PASEI v. Drilon U.S. v.

Pompeya
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J. G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
o police power of the state

o "general welfare" clause

FACTS:
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
ordinance.
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with
Hence, this appeal.
the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power. W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights
therein guaranteed
RULING:
HELD:
“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all- which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55,
comprehensive embrace. as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace
and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be
is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise,
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and
equally to all members of the same class. good government?
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system,
substantial distinctions.
the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the
police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are
constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

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Is there a cause of action?
The complaint is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he
was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions
existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in
the law.
"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered."
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
FACTS:The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody
of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such
as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites
which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in
a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio: “The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter
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on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."
CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO
127980
Facts: On August 12, 1992, respondents United  Harbour Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 which limits the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. On December 23,
1992, the office of the president issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. On March 17, 1993, the Office of the president, through then
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted
the restraining order issued earlier. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court
Issue: WON PPA-AO-04-92 validly exercises due process of law
HELD: It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security
knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would
have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental
or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR 133640 25
November 2005
Facts: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people
is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the
State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily
or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994.
The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15,
1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on
August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks
shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a
maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
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extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend
shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public
safety.”
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the
Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.”
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed
physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for
certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Issue: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clause.
Decision: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and
valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating
against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of
public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a
situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and
commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following
reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian
reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly
encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Second, the
classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of
the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a
commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who
are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on
the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the general application of the
law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it
intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood
banks without exception. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The
health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.
Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order
to promote and preserve public health and safety. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to over overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues
being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
Lupangco vs CA Case Digest
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC
a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that
an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each
and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
El Banco Español-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca
Judicial Due Process Requisites
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Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt
amounted to P218, 294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of
Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property.
Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non-resident El
Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to
Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of
the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been
met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide
the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines
Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s
house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The
counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While
the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from
Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable
cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that
Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory
questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due
to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The
standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality
by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower
court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Javier vs COMELEC
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of ”massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the
2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate
until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers
was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor
General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s
death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in
his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
Facts:Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a
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week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena,
with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was
made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s
check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB
Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to
the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received.
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s
check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena
requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in
the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt
for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30, 1986.
Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large.
One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the
Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
Held: Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena
acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office
of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land.
It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is
patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the
urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that
the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic
of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as
an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional
basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.
G.R. No. 115147 January 4, 1995
GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
This petition for certiorari assails the resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of respondent Civil
Service Commission ("CSC") relative to an administrative case, entitled "Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well as its resolution, dated 03 March 1994, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the
Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner
was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President with having committed the following
offenses:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties
or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in
the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other
persons;
(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;
(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil
Service Rules and regulations;
(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.1
Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if
he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently
received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP.
From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the
amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as
additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another
trip to Hongkong.
Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior
authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the
President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various
companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances
approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing
Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19
February 1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the
bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of
the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in
Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.
On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which
held.2
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby modified that respondent-
appellant George I. Rivera is considered guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Considering that this is his first offense on record, the penalty of Forced
Resignation without separation benefits and gratuities to which he may be otherwise be entitled
under the laws is reduced to one (1) year
suspension.3
6|Page
The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its
resolution,4 promulgated on 08 June 1992, the MSPB denied the motion.
Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-1189,5 the CSC resolved
only the appeal of Rivera (rejecting that of the LBP pursuant to the rule laid down by his Court
in Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission [215 SCRA 398]). The resolution, in part, read:
The Commission is inclined to sustain the original decision of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Committing an act punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is
considered a Grave Misconduct. It is a wanton and/or blatant violation of law. As an officer of the
Bank, respondent Rivera should know better that it was illegal and improper for him to accept
regular monthly allowances from a private firm which is a client of his Bank. More so, that such
act is prohibited and punishable under Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal
of Respondent George Rivera. Moreover, the Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct
for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Accordingly, the MSPB
decision is hereby set aside.6
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276.7
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital
penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.
On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently
show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting
that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her
capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion
for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. The Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994,
resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment
thereon.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, dated 15 September 1994, sided with
petitioner and suggested that the CSC be given an opportunity to submit its own comment. CSC
did in due time.
This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial issue.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals,8 the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that
the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down
while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
administrative justice," the Court said:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,
then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view
since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave
over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its chairman,
had earlier "concurred."9
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde
to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to
give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that
Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is
unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's
resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990.
WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to
respondent Civil Service Commission for the resolution, sans the participation of Commissioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, of herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 93-
1189. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest
Facts:
1. Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister
and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May
17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land
in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and
Filomena Bernardo.
2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P.
Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her
share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and
was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands
therefor.
3. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service,
he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996,
where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February
2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that
petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation
program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. ]
4. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default
and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set aside judgement
at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the property was
sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement
alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by
7|Page
Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which
was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner
NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons
on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to
defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
1. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when
the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.
2. The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
3. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of
summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds
4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that
petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of
suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by
the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of
a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the
case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for
its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by
the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming
the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue
more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due
process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due
to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was
flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to
its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between
facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal offense
cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626
which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it
complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought
has a gap.
8|Page
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not
juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method
toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense
and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
UNICRAFT INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, ROBERT DINO, CRISTINA
DINO and MICHAEL LLOYD DINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FLORANTE V. CALIPAY, DANILO ABARAO, ROGIETO
ABARAO, BENJAMIN AVENTURADO, BENIGNO BELARMINO, FELIX BRAZIL, RENATO
BRIONES, RECCIL ELCANA, ROLAND GERON, RICKY GIMENA, ROMEO INOC, NILIA
MANDAWE, ANTONIO MANGABON, AMELITO MONTELIN, MATIAS ONGOS, ARTURO
ORTEGA, ADRIANO PALO, JR., BERNARDO RAMOS, WILMA RANILE, EDGAR RIVERA,
RAFAEL RONDINA, ANILO ROSALES, DIVINA ROSALES, ALONA SORTOES, VINCH
TRUZ, WILSON VILLARTA, EMETERIO YBAS, ROMEO ABARAO, WILFREDO ABARAO,
EUGENIO ABING, JAIME AGUSTIN, RUBEN RONDINA, LORENA SORTOES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals [1] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 43763, dated June 18, 1998 and July 31, 1998.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner Unicraft Industries International Corporation is a domestic corporation with principal
office at Apao, Mandaue City. Private respondents were employees of petitioner corporation for
at least over a year, performing work necessary and desirable to the business operation of
petitioner corporation. When it expanded its business operations, petitioner corporation opened
a branch in Lapulapu City and transferred private respondents from the Mandaue office to the
Lapulapu City branch. It appears that petitioner corporation failed to comply with some legal
requirements for its business operations in Lapulapu City. Thus, on July 3, 1995, the city
government of Lapulapu ordered the closure of petitioners business due to lack of business and
building permit. Consequently, petitioner corporation effected the mass dismissal of private
respondents eight (8) days after their transfer to the Lapulapu City branch. Hence, the thirty-two
private respondents herein filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City, their individual and separate complaints (consolidated as
NLRC Case No. RAB-VII 07-0705-95) for illegal dismissal, underpayment/non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave. Named
respondents were petitioner corporation, Robert Dino, Michael Lloyd Dino, and Cristina Dino, as
owners/president/managers of the corporation.
Private respondents, complainants in the labor case, contended that petitioners dismissed them
because of their union activities. Petitioners, on the other hand, countered that private
respondents were not illegally dismissed and argued that the closure of the branch office was
effected by virtue of a lawful order of the city government of Lapulapu. Moreover, petitioners
alleged that they offered to pay separation pay to the private respondents who, in fact, have
already executed quitclaims in favor of petitioner corporation. After a summary trial, the case
was submitted for decision on February 14, 1996.
On December 19, 1996, pursuant to Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of Labor, dated
April 6, 1996, and by virtue of the agreement of the parties, the case was submitted for voluntary
arbitration to Florante V. Calipay, the voluntary arbitrator chosen by the petitioners and private
respondents.[2]
On January 9, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for re-selection of voluntary arbitrator. In its order
dated January 21, 1997, the voluntary arbitrator denied petitioners motion and defined the
issues to be resolved in the arbitration proceedings, thus:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers and duties vested upon me as the selected voluntary
arbitrator, I hereby order both parties to submit their respective position papers and evidence,
within fifteen (15) days from today, treating the following issues:
a) whether or not the voluntary arbitrator had been validly selected by the parties and/or whether
the same arbitrator had validly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
b) whether or not the complaining workers were legally dismissed. If not, what are their rights
and remedies under the law?
Failure of any party to submit their position paper and/or evidence within the set period would be
tantamount to waiver of such party to present the same. The case shall then be considered
submitted for immediate resolution based on what would thus far be submitted.[3]
On March 15, 1997, for failure of petitioners and their counsel to appear and present evidence at
the hearing on March 3, 1997, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of private
respondents on the basis of the position papers submitted in the voluntary arbitration
proceedings as well as the documents and pleadings submitted in NLRC Case No. RAB-VII 07-
0705-95 before the NLRC RAB VII, Cebu City. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainants,
to wit:
a) The dismissal of the complainants are (sic) hereby declared illegal. The respondents are
ordered to pay the complainants back wages from the date of termination until the date (sic)
promulgation of this judgment (15 March 1997).
b) The respondents are further ordered, in view of imputations of bad faith and the strained
relations of the parties, to pay the complainants separation pay at one (1) month pay for every
year of service from the first day of service until the date of promulgation of this judgment on 15
March 1997, less the amounts the complainants acknowledged to have received before officials
at the Department of Labor and Employment Region VII, Cebu City. The total separation pay is
9|Page
SIX HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P611,769.50).
c) The respondents are also declared guilty for violating labor standard law and are hereby
ordered to pay the complainants money claims for differentials in wage and other benefits in the
amount of FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
SIXTY NINE PESOS AND FORTY CENTAVOS (P4,857,869.40).
d) The claims for moral damages are DISMISSED for lack of convincing evidence.
e) The respondents are ordered to pay Attorneys Fees in the amount equivalent to ten (10)
percent of the total award or the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND EIGHTY NINE CENTAVOS (P546,963.89). Litigation
costs of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) is likewise awarded to the complainants.
In Summation
Judgment is rendered in favor of the complainants awarding them SIX MILLION TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWO PESOS AND SEVENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P6,026,602.79)
divided as follows:
a) Total Separation Pay -------------------- P 611,796.50
b) Total Money claims ------------------------- P 4,857, 869.40
Sub-total ------ P 5,469, 638.90
c) Attorneys Fees (10% of sub-total) --------- P 546,963.89
d) Litigation Costs -------------------------------- P 10,000.00
---------------------
TOTAL P 6,026, 602.79
The respondents are therefore mandated to comply with this judgment.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that they were
denied opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before the voluntary arbitrator.
On April 22, 1997, the Court of Appeals approved a stipulation of the parties to remand the case
to the voluntary arbitrator so that the petitioners will be granted their day in court to prove their
case. The stipulation recites:
STIPULATION
PARTIES, through their respective counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
stipulate:
1. Both parties desire to put an end to the litigation before this Honorable Court, and instead
refer the above-entitled case back to Voluntary Arbitrator Florante V. Calipay for further hearing
under the following terms and conditions:
a) The petitioners will put up a bond in the amount of P6.5 Million to be issued by the Visayan
Surety & Insurance Company or any other accredited bonding company acceptable to private
respondents to secure payment of the decision dated March 15, 1997 (Annex A of the Petition)
rendered by Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay.
b) The case will be referred back to Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay so that the petitioners will be
granted their day in court to prove their case, the hearing thereat to treat the following issues:
1. Whether or not the complainants mentioned in Exhibit J of the Decision really filed their
complaints before the NLRC;
2. Whether or not complainants were dismissed; if so, whether or not their dismissals were valid;
3. Whether or not complainants are entitled to separation pay, money claims, attorneys fees and
litigation costs specified in the decision, Annex A of the petition; and
4. Whether or not Robert Dino, Cristina Dino and Michael Dino can be held liable for the claims
of complainants.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to
approve the foregoing Stipulation and to render a resolution in accordance therewith. [5]
Instead of conducting further proceedings, however, the voluntary arbitrator filed a comment
praying, inter alia, that he be declared to have lost jurisdiction over the case upon rendition of
the judgment.[6]
On June 18, 1998, upon motion of private respondents, the Court of Appeals re-examined the
stipulation of the parties and thereafter rendered the assailed resolution allowing, among others,
the partial execution of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator with respect to the award of
separation pay and attorneys fees. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, pending decision on all other issues and solely to alleviate the needs of
complainants who complain that they are starving:
1. The IMMEDIATE EXECUTION, pending this petition, of the award of P611,769.50 as total
separation pay plus ten (10%) percent of said amount as attorneys fees is hereby ALLOWED
and AUTHORIZED.
2. The voluntary arbitrator Mr. Florante Villanueva Calipay, is ordered to elevate to this Court
within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution, all payrolls, pleadings, evidence and position
papers submitted in support of the Money Claims, together with the computation made by
him. Exhibits K to K-5;
10 | P a g e
3. In order to help this Court determine the necessity of remanding the award for money claims
for further hearing or whether the award could be affirmed on the basis of the payrolls,
pleadings, evidence and position papers submitted in support of the award, parties are required
to file their respective comment on the award within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
resolution; and
4. Within the same period of fifteen (15) days, parties are required to submit their comment on
the issue of whether petitioners Michael Dino, Robert Dino and Cristina Dino could be held liable
for the claims of complainants and whether complainants are entitled to litigation expenses apart
from the ten (10%) percent attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied by the Court of Appeals on
July 31, 1998. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS AWARD
FOR SEPARATION PAY NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE FORMER, AS CAN READILY BE
GLEANED FROM THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS, DID NOT HAVE IN ITS POSSESSION
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE SUBMITTED TO IT FOR REVIEW.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD
OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN
CONCEDED THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS DURING THE
ARBITRATION STAGE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THERE IS A VALID AND SUBSISTING APPROVED
STIPULATION WHICH HAS THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT BY COMPROMISE.
More specifically, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the award of separation pay in favor of private respondent workers,
considering that the respondent court was not in possession of the records and evidence that
would support its ruling.[8]
It is at once clear from the records that petitioners were not able to present evidence before the
Voluntary Arbitrator. This is plainly evident from the Stipulation entered into by the parties and
submitted to the Court of Appeals, which pertinently states:
b) The case will be referred back to Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay so that petitioners will be
granted their day in court to prove their case, the hearing thereat to treat the following issues:
1. Whether or not the complainants mentioned in Exhibit J of the Decision really filed their
complaints before the NLRC;
2. Whether or not complainants were dismissed; if so, whether or not their dismissals were valid;
3. Whether or not complainants are entitled to separation pay, money claims, attorneys fees and
litigation costs specified in the decision, Annex A of the petition; amd
4. Whether or not Robert Dino, Cristina Dino and Michael Dino can be held liable for the claims
of complainants.
The foregoing is an acknowledgment by both parties that the proceedings before the Voluntary
Arbitrator have not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
resolution ordering the immediate execution of the award of separation pay and attorneys
fees. Prior to that, Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay filed a comment contending that he had lost
jurisdiction over the case after he rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of voluntary
arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may still be subject to review, such as here where
there was a violation of petitioners right to due process and to be heard.
Inspite of statutory provisions making final the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we
have taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave
abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantive justice, or erroneous
interpretation of the law where brought to our attention.[9]
Petitioners decry the Voluntary Arbitrators rendition of judgment against petitioners, after the
latter failed to appear at the hearing scheduled on March 3, 1997 at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon. Subsequently, however, in a motion for the calling of another hearing, which was
denied, petitioners manifested to the Voluntary Arbitrator that the reason why they failed to
appear on March 3, 1997 was because they received notice of the said hearing only at 4:00
oclock in the afternoon of that day. Indeed, this omission to afford petitioners a chance to
present evidence on their behalf is a clear violation of a partys constitutional right and has the
effect of rendering its judgment null and void. It is a cardinal rule in law that a decision or
judgment is fatally defective if rendered in violation of a party-litigants right to due process.[10]
The right of due process is fundamental in our legal system and we adhere to this principle not
for reasons of convenience or merely to comply with technical formalities but because of a
strong conviction that every man must have his day in court.
In its most basic sense, the right to due process is simply that every man is accorded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Its very concept contemplates freedom from arbitrariness,
as what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors all attempts to make an accusation
synonymous with liability.[11]
The right to be heard is among the so-called cardinal primary rights which should be observed
and respected in administrative adjudications in order to comply with the imperatives of due
process.[12] These cardinal primary rights are:
(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
11 | P a g e
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) The evidence must be substantial.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.[13]
Even the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, in Rule VI,
Section 6 thereof, explicitly mandates voluntary arbitrators to observe the requirements of
procedural due process:
Section 6. Arbitration Hearing. --- In the conduct of hearing, the arbitrator shall provide the
parties adequate opportunities to be heard. He shall control the proceedings and see to it
that proper decorum is observed. He must render a ruling of the issue/s raised in the course of
the proceedings. He must treat all significant aspects of the proceedings as confidential in nature
unless confidentiality is waived by the parties. (emphasis provided)
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to restate our previous reminder to labor tribunals in the
weighing of the rights and interest of employers and employees, viz:
While the intendment of our laws is to favor the employee, it in no way implies that the employer
is not entitled to due process. For a tribunal such as the NLRC to wantonly disregard the
employers constitutional right to be heard is a matter that cause great concern to the
Court. Such an action can only result in public mistrust of our entire legal system, and we
strongly remind the NLRC of their duty to uphold an inspire confidence in the same.[14]
It bears stressing that the award of separation pay carries with it the inevitable conclusion that
complainants were illegally dismissed. That finding of the Voluntary Arbitrator, however, was
premature and null and void for the reasons above-stated. Therefore, there is a need to remand
the case to the Voluntary Arbitrator, as originally stipulated by the parties, to allow petitioners to
present evidence in their behalf.
The Court of Appeals, thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ordered the immediate execution of the Voluntary Arbitrators award of separation pay
and attorneys fees, notwithstanding that the same was null and void for violation of petitioners
right to due process of law.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
June 18, 1998 and July 31, 1998 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Voluntary
Arbitrator Florante V. Calipay dated March 15, 1987 is likewise ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay, who is DIRECTED to receive
evidence for the petitioners and conduct further proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
LUIS REGONDOLA, MANUELIT GATALAN, ORESCA AGAPITO, NOEL
ALBADBAD, ROGELIO PINTUAN, DANILO CRISOSTOMO, ROMULO MACALINAO,
NESTOR FERER, RICKY CUESTA, ROLLY ANDRADA, LARRY ROGOLA, FRANCISCO
LENOGON, AUGUSTO QUINTO, ARFE BERAMO, BONIFACIO TRINIDAD,
ALFREDO ASCARRAGA, ERNESTO MAGNO, HONORARIO HORTECIO, NELBERT
PINEDA, GLEN ESTIPULAR, FRANCISCO COMPUESTO, ISABELITO CORTEZ, MATURAN
ROSAURO, SAMSON CANAS, FEBIEN ISIP, JESUS RIPARIP, ALFREDO SIENES, ADOLAR
ALBERT, HONESTO CABANILLAS, AMPING CASTILLO and ELWIN
REVILLA, respondents.
For review on certiorari is the Resolution,[1] dated December 29, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55416, which dismissed outright the petition for certiorari of Mariveles Shipyard
Corp., due to a defective certificate of non-forum shopping and non-submission of the required
documents to accompany said petition. Mariveles Shipyard Corp., had filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to nullify the resolution[2] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), dated April 22, 1999, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, which
affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision,[3] dated May 22, 1998, holding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., for the
underpayment of wages and overtime pay due to the private respondents. Likewise challenged
in the instant petition is the resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals, dated July 12, 2000, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:
Sometime on October 1993, petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of
Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter, Longest Force) to render
security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its
security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest
Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the services
being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its
contract with Longest Force on April 1995.[5] Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment
of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners shipyard.
On September 2, 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against
both Longest Force and petitioner, before the Labor Arbiter. Docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-09-005440-96-A, the case sought the guards reinstatement with full backwages and without
loss of seniority rights.
12 | P a g e
For its part, Longest Force filed a cross-claim[6] against the petitioner. Longest Force admitted Jan. 1-Apr. 7,220.00 5,810 1,410.00 5,597.70
that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the premises of
petitioner from October 16, 1993 to April 30, 1995, rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the
29/95 (3.97 mos.)
said period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential
in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner alleging that the service
fee paid by the latter to it was way below the PNPSOSIA and PADPAO rate, thus, contrary to TOTAL UNDERPAYMENTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P23,792.70
the mandatory and prohibitive laws because the right to proper compensation and benefits
provided under the existing labor laws cannot be waived nor compromised.
OVERTIME:

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no
Oct. 16-Dec. 15/93 P5,485 x 2 = P 5,485.00
employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out
that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had
already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be (2 mos.) 2
dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest Force had benefited from the
contract, it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the ground that it had made a
bad deal. Dec. 16/93-Mar. 6,630 x 3.5 = 11,602.50

On May 22, 1998, the Labor Arbiter decided NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, to wit: 31/94 (3.5 mos.) 2

WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Apr. 1-Dec. 7,090 x 9 = 31,905.00
respondents as follows:
31/94 (9 mos.) 2
1. DECLARING respondents Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. and Mariveles
Shipyard Corporation jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of complainants Jan. 1-Apr. 7,220 x 3.97 = 14,331.70
representing underpayment of wages and overtime pay in the total amount of P2,700,623.40
based on the PADPAO rates of pay covering the period from October 16, 1993 up to April 29,
1995 broken down as follows: 29/95 (3.97 mos.) 2

UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES: TOTAL OVERTIME- - - - - - - - - P63,324.20

PERIOD MONTHLY Sub-Total of Underpayments and Overtime P87,116.90

COVERED PADPAO ACTUAL UNDERPAYMENT 1. Luis Regondula (the same) P 87,116.90

RATES SALARY FOR THE Wage 2. Manolito Catalan (the same) 87,116.90

(8 hrs. duty) RECEIVED PERIOD DIFFERENTIALS 3. Oresca Agapito (the same) 87,116.90

Oct. 16-Dec. P5,485.00 P5,000 P 485.00 P970.00 4. Noel Alibadbad (the same) 87,116.90

15/93 (2 mos.) 5. Rogelio Pintuan (the same) 87,116.90

Dec. 16/93-Mar. 6,630.00 5,000 1,630.00 5,705.00 6. Danilo Crisostomo (the same) 87,116.90

31/94 (3.5 mos.) 7. Romulo Macalinao (the same) 87,116.90

Apr. 1-Dec. 7,090.00 5,810 1,280.00 11,520.00 8. Nestor Ferrer (the same) 87,116.90

31/94 (9 mos.) 9. Ricky Cuesta (the same) 87,116.90

13 | P a g e
10. Andrada Ricky (the same) 87,116.90 2. DECLARING both respondents liable to pay complainants attorneys fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total award recovered or the sum of P270,062.34.
11. Larry Rogola (the same) 87,116.90
3. ORDERING respondent Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. to reinstate all
the herein complainants to their former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and
12. Francisco Lenogon (the same) 87,116.90
privileges with full backwages which as computed as of the date of this decision are as follows:

13. Augosto Quinto (the same) 87,116.90

Backwages:

14. Arfe Beramo (the same) 87,116.90

10/16 12/15/93 =2 mos.

15. Bonifacio Trinidad (the same) 87,116.90

P 5,485.00 x 2 mos. = P 10,970.00

16. Alfredo Azcarraga (the same) 87,116.90

12/16/93 3/31/94=3.5 mos.

17. Ernesto Magno (the same) 87,116.90

P 6,630.00 x 3.5 mos. = 23,205.00

18. Honario Hortecio (the same) 87,116.90

4/1 12/31/94 = 9 mos.

19. Nelbert Pineda (the same) 87,116.90

P 7,090.00 x 9 mos. = 63,810.00

20. Glen Estipular (the same) 87,116.90

1/1 4/29/95 = 3.97 mos.

21. Francisco Compuesto (the same) 87,116.90

P 7,220.00 x 3.97 mos. = 28,663.40

22. Isabelito Cortes (the same) 87,116.90

TOTAL P 126,684.40[7]

23. Maturan Rosauro (the same) 87,116.90

1. Luis Regondula (same) P 126,684.40[8]

24. Samson Canas (the same) 87,116.90

2. Manolito Catalan (same) 126,684.40

25. Febien Isip (the same) 87,116.90

3. Oresca Agapito (same) 126,684.40

26. Jesus Riparip (the same) 87,116.90

4. Noel Alibadbad (same) 126,684.40

27. Alfredo Sienes (the same) 87,116.90

5. Rogelio Pintuan (same) 126,684.40

28. Adolar Albert (the same) 87,116.90

6. Danilo Crisostomo (same) 126,684.40

29. Cabanillas Honesto (the same) 87,116.90

7. Romulo Macalinao (same) 126,684.40

30. Castillo Amping (the same) 87,116.90

8. Nestor Ferrer (same) 126,684.40

31. Revilla Elwin (the same) 87,116.90

9. Ricky Cuesta (same) 126,684.40

GRAND TOTAL P 2,700,623.90

10. Andrada Rolly (same) 126,684.40

14 | P a g e
11. Larry Rogola (same) 126,684.40 5. DISMISSING all other claims for lack of legal basis.

12. Francisco Lenogon (same) 126,684.40 SO ORDERED.[11]

13. Augosto Quinto (same) 126,684.40 Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A. The
labor tribunal, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC.
14. Arfe Beramo (same) 126,684.40

The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for
15. Bonifacio Trinidad (same) 126,684.40
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 55416. The Court of Appeals, however, denied due course to the petition and
16. Alfredo Azcarraga (same) 126,684.40 dismissed it outright for the following reasons:

17. Ernesto Magno (same) 126,684.40 1. The verification and certification on non-forum shopping is signed not by duly authorized
officer of petitioner corporation, but by counsel (Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
18. Honario Hortecio (same) 126,684.40

2. The petition is unaccompanied by copies of relevant and pertinent documents, particularly the
19. Nelbert Pineda (same) 126,684.40 motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC (Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).[12]
20. Glen Estipular (same) 126,684.40
The petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The appellate court
21. Francisco Compuesto (same) 126,684.40 denied the motion, pointing out that under prevailing case law subsequent compliance with
formal requirements for filing a petition as prescribed by the Rules, does not ipso facto warrant a
reconsideration. In any event, it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC to
22. Isabelito Cortes (same) 126,684.40 grant the writ of certiorari.

23. Maturan Rosauro (same) 126,684.40 Hence, this present petition before us. Petitioner submits that THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED:
24. Samson Canas (same) 126,684.40
1. .IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
25. Febien Isip (same) 126,684.40 DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1, RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
26. Jesus Riparip (same) 126,684.40
2. .IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
27. Alfredo Sienes (same) 126,684.40
3. .IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
THAT LONGEST FORCE AND PETITIONER ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
28. Adolar Albert (same) 126,684.40 PAYMENT OF WAGES AND OVERTIME PAY DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT
PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY PAID THE SECURITY SERVICES THAT WAS RENDERED BY
29. Cabanillas Honesto (same) 126,684.40 PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

30. Castillo Amping (same) 126,684.40 4. WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT ONLY LONGEST FORCE SHOULD BE SOLELY AND
ULTIMATELY LIABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.[13]
31. Revilla Elwin (same) 126,684.40
We find the issues for our resolution to be: (1) Was it error for the Court of Appeals to sustain its
[9]
order of dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari, notwithstanding subsequent
GRAND TOTAL P3,927,216.40 compliance with the requirements under the Rules of Court by the petitioner? (2) Did the
appellate court err in not holding that petitioner was denied due process of law by the NLRC?
4. ORDERING said Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. to pay attorneys fees and (3) Did the appellate court grievously err in finding petitioner jointly and severally liable with
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award recovered representing backwages in the Longest Force for the payment of wage differentials and overtime pay owing to the private
amount of P392,721.64.[10] respondents?

15 | P a g e
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 observed that: (1)
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not signed by any duly authorized
officer of petitioner but merely by petitioners counsel; and (2) the petition was not accompanied
by a copy of motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC, thus violating Section 1,[14] Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, a dismissal was proper under Section 3, [15] Rule 46 of the
Rules.
In assailing the appellate courts ruling, the petitioner appeals to our sense of compassion and
kind consideration. It submits that the certification signed by its counsel and attached to its
petition filed with the Court of Appeals is substantial compliance with the requirement. Moreover,
petitioner calls our attention to the fact that when it filed its motion for reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals, a joint verification and certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by its
Personnel Manager[16] and a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration[17] filed before the NLRC
were attached therein. Thus, petitioner prays that we take a liberal stance to promote the ends of
justice.
Petitioners plea for liberality, however, cannot be granted by the Court for reasons herein
elucidated.
It is settled that the requirement in the Rules that the certification of non-forum shopping should
be executed and signed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot sign said
certification unless clothed with special authority to do so.[18] The reason for this is that the
plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed
involving the same case or substantially the same issues.Hence, a certification signed by
counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. [19] In the
case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping. However, in the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing may be
performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the
simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally do the task
themselves.[20] In this case, not only was the originally appended certification signed by counsel,
but in its motion for reconsideration, still petitioner utterly failed to show that Ms. Rosanna
Ignacio, its Personnel Manager who signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping attached thereto, was duly authorized for this purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that
obedience to the requirements of procedural rule is needed if we are to expect fair results
therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.[21]
Thus, on this point, no error could be validly attributed to respondent Court of Appeals. It did not
err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the requirements governing the certification
of non-forum shopping.
Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that there was denial of due process of law when the
Labor Arbiter failed to have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds that the Arbiter did not
observe the mandatory language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now Section 11, per amendment
in Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure which provided
that:
If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their
position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an Order to that effect and shall
inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor. [22]
Petitioners contention, in our view, lacks sufficient basis. Well settled is the rule that the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[23] Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. The requirement of due
process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the
supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the
event the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or that such
hearing was not necessary.[24] In any event, as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the
position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that such
opportunity more than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with
Longest Force for underpayment of wages and overtime pay because it had been religiously and
promptly paying the bills for the security services sent by Longest Force and that these are in
accordance with the statutory minimum wage. Also, petitioner contends that it should not be held
liable for overtime pay as private respondents failed to present proof that overtime work was
actually performed. Lastly, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals failed to render a decision
that finally disposed of the case because it did not specifically rule on the immediate recourse of
private respondents, that is, the matter of reimbursement between petitioner and Longest Force
in accordance with Eagle Security Agency Inc. v. NLRC,[25] and Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority v. NLRC.[26]
Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107
and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows:
ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR Whenever an employer enters into a
contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor
or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in
the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
xxx
ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall
likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or
project.
ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his
contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct
employers.
In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security
agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner
became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107
abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the
corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages. This is
mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of
statutory minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct
employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of
16 | P a g e
paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives
the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987
Constitution.[27]
Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of
guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted
by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs
of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation
thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the
contract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their
contractors or subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage. [28]
However, we must emphasize that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest Force
does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of reimbursement from
his co-debtor by the one who paid.[29] As held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v.
NLRC,[30] the joint and several liability imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for
reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency for such amounts as petitioner may
have to pay to complainants, the private respondents herein. The security agency may not seek
exculpation by claiming that the principals payments to it were inadequate for the guards lawful
compensation. As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws;
and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal
concern and not any others.[31]
On the issue of the propriety of the award of overtime pay despite the alleged lack of proof
thereof, suffice it to state that such involves a determination and evaluation of facts which cannot
be done in a petition for review. Well established is the rule that in an appeal via certiorari, only
questions of law may be reviewed.[32]
One final point. Upon review of the award of backwages and attorneys fees, we discovered
certain errors that happened in the addition of the amount of individual backwages that resulted
in the erroneous total amount of backwages and attorneys fees. These errors ought to be
properly rectified now. Thus, the correct sum of individual backwages should
be P126,648.40 instead of P126,684.40, while the correct sum of total backwages awarded and
attorneys fees should be P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, instead of P3,927,216.40
and P392,721.64, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner and Longest Force are held liable jointly and
severally for underpayment of wages and overtime pay of the security guards, without prejudice
to petitioners right of reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency,
Inc. The amounts payable to complaining security guards, herein private respondents, by way of
total backwages and attorneys fees are hereby set at P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04,
respectively. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (166 SCRA 316)
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who
was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he
filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the
Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in
effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and
defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free"
while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;
that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others. It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b],
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice
in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What
Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide.
In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of
law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
TOMAS K. CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ENCARNACION VALDES-
CHOY, respondents.
The Case
17 | P a g e
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in an action for specific performance[2] filed in the Regional Trial Court[3] by petitioner
Tomas K. Chua (Chua) against respondent Encarnacion Valdes-Choy (Valdes-Choy). Chua
sought to compel Valdes-Choy to consummate the sale of her paraphernal house and lot in
Makati City. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision[4] rendered by the trial court in favor of
Chua.
The Facts
Valdes-Choy advertised for sale her paraphernal house and lot (Property) with an area of 718
square meters located at No. 40 Tampingco Street corner Hidalgo Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati City. The Property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162955 (TCT) issued by
the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the name of Valdes-Choy. Chua responded to the
advertisement. After several meetings, Chua and Valdes-Choy agreed on a purchase price of
P10,800,000.00 payable in cash.
On 30 June 1989, Valdes-Choy received from Chua a check for P100,000.00. The receipt
(Receipt) evidencing the transaction, signed by Valdes-Choy as seller, and Chua as buyer,
reads:
30 June 1989
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA PBCom Check No. 206011 in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P100,000.00) as EARNEST MONEY for the sale of the
property located at 40 Tampingco cor. Hidalgo, San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila (Area
: 718 sq. meters).
The balance of TEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P10,700,000.00) is payable on
or before 15[5] July 1989. Capital Gains Tax for the account of the seller. Failure to pay balance
on or before 15 July 1989 forfeits the earnest money. This provided that all papers are in proper
order.[6]
CONFORME: ENCARNACION VALDES
Seller
TOMAS K. CHUA
Buyer
x x x.[7]
In the morning of 13 July 1989, Chua secured from Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBCom) a
managers check for P480,000.00. Strangely, after securing the managers check, Chua
immediately gave PBCom a verbal stop payment order claiming that this managers check for
P480,000.00 was lost and/or misplaced.[8] On the same day, after receipt of Chuas verbal order,
PBCom Assistant VicePresident Julie C. Pe notified in writing[9] the PBCom Operations Group
of Chuas stop payment order.
In the afternoon of 13 July 1989, Chua and Valdes-Choy met with their respective counsels to
execute the necessary documents and arrange the payments.[10] Valdes-Choy as vendor and
Chua as vendee signed two Deeds of Absolute Sale (Deeds of Sale). The first Deed of Sale
covered the house and lot for the purchase price of P8,000,000.00.[11] The second Deed of
Sale covered the furnishings, fixtures and movable properties contained in the house for the
purchase price of P2,800,000.00.[12] The parties also computed the capital gains tax to amount
to P485,000.00.
On 14 July 1989, the parties met again at the office of Valdes-Choys counsel. Chua handed to
Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check for P485,000.00 so Valdes-Choy could pay the
capital gains tax as she did not have sufficient funds to pay the tax. Valdes-Choy issued a
receipt showing that Chua had a remaining balance of P10,215,000.00 after deducting the
advances made by Chua. This receipt reads:
July 14, 1989
Received from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA PBCom. Check No. 325851 in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P485,000.00) as Partial Payment for the
sale of the property located at 40 Tampingco Cor. Hidalgo St., San Lorenzo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila (Area 718 sq. meters), covered by TCT No. 162955 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati, Metro Manila.
The total purchase price of the above-mentioned property is TEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS only, broken down as follows:
SELLING PRICE P10,800,000.00
EARNEST MONEY P100,000.00
PARTIAL PAYMENT 485,000.00
____________________585,000.00
BALANCE DUE TO
ENCARNACION VALDEZ-CHOY P10,215,000.00
VVVVVVVVVVVV
PLUS P80,000.00 for documentary
stamps paid in advance by seller ___80,000.00
P10,295,000.00
x x x.[13]
On the same day, 14 July 1989, Valdes-Choy, accompanied by Chua, deposited the
P485,000.00 managers check to her account with Traders Royal Bank. She then purchased a
Traders Royal Bank managers check for P480,000.00 payable to the Commissioner of Internal
18 | P a g e
Revenue for the capital gains tax. Valdes-Choy and Chua returned to the office of Valdes-Choys
counsel and handed the Traders Royal Bank check to the counsel who undertook to pay the
capital gains tax. It was then also that Chua showed to Valdes-Choy a PBCom managers check
for P10,215,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price. Chua, however, did not give
this PBCom managers check to Valdes-Choy because the TCT was still registered in the name
of Valdes-Choy. Chua required that the Property be registered first in his name before he would
turn over the check to Valdes-Choy. This angered Valdes-Choy who tore up the Deeds of Sale,
claiming that what Chua required was not part of their agreement.[14]
On the same day, 14 July 1989, Chua confirmed his stop payment order by submitting to
PBCom an affidavit of loss[15] of the PBCom Managers Check for P480,000.00. PBCom
Assistant Vice-President Pe, however, testified that the managers check was nevertheless
honored because Chua subsequently verbally advised the bank that he was lifting the stop-
payment order due to his special arrangement with the bank.[16]
On 15 July 1989, the deadline for the payment of the balance of the purchase price, Valdes-
Choy suggested to her counsel that to break the impasse Chua should deposit in escrow the
P10,215,000.00 balance.[17] Upon such deposit, Valdes-Choy was willing to cause the issuance
of a new TCT in the name of Chua even without receiving the balance of the purchase price.
Valdes-Choy believed this was the only way she could protect herself if the certificate of title is
transferred in the name of the buyer before she is fully paid. Valdes-Choys counsel promised to
relay her suggestion to Chua and his counsel, but nothing came out of it.
On 17 July 1989, Chua filed a complaint for specific performance against Valdes-Choy which the
trial court dismissed on 22 November 1989. On 29 November 1989, Chua re-filed his complaint
for specific performance with damages. After trial in due course, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Applying the provisions of Article 1191 of the new Civil Code, since this is an action for specific
performance where the plaintiff, as vendee, wants to pursue the sale, and in order that the fears
of the defendant may be allayed and still have the sale materialize, judgment is hereby
rendered:
I. 1. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the Court not later than five (5) days from finality of this
decision:
a. the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 162955 registered in her name;
b. the covering tax declaration and the latest tax receipt evidencing payment of real estate taxes;
c. the two deeds of sale prepared by Atty. Mark Bocobo on July 13, 1989, duly executed by
defendant in favor of the plaintiff, whether notarized or not; and
2. Within five (5) days from compliance by the defendant of the above, ordering the plaintiff to
deliver to the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court the sum of P10,295,000.00 representing the
balance of the consideration (with the sum of P80,000.00 for stamps already included);
3. Ordering the Branch Clerk of this Court or her duly authorized representative:
a. to make representations with the BIR for the payment of capital gains tax for the sale of the
house and lot (not to include the fixtures) and to pay the same from the funds deposited with her;
b. to present the deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiff, together with the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 162955, real estate tax receipt and proof of payment of capital gains
tax, to the Makati Register of Deeds;
c. to pay the required registration fees and stamps (if not yet advanced by the defendant) and if
needed update the real estate taxes all to be taken from the funds deposited with her; and
d. surrender to the plaintiff the new Torrens title over the property;
4. Should the defendant fail or refuse to surrender the two deeds of sale over the property and
the fixtures that were prepared by Atty. Mark Bocobo and executed by the parties, the Branch
Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby authorized and empowered to prepare, sign and execute
the said deeds of sale for and in behalf of the defendant;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff;
a. the sum of P100,000.00 representing moral and compensatory damages for the plaintiff; and
b. the sum of P50,000.00 as reimbursement for plaintiffs attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
6. Authorizing the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court to release to the plaintiff, to be taken from
the funds said plaintiff has deposited with the Court, the amounts covered at paragraph 5 above;
7. Ordering the release of the P10,295,000.00 to the defendant after deducting therefrom the
following amounts:
a. the capital gains tax paid to the BIR;
b. the expenses incurred in the registration of the sale, updating of real estate taxes, and
transfer of title; and
c. the amounts paid under this judgment to the plaintiff.
8. Ordering the defendant to surrender to the plaintiff or his representatives the premises with
the furnishings intact within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the proceeds of the sale;
9. No interest is imposed on the payment to be made by the plaintiff because he had always
been ready to pay the balance and the premises had been used or occupied by the defendant
for the duration of this case.
II. In the event that specific performance cannot be done for reasons or causes not attributable
to the plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant:
1. To refund to the plaintiff the earnest money in the sum of P100,000.00, with interest at the
legal rate from June 30, 1989 until fully paid;
2. To refund to the plaintiff the sum of P485,000.00 with interest at the legal rate from July 14,
1989 until fully paid;
19 | P a g e
3. To pay to the plaintiff the sum of P700,000.00 in the concept of moral damages and the
additional sum of P300,000.00 in the concept of exemplary damages; and
4. To pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as reimbursement of attorneys fees and cost of
litigation.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Valdes-Choy appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals handed down a new judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another
one is rendered:
(1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 89-5772;
(2) Declaring the amount of P100,000.00, representing earnest money as forfeited in favor of
defendant-appellant;
(3) Ordering defendant-appellant to return/refund the amount of P485,000.00 to plaintiff-appellee
without interest;
(4) Dismissing defendant-appellants compulsory counter-claim; and
(5) Ordering the plaintiff-appellee to pay the costs.[19]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found that the transaction reached an impasse when Valdes-Choy wanted to be
first paid the full consideration before a new TCT covering the Property is issued in the name of
Chua. On the other hand, Chua did not want to pay the consideration in full unless a new TCT is
first issued in his name. The trial court faulted Valdes-Choy for this impasse.
The trial court held that the parties entered into a contract to sell on 30 June 1989, as evidenced
by the Receipt for the P100,000.00 earnest money. The trial court pointed out that the contract
to sell was subject to the following conditions: (1) the balance of P10,700,000.00 was payable
not later than 15 July 1989; (2) Valdes-Choy may stay in the Property until 13 August 1989; and
(3) all papers must be in proper order before full payment is made.
The trial court held that Chua complied with the terms of the contract to sell. Chua showed that
he was prepared to pay Valdes-Choy the consideration in full on 13 July 1989, two days before
the deadline of 15 July 1989. Chua even added P80,000.00 for the documentary stamp tax. He
purchased from PBCom two managers checks both payable to Valdes-Choy. The first check for
P485,000.00 was to pay the capital gains tax. The second check for P10,215,000.00 was to pay
the balance of the purchase price. The trial court was convinced that Chua demonstrated his
capacity and readiness to pay the balance on 13 July 1989 with the production of the PBCom
managers check for P10,215,000.00.
On the other hand, the trial court found that Valdes-Choy did not perform her correlative
obligation under the contract to sell to put all the papers in order. The trial court noted that as of
14 July 1989, the capital gains tax had not been paid because Valdes-Choys counsel who was
suppose to pay the tax did not do so. The trial court declared that Valdes-Choy was in a position
to deliver only the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax
declarations, and the latest realty tax receipt. The trial court concluded that these documents
were all useless without the Bureau of Internal Revenue receipt evidencing full payment of the
capital gains tax which is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a new certificate of title in Chuas
name.
The trial court held that Chuas non-payment of the balance of P10,215,000.00 on the agreed
date was due to Valdes-Choys fault.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that Chuas stance to pay the full
consideration only after the Property is registered in his name was not the agreement of the
parties. The Court of Appeals noted that there is a whale of difference between the phrases all
papers are in proper order as written on the Receipt, and transfer of title as demanded by Chua.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that all the papers were in
order and that Chua had no valid reason not to pay on the agreed date. Valdes-Choy was in a
position to deliver the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax
declarations, and the latest realty tax receipt. The Property was also free from all liens and
encumbrances.
The Court of Appeals declared that the trial court erred in considering Chuas showing to Valdes-
Choy of the PBCom managers check for P10,215,000.00 as compliance with Chuas obligation
to pay on or before 15 July 1989. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Chua did not want to
give up the check unless the property was already in his name.[20] Although Chua
demonstrated his capacity to pay, this could not be equated with actual payment which he
refused to do.
The Court of Appeals did not consider the non-payment of the capital gains tax as failure by
Valdes-Choy to put the papers in proper order. The Court of Appeals explained that the payment
of the capital gains tax has no bearing on the validity of the Deeds of Sale. It is only after the
deeds are signed and notarized can the final computation and payment of the capital gains tax
be made.
The Issues
In his Memorandum, Chua raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THERE IS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY;
2. WHETHER VALDES-CHOY MAY RESCIND THE CONTRACT IN CONTROVERSY
WITHOUT OBSERVING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1592 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE;
3. WHETHER THE WITHHOLDING OF PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE
PRICE ON THE PART OF CHUA (AS VENDEE) WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES
20 | P a g e
OBTAINING AND MAY NOT BE RAISED AS GROUND FOR THE AUTOMATIC RESCISSION
OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE;
4. WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DECLARE THE EARNEST MONEY IN THE AMOUNT OF P100,000.00 AS FORFEITED IN
FAVOR OF VALDES-CHOY;
5. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW, REASON AND
EQUITY DESERVING OF BEING REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.[21]
The issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the transaction between Chua and Valdes-Choy is
a perfected contract of sale or a mere contract to sell, and (b) whether Chua can compel Valdes-
Choy to cause the issuance of a new TCT in Chuas name even before payment of the full
purchase price.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
There is no dispute that Valdes-Choy is the absolute owner of the Property which is registered in
her name under TCT No.162955, free from all liens and encumbrances. She was ready, able
and willing to deliver to Chua the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale,
the tax declarations, and the latest realty tax receipt. There is also no dispute that on 13 July
1989, Valdes-Choy received PBCom Check No. 206011 for P100,000.00 as earnest money from
Chua. Likewise, there is no controversy that the Receipt for the P100,000.00 earnest money
embodied the terms of the binding contract between Valdes-Choy and Chua.
Further, there is no controversy that as embodied in the Receipt, Valdes-Choy and Chua agreed
on the following terms: (1) the balance of P10,215,000.00 is payable on or before 15 July 1989;
(2) the capital gains tax is for the account of Valdes-Choy; and (3) if Chua fails to pay the
balance of P10,215,000.00 on or before 15 July 1989, Valdes-Choy has the right to forfeit the
earnest money, provided that all papers are in proper order. On 13 July 1989, Chua gave
Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check for P485,000.00 to pay the capital gains tax.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that the balance of P10,215,000.00 was not actually
paid to Valdes-Choy on the agreed date. On 13 July 1989, Chua did show to Valdes-Choy the
PBCom managers check for P10,215,000.00, with Valdes-Choy as payee. However, Chua
refused to give this check to Valdes-Choy until a new TCT covering the Property is registered in
Chuas name. Or, as the trial court put it, until there is proof of payment of the capital gains tax
which is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a new certificate of title.
First and Second Issues: Contract of Sale or Contract to Sell?
Chua has consistently characterized his agreement with Valdez-Choy, as evidenced by the
Receipt, as a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. This has been Chuas persistent
contention in his pleadings before the trial and appellate courts.
Chua now pleads for the first time that there is a perfected contract of sale rather than a contract
to sell. He contends that there was no reservation in the contract of sale that Valdes-Choy shall
retain title to the Property until after the sale. There was no agreement for an automatic
rescission of the contract in case of Chuas default. He argues for the first time that his payment
of earnest money and its acceptance by Valdes-Choy precludes the latter from rejecting the
binding effect of the contract of sale. Thus, Chua claims that Valdes-Choy may not validly
rescind the contract of sale without following Article 1592[22] of the Civil Code which requires
demand, either judicially or by notarial act, before rescission may take place.
Chuas new theory is not well taken in light of well-settled jurisprudence. An issue not raised in
the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as this is offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.[23] In addition, when a party deliberately adopts a
certain theory, and the case is tried and decided on that theory in the court below, the party will
not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. To permit him to change his theory will be
unfair to the adverse party.[24]
Nevertheless, in order to put to rest all doubts on the matter, we hold that the agreement
between Chua and Valdes-Choy, as evidenced by the Receipt, is a contract to sell and not a
contract of sale. The distinction between a contract of sale and contract to sell is well-settled:
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing
sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass
to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the
vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full
payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive
condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from becoming effective.[25]
A perusal of the Receipt shows that the true agreement between the parties was a contract to
sell. Ownership over the Property was retained by Valdes-Choy and was not to pass to Chua
until full payment of the purchase price.
First, the Receipt provides that the earnest money shall be forfeited in case the buyer fails to pay
the balance of the purchase price on or before 15 July 1989. In such event, Valdes-Choy can
sell the Property to other interested parties. There is in effect a right reserved in favor of Valdes-
Choy not to push through with the sale upon Chuas failure to remit the balance of the purchase
price before the deadline. This is in the nature of a stipulation reserving ownership in the seller
until full payment of the purchase price. This is also similar to giving the seller the right to rescind
unilaterally the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.[26]
Second, the agreement between Chua and Valdes-Choy was embodied in a receipt rather than
in a deed of sale, ownership not having passed between them. The signing of the Deeds of Sale
came later when Valdes-Choy was under the impression that Chua was about to pay the
balance of the purchase price. The absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a strong
indication that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of ownership, but only a transfer after
full payment of the purchase price.[27]
Third, Valdes-Choy retained possession of the certificate of title and all other documents relative
to the sale. When Chua refused to pay Valdes-Choy the balance of the purchase price, Valdes-
Choy also refused to turn-over to Chua these documents.[28] These are additional proof that the
agreement did not transfer to Chua, either by actual or constructive delivery, ownership of the
Property.[29]
It is true that Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that [W]henever earnest money is given in a
contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the
contract. However, this article speaks of earnest money given in a contract of sale. In this case,
the earnest money was given in a contract to sell. The Receipt evidencing the contract to sell
stipulates that the earnest money is a forfeitable deposit, to be forfeited if the sale is not
21 | P a g e
consummated should Chua fail to pay the balance of the purchase price. The earnest money
forms part of the consideration only if the sale is consummated upon full payment of the
purchase price. If there is a contract of sale, Valdes-Choy should have the right to compel Chua
to pay the balance of the purchase price. Chua, however, has the right to walk away from the
transaction, with no obligation to pay the balance, although he will forfeit the earnest money.
Clearly, there is no contract of sale. The earnest money was given in a contract to sell, and thus
Article 1482, which speaks of a contract of sale, is not applicable.
Since the agreement between Valdes-Choy and Chua is a mere contract to sell, the full payment
of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition. The non-fulfillment of the condition
prevents the obligation to sell from arising and ownership is retained by the seller without further
remedies by the buyer.[30] Article 1592 of the Civil Code permits the buyer to pay, even after the
expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made
upon him either judicially or by notarial act. However, Article 1592 does not apply to a contract to
sell where the seller reserves the ownership until full payment of the price.[31]
Third and Fourth Issues: Withholding of Payment of the Balance of the Purchase Price and
Forfeiture of the Earnest Money
Chua insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but withheld payment
because Valdes-Choy did not fulfill her contractual obligation to put all the papers in proper
order. Specifically, Chua claims that Valdes-Choy failed to show that the capital gains tax had
been paid after he had advanced the money for its payment. For the same reason, he contends
that Valdes-Choy may not forfeit the earnest money even if he did not pay on time.
There is a variance of interpretation on the phrase all papers are in proper order as written in the
Receipt. There is no dispute though, that as long as the papers are in proper order, Valdes-Choy
has the right to forfeit the earnest money if Chua fails to pay the balance before the deadline.
The trial court interpreted the phrase to include payment of the capital gains tax, with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue receipt as proof of payment. The Court of Appeals held otherwise. We quote
verbatim the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this matter:
The trial court made much fuss in connection with the payment of the capital gains tax, of which
Section 33 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, is the governing provision insofar as
its computation is concerned. The trial court failed to consider Section 34-(a) of the said Code,
the last sentence of which provides, that [t]he amount realized from the sale or other disposition
of property shall be the sum of money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received; and that the computation of the capital gains tax can only be finally
assessed by the Commission on Internal Revenue upon the presentation of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale themselves, without which any premature computation of the capital gains tax
becomes of no moment. At any rate, the computation and payment of the capital gains tax has
no bearing insofar as the validity and effectiveness of the deeds of sale in question are
concerned, because it is only after the contracts of sale are finally executed in due form and
have been duly notarized that the final computation of the capital gains tax can follow as a
matter of course. Indeed, exhibit D, the PBC Check No. 325851, dated July 13, 1989, in the
amount of P485,000.00, which is considered as part of the consideration of the sale, was
deposited in the name of appellant, from which she in turn, purchased the corresponding check
in the amount representing the sum to be paid for capital gains tax and drawn in the name of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which then allayed any fear or doubt that that amount would
not be paid to the Government after all.[32]
We see no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In a contract to sell, the obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon the
happening of the suspensive condition. In this case, the suspensive condition is the full payment
of the purchase price by Chua. Such full payment gives rise to Chuas right to demand the
execution of the contract of sale.
It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the seller becomes obligated to transfer
the ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of
sale as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the seller is not obligated to transfer ownership to
the buyer, even if there is a contract to sell between them. It is also upon the existence of the
contract of sale that the buyer is obligated to pay the purchase price to the seller. Since the
transfer of ownership is in exchange for the purchase price, these obligations must be
simultaneously fulfilled at the time of the execution of the contract of sale, in the absence of a
contrary stipulation.
In a contract of sale, the obligations of the seller are specified in Article 1495 of the Civil Code,
as follows:
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the
thing which is the object of the sale. (Emphasis supplied)
The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the thing sold. In the sale of
real property, the seller is not obligated to transfer in the name of the buyer a new certificate of
title, but rather to transfer ownership of the real property. There is a difference between transfer
of the certificate of title in the name of the buyer, and transfer of ownership to the buyer. The
buyer may become the owner of the real property even if the certificate of title is still registered in
the name of the seller. As between the seller and buyer, ownership is transferred not by the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer but by the execution of the
instrument of sale in a public document.
In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred upon delivery of the thing sold. As the noted civil
law commentator Arturo M. Tolentino explains it, -
Delivery is not only a necessary condition for the enjoyment of the thing, but is a mode of
acquiring dominion and determines the transmission of ownership, the birth of the real right. The
delivery, therefore, made in any of the forms provided in articles 1497 to 1505 signifies that the
transmission of ownership from vendor to vendee has taken place. The delivery of the thing
constitutes an indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring ownership. Our law does not
admit the doctrine of transfer of property by mere consent; the ownership, the property right, is
derived only from delivery of the thing. x x x.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
22 | P a g e
In a contract of sale of real property, delivery is effected when the instrument of sale is executed
in a public document. When the deed of absolute sale is signed by the parties and notarized,
then delivery of the real property is deemed made by the seller to the buyer. Article 1498 of the
Civil Code provides that
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
x x x.
Similarly, in a contract to sell real property, once the seller is ready, able and willing to sign the
deed of absolute sale before a notary public, the seller is in a position to transfer ownership of
the real property to the buyer. At this point, the seller complies with his undertaking to sell the
real property in accordance with the contract to sell, and to assume all the obligations of a
vendor under a contract of sale pursuant to the relevant articles of the Civil Code. In a contract
to sell, the seller is not obligated to transfer ownership to the buyer. Neither is the seller
obligated to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer. However,
the seller must put all his papers in proper order to the point that he is in a position to transfer
ownership of the real property to the buyer upon the signing of the contract of sale.
In the instant case, Valdes-Choy was in a position to comply with all her obligations as a seller
under the contract to sell. First, she already signed the Deeds of Sale in the office of her counsel
in the presence of the buyer. Second, she was prepared to turn-over the owners duplicate of the
TCT to the buyer, along with the tax declarations and latest realty tax receipt. Clearly, at this
point Valdes-Choy was ready, able and willing to transfer ownership of the Property to the buyer
as required by the contract to sell, and by Articles 1458 and 1495 of the Civil Code to
consummate the contract of sale.
Chua, however, refused to give to Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check for the balance of
the purchase price. Chua imposed the condition that a new TCT should first be issued in his
name, a condition that is found neither in the law nor in the contract to sell as evidenced by the
Receipt. Thus, at this point Chua was not ready, able and willing to pay the full purchase price
which is his obligation under the contract to sell. Chua was also not in a position to assume the
principal obligation of a vendee in a contract of sale, which is also to pay the full purchase price
at the agreed time. Article 1582 of the Civil Code provides that
Art. 1582. The vendee is bound to accept delivery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the
time and place stipulated in the contract.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the contract to sell stipulated that Chua should pay the balance of the purchase
price on or before 15 July 1989. The signed Deeds of Sale also stipulated that the buyer shall
pay the balance of the purchase price upon signing of the deeds. Thus, the Deeds of Sale, both
signed by Chua, state as follows:
Deed of Absolute Sale covering the lot:
xxx
For and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT MILLION PESOS (P8,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged by the VENDOR from the VENDEE,
the VENDOR sells, transfers and conveys unto the VENDEE, his heirs, successors and assigns,
the said parcel of land, together with the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens and
encumbrances.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Deed of Absolute Sale covering the furnishings:
xxx
For and in consideration of the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,800,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged by the
VENDOR from the VENDEE, the VENDOR sells, transfers and conveys unto the VENDEE, his
heirs, successors and assigns, the said furnitures, fixtures and other movable properties
thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
However, on the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the purchase price as
required by the contract to sell, the signed Deeds of Sale, and Article 1582 of the Civil Code.
Chua was therefore in default and has only himself to blame for the rescission by Valdes-Choy
of the contract to sell.
Even if measured under existing usage or custom, Valdes-Choy had all her papers in proper
order. Article 1376 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the
ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily
established.
Customarily, in the absence of a contrary agreement, the submission by an individual seller to
the buyer of the following papers would complete a sale of real estate: (1) owners duplicate copy
of the Torrens title;[36] (2) signed deed of absolute sale; (3) tax declaration; and (3) latest realty
tax receipt. The buyer can retain the amount for the capital gains tax and pay it upon authority of
the seller, or the seller can pay the tax, depending on the agreement of the parties.
The buyer has more interest in having the capital gains tax paid immediately since this is a pre-
requisite to the issuance of a new Torrens title in his name. Nevertheless, as far as the
government is concerned, the capital gains tax remains a liability of the seller since it is a tax on
the sellers gain from the sale of the real estate. Payment of the capital gains tax, however, is not
a pre-requisite to the transfer of ownership to the buyer. The transfer of ownership takes effect
upon the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale.
The recording of the sale with the proper Registry of Deeds[37] and the transfer of the certificate
of title in the name of the buyer are necessary only to bind third parties to the transfer of
ownership.[38] As between the seller and the buyer, the transfer of ownership takes effect upon
the execution of a public instrument conveying the real estate.[39] Registration of the sale with
the Registry of Deeds, or the issuance of a new certificate of title, does not confer ownership on
the buyer. Such registration or issuance of a new certificate of title is not one of the modes of
acquiring ownership.[40]
23 | P a g e
In this case, Valdes-Choy was ready, able and willing to submit to Chua all the papers that
customarily would complete the sale, and to pay as well the capital gains tax. On the other hand,
Chuas condition that a new TCT be first issued in his name before he pays the balance of
P10,215,000.00, representing 94.58% of the purchase price, is not customary in a sale of real
estate. Such a condition, not specified in the contract to sell as evidenced by the Receipt, cannot
be considered part of the omissions of stipulations which are ordinarily established by usage or
custom.[41] What is increasingly becoming customary is to deposit in escrow the balance of the
purchase price pending the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer.
Valdes-Choy suggested this solution but unfortunately, it drew no response from Chua.
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que
no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada
vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o
cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;

Chua had no reason to fear being swindled. Valdes-Choy was prepared to turn-over to him the
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax declarations, and the latest
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a
realty tax receipt. There was no hindrance to paying the capital gains tax as Chua himself had
readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
advanced the money to pay the same and Valdes-Choy had procured a managers check
de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue covering the amount. It was only a matter of time
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
before the capital gains tax would be paid. Chua acted precipitately in filing the action for specific
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
performance a mere two days after the deadline of 15 July 1989 when there was an impasse.
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
While this case was dismissed on 22 November 1989, he did not waste any time in re-filing the
same on 29 November 1989.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Accordingly, since Chua refused to pay the consideration in full on the agreed date, which is a
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
suspensive condition, Chua cannot compel Valdes-Choy to consummate the sale of the
Property. Article 1181 of the Civil Code provides that -
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles
in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
ART. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and
loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
the condition.

Chua acquired no right to compel Valdes-Choy to transfer ownership of the Property to him
because the suspensive condition - the full payment of the purchase price - did not happen.
There is no correlative obligation on the part of Valdes-Choy to transfer ownership of the
Property to Chua. There is also no obligation on the part of Valdes-Choy to cause the issuance
of a new TCT in the name of Chua since unless expressly stipulated, this is not one of the
obligations of a vendor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37652 dated 23
February 1995 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
vs.
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
INC., respondents.
where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

24 | P a g e
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion
for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the
nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined
the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and
we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to
their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel,
with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It
shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy
or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by
the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of
public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a
minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration
in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture.
There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall
not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129,
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor
Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
25 | P a g e
(Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.
860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S.
Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225,
74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission
vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section
9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or
public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or
other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but
in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as
to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of
the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and
its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come
to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court
of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and APOLINARIO M.
SIGNO, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the
resolution of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 (p.
28, Rollo) in NLRC Case No. NCR-8-3808-83, entitled, "Apolinario M. Signo, Complainant,
versus Manila Electric Company, Respondents", affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter
which ordered the reinstatement of private respondent herein, Apolinario Signo, to his former
position without backwages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor-leadman since
January 1963 up to the time when his services were terminated on May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company for electrical
services at his residence at Peñafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal. Private
respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the said application as well as the required
documentation for said application at the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof,
private respondent received from Fernando de Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo thereafter
filed the application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.
It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not yet within the
serviceable point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30-meter distance from the
nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the electrical connections at de Lara's
residence, certain employees of the company, including respondent Signo, made it appear in the
application that the sari-sari store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the
subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter.
As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were installed and
made possible. However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of petitioner company,
Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year.
Petitioner company conducted an investigation of the matter and found respondent Signo
responsible for the said irregularities in the installation. Thus, the services of the latter were
terminated on May 18, 1983.
On August 10 1983, respondent Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and
separation pay.
26 | P a g e
After the parties had submitted their position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (p.
79, Rollo) on April 29, 1985, which stated, inter alia:
Verily, complainant's act of inducing the Meralco employees to effectuate the installation on
Engr. de Lara's residence prejudiced the respondent, and therefore, complainant himself had
indeed became a participant in the transactions, although not directly, which turned out to be
illegal, not to mention that some of the materials used therein belongs to Meralco, some of which
were inferior quality. . . .
While complainant may deny the violation, he cannot do away with company's Code on
Employee Discipline, more particularly Section 7, par. 8 and Section 6, par. 24 thereof However,
as admitted by the respondent, the infraction of the above cited Code is punishable by
reprimand to dismissal."
... . And in this case, while considering that complainant indeed committed the above-cited
infractions of company Code of Employee Discipline, We shall also consider his records of
uninterrupted twenty (20) years of service coupled with two (2) commendations for honesty.
Likewise, We shall take note that subject offense is his first, and therefore, to impose the
extreme penalty of dismissal is certainly too drastic. A penalty short of dismissal is more in
keeping with justice, and adherence to compassionate society.
WHEREFORE, respondent Meralco is hereby directed to reinstate complainant Apolinario M.
Signo to his former position as Supervisor Leadman without backwages, considering that he is
not at all faultless. He is however, here warned, that commission of similar offense in the future,
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the respondent Commission. On March 12, 1987, the
respondent Commission dismissed both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On June 23, 1987, the instant petition was filed with the petitioner contending that the
respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on August 3, 1987,
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution of the respondent
Commission.
The issue to resolve in the instant case is whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed
from petitioner company on grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
Petitioner contends that respondent Signo violated Sections 6 and 7 of the company's Code on
Employee Discipline, which provide:
Section 6, Par. 24—Encouraging, inducing or threatening another employee to perform an act
constituting a violation of this Code or of company work, rules or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to
commit such offense.
Penalty—Reprimand to dismissal, depending upon the gravity of the offense.
Section 7, Par. 8—Soliciting or receiving money, gift, share, percentage or benefits from any
person, personally or through the mediation of another, to perform an act prejudicial to the
Company.
Penalty—Dismissal. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
Petitioner further argues that the acts of private respondent constituted breach of trust and
caused the petitioner company economic losses resulting from the unbilled electric consumption
of de Lara; that in view thereof, the dismissal of private respondent Signo is proper considering
the circumstances of the case.
The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An employer, generally, can
dismiss or lay-off an employee for just and authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282
and 283 of the Labor Code. However, the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees
is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. This
is so because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital
than the preservation of corporate profits (Euro-Linea, Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782,
December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78).
There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and violation of
company rules, the penalty for which ranges from reprimand to dismissal depending on the
gravity of the offense. However, as earlier stated, the respondent Commission and the Labor
Arbiter found that dismissal should not be meted to respondent Signo considering his twenty
(20) years of service in the employ of petitioner, without any previous derogatory record, in
addition to the fact that petitioner company had awarded him in the past, two (2) commendations
for honesty. If ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric consumption
of de Lara, this was found to be the fault of petitioner's Power Sales Division.
We find no reason to disturb these findings. Well-established is the principle that findings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this
Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Workers
Union v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. L-51002-06, May 30,1983,122 SCRA 557).
This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that notwithstanding the existence
of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal
should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a
considerable length of time in the service of his employer. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. L- 54280, September 30,1982,117 SCRA 523; Meracap v. International Ceramics
Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48235-36, July 30,1979, 92 SCRA 412; Sampang v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137 SCRA 56; De Leon v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-52056,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 691; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PALEA, G.R. No. L-24626, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 489).
In a similar case, this Court ruled:
As repeatedly been held by this Court, an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with
the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of breach of trust towards his employer
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to its interest. The law in
protecting the rights of the laborers, authorized neither oppression nor self- destruction of the
employer.
27 | P a g e
However, taking into account private respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of service which
undisputedly is unblemished by any previous derogatory record' as found by the respondent
Commission itself, and since he has been under preventive suspension during the pendency of
this case, in the absence of a showing that the continued employment of private respondent
would result in petitioner's oppression or self-destruction, We are of the considered view that his
dismissal is a drastic punishment. ... .
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if
there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to
defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President
pursuant to this Court's requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:

xxx xxx xxx

1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"
The ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private respondent is
reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner's obvious good faith. (Itogon- Suyoc
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment
Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 11 7 SCRA 528)
period was already closed;"

Further, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit
of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July
30,1987,152 SCRA 140).
In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but
without the award of backwages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the
respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 is AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order issued on August 3, 1987 is lifted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities
in leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime
in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the
province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan,
et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court
had admonished "the students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the
opportunity given to them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively
participate in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case
No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on
September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for
damages arising from destruction of university properties
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate,
contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No.
65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within
university premises but without permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or
disrupted classes;" and

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners, 5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
National University, respondents.

1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of
National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for
continually despise and villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members, should
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction"
persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they hate.
dated August 7, 1984, they allege:

2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective
interest of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University.
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be
compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude
to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded
in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
contempt for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and

28 | P a g e
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and
to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY
INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming
semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be
subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner
Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal charge against him for
malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without
prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to
resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P.
Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that
whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and
peaceful manner.
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already
closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so
several times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to
allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in
mass actions ... within the school premises," although there were no existing disciplinary charge
against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time;
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that
"petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited;
and
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the
permission of the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently
refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. "
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the
petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for
petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b)
consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to
file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from notice. ... .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that
they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts
showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-
enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published
rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process,
in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o
penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or
in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall
have been conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime
Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without
due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college." 10 The rules may
include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline"
is a duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides that-
... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be
clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or
guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and
regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-
examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and
these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners
to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the
standards herein set forth.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam
Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional
misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-
29 | P a g e
Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation
her to pay a fine of P1,000.00. into how her case was decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation"
against those whom she felt had committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his
right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts We deny reconsideration in both instances.
of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who
had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What
such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated
due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al.,
positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that
110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type"
he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being
proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta
fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a
was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be
former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the
subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be
Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written
dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also
stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps,
given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court
something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that,
and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she
on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in
prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages,
order to prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the
double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied
Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the
having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his
Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he
having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having
"understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the
committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that
Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to
those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by
present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can
themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of
afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he
respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental
was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the
principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of
Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and
independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or
that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's
proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs.
counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional
Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre
services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that
were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this
Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a
mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in (1)
the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M.
Gonzales being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the
accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two
highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the
in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous
letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts
were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's
to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record.
and finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the
complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan." Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the
alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt
proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of
evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding,
and that she should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that,
with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of
the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel
were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue
a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public
the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical
letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and
Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and
member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14,
1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after
having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on
Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having
been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty.
Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband
and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is
shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file
Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition
Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs.
Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband
and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to
the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to

30 | P a g e
be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All
fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after
Resolution on Ilustre personally. deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on
May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are
not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a
doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn
"reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had
from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of
nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer
the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice
were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s
Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the
allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did
Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact
nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the
irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he
asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-
Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and
around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam
his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court
Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server
rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that
Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C.
statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying
Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he
reconsideration.
reported:

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address
Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his
could not be located;
own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He
thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the
categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of 5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila,
the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in
of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
"unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam
Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances,
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's
pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon
its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy
and of sound practice." 2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at; the
notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an elderly
woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified, and
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this
told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she always
Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the
meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of
"adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before
her house;
the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very
purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun.
Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational 3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to serve a
hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not known in the
statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts
and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice. And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists
in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers
were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before
modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional this Court.
misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for
the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla
(2) Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva
Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice,
or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any
reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case
and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions SO ORDERED.

31 | P a g e
Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
In re: Complaint against ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, LEONARD W.
RICHARDS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint formalized by the Bar Confident on April 29, 1986, pursuant to the Resolution of
this Court, dated February 10, 1986, Respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy as retained counsel of
Complainant, Leonard W. Richards, an Australian, was charged with Malpractice for non-
attendance at Court hearings, negligence and lack of zeal in prosecuting a civil case for
damages, resulting in its dismissal for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute.
Prior to the aforesaid formal Complaint, Leonard W. Richards had filed a letter-complaint on
June 29, 1984 with the Chief Legal Officer, Tourist Division, Department of Tourism followed up
with another letter dated July 13, 1984 to the Chief Justice denouncing Respondent's actuations.
Required to comment in a Resolution, dated August 8, 1984, Respondent failed to do so despite
service of the Resolution together with a copy of the letter-complaint. The Court (First Division)
required Respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, but all efforts to serve copy of the show-cause Resolution on
Respondent at his six (6) available addresses as well as through the national and the Tacloban
Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proved futile. Since, unquestionably,
respondent had gone into hiding and was evading service of pleadings/orders/processes of this
Court, we suspended him from the practice of law in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985.
Copies of the Resolution were circularized to all Courts nationwide with the directive that should
Respondent appear before any lower Court, the latter shall serve upon him a copy of the show-
cause Resolution and require him to appear within five (5) days thereafter before the Deputy
Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant.
Flushed out, on December 2, 1985, Respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration
"submitting himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court," denying any violation of his oath
as an attorney, which would warrant his suspension, and praying that in the interest of due
process and on broader grounds of substantial justice, the order of suspension be lifted and that
he be excused from appearing before the Bar Confidant by reason of distance and financial
constraints. Respondent gave his address as "Room 302 Abalos Bldg., Aguinaldo St., Iligan
City."
In a resolution dated February 10, 1986, the Court denied the lifting of the order of suspension
but excused Respondent from appearing before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant. In
the same Resolution, and as stated initially, the Bar Confidant was directed to formulate the
administrative complaint and respondent to answer the same within five (5) days from receipt of
notice.
The background facts disclose that on April 23, 1982, Complainant retained Respondent as
counsel in CC No. 0181-P before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, Pasay City, entitled
"Spouses Anita M. Richards & Leonard Richards vs. Danilo A. Felindario, et al." It was a suit for
damages allegedly due to faulty workmanship and non-compliance with specifications in the
construction of the RICHARDS house and swimming pool at Johann Menzi St., Phase III, BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Among the terms and conditions in their contract for legal services were the payment by
Complainant to Respondent of an acceptance fee of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
payable upon the signing of the agreement, and a fee of P300.00 for each Court appearance.
The acceptance fee was fully paid by Complainant on April 30, 1982, the initial payment having
been made on April 26, 1982.1 On October 21, 1982,2 Complainant and his family left
permanently for Australia after selling their house to a third party.
On June 20, 1983, Civil Case No. 0181-P was dismissed by the Trial Court without prejudice "for
lack of interest on the part of plaintiffs as shown by the absence of their counsel despite due
notice."3
On August 15, 1983, the case was reinstated after the reconsideration sought by Respondent on
July 13, 1983 was granted by the Trial Court. According to Complainant, reconsideration must
have been sought by Respondent only because in Complainant's letter, dated June 7, 1983, he
had already sought the assistance of Major Fred de Vera of the Bureau of Tourism Services
regarding his complaint against Respondent.1avvphi1
In an Order dated October 20, 1983, the Trial Court again dismissed the case for "lack of
interest and/or failure to prosecute," "it appearing that plaintiffs' counsel was duly notified as
indicated by his signature appearing on the record, it appearing further that notwithstanding said
notice, said counsel for the plaintiffs is not in Court today." The Trial Court further observed that
"this is the second time that this case was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs' counsel to appear
despite notice."4
In his Answer, Respondent states that he was delayed in filing the same as he had to
temporarily reside and hold office at Tubod, Lanao del Norte, by reason of his temporary
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Lanao del Norte effective March 11, 1986; that his
inability to prosecute the case was because Complainant left for Australia without furnishing
Respondent his address and that he was unable to shoulder the burden of paving the fees
required for the services of expert witnesses besides the fact that his daughter was stricken with
cerebral palsy; that he had no intention to delay Complainant for money, that the Administrative
Complaint does not comply with the requirements of Section 1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court;
and that he was deprived of due process of law inasmuch as Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court requires that an attorney be heard before he is removed or suspended. Respondent
then prayed that, pending investigation, his suspension be lifted and that after due hearing the
Complaint be dismissed and Complainant held liable for payment of all damages suffered by
Respondent during the investigation of this case.
In his letter-reply, dated February 13, 1987, addressed to the First Division Clerk of Court,
Complainant stated that he had paid P15,000.00 to Respondent 5 to handle the case for him
conditioned upon Respondent's prosecuting the case to completion, attending all scheduled
hearings and keeping Complainant posted on the progress of the case; that at the time he
engaged Respondent's services, the latter was the Manager of Personnel and Legal Affairs of
Asia International Builders Corporation in Makati, which had connections with an Australian
counterpart in Melbourne; that he had paid Civil Engineer Mendoza P5,000.00 for the inspection
of the house and that the latter was to be the only expert witness so that Respondent's excuse
that he (Respondent) had no funds with which to pay for expert witnesses is "entirely untrue";
that he paid an additional P1,300.00 to Respondent for other expenses like filing fee and other
miscellaneous items6 and that his total expenses relevant to the case aggregate P34,300.00;
that he had informed Respondent of his address in Australia in letters dated November 26, 1982.
February 1, 1983 and June 5, 1983; that Respondent has the financial means to reimburse
Complainant considering his present and former position; and that he is prepared to withdraw his
complaint if reimbursed by Respondent in the amount of P34,300.00.
32 | P a g e
The facts, as disclosed, require no further evidentiary hearing, and speak for themselves. Res
ipsa loquitur. The Orders of the 'Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. 181-P are of record and
Respondent's excuse that he can no longer recall them is feeble. Respondent's side has been
fully heard in the pleadings he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur.
The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. What due process abhors is absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.7
Contrary to Respondent's claim, the lack of verification in the Complaint formulated by the Bar
Confident, as required by Sec. 1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, is not a fatal defect since the
original letter-complaint, which was forwarded to this Court by the Chief Legal Officer, Ministry of
Tourism, had been sworn and subscribed to by Complainant before the Bar Confidant.
Respondent is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He received from Complainant, his client,
compensation to handle his case in the Trial Court, but the same was dismissed for lack of
interest and failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract ignoring
the most elementary principles of professional ethics.8 That Respondent had ignored the
processes of this Court and it was only after he was suspended from the practice of law that he
surfaced, is highly indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the Court. All the facts
and circumstances taken into consideration, Respondent has proven himself unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Consistent with the policy to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession,
insure the observance of legal ethics, protect the interests of clients and help keep their faith in
attorney's-at-law, the Supreme Court is constrained to disbar a member of the bar who violates
his lawyer's oath for failure to properly attend to a client's case not only once, but on two
occasions, with results highly prejudicial to the interest of the latter. 9
Furthermore, since Complainant's rights as Respondent's client have been prejudiced by the
latter's failure to take the steps necessary for the prosecution of the case Complainant may
recover as a result of such gross negligence and grave professional misconduct. 10
If a judgment is obtained against a party upon a complaint which is radically defective, and he
desires to appeal, and procedures bondsmen, but his attorney neglects to do so until the time for
appeal expires, the attorney is guilty of gross negligence, and is liable for the loss sustained by
the client.11
ACCORDINGLY, for malpractice and violation of his oath as a lawyer, 1) respondent Atty.
Patricio A. Asoy is hereby ordered DISBARRED; and 2) he is hereby ordered to reimburse
complainant, Leonard W. Richards, in the sum of P16,300.00 (P15,000.00 + P1,300.00), the
only sums substantiated by the evidence on record,12 within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the
personal record of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy.
Copy of this Resolution shall likewise be furnished Complainant Leonard W. Richards, via
airmail, at his address of record, 4/169 Avoca Street, Randwick NSW 2031, Australia, with copy
furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs for onward transmittal to the Philippine Consulate
General, Sydney, Australia.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation,
Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The herein respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking
cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report
entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The
report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the
Government's policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —
(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than 15 per cent
to 20 per cent without the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase
school fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the DECS;
(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided that
the total schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and
secondary levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the collegiate level. 1
The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS,
through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as
the respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in
school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the
said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS
issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing
the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the
petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a
telegram to the President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of
Department Order No. 37. 4 No response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the
President.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this
Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring
the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said
Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the
questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said
Department Order was issued.
33 | P a g e
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include
the power to increase school fees. 5
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are
interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are
increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of
substantive and procedural due process of law.
Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent Secretary submitted a Comment
on the Petition. 7The respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that the increase in tuition and
other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not
arbitrary in character. In due time, the petitioner submitted a Reply to the
Comment. 8 Thereafter, We considered the case submitted for resolution.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of
merit.
We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always
include the power to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise
known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational
system in the country, to wit:
SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and
regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy.
xxx xxx xxx 9
Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise
necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law, to wit:
SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education and Culture, charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school
fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as
such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes the due
process clause of the Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department
Order. The petitioner maintains that the due process clause requires that prior notice and
hearing are indispensable for the Department Order to be validly issued.
We disagree.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative
agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may
partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. 9a
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We
believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and
convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not
without any justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be
reasonable to assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based
its decision to allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the
instance of the petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the
original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances
peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.
Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 10 In
the absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of
proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the
petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.
We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the public, especially the parents and the
students of the country. Its zeal in advocating the protection of the consumers in its activities
should be lauded rather than discouraged. But a more convincing case should be made out by it
if it is to seek relief from the courts some time in the future. Petitioner must establish that
respondent acted without or in excess of her jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may issue. 11
This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its judicial imprimatur to
future increases in school fees. The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to
amount to an outrageous exercise of government authority and power. In such an eventuality,
this Court will not hesitate to exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MGG MARINE SERVICES, INC. and/or DOROTEO C. GARLAN and CESAR
ROTILO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELIZABETH
A. MOLINA, respondents.
34 | P a g e
DECISION In her pleadings, private respondent did not give a satisfactory explanation as to why she
violated the instruction given her except to claim that she did not profit by a single centavo from
the withdrawals which she paid to company creditors.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

MGG filed estafa charges against private respondent which were however dismissed.
To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer as a rule must prove (a) that the
termination was due to a just cause and (b) that the employee was afforded due process prior to
dismissal. Does the violation by a comptroller-finance officer of explicit instructions from senior On November 12, 1990, MGG terminated private respondent's employment for loss of trust and
management on how the available liquid resources of the company are to be controlled and confidence. She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MGG and its officers.
disbursed, such violation resulting in the collapse of the company's cash flow constitute loss of
trust and confidence sufficient to justify termination of such management officer? Where the
In a decision dated December 21, 1992, the Labor Arbiter held that: (1) the dismissal was illegal;
presence of just cause is shown, what is the consequence of the non-observance of due
(2) MGG should pay private respondent (a) separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for
process? Is an internal audit sufficient compliance with the due process requirement? These are
every year of service, it appearing that strained relations between the parties rendered
the questions that confronted this Court in resolving this petition for certiorari assailing the
reinstatement impractical; (b) thirteenth month pay in the amount of P16,083.32; (c) overtime
Resolution[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),[2] which affirmed in toto the
pay in the amount of P21,977.52; (d) unpaid salary in the amount of P31,166.66; (e) moral
decision of the Labor Arbiter[3] dated December 21, 1992.
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the wrongful and malicious dismissal in bad faith; and
(f) attorneys fees.[4]
After due deliberation and consultation of the petition, the comments filed by the Solicitor
General and the private respondent as well as the reply thereto, the Court gave due course to
The Labor Arbiter noted:
the petition and considered the case submitted for resolution, without requiring the parties to
submit the memoranda.
In the case at bar, except for their bare self-serving allegation that the complainant had allegedly
misappropriated corporate funds, no proof whatsoever was adduced by respondents and not
The Facts
even a scintilla of evidence was presented to show that the complainant had in fact defrauded
the company to the tune of more than a million pesos. The complainant on the other hand
Private respondent was initially employed by the MGG Marine Services, Inc. (MGG) on July 1, successfully defended herself from said accusations by proving that she was in fact authorized
1988. to disburse the corporate funds in question for the purpose of settling the companys various
accounts with its different creditors. Significantly, respondents made no claim at all that a single
centavo went to the pocket of complainant. Moreover, the complaint for estafa filed against the
On March 25, 1990, the president of MGG, petitioner Doroteo C. Garlan, went to the United
complainant was dismissed by Asst. City Prosecutor Eudoxia T. Gualberto in a resolution dated
States for a brief sojourn. On March 1, 1990, before his departure, he appointed private
September 30, 1991 and a subsequent motion for reconsideration of said dismissal was denied
respondent as comptroller and the over-all supervisor, concurrently with her then position as
by the City Prosecutor of Manila.[5]
financial officer. As comptroller, private respondent was tasked to hold in trust for the company
corporate funds to pay its obligations as authorized by the president and the board of
directors. Petitioner Garlan instructed private respondent to pay the company's obligations as MGG appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to NLRC. In a Resolution dated February 28, 1994,
they fell due. Ma. Lourdes G. Unson, vice-president of MGG who also traveled to the United NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the appealed decision.
States, left with private respondent 79 prepared and pre-signed checks, 16 in blank and 63 with
specific amounts on them, with corresponding vouchers containing the amount of debts due and
Hence this petition for certiorari.
the names of the creditors. Private respondent was specifically told to pay only the creditors
mentioned in the cash vouchers and to place on each of the 16 blank checks the amount stated
in the corresponding check voucher. The said checks were made payable to private respondent, The Issues
who upon withdrawal of the money from the bank, was to pay the same to the creditors.
The issues in this case are:
At the time the aforementioned officers left for abroad, the company had about P1.5 million in its
bank account. The total amount payable to the creditors as appearing in the check vouchers
(1) Was there lawful cause for the dismissal of private respondent?
corresponding to the 16 blank checks was P224,131.50. All payments of the company were
programmed in accordance with its plans and budget for the purpose of maintaining the optimal
level of cash reserve. (2) Did petitioners comply with the procedural requirements for valid dismissal? and

When the corporate officers returned from their trip in June 1990, they were dismayed to learn (3) Were petitioners accorded due process at the hearing before the Labor Arbiter?
that the company's deposits in the bank was reduced to only P5,720.00. It turned out that private
respondent disobeyed the instructions given her not to pay more than what was specified in
check vouchers. She increased the amounts she wrote on the blank checks so that instead of The First Issue:
paying only P224,131.50 as budgeted, she withdrew from the bank an aggregate sum of
P1,515,823.00. Likewise, she paid some creditors who were not specified in the cash Loss of Trust and Confidence in the Employee
vouchers. When the company had to pay an obligation of P15,000.00 on June 7, 1990, private
respondent could only withdraw P5,720.00.

35 | P a g e
MGG asserts that it was legally justified in dismissing private respondent on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence.
We find that there is basis for MGGs loss of trust and confidence in private respondent, who
does not deny that she entered on the blank checks amounts in excess of what had been
provided for in the cash vouchers, and made payments to creditors other than those specified in
said vouchers. In his decision, the Labor Arbiter said that the herein petitioners (respondents
therein) filed a position paper explaining the basis of such loss of confidence and defining the
damage wrought by private respondent Molina, thus:5a
For their part, respondents filed a position paper stating that from the time complainant was
appointed as liquidation officer up to her designation as comptroller of the company, she was
tasked to hold in trust corporate funds; that in March 1990 when respondent Doroteo Garlan left
for the United States, complainant was instructed to take care of the financial requirements of
the company and to disburse amounts payable to creditors as they became due and payable;
that respondent corporation through its vice-president, Ma. Lourdes Unson prepared several
check vouchers with the corresponding blank checks with the amounts reflected on the check
vouchers; that said checks were made payable to complainant for her to facilitate the drawing of
cash from the drawee banks so that cash vouchers would then be used in paying creditors; that
complainant disbursed corporate funds not as instructed but with unexplained misappropriation
or the blank checks that were supposed to have been filled up with amounts reflected on the
corresponding check vouchers were intercolated (sic) with amounts different and more than she
was instructed to place; that an audit was made and it was discovered that complainant was
able to draw, with the use of falsified checks the amount of P1,515,823.00, instead of the
amount of P224,131.50 or an excess of P1,291,691.50, which amount remains unexplained up
to the present; that complainant was asked to explain the over-drawing of corporate funds but
she has failed and in fact refused to submit any explanations; (Italics supplied)
This was buttressed by the affidavit of petitioners witness Renato Jose O. Unson, who explained
the limits of Molinas authority as well as the cash flow damage that her violations thereof caused
the company:5b
(7) Before MGGs senior management left for abroad last March 25, 1990, being a small
company with limited resources, senior management set up a very strict budget so that its
company obligations would be met and paid as they fell due.Molina was informed of the purpose
of senior management in setting up a strict budget and implementation thru the issuance of
various checks;
(8) Thus, several checks including eleven (11) blank checks with their corresponding check
vouchers specifying the amount to be placed and the purpose for which the funds were to be
used were left with Molina who enjoyed complete trust and confidence from senior
management. Molina knew that she was under very strict and specific instructions to fill in the
blank checks with amounts only in accordance with the corresponding check vouchers and to
disburse said funds in accordance with the purpose indicated in the respective check voucher.
Thus Molina knew that she had no authority to fill in the blank checks with amounts different
from that as instructed. She also knew that she had no authority to disburse funds to purposes
different from that indicated in the individual check vouchers;
(9) All the time that senior management was abroad, senior management was constantly in
touch with Molina thru overseas phone calls. In fact, during the first two weeks (from March 25,
1990) management called up Molina at least seven times.
Up to the time of arrival sometime June, 1990. Molina consistently informed senior management
that everything was normal and that the business, its operations, funds; collections and accounts
were in accordance with plans and the budget.
xxx xxx xxx
(12) A corresponding company audit was conducted wherein Molina was further allowed to
explain her actuations. It was then discovered that by taking advantage of the blank checks, she
was able to withdraw amounts in excess of instructions.
In fact, within the short period from March 27, 1990 to April 6, 1990 (senior management left
March 25, 1990) Molina withdrew close to P1,000,000.00 pesos in excess of that instructed her
by already encashing six (6) of the blank checks with amounts in excess of those instructed her.
MGGs funds, were so depleted that Molina on June 7, 1990, could not withdraw the amount she
was authorized, that is, even if she was instructed to put the amount of P15,000.00 in the blank
check, Molina only placed and withdrew the amount of P5,720.00 only;
In all, Molina without any authority whatsoever, by placing in the blank checks amounts in
excess of what she was specifically instructed, withdrew about P1,282,411.00 thereby creating
liability and causing damage and prejudice to MGG. It should be noted that these excess
amounts were part of the unbudgeted and unappropriated corporate funds which only senior
management had the right to withdraw or cause to withdraw;
(13) In short, Molinas authority was limited to the physical withdrawal of MGGs budgeted and
appropriated funds from the bank as indicated in the checks/check vouchers and to disburse
said funds in accordance with specific instructions given her;
The above instructions of senior management were not denied by Molina in her testimony before
said Arbiter:5c
Q. - When they left for the U.S. did they leave you any vouchers?
Miss Molina
A. - They left me vouchers and my guideline (sic) are here (producing a list with the date therein
March 27 consisting of 8 pages). They left me this one as my guidelines (sic) is supported by 79
checks, 16 blank checks and 63 with the amount.
Q. - And these 16 blank checks that you mentioned these were left with you with attached
checks?
A. - Yes, sir.
Summing the prejudice caused by private respondent, petitioners allege as follows in their
Petition[6]before us:
x x x While private respondent was authorized to withdraw from company coffers approximately
P200,000.00, by filling-in the checks amounts in excess of those mentioned in the check
vouchers, she was able to withdraw approximately P1.4 million thereby abruptly reducing the
companys reserve funds by as much as P1.2 million (TSN, June 9, 1992, pp. 43- 44). Thus,
36 | P a g e
when the senior officers returned from the United States, they were surprised to find out that the measure of self-protection.[10] This is all the more true in the case of supervisors or personnel
companys reserve funds have significantly dwindled to such an extent that private respondent occupying positions of responsibility.[11]
on June 7, 1990, could not withdraw the amount she was authorized, that is, even if she was
instructed to put the amount of P15,000.00 in blank check, Molina could only place and withdraw
In the instant case, let it be remembered that the private respondent is not an ordinary rank-and-
the amount of P5,720.00. (par. 12, Affidavit of Atty. Unson dated March 26, 1992; Annex D
file employee. She is the Comptroller-Finance Officer who unarguably violated her duty of
hereof). Obviously, by June 7, 1990, the companys reserve funds have been reduced to a
controlling cash flow andspecific instructions on how the very limited cash of the company was
measly P5,720.00 by reason of the over-withdrawal of private respondent.
to be spent. It would be extremely oppressive and cruel to require petitioners to retain in their
innermost sanctum of management an officer (not just a rank-and-file employee) who has
Bearing in mind the purposes and objectives of setting-up the reserve fund, it is respectfully admitted not only violating specific instructions but also to being completely unreliable and
maintained that the abrupt reduction thereof from P1.4 million pesos to the measly sum untrustworthy in the discharge of her duty to safeguard the cash flow of the company.
P5,720.00 in a span of three (3) months from March to June 7, 1990, brought untold miseries on
petitioner MGG. Petitioner found its checks bouncing one after the other. It failed to meet its
That the complaint for estafa filed by MGG against private respondent was dismissed is also of
financial obligations to its preferred creditors. It had to source financial resources elsewhere in
no moment. The rule is that an employees acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude a
order to pay its due and demandable debts, not to mention its obligations to its employees.
finding that he has been guilty of acts inimical to the employers interest. [12]

It is, therefore, incorrect for public respondent NLRC to rule that private respondents act of over-
Corollarily, proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employees misconduct is not required in
withdrawing from the companys reserve funds did not cause any damage or prejudice unto
dismissing and employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The quantum of proof
petitioner MGG.
required is only substantial evidence.[13] In the case before us, there was an admitted, actual and
real breach of duty committed by private respondent, which was the basis of MGGs loss of trust
The Labor Arbiter labored under the wrong impression that private respondent was dismissed and confidence in her.
merely because she embezzled company funds saying that "x x x except for their bare self-
serving allegation that the complainant (private respondent herein) had allegedly
While it is true that initially during the proceedings before the labor tribunals, petitioners were
misappropriated corporate funds, no proof whatsoever was adduced by respondents (petitioner
also faulting Molina for estafa, in addition to loss of confidence, they have abandoned
herein) and not even a scintilla of evidence was presented to show that the complainant had in
misappropriation, in the instant petition, as a ground for dismissal (since the criminal complaint
fact defrauded the company to the tune of more than a million pesos (supra). The NLRC, also
against her was dismissed) and instead relied on the second ground, namely, loss of confidence
falling into the same error as the Labor Arbiter, said:
resulting from her disobedience and unfaithfulness in the discharge of her duties which we hold
as sufficient cause for her dismissal under the circumstances.
x x x the complainant had shown to Our satisfaction that in the questioned transactions, she
never defrauded the company as the monies so defrayed were used to settle various corporate
The Second Issue: Procedural Due Process
accounts x x x.[7]

To constitute a completely valid and faultless dismissal, it is well-settled that the employer must
The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter did not realize that the acts of private respondent complained
show not only sufficient ground therefor but it must also prove that it observed procedural due
of had placed the company in great jeopardy and disturbed its financial stability, thereby causing
process by giving the employee two notices: one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein
it real and actual damage.[8]
his acts or omissions complained against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an
opportunity to answer and rebut the charges against him, in between such notices.
Indeed, private respondents disobedience and precipitated actions caused great damage to the
companys cash flow. In the harsh world of business, cash flow is as important as and
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in
oftentimes, even more critical than profitability. So long as an enterprise has enough liquidity
cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee
(cash) to pay its workers, requisition fuel, meet office rentals, maintain its equipment and satisfy
concerned of the employers intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon
its life-line creditors within tolerable limits, it will survive and bridge better days for its
the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his
recovery. But once it fails to pay such bills because its liquid resources are improvidently used
employers charges against him accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is
and disbursed, as private respondent did in the instant case, it runs the all-too-real risk
effected. Neither of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the
of immediatecollapse. No wonder, petitioners were rightfully aghast when upon their return from
due process requirement of the 1987 Constitution.[14]
abroad, they discovered that their treasury was almost completely drained, with a measly
P5,720.00 remaining.
In the case before us, the petitioners found out about the excess withdrawals when an audit was
conducted. The record is devoid of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the
Private respondent took it upon herself to disburse the company funds in amounts and for
charges against her.Neither was she given a hearing or opportunity to present her defense. The
purposes of her own discretion, and in disregard of the program and plans of the company. She
only allegation of petitioners was that she was asked questions about her withdrawals during the
arrogated to herself the combined powers of the management and the board of directors of the
audit. But these are too scant and too bare to amount to due process. There was no indication of
company.
the nature and the type of questions asked, the process of the supposed inquiry, the time and
opportunity given for her defense, and the degree of explanation allowed her.
An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the
interests of the employer.[9] A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a
When this issue was brought up by the Solicitor General in his Comment, all that the petitioners
could say in their Reply was:

37 | P a g e
There is no dispute that private respondent Molina was audited upon arrival of the senior
management from the United States and that she herself admits that she was asked questions
and was allowed to explain her side (pp. 28-18 (sic), TSN, July 26, 1991).[15]
Plainly, this is not sufficient compliance with due process. An audit cannot take the place of the
twin requirements of notices and hearing. At the very least, petitioners failed to show they
followed these requirements.
There is also no showing that the requirements of due process were adequately met by the
petitioners.
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss
him. (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with
illegality. This procedure is mandatory; in the absence of which, any judgment reached by
management is void and inexistent (Tingson, Jr. v. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National
Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 [1988]; Ruffy v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).[16]
This failure to show due process taints the dismissal. This does not mean however that the
private respondent would be entitled to backwages or reinstatement or even separation
pay.[17] Under prevailing jurisprudence, she is entitled only to indemnity or damages, the amount
of which depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.[18]
In Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC, et al.[19], which is the leading example of these indemnity
cases, the private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, as a result of which both
were suspended the following morning, and in the afternoon of the same day private respondent
was dismissed. In justifying his dismissal, the Court held:
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee
without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until
his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction,
when it appears he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for
just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceedings in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer
to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges
that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service.
Thus in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper,
caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him,
should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages. It may encourage him to do even
worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to
observe. Under the circumstances the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should
be maintained. He has no right to return to his former employer.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private
respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as
above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after
due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be
imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required
by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this
case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of
this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer.
In Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. et al. vs. NLRC, et al.[20] the employer was also ordered to pay the
private respondent P1,000.00 as indemnification for (petitioners) failure to observe the
requirements of due process prior to termination of private respondents employment for just
cause. Following this doctrine, the Court in Aurelio vs. NLRC, et al.[21] ruled that where there was
a valid ground to dismiss an employee but there was non-observance of due process x x x only
a sanction must be imposed upon the employer x x x and that the NLRC erred when it awarded
separation pay x x x.
In Reta vs. NLRC, et al.,[22] the award was raised to P10,000.00 considering that petitioner was
given his walking papers and forced to leave his ship in a foreign port x x x. The said sum of
P10,000.00 was considered fair, reasonable and realistic in Alhambra Industries Inc. vs. NLRC
et al.,[23] the Court adding that termination of a worker for cause, even without procedural due
process, does not warrant reinstatement, but the employer incurs liability for damages. [24]
In striking down the claim for backwages and separation pay where just cause is clearly shown,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado in Cathedral School of Technology vs.
NLRC, et al., (supra), said:
x x x (B)ackwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a worker or employee
has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private respondents dismissal is for just cause, as is
the case herein, there is no factual or legal basis to order payment of backwages; otherwise,
private respondent would be unjustly enriching herself at the expense of petitioners. Where the
employees dismissal was for a just cause, it would be neither fair nor just to allow the employee
to recover something he has not earned or could not have earned.
Neither can there be an award for separation pay. In Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. vs.
Maalat, et al., we reiterated the categorical abandonment of the doctrine that employees
dismissed for cause are entitled to separation pay on the ground of social and compassionate
justice. x x x (citations omitted.)
In the instant case, following the jurisprudence firmly established in the aforecited cases, she is
entitled to indemnity of P1,000.00.
The Third Issue:
Due Process at the Labor Arbiters Forum
Petitioners maintained that they were denied due process when the Labor Arbiter considered the
case submitted for resolution notwithstanding the fact that petitioners had manifested their
intention to present additional evidence.
We do not agree.
Petitioners first asked to be allowed to present additional evidence at the hearing on June 9,
1992 but they manifested that the documents they intended to present were not then
available. The Labor Arbiter allowed petitioners to present the documents at the next hearing,
July 7, 1994. As that next hearing day was declared a special non-working holiday, the case was
reset to August 4, 1992. Inasmuch as the counsel for petitioners had to attend to another urgent
38 | P a g e
matter on August 4, 1992, he failed to appear at the hearing, although he filed a motion for
postponement. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion and issued an order considering the case
as submitted for resolution. On motion for reconsideration of petitioners, the Labor Arbiter reset
the case for the reception of additional evidence on October 30, 1992. Petitioners again failed to
appear on said date, prompting the Labor Arbiter to consider the case submitted for resolution.
Under the foregoing circumstances we cannot say that the Labor Arbiter abused his discretion in
considering the case submitted for resolution on October 30, 1992. There is no denial of due
process where the party was given an opportunity to present his case, which he did not take
advantage of.
That being the case, the claim of private respondent for thirteenth month pay (P16,083.32),
overtime pay (P21,977.56), and unpaid salary (P31,166.66) stands unrebutted.
Refutation of Mr. Justice Punos Dissent
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno contends that there is substantial
evidence on record to justify the factual finding of the Arbiter and the NLRC, and thus faults the
majority with a deviation from the age-old rule that we accord the highest consideration to the
factual findings of labor arbiters especially when they are affirmed by the NLRC.
There is no such deviation. The labor tribunals, as stated earlier, found the private respondents
dismissal unjustified because the complainant had shown to Our satisfaction that in the
questioned transactions, she never defrauded the company as the monies so defrayed were
used to settle various corporate accounts x x x[25] and none of such monies went to her private
pocket. This is correct and if that is all that private respondent was faulted with, we would have
supported the tribunal a quo all the way. But, to repeat, we are not finding her guilty of any
dishonesty. We find that her ill-considered, imprudent and precipitate acts of misusing the very
limited cash of the company, in violation of her inherent duties as Comptroller/Finance Officer
and of the specific instructions of top management caused the near collapse of the
company. We are not reversing the factual findings that private respondent was NOT guilty of
any fraud. But based on the facts as found by the arbiter and the respondent Commission and
borne out by the records, viz., (a) petitioners position paper before the labor arbiter, (b) affidavit
of witness Renato Unson, (c) admissions of private respondent during her testimony before the
labor arbiter, and (d) pertinent allegations in the petition before us, we conclude that there is
more than sufficient basis for the companys loss of trust and confidence in private
respondent. Even Mr. Justice Puno concedes that (and we quote him) there is no doubt that
private respondent entered on the blank checks amounts in excess of what had been specified
in the cash vouchers and she also made payments to creditors other than those named in said
vouchers. This critical fact, conceded by our esteemed colleague, was altogether ignored by the
respondent Commission and the arbiter. In short, we used the same facts brought out before the
lower tribunals in arriving at our conclusion of law a conclusion such tribunals ought to have
made also.
Our dissenting colleague also maintains that private respondent had authority to make the
above-described alterations in the checks and in paying creditors other than those named in the
vouchers, in the absence of specific instructions. His contention lacks basis. Such instructions,
aside from having been presented in petitioners position paper before the arbiter as well as
through the testimony of witness Renato Unson, were also expressly admitted by respondent
Molina in her testimony as quoted in the dissent when she produced her guideline 8 pages long
on how the 79 checks, 16 blank checks and 63 with amounts were to be spent/used.
And even assuming arguendo that there were no specific written instructions, still, Molina was
not a mere clerk but a high corporate officer whose primary and usual duty is/was to control
corporate funds. While in hindsight it is easy to blame petitioners for not documenting their
instructions as insisted by the dissent, it is however not difficult to understand that ordinary
business activities are performed in the normal course without anticipation nor foreknowledge of
litigation, often with dispatch and usually with a minimum of documentation. Considering that the
matter of paying off creditors subject to the constraints of the companys available funds is a
fairly routine business activity and part and parcel of the normal job functions of a comptroller or
finance officer, and considering further that blank checks and supporting vouchers which were
all in writing had been prepared in advance, specific detailed written instructions on what to do
with them would have been appropriate only for a non-thinking clerk and would have been
unusual in fact, even insulting for such comptroller-finance officer. But the immutable fact is that
such instructions were in fact documented. And that notwithstanding, respondent Molina still
acted imprudently and contrary to those instructions.
Mr. Justice Puno also argues that there is no evidence to support petitioners claims of bouncing
checks as a result of Molinas acts. But the majoritys ruling is NOT based at all on such claims of
bouncing checks, but on the precipitate acts of the comptroller which jeopardized the cash flow
of the company. Where a companys current cash resources are not enough to pay off all current
liabilities and obligations, it is the fundamental role of a comptroller/finance officer, even in the
total absence of specific instructions, to allocate available funds to the most critical and
immediate needs and to see to it that there are funds left over to enable the company to
continue operations. Where available funds are not sufficient to meet all obligations, it is a most
basic rule in management to adhere to an order of priorities in the settlement of accounts. In
such situation, payment of lower-priority obligations must necessarily be postponed. For
instance, paying office rentals in advance is not objectionable per se, since such obligation must
be paid anyway. But where such advance payment prevents the company from discharging
more pressing obligations like payment of wages, it is precipitate and ill-considered. And where
the actuations of a comptroller/finance officer, instead of keeping the company afloat, almost
shipwrecks it upon the shoals of illiquidity and bankruptcy, there is certainly a cause for loss of
trust and confidence in the ability and judgment of said comptroller/finance officer.
Lastly, we pass sub silencio Mr. Justice Punos submission for the Court to re-examine the
NLRCs ruling on strained relations. In view of our holding that there was just cause for the
dismissal, such NLRC ruling is now clearly irrelevant in this Decision.
Summation
IN SUM, we rule that the dismissal of private respondent had substantial basis. But because
petitioners have failed to show strict observance of due process they should, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, pay indemnity of P1,000.00. In addition, they should also pay private
respondent the unrebutted claims for thirteenth month pay, overtime pay and unpaid salary. So
too, we delete the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in the absence of proof of bad
faith and malice on the part of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The dismissal of private respondent is
deemed with just cause. The assailed Resolution is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED. Instead, petitioners are ordered to pay to private respondent the following
sums, viz., (a) indemnity of P1,000.00, (b) thirteenth month pay of P16,083.32, (c) overtime pay
of P21,977.56 and (d) unpaid salary of P31,166.66.
SO ORDERED.
CONRADO SAMILLANO and MYRNA V. SAMILLANO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, DAN-AGSA DAKBAYAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
RADIO STATION DXDD, MSGR. JESUS DOSADO and SIMPLICIA NERI, respondents.
39 | P a g e
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court refers to two (2) cases filed by
petitioner-spouses Conrado and Myrna Samillano against private respondents Dan-ag sa
Dakbayan Broadcasting Corporation-Radio Station DXDD and/or Msgr. Jesus Dosado and/or
Simplicia Neri, Chairman of the Board and Manager respectively of said respondent corporation.
The first case, filed by petitioner-spouses on 8 February 1991, is a complaint for illegal demotion
while the second complaint filed on 20 May 1991 is for illegal dismissal, payment of backwages,
commissions and other monetary claims.
The two (2) complaints before Regional Arbitration Branch No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC RAB Case Nos. 10-03-00195
and 10-06-00371-91 were later consolidated since they involve the same parties and issues.
The undisputed facts of the two (2) cases are as follows:
1. Petitioner-spouses Conrado and Myrna Samillano were hired by private respondents on 1
October 1981 and 1 August 1983 respectively;
2. On 2 October 1990, Conrado Samillano was transferred to the Technical Department as an
SSB Operator from his previous position as Traffic Supervisor of private respondent
corporation. On the same day, his wife Myrna V. Samillano was transferred to the AM
Production Department from her position as cashier of respondent corporation;
3. As a result of the transfers, the petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for illegal demotion
contending that the transfers resulted in loss of commissions and violated their security of
tenure;
4. On 20 May 1991, petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for illegal dismissal contending that
private respondents terminated their employment on 23 April 1991 without any lawful cause;
5. Private respondents relied on allegations that petitioner-spouses misappropriated funds of the
radio station and committed acts of insubordination which resulted in loss of trust and
confidence, upon which their dismissals were based;
6. In a supplemental position paper, herein petitioners contended that their demotion and
subsequent dismissal were retaliatory acts of private respondents for their having reported
violations by private respondents of labor laws particularly underpayment/nonpayment of
salaries and other benefits;
Labor Arbiter Noel Augusto S. Magbanua, to whom the cases were assigned, found that
sometime in July 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment conducted an inspection of
the premises of private respondent corporation and initially found deficiencies in wages and
other benefits given to employees.
It was further determined that in March or April 1990, private respondents conducted meetings
with their employees seeking a compromise of the unpaid benefits. Some employees executed
waivers of further claims against private respondents. Herein petitioners refused to sign said
waivers.
The labor arbiter formulated the following issues for resolution: [1]
1) whether complainants demotion and subsequent termination of employment were retaliatory
acts for complainants having allegedly reported respondents violations of labor laws,
2) whether complainants demotions were illegal; and
3) whether complainants terminations from employment were illegal.
The labor arbiter resolved the first two (2) issues in the negative. He declared that no evidence
was presented to show that the demotions of petitioners were linked to their reporting of alleged
violations by private respondents of the Labor Code.
The labor arbiter further upheld managements prerogative, in the absence of bad faith, to protect
its rights in relation to the alleged offenses committed by petitioners. The demotions of
petitioners were therefore upheld.
With respect to the dismissal of petitioners from employment, however, the labor arbiter found
that the alleged misappropriations of funds committed by petitioners were not adequately
substantiated. Hence, the dismissal of petitioners was declared illegal.
The labor arbiter ruled however that instead of reinstatement, it would be for the best interest of
the parties considering the strained relations between them, to award petitioners separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Full backwages were not awarded
based on findings that petitioners acted in an arrogant and uncooperative manner during the
investigation of their case which could be a possible reason why private respondents were not
able to prove the formers involvement in the financial irregularities subject of this case. [2] Only six
(6) months backwages were awarded to each of the complainants (herein petitioners).
Finally, the labor arbiter denied petitioners claims for unpaid commissions for lack of evidence.
Appeal by private respodnents to the NLRC was dismissed on 9 February 1994 for their failure
to properly perfect their appeal. The NLRC found that private respondents had filed their notice
of appeal without attaching thereto their appeal memorandum as required by Section 3 Rule VI
of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. There was therefore failure to perfect the appeal within
the reglementary period of ten (10) days from receipt of the assailed labor arbiters decision.
On 30 June 1994, the NLRC reinstated the appeal based on findings that while the notice of
appeal and appeal memorandum were received by the NLRC on 15 July 1993 and 20 July 1993
respectively, or way beyond the period for appeal which expired on 3 July 1993, both pleadings
were, however, actually mailed on 2 July 1993 as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 77 of the
Tangub Post Office.[3]
On the merits of the appeal, the NLRC ruled that private respondents have substantiated their
claim of having lost trust and confidence in petitioners due to serious irregularities in the
performance of their duties.
40 | P a g e
The NLRC held that, contrary to the findings of the labor arbiter, an audit report submitted by a The legality of petitioners dismissal would be determined based on whether or not private
certain Domeciano Adaya dated 17 September 1990 showed substantial evidence of petitioners respondents have proved the basis for loss of trust and confidence upon which the dismissals
involvement in irregularities including misappropriations of funds, non-turnover of collections and are based.
misuse of funds for personal purposes. The NLRC relied on reports made by Janice Poncianos,
the Finance Department Business Head of respondent corporations radio station addressed to
In China City Restaurant Corporation v. NLRC[8] the Court held thus:
the station manager as well as the report of the station manager to the chairman of the board of
respondent corporation on the alleged acts of herein petitioners.[4]
For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for the dismissal of employees, it must be
substantial and not arbitrary, whimsical, capricious or concocted.
Based on the above findings, the NLRC set aside the assailed decision and ruled that petitioners
were validly dismissed. However, private respondents were ordered to indemnify petitioners the
amount of P2,000.00 each for violation of the latters right to due process. The NLRC agreed with Irregularities or malpractices should not be allowed to escape the scrutiny of this
the petitioners that there was no formal investigation wherein the latter were given the chance to Court. Solicitude for the protection of the rights of the working class are of prime
defend themselves against the charges levelled against them. [5] importance. Although this is not a license to disregard the rights of management, still the Court
must be wary of the ploys of management to get rid of employees it considers as undesirable.
In their petition before this Court, it is argued by petitioners that:
The NLRC based its decision upholding petitioners dismissal on the conclusion that the
irregularities involving petitioners were more than sufficient to make out a case of loss of trust
1. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the dismissals of herein petitioners
and confidence.[9]
were valid; and

Said irregularities allegedly involving petitioners were enumerated in An Updated Report dated
2. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in merely imposing a sanction on private respondents
17 August 1990 submitted by the Finance Department Business Head Janice Procianos and
for violation of petitioners right to due process.[6]
various letter-memos to petitioners as well as the audit report dated 17 September 1990
submitted by Domeciano Adaya.
Before ruling on the merits of this petition, the Court takes notice of a peculiar circumstance
regarding the appeal of the private respondents from the decision of the labor arbiter.
But petitioners correctly argue that the above-mentioned documents do not provide enough
basis for termination of their employment based on loss of trust and confidence.
In the resolution reinstating private respondents appeal, the NLRC found that the notice of
appeal and memorandum on appeal were received on 15 July 1993 and 20 July
The Adaya audit report in part reads:
1993 respectively. The reason for reinstating the appeal was the finding that both pleadings
were actually mailed on 2 July 1993 as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 77 postmarked on the
same date at the Tangub City Post Office. I am suggesting with a request that the above-mentioned observations be reviewed and
confirmed by the Station Accountant, Bookkeeper, Collector and Cashier or Cash Custodian in
my presence in fairness to everyone before I give conclusion, implication or opinion to these
It is unexplained however why two (2) pleadings mailed together using a single registry receipt
observations. They may also give comments or raise objections, if any. The comments or
and presumably contained in one (1) envelope would be received on two (2) different dates. It
objections may be made orally or in writing.
should be pointed out that in the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the
appeal, herein private respondents averred mailing only the notice of appeal and a postal money
order to cover appeal fees on 2 July l993. Be that as it may, the Court shall proceed to resolve In this connection, as I dont have line authority over the personnel concerned may I request you
this case on the merits despite the possible technicality of the appeal being filed late with the to ask them to review and confirm by observations.
NLRC. The NLRC is however reminded to be more accurate in recording the dates of mailing
and receipt of pleadings filed before it since this is essential in the speedy and correct
There is no evidence to show that herein private respondents undertook to review and/or confirm
disposition of cases.
the observations contained in the audit report as recommended by the audit report itself.

Petitioners do not dispute before this Court the validity of their re-assignments. It is clear that the
On the contrary, even in their comment on the petition filed with this Court, which respondents
re-assignments were a valid exercise of management prerogative pending investigation of the
alleged irregularities. The purpose of the re-assignments is no different from that of preventive later adopted as their memorandum, the dismissal of herein petitioners is justified mainly on the
suspension which private respondents could likewise have validly imposed on petitioners; to basis of said audit report submitted by Domeciano Adaya.[10]
protect the employers property pending investigation of the alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee.[7] It is, however, clear from the above-quoted portion of the audit report that the findings contained
therein do not categorically find herein petitioners guilty of committing irregularities. The clear
import of the said audit report is that further investigation and verification would be necessary to
In the present case, the labor arbiter correctly held that there is no evidence to show that the
transfer of petitioners to other positions and the subsequent termination of their employment pinpoint the source of the irregularities.
were retaliatory acts of private respondents for petitioners reporting of the alleged violations by
private respondents of the Labor Code.

41 | P a g e
There is thus no evidence on record to show that any further investigation and verification were STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
done by private respondents. What is apparent is that petitioners were made to answer charges COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL R. CADAY and RENATO SIOJO, respondent.
of misconduct based on suspicions which lacked adequate basis.
DECISION
While the law and this Court recognize the right of an employer to dismiss an employee based
on loss of trust and confidence, the formers evidence must clearly and convincingly establish the
ROMERO, J.:
facts upon which the loss of trust and confidence in the employee is based.[11]

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioner seeking to annul the decision
In the present case, the unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless conclusions of private
of the labor arbiter and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (Third
respondents do not provide legal justification for dismissing herein petitioners. The doubt in this
Division, Quezon City) finding that petitioner illegally dismissed private respondent Renato Siojo
case should be resolved in favor of labor pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and
from his employment. The labor arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Siojo the unexpired portion of
the Constitution.
his contract equivalent to three months salaries and attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter and later dismissed petitioners motion for
Finally, on petitioners right to due process, we uphold the NLRC findings that no formal reconsideration.
investigation was conducted prior to dismissal of petitioners. Private respondents thus failed to
adequately comply with the requirement that an employee should be given the opportunity to be
The relevant facts are as follows:
heard and to defend himself before he is dismissed. In San Antonio v. NLRC,[12] the Court stated
that Proper compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing are conditions sine qua
non before a dismissal may be validly effected. x x x Any procedural shortcut, that effectively Sometime in January 1994, private respondent Renato Siojo was hired as a Second Officer of
allows an employer to assume the roles of both accuser and judge at the same time, should not Stolt Falcon, a vessel of petitioner Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc., for a period of nine
be countenanced. (emphasis supplied). months with a basic salary of US$1,024.00. He boarded the vessel on February 22, 1994, and
immediately commenced to discharge his duties and responsibilities as Second Officer. After
working for just two months, however, he was sent home and it was only upon his arrival in
In the present case, the notices/memoranda to petitioners requiring explanations/answers to the
Manila that he learned of the reason for his termination.
charges against them were plainly meant to provide a semblance of compliance with the due
process requirement which the NLRC correctly ruled to be inadequate.
For its part, petitioner claimed that after a month on board the Stolt Falcon, Siojo started
committing acts of gross insubordination towards his superiors by refusing to communicate with
The Court will not be deceived by schemes to circumvent the requirements of law and the
them with regard to navigation, safety, and cargo. He also allegedly failed to acknowledge or
Constitution. For failure to fully comply with the requirements of due process, private
relay to the relieving personnel/officer any bride night order and wilfully refused to take part in
respondents should, as a matter of course, indemnify the petitioners but we refrain from
cargo operations. Furthermore, on at least three occasions, he refused to wear his safety hat
awarding damages on this score since we are awarding separation pay and backwages due to
during mooring and unmooring, in violation of the companys safety procedures.
petitioners illegal dismissal.

The above-finding that petitioners were illegally dismissed normally requires that they be
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions with full backwages. In this case, however, the
relationships between petitioners and private respondents have undoubtedly become very
strained, hence, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is proper.[13] However, as a consequence
of petitioners illegal dismisal, full backwages from date of dismissal to the finality of this decision
are due the petitioners in line with the ruling in the Bustamante case. [14]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
1. DECLARING the dismissal from employment of petitioners NULL and VOID;
It was also alleged that Siojo refused to follow instructions given by the Chief Officer regarding
cargo operations and did not read the Cargo Safety Data Sheets, such that , on one occasion,
he blew the lines against a closed shore connection valve resulting in the spillage of 100 litters of
cargo into the deck air compressor tank.
Thus, on March 28, 1994, Siojo was summoned to explain his attitude to the master of the
vessel. He, however, allegedly became very agitated and rude, stating that he should not be
made to sign any statement. Convinced that Siojos acts of insubordination and hostile attitude
were prejudicial to the safety and operations of the vessel, and finding that he failed to perform
his duty as deck officer as confirmed by his unsatisfactory ratings, his superiors recommended
his discharge.

2. ORDERING private respondents to pay petitioners separation pay at the rate of ONE-HALF
(1/2) MONTH salary for every year of service; and
3. ORDERING private respondents to pay petitioners full backwages from date of illegal
dismissal to the finality of this decision.
On the other hand, Siojo insisted that all the acts imputed to him were fabricated by petitioner in
order to avoid its liability for his illegal dismissal. In support of his allegations, Siojo submitted
photocopies of the ships logbook for the period March 25 to April 11, 1994, showing that there
was no report of any offense or violation of company rules he had supposedly committed. He
pointed out that the logbook had no entries of the infractions he allegedly committed on March
27 and 28, 1994, respectively.

SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday ruled that Siojo was dismissed without just
cause and without being accorded due process. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

42 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the
complainant illegal and ordering respondent Stolt Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. to pay the
corresponding salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract but not exceeding the equivalent
of three (3) months salaries or in the amount of $3,072.00 which under the current peso dollar
exchange rate is equivalent to P80,486.40.
For having been compelled to hire services of counsel to prosecute his valid and just claims, the
respondent is further ordered to pay the complainant (sic), the equivalent of 10% of the
recoverable award in this case.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Aggrieved by the labor arbiters decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The latter denied the
appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. The NLRC likewise denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that the labor arbiter and the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
considering its evidence and in finding that Siojo was illegally dismissed.
On the labor arbiters and NLRCs appreciation of the facts, it is worth reiterating the well-
entrenched rule that when the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the
evidence on record, the same should be respected by appellate tribunals since he is in a better
position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties. [2] Moreover, it should be
noted that factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, as the power of the Supreme
Court to review labor cases is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. [3]
In the case at bar, the findings of the labor arbiter Siojo was dismissed without just cause and
without being accorded due process is supported by the facts and evidence on record. In
support of his denial of the infractions he allegedly committed, Siojo presented in evidence
photocopies of the ships official logbook entries for the period March 25 to April 11, 1994. Such
entries failed to reflect any of the infractions allegedly committed by Siojo; neither did they
contain any statement regarding the investigation supposedly conducted on board the vessel.
Petitioners evidence, on the other hand, consisting of the notice of investigation and notice of
termination which were authenticated by the Honorary Consulate General of the Philippines in
Rotterdam, Netherlands, appear to be irrelevant.The date of the authentication appeared as
3/5/94 which the labor arbiter read as March 5, 1994. He correctly disregarded such evidence
since it is obvious that said notices were authenticated even before the dates of the alleged
infractions, that is, from March 26 to 28, 1994.
Petitioner explained that the date 3/5/94 actualy stands for May 3, 1994, as it is customary in
European countries to write dates in numbers with the first digit representing the day and the
second digit, the month. In any case, the Philippine Consul General in Rotterdam would not
have authenticated the documents if they were indeed anomalous or irregular.
On this point, it should be observed that the entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This means that
such evidence is satisfactory only if they are uncontradicted by contrary evidence. In the case at
bar, the employee refuted the authenticity of the notices of investigation and termination,
presenting for his part photocopies of certain pages of the vessels logbook showing that there
was, in fact, no record of the violations he was accused of.
Furthermore, the labor arbiters finding that 3/5/94 meant March 5, 1994, not May 3, 1994, is
logical since the documents were authenticated by Philippine consular officials whose customary
manner of writing dates in numbers is by making the first digit represent the month, the second
digit the day, and the last digits the year. Second, petitioner could have presented other
evidence to support its allegation that the documents were indeed authenticated on May 3,
1994, but it did not.It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation.[4] While technical rules are not strictly followed in the NLRC, this does not mean that
the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare allegations are not enough;
these must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least.
Petitioner further asserts that even assuming that Siojo was not afforded the opportunity to
explain his side, his discharge was not thereby rendered illegal since there was just cause for his
removal, that is, gross insubordination. In support of this argument, petitioner relies on the ruling
in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC[5], as reiterated in Cathedral School of Technology vs.
NLRC,[6] where it was held that an employee who was dismissed for just cause but was not
given an notice and hearing is not entitled to reinstatement and back wages. In such case, the
employer should be made to pay an indemnity for his failure to observe the requirements of due
process.
The rule is well established that in termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause
for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so shall result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified.[7] In the present case, petitioner failed to prove by substantial
evidence that Siojo indeed committed acts of insubordination which would warrant his
dismissal. Its reliance on Wenphil is, therefore, misplaced since in that case, there was just
cause for the employees dismissal.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia:
(a) xxx xxx xxx"
"(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and notice under Article 283
of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of causes for termination and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with assistance of his representative if
he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. xxx
In particular, Rule XXIII , Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:
Section 2. Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
43 | P a g e
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
xxx xxx xxx."
In sum, to effect a completely valid and unassailable dismissal, the employer must show not only
sufficient ground therefore, but must also prove that procedural due process had been observed
by giving the employee two notices.[8] In this, petitioner was remiss, hence, it should suffer the
consequences.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
decision of the labor arbiter dated June 21, 1996, and the resolution of the NLRC dated
November 14, 1996, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered
to pay private respondent Siojo his salary for the entire unexpired portion of the employment
contract, that is, one thousand twenty-four US dollars ($1,024.00) multiplied by seven months,
for a total of seven thousand one hundred sixty-eight US dollars (US$7,168.00), or its equivalent
in Philippine pesos plus interest and attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LUVIMINO P. CASUELA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and JOSE L.
VALERIANO, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution[1] dated
July 22, 1993 and the Order[2] dated October 5, 1993, both issued by the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman (hereafter, the Ombudsman), imposing a
three-month suspension on petitioner who was found liable for inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties.[3]
The undisputed facts of the case are the following:
On February 6, 1992, Mary Elaine Bonito filed a complaint against private respondent Jose
Valeriano, then an employee of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), for
allegedly receiving P5,000.00 for the processing of her papers with the POEA x x x.
On February 6, 1992, Bonito withdrew her complaint against Valeriano for the reason that the
amount was returned through Romeo Solis, brother-in-law of Bonito.
Private respondent Valeriano was furnished a copy of the complaint on February 6, 1992, and
was given a period of 72 hours from receipt of the notice to file his written answer.
On February 6, 1992, the POEA Administrative Complaint Committee, composed of Atty.
Vicente Jariol as Chairman, and Attys. Josefina Bilar and [petitioner] Luvimino Casuela as
members, set the case for hearing at 11:00 a.m. on the same day for the reason that Bonito was
set to leave for overseas employment at 10:15 p.m. of that day x x x. Petitioner was preventively
suspended effective February 10, 1992 x x x.
The case was set for further hearings on February 14, 18, 21, March 2, 10 and 19, 1992. On
February 21, 1992, Romeo Solis, brother-in-law of Bonito, and Nony Albarracin, executed a
sworn statement absolving Mr. Jose L. Valeriano for whatever liability be it administratively
and/or whatsoever, for his role only was to advise us that POEA gives assistance to all overseas
contract workers x x x.
In a Decision dated May 4, 1992, signed by then POEA Deputy Administrator and Officer-in-
Charge Manuel Imson, private respondent was declared liable for acts of dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Accordingly, private respondent is
adjudged and meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service pursuant to Section 23 (a),
Rule XIV of the CSC Omnibus Rules x x x.
The decision of the POEA was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in an Order
dated November 27, 1992 x x x.
On August 12, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner and the other members of the Administrative Complaint[s] Committee for willful
violation of Section 36, Article IX of the Civil Service Law.
Petitioner and the other members of the Administrative Complaint[s] Committee filed with the
Ombudsman a joint comment on the complaint, alleging that they acted within the scope of their
functions and in good faith.[4]
After considering all the evidence, it was not lost on the Ombudsman that the Administrative
Complaints Committee, of which petitioner was a member, in conducting the investigation
respecting Bonitos complaint on the very day that private respondent Valeriano was furnished a
copy of said complaint, violated the five-day bar imposed on any administrative investigation as
provided in Section 38, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus ruled the Ombudsman:
x x x On February 6, 1992, Valeriano was furnished a copy of the complaint-affidavit with the
instruction to file his answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. This
notwithstanding, the hearing of the case was set at 11:30 a.m. of the same day, February 6,
1993, with the warning that should Valeriano fail to attend the scheduled hearing, it will be
considered as a waiver for Valeriano to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses and
the committee will proceed with the hearing for the reception of evidence of the complainant x x
x.
xxx
x x x Respondent Valeriano was furnished a copy of the complaint on February 6, 1993. While
he was given 72 hours from receipt to submit his answer, the hearing of the complaint was held
on the same day in flagrant violation of Rule XIV, Sec. 38 of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Execution Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, which provides:
Sec. 38. The investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor later than ten days from the
date of receipt of respondents answer. x x x
44 | P a g e
Such acts should not be countenanced. As lawyers, the members of the Administrative This complaint is not frivolous x x x. This Office cannot overstress the need for a more
Complaints Committee should be familiar with existing rules in the hearing of administrative circumspect and proper behavior on the part of x x x hearing officers upon whom the life of a
cases. The act of the Committee in conducting hearing on the case even before respondent man depends.
could file his answer shows excessive use of authority if not unlawful behaviour, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties.[5]
xxx

Petitioner was consequently found liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
As stated earlier, while this Office fully appreciates the x x x giving [of] immediate assistance and
official duties and meted out the penalty of three (3) months suspension pursuant to Section 23
protection to overseas workers[7] x x x it is equally deplorable not to give protection to the rights
(p), Rule XIV of the CSC Omnibus Rules and Regulations.
of the people being complained of. It is the perception of this Office that Sec. 38 of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 is mandatory and not merely
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the aforecited Resolution on the following grounds: (1) that directory.
the charge against him as set forth in private respondents complaint was one for oppression and
rendering a judgment through negligence; (2) that private respondent was not deprived of his
Still unable to accept the postulations of the Ombudsman, petitioner filed the instant petition
right to due process; (3) that the presumption of regularity of the committee proceedings should
for certiorari with the following assignment of errors:
prevail; and (4) that private respondents complaint was frivolous and patently without merit, thus
justifying an outright dismissal thereof.[6]
I
The Ombudsman, however, was utterly unconvinced and forthwith denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Such denial was contained in the Order dated October 5, 1993 and was worded THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR
in this wise: ACTS WHICH THE LATTER WAS NOT AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN
DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE AGAINST HIM AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY MAINTAINING INCONSISTENT THEORIES ON THE LIABILITY OF
[Petitioner] Casuela argued that since the complaint against him was limited to oppression and
PETITIONER.
rendering a judgment through negligence, he cannot be held liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties. This claim is no more than a vagrant
assertion for the simple reason that it is well settled in this jurisdiction that the real nature of the II
offense charged is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated but by actual recital of the facts in the
complaint. x x x In the instant case, it is undisputed fact that the initial hearing was conducted by THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE INASMUCH
AS THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ITSELF STATED IN ITS ORDER THAT THE
the Committee before [petitioner] x x x could file his answer. It is also an uncontrovertible fact
that the initial hearing of the case was made in total disregard of Sec. 38 of the Rules IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY THE
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 which clearly shows inefficiency and ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE WAS A LAUDABLE ACT.
incompetence in the performance of official duties on the part of herein respondent.
III
It is also argued that [petitioner], as a member of the Administrative Complaints Committee, did
not deprive complainant of his right to due process xxx. When the members of the Committee THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO
acted immediately upon the complaint of Ms. Bonito x x x they acted perfectly within the bounds PETITIONERS DEFENSE OF PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
of their duties x x x. The innocence or guilt of [private respondent Valeriano] and as to whether PUBLIC DUTIES.
or not due process was accorded him is not the issue in this case but whether or not there is
something amiss in the conduct of the members of the Committee in the investigation of the
case. As earlier stated, it is an undisputed fact that the initial hearing was conducted even before IV
complainant could file his answer and the same was made in total disregard of Sec. 38 of the
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. While it is a laudable act on the part of THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN NOT HAVING OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED
the members of the Committee to immediately act on a complaint to protect and give immediate THE COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONER FOR BEING WITHOUT MERIT.
assistance to Filipino overseas workers, it is equally deplorable not to recognize the rights of
people being complained of. If this Office is swayed by the argument that the provision of Sec.
38 of the Implementing Rules of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 should be relaxed in this The petition lacks merit.
particular case, it would render nugatory if not illusory the aforementioned provision of law.
I
This office is not unaware that mistakes committed by public officers are not actionable absent
any clear showing that they were motivated by bad faith. It is, however, very clear in the records Petitioner begrudges the Ombudsman for finding him guilty of violating Section 38, XIV of the
that while complainant was given 72 hours within which to file his answer, the initial hearing was Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,[8] which, he claims, was a virtual non-issue insofar
conducted on the same day in flagrant violation of Sec. 38 of the Rules Implementing Book V of as private respondent Valerianos complaint was concerned as said violation was not alleged
Executive Order No. 292. As stated in our resolution, such act shows excessive use of authority therein. As such, petitioner claims not to have been duly informed of the true charges against
if not unlawful behavior, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. him and accorded the opportunity to refute the same.

45 | P a g e
An examination of private respondents complaint, however, reveals that the private respondent
did allege [t]hat on February 6, 1992, I, Jose L. Valeriano, received an alleged complaint from a
former neighbor, a certain May Elaine O. Bonito x x x dated Feb. 5, 1992[9] and [t]hat x x x the
entire hearing of the alleged complaint x x x began on February 6, 1992. [10] This only shows that
the service of Bonitos complaint upon private respondent Valeriano on February 6, 1992 and the
commencement of the investigation on that same day, were circumstances actually alleged by
private respondent Valeriano in his complaint and which may thus be taken cognizance of by the
Ombudsman in the course of its adjudicatory proceedings.
Significantly, petitioner does not at all take exception to these factual findings made by the
Ombudsman. In fact, petitioner has not proffered any rebuttal evidence to controvert the events
of February 6, 1992.
Petitioner may not also successfully plead violation of his right to due process because he
readily admits having filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 22, 1993
which first established his culpability for having violated Section 38, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292.At this juncture, we quote, with approval, the postulations
of the Solicitor General:
Petitioners claim that the Ombudsman virtually deprived [him] of his right to due process by
failing to inform [him] of the charges against him x x x is bereft of merit. In the first place, as
petitioner admits he had raised the alleged 'lack of sufficient opportunity to be informed of the
charges against him in a motion for reconsideration. This Honorable Court has repeatedly
stressed that the requirements of due process are complied [with] when a party is heard on a
motion for reconsideration (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388; Cebu Institute v. Minister of
Labor, 113 SCRA 257; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438; Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA
764). Secondly, the Constitution has vested the Ombudsman with plenary authority in the scope
of his investigation.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any reason, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. (Article XI, Constitution)
Under the foregoing constitutional provision, the Ombudsman may investigate a matter that
tends to show that an act is illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient motu proprio, or even if not
raised by a complainant. Hence, even if the private respondent did not expressly rise the non-
compliance of the provisions of the Administrative Code, the Ombudsman may impose the
proper sanctions for the non-compliance. As noted by the Ombudsman in his Order dated
October 5, 1993 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, there is something amiss in the
conduct of the members of the Committee in the investigation of the case [against private
respondent Valeriano]. The flaw in the investigation was the cause for the imposition of the
penalty. Hence, contrary to the contentions of petitioner, the Ombudsman did not maintain
inconsistent theories on the liability of petitioner. His liability as well as those of the other
members of the Administrative Complaints Committee arose by reason of the non-compliance
with the provisions of the Administrative Code on administrative disciplinary proceeding. [11]
Petitioner skirts the kernel issue of his undisputed participation in an investigation conducted in
violation of the five-day bar rule under Section 38, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292, and conveniently harks on the alleged violation of his right to due process.
Petitioners evasive stance, however, does not impede our clear perception of the fact that
petitioner did participate in the investigation conducted by the Administrative Complaints
Committee respecting Bonitos complaint against private respondent Valeriano, which
investigation was held on the very same day that private respondent Valeriano was furnished a
copy of Bonitos complaint, in violation of the five-day bar rule mandated by the Rules
Implementing E.O. No. 292. The Ombudsman correctly took cognizance of these circumstances
and was undeniably empowered to investigate the same and impose the proper administrative
sanctions upon the culpable parties. Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has been
inconsistent in citing the basis for petitioners liability. This claim is patently groundless. Both the
Resolution dated July 22, 1993 and the Order dated October 3, 1993, clearly spelled out the
basis for penalizing petitioner with a three-month suspension: petitioner, as member of the
Administrative Complaints Committee, violated the five-day bar rule under Section 38, Rule XIV
of the Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292.
The Ombudsman, fully aware of its proper office as the States guardian against erring public
officials, correctly confined itself to making findings as to petitioners non-compliance with
mandatory reglementary procedure. It steered clear from making any judgments as to the
validity of the decision rendered by the Administrative Complaints Committee that resulted in the
dismissal of private respondent Valeriano. The Ombudsmans herein assailed issuances, thus,
are concisely focused on petitioners violation of the aforesaid five-day bar rule in conducting
investigative proceedings and are devoid of some other postulations from which any
inconsistency or contradiction may arise.
II
Petitioner makes capital of the obiter dictum of the Ombudsman to the effect that the immediate
action undertaken by the Administrative Complaints Committee on Bonitos complaint, was a
laudable act. Petitioner reasons out that, since the said committees action was even praised by
the Ombudsman, the latter erred in finding petitioner guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties.
We are absolutely unstirred by these argumentations.
In the first place, the Ombudsmans statements were taken out of context. In their complete form,
the Ombudsmans statements read, to wit:
x x x [I]t is undisputed fact that the initial hearing was conducted even before complainant could
file his answer and the same was made in total disregard of Sec. 38 of the Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292. While it is a laudable act on the part of the members of the
Committee to immediately act on a complaint to protect and give immediate assistance to
Filipino overseas workers, it is equally deplorable not to recognize the rights of people being
complained of. If this Office is swayed by the argument that the provision of Sec. 38 of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 should be relaxed in this particular
case, it would render nugatory if not illusory the aforementioned provision of law.
xxx
x x x [W]hile this Office fully appreciates the laudable acts of the respondents in giving
immediate assistance and protection to overseas workers, but it is equally deplorable not to give
protection to the rights of people being complained of. x x x[12]
In other words, the Ombudsman was not per se praising petitioners acts; rather, the
Ombudsman had, before criticizing the arbitrary holding of the investigation in violation of the
five-day bar rule, attempted to temper its criticism by acknowledging the nobility of the intention
of the Administrative Complaints Committee to expediently act on Bonitos grievances against
private respondent Valeriano. But certainly, the effort of the Ombudsman to balance its
disciplinary role with a scrupulous sensitivity to its fellow government agencys responsive action
46 | P a g e
in a seemingly extraordinary situation, cannot be deemed an absolution of the fatal flaws that
taint such action.
In the second place, the necessity for expedient action on Bonitos complaint against private
respondent Valeriano, as she was poised to leave for her overseas assignment in the evening of
February 6, 1992, has been diluted by Bonitos subsequent execution, on the same day, of an
Affidavit of Desistance dated February 6, 1992 and entered as Document No. 332, Page No. 9,
Book No. I, Series of 1992 of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Rafael N. Aguilos.[13] Thus,
we have here, a situation where petitioner hurriedly conducted an investigation of Bonitos
complaint against private respondent Valeriano because he wanted to immediately act upon
Bonitos grievances and take her testimony before she departs for her foreign assignment,
notwithstanding the prohibition under Section 38, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292 against holding any investigation earlier than five (5) days from petitioners receipt
of Bonitos complaint.
All these circumstances all the more highlight the underlying rationale for the five-day bar rule on
the conduct of administrative investigation in disciplinary cases. Had petitioner religiously abided
by the said rule and allowed things to take their legal coursehad private respondent Valeriano
been accorded the five (5) days he is entitled to under the law, to clarify the problem with Bonito
and/or prepare an adequate defense against the charges levelled against him in case no
settlement thereof is obtained this conflict would not have grown into the long-drawn litigation
that it now is. The five-day bar rule in conducting administrative investigation, we repeat, is an
indispensable procedure in administrative investigation that both enables the parties therein to
explore the possibility of clarifying their problems or misunderstandings and accords the
defendant therein adequate time to prepare a suitable defense in case no settlement is reached.
III
Petitioner belabors the non-appreciation by the Ombudsman of the presumption of regularity in
petitioners conduct of proceedings in petitioners favor. Petitioner, however, is apparently
beholden to an evidentiary rule that is vulnerable to clear and convincing evidence in negation of
such presumption.
We peruse from the records of this case that there has been proffered clear and convincing
evidence to the effect that petitioner conducted an investigation on Bonitos complaint against
private respondent Valeriano on the very same day the complaint was served on Valeriano, not
to mention the fact that on the very same day, said complaint was withdrawn by Bonito under a
duly executed Affidavit of Desistance. This is a flagrant, undeniable, indefensible violation of the
five-day bar rule under Section 38, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292.
In the face thereof, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties, must
yield.
IV
Finally, petitioner contends that the complaint of the private respondent Valeriano should have
been dismissed outright by the Ombudsman because, at the time of the filing thereof, there was
pending before the Secretary of Labor and Employment, an appeal from the decision of the
POEA deputy administrator finding Valeriano guilty of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and correspondingly punishing him with dismissal from the
service. The outright dismissal of private respondent Valerianos complaint, petitioner insists, is
totally justified by the illegal assumption by the Ombudsman of review powers over the POEA,
which review powers are properly vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment, being the
sole and same issue of the validity of the decision of the POEA dismissing petitioner from the
service, the Ombudsman could not validly and legally assume jurisdiction over Valerianos
complaint without violating the most basic principles in jurisdiction and forum shopping.
We disagree.
The Ombudsman never pretended to have jurisdiction over the issue of the validity of the
decision of the POEA deputy administrator adopting the recommendations of the Administrative
Complaints Committee that led to the dismissal of private respondent Valeriano. In fact, the
issue of the validity of that decision, was never put in issue before the Ombudsman. What
Valeriano sought before the Ombudsman was the imposition of administrative sanctions upon
petitioner and the other members of the Administrative Complaints Committee whose actuations
during the investigation of Bonitos complaint struck Valeriano as oppressive, arbitrary and unjust
and violative of subsisting laws on the conduct on public officers in the performance of their
official duties. Precisely Valeriano appealed the decision of the Poea deputy administrator to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment because the latter is vested with the supervisory and review
powers over the POEA. As such, the charges of forum shopping And violation of the rules on
jurisdiction are absolutely unfounded.
All told, we find the Ombudsman to have issued the herein assailed Resolution dated July 22,
1993 and Order dated October 5, 1993 in accordance with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch
168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991,
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P.
Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in
the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard
at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect
had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
47 | P a g e
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt
for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information
could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor
an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion,
wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite
action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent
Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his
release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be
suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail
of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the
following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48
hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July
1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right
to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent
Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same
date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous
hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and
22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He
alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier
filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled
to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas
corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its
first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14
dismissing the
two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation.
At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him.
During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified
petitioner as the culprit.
48 | P a g e
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one
waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was
Rules. a "continuing crime."

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
conformable to law and justice. which provides as follows:

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner warrant, arrest a person:
was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be
granted.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
conformity.
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
consider these issues seriatim.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be
who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing
the information for murder even without preliminary investigation. It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, arresting office or person
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
"continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization
like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was

49 | P a g e
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask
for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty
of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there
was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as
noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule
112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been
accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at
the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and
that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary
investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional
Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his
omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information
sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should
be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and
not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor
himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion
for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's
omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial
court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the
very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial
court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day
reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied
with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While
that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity
to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right.
To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure
of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation
in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that
the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously
insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the
Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly
if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the
statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to
bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence
of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of
respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no
evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to
50 | P a g e
respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before.
It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4)
witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to
be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the
merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may
at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant
a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was
forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with
extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted
to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking .
During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections
that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to
replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness,
petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary
investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had
promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of
the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. 30 If he did not
walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he
was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run
the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth
in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to
be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning
petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move
in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the
record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to
benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately
to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any
case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights
and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect
those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order
of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any
lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for
cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the
Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the
dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to
conduct the proper investigation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two
Orders[1] of the Sandiganbayan,[2] both dated February 15, 1999. The first Order rejected the
attempt of petitioner to stop his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 24524-25, on the ground that
he had been denied the right to a preliminary investigation. In the assailed second Order, the
Sandiganbayan directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for all the accused, including herein
petitioner.
The Facts
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint[3] filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao issued an Order[4] dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents:
Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city
jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also required respondents, within ten days from receipt
thereof to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15,
1998,[5] recommending the prosecution of the aforenamed respondents for violation of Article
269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No.
3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of
the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in
51 | P a g e

the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
recommendation.
Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest
under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on
May 20 of the same year. On the same day, he filed a Motion To Remand Case To The
Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation.
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his
alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of
preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved
not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its
jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had
not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan
rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment.
Hence, this recourse.[6]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioners plea for preliminary investigation in this wise:
This morning, the accused herein appeared for arraignment duly represented by their
counsel. Before proceeding, Atty. Omar A. Rivera appearing in behalf of accused Yusop
informed this court of his reservations about proceeding with the arraignment this morning,
primarily on the ground that accused Yusop did not undergo preliminary investigation, with the
additional claim that he had not been furnished any notice nor was he informed of the
proceedings before the Ombudsman with respect to these cases. It would appear that one of the
reasons [therefor] is that the accused despite notice of the existence of the accusation against
him in Criminal Case No. 24525, had not given any timely notice nor any statement of any
alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information herein; thus, the
Court is not persuaded that the claim of the accused Yusop with regard to the inadequacy of the
proceedings as against him could still be validly entertained at this time. This is more particularly
significant under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and x x x Criminal Cases 24524 and 24525
refer to the same incident although the prosecution, for its part, has filed Informations under
different statutes covering the same incident. Thus, the claim of accused Yusop that he was not
notified with respect to one of the cases on an identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular
significance since this would be indulging in a superfluity.
xxxxxxxxx
Thus, in view of all the following, the Court will now proceed to the arraignment of the accused
herein.
The Issue
Although the parties did not specify the issue in this case, it is clear from their submissions that
they are asking this Court to resolve this question: Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being
informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, in Criminal Case No.
24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, the
case against him should not be dismissed.
Main Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[7] The Court explained that the rationale of
a preliminary investigation is to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and
burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall
have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. [8]
The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable
by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court.[9] The old Rules, on the
other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial
court.[10]
Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such
offense is punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to
fifteen years.[11] Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is
entitled to a preliminary investigation.
It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no preliminary
investigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman admitted that petitioner
was denied of his right to preliminary investigation.[12]
We find no basis for the Sandiganbayans ruling that petitioner had not given timely notice nor
any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
Information.
First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As
earlier noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the September 19, 1995 Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao. His name did not even appear in the caption of its
January 15, 1998 Resolution,[13] which recommended the filing of charges against the
accused. Indeed, in his Compliance with the August 26, 1998 Sandiganbayan
Resolution,[14] Special Prosecution Officer Diosdado V. Calonge manifested that petitioner was
not notified of the proceedings of the preliminary investigation and was accordingly not given the
opportunity to be heard thereon.[15]
After learning of the filing of the Information against him when he was served a Warrant of
Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary
52 | P a g e
investigation had been conducted in regard to him.Several months later, moments before his
arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light,
the Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given the court timely notice of this
deficiency.
Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information, petitioner had known that the
proceedings and the investigation against his co-accused were pending, he cannot be expected
to know of the investigators subsequent act of charging him. Precisely, he had not been
previously included therein and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof.
In Go v. Court of Appeals,[16] this Court held that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did
in this case, the right is not waived.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioners right to preliminary
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [a]n
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning
the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. x x x.
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.[17] Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayans reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. [18] This
provision cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for
conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals
merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not
the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot
be bound by the Ombudsmans January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of
charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on
his behalf.
In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and believes
that the former has the duty x x x to see to it that the basic rudiments of due process are
complied with.[19] For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this
Court to comment on the Petition.
Dismissal of the Charges
Not Justified
Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary
investigation.[20] We disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to
quash.[21] Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings.[22] We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez:
If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite
the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information,
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior
court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.[23]
In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended with respect to petitioner even if the case
is already undergoing trial, because [t]o reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that
petitioners rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by
evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due
process and to permit the government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and
effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point.[24]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED, and
the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro
Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to
petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and
the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September
17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or
any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes,
former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and
Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal
Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and
Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken
on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted
his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12,
1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07)
against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as
then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the
previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command
(PSC).
53 | P a g e
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P.
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD
Practice Act, committed as follows:
have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO
L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal
action on the matter. That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn
virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for
statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the
reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every
Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina
public officer.
Buzon, recommending that the following informations be filed against petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation
controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith; CONTRARY TO LAW.

2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for
the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the Sandiganbayan
against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully
demand and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of
Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of
P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of
January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the
release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information,
did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group),
a private corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds,
assets and ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private
corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but
whose organization and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department
of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the government,
without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the Department of Public Information
and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:

54 | P a g e
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of
his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year (1976), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn
statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every
public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the
informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502
and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for
Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501 (for
Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to
quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed
refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have already
prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file Statement
of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122
SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts
the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31,
1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on
July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten
(10) year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law
such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal
prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the
Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural or juridical person
having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "...
regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and
officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two
laws are separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that
neither will it render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the
law which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten
(10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's "Consolidated
Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117,
Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal
Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby
directed to amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense
therein charged from January 31, 1974 toSeptember 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the
commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
55 | P a g e
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on
October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court,
without giving due course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment thereon
and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further
orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing
with the trial and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503. In compliance with said resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and the
provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public respondents were
concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action
or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan
manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing
whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the
Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing
any other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his
cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27,
1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-
evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in
question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what
action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing
of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as
the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had
deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition
of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the
petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of prima
facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned
informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a
decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed
petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at
bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed
for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of
any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or
administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed
by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and
circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other
constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings
before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could
have been due to certain factors which do not appear on record and which both parties did not
bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay
may be due to a painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres.
Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within
ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in
view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language
in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for
quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself
remiss in the performance of its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely
abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal
of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any
other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for and
against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused
herein attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings
which precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right
to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by
the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial
stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to
spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear
that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of
course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing
charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974
complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and
docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1,
1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres.
Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad
and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the
case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a
56 | P a g e
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding
criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to
the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending
credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize
too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of
justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may
the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be
justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period
for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet,
on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It
certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended
to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in
the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking
and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the
first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No.
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
"painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving
of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues,
certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to
resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not
be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device
for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that
the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the
instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the
foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio,
Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a
fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the
Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a
member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts
alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his
demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No.
1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
57 | P a g e
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as
provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and
forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-
Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said
that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a
democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less
capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the
Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine
and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-
Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more
often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward
these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called
"reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according
them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had
been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to
civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the
"the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded
them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.)
This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his
instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem
of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and
material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter
measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum
of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.)
To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities
through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to
them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy
of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure
for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady
march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and
applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133
N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage,"
as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term
'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and,
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.)
This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof
who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot
affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as
counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to
any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof.
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their
degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due
process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar.
Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This
rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in
Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there
58 | P a g e
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all
citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal
by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's
property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or
property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when
the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,
442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the
police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been
aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling
necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good
order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its
wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police
power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an
individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian
tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to
hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate
purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable
race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of
their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the
basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding,
are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively
avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's
social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals
educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious
welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of
pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as
to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within
the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our
government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to
enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted,
and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters
which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated
non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending
principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the
discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature
cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which
some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the
paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act
No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or
entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment
of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening
in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine
jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the
testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on
January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional
to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on
March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six
months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17,
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This court,
on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave
to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
59 | P a g e
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding,
set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition
on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a
finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del
peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su
inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying
the latter's petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la
misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria
levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos
ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya
recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes
publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This
was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the
petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been
filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid
motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet
given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the
same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited
me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the
issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to
commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same
and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the
same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On
August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14,
1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his
motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of
the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on
August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal
process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay
in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective
a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
under probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only
to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered
cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No.
4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section
11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City
of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and
distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit
Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting
or denying of applications for probation.
60 | P a g e
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June
28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this
court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing
for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime,
is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon
the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or
otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper
delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by
the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI)
in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in
contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the
authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without
uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the
first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221,
and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive
power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City
Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches
upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of
legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two
memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws
and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same
day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal
protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further,
that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity
of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack
the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional
question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the
very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution
before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same
under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless
cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over
the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be
tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in
the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to
and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution
of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not
specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of
First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order,
resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that the
said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the
requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the
restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial
court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the
motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because
the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an
opportunity to correct or cure the same.
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(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains
its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice;
that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be
exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case
taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal
would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the
accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d],
827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act
No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an
additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition,
that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the
validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from
questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time
before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No.
4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court
and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the
points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we
noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering
the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final
judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either
directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court
in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and
every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty
of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is
constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental
questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C.
L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary
actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where
the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate.
Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see,
also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil.,
259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72
Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo
warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that
the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p.
783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the
contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for
preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a
decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.
S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac.,
875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one,
an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly
known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised
"relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices
dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court
and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of
jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are
exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that
the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the
trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous
persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the
Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it
and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy
upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28
Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A.
1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332;
61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although
objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on
behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad
powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of
the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping
a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.)
The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not
lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of
which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and
consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without
resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
62 | P a g e
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from
enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland,
30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs.
Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs.
Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act
No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused
persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is
true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the
sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288;
Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States
([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the
common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the
contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess
ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their
authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made,
since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of
powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable
also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes
the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute,
elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and
that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge
of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the
conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases
is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.)
Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First
Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by
objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs.
Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the
constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but
also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera,
however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground
that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not
raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p.
339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59;
113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack
made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu
proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare
a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol.
I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the
court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the
question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this
view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the
hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No.
42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not
properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a
suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will
be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the
effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that
the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that
the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that,
as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule
admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when
a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884],
95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities,
it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either
in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the
duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if
it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's
Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905],
188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
(State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn
again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not
now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action
is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
[1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney
General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of
Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of
the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute
was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
63 | P a g e
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12
C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in
the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an
original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting
the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.)
Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the
question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court
or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to
pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a
determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs.
Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage
Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo.,
572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke
[1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional
question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point
with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the
proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to decide —
we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and
the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil.,
259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72
Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted
in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73
Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney
General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a
mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law
officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the
Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last
proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only
in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if
it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts,
the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the
only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice
Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the
legislature: "The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional
limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was
brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In
disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of
Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as
an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City
60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or
county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan.,
803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs.
Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917],
197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181
La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const.
Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind.,
339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last
cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth
Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of
New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor
(47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district
attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his
duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge
should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district
attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other
words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of
constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the
right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition
merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot
avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex
rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the
state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon
them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If
it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the
enactment of criminal laws.
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The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that
the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in
the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as
stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the
City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal
reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking
the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application
outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and
23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time
has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been
impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the
Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that
the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until
it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question
with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for
the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also
Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J.,
p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454
[aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co.,
vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass
Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74
N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation
solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the
Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been
passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of
Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people
will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the
decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance
which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77,
78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616;
Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an
analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of
nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No.
2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for
the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation
which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have
taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has
been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and
section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting
aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The
question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the
government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser
[1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before
the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the
Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that
they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did
not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to
overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6
R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect
the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention
to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this
question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity
and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message
dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the
Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the
Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against
his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and
very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill
referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the
determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the
Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed
within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending
determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance
during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive
no less than of the Legislative department of our government — independent in the performance
of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and
unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand
it.
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The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in
force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in
the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves
and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines.
(Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some
respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after
the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United
States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person
before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power
can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the
United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is
different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says
Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells
[1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am.
Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal
from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may,
by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or
imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from
office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons
he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty
may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the
National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental
changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained
essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the
Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive.
The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor
fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other
officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the
pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the
constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on
the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature
can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then,
confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But
does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United
States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed
the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to
temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief
Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of
penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative
mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the
exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to
them for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in
the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F.
[2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the
enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4,
1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an
appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers
chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the
Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person
sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no
power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act
and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of
Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a
form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61
L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme
Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court
pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers
in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation.
In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In
1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was
never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to
its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states
of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the
law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and
Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In
Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration
have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the
authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also
to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d],
762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
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We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal
language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a
federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has
been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by
the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States,
may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all
penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20
N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of
the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a
minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A.
[N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may
confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to
the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the
Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably,
the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts — particularly the trial courts —
large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is
believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a
position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced,
should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely
because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the
penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper
(see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of
such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui
[1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the
courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law
contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines,
the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the
culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that
"a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of
age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides
that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature
of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are
known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is
deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art.
29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age,
or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are
not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art.
47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3);
the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age
(art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility
(art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal
laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act.
There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the
courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended
provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The
Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was
subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the
amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117
of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the
National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize"
the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed
by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial
court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses,
the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality
decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the
conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the
Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of
punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a
judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns
solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing
to do." (Ex parteBates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the
court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it
attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the
governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the
courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time
prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it
unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a
sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of
the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W.,
177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182
Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.],
1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23;
63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs.
State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel.
Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19
N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer
vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d],
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5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini
[1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac.,
392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118
Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo
[1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E.,
843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind.,
534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882;
People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn.,
529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs.
Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs.
Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl.
424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am.
Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928;
People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180;
281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex
parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455;
95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas.,
1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100;
169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State
[1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548;
165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State
[1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921],
131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex
rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We
elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by
the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A.
L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided
for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and
required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer
during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held
constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision
vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912],
18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and
different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of
Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature.
The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive
power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily
or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and
become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex
parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128;
20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were
used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives
in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was
understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it
was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any
degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts
has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character,
were still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by
the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts
of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, — a power inherent
in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be
an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative
power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the
executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with
approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265,
Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report,
and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody —
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon
the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to
prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from
it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal
law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this
cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162),
is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive
by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of
probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that
case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation
statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to
persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one
hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through
Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction
between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of
the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People,
1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words
& Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the
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Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme
Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state
enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held
the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the
time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-
12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of
the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is
a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense
(Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the
one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of
execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of
execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes
which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is
granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon
the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive
and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue
delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which,
in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of
agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free
government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
(5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke,
namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else,
or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge
Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes
[1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs
shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation
of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that
rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the
grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power
to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the
same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs.
Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr
vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas.,
697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large.
Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164,
citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616).
However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of
its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political
question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32
Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor
by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has
been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R.
A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the
President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified
limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of
the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency,
the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in
the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to
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exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have
existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1),
this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it
undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the
price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf.
Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.)
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules
governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable
or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of
cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at
variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or
absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute, to aid the
delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is
sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act
of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79
L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co.
[1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title
"Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards
in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall
apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any
and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force
of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does
not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but
in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words,
the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the
Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton
County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec
68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660)
and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained
the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and
municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct
non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for
the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions
of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a
menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference
of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own
decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus
[1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
[1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves
the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies,
as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6
R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled
that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully
exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R.
A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
(Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616;
97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs.
Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent
tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of
the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age
(Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs,
July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly
Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in
his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the
Constitution of the United States in the following language — speaking of declaration of
legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to
provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as
require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is
granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative
official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law
by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II,
p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law.
ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of
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course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall
take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State
vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then
may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine
when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not
made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or
non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is
absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or
await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no
principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain
facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need
not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future
time — we cannot say when — the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the
statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of
the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions
provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section
28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state
shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of
Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority
of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of
suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a
law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals
only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396;
6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is
declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be
exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular
cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration
of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in
the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts
of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of
the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with
and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first
article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such
power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same
statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any
statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect,
except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority
in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the
English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside
somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would
be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to
standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed
that the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it
in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious
and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any
one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from
which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog
liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a
knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of
supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed
by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the
legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a
power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days
of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman
[1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs.
Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road
system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the
provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the
operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become
inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads
to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . .
this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left
to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the
question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the
act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every
county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in
order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded
and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered,
to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is
before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before
us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our
constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the
present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county,
after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its
operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the
present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in
may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote
of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in
character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the
running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and
they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not
embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is
nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local
judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while
we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely
local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of
criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be
vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute
does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation
Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate
or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute
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discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective
provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of
a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter
E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof.
"Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs.
Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the
inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no
further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the
restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power
and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power
shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1.
Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision
thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain.
The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is
a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law.
ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431;
46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13;
Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255;
Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353;
133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-
552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed.,
369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough
[1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene
[1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs.
Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act
would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation
in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied
those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in
their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that
probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the
purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will
there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate
any amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we
accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show,
indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may
be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant
authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume
the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the
equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law
which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550;
Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U.
S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon
Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U.
S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583;
42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law.
ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law.
ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in
operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed.,
754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the
law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p.
372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs.
Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force
in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a
given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the
abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act
sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is,
under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf
C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United
States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that
there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis
(Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the
equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this
case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by
General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial
of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612,
amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that
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"in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall
not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting
attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against
him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision
indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the
provinces — was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the
peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a
situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state
from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the
constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The
provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that
makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it
is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,
the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio
vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs.
Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A.
L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established
rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do
this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume
that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128
A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55
Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions
must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner
contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou.,
969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22
L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in
the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and
what remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court
has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839;
Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
[1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers
were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may
be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is,
in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of
the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit
to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that
system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action
of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at
rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to
show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer.
Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers
of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are
imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those
conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall
remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation.
Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the
probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the
conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally
discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with
said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the
probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and
after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if
revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6
prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to
furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the period and
conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed
concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and
admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court
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as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report
in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two months
concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are
necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to
perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the
court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole
officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities
thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the
provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a
Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the
Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four
eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any
funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be
disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and
the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations from among
those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil
Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel
until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section
are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section
11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10
above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as
the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief
Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make
reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the
probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer"
(sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully
answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or
condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period
and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a
particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the
legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in
the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said
province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him
concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to
him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there
are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what
the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry.
The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better
otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial
legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom
of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000,
appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to
receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the
Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to
include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative
personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be
sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial
notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously
contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in
each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial
fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete
is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case
there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws
have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the
"individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid
in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage
of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise
of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313;
48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief
end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that
probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the
repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by
able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have
examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short
time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases
and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action
which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the
general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of
authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention,
except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more
authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach
is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain
in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to
the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United
States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace
the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off.
Gaz., p. 1317);
74 | P a g e
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New
York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new
developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs.
Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX,
No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing
local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection
The Legislative Department – Undue Delegation
Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 which banned residents,
firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without
permission from the Central Bank. Several informations were filed against her. During the
pendency of the cases, C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign
Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations and
corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving
clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ. 960.
Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the informations filed against her based on the new circulars.
The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred that her right to
equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was purposedly designed
to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.
She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which allowed the Central
Bank to issue circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power because the said law allowed
the Central Bank to legislate (define crimes) penal laws and determine penalties therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are correct.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined
the crimes which allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B. Circulars concerned
merely spelled out the details of the offense. These circulars are mere administrative regulations
and not the penal laws itself alleged to have been violated by Marcos.
Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court said “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the
aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused
do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by
even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes,
the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right to equal
protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she
may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage
therefor, and not at their present posture.”
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs,
are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in
a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slainalong Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-
intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the
Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-
six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) informations for murder[2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-the-fact.
75 | P a g e
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutors
a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4] motion for reconsideration.Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and
dissenting opinion.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as xxxxxxxxx
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the
accused[6] was dropped from the case.
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted
cases where one or more of the "principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade
the Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only
supplied]
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.Petitioner argues that:
Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayanadmitted the amended information and ordered
the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as
Superintendent or higher. it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that
way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending
the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of
incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law
the accused.
may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the
No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M.
peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali
commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
the Sandiganbayan.Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249[13]. The law is
entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February
25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
[14]
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA
7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act No.
8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in
the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be
violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support
but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and

76 | P a g e
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines,
filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those
who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in
Article XI, Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486[21] created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No.
1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments
introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following
cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution
or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
77 | P a g e
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of
the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions
for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with
the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to
the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions
lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
78 | P a g e
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in the (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word accused
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is
all of which are present in this case.
due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that
the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between
Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of
certain cases,[29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249. the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
presented documents.Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
subject to the constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim
in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as
with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving"
official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4;
certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any
and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only
to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the one of those affected by the law.Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official
their participation in the passage of the said provisions.In particular, it is stressed that the
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is
Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b
Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to
and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during
protection of the law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. [40]

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their
right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they
had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one

79 | P a g e
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged
as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been rejected by the court several times [50] considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a
penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.[52]Moreover, the law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. [54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court
still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it defines
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not
have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of
the amendments.The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title[57] is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally interpreted
and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4
and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we
shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is
the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case
against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section
4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to
the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the
offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the
terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
80 | P a g e
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S.
v. Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain
acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses
CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN,
SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL,
INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members
of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF
SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO
A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN
SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime
herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed
the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as
among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged
therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995.The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was
one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and
shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation
to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate connection
between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is
an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information
that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
81 | P a g e
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and
provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were
stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as
well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because
it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their
official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below
do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose
of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982
RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special
Court, the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." 1 It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential
Decree. 2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was
passed, 3 to be supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the validity of which was upheld
in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be
clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed
at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A
public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be
pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such
character. The times demanded such a remedial device." 6 It should occasion no surprise,
therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the continuity need to
combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential
Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other
co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. 7 The informations were filed respectively on
February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he
filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. 8 A week later. respondent
Court denied such motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the
same fate. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due
process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the Constitution. 14
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively with
dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether committed by government officials or
not, with the essential cooperation of the private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself
justify any departure from or disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due
recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in his pleadings
butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues
raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity
of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been
demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such
competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the
National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President "shall
continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus, there is
an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in
1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality
of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the
opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such
power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
" 20
2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify
Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land
Tenure Administration: 21 "The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that
none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
82 | P a g e
excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which is of the
very essence of the Idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
exists "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be
given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist .To assure that the general
welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. " 23 Classification is thus not ruled out,
it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest." 24
3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum
thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because
- appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to
the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing,
considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. 27 To repeat, the
Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty
in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to
have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into
force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is
or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v.
Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among
which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific
provision, " in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services
or utilities." 29 The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough
to cover the instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of
appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." 30 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale
would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas
Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post
facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of the
commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime
of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." 32 Even the most careful scrutiny of the
above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an
accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that
the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is
hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo 33 a
1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that
seven of the nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and
the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing
away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight
votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the
law ex post facto.
5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what is
prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided in 1903. Thus:
"An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next paragraph of the opinion of Justice
Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what way
the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as
the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended
First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only
foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility. 36
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Even the very language as to what falls with the category of this provision is well-nigh
Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the
intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order
to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." 38 The
opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The
expressions 'ex post facto laws,' are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution,
and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated
and judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law
precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr.
Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive
and accurate knowledge of the true principle of government. " 39
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American Supreme Court
in April of 1898 - the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American
sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the
exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting
edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional
the challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous
pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this
realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an
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accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether
particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the
time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision
of the American Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion
of the then Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically
stated that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the
creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing
laws surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional
inhibition." 43
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be
successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential
Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this
Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice
Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was
regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and
liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him."
The crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case.
Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a
right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place,
his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court.
Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two
other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a
division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for
rendering judgment. " 44 Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see
whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes
much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of
the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or
not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional
presumption of innocence 45 has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the
appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a
finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to
justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate
that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf.
Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court
has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered
by the accused. Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty." 47 This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing
that this fundamental and basic right to De presumed innocent has been disregarded. 48 It does
seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a
reviewing authority results in the loss "vital protection" of liberty.
Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous
in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the
essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every
concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not
be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 50 What is required
for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v.
Pecson, 51 this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal
proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded
against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that
is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed
in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision
is one of competent jurisdiction." 53 The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided
by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United
States 54 decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has
had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal
procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and
a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law." 55
10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1606. The decision does not go as far as passing on any question not affecting the right of
petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the
Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no
ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must
be construed in such a way as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court
by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for
approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a decision of
conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Ericta, JJ., took no part.
Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the Separate Opinions
exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted
to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is
characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder
v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words,

84 | P a g e
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr.
Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly
placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of
automatic releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely should not be the case. I
must say emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's
independence, it is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is
unworthy of similar protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my
objection to the provision in question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional.
In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully
those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its deserved
superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by Justice
Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose
learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad, that the arguments against the
constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the
Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts.
Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure
designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that
the mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly "shall create", it is not under the
Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More,
the Constitution ordains it to be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed
to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be treated
differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so
under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this respect, I
agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of
constitutional necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have
force and effect unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom.
Section 5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts,
"special" as it may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the Sandiganbayan
and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the
constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a special court to take
cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a constitutional abnormality.
Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest must
be dealt with more expeditiously in order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the
social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals
therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it.
We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary and primordial reason for being is to
insure the people's faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be. We have
only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of
the youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their
conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and
naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies.
Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the
Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the
Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter against legislature's
attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court that cannot modify
or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the Sandiganbayan
cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be legitimately created to try offenses
already committed, like the People's Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new
procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the
constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the
conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long
as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over decisions
of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal
questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but
only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard
to say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I
believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence
and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the appellate
courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases where
pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule
apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of
Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the
Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions
already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as
provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such
special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt
as mandated by the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due
process as wen as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of ex post facto laws,
but also the constitutional provisions on the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over
inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto laws, have
been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no
need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the
ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of
supervision over inferior courts.
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It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No.
1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be
given effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very beginning any
attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two
appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and
malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by
public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal
- to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious
discrimination Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better
than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate
tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create
the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed
by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and government-
owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit
the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court.
The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process
clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to
the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural
due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77
Phil. 548, 555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717;
Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion
hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex
post factolaws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits
the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal
cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law
are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is
greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review
by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity,
detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be
engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only
to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely
abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported
by the substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court
under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted
before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to
determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and therefore subverts the
constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in
other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious
than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate
Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5
thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous
vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the
Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the
majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating.
Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated
by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five
members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the
choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two
other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents.
This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an
acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of
the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the
Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other
defendants indicted before other trial courts.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places
expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated,
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely
limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the
prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases,
special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial
courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being down-
graded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to
the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that "the appropriation for the
Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by
the Sandiganbayan" (emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the. annual
86 | P a g e
appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds
for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon
request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered
by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest
tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential
government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the
Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose
operations can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or
impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds
for the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -
1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one
which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law
required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment against herein petitioner
accused him of graft and corruption committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January
12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December
10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all
persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled
to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of
fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This
right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both factual and
legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner
in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly
committed prior to 1978.
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the
presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the
quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not so
prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying cases against
national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13,
CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on
September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing then as it was abolished on
March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmena soon after the
Liberation. Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of
Appeals which was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13
of the People's Court Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari.
The Supreme Court can review all judgments of the People's Court both on questions of fact and
of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT -
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of
procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the
constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. to pro- promulgate rules of court for
all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER
INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN -
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal
affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases
among them and other matters relating to its business," without requiring the approval of the
Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over the
Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an
inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select
and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to
remove them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or
disapprove such appointments and to review such removals, aggravates the violation of the
constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an
annual report directly to the President without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for
review' and approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General
Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided herein for the
Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions
XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This particular provision impairs
likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme Court over
all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same
General Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the
appropriations for the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the
Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the
Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the
constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are
separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can
therefore be declared unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606.
The valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it - the
test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20,
1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability
although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily
87 | P a g e
binding on, the Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged
portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Section—1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein
the phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more
members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting the
completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence
of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1984, as amended,can apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid
provided it is understood that the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are
deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr.
Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly
placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of
automatic releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely should not be the case. I
must say emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's
independence, it is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is
unworthy of similar protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my
objection to the provision in question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional.
In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully
those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its deserved
superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by Justice
Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose
learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad, that the arguments against the
constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the
Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts.
Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure
designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that
the mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly "shall create", it is not under the
Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More,
the Constitution ordains it to be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed
to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be treated
differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so
under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this respect, I
agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of
constitutional necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have
force and effect unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom.
Section 5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts,
"special" as it may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the Sandiganbayan
and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the
constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a special court to take
cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a constitutional abnormality.
Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest must
be dealt with more expeditiously in order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the
social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals
therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it.
We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary and primordial reason for being is to
insure the people's faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be. We have
only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of
the youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their
conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and
naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies.
Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the
Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the
Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter against legislature's
attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court that cannot modify
or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the Sandiganbayan
cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be legitimately created to try offenses
already committed, like the People's Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new
procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the
constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the
conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long
as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over decisions
of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal
questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but
only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard
to say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I
believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence
and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the appellate
courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases where
pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule
apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of
Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the
Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions
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already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as
provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such
special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt
as mandated by the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due
process as wen as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of ex post facto laws,
but also the constitutional provisions on the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over
inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto laws, have
been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no
need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the
ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of
supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No.
1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be
given effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very beginning any
attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two
appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and
malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by
public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal
- to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious
discrimination Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better
than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate
tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create
the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed
by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and government-
owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit
the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court.
The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process
clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to
the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural
due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77
Phil. 548, 555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717;
Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion
hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex
post factolaws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits
the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal
cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law
are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is
greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review
by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity,
detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be
engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only
to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely
abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported
by the substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond
under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted
before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to
determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and therefore subverts the
constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in
other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious
than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate
Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5
thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous
vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the
Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the
majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating.
Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated
by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five
members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the
choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two
other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents.
This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an
acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of
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the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the
Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other
defendants indicted before other trial courts.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places
expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated,
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely
limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the
prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases,
special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial
courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being down-
graded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to
the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that "the appropriation for the
Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by
the Sandiganbayan" (emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the. annual
appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds
for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon
request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered
by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest
tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential
government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the
Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose
operations can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or
impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds
for the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -
1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one
which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law
required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment against herein petitioner
accused him of graft and corruption committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January
12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December
10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all
persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled
to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of
fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This
right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both factual and
legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner
in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly
committed prior to 1978.
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the
presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the
quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not so
prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying cases against
national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13,
CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on
September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing then as it was abolished on
March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmena soon after the
Liberation. Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of
Appeals which was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13
of the People's Court Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari.
The Supreme Court can review all judgments of the People's Court both on questions of fact and
of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT -
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of
procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the
constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. to pro- promulgate rules of court for
all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER
INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN -
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal
affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases
among them and other matters relating to its business," without requiring the approval of the
Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over the
Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an
inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select
and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to
remove them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or
disapprove such appointments and to review such removals, aggravates the violation of the
constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an
annual report directly to the President without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for
review' and approval.
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That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General
Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided herein for the
Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions
XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This particular provision impairs
likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme Court over
all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same
General Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the
appropriations for the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the
Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the
Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the
constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are
separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can
therefore be declared unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606.
The valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it - the
test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20,
1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability
although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily
binding on, the Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged
portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Section- 1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein the
phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more
members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting the
completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence
of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1984, as amended,can apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid
provided it is understood that the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are
deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Rufino Nuñez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines
“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was
accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of
Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to
equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;
– appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering
both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would
be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special
court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and
corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,
dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to
have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification
therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the
Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein
are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.
Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)
Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of
its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts – first, to the
CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft
and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only
allowed one appeal – to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a
trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry
and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures
better justice to the accused and to the people.
91 | P a g e

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be
reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial
court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact
and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality
unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution).
G.R. No. 89604 April 20, 1990
ROQUE FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents.
Felix B. Claustro for petitioner.
Romeo B. Astudillo for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus becamepunong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 6679, providing in part as follows —
Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted barangay which shall
be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by the
registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall
be the punong barangay . . . .
However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who
placed second in the election with 463 votes, or one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total. 1
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed the challenged decision in
toto. Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast for "Flores" only, without any
distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad.
The judge held that the original total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, to 462,
demoting him to second place. 2
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was dismissed on the
ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional trial court.
This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August 1989, 3 was presumably based on Section
9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, which was quoted therein in full as follows:
Sec. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation
of the result of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within (30) days after
the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court
which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose
decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay
elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.
In this petition for certiorari, the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking cognizance of
the petitioner's appeal and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes should have been
credited to him under the equity of the incumbent rule in Section 211(2) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not entertain the
petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the
regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections
"on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable."
While supporting the dismissal of the appeal, the Solicitor General justifies this action on an
entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the Commission on Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
His submission is that municipal or metropolitan courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been appealed directly to the
Commission on Elections and not to the Regional Trial Court of Abra.
It is recalled that in the case of Luison v. Garcia, 4 respondent Garcia's certificate of candidacy
was declared invalid by the Commission on Elections for non-compliance with the statutory
requirements. What he did was appeal to the court of first instance, which held that the
certificate was merely defective but not altogether null and void. Garcia continued his candidacy
92 | P a g e
on the strength of this ruling and was subsequently proclaimed elected, thereafter assuming already manifested its position on this issue, as will appear presently, the Court will now rule
office as municipal mayor. upon it directly instead of adopting the round-about way of remanding the case to the
Commission on Elections before its decision is elevated to this Court.
In sustaining the quo warranto petition filed against him by Luison, this Court declared that all
the votes cast for Garcia should have been rejected as stray because he did not have a valid Implementing Rep. Act No. 6679, the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No.
certificate of candidacy. The action of the Commission on Elections should have been appealed 2022-A providing in Section 16(3) thereof that:
not to the court of first instance but to the Supreme Court as required by the 1935 Constitution.
Since this was not done, the resolution of the Commission on Elections rejecting Garcia's
Incumbent Barangay Captains, whether elected, appointed or designated shall be deemed
certificate remained valid on the date of the election and rendered all votes cast for him as stray.
resigned as such upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy for the office of "Kagawad,"
which is another office, for the March 28, 1989 barangay election.
The doctrine in that case, although laid down under the 1935 Constitution, is still controlling
under the present charter as the interpretation by this Court of Article IX-C, Section 2(2).
This was the reason why the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, held that the four
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
questioned votes cast for Flores could not be credited to either Roque Flores or Anastacio
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the regional
Flores and should have been regarded as stray under Section 211(1) 7 of the Omnibus Election
trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
Code. Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court held that Roque Flores was not entitled to any of
the four contested votes because he was not incumbent as punong barangay (or barangay
We make this declaration even if the law has not been squarely and properly challenged by the captain, as the office was formerly called) on the date of the election.
petitioner.1âwphi1Ordinarily, the Court requires compliance with the requisites of a judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question. 5 In the case at bar, however, we feel there is no point in
The petitioner insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Code, stating pertinently
waiting to resolve the issue now already before us until it is raised anew, probably only in the
that:
next barangay elections. The time to resolve it is now, before such elections. We shall therefore
disregard the technical obstacles in the case at bar so that the flaw in Rep. Act No. 6679 may be
brought to the attention of Congress and the constitutional defect in Section 9 may be corrected. 2. . . . If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first name or surname and
one of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is written only such full name, first name or
surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of the incumbent.
In taking this step, the Court does not disregard the fact that the petitioner was only acting in
accordance with the said law when he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute specifically directed in its because he should not have been considered resigned but continued to be entitled to the office
Section 9 which, at the time the appeal was made, was considered constitutional. The petitioner of punong barangayunder Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing as follows:
had a light to rely on its presumed validity as everyone apparently did. Even the Congress and
the Executive were satisfied that the measure was constitutional when they separately approved
it after careful study. Indeed, no challenge to its validity had been lodged or even hinted — not Sec. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be considered resigned
even by the public respondent — as to suggest to the petitioner that he was following the wrong upon the filing of then, certificates of candidacy. They shall continue to hold office until their
procedure. In fairness to him therefore, we shall consider his appeal to the Commission on successors shall have been elected and qualified.
Elections as having been made directly from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra,
disregarding the detour to the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner contends that the afore-quoted administrative regulation is inofficious because the
forfeiture prescribed is not authorized by the statute itself and beyond the intentions of the
legislature. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule would lead to discrimination against
Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner's appeal was validly made to the Commission on
Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests. . . involving elective the punong barangay and in favor of the other kagawads, who, unlike him, could remain in office
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." Its decision was in turn also while running for re-election and, additionally, benefit from the equity-of-the-incumbent rule.
properly elevated to us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that
"unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Alternatively, the petitioner argues that, assuming the regulation to be valid he was nonetheless
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within basically also a kagawad as he was a member of the sangguniang barangay like the other six
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." councilmen elected with him in 1982. In fact, Section 5 of the Rep. Act No. 6679 also speaks
of seven kagawads, the foremost of whom shall again be thepunong barangay. He concludes
Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final that he should thus be regarded as running for the same office — and therefore not considered
resigned — when he filed his certificate of candidacy for kagawad.
orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact
and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to The Court does not agree.
resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. 6 We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such authority.
It seems to us that the challenged resolution quite clearly expresses the mandate of the above-
quoted Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered resigned upon the
The issue the petitioner was raising was one of law, viz., whether he was entitled to the benefits filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for the same position. The
of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule, and so subject to our review. This issue was not resolved by purpose of the resolution was merely to implement this intention, which was clearly applicable
the public respondent because it apparently believed itself to be without appellate jurisdiction
over the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra. Considering that the public respondent has

93 | P a g e
not only to the ordinary members of the sangguniang barangay but also to the punong
barangay.
As for the questioned authority, this is found in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
empowers the public respondent to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer. . . ."
The justification given by the resolution is that the position of punong barangay is different from
that of kagawad — as in fact it is. There should be no question that the punong barangay is an
essentially executive officer, as the enumeration of his functions in Section 88 of the Local
Government Code will readily show, unlike the kagawad, who is vested with mainly legislative
functions (although he does assist the punong barangay in the administration of the barangay).
Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest number of votes as
a kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the executive of the political
unit. In the particular case of the petitioner, it should be noted that he was in fact not even
elected in 1982 as one of the six councilmen but separately as the barangay captain. He was
thus correctly deemed resigned upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy for kagawad in 1989,
as this was not the position he was holding, or was incumbent in, at the time he filed such
certificate.
It is worth stressing that under the original procedure followed in the 1982 barangay elections,
the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately from the
candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang barangay. The offices of the
barangay captain and councilmen were both open to the candidates, but they could run only for
one or the other position and not simultaneously for both. By contrast, the candidate under the
present law may aspire for both offices, but can run only for one, to wit, that of kagawad. While
campaigning for this position, he may hope and actually strive to win the highest number of
votes as this would automatically make him the punong barangay. In this sense, it may be said
that he is a candidate for both offices. Strictly speaking, however, the only office for which he
may run — and for which a certificate of candidacy may be admitted — is that of kagawad.
It follows that the petitioner cannot insist that he was running not for kagawad only but ultimately
also for punong barangay in the 28 March 1989 election. In fact, his certificate of candidacy was
for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As the basic position being disputed in the barangay
election was that of kagawad, that of punong barangay being conferred only by operation of law
on the candidate placing first, the petitioner had to forfeit his position of punong barangay, which
he was holding when he presented his candidacy for kagawad. Consequently, he cannot be
credited with the four contested votes for Flores on the erroneous ground that he was still
incumbent as punong barangay on the day of the election.
The petitioner argues that he could not have run for reelection as punong barangay because the
office was no longer subject to separate or even direct election by the voters. That may be so,
but this argument goes to the wisdom of the law, not its validity, and is better addressed to the
legislature. From the strictly legal viewpoint, the statute does not offend the equal protection
clause, as there are, to repeat, substantial distinctions between the offices of punong
barangay and kagawad. Precisely , the reason for divesting the punong barangay of his position
was to place him on the same footing as the other candidates by removing the advantages he
would enjoy if he were to continue as punong barangay while running for kagawad.
In sum, we hold that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is constitutionally defective and must be
struck down, but the challenged resolution must be sustained as a reasonable and valid
implementation of the said statute. The petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong
barangay on election day and so was not entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent
rule. The consequence is that the four votes claimed by him were correctly considered stray,
making the private respondent the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, for having
received the highest number of votes for kagawad.
It remains to stress that although the elections involved herein pertain to the lowest level of our
political organization, this fact has not deterred the highest tribunal from taking cognizance of
this case and discussing it at length in this opinion. This only goes to show that as long as a
constitutional issue is at stake, even the barangay and its officers, for all their humility in the
political hierarchy, deserve and will get the full attention of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that
barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be
appealable to the regional trial court;
2. Declaring valid Section 16(3) of Com. Res. No. 2022-A dated January 5, 1989; and
3. Declaring private respondent Nobelito Rapisora the duly elected punong barangay of
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988,
of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING
THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
94 | P a g e
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only
question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare
of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to
the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is
a clear misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly
with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and
not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The
Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in
this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court.
Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the
courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is
implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief
Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them
enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no
gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department
Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be
noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that
prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
95 | P a g e
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by
A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the
Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A
and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract
and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on
such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women,
and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is
made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult
to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order
clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot
been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar
skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international
organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing
domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall
be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the
Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
96 | P a g e
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never
been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON.
ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on
March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc
as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)
and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an
export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged
that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its
charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,
is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of
paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of
sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of
First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing
ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc
City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal
sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the
only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export
tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal
councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and
merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an
import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use
of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just
and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining
Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And
expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or
licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated
that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall
any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power
of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were
infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
97 | P a g e
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the
ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance
is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the
P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its]
control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding
several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search
warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the
search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to
SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied
petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case,
the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were
not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE
LEDESMA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against illegal searches
and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the government's anti-film piracy campaign.
The main issue hinges on whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued
earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint
filed by the petitioner.
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of
searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants
against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The applications were consolidated
and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made
and left with the private respondents.
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of
the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024; issued against
Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro Manila; SW No. 85-025,
issued against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres.
Avenue BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila; and SW No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A.
Ledesma of Sonix Video Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be
lifted.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants which could not be a
basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the National Bureau of Investigation
which under the law must be delivered to this Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby
ordered to be returned to their owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or
representatives, against proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as
proof that said properties have been returned to the possession of the rightful owners." (p. 34,
Rollo)
The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its order dated
January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985
and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
98 | P a g e
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973
Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search warrants after finding
the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower
court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses
which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces Section 3, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches and seizures provides:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the
private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said
search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the
three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the
NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will
testify on the video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of
the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without
stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him, it is
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
of his personal knowledge.
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified
that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his
purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly
privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case
pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the
of People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is
truth of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "
so important:

Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked
PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is
upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court,
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 119661) What is sought to
for it is a time- honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our
be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven
laws should be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the
of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but
alleged offender.
likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not
as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted xxx xxx xxx
intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. (Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill
Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work
of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
(Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right
as the embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and
than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents' establishments,
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74). it should be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable
cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and effects is
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution. But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not
even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition p. 152 record).
So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined probable cause for
of comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those
a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
seized from respondents, there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
copying of the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision
also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the judge, not xxx xxx xxx
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a
probable cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
AFP, supra). The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI

99 | P a g e
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However,
the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three
questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the
lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only "on the fact that the original or master copies of
the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading
it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo)
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of
the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought to be seized as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
rental/lease distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described." (p. 26, Rollo)
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
document/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd 431), the search warrant which
authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas,
and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise' have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]"' was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-
737). The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently. (at pp. 814-815)
Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the articles sought to
be confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they
were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The search warrant too general
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually
happened in the instant case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8,
1985 said:
100 | P a g e
Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of property usually
found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party should have confined themselves
to articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or
the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or
related to, a legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes,
video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search Warrants,
are items of legitimate business engaged in the video tape industry, and which could not be the
subject of seizure, The applicant and his agents therefore exceeded their authority in seizing
perfectly legitimate personal property usually found in a video cassette store or business
establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it lifted the
search warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents. We agree with the appellate
court's findings to the effect that:
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS
CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and
WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME
VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution[2] of May 10, 1993 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained the order[3] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant
No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order[4] on September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of
Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property.
The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:

An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that the main ground upon which the
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
respondent Court anchored said orders was its subsequent findings that it was misled by the
for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy
applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film
drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
have been committed when it issued the questioned warrants.' Stated differently, the respondent
establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),
Court merely corrected its erroneous findings as to the existence of probable cause and
owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes,
declared the search and seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such action is within the power
Makati, Metro Manila.
and authority of the respondent Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an
oppressive or arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the respondent Court declaring the
existence of probable cause is not final and does not constitute res judicata. On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the
court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of
copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a list attached to the application; and,
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did not commit a
television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of discretion'
paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction,
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in the premises above described. In the hearing of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by another witness,
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingos deposition was also taken. On the basis of the
contemplation of law.' But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were
affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico
motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings collided
V. Domingo, Search Warrant No 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended,
with the constitutional rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even
was issued by the court a quo.
contest the righteousness and legality of the questioned orders but instead concentrated on the
alleged denial of due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or
their representatives. In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant,
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much needed
the NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films
revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline.
owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines, equipment, television
Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy
sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were included in the receipt for
campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say
properties accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered
that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to
to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.
denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of
Rights. The trial court did not commit reversible error.
On December 16, 1987, a Return of Search Warrant was filed with the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. A Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied for lack of merit (p.
280, Records).
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said
motion for reconsideration and justified it in this manner:
[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996]

It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copies (sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search

101 | P a g e
warrants in question. The orders of the Court granting the search warrants and denying the
urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they
must be set aside. (p. 13, Appellants Brief)[5]
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents motion
for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had therefore issued, to the Court of
Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the
validity of respondent courts retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[6] in dismissing petitioners appeal and upholding the
quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the challenge to
petitioners legal standing in our courts, they being foreign corporations not licensed to do
business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to
be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners personality to
sue, private respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of
exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also
to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of
doing business in the Philippines under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board
of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain
a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have
no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.[7]
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines,[8] and contend
that private respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such
business here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, other than averments in the quoted portions of petitioners Opposition to Urgent
Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingos affidavit
of December 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of
such exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the
presumption of doing business.[9]
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a
condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign
corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted
to transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code,
unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting
business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts.[10] As thus interpreted,
any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our
courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within
the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but doing business in
the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our
courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in
the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not
necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.[11]
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes doing business or
transacting business within that forum, in which case said provisions are controlling there. In
others where no such definition or qualification is laid down regarding acts or transactions falling
within its purview, the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all the
combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance
is material which indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its
regular business in the State.[12]
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes doing or
engaging in or transacting business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar
environmental circumstances.[13]The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign
corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. [14]
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such
modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute
involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying
on business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents
and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its
ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished
from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts. [15]
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or
transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a
continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in
progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization. [16]
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted
with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455[17] provides:
SECTION 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) x x x; and the phrase doing business shall
include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling
one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any
domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that
imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and
in-progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization.
Presidential Decree No. 1789,[18] in Article 65 thereof, defines doing business to include soliciting
orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any
calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or
102 | P a g e
more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or
works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive
prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the enumeration of
acts constituting doing business with a catch-all definition, thus:
Sec. 1(g). Doing Business shall be any act or combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the
Code. In particular doing business includes:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
purpose and object of the business organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042[19] embodies such concept in this wise:
SEC. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices,
whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in
the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling
one hundred eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or
control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act
or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that
extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of
the business organization: Provided, however, That the phrase doing business shall not be
deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic
corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investors; nor
having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing
a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own
name and for its own account.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards,
petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under
our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business
in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our
courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact
business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission[20] stating that
its records do not show the registration of petitioner film companies either as corporations or
partnerships or that they have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while
undeniably true, is of no consequence to petitioners right to bring action in the
Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for,
as aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines
and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments
Code lists, among others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations
by a foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm
amounting to negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts,
regardless of where the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business
even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The
arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer
of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does business through the middlemen acting in
their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be
deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or
commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said
representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and
for its own account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign
firm is represented in the Philippines by a person or local company which does not act in its
name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of doing business, the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or
owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not
convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a
license before they can sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with
express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide evidence in support of
both civil and criminal proceedings against any person or persons involved in the criminal
infringement of copyright, or concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or
distribution of any cinematographic work(s) films or video cassettes of which x x x is the owner of
copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any
agreement(s) between x x x and the respective owners of copyright in such cinematographic
work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of x x x criminal or civil actions in the Philippines
against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any
films or video cassettes of which x x x is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights
of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between x x x and the respective
owners of copyright in such works.[21]
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising ones legal and
property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the
appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business
here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State
simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are
consummated outside the State.[22] In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing
business in the state merely because sales of its product are made there or other business
furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural
103 | P a g e
person, where such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation
but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.[23]
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has
purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of
business by the corporation.[24]Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to persons
styled distributing agents in the State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in the State
so as to render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers
is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and
shall sell them at trade prices established by it.[25]
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to
represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope
of the minimum contact test.[26]With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere
retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that doing business imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes
for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution
or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of
the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the
removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a
constitutional provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under
the same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum
contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.[27]
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents basis for arguing
that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly
maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action
before Philippine courts.[28]
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to
sue[29] and that the complaint states no cause of action.[30] Lack of legal capacity to sue means
that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he
claims.[31] On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that
the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
action.[32] The term lack of capacity to sue should not be confused with the term lack of
personality to sue. While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-
interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground
of lack of legal capacity to sue;[33] whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of
action.[34]
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to
our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines
should properly be lack of capacity to sue, not lack of personality to sue. Certainly, a corporation
whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party-in-interest to
bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not
capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Courts rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring
local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business
in the Philippines, invoke the latters supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of
capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of
public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments
or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violations of legal rights of unsuspecting
foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the country. [35]
II
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of the
ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August
19, 1988,[36] that for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the master tape
for comparison with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion of the
court subject to the determination of probable cause in accordance with the procedure
prescribed therefor under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the
search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for the finding of probable cause was that
enunciated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff[37] stating that:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower court
determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and which
determination in fact led to the issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant
No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search warrant so issued in accordance with all
applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not possibly have been expected
to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in
copyright infringement cases involving videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at
the time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century
Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th Century
Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of the
issuance of the search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet
been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling
in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit
that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all along. To
refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine
promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents motion for reconsideration
seeking the quashal of the search warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of
the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted grave
abuse of discretion.[38]
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial
court in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal of the search
warrant, on this renovated thesis:
104 | P a g e
And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th Century
Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among others that the master tapes or
copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the video
tapes to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is Our view that the
Supreme Court would have invalidated the warrant just the same considering the very strict
requirement set by the Supreme Court for the determination of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so because, as was
stated by the Supreme Court in the said case, the master tapes and the pirated tapes must be
presented for comparison to satisfy the requirement of probable cause. So it goes back to the
very existence of probable cause. x x x[39]
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair
play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to
the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners
consistent position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein
defendants motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been
satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of
probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more
evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that (j)udicial decisions
applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of
law; it cannot create law.[40] While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the
Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not
laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines.[41] Judicial decisions
of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.[42]
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above
disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[43] that the
principle of prospectivity applies not only to original amendatory statutes and administrative
rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier
case of People vs. Jubinal[44] echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system. The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
the law was originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled
rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretation
legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. x x x, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. x x x. (Stress supplied).
This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[45] where the
Court expounded:
x x x. But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided. This is expressed in the familiar legal maximum lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs
the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. x x x.
The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima[46] that judicial interpretation of a statute
constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Courts construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into
effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but
consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the
situation obtaining in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that
law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good faith.[47] To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.[48]
There is merit in petitioners impassioned and well-founded argumentation:
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 655
(August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was inexistent in December of 1987 when
Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by the lower court.Hence, it boggles the imagination how the
lower court could be expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable
cause when the formulation was yet non-existent.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting searching examination
questions of the applicant and his witnesses that an offense had been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched
(Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of
the application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail
to comply with any legal requirement for the valid issuance of search warrant.
x x x. (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having followed the
requirements of the law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant is therefore
valid and binding. It must be noted that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents
that the lower court failed to apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it absurd
that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is simply impossible to have required the
lower court to apply a formulation which will only be defined six months later.
Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or doctrinal
requirements which are inexistent at the time they were supposed to have been complied with.
105 | P a g e
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. If the lower courts reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can be given to courts
and litigants to respect the law and rules if they can expect with reasonable certainty that upon
the passage of a new rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds
instability in our system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to redress
their grievances and to protect their property rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the
law, it is most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures then obtaining would bear but fruits
of injustice.[49]
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports application thereof
not only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision was
promulgated, should not be countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its inevitably
unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added
requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted
films for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and
clarification.
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in
anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of
probable cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and
seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that
The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect that the presentation of
the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox,
the pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, to wit:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the
private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said
search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2, 1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the
three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the
NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will
testify on the video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of
the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without
stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from
master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him it is
of his personal knowledge.
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified
that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those
purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly
pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the
truth of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.
Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under
P.D. 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is
merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court,
for it is a time-honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our
laws should be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the
alleged offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill
of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and
were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents establishments,
it should be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable
cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that Cocoon, the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not
even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition, p. 152,
record.) So that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for
purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and
those seized from respondents, there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy,
or copying of the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However,
the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
106 | P a g e
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application (Italics witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding
ours). matters discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.

The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the
presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the
existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar,
respondent appellate court itself observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as
the master tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties which may be seized, were
available for presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search warrant to
determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there
is no reason not to present them (Italics supplied for emphasis).[50]
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in
copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is always
necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can
be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master
tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the
presiding magistrate.[57] Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of
testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence
tending to prove the factum probandum,[58] especially where the production in court of object
evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary
value.[59]

In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search warrants
of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be
prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or
understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in
affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful
copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape
bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches.[60] Indeed,
and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead
Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue
to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dictashould always
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides
thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the
that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
fallacy of undue generalization.
purpose in any proceeding.

In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant
with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his
affidavit[51] and his deposition,[52]did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on
said complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private
respondents video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-
fact, stated in his affidavit[53] and further expounded in his deposition[54] that he personally knew
of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease
and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings. [55] The records the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
clearly reflect that the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were straightforward and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence
and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence
forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the
of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they
trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.
exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the search
warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners witnesses NBI Agent Lauro
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing of
C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the
probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be complied
subject matter of their respective testimonies and that said witnesses claim that the video tapes
with, and such a showing has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the
were pirated, without stating the manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact
issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and
without basis.[56] The difference, it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case
the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.[61] It behooves us, then, to review the
reveal that (1) there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the
concept of probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the American jurisdiction from
lower court, on the part of petitioners witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private
which we patterned our doctrines on the matter.
respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones nor have they
shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or
circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and Although the term probable cause has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the
(3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision; indeed, no

107 | P a g e
definition of it which would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which
would cover every state of facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast
rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation. [62] As to what acts
constitute probable cause seem incapable of definition.[63] There is, of necessity, no exact test.[64]
At best, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; [65] or
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable
mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the
charge made by the applicant for the warrant is true.[66]
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute
certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the
question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his
belief.[67] The requirement is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[68]
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.[69] It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to
issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed, [70] the facts
warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial
determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and
not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et
al., supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and
controlling legal standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of probable cause is
tested. Since the proprietary of the issuance of a search warrant is to be determined at the time
of the application therefor, which in turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of
the offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of
probable cause, can and should logically look to the touchstones in the laws therefore enacted
and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not yet even
been conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable
cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the courts discretion within the
particular facts of each case.Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant
in the absence of probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not command the
legislature to establish a definition or formula for determining what shall constitute probable
cause.[71] Thus, Congress, despite its broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for
searches and seizures,[72] does not venture to make such a definition or standard formulation of
probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up the same, much less limit
the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in
deference to judicial discretion and probity.[73]
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement
(the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in
the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or
statemanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a court's
prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to
a mere ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that
the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of
evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and
we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master
tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court followed
the prescribed procedure for the issuances of a search warrant: (1) the examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant
and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance of the
search warrant now subject to this controversy:
In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1) copyrighted video tapes
bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or
circulated, or offered for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred by
defendants at their video outlets, without the written consent of the private complainants or their
assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated from defendants' possession were video tapes containing
copyrighted motion picture films without the authority of the complainant; (3) the video tapes
originated from spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact
reproductions of the films listed in the search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights
were owned by complainants.
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes,
Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc.
(MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation against certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD
No. 49 as amended by PD No, 1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet
surveillance operations on said video establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty.
Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its members. Knowing that
defendant Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized
by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted
motion pictures, he instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from
said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine Home Video
and rented tapes containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362 dated
October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, he
returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with a rental slip No. 25271 also
for P10.00. On the basis of the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally
went to Sunshine Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial Center,
Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987. There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing,
distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the authority of
MPAA.
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. x x x.[74]
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and substantiated
findings, by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that
x x x. The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged pirated copyrighted
films of private complainants which were found in the possession or control of the
defendants. Hence, the necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated
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films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish the existence of
probable cause.[75]
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the master tape
requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation completely different from
that in the case at bar, and without anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair
play and is a gross reversible error. In fact, this observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste,
S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case:
A review of the grounds invoked x x x in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact
that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should
be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. x x x
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the
master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable cause, is too
exacting and impracticable a requirement to be complied with in a search warrant application
which, it must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic
considerations, a strict application of said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy
and speed which underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in police enforcement
campaigns against all forms of criminality, considering that the master tapes of a motion picture
required to be presented before the court consists of several reels contained in circular steel
casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive objects like
video tapes which can be easily concealed.[76] With hundreds of titles being pirated, this onerous
and tedious imposition would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging and
preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of intellectual
property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind the Courts admonition
also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that
x x x. Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not
be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie
the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive
and administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions
and treaties.
III
The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree No.
1987,[77] which should here be publicized judicially, brought about the revision of its penalty
structure and enumerated additional acts considered violative of said decree on intellectual
property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any sound
recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease,
publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for
profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are so
transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing,
distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, distribution, or possessing
for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the
abovementioned articles, without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; and, (3)
directly or indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of
compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that
such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to reproduce,
without the consent of the owner, any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on
which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual recordings may be transferred, and which
provide distinct bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting
such infringement under Section 29.
The trial courts finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant transgression of
Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of probable cause, which
determination can be reached even in the absence of master tapes by the judge in the exercise
of sound discretion. The executive concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments
to the decree for the protection of intellectual property rights should be matched by
corresponding judicial vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities
in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore
its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on
a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected
by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection,
consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of
anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. [78]
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such
cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he
was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he
copied at his peril. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from
the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not
necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much
is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author
are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of
law to constitute a piracy.[79] The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement
of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television being one of fact, [80] it
should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for conclusive or
preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant
wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master tapes.
In disregarding private respondents argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general
warrant, the lower court observed that it was worded in a manner that the enumerated seizable
items bear direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It
authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease
and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as amended. x x x.[81]
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.,[82] instructs and enlightens:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). x x x. If
the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant
must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and
the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy
merely to strengthen such evidence. x x x.
On private respondents averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than
one specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as there are
rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly
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pirated violates the rule that a search warrant must be issued only in connection with one
specific offense, the lower court said:
x x x. As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56,
PD 49 as amended only. The specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the
copyrighted motion pictures/films belonging to private complainants which defendants were in
control/possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec. 56,
PD 49 as amended.[83]
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with
the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit
requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the courts
protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the court below:
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only producers who have complied
with the requirements of deposit and notice (in other words registration) under Sections 49 and
50 thereof. Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right created, hence, no
infringement under PD 49 as amended. This is not well-taken.
As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has
resolved this legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to
cinematographic works and PD No. 49 had done away with the registration and deposit of
cinematographic works and that even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may
be entitled to protection under the Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its
rights. He cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement. The same
opinion stressed that the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under the
Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to
a suit for damages. The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled
(to) weight and respect.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to believe that a
crime existed when in fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as
amended, does not require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action for
infringement of his rights. These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an action for
damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are shown to exist, an action for infringement may
be initiated.[84]
Accordingly, the certifications[85] from the Copyright Section of the National Library, presented as
evidence by private respondents to show non-registration of some of the films of petitioners,
assume no evidentiary weight or significance, whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to
works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and with copies to be
deposited with the National Library, such as books, including composite and cyclopedic works,
manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to
comply with said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for
infringement. Such non-compliance merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects him
to the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its enumeration of
copyrightable works with the explicit statement that the rights granted under this Decree shall,
from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works. This
means that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an
intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and
deposit. As has been authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the
National Library within three weeks after the first public dissemination or performance of the
work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing
a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said
two copies and in order to recover damages in an infringement suit.[86]
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long
delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without
so much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct their
business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show proof of their
authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or
circulate petitioners copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of
probable cause. That private respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does
not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business practices. What is
more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters have
stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part
of the globe, formerly in the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, now, of
the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be glossed over but should be denounced
and repressed lest the Philippines become an international pariah in the global intellectual
community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and
necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the
validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to
take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this
case. Treble costs are further assessed against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000]
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged
in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to
be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1] stating:
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1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to
as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management
of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines
without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines
processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from UNIFISH
without any receipt of his purchases;
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and
he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the
BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A
verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU

(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the 7th Judicial Region
different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
Branch 28
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn payable to
cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted (sic);
Mandaue City

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn from the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
corporation;

Plaintiff,
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale
of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that
UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain - versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna
for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is
to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
to local customers.
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as Unifish Packing Corporation
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to
other food processing companies.
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT x-------------------------/
CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being
controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t (with sketch)
that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated
by UNIFISH at present.
SEARCH WARRANT

6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH
AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices,
delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as G R E E T I N G S:
ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be
found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture
and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A, It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a

111 | P a g e
(sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy
Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his
Plaintiff,
possession, care and control, the following:

- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
Unifish Packing Corporation
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
x-------------------------/
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
(with sketch)
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
SEARCH WARRANT
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
G R E E T I N G S:

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
(sgd.) [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy
Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
in his possession, care and control, the following:

Judge
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
The second warrant[3]is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION
OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It
consisted of only one page.
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
7th Judicial Region
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
Branch 28
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
Mandaue City
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles

112 | P a g e
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which was docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-
10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant
B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant
(Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of
unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu ,
Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of
Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch
28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a),
Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy
thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent
documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2)
the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying
the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to
post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on
the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other
remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for
certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same
should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These
remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail
for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the
charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the
Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.
911); 3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the informatio
n in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If the motionis denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall h
ave been tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in
the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go totri
al without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that
an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next
legal step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court
committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search
Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of
probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the
properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by
certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.[5]
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and
documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for
Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first
submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners
failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its
credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been
decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential
to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar
case,[6] we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration
constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the
submission of a certified true copy of material portions of the record as are referred to [in the
petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it
be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally
guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.[7]
113 | P a g e
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the
resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of
Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in 220
SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by
petitioners,[8] appears to have been taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash
a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that the issuing judges
disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of
discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that
certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge
de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders
the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order
complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be
entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor
speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her
personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had
been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious
relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to
a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which also involved a special civil action
for certiorari:[11]
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R.
No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not
complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search
warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also
alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the
corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its business.Appeal, therefore, would not be an
adequate remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. [14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in
114 | P a g e
Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names. [23]
A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another
irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place
issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described with
particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in
evidence.[15] In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that
Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the
alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrant states the
warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be
address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B
more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the
consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a
single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede
description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized.[16] The rule is that Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.
a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended[17]and distinguish it from other places
The alleged absence of probable cause
in the community.[18] Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.[19] Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,[20] where the search warrant Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject
mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the search warrants.
adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of
sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [24]
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the
premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified
the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
invalidation in this case. examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma.The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants application.[25] Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant,
and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for
issuance of a valid search warrant.[26]
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1
and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search
Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The
UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation. oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
probable cause.[27] Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor
on mere suspicion or belief.[28]
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
the warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of
warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of
Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with
a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search
this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:
warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises
sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the
legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched. [22]
A. No.
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?

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A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos. appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he
does not issue any invoices.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of
the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud. A Thru delivery receipts.

Q. From where did you get that information? Q Is the delivery receipt official?

A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.[29] A No. It is unregistered.

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities Q For how long has this been going on?
of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by
Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
justify the issuance of the search warrants.[30]

Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was
apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the A August, 1993, last month.
schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the
place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?

Q Do you know Frank Uy?

A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not
go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods
A Yes. that he sold.

Q Why do you know him? Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?

A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993. A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located? Q How did you know this fact?

A Hernan Cortes St. A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last
three years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q What is it being engaged of?
Q Until now?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
A No. I was separated already.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings
that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct? Q When?

A Yes. A August, 1993.

Q How is it done? Q How does he do this manipulation?

A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.
products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it

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Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever? A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight
there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the BIR
but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina?
made to be shown to the BIR.
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
Q Where are they now?

A Yes.
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).

Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts,
sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which
are only for the consumption of the company?
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially
this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of
January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies
which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what
does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.

A Yes, not for the BIR. Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?

Q Where are they kept now? A As far as I know, it does not reflect.

A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the
confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
notebooks.
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.

Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?

Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?

A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the
records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The
second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for
export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they
profit more to dispose the product locally.Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another
company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.

Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but
because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?
instead they are selling it locally?

A Yes.
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was
the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?

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Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling
(sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging
materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that
advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since
according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by
Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.[31]
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records,
and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the
deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to
be sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject
warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32] Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,[33] and Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.[34]
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by
the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as
tending to defeat its major object: the elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages;
business communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records
of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966
to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain
the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The
herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be
seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates,
amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of
stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
others, enumerated in the warrant.
118 | P a g e
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of
loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general
ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several
motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of
their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its
workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued
by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the
charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of
old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents
from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the
terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register
books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory
lists, stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank
statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this
case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales invoices,
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of
these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear
that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. [37] Although it
appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos
to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt
and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. In United States v. Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals
(Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr.
415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described
books and myriad other generally described items.On appeal, the California Supreme Court held
that only the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court
acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court
chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not
particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the
named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not
rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state
courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge
should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See
United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described
with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the
fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of
only the items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong
and removes the court from considering illegally obtained evidence.Moreover, suppression of
only those items that were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in
the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary
description. As the leading commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if a
warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items
were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and
permitting a search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by
the enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
119 | P a g e
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.[39]
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the
constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder.[40] In Tambasen vs. People,[41] it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro v.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212
SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally
protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil.
169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize,
such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230,
235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal
in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
abhors.
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be
seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the
present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May
1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the
seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but
REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent
Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the
subject premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990.]
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Bacolod City and THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law Office for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE;
DEFINITION AND REQUISITES THEREOF. — The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines. Under this provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding
of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133
SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or)
officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and
(3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers
(Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 647). These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — It has been
ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968),
however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or
supported by the record. In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the
rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with.
The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records
disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the
application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of
120 | P a g e
which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds
thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was
sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145
SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388,
where the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH
PARTICULARITY. — Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law
requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items
listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that
the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises
searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court of Appeals
and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling
scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles. Far more important
is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of personal property which
may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither
the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the
subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense;
and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.;SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID
WARRANT. — No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No.
50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said
in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: ‘It has been said that of all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and
papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the
Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions.
A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24, 1987 (p. 43, Record)
and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53-54, Record) of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in
Criminal Case No. 5657.
On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for a
search warrant, alleging:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x.
"That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER
TRADING located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod City has/have in her/his/their
possession and control the following property/ies, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.
"The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and has therefore reasons to
believe that a SEARCH WARRANT should be issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of
the law to take possession and bring the following described property/ies, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable Court to issue a SEARCH WARRANT
commanding any peace officer to search the premises/house described in this application and to
seize and bring to this Honorable Court the person/property/ies above-mentioned to be dealt
with as the law may direct.
Bacolod City, Philippines
Feb. 4, 1987 —.
SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.
ILT, PC
OIC, PFOCIS, Bacolod City"
(p. 18, Records)
The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bacolod City and supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L.
Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the
CIS of Bacolod City, quoted as follows:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly sworn to, testify as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?
"ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an employee of NAPOCOR and
presently residing at Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO ABAJA, CIS, regular
member of the CO/INP CIS Command, Bacolod City.
"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal Street,
near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
"ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
"3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may be found
in the said premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession and control the following
property, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories?
"ANSWER: Yes, sir.
121 | P a g e

"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept in said
premises/house?
"ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to purchase some of these items.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and affixed our signature this 4th day of
Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.
"SGD. IGNACIO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.
SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES
Judge
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BACOLOD CITY"
(p. 19, Record)
On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued Search
Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described in the warrant.
Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the
premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272 kilos of
galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The receipt was
signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked "from Kenneth Siao" (p. 21, Record).
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against Kenneth Siao
with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation. Thereafter, Siao filed a
counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights and ownership over
the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle Pendon. In a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated
May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation against petitioner. On the same day, a
complaint (p. 24, Record) for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against petitioner and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5657 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case
was raffled to Branch 47 of the same court presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T.
Jocson.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the return of the
articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on the ground that the
said search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the
application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was subsequently amended to an application for
quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the articles seized by virtue
thereof (pp. 33-38, Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the
application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the
issuance thereof. The order states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at least one of the seized
items bears the identifying mark of the complainant National Power Corporation, and there being
no statement that the seized items were acquired in usual course of business for value, this
court is constrained to have the case tried without resolving whether or not the questioned
search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43, Records)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October 14, 1987 (p. 11,
Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the legality of search warrant No.
181 and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in evidence of the articles and
properties seized and the return thereof to petitioner. On April 4, 1988, respondent Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate court found the existence of a probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrant. The respondent court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the validity of the
issuance of the Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the ruling of the respondent trial
court in denying the petition for the return of the articles and personal properties seized
thereunder.
"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The previous
order to maintain the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 41, Rollo)
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988 was
denied in a resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 181. It
is the contention of petitioner that the application for the search warrant and the joint deposition
of the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the
rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaja and
Reyes failed to comply with the requisites of searching questions and answers. The joint
deposition of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped, mimeographed
and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-in. No examination of the applicant and of
the joint deponents was personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and the
rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint deposition
of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific
offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were stolen or that
being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of polemics, that the articles
belong to the latter, his Constitutional right prevails over that of NAPOCOR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge alter examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library
122 | P a g e

Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must
examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers
(Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 647). These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states: "Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted."cralaw virtua1aw library
It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511,
Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be
substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must
personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself
was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only
part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge
Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant
had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued.
In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case
of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant
himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to," We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.’
"x x x
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application." (Emphasis supplied; p. 695)
Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the applicant can
hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor admitted in his
memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law
which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
(Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions propounded could hardly support a finding of
probable cause. The first question was on the personal circumstances of the deponents. The
second and third were leading questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was on
how the deponents knew about their answers in the second and third questions. The judge could
have exploited this last question to convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but he
did not. There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized
were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any
knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the
proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading
or with the premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application nor the joint
deposition provided facts or circumstance which could lead a prudent man to believe that an
offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any,
are in the possession of the person named in the application.
". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his
witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the
answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that
the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation
which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but
one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and
must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388) (Emphasis
supplied)
And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467,
483:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Nolasco v. Paño No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163), the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not
satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles
sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to wit:
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that the searching team can
practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as
alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court of Appeals and which has not been
denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second
hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of
personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought
to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other
proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing
an offense.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence of probable
cause in the issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion to quash and application for articles seized by virtue of search warrant
No. 181, he stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant in the lower court
is cured by the admission for the accused of counsel that at least one of the items seized bore
123 | P a g e
the identifying mark of complainant National Power Corporation and the failure to aver in the
quashal motion and in the open hearing that the seized items themselves were acquired in the
usual course of business for value in good faith. However, this order is without prejudice to the
right of the accused to pursue against the administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes
Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)
In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of search warrant
No. 181 was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the receipt in behalf of Kener
Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing."cralaw virtua1aw library
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot
validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26,
1984, 128 SCRA 388:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
v. Herrera:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption
of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power
to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as
galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is no
showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is
proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is
enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search
Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2) ordering the
return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner; and 3) permanently
enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No.
181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991
NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII, DUMAGUETE CITY, respondent.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1
issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00
seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon
Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur
M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2
On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to
search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. Pertinent
portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T.
Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is
probable cause to believe that possession and control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint
has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons
to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at
Tama's Room (Rgt. side lst Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:
X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;
X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the
room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic) aparadors, lockers,
cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of the following property
Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs. 3
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva
in the amount of P1,231.40.
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the
grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried
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leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said
search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court
"holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of
appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that
(1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the
judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and
answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had
replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the
requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. 7
A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied
by Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that
respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order
dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.
We rule for petitioners.
Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. 8
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a
search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and
witnesses through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this
Court defined "probable cause" as follows:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed
to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was
submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part
suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.
In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:
Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search
warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated
above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as
means of committing an offense?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the property in his/their
possession and control?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know all this (sic) things?
A Through discreet surveillance. 9
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The
questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The
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deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their
answers on the blanks provided.
In the case of Nolasco vs. Paño, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this
Court held:
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such
facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are
leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities
to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the
deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements or probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as
invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions
and answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and
short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers".
On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no"
answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge
to the applicant's witness' are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid
search warrant. 10
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His
failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in
Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious
disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search
warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the
money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even
named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only
of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure
of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of
fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when
he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void.
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to
order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been
seized from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999]
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L.
MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July 26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, which denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search
Warrants emanating from the same Court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any
case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including
the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets,
transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay,
another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the
said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search
warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and
investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential information they
received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
chop-chop vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation
of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants
and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and
90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI
agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-
powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was
conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of
NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded
several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of
ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one
motorcycle. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI
agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated
firearms in question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been issued
to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question.Likewise, the radio tranceivers
recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records
of the government agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge
requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes O, P, and Q,
Petition).
On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants,
contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
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2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by
the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the said Motion To
Quash interposed by petitioners.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any
probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI
agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under
controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila? (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15,
1990, p. 4)
Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed
that the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a
detailed account of how the NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were
unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is
perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants
for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked
them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in
compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records
of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what
questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of
inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause.

Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants proscribed by the
Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e.
surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and the firearms listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.
unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored
therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance
together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items
the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI to be seized thus:
Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-
Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was
Search Warrant No. 90-11
there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is
therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on
the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses. Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets,
scanners, monitoring device and the like.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of
whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the Search Warrant No. 90-13
conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the
existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets,
who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
radio communications equipments, scanners, monitoring devices and others.

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions
The use of the phrase and the like is of no moment. The same did not make the search warrants
arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent
in question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the warrant
judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal
although it described the things to be seized as books of accounts and allied papers.
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the
one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions
vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and
investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that
respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms.
conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and
correctness of his findings and impressions. Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:

Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of
subject search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and
statutory requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific
questions they deem particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their
witnesses. To buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to
wit:
Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching

127 | P a g e
authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is
very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be
embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know
before hand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance
they conducted did disclose the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be
searched, they could not have known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing
such weapons at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the
applications for subject search warrants.
Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same
general. Retired Justice Ricardo Franciscos book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily
precise; and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or
its character, is the matter of concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so
far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. x x x
In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ... But where, by the nature of the goods to
be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description
be given, for this would mean that no warrant could issue.
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way of knowing
whether the guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The surveillance
conducted could not give the NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or
brought to the premises to be searched. Thus, they could not be expected to know the detailed
particulars of the objects to be seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for
subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of
law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the
search warrants in question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by
the NBI agents. Among the irregularities alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the following before breaking into the premises:
a. Properly identify themselves and showing necessary credentials including presentation of the
Search Warrants;
b. Furnishing of Search Warrants and allowing the occupants of the place to scrutinize the same;
c. Giving ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow the raiders entry into the place and to
search the premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the main door of
the house.
3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded the maids and the sixteen year-old son of
defendant Kho into the dining room where they were confined for the duration of the raid. In the
case of the son, he was gagged with a piece of cloth, his hands were tied behind his back and
he was made to lie face down.
4. Defendant Khos hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially with a rag and later
with the electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was restrained in a kneeling position with
guns pointed at him throughout the duration of the search. It was only after the search was
completed and the seized items stuffed in carton boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were untied
so he can sign the search warrants which he was forced to do.
5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho and his companions were kept in the dining room
and continuously intimidated of being shot while the raiders search all the rooms all by
themselves and without anybody seeing whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challanged search warrants
is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the
validity of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the
search are not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge,
petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at
hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued
upon belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an
agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid premises
and to confiscate the objects seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of
fact outside the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear
to rule on such issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI
against the herein petitioners.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of
Section 3 in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus
with preliminary and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent
NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the
petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156804. March 14, 2005]
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (PHILS.), INC. and IFPI (SOUTHEAST ASIA),
LTD., petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPANOL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
128 | P a g e
COURT, BRANCH 90, DASMARIAS, CAVITE, ELENA S. LIM, SUSAN L. TAN, DAVID S. LIM,
JAMES H. UY, WILSON ALEJANDRO, JR., JOSEPH DE LUNA, MARIA A. VELA CRUZ,
DAVID CHUNG, JAMES UY, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND SOLID LAGUNA
CORPORATION, respondents.
Assailed and sought to be nullified in this petition for certiorari with application for injunctive relief
are the orders issued by the respondent judge on June 25, 2002[1] and January 6, 2003,[2] the
first quashing Search Warrant No. 219-00, and the second, denying reconsideration of the first.
From the petition, the comment thereon of private respondents, their respective annexes, and
other pleadings filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following relevant facts:
In a criminal complaint filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Videogram Regulatory
Board (VRB)[3] charged herein private respondents James Uy, David Chung, Elena Lim and
another officer of respondent Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) with violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1987.[4] As alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 2000-1576, the four
(4) were engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms without license
and authority from VRB. On account of this and petitioners own complaints for copyright
infringement, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through Agent Ferdinand M. Lavin,
applied on September 18, 2000, with the Regional Trial Court at Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 80,
presided by the respondent judge, for the issuance of search warrants against private
respondents David Chung, James Uy, John and Jane Does, doing business under the name
and style Media Group inside the factory and production facility of SLC at Solid corner Camado
Sts., Laguna International Industrial Park, Bian, Laguna.[5]
During the proceedings on the application, Agent Lavin presented, as witnesses, Rodolfo
Pedralvez, a deputized agent of VRB, and Rene C. Baltazar, an investigator retained by the law
firm R.V. Domingo & Associates, petitioners attorney-in-fact. In their sworn statements, the
three stated that petitioners sought their assistance, complaining about the manufacture, sale
and distribution of various titles of compact discs (CDs) in violation of petitioners right as
copyright owners; that acting on the complaint, Agent Lavin and the witnesses conducted an
investigation, in the course of which unnamed persons informed them that allegedly infringing or
pirated discs were being manufactured somewhere in an industrial park in Laguna; that in the
process of their operation, they were able to enter, accompanied by another unnamed source,
the premises of SLC and to see various replicating equipment and stacks of CDs; and that they
were told by their anonymous source that the discs were being manufactured in the same
premises. They also testified that private respondents were (1) engaged in the reproduction or
replication of audio and video compacts discs without the requisite authorization from VRB, in
violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987, presenting a VRB certification to such effect; and (2) per
petitioners certification and a listing of Sony music titles, infringing on petitioners copyrights in
violation of Section 208 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as Intellectual Property
Code.[6]
On the basis of the foregoing sworn statements, the respondent judge issued Search Warrant
No. 219-00[7] for violation of Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293 and Search Warrant No. 220-00[8] for
violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987.
The following day, elements of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, led by PO2 Reggie Comandante, enforced both warrants and brought the
seized items to a private warehouse of Carepak Moving and Storage at 1234 Villonco Road,
Sucat, Paranaque City and their custody turned over to VRB.[9] An inventory of seized
items,[10] as well as a Return of Search Warrant were later filed with the respondent court.
Meanwhile, the respondents in I.S. No. 2000-1576 belabored to prove before the DOJ
Prosecutorial Service that, since 1998 and up to the time of the search, they were licensed by
VRB to operate as replicator and duplicator of videograms.
On the stated finding that respondents can not . . . be considered an unauthorized reproducers
of videograms, being licensed to engage in reproduction in videograms under SLC in which they
are the officers and/or or officials, the DOJ, via a resolution dated January 15,
2001,[11] dismissed VRBs complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576.
On February 6, 2001, private respondents, armed with the DOJ resolution adverted to, moved to
quash the search warrants thus issued.[12] VRB interposed an opposition for the reason that the
DOJ has yet to resolve the motion for reconsideration it filed in I.S. No. 2000-1576.
Eventually, the DOJ denied VRBs motion for reconsideration, prompting private respondents to
move anew for the quashal of the search warrants. In its supplement to motion, private
respondents attached copies of SLCs license as videogram duplicator and replicator.
In an order dated October 30, 2001,[13] the respondent judge, citing the January 15, 2001 DOJ
resolution in I.S. No. 2000-1576, granted private respondents motion to quash, as
supplemented, dispositively stating:
Nonetheless, such being the case, the aforesaid Search Warrants are QUASHED
Petitioners forthwith sought clarification on whether or not the quashal order referred to both
search warrants or to Search Warrant No. 220-00 alone, since it was the latter that was based
on the charge of violation of PD No. 1987.[14] The respondent judge, in a modificatory order
dated January 29, 2002,[15] clarified that her previous order quashed only Search Warrant No.
220-00.
Meanwhile, or on November 22, 2001, petitioners filed with the DOJ an affidavit-complaint,
docketed thereat as I.S. No. 2001-1158, charging individual private respondents with copyright
infringement in violation of Sections 172 and 208 in relation to other provisions of RA No.
8293.[16] Attached to the affidavit-complaint were certain documents and records seized from
SLCs premises, such as production and delivery records.
Following their receipt of DOJ-issued subpoenas to file counter-affidavits, private respondents
moved, in the search warrant case, that they be allowed to examine the seized items to enable
them to intelligently prepare their defense.[17] On January 30, 2002, respondent judge issued an
order allowing the desired examination, provided it is made under the supervision of the courts
sheriff and in the presence of the applicant of Search Warrant No. 219-00.[18]
On February 8, 2002, the parties, represented by their counsels, repaired to the Carepak
warehouse. An NBI agent representing Agent Lavin appeared. The examination, however, did
not push through on account of petitioners counsel insistence on Agent Lavins physical
presence.[19] Private respondents were able to make an examination on the following scheduled
setting, February 15, 2002, albeit it was limited, as the minutes of the inspection discloses, to
inspecting only one (1) box containing 35 assorted CDs, testing stampers, diskettes, a calendar,
organizers and some folders and documents. The minutes also contained an entry stating
- Other items/machines were not examined because they cannot be identified as they are not
properly segregated from other items/machines in the warehouse. The parties agreed to
schedule another examination on (to be agreed by the parties) after the items/machines subject
of the examination shall have been segregated from the other items/machines by Carepak
Moving and Storage , Inc.[20]
129 | P a g e
During the preliminary investigation conducted on February 26, 2002 in I.S. No. 2001-1158,
however, petitioners counsel objected to any further examination, claiming that such exercise
was a mere subterfuge to delay proceedings.[21]
On April 11, 2002, individual private respondents, through counsel, filed a Motion To Quash
Search Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties) grounded on lack of probable cause to
justify issuance of search warrant, it being inter alia alleged that the applicant and his witnesses
lacked the requisite personal knowledge to justify the valid issuance of a search warrant; that the
warrant did not sufficiently describe the items to be seized; and that the warrant was improperly
enforced.[22] To this motion to quash, petitioners interposed an opposition dated May 7, 2002
predicated on four (4) grounds.[23] On June 26, 2002, respondent SLC filed a Manifestation
joining its co-respondents in, and adopting, their motion to quash.[24]
On June 25, 2002, the respondent judge issued the herein first assailed order quashing
Search Warrant No. 219-00 principally on the ground that the integrity of the seized items as
evidence had been compromised, commingled as they were with other articles. Wrote the
respondent judge:
Based on the report submitted, it appears that on February 15, 2002, an examination was
actually conducted. Unfortunately, the alleged seized items were commingled with and not
segregated from thousands of other items stored in the warehouse. Only one box . . . were (sic)
examined in the presence of both parties with the sheriff, such that another date was set . . . .
On February 22, 2002, during the hearing before the Department of Justice (DOJ), [petitioners
counsel] Atty. Arevalo manifested their objection to the further examination on the alleged
ground that all of the items subject of the DOJ complaint have been examined.
Analyzing the report and the incidents relative thereto, it shows that the items subject of the
questioned Search Warrant were commingled with other items in the warehouse of Carepak
resulting in the failure to identify the machines and other items subject of this Search Warrant,
while the other items enumerated in the said Inventory of Seized Items and Certification of
Legality, Orderliness and Regularity in the Execution and enforcement of Search Warrants were
not examined, hence, the charge imputed against the respondents could not be established as
the evidence to show such violation fails to determine the culpability of said respondents, thus,
violating their constitutional rights.[25]
Excepting, petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing on the main that the quashal order
was erroneously based on a ground outside the purview of a motion to quash.[26] To this motion,
private respondents interposed an opposition, against which petitioners countered with a reply.
On January 6, 2003, respondent judge issued the second assailed order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration on the strength of the following premises:
Careful scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the application of the above-entitled case
stemmed from the application for Search Warrant alleging that the respondent was not licensed
to duplicate or replicate CDs and VCDs. The Court was misled when the applicants declared
that Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) is not licensed to engage in replicating/duplicating CDs and
VCDs, when in truth and in fact, SLC was still a holder of a valid and existing VRB
license. Considering the fact that respondent was duly licensed which facts (sic) was not laid
bare to this Court when the application for writ was filed by the private complainant through the
National Bureau of Investigation, this Court hereby recalls and quashes the above writ.
Lastly, taking into account that respondents were licensed to engage in replicating/duplicating
CDs and VCDs, the issuance of search warrant was of no force and effect as there was absence
of probable cause to justify said issuance. xxx[27]
Hence, petitioners present recourse.
In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003,[28] the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from implementing and enforcing the respondent judges questioned
orders.
Petitioners ascribe on the respondent judge the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the first assailed order in that:
1. It was based on a ground that is not a basis for quashal of a search warrant, i.e., private
respondents failure to examine the seized items, which ground is extraneous to the
determination of the validity of the issuance of the search warrant.
2. Public respondent, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation that absolved the private
respondents from any liability for copyright infringement.
3. Public respondent recognized the motion to quash search warrant filed by persons who did
not have any standing to question the warrant.
Petitioners also deplore the issuance of the second assailed order which they tag as predicated
on a ground immaterial to Search Warrant No. 219-00.
Private respondents filed their Comment on May 13, 2003, essentially reiterating their arguments
in the Motion To Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties). Apart therefrom,
they aver that petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts by filing the petition directly with
this Court. As to be expected, petitioners reply to comment traversed private respondents
position.
Owing to their inability to locate respondent David Chung, petitioners moved and the Court
subsequently approved the dropping, without prejudice, of said respondent from the case.[29]
On February 20, 2004, private respondents filed their Rejoinder, therein inviting attention to
petitioner IFPIs failure to execute the certification on non-forum shopping as required by Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court and questioning the validity of the Special Powers of Attorney of
petitioners attorney-in-fact to file this case.
In Resolution of March 31, 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and directed the
submission of memoranda which the parties, after each securing an extension, did submit.
The underlying issue before Us revolves on the propriety of the quashal of Search Warrant No.
219-00 which, in turn, resolves itself into question of the propriety of the warrants issuance in the
first place.
It has repeatedly been said that ones house, however, humble is his castle where his person,
papers and effects shall be secured and whence he shall enjoy undisturbed privacy except, to
borrow from Villanueva vs. Querubin,[30] in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards. The protection against illegal searches and seizure has
found its way into our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and is now embodied in Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, thus -
130 | P a g e
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized,
and in Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz -
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause . . . to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the same Rule, reading:
SEC. 5. Examination of the complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal
construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual. Consistent with this
postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.[31] For, the presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself detests. [32]
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.[33] And when the law speaks of
facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the
witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant
is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary, as held by us in Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals.[34] Testimony based on what is supposedly told to a witness, being patent hearsay and,
as rule, of no evidentiary weight[35] or probative value, whether objected to or not,[36] would,
alone, not suffice under the law on the existence of probable cause.
In our view, the issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements of
probable cause. The respondent judge did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone
gravely abuse her discretion.
Petitioners argue that the instant petition is on all fours with Columbia,[37] wherein the en
banc Court upheld the validity of search warrants based on the testimonies of the applicant and
his witnesses who conducted an investigation on the unlawful reproduction and distribution of
video tapes of copyrighted films.
We are not persuaded.
In Columbia, the issuing court probed the applicants and his witnesses personal knowledge of
the fact of infringement. It was, however, determined by this Court that during the application
hearing, therein petitioners attorney-in-fact, a witness of the applicant, stated in his affidavit and
further expounded in his deposition that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents
had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purposes of
selling any of the copyrighted films.[38] Significantly, the Court, in upholding the validity of the writ
issued upon complaint of Columbia Pictures, Inc., et al., stated that there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners
witnesses.[39]
Therein lies the difference with the instant case.
Here, applicant Agent Lavin and his witnesses, Pedralvez and Baltazar, when queried during the
application hearing how they knew that audio and video compact discs were infringing or pirated,
relied for the most part on what alleged unnamed sources told them and/or on certifications or
lists made by persons who were never presented as witnesses. In net effect, they testified under
oath as to the truth of facts they had no personal knowledge of. The following excerpts of the
depositions of applicant Lavin and his witnesses suggest as much:
A. Deposition of Agent Lavin
28. Question: What happened next?
Answer: We then went to the Laguna Industrial Park, your Honor . . . We then verified from an
informant that David Chung, James Uy . . . under the name and style Media Group were the
ones replicating the infringing CDs.
xxx xxx xxx
36. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs and CDs you purchased or are indeed
infringing?
Answer: I have with me the VRB certification that the VCDs are unauthorized copies. I also
have with me the Complaint-Affidavit of Sony Music and IFPI that certified that these are
infringing copies, as well as the title list of Sony Music wherein some of the CDs purchased are
indicated. (Annex 10, Comment, Rollo, p. 841)
B. Deposition of Baltazar
18. Question: What did you see in that address?
Answer: We saw that they had in stock several infringing, pirated and unauthorized CDs. They
also had videograms without VRB labels, aside from artworks and labels. John Doe gave us a
Wholesome CD while Jane Doe gave us Kenny Rogers Videoke and Engelbert Humperdinck
Videoke which the informant told us were being reproduced in that facility. The informant further
showed us the rooms where the replicating and/or stamping machine was located.
19. Question: How did you determine that the CDs you purchased are counterfeit, pirated or
unauthorized?
131 | P a g e
Answer: The Attorney-in-fact of Sony Music and IFPI certified in his Complaint-Affidavit that
they are unauthorized copies. I also have with me a listing of Sony Music titles and some of the
CDs I purchased are in that list.[40]
C. Deposition of Pedralvez
27. Question: What proof do you have they are producing infringing materials?
Answer: We were given some samples by John Doe and Jane Doe. These are Kenny Rogers
Videoke, Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke, and Andrew E. Wholesome CD. The informant told
us that the said samples were being reproduced in the facility.
28. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs you purchased or got are indeed
unauthorized?
Answer: The VRB has certified that they are unauthorized copies. (Annex 12, Comment,
Rollo, pp. 849-852).
Unlike their counterparts in Columbia who were found to be personally knowledgeable about
their facts, Agent Lavin and his witnesses, judging from their above quoted answers, had no
personal knowledge that the discs they saw, purchased or received were, in fact, pirated or
infringing on petitioners copyrights. To us, it is not enough that the applicant and his witnesses
testify that they saw stacks of several allegedly infringing, pirated and unauthorized discs in the
subject facility. The more decisive consideration determinative of whether or not a probable
cause obtains to justify the issuance of a search warrant is that they had personal knowledge
that the discs were actually infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies. [41]
Moreover, unlike in Columbia, misrepresentation on the part of the applicant and his witnesses
had been established in this case.
This is not to say that the master tapes should have been presented in evidence during the
application hearing, as private respondents, obviously having in mind the holding in 20th Century
Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,[42] would have this Court believe. It is true that the Court,
in 20th Century Fox, underscored the necessity, in determining the existence of probable cause
in copyright infringement cases, of presenting the master tapes of the copyrighted work. But, as
emphatically clarified in Columbia such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use
of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence
xxx especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay,
inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.[43] What this Court is saying
is that any evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not readily available, in similar
application proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the very least, be based
on the witness personal knowledge.
Petitioners argue, citing People v. Chua Uy,[44] that Agent Lavins informants testimonies are not
indispensable as they would only be corroborative.[45] Like Columbia, Chua Uy is not a winning
card for petitioners, for, in the latter case, there was a reliable testimony to corroborate what the
applicant testified to, i.e., the testimony of the police poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation
involving prohibited drugs. The circumstances are different in this case wherein the applicant
and his witnesses had no personal knowledge that the discs they purchased were infringing or
pirated copies. It cannot be overemphasized that not one of them testified seeing the pirated
discs being manufactured at SLCs premises. What they stated instead was that they were given
copies of Kenny Rogers Videoke, Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke and Andrew E. Wholesome
CD by two anonymous sources, while yet another informant told them that the discs were
manufactured at said premises.
Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and validated,[46] as
what transpired in Columbia. Unfortunately, the records show that such is not the case before
us.
On the issue that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in conducting what
petitioners perceived amounted to a preliminary investigation, this Court has already ruled
in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sheriff of RTC Quezon City, Branch 93,[47] that in the
determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense
exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the warrant. In the exercise of this mandate - which
we can allow as being akin to conducting a preliminary investigation - abuse of discretion cannot
plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the issuing court on account of its prima facie holding that no
offense has been committed, even if consequent to such holding a warrant is recalled and the
private complainant is incidentally deprived of vital evidence to prove his case. Solid
Triangle succinctly explains why:
The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand,
and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings
entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the others finding as regards the
existence of a crime. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed,
and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.
When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds
that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings
in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file the
information for the courts ruling that no crime exists is only of purposes of issuing or quashing
the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the
executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty would amount to an abdication of a
constitutional obligation.[48]
While the language of the first questioned Order may be viewed as encroaching on executive
functions, nonetheless, it remains that the order of quashal is entirely independent of the
proceedings in I.S. No. 2001-1158. And needless to stress, the DOJ is by no means concluded
by the respondent judges findings as regards the existence, or the non-existence, of a crime.
We can, to a point, accord merit to petitioners lament that the basis of the first questioned order,
i.e., the mingling of the seized items with other items, is extraneous to the determination of the
validity of the issuance of the search warrant. It is to be pointed out, though, that public
respondent corrected her error when it was raised in petitioners motion for
reconsideration. There can really be no serious objection to a judge correcting or altogether
altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it being the purpose of such
recourse to provide the court an opportunity to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed,
or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous.[49] A motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari is required precisely to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it
by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[50]
Similarly, as to the matter of the respondent judges recognizing the April 11, 2002 motion to
quash search warrant[51] filed by the individual private respondents, instead of by SLC, as
presumptive owner of the seized items, such error was properly addressed when respondent
SLC, represented throughout the proceedings below by the same counsel of its co-respondents,
formally manifested that it was adopting the same motion as its own. [52]
It is apropos to point out at this juncture that petitioners have imputed on individual private
respondents criminal liability, utilizing as tools of indictment the very articles and papers seized
132 | P a g e
from the premises of SLC. Be that as it may, petitioners should be deemed in estoppel to raise
the personality of individual private respondents to interpose a motion to quash. To be sure, it
would be unsporting for petitioners to prosecute individual private respondents on the basis of
seized articles but on the same breath deny the latter standing to question the legality of the
seizure on the postulate that only the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, meaning
SLC, can raise that challenge. There can be no quibbling that individual private respondents
stand to be prejudiced or at least be inconvenient by any judgment in any case based on the
seized properties. In a very real sense, therefore, they are real parties in interest who ought not
to be prevented from assailing the validity of Search Warrant 219-00, albeit they cannot plausibly
asked for the release and appropriate as their own the seized articles.
Petitioners related argument that SLC could not have validly adopted individual private
respondents motion to quash due to laches is untenable.
The records show that the seizure in question was effected on September 19, 2000. The
complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576 was filed against the officers of SLC, all of whom, except for
one, are also private respondents in the instant petition. I.S. No. 2000-1576 was only resolved
on January 15, 2001 when the DOJ dismissed the complaint on the ground that SLC was, in
fact, duly licensed by the VRB. Shortly thereafter, or on February 6, 2001, less than five (5)
months after the seizure, private respondents moved to quash both search warrants.[53] The
motion clearly indicates private respondents desire for the return of the seized items, and there
is nothing in the records showing that petitioners objected to the motion on the ground that the
movants had no standing to question the warrants.
This bring Us to the second assailed order. As earlier stated, DOJ, in I.S. No. 2000-1576, found
respondent SLC to be licensed by VRB to engage in the business of replicating or duplicating
videograms.
Petitioners would have the Court believe that the second questioned order was based on a
ground immaterial to the charge of infringement. A scrutiny of the text of the said order,
however, shows that the respondent judge denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
because she was misled by the applicants and his witnesses testimony. It may be that a VRB
license is no defense to a charge of violating Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293. It must be stressed
in this regard, however, that the core issue here is the validity of the warrant which applicant
secured on the basis of, among others, his representation which turned out to be false.
As above discussed, the answers of Agent Lavin and his witnesses to the public respondents
searching questions, particularly those relating to how they knew that the compact discs they
purchased or received were illegal, unauthorized or infringing, were based on certifications and
not personal knowledge. The subject warrant, as well as Search Warrant No. 220-00, was
issued nonetheless. It may well have been that the issuing judge was, in the end, convinced to
issue the warrants by means of the erroneous VRB certification presented during the joint
application hearing, overriding whatever misgivings she may have had with the applicants and
his witnesses other answers. This Court, however, cannot engage in such speculation and sees
no need to.
Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at bottom, predicated on the
sworn testimonies of persons without personal knowledge of facts they were testifying on and
who relied on a false certification issued by VRB. Based as it were on hearsay and false
information, its issuance was without probable cause and, therefore, invalid.
Given the foregoing perspective, the peripheral issues of (a) whether or not petitioner IFPI
(South East Asia), Ltd. failed to comply with the rules requiring the filing of a certification on non-
forum shopping; and (b) whether or not IFPIs board of directors ratified its conditional
authorization for its attorney-in-fact to represent IFPI in this petition, need not detain us long. In
our review of the records, R.V. Domingo & Associates, whose authority to represent the
petitioners in this petition continues, had duly executed the sworn certification on non- forum
shopping.
In the same manner, this Court, having taken cognizance of this petition, need not belabor the
issue of whether or not petitioners have cavalierly breached the rule on hierarchy of courts.
Suffice it to state that, while the Court looks with disfavor on utter disregard of its rules, [54] it is
within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation
whenever the ends of justice so requires, as here.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order
issued on February 19, 2003 is consequently RECALLED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial
Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR
CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR
HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD
ALI, respondents.
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari to
invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the Peoples motion for
reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216
of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days to be
released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned
in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay
Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain
was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail
Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-
133 | P a g e
shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00
and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the
warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court
on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two
pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items
described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol;
(c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted
magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without
mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private
respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged; ** and on the same date, submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search
Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition
for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was
conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in
the order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigails
Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building as it is correspondingly called only
Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigails Variety Store to Apartment
No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for
ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be reduced on
the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly granting the motion to quash
search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed opposition/comment and
supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated
motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of
the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for
lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: [6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search
warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings
wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No.
1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent
to, Abigails Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the
application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched -- was
effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not dated, not
signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the
Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead ** directed them to search Abigail Variety Store
Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December 15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address given
in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger
James Brillantes, the Team Leader. The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the
Peoples admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that
said sketch was in truth not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely
attached to the motion for reconsideration.[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge Casanova
contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:[8]
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella
and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks
of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN
THEIR MOUTH to say in TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the
words KATABI, or KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin
or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their
mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT
to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein
private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and
immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.[9]
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant
itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section
11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[10]
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant
to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the
134 | P a g e
previous ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof
and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the
warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the
presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil aciton
of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing
Court and overturning the latters determination of probable cause and particularity of the place
to be searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application for
warrant despite the clear evidence ** to the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by
which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal
although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that
rule; and
6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant
when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly
issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or
more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. It claims tha tone of said officers, infact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place
to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the
search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken
therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of the premises
to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a
description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the
search warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And the scope of the search was made
more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the warrant that the search
be limited only to the premises herein described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety Store, and four (4) separate and
independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could
pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of
the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one of the residential units at the
rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store
and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand
the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant --
which directs that the search be limited only to the premises herein described, Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did
not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch
they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at No. 19. Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the
execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This
was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it
was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one
place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct
addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the second
warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously typographical
error, the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file. [12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious typographical erro
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos,
the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants
in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
135 | P a g e
done was to substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises
that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor
licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched -- although not that specified in the warrant -- is exactly what
they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of
the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have
been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant.Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacallas
finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A perusal of the record however
shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the
police officers examined by Judge Bacalla.[13] In Judge Casanovas view, said inconsistencies,
being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts
on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before
Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is,
to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant -- which, of course, is the only place
that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -- was not that which the police officers who
applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-
and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigails Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 -- the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:[14]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularlydescribing the place to be
serched, and the things to be seized.,
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause,
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe
the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to
the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought
into operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of
the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be
made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly
marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among
others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the
return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which
** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the
remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously
availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that
the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is
different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument
that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office opines that where a
search warrant has been issued by the court other than the one trying the main criminal case,
the proper recourse of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is
afterwards filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5) policy guidelines laid down by this
Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case. Said second guideline reads: [19]
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues
the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said
court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, other they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is
not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be
filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time for the first time in
either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the
exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and
the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed
is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and not
cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised
136 | P a g e
in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appopriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for
the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been
presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action
had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence
was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September
11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders
of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in the
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby
AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme
Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
vs.
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents. Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon premises had been raided.
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
benevolence or largesse

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President,
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
results.
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
124, Rollo]
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the

137 | P a g e
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence
does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in
this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime
of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the
same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill
Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
138 | P a g e
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in
the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of
the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress
and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
139 | P a g e
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE The petitioners rely on the following grounds for the grant of the reliefs prayed for in this petition:
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
I

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the arrest of the
and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
petitioners without examining the record of the preliminary investigation and in determining for
himself on the basis thereof the existence of probable cause.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
II

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by
The Department of Justice 349 Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refused
the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
to review the City Prosecutors Joint Resolution and dismissed petitioners appeal therefrom.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
III
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21 The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the subject order
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest without assessing for itself whether based on
such records there is probable cause against petitioners.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is IV
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No
costs.
The facts on record do not establish prima facie probable cause and Criminal Case No. Q-93-
43198 should have been dismissed.[5]
SO ORDERED.
The antecedents of this petition are not disputed.

[G.R. No. 113930. March 5, 1996]
PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS LORENZO, SR., LUIS LORENZO,
JR., AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B.
PALANNUAYAN, and WONG FONG FUI, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON. APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F.
GINGOYON, and HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, in their capacities as Members of the
Department of Judge 349 Committee, and the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.
ROBERTO DELGADO, petitioner-intervenor.
We are urged in this petition to set aside (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals of 28
September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226,[1] which dismissed the petition therein on the ground
that it has been mooted with the release by the Department of Justice of its decision x x x
dismissing petitioners petition for review; (b) the resolution of the said court of 9 February
1994[2] denying the petitioners motion to reconsider the decision; (c) the order of 17 May
1993[3] of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the public
prosecutors motion to defer arraignment; and (d) the resolution of 23 July 1993 and 3 February
1994[4] of the Department of Justice, (DOJ) dismissing petitioners petition for the review of the
Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City and denying the motion to
reconsider the dismissal, respectively.
Several thousand holders[6] of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi Cola Products
Phils., Inc.s (PEPSIs) Number Fever Promotion[7] filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City complaints against the petitioners in their respective capacities as Presidents or
Chief Executive Officers, Chairman of the Board, Vice-Chairman of the Board, and Directors of
PEPSI, and also against other officials of PEPSI. The complaints respectively accuse the
petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A.
No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines; (c) violation of E.O. No.
913;[8] and (d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and
Misleading Advertisements, as amended by Act No. 3740.[9]
After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, Ramon M. Gerona, released on 23
March 1993 a Joint Resolution[10] where he recommended the filing of an information against the
petitioners and others for the violation of Article 3 18 of the Revised Penal Code and the
dismissal of the complaints for the violation of Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code; R.A.
No. 7394; Act No. 2333, as amended by Act No. 3740; and E.O. No. 913. The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. The attached information be filed against respondents Paul G. Roberts, Jr., Rodolfo C.
Salazar, Rosemarie R. Vera, Luis F. Lorenzo, Sr., Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr., J. Roberto Delgado,
Amaury R. Gutierrez, Bayani N. Fabic, Jose Yulo, Jr., Esteban B. Pacannuayan, Jr., Wong Fong
Fui, Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. and Chito V. Gutierrez for estafa under Article 318, Revised Penal
Code, while the complaint for violation of Article 315, 2(d), Revised Penal Code against same
respondents Juanito R. Ignacio, R. Sobong, R.O. Sinsuan, M.P. Zarsadias, L.G. Dabao, Jr., R.L.

140 | P a g e
Domingo, N.N. Bacsal, Jesus M. Manalastas, Janette P. Pio de Roda, Joaquin W. Sampaico,
Winefreda 0. Madarang, Jack Gravey, Les G. Ham, Corazon Pineda, Edward S. Serapio, Alex 0.
Caballes, Sandy Sytangco, Jorge W. Drysdale, Richard Blossom, Pablo de Borja, Edmundo L.
Tan, Joseph T. Cohen, Delfin Dator, Zosimo B. San Juan, Joaquin Franco, Primitivo S. Javier,
Jr., Luisito Guevarra, Asif H. Adil, Eugenio Muniosguren, James Ditkoff and Timothy Lane be
dismissed;
2. The complaints against all respondents for violation of R.A. 7394 otherwise known as the
Consumer Act of the Philippines and violation of Act 2333 as amended by Act 3740 and E 0. 913
be also dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, and
3. I.S. Nos. 92-7833; 92-8710 and 92-P-1065 involving Crowns Nos. 173; 401; and 117, 425,
703 and 373, respectively, alleged to be likewise winning ones be further investigated to afford
respondents a chance to submit their counter-evidence.[11]
On 6 April 1993, City Prosecutor Candido V. Rivera approved the recommendation with the
modification that Rosemarie Vera, Quintin Gomez, Jr., and Chito Gonzales be excluded from the
charge on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.[12]
The information for estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was approved (on 7 April 1993) by
Ismael P. Casabar, Chief of the Prosecution Division, upon authority of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, and was filed with the RTC of Quezon City on 12 April 1993. It was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.[13] The information reads as follows:
The undersigned 1st Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR. RODOLFO C.
SALAZAR, LUIS F. LORENZO, SR., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR., J. ROBERTO DELGADO,
AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B.
PACANNUAYAN, JR. and WONG FONG FUI, of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows:
That in the month of February, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, the above-named accused -
Paul G. Roberts, Jr. ) being then the Presidents
Rodolfo G. Salazar and Executive Officers
Luis F. Lorenzo, Sr. ) being then the Chairman of the Board of Directors
Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. ) being then the Vice Chairman of the Board
J. Roberto Delgado ) being then Members of the Board
Amaury R. Gutierrez )
Bayani N. Fabic )
Jose Yulo, Jr. )
Esteban B. Pacannuayan, Jr. and
Wong Fong Fui )
OF THE PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSPIRING with one another, with
intent of gain, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts or false pretenses, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the private complainants whose names with their prizes claimed appear in
the attached lists marked as Annexes A to A-46; B to -33; C to C-281; D to D-238; E to E-3O
and F to F-244 in the following manner: on the date and in the place aforementioned, said
accused pursuant to their conspiracy, launched the Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
Number Fever Promotion from February 17 to May 8, 1992 later extended to May 11-June 12,
1992 and announced and advertised in the media that all holders of crowns and/or caps of
Pepsi, Mirinda, Mountain Dew and Seven-Up bearing the winning 3-digit number will win the full
amount of the prize printed on the crowns/caps which are marked with a seven-digit security
code as a measure against tampering or faking of crowns and each and every number has its
own unique matching security code, enticing the public to buy Pepsi softdrinks with aforestated
alluring and attractive advertisements to become millionaires, and by virtue of such
representations made by the accused, the said complainants bought Pepsi softdrinks, but, the
said accused after their TV announcement on May 25, 1992 that the winning number for the next
day was 349, in violation of their aforecited mechanics, refused as they still refuse to
redeem/pay the said Pepsi crowns and/or caps presented to them by the complainants, who,
among others, were able to buy Pepsi softdrinks with crowns/caps bearing number 349 with
security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ, despite repeated demands made by the
complainants, to their damage and prejudice to the extent of the amount of the prizes
respectively due them from their winning 349 crowns/caps, together with such other amounts
they spent ingoing to and from the Office of Pepsi to claim their prizes and such other amounts
used in buying Pepsi softdrinks which the complainants normally would not have done were it
not for the false, fraudulent and deceitful posters of Pepsi Cola Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 14 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the
reconsideration of the Joint Resolution[14] alleging therein that (a) there was neither fraud in the
Number Fever Promotion nor deviation from or modification of the promotional rules approved
by the Department of Trade and industry (DTI), for from the start of the promotion, it had always
been clearly explained to the public that for one to be entitled to the cash prize his crown must
bear both the winning number and the correct security code as they appear in the DTI list; (b)
the complainants failed to allege, much less prove with prima facie evidence, the specific overt
criminal acts or ommissions purportedly committed by each of the petitioners; (c) the
compromise agreement entered into by PEPSI is not an admission of guilt; and (d) the evidence
establishes that the promo was carried out with utmost good faith and without malicious intent.
On 15 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review[15] wherein, for the
same grounds adduced in the aforementioned motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the
Joint Resolution be reversed and the complaints dismissed. They further stated that the approval
of the Joint Resolution by the City prosecutor was not the result of a careful scrutiny and
independent evaluation of the relevant facts and the applicable law but of the grave threats,
intimidation, and actual violence which the complainants had inflicted on him and his assistant
prosecutors.
On that same date, the petitioners filed in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 Motions to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they
had filed the aforesaid Petition for Review.[16]
On 21 April 1993, acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia
issued a 1st Indorsement,[17] directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ
141 | P a g e
whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to move in court for the 2. There was no fraud or deceit therefore there can be no estafa;
deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the
case, for the case is being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Department Circular
3. No criminal overt acts by respondents were proved;
No. 7 dated 25 January 1990.

4. Pepsi nor the accused herein made no admission of guilt before the Department of Trade and
On 22 April 1993, Criminal Case no. Q-93-41398 was raffled to Branch 104 of the RTC of
Industry;
Quezon City.[18]

5. The evidence presented clearly showed no malicious intent on the part of the accused.
In the morning of 27 April 1993, private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.[19]
Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero in his Motion to Defer Arraignment averred that there is a
pending petition for review with the Department of Justice filed by the accused and the Office of
In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner Paul Roberts, Jr., filed a Supplemental Urgent
the City Prosecutor was directed, among other things, to cause for the deferment of further
Motion to hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings.[20] He
proceedings pending final disposition of said petition by the Department of Justice.
stressed that the DOJ had taken cognizance of the Petition for Review by directing the City
Prosecutor to elevate the records of I.S. No. P-4401 and its related cases and asserted that the
petition for review was an essential part of the petitioners right to a preliminary investigation. The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are hereby DENIED.

The next day, respondent Judge Asuncion, Presiding Judge of Branch 104 of the RTC of
Quezon City, issued an order advising the parties that his court would be guided by the doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 and not by the
resolution of the Department of Justice on the petition for review undertaken by the accused.[21]
On 30 April 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed with the trial court a Motion to
Defer Arraignment wherein he also prayed that further proceedings be held in abeyance pending
final disposition by the Department of Justice.[22]
On 4 May 1993, Gavero filed an Amended Information,[23] accompanied by a corresponding
motion[24] to admit it. The amendments merely consist in the statement that the complainants
therein were only among others who were defrauded by the accused and that the damage or
prejudice caused amounted to several billions of pesos, representing the amounts due them
from their winning 349 crowns/caps. The trial court admitted the amended information on the
same date.[25]
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul (SCRA 151, pp. 471-472) stated as follows:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, let warrant of arrest be issued after June 21, 1993, and arraignment be set
on June 28, 1993, at 9:30 in the morning.

Later, the attorneys for the different private complainants filed, respectively, an Opposition to
Motion to Defer Arraignment,[26] and Objection and Opposition to Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.[27]
On 14 May 1993, the petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of their Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest.[28]
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying the
petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold In Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest and the public prosecutors Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2) directing the issuance of
the warrants of arrest after 21 June 1993 and setting the arraignment on 28 June
1993.[29] Pertinent portions of the order read as follows:
In the Motion filed by the accused, it is alleged that on April 15, 1993, they filed a petition for
review seeking the reversal of the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City approving the
filing of the case against the accused, claiming that:
1. The resolution constituting [sic] force and duress;
On 7 June 1993, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order, [30] which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31226. They contended therein that respondent Judge Asuncion
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
aforementioned order of 17 May 1993 because
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE RECORD OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION BEFORE ORDERING THE ARREST OF PETITIONERS.
II. THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONERS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR
ESTAFA, OTHER DECEITS, OR ANY OTHER OFFENSE.
III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED TO AWAIT THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICES RESOLUTION OF PETITIONERS APPEAL, AND
IV. THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW.

142 | P a g e
On 15 June 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to maintain
the status quo.[31] In view thereof, respondent Judge Asuncion issued an order on 28 June
1993[32] postponing indefinitely the arraignment of the petitioners which was earlier scheduled on
that date.
On 28 June 1993, the Court of Appeals heard the petitioners application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, granted the motion for leave to intervene filed by J. Roberto Delgado, and directed
the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City to elevate the original records of Criminal
Case No. Q-93-43198[33]
Upon receipt of the original records of the criminal case, the Court of Appeals found that a copy
of the Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, which fact belied the petitioners claim that the respondent Judge had not the slightest
basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. It
ruled that the Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent
Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest; and that the mere silence of the records or the absence of any
express declaration in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to
an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his official duty. The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution[34] denying
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On 8 June 1993, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider[35] the aforesaid resolution. The
Court of Appeals required the respondents therein to comment on the said motion. [36]
On 3 August 1993, the counsel for the private complainants filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a
Manifestation[37] informing the court that the petitioners petition for review filed with the DOJ was
dismissed in a resolution dated 23 July 1993. A copy[38] of the resolution was attached to the
Manifestation.
On 21 September 1993, the public respondents filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a motion to
dismiss the petition[39] on the ground that it has become moot and academic in view of the
dismissal by the DOJ of the petitioners petition to review the Joint Resolution. The dismissal by
the DOJ is founded on the following exposition:
You questioned the said order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals and prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Trial Judge from issuing any warrant of
arrest and from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused. The appellate court in a
resolution dated July 1, 1993, denied your petition.
In view of the said developments, it would be an exercise in futility to continue reviewing the
instant cases for any further action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound
discretion of the Trial Court. The denial by the said court of the motion to defer arraignment filed
at our instance was clearly an exercise of its discretion. With the issuance of the order
dated May 17, 1993, the Trial Court was in effect sending a signal to this Department that the
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. The rule is that x x
x once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. x x x (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462).[40]
On 28 September 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[41] dismissing the petition
because it had been mooted with the release by the Department of Justice of its decision x x x
dismissing petitioners petition for review by inerrantly upholding the criminal courts exclusive and
unsupplantable authority to control the entire course of the case brought against petitioners,
reiterating with approval the dictum laid down in the Crespo case.
The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the DOJs dismissal of the petition citing therein its
resolutions in other similar cases which were favorable to the petitioners and adverse to other
349 Pepsi crowns holders.
In its resolution of 3 February 1994, the DOJ, through its 349 Committee, denied the motion and
stated: The instant petition is different from the other petitions resolved by this Department in
similar cases from the provinces. In the latter petitions, the complaints against herein
respondents [sic][42] were dismissed inasmuch as the informations have not yet been filed or
even if already filed in court, the proceedings have been suspended by the courts to await the
outcome of the appeal with this Department.[43]
The petitioners likewise filed a motion to reconsider[44] the aforesaid Court of Appeals decision,
which the said court denied in its resolution[45] of 9 February 1994. Hence, the instant petition.
The First Division of this Court denied due course to this petition in its resolution of 19
September 1994.[46]
On 7 October 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration[47] of the aforesaid
resolution. Acting thereon, the First Division required the respondents to comment thereon.
Later, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration[48] and a motion to refer this
case to the Court en banc.[49] In its resolution of 14 November 1994,[50] the First Division granted
the latter motion and required the respondents to comment on the supplemental motion for
reconsideration
In the resolution of 24 November 1994, the Court en banc accepted the referral.
On 10 October 1995, after deliberating on the motion for reconsideration and the subsequent
pleadings in relation thereto, the Court en banc granted the motion for reconsideration;
reconsidered and set aside the resolution of 19 September 1994; and reinstated the petition. It
then considered the case submitted for decision, since the parties have exhaustively discussed
the issues in their pleadings, the original records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and of CA-
G.R. SP No. 31226 had been elevated to this Court, and both the petitioners and the Office of
the Solicitor General pray, in effect, that this Court resolve the issue of probable cause On the
basis thereof.
The pleadings of the parties suggest for this Courts resolution the following key issues:
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying,
on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved.
2. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
3. Whether the DOJ, through its 349 Committee, gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
petition for review on the following bases: (a) the resolution of public respondent Court of
143 | P a g e
Appeals denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) of public respondent
Asuncions denial of the abovementioned motions.
4. Whether public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction solely on the ground that public respondent
Asuncion had already before him the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor when he
ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition on the
ground of mootness since the DOJ has dismissed the petition for review.
5. Whether this Court may determine in this proceedings the existence of probable cause either
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime
of estafa.
We resolve the first four issues in the affirmative and the fifth, in the negative.
I.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul[51] which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable
ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in Court. More specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. [52]
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[53] this Court explicitly declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to
refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion
to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court[54] which recognizes the authority of the
Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on appeals
from resolutions in preliminary investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their petition for the
review of the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the governing rule was Circular
No. 7, dated 25 January 1990. Section 2 thereof provided that only resolutions dismissing a
criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Its Section 4,[55] however,
provided an exception, thus allowing, upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable cause, provided that the accused has not
been arraigned.
The DOJ gave due course to the petitioners petition for review as an exception pursuant to
Section 4 of Circular No. 7.
Meanwhile, the DOJ promulgated on 30 June 1993 Department Order No. 223[56] which
superseded Circular No. 7. This Order, however, retained the provisions of Section 1 of the
Circular on appealable cases and Section 4 on the non-appealable cases and the exceptions
thereto.
There is nothing in Department Order No. 223 which would warrant a recall of the previous
action of the DOJ giving due course to the petitioners petition for review. But whether the DOJ
would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of guesswork.
Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend
proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or
to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the
Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Before that time, the following pronouncement
in Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or applicable:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.[57]
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant
or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial
prerogative. This Court pertinently stated so in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals:[58]
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of
discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only
after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions
word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of
the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the
prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it
was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the
court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.
II.
144 | P a g e
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs) except those in the National Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive original
jurisdiction;[59] in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the accused fails to
appear when required;[60] and in cases filed with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs);[61] and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region
(MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary investigations
conducted by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs. [62]
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing
and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar[63] that the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but
[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. [64]
Sound policy supports this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It must be emphasized that judges must not
rely solely on the report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate the
report and the supporting documents. In this sense, the aforementioned requirement has
modified paragraph 4(a) of Circular No. 12 issued by this Court on 30 June 1987 prescribing the
Guidelines on Issuance of Warrants of Arrest under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provided in part as follows:
4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge, following established doctrine and procedure, may either:
(a) Rely upon the fiscals certification of the existence of probable cause whether or not the case
is cognizable only by the Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
xxx
This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or certification of the fiscal but also of the
supporting documents was further explained in People vs. Inting,[65] where this Court specified
what the documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material
in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause. Thus:
We emphasize the important features of the constitutional mandate that x x x no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge x x x (Article III, Section 2, Constitution).
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting
the Judge to make his determination.
In adverting to a statement in People vs. Delgado[66] that the judge may rely on the resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to file the information by the same token that it may
rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in
the issuance of the warrant of arrest, this Court stressed in Lim vs. Felix[67] that
Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutors certification presupposes that the
records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he
relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the
recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but
because of the records which sustain it.
And noting that judges still suffer from the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, this Court found it necessary to restate the rule in greater detail and
hopefully clearer terms. It then proceeded to do so, thus:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as
a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
Judges examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief as or
detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutors certification and investigation report whenever, necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
This Court then set aside for being null and void the challenged order of respondent Judge Felix
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest against petitioners Lim, et al., solely on the basis
of the prosecutors certification in the informations that there existed probable cause without
having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause.
In Allado vs. Diokno,[68] this Court also ruled that before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
In the recent case of Webb vs. De Leon,[69] this Court rejected the thesis of the petitioners of
absence probable cause and sustained the investigating panels and the respondent Judges
findings of probable cause. After quoting extensively from Soliven vs. Makasiar,[70] this Court
explicitly pointed out:
145 | P a g e
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted searching examination of witnesses
before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners contention that a
judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule
requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer as well
as the counter- affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the
parties evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable
cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of the
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The
sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours.
The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the Probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case. (italics supplied)
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis
for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel
but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the
respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of
the case.
Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, nothing accompanied the information upon its
filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. As found by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1
July 1993, a copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only
on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification[71] of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula,
Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge
Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance
of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as
bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors finding of
probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he
merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be
argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a
constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition,
conjecture, or even convincing logic.
III.
As earlier stated, per its 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993, the DOJ gave due course to the
petitioners petition for review pursuant to the exception provided for in Section 4 of Circular No.
7, and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to forward to the Department the
records of the cases and to file in court a motion for the deferment of the proceedings. At the
time it issued the indorsement, the DOJ already knew that the information had been filed in
court, for which reason it directed the City Prosecutor to inform the Department whether the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings. It must have been fully aware that, pursuant to Crespo vs. Mogul, a motion to
dismiss a case filed by the prosecution either as a consequence of a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice after a review of the records of the investigation is
addressed to the trial court, which has the option to grant or to deny it. Also, it must have been
still fresh in its mind that a few months back it had dismissed for lack of probable cause other
similar complaints of holders of 349 Pepsi crowns.[72] Thus, its decision to give due course to the
petition must have been prompted by nothing less than an honest conviction that a review of the
Joint Resolution was necessary in the highest interest of justice in the light of the special
circumstances of the case. That decision was permissible within the as far as practicable
criterion in Crespo.
Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed on 23 July 1993 a
unilateral volte-face, which was even unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same
end, by dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition simply because it thought that
a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in that any further action on the
part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the
latters denial of the motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an
exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the Department that the determination of
the case is within the courts exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity becomes more
pronounced because the reason adduced by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions
to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.
IV.
If the only issue before the Court of Appeals were the denial of the petitioners Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public
prosecutors Motion to Defer Arraignment, which were both based on the pendency before the
DOJ of the petition for the review of the Joint Resolution, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 31226
on the basis of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petition for review might have been correct.
However, the petition likewise involved the issue of whether respondent Judge Asuncion gravely
abused his discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest despite want of basis. The
DOJs dismissal of the petition for review did not render moot and academic the latter issue.
In denying in its resolution of 1 July 1993 the petitioners application for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain respondent Judge Asuncion from issuing warrants of arrest, the Court of
Appeals ,justified its action in this wise:
The Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in
convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. The mere silence of the records or the absence of any express
declaration in the questioned Order of May 17, 1993 as to where the respondent Judge based
his finding of probable cause does not give rise to any adverse inference on his part. The fact
remains that the Joint Resolution was at respondent Judges disposal at the time he issued the
Order for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. After all, respondent Judge enjoys in his favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official actuations. And this presumption
prevails until it is overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption, and in case of doubt as to an officers act
being lawful or unlawful it should be construed to be lawful. (31 C.J.S., 808-810. See also
Mahilum, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 482; People vs. Cortez, 21 SCRA 1228;
Government of the P.I. vs. Galarosa, 36 Phil. 338).
We are unable to agree with this disquisition, for it merely assumes at least two things: (1) that
respondent Judge Asuncion had read and relied on the Joint Resolution and (2) he was
convinced that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. Nothing in the records provides reasonable basis for these assumptions. In his
assailed order, the respondent Judge made no mention of the Joint Resolution, which was
146 | P a g e
attached to the records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 on 22 April 1993. Neither did he state
that he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. And, for an undivinable
reason, he directed the issuance of warrants of arrest only after June 21, 1993. If he did read the
Joint Resolution and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no reason at all
to delay for more than one month the issuance of warrants of arrest. The most probable
explanation for such delay could be that the respondent Judge had actually wanted to wait for a
little while for the DOJ to resolve the petition for review.
It is, nevertheless, contended in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno that
whatever doubts may have lingered on the issue of probable cause was dissolved when no less
than the Court of Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause made by the respondent
Judge after an evaluation of the Joint Resolution. We are not persuaded with that opinion. It is
anchored on erroneous premises. In its 1 July 1993resolution, the Court of Appeals does not at
all state that it either sustained respondent Judge Asuncions finding of probable cause, or found
by itself probable cause. As discussed above, it merely presumed that Judge Asuncion might
have read the Joint Resolution and found probable cause from a reading thereof. Then too, that
statement in the dissenting opinion erroneously assumes that the Joint Resolution can validly
serve as sufficient basis for determining probable cause. As stated above, it is not.
V.
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a
judicial prerogative. In People vs. Inting,[73] this Court aptly stated:
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial- is the function of the Prosecutor.
xxx xxx xxx
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge x x x.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs.
Enrile[74] as follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA
607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil.
1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J., [1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8,
1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953). (cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation, as it did in Salonga vs.
Pao,[75] Allado, and Webb.
There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand private complainants in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-43198 and several thousands more in different parts of the country who are
similarly situated as the former for being holders of 349 Pepsi crowns, any affirmative holding of
probable cause in the said case may cause or provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners, the
filing of several thousand cases in various courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the
petitioners would be exposed to the harassments of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and
to huge expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for travels from one court to another
throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such
cases. Worse, the filing of these staggering number of cases would necessarily affect the trial
calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of their attention, time, and energy, which
they could devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a frightful scenario would
seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions
- a situation already long conceded by this Court to be an exception to the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction.[76]
147 | P a g e
We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43298. For, as earlier stated,
the respondent Judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not
have the basis therefor as mandated by Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and even Webb. Moreover,
the records of the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 are not with this
Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in
compliance with the latters 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must
be required to perform their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted and the following are hereby SET ASIDE:
(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February 1994 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226;
(b) The Resolution of the 349 Committee of the Department of Justice of 23 July
1993 dismissing the petitioners petition for review and of 3 February 1994 denying the motion to
reconsider the dismissal; and
(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17 May 1993 in Criminal Case
No. Q-93-43198.
The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits, within sixty (60) days from
notice of this decision, the petitioners petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of
Investigating Prosecutor Ramon Gerona and thereafter to file the appropriate motion or pleading
in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, which respondent Judge Asuncion shall then resolve in light
of Crespo vs. Mogul, Soliven vs. Makasiar, People vs. Inting, Lim vs. Felix, Allado vs.
Diokno, and Webb vs. De Leon.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to cease and desist from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the petitioners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO DELOS SANTOS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
1. REMEDIAL LAW CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY
APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION EQUIVALENT TO SERVICE OF SUMMONS; CASE AT BAR.
— At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable
response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not
indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted
service. Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of
summons have not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of
effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-
examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate
execution (Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA 541 [1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136). Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary
submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for
petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant
(Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil.
746 [1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473 Sison, et al. vs.
Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467). Neither
can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable disposition as a
special appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of summons since the
application therefor raised another ground on failure to state a cause of action when conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly bypassed, nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker
and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
2. ID APPEAL; ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED IN PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45; CASE AT BAR The fact that petitioners are supposedly
occupying a parcel of land other than the realty claimed by private respondent deserves scant
consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is proscribed by the second
paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners'
assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the grievance to be elevated to
this Court will focus "fully on a question of law" (p. 32 Rollo) is a self-defeating posture and
operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual premise (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on
Evidence).
3. ID; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; PREVAILING PARTY MOVING FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OBLIGED TO SERVE COPY OF MOTION ON ADVERSE
PARTY'S COUNSEL. — Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered
without any prior notice to them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of
substance since it erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the
immediate enforcement of the appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing party moving for
execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged
to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on the face of the subject
motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967];
2 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p. 288).
In the suit for desahucio initiated below by herein private respondent against petitioners, the
court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in question to pay P5,000.00 per year as
reasonable rental from 1985 until possession is surrendered, and to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit (pp. 37-38, Rollo). Upon appeal, Branch XIX of the Regional Trial
Court of the Third Judicial Region stationed in Malolos and presided over by herein respondent
judge, granted private respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of
petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond (p. 21, Rollo). To set aside the proceedings
below, the petition at hand was instituted anchored on the supposition that petitioners were
deprived of their day in court.
Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns Lot 39 of the
Cadastral survey of Bustos with an area of 5,358 square meters covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. U-7924 a portion of which petitioners entered and occupied, lodged the complaint
geared towards petitioners' eviction. Summons was served through the mother of petitioners
when the process server was unable to locate Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in
Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer,
judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure (pp. 2-3, Decision; pp. 37-
38, Rollo).
Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they
were never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the
summons. They insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because
petitioners actually occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by Nicolas delos Santos under Original
148 | P a g e
Certificate of Title No. F-10418. Moreover, petitioners advanced the proposition that Dolores'
husband should have been impleaded. All of these arguments were to no avail. As indicated
earlier, execution pending appeal was ordered due to petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas
bond.
To stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on April
28, 1986 directed against the reviewing authority and private respondent until further orders (p.
52, Rollo).
At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable
response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not
indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted
service. Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of
summons have not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of
effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-
examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate
execution (Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA 541 [1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136). Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary
submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for
petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant
(Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil.
746 [1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473 Sison, et al. vs.
Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467).
Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable disposition
as a special appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of summons since the
application therefor raised another ground on failure to state a cause of action when conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly bypassed, nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker
and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land other than the realty claimed
by private respondent deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this
nature is proscribed by the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge
that the grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully on a question of law" (p. 32 Rollo)
is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the truth or falsehood
of such factual premise (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule
131, Revised Rules on Evidence).
Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered without any prior notice to
them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of substance since it erroneously
suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the immediate enforcement of the
appealed .appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged to serve
a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on the face of the subject motion,
was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p. 288).
In fine, petitioners may not press the idea that they were deprived of their day in court amidst the
implicit forms of waiver performed by their lawyer in submitting every conceivable defense for
petitioners via the two motions for reconsideration below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order
issued on April 28, 1986 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG,
MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57.
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, Ballicid & Associates
for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying
solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue
a warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio
Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante
Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry
O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City
filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others,
Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989
stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during
the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the
amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly
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Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho,
Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount
of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which
was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each.
Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261)
pages were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal
Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima
facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that
". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder"
but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case
for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of Fiscal
Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by
petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no
bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-
90)
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment
of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause
or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate
shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a
matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be
allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos.
94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if
there really exists aprima facie case against them in the light of documents which are
recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations
were opposed by the prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners
herein. The respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple
murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed
upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four
separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom
such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each
information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this
Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information which
reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)

On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from xxx xxx xxx
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage
of justice, to wit:
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.

Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813,
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY
and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer of
Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents to CEASE
venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII, Section 5(4) of the Philippine
and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without bail issued against the
Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to transmit
petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for
raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking cognizance of the said cases until such time that In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
the petition is finally resolved.
xxx xxx xxx
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and the respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest
manifestations which in substance prayed for the following: without bail issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from confinement at PC-CIS Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective

150 | P a g e
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or
his duly authorized representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or
implementing the warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim
and Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a
warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled
that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to
come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision
of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce . . .
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has
been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this
evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15,
16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed
in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of
probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the
required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where
he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution. We stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990),
reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting
the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
151 | P a g e
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to
conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections
13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of
1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4,
pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting
that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of
a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the prosecution's job, a
function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to
them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October
1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29,
1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not
in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to
make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as
much a duty as it is a power –– has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in
the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere
Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC
Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient
ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a
pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than
conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the
authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18,
1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the
information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however,
also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be
submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a
warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or
the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the
Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution
because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on
the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges
are still bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will,
therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where
there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with
warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally
question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation
page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest
warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial
functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which
requires ". . . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other
officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records
of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.
The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make
his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as
a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for,
after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief
or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond
the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent
Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima
facie case against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much
weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of
Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298
[1972]) the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least,
have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the
evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones"
prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the
recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are
affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an
affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and
152 | P a g e
Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written statements of these
witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of a prima facie case
against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently,
the same written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the
attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet
been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of
this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No. 59524,
February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance
depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a
warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent
Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO
L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS
C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
153 | P a g e
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and
that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of
the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels
so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
154 | P a g e
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution
and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other
man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be
allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as
libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez, supra).
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v.
Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy
of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other
various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risk to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in
the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. ... (at pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of
these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead
of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers
and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers
and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not
protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words,
which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended
to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a
criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of
public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not
been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to
narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied
in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a
warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft
of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception.
I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But
why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial
court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore
the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power
and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel
laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
Separate Opinions
155 | P a g e
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels
so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution
and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other
man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be
allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as
libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v.
Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy
of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other
various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risk to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in
the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. ... (at pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of
these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead
of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers
156 | P a g e
and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers CONCEPCION, C.J.:
and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not
protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words,
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred
which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended
to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a
Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
been considered.
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to
narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied
in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a
warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft
of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception.
I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But
why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial
court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore
the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power
and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel
laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors,
their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers,
things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
BECK, petitioners, searches and seizures.
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners.
petitioners herein.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.

157 | P a g e
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the
rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer
& Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void.
In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
158 | P a g e
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then
just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions
of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as
a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that
the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment
included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection
and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that
the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of
the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that
the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer
who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no
reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of
the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-
Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences
of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated
159 | P a g e
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general
warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared
null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect
seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they
have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in
the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other
places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the
lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
160 | P a g e
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing." We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305.
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by
nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
hotel room or his automobile:
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or
motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an
granted. (Emphasis supplied).
unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless
search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
(December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
(Emphasis supplied). later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where
the search occurs."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First —he had a
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the
offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually,
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved.
to Jones, the court observed:
The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore
independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers
and affects seized therefrom. Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of
merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or
the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
2d at 651). .
court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

161 | P a g e
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to
quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against
the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books
and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped
through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and
deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a
farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in
Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises
where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofall the papers and
properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra,
pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M.
Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M.
Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn,
it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United
States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L.
Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents
were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners
connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA
LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod
City, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the Order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City
in Civil Case No. 5331, which nullified the order earlier issued by the Municipal Trial Circuit Court
(MTCC) of the City of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to petitioner of the amount
of P14,000.00 which had been seized by the police.
162 | P a g e
I v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986). In those cases, the Court held that pending the
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the
MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at
the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades,
.45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles
were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the
application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which
allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15).
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and
seized the following articles:
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00 (one envelope
P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) SN-00485;
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R w/Antenae (sic);
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;
(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC;
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p. 16).
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the
seized articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The
following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return
in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to
submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel
manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not
present when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to the
motion, Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City Police, said that the
amount of P14,000.00 had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the Armed City
Partisan (ACP) and other "known NPA personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money
seized to petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation of the search warrant, any
seizure should be limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that the money could not
be considered as "subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a
petition for certiorariseeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The
petition alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not
entitled to its return citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan
determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia legis.
The petition also averred that a criminal complaint for "any of the crimes against public order as
provided under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had been filed with the City Fiscal
(BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be found as having been earmarked for
subversive activities, it should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and
directing the clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint. In
said order, the RTC held:
The Court observed that private respondent Leon Tambasen never questioned the validity of the
search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes. A perusal of private
respondent's "Motion to Declare Search and Seizure Illegal and to Return Seized Properties"
dated October 7, 1988 shows that respondent Tambasen questions not the validity of the search
warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes, but rather, the execution or
implementation of the said warrant principally on the ground that the articles seized are not
allegedly mentioned in the search warrant. However, the question thus raised involves matters
determinative of the admissibility in evidence and the legality of the articles seized. These
matters, it is submitted, go beyond the immediate and limited jurisdiction of the respondent
Judge to inquire into the validity of the search warrant he issued. These issues which relate
exclusively or principally with the intrinsic and substantive merits of the case or cases which are
being prepared against respondent Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is concerned involve
matters of defense which should be properly raised at the criminal action or actions that may be
filed against respondent Leon Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., G.R. No.
85289, Feb. 20, 1989). They cannot be addressed to the respondent Judge because the
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the said issue. It is clear therefore that respondent
Judge has transcended the boundaries of his limited jurisdiction and had in effect encroached
upon the jurisdiction of the appropriate trial court or courts that will try the criminal case or cases
against respondent Leon Tambasen, in issuing the assailed order dated December 23, 1988.
Ostensibly, the assailed order, if not corrected, will unduly deprive the prosecution of its right to
present the evidence in question and, consequently, will improperly oust the trial court, which will
try the criminal case or cases against private respondent Leon Tambasen of its original and
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and legality of the said evidence. This order of
respondent court is tantamount to a denial of due process. It may be considered as a grave
abuse of discretion reviewable by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil. 749) (Rollo, pp.
47-48).
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and desist
from continuing with the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the RTC from
taking any step with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search Warrant No.
365 and the seizure of his personal effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July 20,
1989 be reversed and annulled.
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of
armalite rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and
(3) illegal possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of Section 3 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure of the articles which
were not mentioned in the search warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed
only after his house had been searched, petitioner claimed that the police were "on a fishing
expedition."
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events related to the questioned search
and seizure transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, petitioner, who was then on
163 | P a g e
board a passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay Mandalagan,
Bacolod City and forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of two rebel returnees,
the police filed a complaint for subversion against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. The following day, the City Prosecutor filed an information for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Law against petitioner with RTC, Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517).
An order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on March 2, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioner's motion to quash and recalled the
warrant of arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No. 88-
1239.
On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested before
RTC, Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239. However, the City
Prosecutor had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Resolution of March 15,
1990. The motion was denied.
Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the question of whether RTC, Branch 44
gravely abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's house,
specifically the amount of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis.
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of
Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion
Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void
(People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]).
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.] Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212
SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally
protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and
seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65
Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614
(1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors."
For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which issued
the search warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In like manner,
only the court which issued the search warrant may order their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60
SCRA 295 [1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered
quashed by the trial court and the prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal
order had been denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being investigated by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Hence, there
appears to be no criminal prosecution which can justify the retention of the seized articles
in custodia legis.
A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized
articles: R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore,
the crimes defined in the repealed law no longer exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of the Philippines is ORDERED to
RETURN the money seized to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28,
1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
164 | P a g e
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams
of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist
and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory,
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution
evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y
Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open
and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint [9] having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. [13] The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the
other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated
by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave
their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about
20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. [16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-
appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified
that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and
other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence
with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks
are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian
of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of
Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
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THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
Judge

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of sufficient particularity.
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the Existence of Probable Cause
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
[21] paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution
on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled. Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
A - Yes, sir.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
For: Violation of RA 6425
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
SEARCH WARRANT

Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

GREETINGS:

Q - Are you familiar with that place?

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit: contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the
former.
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

166 | P a g e
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the
stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw
that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I
bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central
Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for
shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95
dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly
described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as
a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect
to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating
to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for
and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a
warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that
warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet
the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the
expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an
abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellants house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the
text thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby
of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the
specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity
of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425, without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of
dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias
(sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search
warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses
167 | P a g e
which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the
search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30] right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground
seizing the marijuana in this case.
that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished
several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree
is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once
cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
Particularity of the Place

What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
with sufficient particularity. evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]
several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for
search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the
pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search
premises as a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3)
incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who
immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested
raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could
from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy
not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan
it.
where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in Binhagan.
Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it was really
appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation. [32] to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet,
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there
was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the
accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.[34] In this case, the location of
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic
accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence,
Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When
the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in
this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they
not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across
the plastic bag because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their
plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It

168 | P a g e
cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. [40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. [41] In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the
seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and
competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several
times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the
house. These circumstances justified the searching partys forcible entry into the house, founded
as it is on the apprehension thatthe execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do
so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession
of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through
the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the
following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter,
issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of
respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on
March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central
Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant.
The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro
St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued
Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM,
armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a
labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then
taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive
materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.
And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp
Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein
petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case
No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant
and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a
"Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and
Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order,
consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under
attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of
Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but
anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by
the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant
petition, raising the sole issue:
169 | P a g e
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A
SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial
officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding
to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, 10 or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by
to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had
anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be
filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different
submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts
of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.
doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do
not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create,
competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible
we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the
jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial
venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of
one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the
seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim. Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. —

I (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the
search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward
the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is (b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private
sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip,
search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue including the place of departure and arrival.
in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having
been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the
of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It generally accepted principles of international law.
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is
inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of
in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed.
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
(14a)
institution of a criminal action.

It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the
process.4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name
uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It
of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the
said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6

Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search
Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the
warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a
jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations

170 | P a g e
of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who
would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions,
under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on
judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something
that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has
already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be
presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant,
upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application
would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to
be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such
articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the
respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the
thirteen judicial regions, 15 invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority
granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over
which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to
search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court,
that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4,
1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of
general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the
case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the
Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search
warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas
and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under
the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue
search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule
sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure
which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No.
3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts," was the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise
of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant
to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which
states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. — The Supreme Court shall
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority.
The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for
purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, .
. . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a
procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred
by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section
17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall
be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city
or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall
not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new
appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per
se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-
observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the
limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated
to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue
search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to
the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of
power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to
be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from
exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to
provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative
Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search
warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his
administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered
instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by
the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial
Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes
enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves
directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other
judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act
only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the
assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and
not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even
specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the
corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No.
7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to
whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case
can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only
the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to
search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is
pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primaryjurisdiction to
issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive
judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No.
19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the
place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search
171 | P a g e
warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction
over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under
the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it
was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of
enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial
court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.
Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the
time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for
the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said
warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced
or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our
Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be
enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein
which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules
would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention
thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions
which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary
interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that
writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only
with the approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial
court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first
instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules
and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only
within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision
be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued
by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines,
and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
(Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in
unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly
provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a
judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary,
the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere
in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no
distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search
warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to
detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or
prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for
the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more
onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a
search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark
case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24 the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and
the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants
issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the
Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on
jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously
invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe
that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction
wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we
swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what
could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly"
court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action.
Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and
all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for
or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the
distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really
compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable
indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and
liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now
and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence,
political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a
search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact
that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination
in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded
precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as
quoted by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost
importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate
172 | P a g e
within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where
the place to be searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign
judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one
district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county
and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction
to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such
statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the
enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in
the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as
evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our
jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13
of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may
be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant
must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court
with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in
and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate
higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is
not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with
the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in
different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have
been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89373. March 9, 1993.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YOLANDA GESMUNDO,
accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS IN TESTIMONIES
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES CAST DOUBT ON GUILT OF ACCUSED. — Irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the
guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. (People of the Philippines vs. Romeo
F. Remorosa)
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; SEARCH MADE WITHOUT THE
PRESENCE OF OCCUPANT, HIGHLY IRREGULAR; CASE AT BAR. — The claim of the
accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in which the
search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala
together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered "ito na." Apparently, the
search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise
shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the
execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of
the Revised Penal Code.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATIVE OF THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE LAW. — As we have
ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein
members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any
witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search
conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of
both the spirit and the letter of the law.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSION; OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED,
INADMISSIBLE. — It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-
appellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a
document entitled "PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a
person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that
the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she
informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as
evidence against her.
5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH; PROPERTY SEIZED MUST BE DELIVERED TO
THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANT. — Not only does the law require the presence of
173 | P a g e
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al. vs.
Mariano Almeda, et al. (70 Phil. 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the
custody of the allegedly confiscated specimens. While in said decision, this Court recognized the
fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being
turned over to the Justice of the Peace of Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was "for the
reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention
having been approved by the latter." Thus, approval by the court which issued the search
warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers; and only then
will their custody be considered custody of the court. Absent such approval, the police officers
have authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to
another agency, like the NBI.
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, * in
Criminal Case No. 4358-SP imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the accused-
appellant for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended; sentencing her to pay a fine of Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000.00) pesos
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the Information filed by Second Assistant City Fiscal Rogelio B. Javier of San Pablo City, it
was alleged:
"That on or about November 17, 1986, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute and sell marijuana and confiscated in her
possession is a plastic bag containing 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves and three (3) rolls of
magazine newspaper containing marijuana, a dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of San Pablo, November 21, 1986." 1
The facts as presented by the prosecution are stated in the decision of the trial court as follows:
" . . . in the morning of November 17, 1986, police officer Jose Luciano gave money and
instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the back of the Cocoland
Hotel at Brgy. Del Remedio, San Pablo City, thereafter with another police officer, Luciano
positioned himself at the ground floor of the hotel and watched. He actually saw the accused
selling marijuana to his civilian informer by the door outside the house of the accused.
Immediately thereafter, that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant.
"At about 2:00 p.m. of that day, a raiding police team armed with Search Warrant No. 10 issued
by Hon. Judge Geronima Pueblo Atanacio of RTC, Branch XXXII of the Court, went to the
residence of the Brgy. Capt. Angel Capuno for them to be accompanied by him in serving the
said warrant at the residence of the accused located at the Cocoland Compound of said
barangay.
"Upon reaching the residence of the accused, the police team were allowed entry inside the
house on the strength of the said search warrant shown to the accused. The accused cried upon
reading the contents of the warrant. She begged the team not to search and to leave her house.
But the police team insisted on their search. The accused led the team into her kitchen and she
pointed to a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of the dried marijuana flowering
tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native
"uway" cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped separately in three (3) pieces of Komiks
paper. After the discovery, the accused was photographed together with the confiscated items.
Thereafter, accused was made to acknowledge in writing that the dried marijuana flowering tops
were taken from her possession and control inside her residence. Brgy. Capt. Capuno also
affixed his countersignature thereto.
"The police forthwith brought the accused to the police station where she was properly booked.
Pfc. Luciano, Pat. Rizalde Perez and Brgy. Captain Capuno executed their sworn statements.
"On November 18, 1986, Pat. Angelito Caraan was dispatched to the NBI requesting for the lab
examination of the items confiscated from the accused. On that same day, the NBI Forensic
Chemist Salud Manguba issued a Certification with a finding that per preliminary examination
which she made, the confiscated items gave positive results for marijuana (Exh. "E"). This was
confirmed later on by her with the issuance of her Report No. DDN-86-2639 (Exh. "H")." 2
Accused-Appellant's version, on the other hand, is as follows:
"On November 17, 1986 at around 1:00 p.m. while accused-appellant was in the terrace of their
house located at Barangay del Remedio, San Pablo City, a jeep with policemen on board
arrived. (Tsn, p — 3, December 16, 1988). She identified Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano to be
among the group. Sgt. Yte was invited by accused appellant to enter the house while PFC
Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. (TSN, p — 4, ibid). While seated at
the sala, Sgt. Yte was showing to accused-appellant something which he claimed to be a search
warrant when someone uttered the following words "ito na" coming from the direction where the
kitchen of the house is. She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen and saw PFC
Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions who entered the house through the
back door which was opened at that time. (TSN, p — 5, ibid). Luciano handed the bag to Sgt.
Yte who, after examining the contents, confronted the accused-appellant and insisted that the
plastic bag came from her. (TSN, p — 6, ibid). She vehemently denied the accusation of Sgt. Yte
and told him that she does not know anything about it. But Sgt. Yte persisted and accused-
appellant, who was then seven (7) months on the family way, was seized by abdominal pains
which made her cry. Then she was made to sign a prepared document with her name already
printed on it. Under extreme pressure and promised that they will just talk with her at the City
Hall, accused-appellant was constrained to sign said document. Afterwards, she was brought to
the police station and detained. (TSN, pp. 7-8, ibid). That before the incident in question, Sgt.
Yte asked help from accused-appellant to testify against one Warner Marquez, son of her former
landlord, for drug pushing. Accused refused, reasoning out that it would be unfair since she is
totally unaware of this thing. But Sgt. Yte remained undaunted and was forcing her for the
second time to testify against Marquez. Spurned, Sgt. Yte left word that she, accused, should be
careful as she might be the next to be charged with drug pushing. (TSN, pp. 11-13, ibid)." 3
On 14 April 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused
Yolanda Gesmundo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article
II, R.A. 6425, as amended without any modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the fine of P25,000,00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
174 | P a g e
"The confiscated specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
"The bail bond for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and the accused is hereby ordered
immediately incarcerated." 4
A notice of appeal was filed on 21 April 1989 with the Regional Trial Court which, on the same
day, ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Court.
Assailing the Regional Trial Court's decision both on questions of law and fact, accused-
appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
"I. LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF AN
ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND OR PLANTED EVIDENCE.
II. LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION DESPITE VARIANCE AND MATERIAL
CONTRADICTIONS.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION'S EXHIBITS "F" — "F-1"
AND "F-2" IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE THE ONES
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED AND RECOVERED FROM THE HOUSE OF THE ACCUSED." 5
The accused-appellant's conviction by the lower court is anchored on the marijuana seized in
her possession and control by virtue of a Search Warrant issued by Judge Atanacio. Her arrest
did not result from a "buy-bust" operation supposedly conducted by police officers. Although Pfc.
Luciano states that he actually saw the accused-appellant selling marijuana to his civilian
informer outside the house of the accused-appellant, she (accused) was not placed under police
custody at that very moment. Rather, the police officers decided to let her go and effect her
arrest later in the day through a search warrant, so as to apprehend her with a larger amount. 6
There is no question that a search warrant was issued by Judge Geronima P. Atanacio of the
RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 32, as declared by the Court Interpreter of said Branch (a
defense witness). 7 The accused-appellant herself also testified that Sgt. Yte showed her the
search warrant obtained by the police. 8 The controversy centers on the allegation by the
accused-appellant that the marijuana supposedly seized by the raiding police team in her
possession, was planted by the police officers.
The Investigation Report prepared by Pfc. Jose V. Luciano as Investigating Officer and which
was noted by Sgt. Bayani R. Yte as Chief of Intelligence and Investigation Division stated that:
"5. At about 171430 H November 1986, we conducted raid at said residence and premises.
During the search we discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect with a big
biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the
marijuana were kept. Confiscated were more or less 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves and
three rolls of magazine newspaper containing marijuana which is ready for disposal." 9
On direct examination, however, Pfc. Luciano said that the marijuana leaves contained inside
the plastic bag covered by a basin weighed about 800 grams since he himself weighed them on
the weighing scale found in the accused-appellant's house; and he also saw other marijuana
wrapped in a komiks magazine found in an uway cabinet or rattan cabinet. 10 Sgt. Bayani Yte,
on the other hand, affirmed the investigation report when he testified that during the search, they
found dried marijuana leaves, more or less 100 grams on top of the dining table, placed inside a
plastic bag and covered by a metal basin. 11 Angel Capuno, the Barangay Chairman, on cross-
examination, said that the only marijuana confiscated by the police was the one contained in the
white plastic bag. 12
In all their testimonies, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot placed
on top of a biscuit can inside a hole at the backyard of the accused's house as stated in the
investigation report. It would seem that the raiding party "could not put their act together", as to
how much marijuana was recovered and where. The trial court held that the fact of discovery of
the hole at the backyard was merely for the purpose of reporting the hiding place of the
marijuana. 13 But how, it may be asked, could one conclude that it was the hiding place, if no
marijuana was actually seen inside?
Moreover, during the pre-trial, Fiscal Javier requested the marking of a photograph depicting
buried marijuana on the ground for the purpose of showing the place where the dried marijuana
was recovered. 14
Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered and where but also as to whom the
marijuana was supposed to have been surrendered by the accused. Pfc. Luciano pointed out
during his direct examination that it was the accused-appellant who actually gave the marijuana
leaves to Sgt. Yte in the kitchen, and that he (Pfc. Luciano) was asked by Sgt. Puhawan to come
inside the house and they saw the other marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine located at the
uway cabinet. 15 Unfortunately, Sgt. Yte contradicted Pfc. Luciano's testimony. During his cross
examination, Sgt. Yte asserted that the marijuana leaves were surrendered by the accused-
appellant to Pfc. Luciano upon the presentation of the search warrant and before the search was
actually conducted. 16 When asked to explain why their inconsistent statements, Sgt. Yte merely
answered: "That was the testimony of Pat. Luciano that accused personally . . . " 17
We do not agree with the trial court in its conclusion that these discrepancies are trivial. We must
be absolutely convinced that marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused-appellant and
not planted as claimed by her. As held in People of the Philippines vs. Romeo F. Remorosa: 18
"Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged."
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened
by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-
appellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen
uttered "ito na". Apparently, the search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in
violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search
of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement
is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is
in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. 20 a
procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made
to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the
house, is violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law.
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana
was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled
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"PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense. 21 The records show that the accused-appellant
was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of her right to
the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.
22
The accused-appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove
that the marijuana marked as exhibit in court are the same marijuana allegedly confiscated by
the police from her. The contention is well taken.
Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted. but it
also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the
property seized. 23 He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued
the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. 24
Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized
by interested parties.
The police authorities in the case at bar testified that they submitted an inventory to the court
without the marijuana, the latter having been turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Whether an inventory was actually made by the police was not clearly established in the
trial court. The records show that an inventory was not part of the documents transmitted from
Branch 32 (the warrant issuing branch) to Branch 30 (the trial branch) of the RTC of San Pablo
City. And when asked by the trial judge, the court Interpreter said that Judge Atanacio (who
issued the warrant) confirmed that she does not have among her files the inventory supposedly
submitted by the police. 25 If indeed an inventory of the seized items was made, it must be part
of the records of the case. But this was not so.
On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court, the trial court held that it takes
"judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo City police force of retaining possession of
confiscated specimens suspected of being marijuana by immediately forwarding them to the NBI
or to an NBI accredited physician for preliminary examination and/or laboratory examination
before filing a case with the city prosecutor's office." 26 The mere tolerance by the trial court of
such a practice does not make it right. Clearly, such practice violates the mandatory
requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose for which they were enacted. Speculations
as to the probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.
The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al. vs. Mariano Almeda, et al. (70 Phil. 141) to
justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of the allegedly confiscated
specimens. While in said decision, this Court recognized the fact that the objects seized were
retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the Justice of the
Peace of Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was "for the reason that the custody of said
agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention having been approved by the
latter." 27 Thus, approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the
retention of the property seized by the police officers; and only then will their custody be
considered custody of the court. Absent such approval, the police officers have no authority to
retain possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to another agency, like
the NBI.
Having made no return or inventory to the warrant-issuing court, there is no proof that the police
really found marijuana in the house of the accused. Besides, Salud Manguba, the Forensic
Chemist who examined the marijuana allegedly confiscated by the police from the appellant,
asserted that when the police officer turned over said items to the NBI, there were no identifying
marks on the plastic bag. 28 How sure are we then that the marijuana submitted for examination
was the same marijuana allegedly seized from the accused-appellant?
Lastly, the prosecution in the Information averred that the accused-appellant engaged in the
distribution and sale of marijuana. And yet, as held by this Court,
" . . . In order to sustain conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the element of sale must be
unequivocally established. Also, what the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also,
albeit not limited to, the act of delivering. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. What is important is that
the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused." 29
It is also required that the marijuana received by the poseur-buyer be presented as evidence in
court. The identity of the marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti must be established
before the court. 30
Undisputedly, the accused-appellant was not caught in the act of selling marijuana. Sgt. Yte
himself testified during cross-examination that accused-appellant was not actually dispensing
marijuana when the search warrant was served. 31 Neither was the marijuana, object of the
supposed sale, presented in court to support the allegation of the prosecution that accused-
appellant was engaged in the sale of marijuana.
The trial court held that the possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana, coupled with the
fact that the accused-appellant is not a user of prohibited drugs, indicates an intention of the
accused-appellant to sell, distribute and deliver marijuana as held in People of the Philippines
vs. Roberto Toledo y Tejario alias "OBET ." 32
The reliance of the trial court on the above-mentioned case is not quite accurate. The basis of
the conviction of the accused in said case was his confession, and thus, the reiteration by the
Court of the trial court's pronouncement amounts to an obiter dictum. Moreover, a person is
always presumed innocent until proven guilty.
From a careful review of the proceedings a quo, this Court is constrained to set aside the lower
court's findings, and we hold that the guilt of the accused-appellant Yolanda Gesmundo has not
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. (People v. Parayno, 24 SCRA 3; U.S. v. Maano, 2 Phil. 718; People v. Pacana, 47
Phil. 48). 33
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED, and on reasonable doubt, the appellant
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. She is ordered immediately released from
detention unless she is being held for some other legal cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
U.S. Supreme Court
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
Carroll v. United States
No. 15
Argued December 4, 1923
Restored to docket for reargument January 28, 1924
Reargued March 14, 1924
Decided March 2, 1925
176 | P a g e
267 U.S. 132
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Syllabus
1. The legislative history of 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, November
23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 223, which makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of the United
States to search a private dwelling without a search warrant or to search any other building or
property without a search warrant, maliciously and without reasonable cause, shows clearly the
intent of Congress to make a distinction as to the necessity for a search warrant in the searching
of private dwellings and in the searching of automobiles or other road vehicles, in the
enforcement of the Prohibition Act. P.267 U. S. 144.
2. The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures as are unreasonable, and
it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens. P. 267 U. S. 147.
3. Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to seizure and
destruction under the Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, if made upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the
vehicle contains such contraband liquor. P. 267 U. S. 149.
4. Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning of the
Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-house, or other structure
Page 267 U. S. 133
for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon,
automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. P. 267 U. S. 150.
5. Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, provides that, when an officer "shall
discover any person in the act" of transporting intoxicating liquor in any automobile, or other
vehicle, in violation of law, it shall be his duty to seize the liquor and thereupon to take
possession of the vehicle and arrest the person in charge of it, and that, upon conviction of such
person, the court shall order the liquor destroyed, and, except for good cause shown, shall order
a public sale, etc. of the other property seized.
Held:
(a) That the primary purpose is the seizure and destruction of the contraband liquor, and the
provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and arrest of the transporter are merely incidental. P. 267
U. S. 153.
(b) Hence, the right to search an automobile for illicit liquor and to seize the liquor, if found, and
thereupon to seize the vehicle also and to arrest the offender, does not depend upon the right to
arrest the offender in the first instance, and therefore it is not determined by the degree of his
offence -- whether a misdemeanor under § 29, Title II of the Act, because of being his first or
second offence, or a felony because it is his third, and the rule allowing arrest without warrant for
misdemeanor only when the offence is committed in the officer's presence, but for a felony when
the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, is
not the test of the validity of such search and seizure. Pp. 267 U. S. 155, 267 U. S. 156.
(c) The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the vehicle, has reasonable or
probable cause for believing that contraband liquor is being illegally transported in it. P. 267 U.
S. 155.
(d) The language of § 26 -- when an officer shall "discover " any person in the act of
transporting, etc. -- does not limit him to what he learns of the contents of a passing automobile
by the use of his senses at the time. P. 267 U. S. 158.
(e) The section thus construed is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. P. 267 U. S. 159.
6. Probable cause held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a highway much used
in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an automobile upon the faith of
information previously obtained by them that the car and its occupants, identified by the officers,
were engaged in the illegal business of "bootlegging." P. 267 U. S. 159.
Page 267 U. S. 134
7. When contraband liquor, seized from an automobile and used in the conviction of those in
charge of the transportation, was shown at the trial to have been taken in a search justified by
probable cause, held that the Court's refusal to return he liquor on defendants' motion before
trial, even if erroneous because probable cause was not then proven, was not a substantial
reason for . reversing the conviction. P. 267 U. S. 162.
8. The Court notices judicially that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that
Detroit, and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the international boundary, is one
of the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for
distribution into the interior. P. 267 U. S. 160.
Affirmed.
This is a writ of error to the District Court under Section 238 of the Judicial Code. The plaintiffs in
error, hereafter to be called the defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro, were indicted and
convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, to-wit: 68 quarts of so-
called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The ground on which
they assail the conviction is that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles, one of
whiskey and one of gin, found by searching the automobile. It is contended that the search and
seizure were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as
evidence was not proper. Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the
liquor seized be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This motion was
denied.
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition
agents, and one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on
the highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The
facts leading to the search and seizure were as follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and
177 | P a g e
Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named
Kruska and the two defendants,
Page 267 U. S. 135
Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the Michigan
Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey. The price was
fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get
the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and
in a short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it that night, that the man who had
it was not in, but that they would deliver it the next day. They had come to the apartment in an
automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified,
a did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no
explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real character
of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in
December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road
leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to
have been their regular tour of duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward
from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some
distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the
Carroll boys had passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them
to see where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit,
but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and
Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand
Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same
automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government agents
turned
Page 267 U. S. 136
their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where
they stopped them and searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the
filling of which had been removed, 68 bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be
certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch whiskeys, and the rest
that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness was called to prove
the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be whiskey and gin. When the
defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett, "Take the liquor and give us one more
chance and I will make it right with you," and he pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for
$10. Peterson and another took the two defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids,
while Cronenwett, Thayer and Scully remained on the road looking for other cars of whose
coming they had information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be
coming through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they
believed they were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest.
Page 267 U. S. 143
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case include the Fourth Amendment
and the National Prohibition Act.
The Fourth Amendment is in part as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person, or things to be seized."
Section 25, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315, passed to enforce
the Eighteenth Amendment, makes it unlawful to have or possess any liquor intended for use in
violating the Act, or which has been so used, and provides that no property rights shall exist in
such liquor. A search warrant may issue and such liquor, with the containers thereof, may be
seized under the warrant and be ultimately destroyed. The section further provides:
"No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being
used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business
purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house. The term 'private
dwelling' shall be construed to include the room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but
solely as
Page 267 U. S. 144
a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house."
Section 26, Title II, under which the seizure herein was made, provides in part as follows:
"When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall discover any
person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy,
automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating
liquors found therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors
transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he shall take possession of the
vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall
arrest any person in charge thereof."
The section then provides that the court, upon conviction of the person so arrested, shall order
the liquor destroyed, and, except for good cause shown, shall order a sale by public auction of
the other property seized, and that the proceeds shall be paid into the Treasury of the United
States.
By Section 6 of an Act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223, it
is provided that, if any officer or agent or employee of the United States engaged in the
enforcement of the Prohibition Act or this Amendment, "shall search any private dwelling," as
defined in that Act, "without a warrant directing such search," or "shall without a search warrant
maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or property," he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine or imprisonment or both.
In the passage of the supplemental Act through the Senate, Amendment No. 32, known as the
Stanley Amendment, was adopted, the relevant part of which was as follows:
"Section 6. That any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement
of this Act or
Page 267 U. S. 145
178 | P a g e
the National Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search or attempt to
search the property or premises of any person without previously securing a search warrant, as
provided by law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not
to exceed $1000, or imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both so fined and imprisoned in the
discretion of the Court."
This Amendment was objected to in the House, and the Judiciary Committee, to whom it was
referred, reported to the House of Representatives the following as a substitute.
"Sec. 6. That no officer, agent or employee of the United States, while engaged in the
enforcement of this Act, the National Prohibition Act, or any law in reference to the manufacture
or taxation of, or traffic in, intoxicating liquor, shall search any private dwelling without a warrant
directing such search, and no such warrant shall issue unless there is reason to believe such
dwelling is used as a place in which liquor is manufactured for sale or sold. The term 'private
dwelling' shall be construed to include the room or rooms occupied not transiently, but solely as
a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. Any violation of any provision of
this paragraph shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed $1000 or imprisonment not to exceed
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."
In its report, the Committee spoke in part as follows:
"It appeared to the committee that the effect of the Senate amendment No. 32, if agreed to by
the House, would greatly cripple the enforcement of the national prohibition act and would
otherwise seriously interfere with the Government in the enforcement of many other laws, as its
scope is not limited to the prohibition law,
Page 267 U. S. 146
but applies equally to all laws where prompt action is necessary. There are on the statute books
of the United States a number of laws authorizing search without a search warrant. Under the
common law and agreeably to the Constitution, search may in many cases be legally made
without a warrant. The Constitution does not forbid search, as some parties contend, but it does
forbid unreasonable search. This provision in regard to search is, as a rule, contained in the
various State constitutions, but notwithstanding that fact, search without a warrant is permitted in
many cases, and especially is that true in the enforcement of liquor legislation."
"The Senate amendment prohibits all search or attempt to search any property or premises
without a search warrant. The effect of that would necessarily be to prohibit all search, as no
search can take place if it is not on some property or premises."
"Not only does this amendment prohibit search of any lands, but it prohibits the search of all
property. It will prevent the search of the common bootlegger and his stock in trade, though
caught and arrested in the act of violating the law. But what is perhaps more serious, it will make
it impossible to stop the rum running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from
the officers the power that they absolutely must have to be of any service, for if they cannot
search for liquor without a warrant, they might as well be discharged. It is impossible to get a
warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be secured, the automobile would be
beyond the reach of the officer, with its load of illegal liquor disposed of."
The conference report resulted, so far as the difference between the two Houses was
concerned, in providing for the punishment of any officer, agent or employee of the Government
who searches a "private dwelling" without a warrant, and for the punishment of any such officer,
Page 267 U. S. 147
etc., who searches any "other building or property" where, and only where, he makes the search
without a warrant "maliciously and without probable cause." In other words, it left the way open
for searching an automobile, or vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the search was not
malicious or without probable cause.
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the
searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road vehicles is the
enforcement of the Prohibition Act is thus clearly established by the legislative history of the
Stanley Amendment. Is such a distinction consistent with the Fourth Amendment? We think that
it is. The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable.
The leading case on the subject of search and seizure is Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616.
An Act of Congress of June 22, 1874, authorized a court of the United States, in revenue cases,
on motion of the government attorney, to require the defendant to produce in court his private
books, invoices and papers on pain in case of refusal of having the allegations of the attorney in
his motion taken as confessed. This was held to be unconstitutional and void as applied to suits
for penalties or to establish a forfeiture of goods, on the ground that, under the Fourth
Amendment, the compulsory production of invoices to furnish evidence for forfeiture of goods
constituted an unreasonable search even where made upon a search warrant, and that it was
also a violation of the Fifth Amendment, in that it compelled the defendant in a criminal case to
produce evidence against himself or be in the attitude of confessing his guilt.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, it was held that a court in a criminal prosecution could
not retain letters of the accused seized in his house, in his absence and without his authority, by
a United States marshal
Page 267 U. S. 148
holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his premises, to be used as evidence
against him, the accused having made timely application to the court for an order for the return
of the letters.
In Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, a writ of error was brought to
reverse a judgment of contempt of the District Court, fining the company and imprisoning one
Silverthorne, its president, until he should purge himself of contempt in not producing books and
documents of the company before the grand jury to prove violation of the statutes of the United
States by the company and Silverthorne. Silverthorne had been arrested, and, while under
arrest, the marshal had gone to the office of the company without a warrant and made a clean
sweep of all books, papers and documents found there, and had taken copies and photographs
of the papers. The District Court ordered the return of the originals, but impounded the
photographs and copies. This was held to be an unreasonable search of the property and
possessions of the corporation and a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the judgment for
contempt was reversed.
In Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, the obtaining through stealth by a representative of
the Government, from the office of one suspected of defrauding the Government, of a paper
which had no pecuniary value in itself, but was only to be used as evidence against its owner,
was held to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It was further held that, when the paper
was offered in evidence and duly objected to, it must be ruled inadmissible because obtained
through an unreasonable search and seizure, and also in violation of the Fifth Amendment
because working compulsory incrimination.
179 | P a g e
In Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, it was held that, where concealed liquor was found by
government officers without a search warrant in the home of the defendant,
Page 267 U. S. 149
"That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of
them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which
they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be
concealed, and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise,
and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any

in his absence, and after a demand made upon his wife, it was inadmissible as evidence against
Page 267 U. S. 151
the defendant because acquired by an unreasonable seizure.

particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon
In none of the cases cited is there any ruling as to the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter
seizure without a warrant of contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to
such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and
forfeiture or destruction.
if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial, and all such goods, wares, and
merchandise, on which the duties shall not have been paid or secured, shall be forfeited."
On reason and authority, the true rule is that, if the search and seizure without a warrant are
made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
Like provisions were contained in the Act of August 4, 1790, c. 35, Sections 451, 1 Stat. 145,
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
170; in Section 27 of the Act of February 18, 1793, c. 8, 1 Stat. 305, 315, and in Sections 68-71
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is
of the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, 677, 678.
to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens. Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, as already said, the decision did not turn on whether a
house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable
reasonable search might be made without a warrant; but for the purpose of showing the principle
vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant. Compare Hester v.
on which the Fourth Amendment proceeds, and to avoid any misapprehension of what was
United States, 265 U. S. 57.
decided, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, used language which is of particular
significance and applicability here. It was there said (page 116 U. S. 623):
Again, by the second section of the Act of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 231, 232, it was made lawful
for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts,
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed
but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they
to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's
should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or had been introduced into
private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using
the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle
them as evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government
or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares or merchandise thereon, which
is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other, it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is
they had probable cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and
authorized by the
secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial

Page 267 U. S. 150

Page 267 U. S. 152

common law, and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed
and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816, 3 Stat. 315, for a year and expired. The Act
to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two
of February 28, 1865, revived Section 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, c. 67, 13 Stat. 441.
centuries past, and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the
The substance of this section was reenacted in the third section of the Act of July 18, 1866, c.
commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the
201, 14 Stat. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as Section 3061.
collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As
Neither Section 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated a operative by this Court
amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard
in Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 107 U. S. 219. See also United States v. One Black
searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the
Horse, 129 Fed. 167.
prohibition of the amendment. So, also, the supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of
the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in
books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the Again, by Section 2140 of the Revised Statutes, any Indian agent, sub-agent or commander of a
category of unreasonable searches and seizures. So, also, the laws which provide for the search military post in the Indian Country, having reason to suspect or being informed that any white
and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for person or Indian is about to introduce, or has introduced, any spirituous liquor or wine into the
the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of Indian Country, in violation of law, may cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds and
gambling, &c., are not within this category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329. Many places of deposit of such person to be searched, and if any liquor is found therein, then it,
other things of this character might be enumerated." together with the vehicles, shall be seized and proceeded against by libel in the proper court and
forfeited. Section 2140 was the outgrowth of the Act of May 6, 1822, c. 58, 3 Stat. 682,
authorizing Indian agents to cause the goods of traders in the Indian Country to be searched
It is noteworthy that the twenty-fourth section of the Act of 1789, to which the Court there refers,
upon suspicion or information that ardent spirits were being introduced into the Indian Country,
provides:

180 | P a g e
to be seized and forfeited if found, and of the Act of June 30, 1834, Section 20, c. 161, 4 Stat.
729, 732, enabling an Indian agent having reason to suspect any person of having introduced or
being about to introduce liquors into the Indian Country to cause the boats, stores or places of
deposit of such person to be searched and the liquor found forfeited. This Court recognized the
statute of 1822 as justifying such a search and seizure in American Fur Co. v. United States, 2
Pet. 358. By the Indian
Page 267 U. S. 153
Appropriation Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39 Stat. 969, 970, automobiles used in introducing or
attempting to introduce intoxicants into the Indian Territory may be seized, libeled and forfeited
as provided in the Revised Statutes, Section 2140.
And again, in Alaska, by Section 174 of the Act of March 3, 1899, c. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1280, it
is provided that collectors and deputy collectors, or any person authorized by them in writing,
shall be given power to arrest persons and seize vessels and merchandise in Alaska liable to
fine, penalties or forfeiture under the Act and to keep and deliver the same, and the Attorney
General, in construing the Act, advised the Government:
"If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opinion they have
power to search any vessel within the 3-mile limit according to the practice of customs officers
when acting under Section 3059 of the Revised Statutes, and to seize such vessels."
26 Opinions Attorneys General 243.
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the guaranty of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been
construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an
automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider
under what circumstances such search may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable
Page 267 U. S. 154
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor,
and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of
such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of
national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as
entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search,
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, like the second section of the Act of 1789, for
the searching of vessels, like the provisions of the Act of 1815, and Section 3061, Revised
Statutes, for searching vehicles for smuggled goods, and like the Act of 1822, and that of 1834
and Section 2140, R.S., and the Act of 1917 for the search of vehicles and automobiles for liquor
smuggled into the Indian Country, was enacted primarily to accomplish the seizure and
destruction of contraband goods; secondly, the automobile was to be forfeited, and thirdly, the
driver was to be arrested. Under Section 29, Title II, of the Act the latter might be punished by
not more than $500 fine for the first offense, not more than $1,000 fine or 90 days' imprisonment
for the second offense, and by a fine of $500 or more and by not more than 2 years'
imprisonment for the third offense. Thus, he is to be arrested for a misdemeanor for his first and
second offenses and for a felony if he offends the third time. The main purpose of the Act
obviously was to deal with the liquor and its transportation and to destroy it. The mere
manufacture of liquor can do little to defeat the policy of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Prohibition Act, unless the forbidden
Page 267 U. S. 155
product can be distributed for illegal sale and use. Section 26 was intended to reach and destroy
the forbidden liquor in transportation, and the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and the
arrest of the transporter were incidental. The rule for determining what may be required before a
seizure may be made by a competent seizing official is not to be determined by the character of
the penalty to which the transporter may be subjected. Under Section 28, Title II, of the
Prohibition Act, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents and inspectors are
to have the power and protection in the enforcement of the Act conferred by the existing laws
relating to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. Officers who seize under Section 26 of
the Prohibition Act are therefore protected by Section 970 of the Revised Statutes, providing
that:
"When, in any prosecution commenced on account of the seizure of any vessel, goods, wares,
or merchandise, made by any collector or other officer, under any Act of Congress authorizing
such seizure, judgment is rendered for the claimant, but it appears to the court that there was
reasonable cause of seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered, and
the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the
seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or
prosecution: Provided, That the vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise be, after judgment,
forthwith returned to such claimant or his agent."
It follows from this that, if an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor in it without a warrant and
the facts as subsequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture,
the officer may escape costs or a suit for damages by a showing that he had reasonable or
probable cause for the seizure. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642. The measure of legality of such a
seizure is,
Page 267 U. S. 156
therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally
transported.
We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of liquor in transport in
vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It gives the owner of an automobile or other
vehicle seized under Section 26, in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him
the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor as
evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to damages. On the other
hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials are given the
opportunity which they should have, to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably
suspected contraband goods and to seize them.
Such a rule fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. In cases where the securing of a
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and
181 | P a g e
issued after judicial approval, protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages. In cases
where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his
peril unless he can show the court probable cause. United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, 972.
But we are pressed with the argument that, if the search of the automobile discloses the
presence of liquor and leads under the statute to the arrest of the person in charge of the
automobile, the right of seizure should be limited by the common law rule as to the
circumstances justifying an arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor. The usual rule is that a
police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to
have been guilty of a felony, and that he may only arrest without a warrant one guilty of
misdemeanor if committed
Page 267 U. S. 157
in his presence. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487; Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529. The rule is
sometimes expressed as follows:
"In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer, like a private person, has at common law no power
of arresting without a warrant except when a breach of the peace has been committed in his
presence or there is reasonable ground for supposing that a breach of peace is about to be
committed or renewed in his presence."
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, part III, 612.
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law was promptly to
suppress breaches of the peace, 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 193, while the reason for
arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a felony was because the public safety and the due
apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required that such arrests should be
made at once without warrant. Rohan v. Sawan, 5 Cush. 281. The argument for defendants is
that, as the misdemeanor to justify arrest without warrant must be committed in the presence of
the police officer, the offense is not committed in his presence unless he can by his senses
detect that the liquor is being transported, no matter how reliable his previous information by
which he can identify the automobile as loaded with it. Elrod v. Moss, 278 Fed. 123; Hughes v.
State, 145 Tenn. 544.
So it is that, under the rule contended for by defendants, the liquor, if carried by one who has
been already twice convicted of the same offense, may be seized on information other than the
senses, while, if he has been only once convicted, it may not be seized unless the presence of
the liquor is detected by the senses as the automobile concealing it rushes by. This is certainly a
very unsatisfactory line of difference when the main object of the section is to forfeit and
suppress the liquor, the arrest of the individual being only incidental, as shown by the lightness
Page 267 U. S. 158
of the penalty. See Commonwealth v. Street, 3 Pa.Dist. & Co. Reports, 783. In England at the
common law, the difference in punishment between felonies and misdemeanors was very great.
Under our present federal statutes, it is much less important, and Congress may exercise a
relatively wide discretion in classing particular offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. As the
main purpose of Section 26 was seizure and forfeiture, it is not so much the owner as the
property that offends. Agnew v. Haymes, 141 Fed. 631, 641. The language of the section
provides for seizure when the officer of the law "discovers" anyone in the act of transporting the
liquor by automobile or other vehicle. Certainly it is a very narrow and technical construction of
this word which would limit it to what the officer sees, hears or smells as the automobile rolls by,
and exclude therefrom, when he identifies the car, the convincing information that he may
previously have received as to the use being made of it.
We do not think such a nice distinction is applicable in the present case. When a man is legally
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful
for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as
evidence in the prosecution. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 232 U. S. 392; Dillon v.
O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox. C.C. 245; Getchell v. Page, 103 Me. 387; Kneeland v. Connally, 70
Ga. 424; 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure, Sec. 211; 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th edition),
Sec. 97. The argument of defendants is based on the theory that the seizure in this case can
only be thus justified. If their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the
seizure then would turn wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory is
unsound. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer
Page 267 U. S. 159
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. The seizure in such a
proceeding comes before the arrest, as Section 26 indicates. It is true that Section 26, Title II,
provides for immediate proceedings against the person arrested, and that, upon conviction, the
liquor is to be destroyed and the automobile or other vehicle is to be sold, with the saving of the
interest of a lienor who does not know of its unlawful use; but it is evident that, if the person
arrested is ignorant of the contents of the vehicle, or if he escapes, proceedings can be had
against the liquor for destruction or other disposition under Section 25 of the same title. The
character of the offense for which, after the contraband liquor is found and seized, the driver can
be prosecuted does not affect the validity of the seizure.
This conclusion is in keeping with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the principles
of search and seizure of contraband forfeitable property, and it is a wise one, because it leaves
the rule one which is easily applied and understood and is uniform. Holbck v. State, 106 Ohio
St.195, accords with this conclusion. Ash v. United States, 299 Fed. 277 and Milam v. United
States, 296 Fed. 629, decisions by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit, take the
same view. The Ashcase is very similar in its facts to the case at bar, and both were by the
same court which decided Snyder v. United States,285 Fed. 1, cited for the defendants. See
also Park v. United States (1st C.C.A.) 294 Fed. 776, 783, and Lambert v. United States, (9th
C.C.A.) 282 Fed. 413.
Finally, was there probable cause? In The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, the question was whether the
seizure of a French vessel at a particular place was upon probable cause that she was there for
the purpose of smuggling. In this discussion, Mr. Justice Story, who delivered the judgment of
the Court, said (page 22 U. S. 374):
"It has been very justly observed at the bar that the Court is bound to take notice of public facts
and geographical
Page 267 U. S. 160
positions, and that this remote part of the country has been infested, at different periods, by
smugglers, is a matter of general notoriety, and may be gathered from the public documents of
the government."
We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its
neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most
active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the
182 | P a g e
interior. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a regular
patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor carried
in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll
boys, as they called them, were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were
engaged in plying the unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after
noted their going from Grand Rapids half way to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city
to see where they went, but they escaped observation. Two months later, these officers
suddenly met the same men on their way westward, presumably from Detroit. The partners in
the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile
they had been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus
identified as part of the firm equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source
of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where they plied their trade. That the officers, when
they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we
think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put by
defendants' counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for
defendants at the particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight.
As soon as they did appear,
Page 267 U. S. 161
the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had
previous knowledge in respect to the defendants.
The necessity for probable cause in justifying seizures on land or sea, in making arrests without
warrant for past felonies, and in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases has led to
frequent definition of the phrase. In Stacey v. Emery,97 U. S. 642, 97 U. S. 645, a suit for
damages for seizure by a collector, this Court defined probable cause as follows:
"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."
Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339; The George, 1 Mason, 24; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155. It
was laid down by Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Carey, 12 Cush. 246, 251 that
"if a constable or other peace officer arrest a person without a warrant, he is not bound to show
in his justification a felony actually committed, to render the arrest lawful; but if he suspects one
on his own knowledge of facts, or on facts communicated to him by others, and thereupon he
has reasonable ground to believe that the accused has been guilty of felony, the arrest is not
unlawful."
Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396; Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Cush. 281, 285. In McCarthy v. De
Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sums up the definition of probable
cause in this way (page 69):
"The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for belief in guilt."
In the case of the Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, which was a suit for false
imprisonment, it was said by this Court (page 263 U. S. 28):
"But, as we have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General's agent,
Page 267 U. S. 162
which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable."
See also Munn v. e Nemours, 3 Wash.C.C. 37.
In the light of these authorities, and what is shown by this record, it is clear the officers here had
justification for the search and seizure. This is to say that the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient, in
themselves, to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was
being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.
Counsel finally argue that the defendants should be permitted to escape the effect of the
conviction because the court refused on motion to deliver them the liquor when, as they say, the
evidence adduced on the motion was much less than that shown on the trial, and did not show
probable cause. The record does not make it clear what evidence was produced in support of or
against the motion. But, apart from this, we think the point is without substance here. If the
evidence given on the trial was sufficient, as we think it was, to sustain the introduction of the
liquor as evidence, it is immaterial that there was an inadequacy of evidence when application
was made for its return. A conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set
aide on such a ground. The whole matter was gone into at the trial, so no right of the defendants
was infringed.
Counsel for the Government contend that Kiro, the defendant who did not own the automobile,
could not complain of the violation of the Fourth Amendment in the use of the liquor as evidence
against him, whatever the view taken as to Carroll's rights. Our conclusion as to the whole case
makes it unnecessary for us to discuss this aspect of it.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Page 267 U. S. 163
MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, before his retirement, concurred in this opinion.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS concurred in by MR. JUSTICE
SUTHERLAND.
1. The damnable character of the "bootlegger's" business should not close our eyes to the
mischief which will surely follow any attempt to destroy it by unwarranted methods.
"To press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands
in the way of its establishment; . . . in short, to procure an imminent good by means that are
unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as to public justice."
Sir William Scott, The Louis, 2 Dolson 210, 257.
While quietly driving an ordinary automobile along a much frequented public road, plaintiffs in
error were arrested by Federal officers without a warrant and upon mere suspicion -- ill-founded,
as I think. The officers then searched the machine and discovered carefully secreted whisky,
183 | P a g e
which was seized and thereafter used as evidence against plaintiffs in error when on trial for
transporting intoxicating liquor contrary to the Volstead Act (c. 85, 41 Stat. 305). They maintain
that both arrest and seizure were unlawful, and that use of the liquor as evidence violated their
constitutional rights.
This is not a proceeding to forfeit seized goods; nor is it an action against the seizing officer for a
tort. Cases like the following are not controlling: Crowell v. M'Fadon, 8 Cranch 94, 12 U. S.
98; United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch 398, 403 [argument of counsel --
omitted], 12 U. S. 405; Otis v. Watkins, 9 Cranch 339; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 16 U. S.
310,16 U. S. 318; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 44
U. S. 205. They turned upon express provisions of applicable Acts of Congress; they did not
involve the point now presented, and afford little, if any, assistance toward its proper solution.
The Volstead Act does not, in terms, authorize arrest or seizure upon mere suspicion.
Page 267 U. S. 164
Whether the officers are shielded from prosecution or action by Rev.Stat. Sec. 970 is not
important. That section does not undertake to deprive the citizen of any constitutional right, or to
permit the use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It does, however, indicate the clear
understanding of Congress that probable cause is not always enough to justify a seizure.
Nor are we now concerned with the question whether, by apt words, Congress might have
authorized the arrest without a warrant. It has not attempted to do this. On the contrary, the
whole history of the legislation indicates a fixed purpose not so to do. First and second violations
are declared to be misdemeanors -- nothing more -- and Congress, of course, understood the
rule concerning arrests for such offenses. Whether different penalties should have been
prescribed or other provisions added is not for us to inquire; nor do difficulties attending
enforcement give us power to supplement the legislation.
2. As the Volstead Act contains no definite grant of authority to arrest upon suspicion and
without warrant for a first offense, we come to inquire whether such authority can be inferred
from its provisions.
Unless the statute which creates a misdemeanor contains some clear provision to the contrary,
suspicion that it is being violated will not justify an arrest. Criminal statutes must be strictly
construed and applied, in harmony with rules of the common law. United States v. Harris, 177 U.
S. 305, 177 U. S. 310. And the well settled doctrine is that an arrest for a misdemeanor may not
be made without a warrant unless the offense is committed in the officer's presence.
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 115 U. S. 498 --
"By the common law of England, neither a civil officer nor a private citizen had the right without a
warrant to make an arrest for a crime not committed in his presence except in the case
Page 267 U. S. 165
of felony, and then only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate."
Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529, 177 U. S. 531 --
"An officer, at common law, was not authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere
misdemeanor not committed in his presence."
Commonwealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 158 --
"It is suggested that the statutory misdemeanor of having in one's possession short lobsters with
intent to sell them is a continuing offence, which is being committed while such possession
continues, and that, therefore, an officer who sees any person in possession of such lobsters
with intent to sell them can arrest such person without a warrant, as for a misdemeanor
committed in his presence. We are of opinion, however, that for statutory misdemeanors of this
kind, not amounting to a breach of the peace, there is no authority in an officer to arrest without
a warrant unless it is given by statute. . . . The Legislature has often empowered officers to
arrest without warrant for similar offenses, which perhaps tends to show that, in its opinion, no
such right exists at common law."
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584 --
"Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a
conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or
upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights which
our Constitution guarantees. These are rights which existed long before our Constitution, and we
have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the fundamental law of the
land. . . . If persons can be restrained of their liberty, and assaulted and imprisoned, under such
circumstances, without complaint or warrant, then there is no limit to the power of a police
officer."
3. The Volstead Act contains no provision which annuls the accepted common law rule or
discloses definite intent
Page 267 U. S. 166
to authorize arrests without warrant for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence.
To support the contrary view, Section 26 is relied upon --
"When . . . any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation
of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or aircraft, or other
vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being
transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally
shall be seized by an officer, he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile,
boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge thereof."
Let it be observed that this section has no special application to automobiles; it includes any
vehicle -- buggy, wagon, boat or air craft. Certainly, in a criminal statute, always to be strictly
construed, the words "shall discover. . . in the act of transporting in violation of the law" cannot
mean shall have reasonable cause to suspect or believe that such transportation is being carried
on. To discover and to suspect are wholly different things. Since the beginning, apt words have
been used when Congress intended that arrests for misdemeanors or seizures might be made
upon suspicion. It has studiously refrained from making a felony of the offense here charged,
and it did not undertake by any apt words to enlarge the power to arrest. It was not ignorant of
the established rule on the subject, and well understood how this could be abrogated, as plainly
appears from statutes like the following: "An Act to regulate the collection of duties on imports
and tonnage," approved March 2, 1789, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, 677, 678;
"An Act to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods,
wares and merchandise imported
184 | P a g e
Page 267 U. S. 167
into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels,"
approved August 4, 1790, c. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 170; "An Act further to provide for the collection of
duties on imports and tonnage," approved March 3, 1815, c. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232. These and
similar Acts definitely empowered officers to seize upon suspicion and therein radically differ
from the Volstead Act, which authorized no such thing.
"An Act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act," approved November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42
Stat. 222, 223, provides --
"That any officer, agent, or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of this
Act, or the National Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search any
private dwelling as defined in the National Prohibition Act, and occupied as such dwelling,
without a warrant directing such search, or who while so engaged shall without a search warrant
maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or property, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined for a first offense not more than
$1,000, and for a subsequent offense not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both such fine and imprisonment."
And it is argued that the words and history of this section indicate the intent of Congress to
distinguish between the necessity for warrants in order to search private dwellings and the right
to search automobiles without one. Evidently Congress regarded the searching of private
dwellings as matter of much graver consequence than some other searches, and distinguished
between them by declaring the former criminal. But the connection between this distinction and
the legality of plaintiffs in error's arrest is not apparent. Nor can I find reason for inquiring
concerning the validity of the distinction under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, the distinction
is
Page 267 U. S. 168
valid, and so are some seizures. But what of it? The Act made nothing legal which theretofore
was unlawful, and to conclude that, by declaring the unauthorized search of a private dwelling
criminal, Congress intended to remove ancient restrictions from other searches and from arrests
as well would seem impossible.
While the Fourth Amendment denounces only unreasonable seizures, unreasonableness often
depends upon the means adopted. Here, the seizure followed an unlawful arrest, and therefore
became itself unlawful -- as plainly unlawful as the seizure within the home so vigorously
denounced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 232 U. S. 391, 232 U. S. 392, 232 U. S.
393.
In Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, 2, the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected evidence
obtained by an unwarranted arrest, and clearly announced some very wholesome doctrine:
"That an officer may not make an arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence,
without a warrant, has been so frequently decided as not to require citation of authority. It is
equally fundamental that a citizen may not be arrested on suspicion of having committed a
misdemeanor and have his person searched by force, without a warrant of arrest. If, therefore,
the arresting officer in this case had no other justification for the arrest than the mere suspicion
that a bottle, only the neck of which he could see protruding from the pocket of defendant's coat,
contained intoxicating liquor, then it would seem to follow without much question that the arrest
and search, without first having secured a warrant, were illegal. And that his only justification
was his suspicion is admitted by the evidence of the arresting officer himself. If the bottle had
been empty, or if it had contained anyone of a dozen innoxious liquids, the act of the officer
would, admittedly, have been an unlawful invasion of the personal liberty of the defendant. That
it happened in this instance to contain whisky, we think,
Page 267 U. S. 169
neither justifies the assault nor condemns the principle which makes such an act unlawful."
The validity of the seizure under consideration depends on the legality of the arrest. This did not
follow the seizure, but the reverse is true. Plaintiffs in error were first brought within the officers'
power, and, while therein, the seizure took place. If an officer, upon mere suspicion of a
misdemeanor, may stop one on the public highway, take articles away from him, and thereafter
use them as evidence to convict him of crime, what becomes of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments?
In Weeks v. United States, supra, through Mr. Justice Day, this court said:
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the
exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses,
papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the
laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal
Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. . . . The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
Page 267 U. S. 170
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 251 U. S. 391:
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that, although, of course, its seizure
was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns
them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in
a more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession, but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit
by doing the forbidden act. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, to be sure, had established
that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean
only that two steps are required instead of one. In our opinion, such is not the law. It reduces the
Fourth Amendment to a form of words. 232 U.S. 232 U. S. 393. The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course, this does not
mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
185 | P a g e
Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, and Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, distinctly
point out that property procured by unlawful action of Federal officers cannot be introduced as
evidence.
The arrest of plaintiffs in error was unauthorized, illegal and violated the guarantee of due
process given by the Fifth Amendment. The liquor offered in evidence was obtained by the
search which followed this arrest, and was therefore obtained in violation of their constitutional
Page 267 U. S. 171
rights. Articles found upon or in the control of one lawfully arrested may be used as evidence for
certain purposes, but not at all when secured by the unlawful action of a Federal officer.
4. The facts known by the officers who arrested plaintiffs in error were wholly insufficient to
create a reasonable belief that they were transporting liquor contrary to law. These facts were
detailed by Fred Cronenwelt, chief prohibition officer. His entire testimony as given at the trial
follows --
"I am in charge of the Federal Prohibition Department in this District. I am acquainted with these
two respondents, and first saw them on September 29, 1921, in Mr. Scully's apartment on
Oakes Street, Grand Rapids. There were three of them that came to Mr. Scully's apartment, one
by the name of Kruska, George Kiro and John Carroll. I was introduced to them under the name
of Stafford, and told them I was working for the Michigan Chair Company, and wanted to buy
three cases of whisky, and the price was agreed upon. After they thought I was all right, they
said they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour; that they had to go out to the east
end of Grand Rapids, to get this liquor. They went away and came back in a short time, and Mr.
Kruska came upstairs and said they couldn't get it that night; that a fellow by the name of Irving,
where they were going to get it, wasn't in, but they were going to deliver it the next day, about
ten. They didn't deliver it the next day. I am not positive about the price. It seems to me it was
around $130 a case. It might be $135. Both respondents took part in this conversation. When
they came to Mr. Scully's apartment, they had this same car. While it was dark and I wasn't able
to get a good look at this car, later, on the sixth day of October, when I was out on the road with
Mr. Scully, I was waiting on the highway while he went to Reed's Lake to get a light
Page 267 U. S. 172
lunch, and they drove by, and I had their license number and the appearance of their car, and
knowing the two boys, seeing them on the 29th day of September, I was satisfied when I seen
the car on December 15th it was the same car I had seen on the 6th day of October. On the 6th
day of October, it was probably twenty minutes before Scully got back to where I was. I told him
the Carroll boys had just gone toward Detroit and we were trying to catch up with them and see
where they were going. We did catch up with them somewhere along by Ada, just before we got
to Ada, and followed them to East Lansing. We gave up the chase at East Lansing."
"On the 15th of December, when Peterson and Scully and I overhauled this car on the road, it
was in the country, on Pike 16, the road leading between Grand Rapids and Detroit. When we
passed the car, we were going toward Ionia, or Detroit, and the Kiro and Carroll boys were
coming towards Grand Rapids when Mr. Scully and I recognized them and said 'there goes the
Carroll brothers,' and we went on still further in the same direction we were going and turned
around and went back to them; drove up to the side of them. Mr. Scully was driving the car; I
was sitting in the front seat, and I stepped out on the running board and held out my hand and
said, 'Carroll, stop that car,' and they did stop it. John Kiro was driving the car. After we got them
stopped, we asked them to get out of the car, which they did. Carroll referred to me and called
me by the name of 'Fred' just as soon as I got up to him. Raised up the back part of the roadster;
didn't find any liquor there; then raised up the cushion; then I struck at the lazyback of the seat
and it was hard. I then started to open it up, and I did tear the cushion some, and Carroll said,
'Don't tear the cushion; we have only got six cases in there;' and I took out two bottles and found
out it was liquor; satisfied it was liquor. Mr. Peterson and a fellow by the
Page 267 U. S. 173
name of Gerald Donker came in with the two Carroll boys and the liquor and the car to Grand
Rapids. They brought the two defendants and the car and the liquor to Grand Rapids. I and the
other men besides Peterson stayed out on the road, looking for other cars that we had
information were coming in. There was conversation between me and Carroll before Peterson
started for town with the defendants. Mr. Carroll said, 'Take the liquor and give us one more
chance and I will make it right with you.' At the same time, he reached in one of his trousers
pockets and pulled out money; the amount of it I don't know. I wouldn't say it was a whole lot. I
saw a ten dollar bill, and there was some other bills; I don't know how much there was; it wasn't
a large amount."
"As I understand, Mr. Hanley helped carry the liquor from the car. On the next day afterwards,
we put this liquor in boxes, steel boxes, and left it in the Marshal's vault, and it is still there now.
Mr. Hanley and Chief Deputy Johnson, some of the agents and myself were there. Mr. Peterson
was there the next day that the labels were signed by the different officers; those two bottles,
Exhibits 'A' and 'B.'"
"Q. Now, those two bottles, Exhibits 'A' and 'B,' were those the two bottles you took out of the
car out there, or were those two bottles taken out of the liquor after it go up here?"
"A. We didn't label them out on the road; simply found it was liquor and sent it in, and this liquor
was in Mr. Hanley's custody that evening and during the middle of the next day when we
checked it over to see the amount of liquor that was there. Mr. Johnson and I sealed the bottles
and Mr. Johnson's name is on the label that goes over the box with mine, and this liquor was
taken out of the case today. It was taken out for the purpose of analyzation. The others were not
broken until today. "
Page 267 U. S. 174
"Q. And are you able to tell us, from the label and from the bottles, whether it is part of the same
liquor taken out of that car? A. It has the appearance of it, yes sir. Those are the bottles that
were in there that Mr. Hanley said was gotten out of the Carroll car."
"[Cross-examination.] I think I was the first one to get back to the Carroll car after it was stopped.
I had a gun in my pocket; I didn't present it. I was the first one to the car, and raised up the back
of the car, but the others were there shortly afterward. We assembled right around the car
immediately."
"Q. And whatever examination and what investigation you made you went right ahead and did it
in your own way? A. Yes, sir."
"Q. And took possession of it, arrested them, and brought them in? A. Yes, sir."
"Q. And at that time, of course, you had no search warrant? A. No, sir. We had no knowledge
that this car was coming through at that particular time."
186 | P a g e
"[Redirect examination.] The lazyback was awfully hard when I struck it with my fist. It was
harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs; a great deal harder. It was practically solid.
Sixty-nine quarts of whiskey in one lazyback."
The negotiation concerning three cases of whisky on September 29th was the only circumstance
which could have subjected plaintiffs in error to any reasonable suspicion. No whisky was
delivered, and it is not certain that they ever intended to deliver any. The arrest came two and a
half months after the negotiation. Every act in the meantime is consistent with complete
innocence. Has it come about that merely because a man once agreed to deliver whisky, but did
not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an automobile on the road to
Detroit!
5. When Congress has intended that seizures or arrests might be made upon suspicion, it has
been careful to say
Page 267 U. S. 175
so. The history and terms of the Volstead Act are not consistent with the suggestion that it was
the purpose of Congress to grant the power here claimed for enforcement officers. The facts
known when the arrest occurred were wholly insufficient to engender reasonable belief that
plaintiffs in error were committing a misdemeanor, and the legality of the arrest cannot be
supported by facts ascertained through the search which followed.
To me, it seems clear enough that the judgment should be reversed.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND concurs in this opinion.
Facts of the case
Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and
conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of
arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of
evidence was appealable.
Question
Was the order for suppression of evidence appealable?
Conclusion
No. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion, reversing the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the United States had no right to appeal the
suppression order. The order was sufficiently separate from the criminal trial to be final and not
appealable under statutes relating to criminal cases.
[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos
Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several
times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc
went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-
wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it
at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson
Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck
and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the
coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents, specifically: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt
from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued
to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the
provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task
Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.[9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three
CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of
coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck,
concealing the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the
seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with
a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value
of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an
I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of
various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of
3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50
187 | P a g e
at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus
violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces
of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber
permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose
timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from
the forest area covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by
Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence
against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an
uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-
appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused
is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors: [18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277
for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for
the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest
products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of
accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of
accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the
particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws
and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction
should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-
timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be
covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified
in the succeeding sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by
a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized
representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the
lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be
supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales
invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of
origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
188 | P a g e
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single
document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed
documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued
by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit
"E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the
coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on bo
ard truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside
the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its
final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused
was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearingplate number PAD-548 which was
loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber
could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless
the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that
he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and,
therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be
seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994
addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO
that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit
to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the
court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he
filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was
then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a
permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x
came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government
agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government
agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he
has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the
employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on
his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the
employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could
recognize the person x x but they were already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At
one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the
DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am
hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest
products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate
offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime.Whether or not the lumber comes from a
legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are
inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of
lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures as well as his right to counsel.
189 | P a g e
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in
People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall
be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except
by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be
found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellants
truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information
that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass
through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were
patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the
informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the
truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs.When
the police officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not
present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable
cause which justified the extensive search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence
to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants right to counsel
under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding
of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa
Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of theft, and the resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere
in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00,
belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of
3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,
244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they
came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,
appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification
card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a
190 | P a g e
passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search
his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he thereof.
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something
unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base
in Pagsanjan.
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered
1991, it has been held that considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things
with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables,
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity,
he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.The doctrine is
owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
locked him up in jail for a week."[4]
automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not
justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which reads: case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v.
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a
property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO
search may be made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under
(2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
the circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to
TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
arrest the accused even without a warrant."[7]
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty
imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and
penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine
(9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years,
Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no
costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged
in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said
defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the
findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express
or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article
III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;[8] (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;[9] (3) search of moving vehicles;[10] (4)
consented warrantless search;[11] (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]

191 | P a g e
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in
the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured.[14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at
bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. [15] Thus,
the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.[16] Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause.[18] Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a
case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[19] The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. [20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military
or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, [21] for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order[22] and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.[23] A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle;[25] (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;[27] (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection;[28] and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of
the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment,
to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to
see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle
by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by the
Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a
home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents
had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as
that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the accused who were riding
a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the
moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country.[33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
192 | P a g e
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the said
place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched the load
of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became suspicious, why
did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you do
next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused
was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to
flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines
x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate
dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or
the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior,
and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA
was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise
have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information
has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.[38]
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.[40]
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with
the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He
claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there
was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[41] Hence, consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[42] The question whether a
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances.[43] Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on;[44] (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
193 | P a g e
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. [47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said date
and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a
vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I
became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by so
doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him I
will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the Cavinti area,
sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was
orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter
fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the
request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. [49]
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants
readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to
the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People
vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely
consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were
carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held that the accused spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People
vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag
to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The
Court said there was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained
the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to
believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission
that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they
were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of
the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of
consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain
terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the
police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look
inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted
because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the
vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told
petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise,
when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped
the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he
asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.[56]
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Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton
box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and
found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box
and failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal
and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused,
RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR
POLICE CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE
OF THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT
PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. — There are indeed instances where search and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the "stop-
and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has
already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped
and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense. However, lest it be
misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall
be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except
by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before Us is an
incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE
WAIVED, AS IN THIS CASE. — Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts
serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search.
Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In one case
We held — ". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT
OF DISPATCHING IN TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 4,
ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN
INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR. (A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. — The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful
because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was
no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the
situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be made. The accused were caught in the act of
dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as
amended.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. — Factual conclusions by the trial court relative
to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and are generally sustained by the
appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to affect
the result. There is none in this case on appeal.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. —
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of
Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was
conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This
issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of
the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently,
he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit
evidence.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A
PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. — Proof of
ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful transportation of
marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the owner
of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a
prohibited drug.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN ORDINARY
CHECKPOINT IS ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS ENVISIONED IN THE BILL
OF RIGHTS. — I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may
be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the chance that it
may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the
Bill of Rights. In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the
search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is
no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been
committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being searched or
arrested is the culprit . . . I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the seized
marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always
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maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all,
the articles seized are illegal.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a checkpoint after being stopped
for routine inspection is put to test in this appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite City finding inter alia accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972."
On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by accused-appellant
Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection
regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused
Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection
team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered
in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight
inside. He noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long
with its sides bulging. He asked what it contained. There was deadening silence. Nobody
answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime P. Fernandez and
Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened.
He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!" At
this juncture, the three (3) remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear.
They were brought to the police station that same night for further investigation. 2
After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian
hemp otherwise known as marijuana. 3
Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P. Fernandez were accordingly
charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. A fine of
P25,000.00 was also imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and received
lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Exala did not.
Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his
conviction; hence, We deal only with him in this appeal.
Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. 5
Bocalan claims that while on the way to Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride.
Exala accepted the offer and requested Bocalan to make a detour to Salitran, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They agreed and Exala got the bag which he
kept beside him all the time until their apprehension at the checkpoint. 6
Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him
since it was obtained through a warrantless search. 7
The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that the conduct
of Bocalan was not only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience. 8 He alleged
that he knew Exala only by face and had no personal association with him; 9 yet, on that
eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran which was some fifteen (15) to
twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who owned the bag
containing the marijuana is hardly credible.
On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of the bag as it
was already in the jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or
Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore that Bocalan and Fernandez offered him
P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone, but he refused. 10
Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful transportation
of marijuana. 11 Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the
owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or
transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus —
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. —
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is
a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly involved in the
unlawful dispatch in transit or transport of marijuana. The evidence of the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo Galang and Pat. Rosauro de Guzman, belies the
defense of Bocalan and establishes beyond cavil that he was caught in flagrante delicto of
transporting the prohibited drug; that he was the driver of the jeep owned by his father that
carried the stuff; and, that he was in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan
picked up Fernandez and Exala one after the other to accompany him to the place where the
bag of marijuana was taken and to help him bring the marijuana to Cavite City. 12 Regardless of
the degree of participation of Fernandez and Exala, Bocalan is correctly punished for his direct
involvement in the crime.
Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect and are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts
have been overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result. 13 There is none in this case on
appeal.
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of
Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was
conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest.
This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the
admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search.
Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. 14 In view of such waiver, the court
is bound to admit the evidence. 15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still
appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest. 16 An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this
Court. 17 Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is
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because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have
been instruments in the commission of an offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this
doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to
search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an incident to or
an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main
object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the
possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. 20 When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants were asked
routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of
which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused
answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously
quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly
appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause
justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the
prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The
accused remained silent even after their arrest.
Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of
any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed
innocence 21 but also confirms their acquiescence to the search. 22 Clearly then, there was
waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. 23 In one case 24 We held —
". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th
Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly" (emphasis
supplied).
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the
prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while
a crime was committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be made.
25 The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in
violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc. Galang and Pat. de Guzman
was explained in their separate testimonies and, in any event, has been resolved by the trial
court as a factual issue. We find no reason to reverse its findings.
Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have been assigned different levels of
liability, suffice it to say that whether a principal, co-principal or conspirator, accused-appellant
would have been meted out the same penalty imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from finding accused-
appellant RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the
same is AFFIRMED, with costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinions in Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA
665/178 SCRA 211, and People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, and the following additional
observations.
I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality in
general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be
stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the chance that it may
be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of
Rights.
In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The
search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing
that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed
and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is
the culprit.
I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at "constructive
borders" near the boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of immigration and customs
laws. But in the interior of the territory, the requirements of a valid search and seizure must be
strictly observed. The only permissible exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just
been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to seal off all possible
avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be
allowed.
I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the of the seized marijuana as
evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained,
we cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles
seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would rather see some criminals go
unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in the
oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a conviction
based on a violation of the rights of the accused.
United States v. Chadwick
Brief Fact Summary. One and a half hours after arresting the Respondents, Chadwick,
Machado, and Leary (Respondents), federal narcotics agents opened a footlocker confiscated
during the arrest. The agents had not obtained a warrant to open the footlocker.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Once property cannot be accessed by an arrestee, it cannot be
searched without a warrant.
Facts. The Respondents were arrested by federal narcotics agents as they were lifting a
footlocker into the trunk of a car. The agents confiscated the footlocker and moved the
Respondents, footlocker, and car to the Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the
arrest, the agents unlocked the footlocker without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances.
Large amounts of marijuana were found in the footlocker.
Issue. Is a search warrant required to open a locked footlocker that was seized during arrest,
when there is probable cause to believe that the footlocker contains contraband?
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Held. Yes. Personal effects that have been confiscated by the police incident to an arrest cannot
be searched without a warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Because people have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal effects, a warrant is required to search
confiscated luggage.

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