CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993
LUISA LYON NUÑAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUÑAL, and ANITA NUÑAL
HORMIGOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON
in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY
SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO
GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS PEÑAS,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT BECOMES FINAL,
MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS. — In the case of
Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, (195 SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ".
. ., nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory,
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the
judgment is void." Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including
the entire proceedings held for that purpose."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF AGGRIEVED PARTY. — In the case at bar, the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus,
upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any
modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would
be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent
suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the
subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** dated February 22, 1990 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14889 entitled "Emma Lyon de Leon, et al.,
plaintiffs-appellees versus Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased herein represented by Albert
Nuñal, et al., defendants appellants," dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the trial
court's order *** dated January 9, 1987 for the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as one of
the heirs who shall benefit from the partition.
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows.
This case originated from a suit docketed as Civil Case No. 872 filed by Emma Lyon de
Leon in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre and Kenny
Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman, Mercedes Lyon Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon
Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las Peñas, (herein private respondents) against Luisa
Lyon Nuñal, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs, Albert Nuñal and Anita
Nuñal Hormigos (herein petitioners), for partition and accounting of a parcel of land
located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C.
Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and
William James. Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, formerly covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in
possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since 1946 and that she made no accounting
of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the
partition and delivery of their shares.
On December 17, 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered
the partition of the property but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting.
The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among the plaintiffs and defendant. The parties
shall make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to
the Court's confirmation, should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the court
shall appoint commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to such
party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the Court shall direct.
Defendant is further ordered to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000.00." 1
On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 57265-R. The case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered
partition. 2
On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the
court a quo. 3
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary
Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution
with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the
above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land
should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is
unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said
1

share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further
invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. 4
On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of the three
commissioners and in lieu thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. 5
On February 4, 1986, the said court issued an order appointing a Board of
Commissioners to effect the partition of the contested property. 6
On May 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the motion to quash order of execution with
preliminary injunction filed by Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition of the property
among the original party plaintiffs and defendants. 7
On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of
the fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of
Title, she could therefore be construed as one of the heirs. A ruling from the trial court
was then sought. 8
On September 29, 1986, the lower court issued an order directing the counsel of Emma
Lyon de Leon to furnish the court within five days from receipt thereof all the names the
of heirs entitled to share in the partition of the subject property. 9
On October 1, 1986, the petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the court issue an
order directing the partition of the property in consonance the decision dated December
17, 1974 of the trial court the order of said court dated May 28, 1986. 10
Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board
of Commissioners to immediately partition the said property. 11
On January 3, 1987, the private respondents filed motion for clarification as to whether
the partition of property is to be confined merely among the party plaintiffs and
defendants, to the exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin. 12
On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property, to wit:
"After a perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 57265-R, where this
case was appealed by the unsatisfied parties, there is a finding that Mary now Mary Lyon
Martin is one of the legitimate children of Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom. (Page 3 of
the decision).
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
In view of this finding, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left out in the partition
of this property now undertaking (sic) by the said court appointed commissioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court appointed commissioners is hereby
directed to include Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner in the said property subject of partition
with the corresponding shares adjudicated to her.
SO ORDERED." 13
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 14 of the aforesaid order was denied by the trial
court. 15
On February 22, 1990 the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing petitioners'
appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no legal impediment to the inclusion
of Mary Lyon Martin by the court-appointed Board of Commissioners as one of the heirs
who shall benefit from the partition, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED." 16
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on June 6, 1990. 17
Petitioners filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals has decided
questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court, for the
following reasons:
"1.) BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DIRECTING
THE COURT APPOINTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO INCLUDE MARY L.
MARTIN TO SHARE IN THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION
DESPITE THE FACT, OVER WHICH THERE IS NO DISPUTE, THAT SHE HAS NOT
LITIGATED EITHER AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT IN CIVIL CASE NO.
872, IT HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO AMEND OR MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO.
872 AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 28 MAY 1986 WHICH
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2.) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT MARY
L. MARTIN "NEVER LITIGATED AS ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN SAID CASE," AND
HER ONLY PARTICIPATION THEREIN WAS SIMPLY CONFINED "AS A WITNESS
2

FOR DEFENDANT-SISTER LUISA LY ON NUÑAL," AND TO ALLOW HER TO SHARE
IN THE PARTITION THIS LATE WITHOUT REQUIRING A PROCEEDING WHERE THE
PARTIES COULD PROVE THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO
DENYING THE NUÑALS OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 18
The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L.
Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that
she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition
and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has
long become final and executory.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil
Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the
parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9, 1987 of the trial
Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court dated December 17, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in Civil Case
No. 872 ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3141 among plaintiffs and defendants has long become final and executory. Hence
the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987
ordering the Board of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the
partition of said property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said
Order, therefore, resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 872.

We find merit in the instant petition.

In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 We held that ". . ., nothing
is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void."

Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and

executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose." 20

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final
and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.

3

G.R. No. 160727 June 26, 2007
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DANILO L.
CONCEPCION, respondent.
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) assails and seeks the setting aside of the Decision1 dated
July 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75355, as effectively
reiterated in its Resolution2 of November 7, 2003 denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The records, which include a copy of this Court’s Decision dated May 19, 1998 in G.R.
No. 131729 entitled "Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al.,
respondents,"3 yield the following material facts:
On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies4 (EYCO or EYCO Group) filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a PETITION 5 for the declaration of
suspension of payment, appointment of a rehabilitation receiver/committee and approval
of rehabilitation plan with an alternative prayer for liquidation and dissolution of
corporations (Petition for Suspension of Payment, hereinafter). In it, EYCO depicted the
Group’s composite corporations as having a combined assets that are more than enough
to pay off all their debts, but nonetheless unable to pay them as they fall due. Joining
EYCO as co-petitioners were Eulogio Yutingco and two other individuals holding
controlling interests in the composite corporations (collectively, the Yutingcos).
Finding the petition, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, to be sufficient in form and
substance, the SEC Hearing Panel, by an order of September 19, 1997, directed the
suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO, et al. pending before
any court, tribunal, board or office6 (the Suspension Order). At the same time, the Panel
set the petition for hearing.
Meanwhile, a consortium of private banks which had granted credit facilities to EYCO,
among them, Union Bank, convened to map out their collective collection options. The
formation of a management committee (ManCom) to represent the creditor banks was
agreed upon in that meeting.
Subsequently, Union Bank decided to break away from the consortium and, without
notifying its members, filed a slew of civil cases against EYCO, et al. Of relevance is the
first, a complaint for a sum of money instituted on September 23, 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, against four (4) members of the EYCO Group
and spouses Eulogio and Bee Kuan Yutingco, as sureties of the corporate obligations,
with application for preliminary attachment. This complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No.
97-2184, eventually ended up in Branch 148 of the court. The next day, the Makati RTC
issued the desired writ of preliminary attachment,8 pursuant to which levy on attachment
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
was annotated on the titles, i.e., TCT Nos. V-481929 and V-4819310 of the Registry of
Deeds of Valenzuela City, of two parcels of land under the name of Nikon Plaza, Inc. and
EYCO Properties, Inc., respectively. Also attached, per herein respondent Danilo L.
Concepcion (Concepcion, for brevity), without denial from the petitioner, is a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. V-49678 of the same registry allegedly held by the Yutingcos in
trust for Nikon Industrial Corporation.11
On October 22, 1997, Union Bank moved, on jurisdictional ground, for the dismissal of
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. On the same date, EYCO submitted its rehabilitation plan.
In January 1998, the SEC Hearing Panel appointed the regular members of the newly
created ManCom for EYCO.
Meanwhile, Union Bank, without awaiting for the SEC’s ruling on its motion to dismiss
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to nullify what it
tagged as the precipitate September 19, 1997 SEC suspension order12 and its creation of
the ManCom. In the same petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45774, Union Bank
alleged that the jurisdiction over the basic petition for declaration of suspension of
payment pertains to the RTC under Act No. 1956, as amended, or the Insolvency Law.
On December 22, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45774, the CA rendered judgment declaring
Union Bank guilty of forum shopping and accordingly dismissed its petition for certiorari.
This Court, in its Decision13 dated May 19, 1998 in G.R. No. 131729, in turn affirmed that
of the CA, but proceeded further to declare the SEC as possessed of jurisdiction over
EYCO’s petition for suspension of payments filed pursuant to Section 5(d) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, but not insofar as the Yutingcos’ petition was concerned. With
respect to the Yutingcos, the Court held that the SEC’s jurisdiction on matters of
suspension of payments is confined only to those initiated by corporate entities, as the
aforecited section does not allow an individual to file, or join in, the corresponding
petition. In line with the rule on misjoinder of parties, the Court directed the SEC to drop
the individual petitioners from the petition for suspension of payment.
Conformably with this Court’s Decision aforementioned, the Makati RTC issued, in Civil
Case No. 97-2184, an Order14 dated August 17, 1998 thereunder indefinitely suspending
the proceedings in that collection suit until further orders. The fallo of the RTC’s order
reads:
WHEREFORE, … the complaint filed by the plaintiff [Union Bank] against defendant-
corporation [EYCO 4] … is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED until further Orders
from this Court in view of the existing petition for Suspension of Payment before the
[SEC]. On the other hand, the defendant’s motion to dismiss complaint against the
individual-defendants, namely: Spouses Eulogio and Bee Kuan Yutingco, is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
4

Consequently, in order to give defendant-Spouses [Yutingcos] ample time to prepare for
whatever defense they may raise, they are hereby given a new fifteen (15) days period
from receipt of this Order within which to file their answer to the complaint against them.
SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets and emphasis supplied.)
In a related development, the SEC Hearing Panel, over the objection of the consortium of
EYCO’s creditor banks, approved, on December 18, 1998, the rehabilitation plan
prepared by the Strategies and Alliance Corporation for EYCO. The consortium lost no
time in appealing to the SEC en banc the Hearing Panel’s approval order and prayed for
the liquidation and dissolution of EYCO, the appellate recourse docketed as SEC AC No.
649.
On September 14, 1999, the SEC en banc issued in SEC AC No. 649 an order finding
for the consortium, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, … the appeal is, as it is hereby granted and the Order dated 18
December 1998 is set aside. The Petition to be Declared in State of Suspension of
Payment is hereby disapproved and the SAC Plan terminated. Consequently, all
committees, conservator/receivers created pursuant to said Order are dissolved. xxx
The Commission, likewise, orders the liquidation and dissolution of the [EYCO Group].
The case is hereby remanded to the hearing panel below for that purpose. xxx (Words in
brackets and emphasis supplied.)
Another en banc order15 of March 31, 2001 followed, with the SEC this time appointing
respondent Concepcion to act, vice the dissolved Liquidation Committee, as EYCO
Liquidator. Among Concepcion’s first act as such liquidator was to file, on March 8, 2002,
in Civil Case No. 97-2184, a Motion to Intervene and To Admit Motion to Set Aside Order
of Attachment16 (Motion to Intervene, for brevity). Three days later, Concepcion
submitted before the SEC a Liquidation Plan17 for the EYCO Group.
After due proceedings, the SEC approved, on April 11, 2002, the Concepcion-submitted
Liquidation Plan.18Concepcion’s motion to intervene, however, met a different fate. For,
by Order19 of August 8, 2002, the Makati RTC denied Concepcion’s motion to intervene
in Civil Case No. 97-2184 on the ground of lack of standing to intervene, his appointment
as Liquidator being, according to the court, of doubtful validity. The order, in addition,
granted Union Bank’s earlier motion to declare EYCO in default, and set a date for the
ex-parte reception of Union Bank’s evidence.
Concepcion then moved for reconsideration questioning the basis of the denial of his
motion to intervene. Questioned, too, was the default aspect of the order, Concepcion
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
arguing in this regard that the collection proceedings were suspended "until further
Orders from this Court" 20 and the RTC of Makati has yet to issue the suspension-lifting
order. The Makati RTC denied the motion on December 16, 2002.
Earlier, however, Union Bank presented evidence ex parte, on the basis of which the
Makati RTC rendered, on December 27, 2002, partial judgment21 ordering EYCO to pay
the bank P400 million plus interests and attorney’s fees.
Via a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Concepcion challenged the
RTC’s partial judgment aforementioned and its earlier order denying the motion to
intervene. His recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75355.
The appellate court eventually issued the herein assailed Decision22 reversing the Makati
RTC’s impugned issuances and allowing Concepcion to intervene, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
orders and partial judgment are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent
[RTC Judge Oscar Pimentel, Branch 148, Makati City] is ordered to allow petitioner
[Concepcion] to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184.
SO ORDERED.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23 Union Bank has interposed this
petition ascribing to the CA the following errors:
1. In ruling in favor of respondent Concepcion’s right to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-
2184 pending in the lower court despite his lack of legal interest in the matter in litigation.
2. In ruling in favor of respondent Concepcion’s right to intervene in said Civil Case No.
97-2184 despite his lack of legal personality, his appointment by the SEC as liquidator of
EYCO being null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and
3. In giving due course to respondent Concepcion’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure despite its being the improper remedy.
We DENY.
As the Court distinctly notes, the petitioner does not assail the CA’s judgment insofar as
it nullified the RTC’s partial judgment or its default order. As thus couched, the petition
particularly sets its sight on that part of the appellate court’s ruling allowing respondent
Concepcion to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184. Of the three errors assigned, the
more critical relates to the challenged validity of the respondent’s appointment by the
5

SEC as liquidator of the EYCO Group, his right to intervene predicated as it is on his
being such liquidator.
It is the petitioner’s posture, following the Makati RTC’s line, that the respondent’s
appointment as liquidator of EYCO was invalid for lack of jurisdiction on the part of SEC
to preside, in first place, over EYCO’s liquidation and dissolution. Pressing on, the
petitioner states that EYCO is already insolvent and insolvency proceedings fall under
the jurisdiction of regular courts under the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended) in
relation to the pertinent provision of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code.
We are not persuaded.
As it were, the underlying petition24 EYCO filed with and over which the SEC assumed
jurisdiction was one for declaration of suspension of payment, appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver/committee, approval of rehabilitation plan with alternative prayer
for liquidation and dissolution. That the SEC, along the way, ordained EYCO’s liquidation
and dissolution did not, without more, strip the SEC of jurisdiction over the liquidation
process. Albeit jurisdiction over a petition to declare a corporation in a state of insolvency
strictly lies with regular courts, the SEC possessed, during the period material, ample
power under P.D. No. 902-A,25 as amended, to declare a corporation insolvent as an
incident of and in continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over the petition to be
declared in the state of suspension of payments in the two instances provided in Section
5(d) thereof.26 Said Section 5(d)27 vests the SEC with exclusive and original jurisdiction
over petitions for suspension of payments which may either be: (a) a simple petition for
suspension of payments based on the provisions of the Insolvency Law, i.e., the
petitioning corporation has sufficient assets to cover all its debts, but foresees the
impossibility of meeting the obligations as they fall due, or (b) a similar petition filed by an
insolvent corporation accompanied by a prayer for the creation of a management
committee and/or rehabilitation receiver based on the provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as
amended by P.D. No. 1758.28
In the case at bench, EYCO’s petition for suspension of payment was, at bottom, a mix
of both situations adverted to above. For, while EYCO, in the said petition, alleged being
solvent but illiquid, it nonetheless pleaded for the constitution of a rehabilitation
receiver/committee, with an alternative prayer for liquidation, if warranted. Clearly then,
the SEC has, from the start, jurisdiction over EYCO’s petition for suspension of payment,
such jurisdiction, following Ching,29 continuing for purposes of liquidation after it (SEC)
declared EYCO insolvent. The SEC appeared to be aware of the continuity angle as it
even ordered the remand to the SEC Hearing Panel of SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 for
purposes of liquidating and dissolving the EYCO Group.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
If the SEC contextually retained jurisdiction over the liquidation of EYCO, is it not but
logical then that it has competence to appoint the respondent – or any qualified individual
for that matter – as liquidator?
And lest it be overlooked, the Court had, in G.R. No. 131729, already rejected the
petitioner’s thesis about the SEC’s purported lack of jurisdiction over EYCO’s suspension
of payment case owing to its supervening insolvency. Therein, the Court stated:
We are of course aware of the argument [of] … petitioner [Union Bank] that the petition
of [EYCO] should be entirely dismissed and taken out of the SEC’s jurisdiction on
account of the alleged insolvency of [the latter]. In this regard, petitioner theorizes that
[EYCO has] already become insolvent when [the composite corporations] allegedly
disposed of a substantial portion of their properties … hence suspension of payments
with the SEC is not the proper remedy.
Such argument does not persuade us. Petitioner’s allegations of … [EYCO’s] …
supposed insolvency … are hardly of any consequence to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the SEC over the nature or subject matter of the petition for suspension of payments.
Aside from the fact that these allegations are evidentiary in nature …, we have likewise
consistently ruled that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint, or a petition as in this
case, and the character of the relief sought. That the merits of the case after due
proceedings are later found to veer away from the claims asserted by EYCO in its
petition, as when it is shown later that it is actually insolvent and may not be entitled to
suspension of payments, does not divest the SEC at all of its jurisdiction already
acquired as its inception …. (Words in brackets and emphasis added.)
The Court is certainly aware of the transfer, effected by R.A. No. 8799, to the RTC of the
SEC’s jurisdiction defined under Section 5(d) of P.D. No. 902-A.30 Such transfer,
however, did not, as the petitioner and the RTC posit, divest the SEC of its jurisdiction
over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, given that it had already issued, as early as September
19, 1998, the suspension order after it found the petition for suspension filed on
September 16, 1998 to be sufficient in form and substance. Subsection 5.2 of R.A. No.
8799 prescribing the jurisdiction transfer and the rules on transition provides as follows:
5.2. The [Securities and Exchange] Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of [P.D.] No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the appropriate [RTC]:
Provided that the Supreme Court … may designate the [RTC] branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally
disposed. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)
6

EYCO’s petition for suspension for payment was, for all intents and purposes, still
pending with the SEC as of June 30, 2000. Accordingly, the SEC’s jurisdiction thereon,
by the express terms of R.A. No. 8999, still subsists "until [the suspension of payment
case and its incidents are] finally disposed." In the words of the CA:
As held by this Court … Section 5.2 of RA 8799 specifically provided that the SEC shall
retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of
June 30, 2000 until finally disposed. The records are clear that the suspension of
payment was filed on September 7, 1998. As such, the petition is still pending with the
SEC as of the cut-off date set in the rules. xxx31
When the law speaks of "until finally disposed," the reference should include the final
disposition of the liquidation and dissolution processes since it is within the power of the
SEC by law,32 or as incident of or in continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over
the petition for suspension of payment,33 to order the dissolution/liquidation of a
corporation and accordingly appoint a liquidator. In fine, the continuing exercise of
jurisdiction by the SEC over the liquidation and dissolution of the EYCO Group is
warranted. Once jurisdiction attaches, the court cannot be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another body. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no
sway in the present case, arise when the statute expressly so provides or when the
statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.34
Given the above perspective, the Court is at a loss to understand petitioner’s challenge
against the right of the respondent to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184, on the
postulate that the latter lacks legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Intervention is a procedure by which a third person, not originally party to the suit, but
claiming an interest in the subject matter, comes into the case, in order to protect his
right or interpose his claim.35 Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of or the whole controversy among the persons
involved.36 To warrant intervention under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 two
requisites must concur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and
(b) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character38 that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.39
Just like the CA, the Court has no doubt about the respondent, as the duly-appointed
liquidator of EYCO’s remaining assets, having a legal interest in the matter litigated in
Civil Case No. 97-2184. This is particularly true with respect to the parcels of land
covered by the writ of attachment which, in the implementation of the SEC-approved
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
Liquidation Plan for EYCO, had been conveyed to the respondent40 in trust for the benefit
of creditors, EYCO’s stockholders and other persons in interest. At the very least, the
respondent, as liquidator-trustee, is so situated as to be affected by the distribution or
disposition of the attached properties which were under threat of being levied on
execution and sold at public auction. Respondent would be unfaithful to his trust if he
does take a bona fide effort to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184 to thwart the attempt
of the petitioner to collect unpaid loans ahead of other legitimate creditors similarly
situated. Under the SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery pursuant to which
the SEC appointed the respondent to liquidate the remaining assets of EYCO, the
liquidator is empowered and duty bound to "[R]epresent the debtor … in any case filed
by or against the debtor in any tribunal" and "[B]ring any action on behalf of the debtor to
collect, recover or preserve any of its assets, or to resist or defend against any claim."41
Any suggestion that allowing intervention would unduly delay the final closure of the
collection case cannot be accepted. Far from unnecessarily prolonging or complicating
the case, the desired intervention, if allowed, would possibly enable the court in one
single action and judgment to protect the collective interests of the creditors of the EYCO
Group that are seriously threatened by the imminent exclusion of certain properties from
the pool of assets that should legally, if not ideally, be equitably distributed among them.
Disallowing intervention would pave the way for the petitioner to seize the proceedings
before the Makati RTC to work entirely in its favor. Such course of action trifles with the
entire liquidation process. And any decision rendered therein would unlikely be left
undisturbed by other legitimate but unpaid creditors whose interest in the attached
properties can hardly be disputed.
Moreover, the claim of the respondent over the attached properties could not possibly be
better threshed out in a separate but subsequent proceedings given that he had already
secured titles over them.
The third and last issue turns on the propriety of certiorari as a recourse to the denial of a
motion for intervention. The correct remedy, according to the petitioner, is an appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an order denying intervention being final in
character, not merely interlocutory. Petitioner thus faults the CA for allowing respondent
Concepcion’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules as a vehicle to impugn the
denial of his motion for intervention. It stresses that the availability of appeal proscribes
recourse to the special civil action of certiorari.
We are not convinced.
Petitioner’s statement of the rule on the availability of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
under the premises is impeccable. So too is its citation of supporting jurisprudence.
Petitioner conveniently forgot, however, to include in its formulation settled exceptions to
and qualifications of the rule, even as it glossed over another holding that intervention is
7
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
merely accessory to the principal action and, as such, is an interlocutory proceeding
dependent on the case between the original parties.42

It is true that certiorari may not be resorted to when appeal is available as a remedy.
However, it is also true that the Court has allowed the issuance of a writ of certiorari
when appeal does not afford a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. As in the past, the Court has ruled that the availability of an appeal does not
foreclose recourse to the ordinary remedies or certiorari or prohibition where appeal is
not adequate, equally beneficial, expeditious and sufficient.43 Stated a bit differently,
certiorari may be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient.
The determination as to what exactly constitutes plain, speedy and adequate remedy
rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular circumstances of each case.

In the case at bar, the CA did not commit any reversible error in allowing the petition for
certiorari filed by the respondent. As it were, the respondent was able to convince the CA
of the urgency of his cause and that an appeal from the denial of the motion for
intervention would not constitute speedy and adequate remedy, thus necessitating the
resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. And in an instance justifying the
invocation of the remedy of certiorari, it would appear too that the CA found the RTC to
have exercised its judicial authority in an oppressive manner,44 so much so that the CA
stated the apt observation that: "In the first place, it [RTC] should not have taken
cognizance of the case when it was notified of the pending petition [for suspension of
payments] before the SEC at the time the complaint was filed."45

Certainly not lost on the Court is an obvious reality: the Makati RTC virtually interfered
with and invalidated the appointment made by the SEC when it has no jurisdiction over
the latter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the impugned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 2003 and November 7, 2003,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

8

G.R. No. 182902 October 5, 2011
VIRRA MALL TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. VIRRA MALL
GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION, INC., LOLITA C. REGALADO, ANNIE L. TRIAS,
WILSON GO, PABLO OCHOA, JR., BILL OBAG and GEORGE V.
WINTERNITZ, Respondents.
Before us is a Petition for Review of the 21 May 2007 Decision1 and 14 May 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention and
denying the Motion for Reconsideration both filed by petitioner.
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is the owner of the Greenhills
Shopping Center (GSC). On 5 November 1975, Ortigas and Virra Realty Development
Corporation (Virra Realty) entered into a Contract of Lease (First Contract of Lease) over
a portion of the GSC. The 25-year lease was to expire on 15 November 2000. Pursuant
thereto, Virra Realty constructed a commercial building, the Virra Mall Shopping Center
(Virra Mall), which was divided into either units for lease or units whose leasehold rights
were sold.3
Thereafter, Virra Realty organized respondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association (VMGA),
an association of all the tenants and leasehold right holders, who managed and operated
Virra Mall. In the First Contract of Lease, VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the
rights, obligations and liabilities of Virra Realty.4
On 22 November 2000, VMGA, through its president, William Uy (Uy), requested from
Ortigas the renewal of the First Contract of Lease.5
VGMA secured two insurance policies to protect Virra Mall against damage by fire and
other causes. However, these insurance coverages expired simultaneously with the First
Contract of Lease on 15 November 2000.6Subsequently, on 13 March 2001, VGMA
acquired new sets of insurance policies effective 10 January 2001 to 31 December
2001.7
On 5 May 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair and restoration.
VMGA thus filed an insurance claim through the insurance broker, respondent Winternitz
Associates Insurance Company, Inc. (Winternitz). Thereafter, the proceeds of the
insurance were released to VMGA.8
On 3 September 2001, Ortigas entered into a Contract of Lease (Second Contract of
Lease) with Uy effective 2 November 2001 to 31 December 2004. On 11 September
2001, the latter assigned and transferred to petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association
(VMTA) all his rights and interests over the property.9
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
On 7 February 2003, Ortigas filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
and Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against several defendants,
including herein respondents. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion
of substantial portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to
the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. To secure the subject insurance proceeds,
Ortigas also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against herein
respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 69312, and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC Br.
67), which issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment on 12 February 2003.10
On 17 February 2003, VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention.11 It claimed that as the
assignee or transferee of the rights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of
Lease, and upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the services of various contractors.
These contractors undertook the restoration of the damaged area of Virra Mall
amounting to P18,902,497.75. Thus, VMTA sought the reimbursement of the expenses it
had incurred in relation thereto.12 RTC Br. 67 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention in its
Order dated 8 January 2004.13
On 5 March 2004, herein respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint-in-
Intervention on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 In its Omnibus Order dated
2 August 2005, RTC Br. 67 denied this Motion to Dismiss.15 The trial court based its
Decision on the grounds that (a) by filing the said motion, herein respondents
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the Complaint-in-Intervention, and
(b) the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged was whether or not the court could render a
valid judgment as prayed for, accepting as true the exclusive facts set forth in the
Complaint.16 Thus, RTC Br. 67 held that if there are doubts as to the truth of the facts
averred, then the court must not dismiss the Complaint, but instead require an answer
and proceed to trial on the merits.17
On a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion, the CA reversed
the ruling of RTC Br. 67 and dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention on the following
grounds: (a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and (c) the Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial
of the action, make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and
relief.18 The relevant portions of the Decision read:
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
9

2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief. (Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
161135, April 8, 2005, 455 SCRA 175, 183). If these elements are absent, the complaint
is dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
What VMTA actually seeks in filing a complaint-in-intervention is the reimbursement of
the cost of the restoration and rehabilitation of the burned area of the Virra Mall building.
And VMTA believes that such reimbursement must be made from the fire insurance
proceeds released to VMGA. Such position cannot be sustained.
………
Firstly, We find that the complaint-in-intervention fails to state a cause of action against
the petitioners. The material averments of the complaint-in-intervention belie any
correlative obligation on the part of herein petitioners vis-à-vis the legal right of VMTA for
reimbursement. The petitioners are not the proper parties against whom the subject
action for reimbursement must be directed to. On the contrary, since "x x x plaintiff
Ortigas, as owner of the building, has ordered intervenor VMTA to undertake with
dispatch the restoration and rehabilitation of the burned area or section of the Virra Mall
buiding x x x" (par. 7 of Complaint-in-Intervention), VMTA’s recourse would be to file and
direct its claim against ORTIGAS who has the obligation to pay for the same. The
complaint-in-intervention is not the proper action for VMTA to enforce its right of
reimbursement. At any rate, VMTA’s rights, if any, can be ventilated and protected in a
separate action. The complaint-in-intervention is therefore dismissible for failure to state
a cause of action against the petitioners.
Secondly, VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation. It is not privy to the
Contract of Lease between ORTIGAS and VMGA. It came into the picture only after the
expiration of the said contract.
Finally, Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property
in the custody of the court or of an offices thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
As a general guide in determining whether a party may intervene, the court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding (Sec. 2(b), Rule 12; Balane, et al. vs. De Guzman, et
al., 20 SCRA 177 [1967]).
The complaint below is primarily on the issue of specific performance. The relief being
sought by the VMTA in its complaint-in-intervention is the reimbursement of expenses
incurred by it for the repair/restoration of the Virra Mall Building. VMTA’s cause of action
has a standpoint which is unique to itself. New, unrelated, and conflicting issues would
be raised which do not concern the petitioners herein, or VMTA as intervenor. Inevitably,
the allowance of the intervention will not only cause delay in the trial of the action, make
the issues even more complicated, and stretch the issues in the action as well as amplify
the breadth of the remedies and relief.
Thereafter, VMTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in the
assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2008.19 Hence, the instant Petition raising the
following issues:
I. With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error
in declaring that the complaint in intervention failed to state a cause of
action against private respondents when it declared that the complaint in
intervention belies any correlative obligation on the part of private
respondents vis-à-vis the legal right of petitioner for reimbursement.
II. With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error
in holding that private respondents are not the proper parties against
whom the subject action for reimbursement must be directed to but
recourse would be for petitioner VMTA to file and direct its claim against
OCLP who has the obligation to pay petitioner VMTA since it was OCLP
who has (sic) ordered to undertake the restoration and rehabilitation of
the burned area or section of the Virra Mall Building.
III. With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals similarly committed
grave error when it ruled that the complaint-in-intervention is not the
proper action to enforce its right in the controversy between OCLP and
10

private respondents since the proper remedy is for petitioner VMTA to
ventilate and protect its right in a separate action.20
The determination of whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the
Complaint-in-Intervention filed by VMTA boils down to the sole issue of the propriety of
this remedy in enforcing the latter’s rights.
According to VMTA, it has a legal interest in Civil Case No. 69312, which is rooted in the
alleged failure of VMGA to turn over the insurance proceeds for the restoration and
rehabilitation of Virra Mall, in breach of the latter’s contractual obligation to Ortigas.
However, the CA ruled against this position taken by VMTA not only because, in the
CA’s view, VMTA’s Complaint-in-Intervention failed to state a cause of action, but also
because it has no legal interest in the matter in litigation. We rule in favor of VMTA.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,21 this Court explained intervention in this
wise:
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing
intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his
possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such
interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental
desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural,
consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of
which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."22 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene, and
the ruling of RTC Br. 67 allowing intervention was wrongly reversed by the CA because
such a ruling does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
VMTA has a cause of action
A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another."23 In Shell Philippines v. Jalos,24 this Court expounded on what constitutes a
cause of action, to wit:
A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation
of the primary rights of the plaintiff. Its elements consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of
the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff’s right, and (3)
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right. To sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain.25
In the case at bar, VMTA, in its Complaint-in-Intervention, explicitly laid down its cause of
action as follows:26
Pursuant to and by virtue of such claim, defendant VMGA and defendant VMGA Board
Members, impleaded as party defendants herein, received, at various times, from their
insurance broker, and it is in their custody, the insurance proceeds arising out of such
claim which, as of January 8, 2003, aggregated P48.6-Million. Having failed to deliver the
said proceeds to the real beneficiary inspite of due notice and demand, plaintiff Ortigas
herein instituted the present action against all the defendants to compel delivery of the
said insurance proceeds which are being unlawfully and illegally withheld by all the
defendant VMGA and defendant VMGA Board Members inspite of written demands
made therefor. Worse, a portion of said insurance proceeds, aggregating P8.6-Million
had already been disbursed and misappropriated in breach of trust and fiduciary duty.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing allegations that VMTA’s purported right is rooted in its claim
that it is the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a)
facilitated the repair and restoration of the insured infrastructure upon the orders of
Ortigas, and (b) advanced the costs thereof. Corollarily, respondents have a duty to
reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in
favor of respondent VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally,
11
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Intervention (Rule 19)
the imputed act or omission on the part of respondents that supposedly violated the right Complaint-in-Intervention of VMTA in Civil Case No. 69312 is allowed to proceed before
of VMTA was respondent VMGA’s refusal, despite demand, to release the insurance RTC Br. 67.
proceeds it received to reimburse the former for the expenses it had incurred in relation
to the restoration and repair of Virra Mall. Clearly, then, VMTA was able to establish its SO ORDERED.
cause of action.

VMTA has a legal interest in the matter in litigation

VMTA was also able to show its legal interest in the matter in litigation — VMGA’s
insurance proceeds — considering that it had already advanced the substantial amount
of P18,902,497.75 for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. That VMTA seeks
reimbursement from Ortigas is precisely the reason why intervention is proper. The main
issue in Civil Case No. 69312 is whether Ortigas has a contractual right to the insurance
proceeds received by VMGA. Thus, the recoupment by VMTA of the expenses it incurred
in the repair of Virra Mall depends on the success of either party in the main case. VMTA
therefore has an undeniable stake in Civil Case No. 69312 that would warrant its
intervention therein.

Further, the issuance to Ortigas of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts
VMTA in a situation in which it will be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of the property in the custody of the court, pursuant to the said writ. The
lawphil

prospect of any distribution or disposition of the attached property will likewise affect
VMTA’s claim for reimbursement.

VMTA’s intervention in Civil Case No. 69312 will avoid a multiplicity of suits

Lastly, allowing VMTA to intervene in Civil Case No. 69312 finds support in Heirs of
Medrano v. De Vera,27 to wit:

The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in

order for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims.
Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process
considerations.28

Thus, although the CA was correct in stating that VMTA could always file a separate
case against Ortigas, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and avoid a multiplicity of suits. We do not see how delay will be inordinately
occasioned by the intervention of VMTA, contrary to the fear of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 21 May 2007 and
Resolution dated 14 May 2008 of the CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as the dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention filed by VMTA is concerned. The

12