a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment. Meanwhile, on June 2, 1995, Delgado
mortgaged the subject property to Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB) using her newly
registered title. Three (3) days later, or on 5 June 1995,
HSLB caused the annotation of the mortgage.
On 14 September 1995, Felonia and De Guzman cause
the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Delgado's
title, TCT No. 44848.
On 20 November 1997, HSLB foreclose the subject
property and later consolidated ownership in its favor,
causing the issuance of a new title in its name, TCT No.
64668,
On October 27, 2000, the CA annulled and set aside the
decision of the RTC, Las Pinas City in the Consolidation
case. The decision of the CA, declaring Felonia and De
Guzman as the absolute owners of the subject property
and ordering the cancellation of Delgado's title,
becamse final and executory on December 1, 2000.
On 29 April 2003, Felonia and De Guzman represented
by Maribel Frias (Frias), claiming to be the absolute
owners of the subject property, instituted the instant
complaint against Delgado, HSLB, Register of Deeds of
Las Pinas City and Rhandolfo B. Amansec before the
RTC of Las Pinas City for Nullity of Mortgage and
Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Titles of Delgado and
HSLB, and finally, Reconveyance of Possession and
ownership of the subject property in their favor.
After trial, the RTC rules in favor of Felonia and De
Guzman as the absolute owners of the subject
property.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modifications the RTC
decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
We cannot grant the prayer of petitioner. The priorly
registered mortgage lien of HSLB is now worthless.
Arguably, HSLB was initially a mortgagee in good faith.
When the property was mortgaged to HSLB, the
registered owner of the subject property was Delgado
who had in her name TCT NO. 44848. Thus, HSLB
cannot be faulted in relying on the face of Delgado's
title. The records indicate that Delgado was at the time
of the mortgage in possession of the subject property
and Delgado's title did not contain any annotation that
would arouse HSLB's suspicison. HSLB, as a mortgagee,
had a right to rely in good faith on Delgado's title, and
in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicison,
HSLB had no obligation to undertake further
investigation.
However, the rights of the parties to the present case
are defined not by the determination of whether or not
HSLB is a mortgagee in good faith, but of whether or
not HSLB is a purchased in good faith. And HSLB Is not
such a purchaser.
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a
property without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, the property and pays full and
fair price at the time of purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of other persons in the
property.
When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and
circumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take
precautionary steps to qualify as a purchased in good
faith.
In the case at bar, HSLB utterly failed to take the
necessary precautions. At this time the subject
property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated
Notice of Lis Pendens. However at the time HSLB
purchased the subject property, the Notice of Lis
Pendens was already annotated on the title.
Indeed at the time HSLB bought the subject property,
HSLB had actual knowledge of the annotated Notice of
Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the same, HSLB
continued with the purchase knowing the legal
repercussions a notice of lis pendens entails. HSLB took
upon itself the risk that the Notice of Lis Pendens leads
to.
There is no longer any public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of the certificate of title of its mortgagor,
Delgado. Such title has been nullified in a decision that
had become final and executory. Its own title, derived
form the foreclosure of Delgado's mortgage in its favor,
has likewise been nullified in the very same decision
that restored the certificate of title in respondent's
name. There is absolutely no reason that can support
that prayer of HSLB to have its mortgage lien carried
over and into the restored certificate of title of
respondents.
Page 17 of 24
  Elements of Reconstitution:
1. That the certificate of title has been lost or
destroyed;
2. That the petitioner is the registered owner or
has an interest therein;
3. That the certificate of title was in force at the
time it was lost or destroyed.

 What is lost is the title itself in the Register of

Deeds
12. CRIMINAL ACTION  There is no need for the execution of an
Affidavit of Loss as the title with the ROD is lost
WHEN CAN  Requires publication in 2 successive issues of
IT BE FILED? the Official Gazette. This is mandatory.
Publication in a newspaper of general
WHERE TO circulation is not sufficient (MWSS vs Sison 124
FILE?
SCRA 394)
WHO CAN
FILE?  Requires notice to be sent by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to
GROUNDS The State may criminally prosecute every person named in the notice
for perjury the party who obtains  The above Publication, posting, and sending of
registration through fraud, such as notice by mail should be made at least 30 days
stating false assertions in the sworn prior to the date of the hearing. This is
answer required of applicants in
mandatory and jurisdictional.
cadastral proceedings. (People vs
Cainglet 16 SCRA 749)  Publication without posting of notice and
service by mailing = COURT HAS NO
AGAINST JURISDICTION ( Republic vs Marasigan 198
WHOM TO SCRA 219)
FILE?

WHEN IT Who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost

CANNOT BE
certificate of title?
FILED?

Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. v. Republic

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE
 Reconstitution is an action in rem which means
that it is one directed not only against a
particular person but against the thing itself
(Rep vs CA 247 SCRA 551)
 Courts must exercise great caution in
entertaining petitions for reconstitution of
destroyed or lost certificates of title in order to
help avoid litigations and controversies, as well
as discordant supervening events, that may be
spawned by a hasty grant of reconstituion. (
Ortigas vs Velasco 277 SCRA 342)
Purpose: To have the title or any document
reproduced after proper proceeding on the same form
they were when the loss or destruction occurred.
G.R. No. 187892, January14, 2015
Persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of
a lost certificate are:
1. The registered owner;
2. His assigns; or
3. Persons-in-interest in the property.
In this case, petitioner admitted that it was not the
owner of the land on which the mining patent was
issued as the same was owned and registered in the
name of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc. Thus, not having an
interest on the land amounting to a title to the same,
petitioner is not possessed of a legal personality to
institute a petition for judicial reconstitution of the
alleged lost Original Certificate of Title.
Heirs of Navarro vs Willy Go ( June 17, 2008)
Page 18 of 24

Section 2 and 3 must be followed in order for the court
to acquire jurisdiction.
Publication is a jurisdictional requirement and non-
compliance therewith is fatal to the petition for
reconstitution of title. Moreover, notwithstanding
compliance with the notice of publication, the
requirement of actual notice to the occupants and the
owners of the adjoining property under Sec 12 and 13
of RA 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon
the court in a Petition for Reconstitution of Title and
essential in order to allow said court to take the case
on its merits. The non-observance of the requirement
invalidates the whole reconstitution proceeding in the
trial court.
In the instant case, respondent was in actual
possession of the property and this fact was known to
petitioners yet they failed to give him notice of the
reconstitution proceedings. Hence, reliance on Esso
Standard Eastern vs Lim (208 Phil 349) is misplaced
because in that case, the person who assailed the
proceeding is really a squatter.
Manotok vs Heirs of Barque (Dec 18, 2008)
In this case, the CA upon MR, affirmed by SC’s 1st
division, cancelled Manotok’s title based on Barque’s
petition for administrative reconstitution of title with
the LRA.
Held:
The CA cannot do it. Sec. 98 of PD 1529 provides that
a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral
attach and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot
arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding
for reconstitution of the BArque title even if the
evidence from the proceeding revealed that the
Manotok title is fake. Nor could it have emerged
incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA’s
administrative proceeding. and Manotok’s title.
Neither the CA nor the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title. Sec 9 of BP 129 restricts the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the CA to special civil
actions and action for annulment of judgments. Sec 6
PD 1529 also does not state any power by the LRA to
cancel titles. The power is lodged with tht RTC under
Par 2 Sec 19 of BP 129.
Neither the CA nor the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title. Sec 9 of BP 129 restricts the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the CA to special civil
actions and action for annulment of judgments. Sec 6
PD 1529 also does not state any power by the LRA to
cancel titles. The power is lodged with tht RTC under
Par 2 Sec 19 of BP 129
Petition for Administrative Reconstitution before the
LRA is intended for non-controversial cases. Dismissal
is proper if it appears from the official records that the
subject property is already covered by an existing
Torrens title in the name of another person.
Reliance on Ortigas vs Velasco is misplaced because in
that case, the lower court invalidated the notice of
appeal shortcut made therein and is thus inapplicable
in this case.
Case is remanded to CA to determine the genuineness
of Barque and Manotok’s title.
Case Update: Paulino v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 205065, June 4, 2014.
In reconstitution proceedings, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that before jurisdiction over the case can be
validly acquired, it is a condition sine qua non that the
certificate of title has not been issued to another
person. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in
fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the
decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of new title.
In the case at bench, the CA found that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the original
copy of TCT No. 301617, there being no lost or
destroyed title over the real property, the respondent
having duly approved that TCT No. 301617 was in the
name of a different owner, Florendo, and the technical
description appearing on that TCT No. 301617 was
similar to the technical description appearing in Lot
939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869
(42532) in the name of Antonio.
Case Update: Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate
Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Riel, G.R. No.
176508, January 12, 2015
The petition for judicial reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title was validly dismissed for failure of
the petitioner to present the duplicate or certified
Page 19 of 24
copy of Original Certificate of Title. Thereby, it is
disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No.
26, the provisions that expressly listed the acceptable
bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens
title.
PROCEDURE (judicial or administrative)
1. Filing of Petition with the proper RTC by the
registered owner, his assigns or other persons
having an interest in the property.
2. Petition accompanied with:
a) The necessary sources of
reconstitution under the applicable
provisions of Sec 3 and 10 of RA 26 and
PD 1529;
b) Affidavit of the registered owner
stating among others, the deed or
other instrument affecting the
property had been presented for
registration, and if there is any, the
nature thereof;
c) date of its presentation;
d) name of the parties;
e) statements as to whether the
registration of such deed of
instrument is still pending
accomplishment.
SOURCES OF RECONSTITUTION (judicial)
For original certificate:
 Owner’s duplicate certificate of title
 Co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate
of said copy
 Certified copy of such certificate previously
issued by the ROD or by a legal custodian
thereof
 Authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent
 Deed of mortgage, lease, or encumbrance
containing a description of the property
covered by the certificate of title and on file
with the ROD or an authenticated copy thereof
indicating that the original had been registered
 Any other document which in the judgment of
the court is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstitution
For TCT:
 Owner’s duplicate certificate of title
 Co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate
of said copy
 Certified copy of such certificate previously
issued by the ROD or by a legal custodian
thereof
 Deed of transfer or other document containing
description of the property covered by the TCT
and on file with the ROD or an authenticated
copy
ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION
Revived on July 17, 1989
Sources:
1. owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title
2. Co-owner’s duplicate, mortgagee’s or lessee’s
duplicate of said certificate (Sec 2, RA 6732)
a) Substantial loss or destruction of land title is
due to fire, flood, or force majeure
b) Number of titles lost is at least 10% of the total
certificates
c) Not less than 500
FILE a VERIFIED Petition with the ROD then if aggrieved,
one may appeal to the LRA within 15 days from the
receipt of the decision.
BUT a Petition to set aside the decision, order of
reconstituting officer on the ground of Fraud, accident,
or mistake, shall be filed with the RTC.
From LRA to CA by way of Petition for Review on
Certiorari
Republic vs Versoza ( March 28, 2008)
Q: What if what is presented is a photocopy of the
owner’s duplicate copy of title? Would this comply with
Section 3(f) of RA 26?
A: Yes but it is still considered as secondary evidence
hence exceptions to its admissibility must be proven
under Sec 3 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. One must
present evidence under Sec 5 Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to existence, execution, loss, and contents.
A: In this case, the respondent was able to submit
several documents to prove the existence and contents
of the title and he was also able to execute an Affidavit
of Loss hence, Reconstitution was allowed.
Page 20 of 24

MORE CASE UPDATES
Arambulo v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
Syllabus
Land Titles and Deeds; Partition of co-owned property.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-
owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of
the modes of extinguishing co-ownership. Article 494
of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others,
it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.
Syllabus
Land Titles and Deeds; Partition of co-owned property.
This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As
already shown, this cannot be done while the co-
ownership exists.
The instant petition seeking the reversal of the CA
decision and praying for the affirmance of the trial
court's decision that ordered respondents to give their
consent to the sale of the subject properties.
Petitioners emphasize that under Article 491 of the
Civil Code, they may ask the court to afford them
adequate relief should respondents refuse to sell their
respective shares to the co-owned properties. They
assail the appellate court's finding that they failed to
show that the withholding of consent by respondents
becomes prejudicial to their common interest. They
assert that one of the subject properties has an area of
122 square meters and if they decide to partition,
instead of selling the same, their share would be
reduced to a measly 30-square meter lot each. The
property was testified to as measuring only 111 square
meters. Petitioners reiterate that all the other co-
owners are to sell the property and give respondents
their share of the proceeds of the sale.
Core of the petition:
Whether respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled
by the court to give their consent to the sale of their
shares in the co-owned properties.
Until it reaches this Court, the discussion of the issue
moved around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to
remove the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It
does not apply to the problem arising out of the
proposed sale of the property co-owned by the parties
in this case.
The erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case,
an innate infirmity. The very initiatory pleading below
was captioned Petition for Relief Under Article 491 of
the New Civil Code. Petitioners, likewise petitioners
before the RTC, filed the case on the submission that
Article 491 covers the petition and grants the relief
prayed for, which is to compel the respondent co-
owners to agree to the sale of the co-owned property.
The trial court took up all that petitioners tendered,
and it favored the pleading.
That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in
Article 491 is an established jurisprudence. It is settled
that alterations include any act of strict dominion or
ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.
Alienation of the thing by sale of the property is an act
of strict dominion. However, the ruling that alienation
is alteration does not mean that a sale of commonly
owned real property is covered by the second
paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co-owner
withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a
showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest,
may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld
consent. Such is the conclusion drawn by the trial
court, and hinted at, if not relied upon, by the appellate
court.
Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the
Court of Appeals correctly relied on Article 493 in
support of the finding that respondents cannot be
compelled to agree with the sale. We affirm the
reversal by the CA of the judgment of the trial court.
Page 21 of 24

There is co-ownership whenever, as in this case, the
ownership of an undivided thing, belongs to different
persons. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership
of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its
fruits and benefits.
Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each
one of the parties herein as co-owners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part.
The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect
the full ownership by the respondents of the part that
belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell
shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
With the full ownership of the respondents remaining
unaffected by petitioners' sale of their parts, the
nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In
lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-
owners with the respondents.
The text of Article 493 says so.
Our readings of Article 493 as applied to the facts of
this case is a reiteration of what was pronounced in
Bailon-Casilao v. CA (243 phil. 888 [1988]). The rights of
a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code.
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such
by the Court, agree that co-owners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full and
absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of
individual owners which is not diminished by the fact
that the entire property is co-owned with others. The
part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental
portion, may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co-owners. So we
rule in this case. The respondents cannot be ordered to
sell their portion of the co-owned properties. “Each
party is the sole judge of what is good for him.”
Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the
conclusion that, insofar as the sale of co-owned
properties is concerned, there is no common interest
that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co-
owners refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is
exactly the factual situation in this case. When
respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely
asserted their individual ownership rights. Without
unanimity, there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-
owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of
the modes of extinguishing co-ownership. Article 494
of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others,
it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.
This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners; and (b) the co-owners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As
already shown, this cannot be done while the co-
ownership exists.
Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties
the opportunity to be heard, the denial of which was
raised as defense by respondents for opposing the sale
of the subject properties.
Residents of Lower Atab & Teacher's Village v. Sta.
Monica Industrial. & Development Corporation.,
GR No. 198878 , October 15, 2014
In May 2001, Residents filed a case for quieting of title
with damages against Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corp. They alleged:
1. That they are succesosrs and transferees-in-
interest of Torres, the supposed owner of an
unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City
which Torres possessed and declared for tax
purposes in 1918;
2. That they are in possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner, declared
their respective lost and homes for tax
purposes, and paid the real estate taxes
thereon;
Page 22 of 24
 3. that in May 2000, Sta. Monica began to erect a
fence on the subject property, claiming that it
is the owner of a large portion thereof by
virtue of TCT No. T-63184;
4. That said TCT is null and void, as it was derived
from OCT No. O-281 which was declared void
pursuant to PD 1271 and in the decided case of
Republic v. Maroc (152 Phil 2014[1973]); and
5. That TCT No. T-63148 is a cloud upon their title
and interests and should therefore be
cancelled.
Sta. Monica answered
1. That Residents have no cause of action;
2. That TCT No. 63184 is a valid and subsisting
title;
3. That the case for quieting of title constitutes a
collateral attack upon TCT No. T-63184; and
4. That petitioners have no title to the subject
property and are mere illegal occupants
thereof.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must be present namely:
(1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its primo facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
“Legal title denotes registered ownership, while
equitable title means beneficial ownership.”
Residents do not have legal or equitable title to the
subject property.
Evidently, there are no certificates of title in their
respective names. And by their own admission in their
pleadings, they acknowledged that they applied for the
purchase of the property from the government,
through townsite sales applications coursed through
the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they
particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in
order that the said title would not hinder the approval
of their townsite sales application pending with the
DENR.
Thus, Residents admitted that they are not the owners
of subject property; the same constitutes state or
government land which they would like to acquire by
purchase. It would have been different if they were
directly claiming the property as their own as a result
of acquisitive prescription, which would then give them
the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were
in the process of applying to purchase the subject
property from the government, they admitted that
they had no such equitable title, at the very least,
which should allow them to prosecute a case for
quieting the title.
In short, Residents recognize that legal and equitable
title to the subject property lies in the State. Thus, as to
them, quieting of title is not an available remedy.
Syjuco v. Bonifacio
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015
The filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible
if the disputed real property is in the possession of the
plaintiff. The rule on the incontrovertibility or
indefeasibility of title has no application in this case
given the fact that the contending parties claim
ownership over the subject based on their respective
certificates of title thereon which originated from
different sources.
The Syjucos' title, shows that it originated from OCT
No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 while Bonifacio's
title shows that it likewise originated from OCT No.
994, but registered on April 19, 1917. This case
affirmed the earlier finding that “there is only one OCT
No. 994, the registration date of which had already
been decisively settled as of 3 May 1917 and not 19
April 1917” and categorically concluded that “OCT No.
994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void.
Almero v. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
G.R. No. 199008, November 19, 2014
Thus, in order for the homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs to retain their homestead, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
a) They must still be the owners of the original
homestead at the time of the CARL's
effectivity; and
Page 23 of 24
b) They must continue to cultivate the
homestead land. In this case, Linda, as the
direct compulsory heir of the original
homestead grantee, is no longer cultivating
the homestead land. That parcels of land are
covered by homestead patents will not
automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the continued
cultivation by the original grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt
their lands from land reform coverage.”

Page 24 of 24