Comparative Analysis

1. Naguid vs. Naguid (17 SCRA 499) with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa (21 SCRA 1369)

In the case of Naguid vs. Naguid, 17 SCRA 499, Rosario died single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and
6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
11 years before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be appointed
administrator. The parents opposed saying that they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in
the direct ascending line and that the will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.

The Court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

On appeal by the petitioner, a procedural aspect has engaged the attention of the court.
The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination
of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed,
are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon the court. The parties shunted aside the question
of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal,
travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

The Supreme Court held that if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of
the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.

In the case of Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369, Mariano Sumilang filed in the
CFI a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion
Ramagosa. Said document, written in Tagalog, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the
testator.The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors who questioned the due
execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended
by the deceased to be his last will and testament.. However, during the hearing, oppositors
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, and after
making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario
the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles to said
lands were no longer in his name.

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 The Supreme Court, citing Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499, held that “the petition
below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court.
Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of
any devise or legacy is premature.”

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424).

Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground that
the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of
therein. True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

In both cases of Naguid vs. Naguid and Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, the court ruled that the
court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. The court's area of inquiry is limited —
to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by
the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. In
the case of Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition
for probate on the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his
death, the lands disposed of therein. True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of
the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. This is to emphasized the difference of the
intrinsic validity and the extrinsic validity of the will. In probate, the court is only limited to the
extrinsic validity of the case and is not anymore called upon to rule on the intrinsic aspect of the
will such as the validity of the testamentary provisions.

2. Valera vs. Inserto (149 SCRA 533) and Trinidad vs. CA (202 SCRA 106)

In the case of Valera vs. Inserto, 149 SCRA 533, Rafael Valera was granted leasehold
rights over an 18 hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the government to last during his lifetime. He
transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to support her children with the
agreement that when the children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to him. Valera
and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died.

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 The heirs of Teresa – her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from
the government, acquiring title thereto.The administrators of the spouses Rafael Valera and
Consolacion Sarrosa claim that the fishpond should be returned to the spouses’ estates.

The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied trust
created, therefore the fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Arts.
1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code. Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce
reconveyance of the fishpond to the estate. The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to
Fabiana, who although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later filed a complaint-in-
intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate action for injunction and damages.

Court of Appeals reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin Heirs and their lessee
Fabiana) saying that:
(1) Probate Court had no jurisdiction;
(2) that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the presumption that the estate
owns the fishpond; and
(3) that assuming the Probate Court had competence to resolve ownership, a separate action has
to be filed.

The issue now is whether or not the probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of
the fishpond?

The Supreme Court held NO. The CFI (now RTC), acting as Probate Court, exercises but
limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the
Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced. This is issue is not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode
of practice which may be waived.

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception
to the rule. It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was
being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the
issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should
not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be
included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was
merely provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor who
has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess
has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names
but in others. A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.

In the case of Trinidad vs. CA, 202 SCRA 106, Tomas Trinidad, being the administrator
of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, President and General Manager of the Mother Earth
Realty Development Corporation, owner-developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision,
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located at Antipolo, Rizal, and having knowledge of the sale of Lot No. 19, Block No. 51 of the
said Subdivision to Francisca Dimabuyo for the purchase price of P14,000,00, failed to deliver
the title of said subdivision lot to the said lot buyer upon full payment thereof in violation of the
aforementioned P.D. No. 957. The RTC found him guilty which was affirmed by the CA. In his
petition to the Supreme court, one of the issues raised is that the petitioner, as judicial
administrator of the estate of Nicolai Drepin is caught in the horns of a dilemma and a no win
position at that. In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed execute the deed of
absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to be recreant to his sworn duty as
administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done without the permission of the Probate
Court.

The Supreme Court held that this contention is correct and is impressed with merit.
Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and there were proceedings in
the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give authorization to
administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots which had previously been sold. The decedent
after all, might be considered the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation.
The private complainant had been duly instructs by the accused herein to file the proper petition
or motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said complainant for one reason or
another, disregarded said instructions. If at anybody should be blamed, it should be private
complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed authorization from the court. Indeed,
questions of title to any property apparent still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed
upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such
as the herein private complainant.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

In Valera vs. Inserto, the Supreme Court held that the RTC, acting as Probate Court,
exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the
issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant
and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced. This is issue is not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving
a mode of practice which may be waived.

However, in the case of Trinidad vs. CA, the Supreme Court held it was incumbent for
the Probate Court to first give authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots
which had previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be considered the alter ego of the
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant had been duly instructs
by the accused herein to file the proper petition or motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of
said title but said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at
anybody should be blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the
needed authorization from the court. Indeed, questions of title to any property apparent still
belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all
the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant.

To reconcile the cases, the case of Trinidad vs. CA falls under the exception. The general
rule is that the RTC, acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent. The exception is when questions of title to any property apparent still
belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all

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the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant. In Trinidad
vs. CA, the title of the property in question is already submitted to the probate court without any
objections from any of the party which is why the court instructed the complainant to first secure
authorization from the probate court.

3. Roxas vs. Pecson (82 Phils. 407) with Matias vs. Gonzales (101 Phils. 852)

In the case of Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phils. 407, Pablo Roxas died leaving properties in
Bulacan. The other respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the
deceased, filed a petition for the administration of the latter's estate, in special intestate
proceeding No. 1707 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed
special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. Later on, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de
Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her
deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated is said will.
Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate proceeding No. 170 was dismissed and ordered
closed by the court. Later, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the
appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix, and the
respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as
special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as
special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M.
Roxas.

The Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present
case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have
been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far
as the inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate inventoried should not be sufficient to pay
the dowry and the parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges and obligations of the
partnership, the provision of Title XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference
of credits shall be observed. If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the present
case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the
deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no
cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being
administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire
estate is only one.

As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer,
liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special
administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general
administrator.

In the case of Matias vs. Gonzales, 101 Phils. 852, Aurea Matias initiated said special
proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single. The heir to the entire estate of the
deceased is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix
thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her
alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent Judge,
issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate.

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 Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio
Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his
stead of Ramon Plata. Respondent Judge by an order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez
guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix
thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as
aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud
shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."

On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set aside
and that she be appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the
ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically
incapacitated to perform the duties of said office. This motion was denied in an order dated
March 10, 1956, which maintained "the appointment of the three above named persons.
However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by
reason of physical disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her place, of
Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March 21, 1956, Aurea Matias
sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956. Moreover, on March 24, 1956, she
expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the appointment, in lieu of Basilia
Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to said Aurea Matias . This motion for
reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.

According to the Supreme Court, the record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions
among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one, represented by the petitioner, and another, to
which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best
to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.

The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special
administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be
considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one
special administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix
for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent special
administrators. In the case at bar there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of
which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not
squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint
several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison vs. Clark, 52 A. 514; In
re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49; Davenport vs. Davenport, 60 A. 379). Wherefore, the
orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower court should re-hear the
matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of special administrators.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

Sec.1. Rule 80 of the Rules of court provides that there is an appointment of special
administrator when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. According to
the Supreme Court, The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the
fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being

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exposed to great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve
the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some
cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is
delayed. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor in being capable
of acting, however "Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve
estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of
creditors and heirs”/
The Supreme Court held in Roxas vs. Pecson that under the law only one general
administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased
spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer
temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. However in Matias vs. Gonzales, the record
shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one,
represented by the petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong.
The court held that inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one
special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased.

In reconciling both cases, the Supreme Court held that the rule, laid down in Roxas vs.
Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to
administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts
obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some
properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof.
Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case of Matias
vs. Gonzales, there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised
jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point.
Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special co-
administrators