1. QUINICOT V.

PEOPLE, JUNE 22, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner, through an informant, was arrested in a buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP. He was then charged with
illegal possession of shabu and illegal selling of shabu in violation of Sec. 15, Art.III of RA 6425, as amended. He was convicted by
the trial court. On appeal, petitioner asserts that there was no buy-bust operation conducted and that he was framed.
Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the non-presentation of the informant is fatal to the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-presentation of the informant is fatal to the prosecution.

HELD: NO. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable
service to the police. It is well settled rule that except when the petitioner vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there
are material inconsistencies in the testimony of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers
had motives to testify falsely against the petitioner, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending
officers’ eye-witness testimonies. There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and
adequately proved by the prosecution witnesses.

2. ANG v. CA, 20 APRIL 2010

FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act, or RA 9262. Allegedly, the
petitioner who was about to get married tried to persuade his ex-girlfriend, Irish Sagud to elope with him because he doesn’t
love the woman he is about to marry. When Irish rejected him, he started harassing and threatening her that he would spread
scandalous photos of Irish through the internet. Irish sought the help of the Vice-Mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the
police. Under police supervision, Irish set-up a meeting with petitioner at Lorentes Resort where the latter was arrested and the
Sony Ericson cell phone and SIM cards were seized from him. Petitioner was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, petitioner
questioned his conviction asserting that the cellphone and SIM cards that were seized from him was never presented in evidence
and that the obscene pictures sent through a text message constitutes an electronic evidence. Thus, it should be authenticated.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the cellphone and SIM cards are needed by the prosecution to prove its cause.

b) Whether or not petitioner’s objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture be entertained by the court.

HELD: a) No, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated items to prove that the Petitioner sent those messages.
During the trial conference, petitioner admitted owning said cellphone. Actually, though, the bulk of evidence against him
consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene pictures and malicious text messages that the sender’s numbers
belonged to petitioner with whom she had been previously communicating. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers
belonged to petitioner, Irish and the police used such number to summon him to come to Lorentes Resort and he did.

b) No. Rustan Ang is raising this objection for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected to the admission of such picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.

3. PEOPLE v. Welvin Dui and Dennis Dayaon, April 03, 2013

FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with robbery with homicide in the RTC of Pampanga for robbing the sisters Perlie and
Nely Salvador who were on their way home at 10:30 in the evening, and for stabbing to death the victim, Nely. Perlie, the
surviving victim was presented as eye-witness. She positively identified the accused-appellants and described specifically the role
each played and even identified with certainty that the knife shown to her at the police station was the very same knife used in
the stabbing of Nely. The RTC convicted the accused. The latter appealed their conviction arguing, among others, that the knife
allegedly used by them in stabbing Nely was never presented by the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-presentation of the knife is fatal

HELD: No. Presentation of the knife used is not essential to prove homicide. The fact and manner of Nely’s death were duly
established by evidence on record. Perlie saw the accused-appellants stabbed Nely with a double-edged knife that was
approximately 7 inches long. Nely was declared dead on arrival at the hospital due to multiple stab wounds.

4. PEOPLE vs. BISDA, JULY 17, 2003

FACTS: Appellants were charged and convicted in the RTC of Marikina City of kidnapping for ransom, for detaining 6 years old
Angela Soriano for the purpose of extorting money from her family. Earlier during the trial, Angela was presented as witness by
the prosecution. She was able to identify the appellants as the same people who fetched her from school, brought her to the
dirty house and detained her until she was rescued by the police. On appeal, the appellants contended that the prosecution
failed to establish that Angela understood the nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth must fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants’ objection to Angela’s competency should be entertained on appeal.

HELD: No. If the opponent believes that the witness is not aware of his obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and
consequences of telling a lie, the party may ask for leave to conduct a voire dire examination.

Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as
soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility become apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and
such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence.

In this case, there was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the part of the appellants to Angela’s competence as
witness and the prosecutor’s failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela understood her obligation and
responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants didn’t even bother
questioning the trial court for leave to conduct a voire dire examination of Angela. It was only in this court that the appellants
raised the matter for the first time. It is too late in the day for the appellants to raise the issue.

5. PEOPLE v. NARCA, JULY 21, 1997

FACTS: Defendant-appellants were charged with murder for the death of Mauro Reglos Jr. The defendants filed a motion for
bail. During the bail hearing, the victim’s wife Elizabeth Reglos, who was with the victim on that fateful night, testified on direct
examinations. Defense counsel requested the court that his cross-examination for Elizabeth be conducted on the next hearing.
However, such examination never took place because Elizabeth and her son were bludgeoned to death before the scheduled
hearing. Nevertheless, defendants were convicted by the trial court. On appeal, defendant-appellants by way of a defense argued
the testimony of Elizabeth in the bail hearings should not be given credence since she was not cross-examined.

ISSUE: Whether or not lack of cross-examination due to the death of witness necessarily render the deceased’s previous
testimony expungible.

HELD: No. Where death prevents cross- examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed
to the plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in the direct examination.

Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross- examination is the essence of the right to cross examine. Appellants
lost such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their cross-examination of Elizabeth, and they only have themselves to
blame in forever losing that right by reason of Elizabeth’s demise.

6. PEOPLE v. FABRE, 23 JULY 2002

FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the RTC, of raping his own daughter Marilou, 13 years old, and he was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death. Upon automatic review, the defense argues among others, that the testimony of appellant should
acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to cross-examine on him and to present rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure of the prosecution to cross-examine the appellant is conclusive evidence that he did not commit
the offense charged.

HELD: No. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against
whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence therefore
adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial
court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined
by the other party.

7. PEOPLE v. GUAMOS, 21 FEBUARY 1995

FACTS: Guamos was found guilty of raping Michelle, then 8 years old. On appeal, Guamos sought to discredit and exclude the
testimony of Michelle on the ground that she did not answer the questions posed to her at the cross-examination during the
trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Michelle should be discredited.

HELD: No. This failure does not detract from the admissibility of Michelle’s testimony. This appears to the Court to be a case of
failure of Michelle to answer some questions rather than an obstinate refusal to do so. In formulating those questions on cross-
examination, defense counsel obviously did not take into account that he was cross-examining a child of tender age susceptible to
confusion and probably intimidation.

It is clear, that defense counsel exercised no substantial effort to present intelligible questions to the child witness,
designed to elicit straightforward answers. The Court considered that she, in all probability, simply failed to grasp some of the
questions put to her on cross-examination. The defense had made it very difficult if not practically impossible for her to answer
those questions intelligently and truthfully.

8. DANS JR., vs. PEOPLE, 29 JANUARY 1998

FACTS: Petitioners Imelda Marcos and Ernesto Dans Jr. Were charged with a violation of RA 3019, or the Anti- Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for taking advantage of their position as Chairman and Vice-chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA), a government-owned corporation, in entering into a Lease Agreement with Philippine General Hospital
Foundation, Inc (PGHFI) a private corporation, where petitioners also serve as Chairman and Director, respectively, of its Board of
Trustees, over the two lots owned by LRTA. The monthly rent agreed upon is incredibly low which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners. On petition, the petitioners, point out that the
limitations on the right of the judges to ask during the trial were not observed by the SB. They accused Justice Garchitorena of
acting more of a prosecutor than the impartial Judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners` objection of the trial court`s active role in the examination of witnesses be entertained.

HELD: No. The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the promulgation of the questioned
judgment regarding the line of questioning by respondent court, none of them ever objected to such queries during the trial.
Neither did they attempt to salvage the situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they harbored the impression
that the court`s cross examination seriously prejudiced their case. It is now too late in the day to object the alleged leading,
misleading, and badgering questions of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask (the court) to expunge the answers thereto from
record. Needless to say, petitioners should have done so when supposed objectionable nature of questionable and or answers
were propounded or given.

9. LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING INC., vs. CA, 01 DECEMBER 1995

FACTS: Limketkai filed an action for specific performance against BPI compelling the latter to comply with the alleged Contract of
Sale entered into between Limketkai through its representative Adolfo Lim and BPI for the sale of a parcel of land held in trust by
BPI, to Limketkai. BPI denied having entered into a perfected contract of sale with Limketkai. During the trial, the documentary
evidence presented by Limketkai floundered to establish its claim of a perfected sale and despite persistent objection by the
private respondent (BPI) invoking parol evidence rule, the trial court admitted in evidence oral testimony to prove the existence
of a perfected contract of sale of real property between the parties.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the trial court violated the parol evidence rule in admitting oral testimony to establish existence of a
perfected contract of sale between the parties.

b) Whether or not the cross-examination by the private respondent`s counsel of the witnesses constitutes a waiver of
the parol evidence rule.

HELD: a) yes. Corrolarily, as the petitioner`s exhibits failed to establish perfection of a contract of sale, oral testimony cannot
take their place without violating the parol evidence rule. It was therefore irregular for the trial court to have admitted in
evidence testimony to prove the existence of a contract of sale of a real property between the parties despite persistent
objection made by private respondent`s counsels as early as the first scheduled hearing.

b) No. While said counsels cross-examined the witnesses, this, to our view, did not constitute a waiver of the parol
evidence rule.

The rulings in Talosig v. Vda. De Nieba, and Abrenica v. Gonda and de Gracia cited by the Court in its initial decisions,
which ruled to the effect that an objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, i.e., ``xxx at
the time question is asked, `` and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived, do not apply as these two cases
involved facts different from the case at bench. More importantly, here, the direct testimonies of the witnesses were presented in
``affidavit-form`` where prompt objection to inadmissible evidence is hardly possible, whereas the direct testimonies in these
cited cases were delivered orally in open court. The best that the counsels could have done, and which they did, under the
circumstances was to preface the cross-examination with objection.

10. PEOPLE vs. De GUZMAN, 2 December 1996

FACTS: de Guzman was charged and convicted of rape by the RTC for raping Gilda Ambray, 32 years old and a mother of two
children. Earlier during the cross examination, Gilda testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination, she said that
she was raped three times. On appeal, de Guzman argues that Gilda’s testimonies deserve scant consideration for being
inconsistent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of Gilda constitutes inconsistencies.

HELD: NO. The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by
affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent
contradiction or inconsistency in his statements and opportunity which is ordinarily afforded him during cross-examination. The
re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of correcting a possible misrepresentation of
testimony.
 While it may be true that on cross-examination Gilda testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination
she said that she was raped thrice, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal
qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda’s answers were conclusions of law.

11. PEOPLE v. VELASCO 28 May 1999

FACTS: Velasco, along with two others, were charged with murder for stabbing to death one Danilo Valencia. Leonardo Lucaban,
the sole witness to the crime, positively identified the accused in his Supplemental Statement. However, when he first testified in
court, he averred that “he cannot remember his (referring to the person who stabbed the victim) face because it was dark.”
When Lucaban was recalled to the witness stand, three days thereafter, again he positively identified Velasco as the person who
stabbed the victim. The trial court acquitted the two other accused while convicted Velasco. On appeal, the defense attacks the
credibility of Lucaban due to the inconsistencies in his testimonies.

ISSUE: Whether or not discrepancies between sworn written statements or affidavits and testimonies made at witness stand
discredit the witness.

HELD: No. We do not deem the deficiencies made by deficiencies made by Lucaban in his testimonies so material as to put the
trustworthiness of said witness open to serious doubt. Minor inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence as a whole.

Moreover, discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit the witness.

12. PEOPLE vs. PEREZ, 5 FEB. 2003

FACTS: Perez was charged and convicted of rape by the RTC for raping 6 years old Mayia Ponesca, and was imposed on him the
death penalty. Upon automatic review, appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular.
Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor
asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after
the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done in a police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether or not leading questions are allowed when the witness is a child of tender years.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rule provides for exceptions when the witness is a child of
tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary
to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia
as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.

“Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same shall further the interest of Justice”

13. PEOPLE vs. LEGAZPI, 17 FEB 2003

FACTS: Legaspi was charged and convicted of rape by the RTC of Tarlac for raping 6 years old Cristina Castaneda. On automatic
review by the Court, accused-appellant submitted that the predisposition of the trial court to convict him was shown by the fact
that it asked and allowed the prosecution to ask the victim leading questions without first showing that there was difficulty in
getting direct and intelligible answers from her because of tender age.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prior proof of difficulty in eliciting intelligible answers from the child witness is required before leading
question be allowed.

HELD: NO. No prior proof of difficulty in eliciting intelligible answers from the child is required in order to allow leading questions. It
is sufficient that the witness is shown to be a child of tender years as on Cristina’s case.

14. PEOPLE vs. ANDRADA

FACTS: Appellant Teresita Andrada was arrested for allegedly selling “shabu” to Benito Villanueva after an informant tipped off
the police that a driver of a tricycle was about to buy shabu from Teresita.

During the trial, the prosecution presented Villanueva, who was also charged in separate information, as witness to
elicit from him the identity of the person who delivered the drugs to him. However, said witness when asked, did not name
appellant and even denied that appellant delivered anything to him. Such testimony devastated the case of the People of the
Philippines. The prosecution then sought to impeach Villanueva as the prosecution witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution is bound by Villanueva’s testimony.

HELD: YES. In impeaching Villanueva as prosecution witness, the Prosecution failed to show that Villanueva was declared by the
trial court as hostile witness as required in Sec. 12 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence. Neither was it shown by the prosecution
that Villanueva had an adverse interest in the case or was unjustifiably reluctant to testify, or had misled the prosecution into
calling him to the witness stand. Hence, Villanueva cannot be considered as a hostile witness and the prosecution is bound by his
testimony that nothing was delivered to him by the appellant.

Wherefore, appellant is acquitted of the crime charged.

15. PEOPLE vs. CASTILLANO, Sr., 1 APRIL 2003

FACTS: Accused Jaime Castillano, Sr., Ronald Castillano and Jaime Castillano Jr., were charged with murder for the killing of
Diosdado Volante. On trial, the prosecution presented Luz, the victim’s wife as the sole eye witness to the crime. Ronald and
Jaime Jr. Were convicted by the trial court while Jaime Sr., was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. On appeal, appellants
sought to impeach Luz as a witness by reason of her inconsistencies in her testimonies during the preliminary examination before
the MTC and her sworn written statement given to the police investigators.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inconsistencies in Luz’ testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn written statement
enough ground to impeach her as a witness.

HELD: No. Luz, the principal witness for the prosecution cannot be impeached for the reason that the transcripts and sworn
statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover,
the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn written statement to the
police investigators. Luz, was not, therefore, accorded the chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Sec.
13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.

16. PEOPLE vs. PLASENCIA, 7 Nov. 1995

FACTS: Accused-appellants Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joselito Descartin were charged of robbery with homicide
for killing Herminio Mansueto by stabbing, hacking and dumoing his body into the sea and taking the victim’s bicycle. The
prosecution presented Francisca Espina as the sole witness. The accused were all found guilty of murder by the trial court. On
appeal, the accused-appellants attack the credibility of Francesca because of her alleged inconsistencies, and that while
testifying, she was at times seen reading some notes written on her left palm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is proscribed.

HELD: NO. Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states that:

Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum – A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by
anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or
at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-
examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he
retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when
made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that
discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like basis.

17. CANQUE vs. CA, 13 APRIL 1999

FACTS: Rosario Canque is a contractor operating under the name of RDC Construction. Canque had contracts with the
government and in relation to this projects, she entered two contracts with SOCOR Construction Corporation for supplying as
well as applying certain materials in the construction sites. When SOCOR billed Canque, the latter refused to pay the amount
stated in the bill claiming that SOCOR failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items
and the acceptance thereof by the government. This led to a complaint filed by SOCOR to collect from Canque. During the trial,
SOCOR presented its bookkeeper Dolores Aday who testified on the entries she made in the SOCOR’s Book of Collectible
Accounts. TC ruled in favor of SOCOR. The CA affirms in reliance to the SOCOR’s Book of Collectible Accounts on the basis of
Sec.14, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the admissibility of the Book of Collectible Accounts considering that Aday who made
said entries actually testified but had no personal knowledge of said entries, thus, hearsay. SOCOR on the other hand contended
that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, section
16 of the Rules of Evidence. Petitioner countered that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered
cannot be admitted for another purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Book of Collectible Accounts by SOCOR can be offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 16 of the
Rules of Evidence.

HELD: NO. It shall be considered as a memorandum which purpose is to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as witness. It does
not itself constitute evidence.

As the entries in question were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate Aday’s testimony
that she made the entries as she received the bills.

The court nonetheless affirms CA’s ruling not based on the Book of Collectible Accounts but on other evidence by the
private respondent.

18. PEOPLE vs. KEMPIS, 10 MAY 1993

FACTS: Teofilo Kempis was charged with murder for killing Lolito Rivero. During the trial, the prosecution presented Rosalia
Adonis, victim’s sister, and Carmen Navarro, the victim’s guest who was at the latter’s house when the killing took place. All the
prosecution witnesses testified that the killing of the victim took place on Sept. 15, 1988. The accused interposed self-defense. To
destroy the credibility of the witnesses as to their testimony that the incident occurred on Sept.15, the defense presented as
documentary evidence the Investigation Report of the Office of the Regional Inspector offering in evidence Entries No. 904 and
905 (Exhibit 1). Entry 904 states that the accused reported to the police that he shot Lolito Rivero to death on Sept. 16, 1988.
Entry No. 905 states that one Corazon de Paz (prosecution witness) came to report on Sept.16 about the killing of Rivero.

The trial court in bolstering its conclusion that the killing took place on September 15, aside from relying on the
prosecution witnesses’ testimony it also considered other portions of the Investigation Report (referring to the blotter reports
made by prosecution witnesses, which reports were also entered in said Report.) The trial court found Kempis guilty of murder.

On appeal, the defense imputes among others upon the lower court the commission of error in taking into
consideration that portion of the Investigation Report which is not included in “Exhibit 1”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed an error in considering other portions of the Investigation Report when only
“Exhibit 1” is offered in evidence.

HELD: Yes. Section 17, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Section 17. When part of an act, declaration or conversation, writing or records is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same object maybe inquired into by the other, and when detached act, declaration, writing or records is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

Thus, in order that the rest of the Investigation Report may have been considered by the trial court, the prosecution
should have offered the same in evidence or moved that the entire document be received in evidence.

The conviction of the appellant is nonetheless affirmed based on other evidence.