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TABULATION OF REVISION
REVISION REVISION
PAGE REMARKS PAGE REMARKS
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ATTACHMENT
A X D X
B X E X
C X F X
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
RECORD OF REVISION
Rev. Implemented
Page Subject Client’s Comment Explanation
Code (Y/N)
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABULATION OF REVISION......................................................................................................... 2
RECORD OF REVISION ................................................................................................................ 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. 4
1. GENERAL ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Definition ....................................................................................................................... 7
2. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Codes and Standards ................................................................................................... 7
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................... 8
4. ORGANIZATION ...................................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Study Team Composition ............................................................................................. 9
4.2 Chairman’s Responsibilities ........................................................................................ 9
4.3 Team Member’s Responsibilities............................................................................... 10
4.4 Scribber Responsibilities ........................................................................................... 10
5. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 10
5.1 HAZID Methodology.................................................................................................... 10
5.1.1 Guidewords ......................................................................................................... 10
5.1.2 Threats/Hazards and Consequences ................................................................ 11
5.1.3 Safeguards .......................................................................................................... 11
5.1.4 Risk Ranking ....................................................................................................... 11
5.1.5 Mitigation Required ............................................................................................ 12
5.2 HAZOP Methodology .................................................................................................. 12
5.2.1 HAZOP Technique .............................................................................................. 12
5.2.2 Causes & Consequences ................................................................................... 14
5.2.3 Safeguards .......................................................................................................... 14
5.2.4 Risk Ranking ....................................................................................................... 15
5.2.5 Action Required .................................................................................................. 15
6. HAZID REVIEW SESSION ..................................................................................................... 16
6.1 HAZID Workshop ........................................................................................................ 16
6.2 Reviewed Drawing ...................................................................................................... 16
6.3 Document Studied in HAZID ...................................................................................... 16
6.4 Nodes Consideration in HAZID .................................................................................. 17
7. HAZOP REVIEW SESSION ................................................................................................... 18
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
1. GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
The gas pipeline length will be 67 km from Trans Gas Indonesia (TGI) at Duri to PT
Pertamina Refinery Unit II at Dumai. This project also includes the construction of Four Line
Break Control Valve stations and Gas Metering Station at Dumai.
1.2 Objectives
1. To identify possible operational hazards that has the potential to impact the unit
operation, operator injury and environment for the new facility.
2. To record the identified threats and hazards associated with the operational activities
that have the potential to impact the facilities.
3. To identify and determine adequacy of critical safeguards (hardware systems and/or
procedures) associated with the identified risks and propose recommendations to
improve the safety systems of the facilities.
4. Highlighted those hazards for which risk level need to be managed during normal
operation and identify any opportunities for risk reduction.
5. Provide the basis for CLIENT Facilities Development hazard register.
It should be underlined that HAZOP Study is not a design review meeting and, therefore the
team should be reminded to avoid spending too much time for “Design Solutions”.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
1.3 Definition
2. REFERENCES
1. OHSAS 18001: 2007 Klausul 4.3.1 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment, and
Determining Control
2. SNI ISO 14001 - 2005 Klausul 4.3.1 Aspek Lingkungan
3. Oil and Gas Producer, Evaluation and Risk Management
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Gas from tie-in at TGI plant is connected with new metering station that will be provided by
TGI. The new metering station will be located tie-in point near existing TGI gas plant. In
metering station, regulator is close with metering located in downstream of metering.
Regulator is provided to adjust required supply pressure to achieve respected destination
pressure of 410 psig at Dumai receiving facility. The gas from Duri Station will be sent to
Dumai Receiving Facility via onshore gas pipeline. Arround 61 Km from inlet pipeline, a 24”
future connection will be provided for future user / gas costumer.
Dumai Receiving Facility is located in Pertamina RU II Dumai. At receiving facility, gas from
pipeline is routed to slug catcher for separate condensation liquid from gas during normal
operation and receive liquid during pigging operation. Gas from slug catcher is controlled by
pressure control valve to meet with sales gas pressure based on costumer requirement at
363 psig (25 barg) as minimum. The sales gas is metered using gas costudy metering before
sent to customer.
The condensate vessel will store liquid from slug catcher during normal operation and
pigging operation with capacity 5000 liters. Condensate from Condensate Vessel will be
pump to costumer in intermittent using Condensate Pump. At downstream of Condensate
Pump is installed condensate metering to account condensate sales.
Flash gas from Condensate Vessel will be routed to Pertamina RU II venting line.
4. ORGANIZATION
The core of the HAZID & HAZOP Study team shall consist of a Chairman and Scribber. The
Chairman or HAZOP Leader shall be come from Legal Institution (not personal). The
process engineers of CONTRACTOR project team will attend the Study Meeting and give
explanation about process, instrumentation philosophy, operation and maintenance for the
facilities.
CLIENT also will attend the HAZOP Meeting. Therefore, CONTRACTOR will request
CLIENT to assign adequate personnel of engineer including Employer’s operating personnel.
Other engineers, such as electrical, piping, and civil of CONTRACTOR team will attend as
required (on call basis) by the Chairman.
Ensure all HAZID & HAZOP Reports prepared completely and accurately
Maintain the meeting is always conducted consistently and timely
The Chairman shall be qualified as PHA Leader from authorized institute.
5. METHODOLOGY
5.1.1 Guidewords
The guidewords in the HAZID review were used as examples to prompt the workshop group
into considering the possible causes of each hazard. The guidewords should carefully be
chosen to promote creative thought about all possible hazards. The guidewords used in the
HAZID review are listed below.
1. Loss of Containment: Leaks or rupture that may cause fluid inside piping/equipment
release to atmosphere.
2. Non Hydrocarbon Fires: Any fire not modeled as a hydrocarbon event, including
electrical fires, combustible material fires, static electricity, and lightning fires.
3. Transport Accidents: Collision between the installation (building, tank, or piping) and
vehicles.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
4. Personal Accidents: Accidents with no potential to cause fatalities out of the immediate
area of the incident and no more than 5 fatalities (the majority cause only a single
fatality). They include a variety of events such as falls, and burns.
5. Constructability: Construction of the platform that may cause injury when someone is
working at the area.
6. Evacuations: Procedure/method/instrument to escape from hazardous area when facility
in damage (emergency case).
7. Design Considerations: Inappropriate consideration during design phase may cause
hazards to environment/ personnel during operation.
8. Structural: Any structural failure, i.e. structural/support fatigue, earthquake that cause
building collapse.
9. Miscellaneous: Any other issues that have not defined on the above guidewords.
The HAZID will identify the hazards or threats that may occur on specific area based on the
guidewords shown above. The hazards or threats will be identified assuming no
safeguarding or protective system is in place. Of each hazards/threats, the consequences
that may happen are considered as the worst case, where no safeguarding are
implemented.
5.1.3 Safeguards
Safeguards are inherent safety systems provided in the design facilities under HAZID to
prevent the escalation of a “threats/hazards” leading to “consequence” for a given keyword.
Systems or procedures which may prevent or reduce the potential for the deviation to
arise
Systems or procedures which are intended to mitigate the impact of an incident
Hazard prevention systems include design standards, operating procedures, fire
protection, etc. Mitigation systems include emergency systems such as gas detectors,
evacuation plans, emergency plans, etc.
During the HAZID the effectiveness of the installed or planned Safeguards are assessed
and, if deemed necessary, additional safeguards are decided upon in the form of Actions.
Hazard scenarios shall be risk ranked using the risk matrix, as shown on Attachment F. The
consequence severity of the hazard scenario is determined based on team’s experience /
judgment or consequence analysis results available to the study team. The consequence
severity shall be determined without considering available safeguards.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
The likelihood of the hazard scenario shall be determined considering available safeguards.
When estimating the likelihoods, care should be taken to verify that listed safeguards
genuinely reduce likelihoods.
The HAZOP Study will be carried out by a team of individuals with expertise in different
areas such as process, operation, and safety. Other engineers may be involved by on-call
basis.
A HAZOP is a systematic method of identifying hazards and operability problems that could
arise during the operation of a potentially hazardous process or system. The HAZOP
conducted with the participants from each phase of the lifecycle of the project, from the
designer, engineering, construction, operations with a facilitator to provide an independent
review of the system.
The technique is systematically applied to each node such that safety and operability
problems on the complete scope of study are eventually identified.
The HAZOP study is carried out in a group session involving a number of experts with
knowledge and experience of the process, equipment and operations, with brainstorming
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
each node by applying a number of basic Process Variable (parameter) and Guide Words,
as listed in Table 6.1.
Flow: Pipe blockage, leakage/rupture, valve fail open, defective check valve, operation
trip, etc;
Pressure: Fire case, low/high supply from source, etc;
Temperature: Fire case, high pressure, etc;
Level: Pipe blockage, valve fail open, etc;
Composition Change: Raindrop penetration, occurrence of other component;
Impurities: Scaling, etc;
Erosion/corrosion: Sour material in composition, etc;
Commissioning: Any incomplete procedure during commissioning, operator not
following SOP commissioning;
Start Up: Any incomplete procedure during start up process, operator not following SOP
start up;
Shut Down: Any incomplete procedure during shut down process, operator not following
SOP shut down;
Maintenance: Any incomplete procedure during maintenance, operator not following
SOP maintenance;
Testing/Sampling: Impurities, etc;
Miscellaneous: Any other issues that have not defined on the above
guidewords/process variables.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
The HAZOP will identify the causes for the deviation based on the guidewords shown in
Table 6.1. The causes will be identified assuming no safeguarding or protective system is in
place.
The consequences describe the impact of causes for the deviation that may be occurred
during operation.
5.2.3 Safeguards
Safeguards are inherent system provided in the system under HAZOP to prevent the
escalation of a “cause” event leading to “consequence” for a given keyword.
Systems or procedures which may prevent or reduce the potential for the deviation to
arise;
Systems or procedures which are intended to mitigate the impact of an incident.
Prevention systems include design standards, operating procedures, plant alarm and
trip systems, fire protection, etc.
Mitigation systems include emergency systems such as gas detectors, water spray
system, emergency shutdown system, alarm systems, evacuation plans, emergency
plans, etc.
During the HAZOP the effectiveness of the installed or planned Safeguards were assessed
and, if deemed necessary, additional safeguards were decided upon in the form of Actions.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
Hazard scenarios shall be risk ranked using the risk matrix, as shown on Attachment F. The
consequence severity of the hazard scenario is determined based on team’s experience /
judgment or consequence analysis results available to the study team. The consequence
severity shall be determined without considering available safeguards.
The likelihood of the hazard scenario shall be determined considering available safeguards.
When estimating the likelihoods, care should be taken to verify that listed safeguards
genuinely reduce likelihoods.
If the team judges that the engineering system and operating procedures are unlikely to cope
safely with the consequences of all deviations or that an operability feature requires
attention, and then a recommendation should be made. The Leader should have every
recommendation read out at the time it is raised in the session. The team members should
be obliged to reach consensus on it at the time. This is vital as many Leaders are in the habit
of rewording recommendations outside the review sessions without the input of the team
members at the time. This often results in a change of the essence of a recommendation.
The worksheets should be circulated to all team members for comments after the review
sessions.
The Leader should take particular care that the team does not fall into the trap of trying to
design the solution to all problems identified. If an obvious solution is apparent, it should be
recommended; otherwise the team should just identify the problem and recommend further
study to determine resolution.
For each guideword, the team considers whether there are realistic causes for that
guideword and whether the consequences are significant. The risks of each consequence
are assessed using a hazard ranking exercise to highlight the level of attention each hazard
requires. Each hazard is assigned a frequency of occurrence and a consequence severity.
The prioritization of HAZOP action items is of great value to Asset Management who may be
faced with addressing a large number of actions. As such, it is worth the Leader allowing the
team to take some time to reach consensus.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
The HAZID workshop was conducted at Meeting room in Hotel Grand Zuri Dumai, Jl. Jendral
Sudirman No.88, Bintan, Dumai Kota, Kota Dumai, Riau, Indonesia, 28812, on 22th
December 2017
The HAZID workshops were chaired and scribed by 3rd Party that appointed by KPE and
Approved by KSO. The workshop was attended by engineers and operation personnel from
Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. Members of the HAZOP/
HAZID Study Team present are listed in Attendance Sheet in Attachment A.
Technical documents such as drawings have been provided. Layouts drawing are used as
basis for developing HAZID “Area NODES” based on actual condition on site.
The process flow and understanding of the platforms processes are mainly based on the
description provided by engineers and operation personnel from Pembangunan Pipa Gas
Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. The marked up drawings used during the review
are attached in Attachment D and E. The drawings reviewed during the HAZID Workshop
are presented in following section.
The HAZID workshop was systematically considered all potential hazard scenarios
applicable for all phases/components of the design facility. Documents related are listed in
Table 6-1.
Node No Description
1 Duri Station
2 Pipeline Duri-Dumai
3 Dumai Station
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
The HAZOP workshop was conducted at Meeting room in Hotel Grand Zuri Dumai, Jl.
Jendral Sudirman No.88, Bintan, Dumai Kota, Kota Dumai, Riau, Indonesia, 28812, on 21th -
22th December 2017
The HAZOP workshops were chaired and scribed by 3rd Party that appointed by KPE and
Approved by KSO. The workshop was attended by engineers and operation personnel from
Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. Members of the HAZOP
Study Team present are listed in Attendance Sheet in Attachment A.
Technical documents such as drawings have been provided. The Piping and Instrumentation
drawings (P&ID) act as the basis for developing the HAZOP “NODES” and as the basis for
assessment of the potential undesirable hazardous situations and operational impacts
caused by the basic design and operational characteristics of the systems as designed.
The process flow and understanding of the platforms processes are mainly based on the
description provided by engineers and operation personnel from Pembangunan Pipa Gas
Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. The marked up drawings used during the review
are attached in Attachment D and E. The drawings reviewed during the HAZOP Workshop
are presented in following section.
The HAZOP was carried out on the process based on Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
(PIDs), and Heat and Material Balance (HMB). The documents related are listed in Table 6-3
Node No Description
Tie-in from TGI Facility (TP-DR1) to SDV & Pressure Control System
1 Duri to Pig Launcher at Duri Station
6 Condensate Drum
Fourty nine (49) HAZOP recommendation was generated during the HAZOP review.
Meanwhile, ten (10) HAZID recommendations arise from the workshop. The
recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the
process or improve the clarity of the process (P&ID’s) and layout drawings. Summary of the
number of recommendations raised for the HAZOP / HAZID reviews is presented in table
below,
# HAZOP # HAZID
Risk Ranking
Recommendation Recommendation
Fatal 4 8
Berat 8 1
Moderate 12 1
Rendah 25 -
49 10
The recommendation is to be followed up by the nominated party and closed out as soon as
possible. Action plans need to be developed and distributed to the responsible parties to
ensure that all of these recommendations are closed out.
Several changes/ corrections were recommended on the drawings and are directly marked
on the soft copy of the respective drawings/ SAFE Charts during the workshops; this shall
also be considered as a drawing comment recommendations and shall be considered for
implementation accordingly. These were not separately listed as recommendations as
agreed by the team members.
Total of fourty nine (49) recommendations that has been proposed during workshop was
shown in Table 8-2.
02-PV-001/002
stuck open or open
To confirm with vendor PV at gas
morethan required
5.2.1 38 metering package will keep flowrate to Rendah Pertagas
when on demand
customer
(02-PV-003 on
standy position)
6"-FW-DM-A01A-
Consider to install redundant fire water
040 line blocked or
8.1.1 47 supply connection Berat KPE
isolated during
maintenance
Ten (10) recommendation recommendations have been proposed by the HAZID team as
shown in Table 7-3.
Leak or rupture at Consider to install one pair OPGD between KPE &
1.1.1.2. 9 Fatal
Duri regulator area regulator and EDG & IA package KSO
All HAZOP/HAZID Nodes have been assessed successfully. The HAZOP/HAZID has found
total of 59 action items to be closed out by the KPE and KSO. This will need to be closed out
prior to commissioning the system.
As part of HAZOP/HAZID, a close out report completed with close out register, shall be
generated to ensure all items are duly closed out.
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT A -
ATTENDANCE LIST
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT B -
HAZID WORKSHEET
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT C -
HAZOP WORKSHEET
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT D -
HAZID DRAWING REVIEWED
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT E -
HAZOP DRAWING REVIEWED
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
ATTACHMENT F -
RISK MATRIX