SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
1. SILVERIO VS SILVERIO 6. Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate
court having jurisdiction over properties
under administration has the authority not
only to approve any disposition or
conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized
sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
x x x It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void.
FACTS:
1. In 7 October 1987, Sr.’s wife Beatriz died
intestate and was survived by 6 heirs, Sr.,
Edmundo, Edgardo, Jr., Neilia and Ligaya.
This led the heirs to file an SP Proc. No. M-
2629 under Rule 74;
2. The Intestate Court (IC) first appointed
Edgardo as administrator. The latter withdrew
thru a motion in 3 November 1999 which then
caused the appointment of Sr. as new
administrator;
3. On 3 January 2005, IC replaced Sr. with Jr.
as administrator and denied the MR
challenging such order. Thus, IC granted Jr.’s
motion to take oath as administrator and
expunged Sr.’s inventor report;
4. On 12 December 2005, IC recalled the
Order granting letters of administration to Jr.
upon Sr.’s motion, but the same was reinstated
through Jr.’s motion for partial consideration
for Sr.’s alleged gross violation of his duties
and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court;
5. Sr. filed an MR while Nelia filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA, leading to the
reinstatement of Sr. as administrator due to
the declaration of nullity of certain portions of
the Orders, for which a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued and made the said
portions permanent;
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(Rule 45) before the SC challenging the CA
Order but the same was denied by SC for
failure to show sufficient reversible error. MR
for the same was likewise denied;
7. With Sr.’s urgent motion, IC reinstated Sr.
as administrator. This order was challenged in
the first of three petitions (Rule 45);
8. The second petition challenges the denial
of Jr.’s motion for inhibition of Judge Guanlao
(of IC) on the ground of the latter’s partiality
as he appeared once as counsel in the intestate
proceedings;
9. The third challenged order involves the
sale made by Jr. in favor of Citrine of a parcel
of land in Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati via
a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) executed on
16 October 2007. Another parcel of land in
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati was
sold to Ocampo in 16 September 2010, which
the latter sold to Zee2. Individual titles were
issued under the buyers’ names respectively;
10. Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA with prayer for injunction. A TRO was
issued on 5 February 2007, and later, a Writ of
Prelim. Injunction conditioned upon the
posting of a bond of Php 2,000,000.00;
11. Nelia initially paid the said bond but
failed to comply with the other requirements
of A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. CA Ordered Nelia to
comply and increased the bond to Php
10,000,000.00 which the latter did;
12. However, with the issuance of the order
reinstating Sr. as administrator (see Fact No. 5),
Sr. sought for a TRO/Pre. Prohibitory
Injunction v. Jr., Ocampo and Citrine and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act
that would affect the titles issued in their
names. Likewise, Sr. sought the IC to declare
the DOAS executed as null and void. IC
granted said motions;
13. Jr. filed a consolidated petition for
certiorari before the CA challenging the
reinstatement of Sr. as administrator, the
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
denial of Jr.’s motion for inhibition, and the
declaration of nullity of the DOAS. CA denied
the first 2 but granted the latter, thereby
reversing IC’s declaration of nullity. Hence,
the instant petition (Rule 45).
ISSUES: WON the CA erred in reversing the
IC’s declaration that the DOAS and the titles
issued to buyers are null and void.
PROVISION: RULING + RATIO: No. The
CA was correct in reversing the IC Decision.
·
In reversing the IC, CA relied on Jr.’s
arguments that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction pertained only to the
portion of Sr.’s reinstatement as administrator.
It ruled:
x x x In reversing the intestate court’s order
annulling the sale of the subject properties, the
CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact
that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect.
It then concluded that the eventual decision in
the latter case making the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent only with respect to the
appointment of petitioner as administrator and not
to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue
of whether the sale was executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect. x x x
x x x The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the
testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale
of the three properties in question was not declared
by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null
and void. x x x
x x x While it is true that petitioner was
eventually reinstated as Administrator
pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari
filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree with the
CA that the permanent injunction issued
under the said decision, as explicitly stated in
its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the
October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding
the grant of letters of administration to and
taking of an oath of administration by
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respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA
would have expressly set aside as well the
directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing
the sale of the subject properties. Moreover,
the CA Decision attained finality only on
February 11, 2011 when this Court denied
with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion
for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
Resolution denying his petition for review
(G.R. No. 185619).
2. SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS
FACTS: The instant case involves the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December
14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He
had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City
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On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo's place of
residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married
to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994; Linda
invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal
On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee
was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo's legitimate children.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998
ISSUE: whether or not the venue was
properly laid
RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death.
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Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature - residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary.
There is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. However,
for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules
of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence
in one place and domicile in another.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed
in the Regional Trial Court which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa.
3. AGTARAP VS AGTARAP
FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on
November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any
known debts or obligations. Joaquin
contracted two marriages during his lifetime,
with Lucia Garcia (Lucia) and with Caridad
Garcia (Caridad) respectively. Joaquin and
Lucia, who died on April 24, 1924, had three
children—Jesus (died without issue),
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children,
namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin
married Caridad on February 9, 1926 and also
had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and
Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile).
At the time of his death, Joaquin left two
parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255).
Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been
leasing and improving the said realties and
had been appropriating for himself P26, 000.00
per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator
and was granted by the probate court, issuing
him with letters of administrator. Joseph,
Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two
subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership
of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s
death in April 1924, they became the pro
indiviso owners of the subject properties. They
said that their residence was built with the
exclusive money of their late father Jose, and
the expenses of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while
the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was
built with the exclusive money of Joseph and
his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of
Partition, holding that considering that the
bulk of the estate properties were acquired
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during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No.
(38255) which showed on its face that
decedent was married to Caridad Garcia,
which fact oppositors failed to contradict by
evidence other than their negative allegations,
the greater part of the estate is perforce
accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared
that the real estate properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It
also directed the modification of the October
23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct
sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo
and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. The
CA settled, together with the settlement of the
estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros.
Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the
intestate proceedings despite the fact that a
proceeding was conducted in another court for
the probate of the will of Milagros,
bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever shares
that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate.
CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties
subject of this case belong to the first marriage
of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the
certificates of title were registered in the name
of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to")
Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an
intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is
vested with the power and authority to
determine questions of ownership.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As
held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate
or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)

estate and which are claimed to belong to 4. SUNTAY III VS COJUANGCO-

outside parties, not by virtue of any right of SUNTAY
inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died
All that the said court could do as regards said intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived
properties is to determine whether or not they by her spouse, Federico and five
should be included in the inventory of grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
properties to be administered by the including respondent Isabel; and two
administrator. If there is no dispute, there illegitimate grandchildren, including
poses no problem, but if there is, then the petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
parties, the administrator, and the opposing Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio
parties have to resort to an ordinary action I) who predeceased.
before a court exercising general jurisdiction
for a final determination of the conflicting Federico Cristina
claims of title.
Emilio 1 Isabel Cojuangco
However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and Emilio III Nenita Emilio II Margarita Isabel
convenience. Illegitimate Legitimate

First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply
to the instant case considering that the parties
are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution
of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate
of Joaquin.
In 1965, the marriage between Emilio I and
Isabel Cojuancgo was declared null and void
by a judicial decree. The illegitimate children
grew up with Grandparents Federico and
Cristina. The legitimates were raised by their
mother, Isabel Cojuangco.
In 1993, after Cristina’s death, Federico
adopted his two illegitimate grandchildren.
In 1995, Isabel filed for an application for letter
of administration. Federico opposed in that he
is the nearest of kin and the application did
not include the two illegitimates as heirs.
Federico prayed that he be appointed as
administrator or Emilio III in his stead.
In November of 2000, Federico died. Emilio III
was appointed as administrator in 2001. On
appeal, the appointment was revoked and
Isabel was appointed administrator.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Emilio III
and Isabel were appointed as co-
administrators. Isabel filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Who between Isabel and Emilio III is
better qualified as administrator.

5
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
RULING: Partially Granted. Letter of
Administration is issued solely to Isabel.
FACTS:
The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is
the same consideration which Section 6, Rule
78 takes into account in establishing the order
of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale
behind the rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. Mere
demonstration of interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested
person to co-administration thereof. Neither
does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator.
In this case, both parties have interest to the
estate and are heirs of the decedent. Emilio III
was reared by the decent and was nominated
by Federico as the administrator. On the other
hand, Isabel grew apart from the decedent and
became only interested with the estate upon
her grandmother’s death.
However, Emilio III showed incompetence in
administering the properties. He failed to
provide for a complete inventory of the
properties as required by the court. He
likewise committed fraud in transferring the
properties to different names. With this, the
court sees that Isabel Emilio III is unfit to
administer the estate.
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5. LEE VS RTC OF QC
 Rafael and Jose Ortaez were
appointed by the RTC of QS as the
joint special administrators of their
fathers estate. As special
administrators they submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father
which included, among other
properties, shares of stock in
Philippine International Life Insurance
Company (Philinterlife)
 During its pendency, the decedent’s
wife claiming that she owned some
shares of stock as her conjugal share in
the estate, sold said shares in favor of
herein petitioner Filipino Loan
Assistance Group (FLAG), likewise,
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez
acting in his personal capacity also
sold the remaining shares of stocks as
his inheritance share in the estate in
favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
 After being appointed as Special
Administratix, private respondent
Enderes filed a motion to declare void
ab initio the deeds of sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock, which
was opposed by Special Administrator
Jose Ortaez.
 Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion
for the approval of the deeds of sale of
the Philinterlife shares of stock but it
was denied by the intestate court.
 Petitioners Lee and Aggabao (officers
of the Philinterlife) subsequently filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, alleging that the
intestate court gravely abused its
discretion in (1) declaring that the
ownership of FLAG over the
Philinterlife shares of stock was null
and void and (2) ordering the
execution of its order declaring such
nullity.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
ISSUE (1): WON the intestate court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or want of jurisdiction in declaring that
the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife
shares of stock was null and void.
HELD (1): NO.
The jurisprudence is clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending
final adjudication requires court approval and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to
annul the unauthorized disposition. In a
prevailing jurisprudence, an heir can only
alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by
the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees
shall have been given their shares. This means
that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific
property therein. In the present case, Juliana
Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties
of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This
they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause
the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case.
ISSUE (2): WON the intestate or probate court
can execute an order nullifying the invalid
sale?
HELD (2): YES
The intestate court has the power to execute its
order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property,
otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized
or fraudulent disposition of estate property
would be meaningless. Enforcement is a
necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate
courts power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the
dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.
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In this case, the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale was affirmed by the
appellate courts. The finality of the decision of
the Supreme Court was entered in the book of
entry of judgments on February 23, 1999.
Considering the finality of the order of the
intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed
by the appellate courts, it was correct for
private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of
execution and for the intestate court to grant
it.
6. HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ VS
EDMOND RUIZ
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only
son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of
Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his
heirs substantial cash, personal and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor
of his estate.
Hilario Ruiz died for unknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take
any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
Four years after the testator's death, private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes filed
before the RTC, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under
undue influence.
One of the properties of the estate — the house
and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV,
Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline— was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to
third persons.
The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit
with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
deposit and payments totaling P540, 000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle
Verde property. In compliance, Edmond
turned over the amount of P348, 583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after
deducting P191, 416.14 for repair and
maintenance expenses on the estate.
Edmond moved for the release of P50, 000.00
to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7, 722.00.
The probate court admitted the will to probate
and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,
000.00.
Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the
release of the rent payments deposited with
the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion. Montes prayed for the
release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the
testator's properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions
of the holographic will.
The probate court ordered the release of the
rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the
properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon
the filing of a bond of P50, 000.00. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: Whether the probate court, after
admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate's debts and obligations,
has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance
from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the
release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to
grant possession of all properties of the estate
to the executor of the will.
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HELD 1: On the matter of allowance, Section 3
of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The
widow and minor or incapacitated children of
a deceased person, during the settlement of
the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
Petitioner contends that the testator's three
granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated
and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. In addition,
the provision expressly states "children" of the
deceased which excludes the latter's
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under
Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 188of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testator's death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse
and children, regardless of their age, civil
status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the
estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not
entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to "widow and children" and
does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's
order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
HELD 2: Respondent courts also erred when
they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to
properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only
under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special
proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending
controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle
the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of
the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among
the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with
the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only
be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance
to the widow, and estate tax have been paid;
or (2) before payment of said obligations only
if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs, or when provision is
made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered
the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
left no debts when he died but the taxes on his
estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the
rule requires that the distributees post a bond
or make such provisions as to meet the said
tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time
the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
9
HELD 3: Still and all, petitioner cannot
correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of
all the real and personal properties of the
estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration, "Section 3 of Rule 84 of the
Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole
estate to pay debts and to administer estate not
willed. — An executor or administrator shall
have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal
estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court
that petitioner had deposited with it only a
portion of the one-year rental income from the
Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not
deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of
the lease. Neither did he render an accounting
of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of
ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned. As executor,
he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The
funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds
and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself
and possess all his parents' properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and
personal properties of the deceased, rendering
a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are
subject to a determination by the court as to
their veracity, propriety and justness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated
December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are
affirmed with the modification that those
portions of the order granting an allowance to
the testator's grandchildren and ordering the
release of the titles to the private respondents
upon notice to creditors are annulled and set
aside.
7. UNION BANK VS SANTIBANEZ
FACTS: The deceased, Efraim Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement with First
Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) for
the payment of Agricultural Tractors. Efraim
died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of
Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate. In the
meantime, FCCC assigned all its assets and
liabilities to petitioner Union Bank. Demand
letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund,
but the latter refused to pay. Thus, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, before
the RTC of Makati City. Union Bank asserts
that the obligation of the deceased had passed
to his legitimate heirs.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should
have been filed with the probate court before
which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibañez was pending.
HELD: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that a
probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered. The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation
and distribution of the estate.
The filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. This requirement is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to
10
determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of
the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs.
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
FACTS: Elise Quiazon is the daughter of
Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma.
Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate,
Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married,
together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife
by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s
death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of
Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las
Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the
proper venue.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be
administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in
the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
now Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13 Even where the statute
uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or
11
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have
one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue
for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident
from the records that during his lifetime,
Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be
benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate,
is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is
just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
9. PILAPIL VS HEIRS OF MAXIMINO
R. BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late
Donata Ortiz-Briones, consisting of her
surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila;
Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
other nephews and nieces of Donata.
Respondents are the heirs of the late
Maximino Briones, composed of his nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, in representation of the deceased
siblings of Maximino.
Maximino was married to Donata but their
union did not produce any children. When
Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husband’s estate,
which appointed Donata as the administratrix
of Maximino’s estate. Donata died. Erlinda
instituted a petition for the administration of
the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her
husband, Gregorio, were appointed as
administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed
for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino, which was initially
granted. The trial court also issued an order,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals from
Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio
filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the
Order, claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wife’s
administration as part of the intestate estate of
Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration
for the intestate estate of Maximino was
subsequently set aside by the RTC.
The heirs of Maximino filed a complaint
against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of
the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her
name the real properties belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino. Furthermore, the
facts show that after Donata’s death, Erlinda
took possession of the real properties, and
continued to manage the same and collect the
rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently,
Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real properties, in
exclusion of all others, which must have
already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if
12
they truly believed that they still had rights
thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May
1952. They even attended his wake. They did
not offer any explanation as to why they had
waited 33 years from Maximino’s death before
one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After
learning that the intestate estate of Maximino
was already settled in a special proceeding,
they waited another two years, before
instituting, on 3 March 1987, a complaint for
partition, annulment and recovery of the real
property belonging to the estate of Maximino.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents’ right to
recover possession of the disputed properties,
based on implied trust, is also barred by
laches.
HELD: Yes. Respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based
on implied trust, is also barred by laches.
Considering the circumstances in the afore-
quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents’
conduct before this Court, particularly the
belated submission of evidence and argument
of new issues, respondents are consistently
displaying a penchant for delayed action,
without any proffered reason or justification
for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those
who are vigilant and diligent and not those
who sleep when the law requires them to act.
The law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he must show
that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid
failings.
10. SABIDONG VS SOLAS
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s
mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a
parcel of land, designated as Lot 11 originally
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo
City. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-
half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate
(Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by PriscilaSaplagio. Lot 11 was the
subject of an ejectment suit filed by the
Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No.
14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. On
May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said
case ordering the defendant to immediately
vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and
to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees,
expenses and costs. At the time, respondent
was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3,
Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent
submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment
Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the
Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in
view of an application to purchase already
filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line
with the policy of the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual occupants in awarding
approval of Offers". While the check for initial
down payment tendered by respondent was
returned to him, he was nevertheless informed
that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11
and that if he could put up a sufficient down
payment, the Estate could immediately
endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so
that the property can be awarded to him
"should the occupant fail to avail of the
priority given to them."
The following day, respondent again
submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an
area of 234 square meters for the amount of
P35,100. Under the Order issuedby the probate
court (RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special
Proceedings No. 1672, respondent’s Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the
court’s observation that the occupants of the
subject lots "have not manifested their desire
to purchase the lots they are occupying up to
this date and considering time restraint and
considering further, that the sales in favor of
the x xxofferors are most beneficial to the
estate x xx". The probate court issued another
Order granting respondent’s motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor.
13
The writ of possession over Lot 11 was
eventually issued. Consequently, TCT No. T-
11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT
No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was
issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the
sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court
employee respondent cannot buy property in
litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in
good faith), commit deception, dishonesty,
oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Court Administrator Benipayo issued an
Evaluation and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of violating Article 1491 of
the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the
purchase by certain court officers of property
and rights in litigation within their
jurisdiction.
On September 10, 2007, respondent
compulsorily retired from service. Eventually,
the case was assigned to Judge Roger B.
Patricio, the new EJ of the Iloilo City RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and
Recommendation finding respondent liable
for grave misconduct and dishonesty under or
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
The Court noted Judge Patricio’s Investigation
Report and referred the same to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Then
Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
respondent liable for serious and grave
misconduct and dishonesty and recommended
the forfeiture of respondent’s salary for six
months, which shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether Clerk of Court Solas violated
the rule on disqualification to purchase
property in litigation
HELD: NO. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the
Civil Code prohibits court officers such as
clerks of court from acquiring property
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or
territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
Article 1491. The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is
that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved,
i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and
the peculiar control exercised by these
persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to
prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to
give occasion for fraud, which is what can and
must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased
Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision
in Civil Case No. 14706 which was
promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long
become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be
said that the property is no longer "in
litigation" at that time considering that it was
part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the
14
judge. A property forming part of the estate
under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court
issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is
that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled
to receive the same. Since there is no evidence
to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of
Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November
21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of
Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate
the rule on disqualification to purchase
property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not
MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11. ARANAS VS MERCADO
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died
intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita),
and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria
Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by
his first marriage, namely: respondent
Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M.
Aranas (Thelma). Emigdio inherited and
acquired real properties during his lifetime.
He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu
Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu
Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty. Thelma
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The
RTC granted the petition considering that
there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an
inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She
indicated in the inventory that at the time of
his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties
but only personal properties" worth P6,
675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,
141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,
000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15, 000.00;
44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth
P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25. Claiming that
Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding
it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of
January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory
with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by
Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory.
The RTC issued an order expressing the need
for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to
resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of
the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory. The RTC
issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should
be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of
inventory and orders the said administratrix
to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed
the administratrix to render an account of her
15
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio
S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio,
timely sought the reconsideration of the order
of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of
the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold
to Mervir Realty, On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the
inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No.
3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of
53,301 square meters subject matter of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9,
1989 and the various parcels of land subject
matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the
revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion
of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: No.
The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous. WHEREFORE,
the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on May 15, 2002;
REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in
Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled
Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado,
Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the
case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.
RATIO: The probate court is authorized to
determine the issue of ownership of properties
for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only
be provisional unless the interested parties are
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and
willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the
RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the
duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant
to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be
returned within three months. - Within three
(3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the deceased which
has come into his possession or knowledge. In
the appraisement of such estate, the court may
order one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra,
demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory. However, the word all is qualified
by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that
the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase
true inventory implies that no properties
16
appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person
or entity. The objective of the Rules of Court in
requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in
revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator,
and in malting a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide
discretion on the question of what properties
should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that
of the RTC on the issue of which properties are
to be included or excluded from the inventory
in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion,"
for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts
should not interfere with or attempt to replace
the action taken by them, unless it be shown
that there has been a positive abuse of
discretion." As long as the RTC commits no
patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. There is no
dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court
as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate but are
claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised.
As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap: The
general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate court or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.
The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings,
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there
poses no problem, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction
for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title. However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience. The probate
court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership
in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be
prepared and submitted for the important
purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article
1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse,
17
herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he (or
she) may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account
of the partition."
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the
decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be
heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the
final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir."
Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate
court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by
authorizing it to direct the inclusion of
properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous
title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should
be excluded from or included in the inventory
of estate properties was well within the
authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination,
the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it
was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were
known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of
the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse
of discretion means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
12. BUTIONG VS PLAZO
FACTS: In 1989, Pedro Riñoza died intestate,
leaving several heirs, including his children
with his first wife, who are also the
respondents in this case; (Ma. Gracia and Ma.
Fe). Pedro also left several properties
including a resort and a family home both
located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
The respondents alleged that in 1991, their co-
heirs - Pedro's second wife Benita, and other
children had sold the subject properties to the
petitioner spouses, Francisco Villafria and
Maria Butiong without their knowledge and
consent. The spouses are now deceased and
substituted by their son, Ruel.
They confronted Benita about the sale, and she
acknowledged the same, showing a document,
she believed to be as a receipt of her share in
the sale. However, said document did not
refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro (decedent) and Benita from
a bank. The document actually evidenced
receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of
P87, 352.62 releasing Pedro and Benita's
indebtedness therefrom.
Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no
record of any sale transaction involving the
subject properties, giving them certified true
copies of the titles to the same. When
respondents went to the subject properties,
they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in
the resort had been demolished. They were
not able to enter as the premises were
padlocked.
Respondents learned that in July 1991, a notice
of an extrajudicial settlement of estate of their
late father was published in a tabloid called
"Balita". Because of this, respondents caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the
subject properties before the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying,
among others, for the annulment of all
18
documents conveying the subject properties to
the petitioners and certificates of title issued to
them.
Petitioners denied the allegations of the
complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco
contended that what they purchased was only
the resort. He also presented an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations
and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides
that respondents' co-heirs sold the family
home to a certain spouses Bondoc for P1M as
well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the
resort to petitioners for P650K.
In 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of
the subject properties to petitioners (Butiong;
Villafria) and the spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners; as well as the
circumstances surrounding the execution of
the same. The Extrajudicial Settlement was
notarized by a notary public who was not duly
commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the
date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro
Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the
document was not signed. Also, both
documents were never presented to the Office
of the Register of Deeds for registration and
that the titles to the subject properties were
still in the names of Pedro and his second wife
Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and
buyers of the subject properties were not even
presented as witnesses who supposedly
witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance. On the basis
thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondents. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
ruling which was grounded on the premise
that the complaining heirs are insisting that
the settlement of the family home and the
resort deed are void as their signatures
thereon are forgeries as opposed to the
Villafrias who profess the deeds'
enforceability. And that after the complaining
heirs presented proofs in support of their
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
claim that their signatures were forged, the
burden then fell upon the Villafrias to
disprove the same, or conversely, to prove the
authenticity and due execution of the said
deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
The Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a)
the notary public who purportedly notarized
the questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses
who appeared in the instruments as
eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to
prove the authenticity and genuineness of all
the signatures appearing on the said
instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper
foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity
and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a prerequisite to its
admission, was prudently observed by the
lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement of the family home and the resort
deeds as their veracity are doubtful.
Aggrieved, Ruel then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration raising the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction. He alleged that when the
Complaint for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession was filed, there was yet no
settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as
to the nature thereof, nor was there an
identification of the number of legitimate
heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the
settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its
ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was
for Judicial Partition. Considering that the
instant action is really one for settlement of
intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely
in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of
forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner
argued that said ruling is void and has no
effect for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint
filed by respondents was captioned as
"Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession," the allegations
therein show that the cause of action is
actually one for settlement of estate of
19
decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement
of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by
a probate court of limited jurisdiction while
judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general
jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it
was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.
This is in view of the prohibition found in the
Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and
ordinary civil actions. Thus, petitioner argued
that the ruling of the trial court is void and has
no effect for having been rendered in without
jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised
before the appellate court that since the
finding of forgery relates only to the signature
of respondents and not to their co-heirs who
assented to the conveyance, the transaction
should be considered valid as to them.
Petitioner also denies the findings of the courts
below that his parents are builders in bad faith
for they only took possession of the subject
properties after the execution of the transfer
documents and after they paid the
consideration on the sale.
The Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed reversible
error in not ruling that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Pedro and the civil action for annulment of
title of the heirs and third persons in one
proceeding
RULING: NO.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of
respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of
their interests thereon, may fall under an
action for settlement of estate. However, a
complete reading of the complaint would
readily show that, based on the nature of the
suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery
of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. — If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he
may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filled in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an
extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending
action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously
with and as a condition precedent to the filing
of the public instrument, or stipulation in the
action for partition, or of the affidavit in the
office of the register of deeds, a bond with the
said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent
to the value of the personal property involved
as certified to under oath by the parties
concerned and conditioned upon the payment
of any just claim that may be filed under
section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within
two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
20
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court provides:
RULE 69
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of
real estate. — A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so
as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and
an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the
property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing
provisions, the allegations of respondents in
their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real
estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1)
that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents,
together with their co-heirs, are all of legal
age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs
enumerated are the only known heirs of
Pedro; (4) that there is an account and
description of all real properties left by Pedro;
(5) that Pedro's estate has no known
indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as
rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for
the partition of the same in accordance with
the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
based on the allegations of the complaint, the
case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying
the heirs of the decedent, properties of the
estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of
estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that
when a person dies intestate, or, if testate,
failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required
by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the
competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)

exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the
heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no
debts due from his estate, may divide the
estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action for partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying
for the appointment of an administrator by the
court. The reason is that where the deceased
dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for them
and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately
entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the
complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro
died without a will, leaving his estate without
any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner's contention, respondents were
under no legal obligation to submit me subject
properties of the estate to a special proceeding
for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in
fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially.
age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court.
It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing
an action for judicial partition instead of a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate
as the same is expressly permitted by law.
That the complaint contained allegations
inherent in an action for settlement of estate
does not mean that there was a prohibited
joinder of causes of action for questions as to
the estate's properties as well as a
determination of the heirs, their status as such,
and the nature and extent of their titles to the
estate, may also be properly ventilated in
partition proceedings alone.
--- END OF MIDTERMS ---

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of

Court, however, does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no" debts or obligations,
if they do not desire to resort for good reasons
to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate
among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even
if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if
the heirs have good reasons for not resorting
to an action for partition. Where' partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a

person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of aiza/2017

21