The earliest surviving records of medieval principles of ethical conduct for lawyers concern the

advocates and proctors who appeared before the church courts. One very early record is a book
written in 1239 by William of Drogheda, an Oxford priest and lawyer, advising the reader how to be a
successful advocate. The text reveals something of an ironic disconnect between the ethical
standards of these two professions on the important subject of remuneration: the author
recommends that advocates should ensure payment in advance – 'Get your money while the patient
is ill.'

A number of other records date back to the late 14th and early 15th centuries and, while not
comprehensive, contain further examples both of the observance of the ethical standards of the time
and, indeed, of their breach.

High ethical standards were imposed by the canon law. Lawyers who practised before the church
courts were usually clerics who were literate, conversant in Norman French – the language of the
secular courts – and adequately trained in the law. They had to be free from 'infamia'. They were
obliged to take an annual oath requiring them to charge only moderate fees, to act without charge for
poor litigants and to deal honestly with all matters relating to their clients. They were entitled only to
accept cases which they believed were properly brought and they were not to make pleas which
they did not believe in their conscience to be right. Further, they were obliged to drop cases even
during their prosecution if they subsequently discovered them to be without foundation. They were
not to engage in conflicts of interest, or 'ambidexterity', sometimes described as 'playing on both
hands'. They were not to suborn witnesses unnecessarily to delay litigation or to make frivolous
appeals. Proctors were even required frequently to swear the oath of 'calumny' during the course of
the proceedings, vouching that their client was acting in good faith.

In practice, however, these early professional lawyers often charged substantial fees based on the
amount of work they were required to do and they regulated entry into their professions to ensure
that their practices remained sufficiently busy for their desired fee income to be achieved. There is
also evidence of judicial corruption, with lawyers acting as intermediaries between litigants and
judges, a practice which seems to have been fairly common until the 17th century.

There is surviving evidence, on the other hand, that the early lawyers occasionally acted for poor
litigants without taking any fee at all and that, in general, they did not seek to prolong litigation for
their own gain but frequently compromised claims rather than pursuing them in the church courts.
There is also surviving evidence which shows that medieval lawyers took seriously their duty to the
court not to take on unjust claims and were prepared to drop a 'causa desperate' if the injustice of a
case emerged during its prosecution. If a lawyer was uncertain as to the good faith of his client he
might refuse to swear the oath of calumny, effectively bringing the claim to an abrupt halt. Part 22 of
the modern Civil Procedure Rules, which requires statements of case to be verified by a statement
of truth, can be seen in some ways as a 21st century equivalent of the oath of calumny.
Statutory regulationThe earliest example of statutory regulation of the English legal profession,
emerging at the same time as the profession itself, is chapter 29 of the Statute of Westminster I
(1275), in which 'deceit or collusion' by early lawyers was forbidden in the king’s court. This statute
was introduced shortly after an inquest by Edward I had found substantial evidence of, among other
things, abusive litigation practices by court and royal officials, lawyers and litigants which were
having an adverse impact upon the judicial system.

Chapter 29 of the statute provided that '…if any Serjeant, Pleader or other, do any manner of Deceit
or Collusion in any King’s Court or consent in deceit of the Court or beguile the Court or the Party
and thereof be attainted, he shall be imprisoned for a year and a day from thenceforth shall not be
heard to plead in Court for any Man'. Prohibited behaviour included deception of the court or a party
and ranged from extortion, bribery and abuse of power to abusive litigation tactics such as
champerty, maintenance and barratry (habitually initiating, maintaining or vexatiously persisting in or
inciting litigation) through false statements in pleadings and antagonising judges. Indeed, so wide
was the discretion given to judges to regulate the conduct of lawyers that the statute was effectively
a general prohibition on misconduct by lawyers (even in some cases extending to professional
negligence) and breaches were punishable by imprisonment, fines and/or a prohibition upon further
pleading.

The London Ordinance of 1280 reflects a continuation of concern over standards of conduct by
lawyers, but also over controlling the number of lawyers in practice. The ordinance regulated the
admission of lawyers to practise in the City of London courts such that the serjeants and attorneys
probably had a monopoly on the right to practise in these courts. Although no doubt partially
motivated by self-interest, these early attempts to restrict competition appear to have been aimed at
assuring the competency of lawyers in the public interest.

The ordinance also prohibited lawyers from acting for both parties or acting for a party against a
former client in the same matter and ensured that a lawyer could not withdraw from proceedings
without the consent of the client. Breach of the ordinance was punishable mainly by temporary or
permanent suspension from practice. Very few records have been discovered of cases in which the
ordinance was applied, and those that exist relate to such diverse conduct as conflict of interests
and professional negligence. The former case was settled and in the latter case the sanction was
imprisonment.

A further ordinance, promulgated by Edward I in 1292, appears to have been introduced in response
to a perception of extensive misconduct by both lawyers and the judiciary. The ordinance placed the
supervision of lawyers practising in the king’s courts under the control of the king’s judges. The
same ordinance further regulated the admission of lawyers to practise by reference to minimum
standards of competence and was designed to reduce the number of practising lawyers to 'seven
times twenty', although ultimately the number of appointments was left to the discretion of the
justices and the number of 140 was quickly surpassed. The thinking behind this, as confirmed by
Edward I himself following the adoption of the ordinance, appears to have been that too many
lawyers would mean excessive litigation and that some lawyers could only survive through 'fraud and
malice'. The ordinance of 1292 was also the first time that a requirement was formally set out in
statute for lawyers to be able to prove their integrity.

There were further statutes in 1402 and 1455 designed to limit the number of practising attorneys
and to ensure that they were properly trained, competent and of good moral character. Again, these
interventions were in response to public complaints about excessive litigation resulting from
incitement to suit, incompetence and misconduct by lawyers.

A series of bills was presented to parliament during the 16th century intended to reduce the number
of lawyers and, with it, the number of frivolous suits. In 1606 parliament passed one such bill entitled
'An Acte to reforme the Multitudes and Misdemeanours of Attorneys and Solicitors at Lawe'. The
preamble to the act related that excessive and/or fictitious fees had been demanded by lawyers,
'whereby the subjectes growe to be overmuch burthened, and the practise of the juste and honest
sergeant and counsellor at lawe greatly slandered'. The act further provided that if any attorney or
solicitor should 'willingly delay his client’s suites to worke his own gaine', or if they were to demand
more in fees than had been initially indicated, he would be liable to an action for damages of up to
three times that value and could be discharged from practice. It also included provisions relating to
avoiding 'the infinite number' of solicitors and attorneys.