Journal of the Operational Research Society (2009) 60, 441 --460 © 2009 Operational Research Society Ltd.

Ltd. All rights reserved. 0160-5682/09

www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/

The history and ideas of critical rationalism:

the philosophy of Karl Popper and its
implications for OR
RJ Ormerod∗
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Critical rationalism is the philosophy developed by Karl Popper during the middle of the 20th century. Popper’s
approach is based on the naturalistic idea that society has developed through a process of solving problems
using trial and error. The natural and social sciences have been born out of such problem solving and progressed
by subjecting potential theories to vigorous testing and criticism. Falsified theories are rejected. Popper calls
for a society which is conducive to such problem solving, a society which permits bold theorizing followed
by unfettered criticism, a society in which there is a genuine possibility of change in the light of criticism: an
open society. Popper’s ideas provide a doorway for accessing philosophical ideas and debates relevant to OR.
For some such as Boothroyd it has proved inspirational, for others such as Ulrich it has provided a critical
point of departure.
Journal of the Operational Research Society (2009) 60, 441 – 460. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602573
Published online 5 March 2008

Keywords: philosophy of OR; history of ideas; critical rationalism

Introduction demarcation problem, but it also provided a productive

perspective from which to view the activities of science
This is the third in a series of papers that describe the history
generally. His approach attracted both interest and criticism.
and ideas of major intellectual movements and explore
Do scientists in practice abandon their theories when faced
their relevance for OR today. The first paper took as its
with falsifying evidence? On what basis should the evidence
subject pragmatism (Ormerod, 2006), the second Marxism
of falsification be accepted? If the most we can do in science
(Ormerod, 2008). Critical rationalism is the philosophy of
is to disprove theories, how do we know which theories to
the Anglo-Austrian philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994).
believe and act on? (O’Hear, 1995a, p 702).
Popper made major contributions in two distinct (but in
The themes of human ignorance and the need for critical
Popper’s mind linked) areas of philosophy, the philosophy of
scrutiny of ideas are also prominent in Popper’s social and
science and the philosophy of sociology and politics. In his
political philosophy. He advocated the development of an
early works he was associated with, but not a member of, the
‘open society’ the key feature of which was the freedom
Vienna Circle (see below) and shared their interest in distin-
of those affected by policies to voice their criticisms and
guishing between science and other activities (the demarca-
to be able peacefully and regularly to change their rulers.
tion problem). However, he did not think it was possible to
He attacked those who claimed the right to impose their
approach that (or any other philosophical problem) by an
blueprints on the rest of us by virtue of a supposed knowl-
analysis of language or meaning. This set him outside the
edge of the course of history (historicism). His analysis of
main stream of philosophy at that time, analytic philosophy,
the origins and ideas of ideological totalitarian regimes (both
which was in the thrall of the linguistic analysis of Ludwig
fascist and communist) were published at the end of World
Wittgenstein (1889–1951).
War II just as the two great power blocks, representing on
Popper, following a sceptical approach, took ‘falsifica-
the one side free-market liberal democracy and on the other
tion’ as the distinguishing characteristic of science: universal
centrally planned communism, began to enter the next great
theories are never verified or confirmed with any positive
struggle, the Cold War.
probability, they can only be falsified. Popper showed how
Popper’s major work on the philosophy of science, Logik
this perspective not only solved the ‘problem of induction’,
der Forschung (Popper, 1934), was published in English 25
originally identified by David Hume (1711–1776), and the
years later as The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper, 1959).
∗ Correspondence: RJ Ormerod, 26 Coulsdon Road, Sidmouth, Devon His books on political philosophy, The Poverty of Histori-
EX10 9JP, UK. cism (Popper, 1944/5) and The Open Society and its Enemies
E-mail: richard@rormerod.freeserve.co.uk (Popper, 1945a, b), were published at the end of the war.
442 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
Conjectures and Refutations (Popper, 1963) brings together
various essays and lectures on the theme that we can learn
by our mistakes. In Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary
Approach (Popper, 1972), Popper addresses the arguments
of his critics and outlines his overall philosophy. The three
volumes of the Postscript, originally intended to be appen-
dices to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, were extended and
finally published in the early 1980s (Popper, 1982a, b, 1983).
Key extracts from his major works can be found in The Pocket
Popper (Miller, 1983). A brief but authoritative summary
of Popper’s ideas can be found in Popper (Magee, 1973).
Unended Quest (Popper, 1976a) is what Popper describes as
an intellectual autobiography; it includes an extensive bibli-
ography of his published works. This biography is included
in Schilpp (1974), which also contains 33 critical essays and
Popper’s responses. Summaries and evaluations of Popper’s
life and works can be found in O’Hear (1980), Magee (1985),
Williams (1989), Shearmur (1996), Corvi (1997), Hacohen
(2000), and Notturno (2003). In Popper’s final book, The
Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Ratio-
nality (Popper, 1994), he says that his work has been aimed
at defending rationality and rational criticism as a way of
thinking and even a way of living: a readiness to listen to
critical arguments, to search for one’s own mistakes, and to
learn from them.
After a biographical sketch in the next section, a brief
historical context of Popper’s life and work is given. The
cornerstone of Popper’s thinking, his logic of scientific
discovery, is then summarized and the consequent controversy
initiated by Thomas Kuhn is described. The next section sets
outs Popper’s views on social and political science (including
his attack on historicism and his advocacy of the open
society) and gives an account of the subsequent dispute with
Theodor Adorno. In the final section describing Popper’s
views, his evolutionary account of epistemology (how we
know things) is briefly described. The next section looks
at the absorption of Popper’s ideas by operational research
(OR). It considers the approaches of Boothroyd and Ulrich,
both of whom have made use of Popper’s philosophy in
their quest to describe, provide foundations for and improve
professional practice; Dando and Bennett’s suggestion that a
Kuhnian revolution was underway in OR is examined; and the
approach of Jackson is viewed from a Popperian perspective.
Finally some suggestions are made as to how a productive
relationship between Popper’s philosophy and OR can be
achieved.
Karl Raimund Popper
Karl Popper was born in Vienna in 1902. His father was a
practising lawyer and a historian. His mother was musical and
at one point he considered a career in music. Both Popper’s
parents were born in the Jewish faith, but were baptized into
the Protestant (Lutheran) Church before their children were
born. Popper read his first book on socialism at the age of 12,
and it made a great impression on him (Popper, 1976a, p 13).
As a young man he was a socialist and for a brief period, at
the age of 17, he regarded himself as a communist. However,
a violent incident in Vienna instigated by Marxists led him
to turn against it. Nevertheless, as in all large European cities
the sight of abject poverty could not be avoided even by
the reasonably well off. Popper came to believe that nothing
was more important than the eradication of poverty (Popper,
1976a, p 12).
At University Popper studied a wide range of subjects. He
then qualified to teach in primary schools and later to teach
mathematics, physics and chemistry in secondary schools.
Remarkably, at the same time he was apprenticed to be a
cabinet maker, completing his apprenticeship in 1924. As
there were no teaching posts available he became a social
worker, working with neglected children (Popper, 1976a,
pp 39–41). Popper’s PhD was initially meant to be about
psychology, but he became disillusioned with it and placed
the emphasis on method rather than psychology itself; he had
concluded that the study of logic should have priority over
the study of subjective thought processes. (Popper, 1976a,
pp 77–78). He obtained his PhD in 1928 and, after a period of
researching and writing, in 1930 he married and settled down
to school teaching. Late in 1934 his Logik der Forschung was
published. The main outline of the The Poverty of Histori-
cism was completed in 1935 and read as a paper in 1936.
Finally, in 1937 at the age of 35, he became a full time
philosopher.
On publication, the Logik der Forschung was widely
reviewed and debated. As war approached and the future of
those of Jewish origin started to look threatened in Austria,
his reputation allowed him to obtain a lecturing post in New
Zealand. While there he wrote The Open Society and its
Enemies. It was published in two volumes in 1945. In 1946
Popper took up a post at the London School of Economics in
the school of social sciences where he continued to develop
and defend his ideas.
The historical context
Europe between the wars
After World War I the Austro-Hungarian Empire was broken
up and Austria was created out of the main German-speaking
areas. The war left Austria economically and politically
unstable and after a brief respite factions from the right
and left fought for ascendancy. In 1934 the ruling Christian
Socialist Party was displaced by The Popular Front, which
established a one-party fascist regime. At the same time
much of Europe was also succumbing to fascism. Mussolini
gradually turned the liberal democracy of Italy into a fascist
totalitarian state. Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain were
heavily influenced by Italy’s example. Under the impact of
worldwide economic depression and 6 million unemployed,
the electorate in Germany swung to the right. In 1933 Hitler
was appointed Chancellor. In a series of manoeuvres the

democratic Weimer republic was replaced by a one-party
dictatorship. In 1935 the so-called Nuremberg race laws were
passed directed at Jewish citizens. In Spain civil war broke
out in 1936. Backed by Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s
Italy the Nationalists under Franco were victorious in 1939.
In Russia, after the successful Bolshevik revolution in
October 1917, the communist regime under Lenin, faced with
an enormous country savaged by war and anarchy, struggled
to develop a system to bring about the socialism of Marx’s
vision. In 1922 Lenin began his ‘new economic policy’ of
limited free enterprise before entering the era of giant state
planning. On Lenin’s death in 1924 Stalin introduced a series
of five-year plans and brutally eliminated all potential oppo-
sition. Across Europe between the wars different types of
government, various attitudes to those of Jewish origin, and
struggles between left and right were continuously on display
as each nation attempted to recover from World War I and
overcome the effects of the global depression. None of this
was lost on Popper.
Vienna
Up to the end of World War I, Vienna was the capital of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Popper grew up there at a time
when it was not only a political centre of great power but
was also a vibrant world centre for the arts and sciences, a
cauldron of intellectual endeavour and creative activity. As an
imperial capital at its zenith Vienna ruled over Hungarians,
Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Galicians, Slovenes, Serbs
and Croats, and Austrians. Of course, it was not just a closed
community at the centre of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
it was also part of the wider German-speaking culture. Nor
was this Germanic culture isolated within Europe. Interac-
tion with the French and English-speaking worlds ensured an
exchange of ideas and intellectuals. Vienna University was a
flourishing seat of independent learning with an international
reputation.
The new uncertainties of science
Just as Kant felt he had to derive a philosophical framework
that accounted for the logic of Aristotle, Euclidian geom-
etry and Newton’s physics of space and time, philosophers of
science in the first half of the 20th century had to wrestle with
the revolution in physics. The work of James Clerk Maxwell,
Heisenberg, Max Planck, Niels Bohr and above all Albert
Einstein overthrew the long standing deterministic equations
of Newtonian physics, replacing them by the probabilistic,
relativistic equations of quantum mechanics and relativity
theory. Newton’s laws, which had for many years been the
exemplar of science’s ability to provide a reliable foundation
of scientific knowledge and had been verified in numerous
and varied experiments and technical applications, had been
overturned. The epistemology of science needed rethinking to
account for the fact that theories, however well established,
may in turn be superseded. Nothing was now certain. Despite
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 443
this, science continued to move forward confidently with ever
more and deeper insights as well as technical and commer-
cial successes. This needed to be explained. Another major
issue was the status of the psychological pursuits of Freud
(psychoanalysis), Adler (individual psychology) and others.
Since the enlightenment, science had fought a long battle to
separate the rational and empirical truths of scientific inquiry
from the revealed truth of religion. Were these new subjects
part of science or merely new dogmatisms?
The need for a framework for economics and sociology
During the latter half of the 19th century the British school
of economics of the late 18th century and early 19th century
was dominant. This British tradition (based on the objective-
cost and labour-productivity theory of value) ultimately led
to the rise of the Marxist doctrine of capitalist exploita-
tion. This way of thinking received its first serious chal-
lenge when the Principles of Economics by Carl Menger
(1840–1921) was published in 1871. Menger spelt out the
subjective basis of economic value, and explained for the
first time the theory of marginal utility. The approach of
the Austrian School of economists, which developed from
Menger’s ideas, was based on the decisions of individuals;
this brought them into direct conflict (known as the Method-
enstreit or methodological dispute) with the German Histor-
ical School, which attributed market development to histor-
ical social forces. FA Hayek (1899–1992), a collaborator and
friend of Popper, was the best-known advocate of the Austrian
School’s ideas in the English speaking world. The Austrian
School needed support for their methodological approach.
They found it in Popper’s philosophy.
Another heated controversy was the Werturteilsstreit or
value-judgement dispute. The conflict started in earnest in
1909 at a meeting in Vienna (Max Weber was a key partici-
pant). The issue was whether sociology should concern itself
solely with ‘what is’ rather than ‘what should be’? What is
the role of values, can they be empirically determined? Can
science itself be value free? (Frisby, 1976, pp xxiii–xxiv). In
the 1960s Popper became the focus in another round of this
dispute, this time referred to (misleadingly) as the Positivis-
musstreit (positivist dispute) (Adorno, 1969, 1976).
The philosophical landscape
Arguably Betrand Russell (1872–1970) dominated Western
philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century. From the
time of Descartes in the 17th century, the central branch of
philosophy had been epistemology, the study of what we can
know. British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) were
among those who followed this tradition. But after Russell
epistemology was displaced by the philosophy of language
and the premise that our words are the lenses through which
we access our thoughts and the world (Edmonds and Eidinow,
2001, pp 174–175). Russell took his approach to language
from his attempt (with Whitehead) to put mathematics on a
444 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
sound logical footing. He applied the same rigorous use of
logical techniques to philosophical problems which took the
form of linguistic statements (Sainsbury, 1995, p 782).
In time, Russell came to be overshadowed by his student
Wittgenstein who applied Russell’s approach in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. This work influenced the Vienna Circle
and a group in Berlin led by Reichenbach (1891–1953); it
was the mainspring, sometimes through misunderstanding,
of their ‘logical positivism’ (Hacker, 1995, p 912). Analytic
philosophy, derived from the work of Russell and the early
Wittgenstein, came to dominate British philosophy. Linguistic
philosophy, derived from the later Wittgenstein (given defini-
tive expression in his masterpiece Philosophical Investiga-
tions), increasingly prevailed in most of the English-speaking
world from 1945 until about 1960 (Quinton, 1995, p 29).
Popper was on the edge of the Vienna Circle and interacted
with members of it. He shared their interest in the nature
of science. However, he was a critic and was never invited
to join. He was partly instrumental in its eventual demise.
Another group, the Frankfurt School led by Max Horkheimer
(1895–1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), played no
part in the formative years of the development of Popper’s
thinking but did come into conflict with him in the Positivis-
musstreit referred to above. Jürgen Habermas played a promi-
nent role in this dispute.
The logic of scientific discovery
Popper first formed his key idea of falsification at the age
of 17. He was concerned about the problem of demarcation,
which he formulated as: how can science be separated from
pseudo-science? It was only later that he extended his ‘crite-
rion of demarcation’ to metaphysics. He had been shocked by
the fact that the Marxists (whose central claim was that they
were social scientists) and the psychoanalysts of all schools
seemed able to interpret any conceivable event as a verifica-
tion of their theories. In Unended Quest he says: ‘My main
idea in 1919 was this. If somebody proposed a scientific theory
he should answer, as Einstein did, the question: “Under what
conditions would I admit that my theory is untenable?” In
other words, what conceivable facts would I accept as refuta-
tions or falsifications, of my theory?’ (Popper, 1976a, p 41).
But it was not until he qualified as a teacher at the age of 29
that he realised the significance of his earlier ideas:
. . . my earlier ideas fell into place. I understood why the
mistaken theory of science which had ruled since Bacon—that
the natural sciences were the inductive sciences, and that
induction was a process of establishing or justifying theo-
ries by repeated observations or experiments—was so deeply
entrenched. The reason was that scientists had to demarcate
their activities from pseudoscience as well as from theology
and metaphysics, and they had taken over from Bacon the
inductive method as their criterion of demarcation. (On the
other hand, they were anxious to justify their theories by an
appeal to sources of knowledge comparable in reliability to the
sources of religion.) But I had held in my hands for many years
a better criterion of demarcation: testability or falsifiability.
(Popper, 1976a, p 79)
Meaning and truth
Popper rejected the idea that philosophy should try to establish
the meaning of language (essentialism). Such pursuits would
always lead to an infinite regress: the meaning of the words
used to describe the meaning of the words under scrutiny
would have to be defined. Rather than having any essence, he
saw words as simply convenient shorthand for some longer
description of a phenomenon. Thus Popper felt that philoso-
phies of meaning and language were unimportant (Popper,
1976a, pp 20–22). Rather he took the view that: ‘In matters of
the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theo-
ries, or theories which come near to the truth—at any rate
nearer than some other (competing) theory, for example an
older one’ (Popper, 1976a, p 22). Popper therefore determined
to address the traditional philosophical problem of what is it
that we can know (epistemology), particularly in the light of
the upheavals in physics and his doubts about the status of
psychological theories such as those of Freud and Adler. This
line of thinking went against that of Wittgenstein; Wittgen-
stein taught that the task of philosophers was to untangle
linguistic puzzles. Surprisingly, the two Austrian Jews from
Vienna, who had both emigrated to Britain, only ever met
once; this was the famous poker incident in Cambridge in
1946 (Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001).
Falsification and demarcation
The results of his investigation into epistemology were
published in Logik der Forschung (Popper, 1934). The book
was devoted to two problems, the problem of induction and
the problem of demarcation, and their interaction. It was
meant to provide a theory of knowledge and, at the same
time, to be a treatise on method, the method of science
(Popper, 1976a, p 85). His approach was to replace induc-
tion by falsification. It is important to recognize this was a
decision, a decision going beyond rational argument: ‘My
criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded
as a proposal for an agreement or convention’ (Popper, 1959,
p 37, original emphasis). He concludes, ‘There is only one
way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support
of my proposals. This is to analyse their logical conse-
quences: to point out their fertility—their power to elucidate
the problems of the theory of knowledge’ (Popper, 1959,
p 38, original emphasis).
On falsification, the key point is that universal theories
cannot be induced from singular statements as induction
would have it (from many observations of white swans it
cannot be concluded that ‘all swans are white’). However,
the situation is asymmetric: universal theories may be refuted
by singular statements (the observation of a black swan)
(Popper, 1976a, p 86). It follows that hypotheses cannot be

verified as envisaged by the method of induction. (If to date
only white swans have been observed, another observation
of a white swan does not verify or increase the probability
of the statement that ‘all swans are white’.)
On demarcation, the logical positivists held that any
statements, which could not be assessed either by appeal
to empirical evidence (synthetically true or false) or by
appeal to the meaning of words and the grammatical struc-
ture that constitutes them (analytically true or false), were
meaningless; this included metaphysical, religious, aesthetic,
and ethical claims. (Fotion, 1995, p 507). Popper instead
held that these claims were by his definition not scientific,
but they were far from meaningless. What is intellectually
disreputable is pseudo-science, which arises when holders of
an empirical theory refuse to be deflected by observational
disproof or where a supposed scientific theory never makes
any predictions (O’Hear, 1995a, p 702). Popper held that non-
science was crucial to the pre-science process of developing
hypotheses; for instance, the idea of all matter consisting of
atoms was hypothesised (by Leucippus and Democritus in the
fifth century BC) long before it could be empirically tested.
The problem of ad hoc hypotheses and basic statements
Popper observed that when faced with falsifying evidence, it
was always possible that the purveyor of an incorrect theory
or a pseudo-science could react by adding ad hoc an auxiliary
hypothesis or by changing ad hoc a definition to their ‘law’
rather than discarding it. For instance, the discovery of black
swan-like birds in Australia could lead to the classification
of a new type of bird or to a change in the theory to exclude
swans in the Southern Hemisphere, leaving the original asser-
tion of whiteness intact. Of course, the addition of ad hoc
qualifiers might in practice be an improvement for predic-
tive purposes, but the aim of science is to discover universal
laws; every added ad hoc hypothesis weakens this prospect.
The aim therefore, to be adopted as a convention, is to falsify
hypotheses rather than to use ad hoc additions to bolster them
up (Popper, 1959, p 43).
The other reaction to falsifying evidence is to reject the
evidence, arguing perhaps that the conditions were wrong,
the experimenters were incompetent, or that some deliberate
attempt to deceive was involved. Perhaps repetitions of the
experiment by different researchers in different laboratories
could clear up the disagreement; but to conclude that falsi-
fying observations had been verified is itself an inductive
statement. Thus the soundness or otherwise of basic or what
are sometimes called protocol statements (statements of the
empirical evidence) needs to be established. Popper’s solu-
tion was to accept that all basic statements are falsifiable but
at any time it is necessary to take a decision as to whether
a basic statement is to be accepted or not; it is the job of
scientists to decide. These basic statements are then used to
sort hypotheses into those that for the time being are accepted
as true (have yet to be falsified), and those that are taken to
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 445
be false (have failed a test according to accepted basic state-
ments). The sorting is, of course, undertaken by scientists and
scientists are humans subject to prejudices, biases and errors
(to this extent idealism is right). It is through the involvement
of a community of scientists exercising their critical facul-
ties that objectivity can be sought. As Popper puts it: ‘But to
obtain objectivity we cannot rely on the empty mind: objec-
tivity rests on criticism, on critical discussion, and on the crit-
ical examination of experiments’ (Popper, 1983, p 84). Thus
prejudice, biases and errors are driven out (thus in the end
realism is right).
Defence against induction and psychologism
To defend his position Popper has to ensure that induction
does not creep back in and he attempts to identify and expose
the presence of induction in his opponents’ arguments (his
opponents similarly try to find evidence of induction in his
arguments). He also needs to keep out any argument that
involved ‘psychologism’, anything that results in speculation
about sensations or beliefs: he has built his castle from logic
not psychological speculation. He argues that the then current
almost universal belief in inductive logic was largely due to
a confusion of psychological problems with epistemological
ones (Popper, 1959, p 30). To avoid psychologism (individual
psychological judgements or beliefs) Popper suggests that the
objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can
be inter-subjectively tested (Popper, 1959, p 44). To be inter-
subjectively testable they must always have the character of
universal statements (Popper, 1959, p 45n).
One particularly difficult problem Popper faced was how
to deal with laws couched in terms of probabilities: could
probabilities avoid psychologism? Almost half of Logic is
concerned with probabilities. There are two issues: (i) how
can a hypothesis, which predicts an event will occur with a
given probability, be falsified by empirical evidence, and (ii)
whether a more frequently tested hypothesis is more probable
than one that has been little tested? The first issue Popper
refers to as the probability of events; the second, the proba-
bility of hypotheses, he considers under the heading of corrob-
oration (Popper, 1959, p 146).
The probability of events
Probabilities were central to the new physics based on
quantum mechanics. Popper claimed that physicists used
probability without providing a satisfactory consistent defi-
nition of it. He split the task into two: (i) to provide new
foundations for the calculus of probability and (ii) to eluci-
date the relations between probability and experience, or the
problem of decidability. To help clarify quantum mechanics
he needed an interpretation that was physical and objective,
yielded probability hypotheses which could be statistically
tested, could be applicable to single cases, and are relative to
the experimental setup (Popper, 1976a, p 95). All subjective
interpretations of probability, those that treat the degree of
446 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
probability as a measure of the degree of certainty or uncer-
tainty, must be resisted (the Bayesian approach was a partic-
ular target of attack). These can be recognized by expressions
such as ‘expectation’, ‘error’ and ‘belief’. Initially Popper
preferred a frequency interpretation. However, in Logic he
says that he had subsequently decided to replace this with
an objective interpretation in terms of propensity (Popper,
1959, p 147n). This change is explained and developed in the
Postscript (Popper, 1983, pp 394–401). The propensity inter-
pretation is, he suggests, that of classical statistical mechanics
(Popper, 1983, p 398). In Volumes II and III of the Postscript
he again applies his approach to quantum mechanics (Popper,
1982a, b). A review of Popper’s contribution to the philos-
ophy of probability can be found in Gillies (1995).
The problem of decidability is more distinctively method-
ological: probability hypotheses do not rule out anything
observable; logically therefore such statements cannot be
falsified. However, Popper had to accept that a physicist is
usually quite able to decide whether he may for the time
being accept some probability hypothesis as ‘empirically
confirmed’, or whether he ought to reject it as ‘practically
falsified’, that is, useless for the purposes of prediction
(Popper, 1959, pp 189–190).
Corroboration
If the principle of induction is untenable and hypotheses
cannot be verified, what can be said? If we cannot prove some-
thing is true or false, can we say it is more or less probable?
Popper suggests that instead of assessing the ‘probability’ of
a hypothesis we should try to assess what tests, what trials, it
has withstood; that is, we should try to assess how far it has
been able to prove its fitness to survive by standing up to tests;
how far has it been corroborated (Popper, 1959, p 251); how
far has it ‘proved its mettle’ under fire? Given a theory and
some accepted basic statements (data), the theory is corrob-
orated if these basic statements do not contradict the theory,
and it does this with due regard to the degree of testability of
the theory, and the severity of the tests to which the theory
has been subjected up to a stated point in time. Corrobora-
tion should not be equated to truth as it is time dependent:
it depends on the basic statements that have been obtained
up to a particular time. In contrast the pragmatists proposed
to define truth in terms of the success of a theory—thus of
its usefulness, or of its confirmation or of its corroboration
(Popper, 1959, pp 266–276).
Using aspects of the theory of the truth of sentences devel-
oped by the Polish mathematician Alfred Tarski (1902–1983),
Popper developed his concept of verisimilitude. Verisimili-
tude reflects the degree to which the hypothesis corresponds
to the truth defined in terms of its content (which will contain
both true and false consequences). A theory which has some
false consequences may thus be retained because it has greater
verisimilitude than competing theories. Any judgement about
verisimilitude will, of course, be fallible and the evidence
of truth or falsity may at any time itself be falsified (Tarski,
1956; Popper, 1972, pp 44–60).
The conduct of science
Popper was not the first philosopher to suggest that scien-
tific knowledge was fallible, the pragmatists, for instance,
were equally adamant on this point (Popper points out the
amoeba also proceeds by trial and error); but he was the
first to suggest that fallibility could provide solutions to the
problems of induction and demarcation. Having established
his new perspective he then turned to how science should be
conducted:
Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, state-
ments; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a
state of finality. Our science is not knowledge (episteme): it
can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for
it, such as probability [episteme is the old scientific ideal of
absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge]. Yet science has
more than mere biological survival value. It is not only a useful
instrument. Although it can attain neither truth nor probability,
the striving for knowledge and the search for truth are still the
strongest motivation of scientific discovery. We do not know:
we can only guess. And our guesses are guided by the unsci-
entific, the metaphysical (though biologically explicable) faith
in laws, in regularities that we can uncover—discover. Like
Bacon, we might describe our own contemporary science—‘the
method of reasoning which men now ordinarily apply to nature’
as consisting of ‘anticipations, rash and premature’ and of
‘prejudices’ (Bacon, 1620). But these marvellously and bold
conjectures or ‘anticipations’ of ours are carefully and soberly
controlled by systematic tests. Once put forward, none of our
‘anticipations’ are dogmatically upheld. Our method of research
is not to defend them, in order to prove how right we were.
On the contrary, we try to overthrow them. (Popper, 1959,
pp 278–279, original emphasis).
Popper’s ideas on the conduct of science contradicted the
then current belief of scientists that they were engaged in a
cumulative exercise of establishing the truth about the nature
of the world. Nevertheless, in Popper’s new perspective they
found a compelling account of the logic of science in the
light of the revolution they had been experiencing in physics.
Furthermore, Popper’s model of bold conjectures and discrim-
inating tests is one they found they could fruitfully bring to
bear on their research programmes. Eminent scientists in the
second half of the 20th century came to regard Popper as
the greatest living philosopher of science (Magee, 1973, p 9).
Popper’s emphasis on falsification seemed to come as some-
thing of a relief to scientists—they no longer had to hold on
to the scientific laws that they had come to believe or even
perhaps had themselves established; as Einstein said: ‘No
fairer destiny could be allotted to any physical theory than
itself point out the way to introducing a more comprehensive
theory in which it lives as a limited case’ (Albert Einstein
quoted in Popper, 1983, p 131).

Criticism of Popper’s approach to scientific discovery
Despite the positive response of scientists, Popper’s theories
on the logic of scientific inquiry came under attack from
philosophers, sociologists and historians of science from the
word go. Much of the philosophical criticism centred on the
logical implications of his formulation. He rebutted these
vigorously. However, he ran into most difficulty on the soci-
ological/historical question of how scientists actually went
about their business. The debate, initiated by Kuhn, attracted
Lakatos, Feyerabend and others. Published only three years
after Popper’s Logic, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962) is credited with being one
of the most influential books of the 20th century. Fuller
explains why the book achieved rapid prominence, ‘Structure
received appreciatively critical reviews by those interested in
reviving the fortunes of the American national philosophy,
pragmatism, which had been eclipsed by logical positivism.
. . . Kuhn’s focus on science as a mode of experience was
credited with having reintroduced a “human” dimension to
science that had been the hallmark of pragmatism . . . .’ (Fuller,
2003, p 30)
In Structure, Kuhn suggested that scientific endeavour can
be characterized by periods of ‘normal’ science interspersed
infrequently with revolutions. During the period of normal
science, work is carried out under a particular paradigm that
determines how the domain is understood, what theoretical
and methodological beliefs are taken for granted, what types
of problems are addressed, what types of experiments are
conducted, what types of measurements are made and so on.
If an unexpected result is obtained it is treated as an anomaly,
perhaps the experimenter did something wrong, perhaps some
adjustment to some aspect is required. It is very difficult for
scientists to shift paradigms in the middle of their career;
as a consequence they may spend their whole career in one
paradigm. At some point a new way of looking at things is
suggested and a period of extraordinary, exploratory research
identifies and develops a new paradigm. Particularly younger
scientists and scientists new to the field, unencumbered with
past commitments, start to adopt the new paradigm because it
is thought to be productive in solving some of the problems of
the existing paradigm. Symptoms of a transition from normal
to extraordinary research may include the proliferation of
competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the
expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy
and debate over fundamentals. Once a transition is underway
the older schools gradually disappear. ‘To be accepted as a
paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors,
but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts
with which it can be confronted’ (Kuhn, 1962, p 18). It is
very difficult to compare two paradigms because of their
incommensurability: proponents of competing paradigms
fail to make complete contact with each other’s viewpoints
(Kuhn, 1962, p 148). Kuhn is explicit that the new paradigm
is not necessarily closer to the truth than the old: ‘We may,
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 447
to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit
or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and
those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth.’
(Kuhn, 1962, p 170). Kuhn had produced an evolutionary
view of science, not so much an evolution-towards-what-we-
wish-to-know, rather an evolution-from-what-we-do-know
(Kuhn, 1962, p 171). He rejected any emphasis on falsifica-
tion rather than verification. When confronted by anomalies
scientists do not renounce the paradigm that led them into
the crisis: ‘No process yet disclosed by the historical study
of scientific development at all resembles the methodological
stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature’
(Kuhn, 1962, p 77).
The only time that Popper and Kuhn met was at a collo-
quium held in 1965 in London. A session, chaired by Popper,
was dedicated to discussing Kuhn’s ideas. The papers given
(together with some that were not) and a response from Kuhn
were published in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
(Lakatos and Musgrove, 1970). A recurrent theme was the
existence, nature and role of what Kuhn had labelled normal
science as opposed to revolutionary science. The critics
tended to disparage Kuhn’s normal science as boring and
dull, conducted by hacks and in any case ill-defined, with
the transition to exploratory science based on some sort of
vague mystical intuition (ideology). Kuhn was able to show
that his perspective, based in the first instance on careful
historical observation, was no less logical, nor more ideo-
logical than Popper’s perspective, based in the first instance,
on logic. He accepted that Popper’s approach (scientists
should try at all times to be a critic and a proliferator of
alternate theories) was appropriate for revolutionary periods
but he urged ‘the desirability of an alternative strategy which
reserves such behaviour for special occasions’ (Kuhn, 1970,
p 243). He argues that once a new theory (a new frame-
work or paradigm) is in hand ‘the time for steady criticism
and theory proliferation has passed’ (p 246). In such a case
‘practitioners of mature sciences are freed to explore nature
to an esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable’ (p
247). It is these productive periods of normal science that
distinguish science from other intellectual activities (such
as philosophy which is continuously in critical mode) and
accounts for its very success. Ultimately anomalies will alert
scientists that there is a crisis looming and it is time for
them to become Popperian critics. Thus the Kuhnian model
is an extension to the Popper model rather than an outright
rejection of it. Kuhn’s paper in Lakatos and Musgrove
(1970) cemented his reputation as an insightful and subtle
commentator on science. However, Kuhn is clear that his
observations and interpretation are not simply a contribution
to the history of science; rather, he is providing normative
guidance as to how science should be taught, conducted and
organized.
Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), an LSE colleague of Popper,
is generally depicted as coming into the debate on Popper’s
side. The starting point of Lakatos’ work was not that
448 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
knowledge existed but that it grows. The growth of knowledge
provides a demarcation between ‘rational’ activity and ‘irra-
tionalism’. Whereas the logical positivist Carnap had argued
that a good reason for a hypothesis is high probability in the
light of evidence and Popper had offered his conjectures and
refutations, Lakatos suggested examining and sorting past
sequences of theories to see whether they are degenerating
or progressive. A degenerating programme is one that grad-
ually becomes closed in on itself with auxiliary hypotheses
continually being added to deal with counterexamples.
Progressive programmes respond to new examples with
strong new predictions, some of which turn out to be right.
Despite their differences Lakatos continued to keep Popper’s
hypothetico-deductive reasoning at the centre of his own
ideas (Lakatos, 1970, 1981; Hacking, 1981).
Feyerabend, a student of Popper’s, attacked Lakatos for
following the pragmatist CS Peirce (1839–1914) in replacing
truth by method. In Against Method (Feyerabend, 1975) he
based his arguments on both historical analysis of scien-
tific discovery and, very importantly, its cultural context. He
concluded that ‘the events, procedures and results that consti-
tute the sciences have no common structure . . . Successful
research does not obey general standards; it relies now on one
trick, now on another . . . there can be many different kinds
of science’ (Feyerabend, 1975, pp 1–2). The approaches of
Kuhn (based on paradigms) and Lakatos (based on research
programmes) both take a historical approach. Larry Laudan
in his Progress and its Problems (1977) developed a third
such approach based on research traditions. Laudan argued
that scientists may accept or reject theories, but they may also
pursue them, entertain them and take a range of cognitive
stances. He observed that there are always co-existent rivals
and conceptual debates: it was difficult to find any lengthy
period of normal science in the history of any science in the
last 300 years.
Newton-Smith (1981) held that people are generally
rational in their own terms, but scientists have a narrower
requirement to be scientifically rational. Sometimes scien-
tists will yield to different interests and act in a scientifically
non-rational way. However, the success of science suggests
that scientists generally act in a scientifically rational way
because he or she believes that there is a general interest in
doing so. However, the way scientists form their beliefs and
adopt (scientifically or personally rational) goals is something
that can be the subject of research. This says Newton-Smith,
a philosopher, is the proper role of sociologists, a prospect
that earlier had not appealed to Popper (Popper, 1970, pp
57–58). In fact, sociologists, psychologists, historians, and
others (including those from the newer fields of cultural
studies, literary theory and science studies) needed no second
bidding: the stable door had already been opened by Kuhn in
the 1960s. The open warfare between critics and defenders
of science has raged to this day (Sardar, 2000). These attacks
draw their strength from the observation and interpretation
of actual practice.
Social and political science
Historicism
The question of what methods or methodological approach
to adopt in the social sciences is the subject of The Poverty
of Historicism (Popper, 1944/5). Popper defines ‘historicism’
as ‘an approach to the social sciences which assumes that
historical prediction is the principal aim, and which assumes
that this aim is attainable by discovering the “rhythms” or the
“patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” that underlie the evolu-
tion of history’ (Popper, 1944/5, p 3). The person Popper most
closely associates with historicism is the German sociologist
Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), one of the founders of the ‘soci-
ology of knowledge’. Historicism claims that the methods of
physics cannot be applied to the social sciences. The laws of
social life differ in different places and periods; they depend
on a particular historical situation. Apart from trivial truisms
(for instance, human beings always live in groups) there are
no long-run uniformities in society on which long-term gener-
alizations could be based. A method which ignores this limi-
tation and attempts to generalise will implicitly assume regu-
larities are everlasting (Popper, 1944/5, pp 5–8).
Historicists argue that social science runs into all sorts
of difficulties if it tries to use the experimental methods of
physics. Artificial controls and conditions, which allow the
reproduction of similar conditions, eliminate precisely those
factors in sociology which are most important. Large-scale
experiments are never experiments in the physical sense: they
are not made to advance knowledge as such, but to achieve
political success. Moreover, their very performance changes
the conditions of society; they can never be repeated under
precisely similar conditions. Even the observer is changed
by the experience of observing, habits are formed, learning
occurs; an observer has a history. According to historicism,
society also experiences and learns and it too has a history;
traditions and traditional loyalties and resentments, trust and
distrust, could not otherwise play their important role in social
history. In the world of physics nothing can happen that is
truly and intrinsically new; whatever is invented can always
be analysed into the components parts. Social newness, like
biological newness, is an intrinsic sort of newness, a newness
irreducible to its component parts: real novelty is always
emerging. Historicism concludes that nothing is of greater
moment than the emergence of really new periods or stages
in history, each of which differs intrinsically from any other
(Popper, 1944/5, pp 8–11).
There are other methodological difficulties with social anal-
ysis. Social life is a natural phenomenon that presupposes
the mental life of individuals (psychology), which presup-
poses biology, which presupposes chemistry and physics. The
factors involved are therefore complex. Predictions may influ-
ence people’s behaviour; for instance, they may act to prevent
an unwelcome event. Most historicists believe that there is
an even deeper reason why the methods of physical science
cannot be applied to the social sciences, namely the holistic

character of social groups. They argue that the social group
is more that the mere sum total of its members; a group can
retain much of its original character even if all of its original
members are replaced by others. If we wish to understand
and explain a group and perhaps foresee its future develop-
ment, we must study its history, its traditions, institutions and
rites. In contrast, we do not need to know the history of the
solar system (the age of the planets, for instance) to project
its behaviour (Popper, 1944/5, pp 11–19).
A methodological doctrine, which is very closely related to
historicism, is that the proper method of the social sciences is
based on an intimate understanding of social phenomena, an
intuitive understanding. According to this doctrine, physics
aims at causal explanation, whereas sociology aims at an
understanding of purpose and meaning. This is why physics
operates with inductive generalizations whereas sociology can
only operate with the help of sympathetic imagination; soci-
ology must be content with the intuitive understanding of
unique events, and of the role they play in particular situ-
ations; events occur within particular struggles of interests,
tendencies, and destinies. A sociological method must be
holistic in character: it must aim at determining the role played
by the event within a complex structure—within a whole
which comprises not only contemporaneous parts but also the
successive stages of temporal development. This approach
tends to rely on the analogy between an organism and a group,
and it tends to operate with ideas such as that of a mind or
spirit of an age (Popper, 1944/5, pp 19–24).
Despite all the difficulties of making sociological predic-
tions with any detail or precision, historicism argues that
it is possible to make long-term, large-scale predictions
whose vagueness is balanced by their scope and signifi-
cance. Although vague, the qualitative terms of social science
(‘culture clash’, ‘prosperity’, ‘solidarity’, ‘urbanization’,
‘utility’) provide a certain richness and comprehensiveness of
meaning. Large-scale forecasts are the only forecasts worth
attempting and the only observational source for such fore-
casts is history: in fact sociology is theoretical history. Histor-
ical forces, whether spiritual (eg ethical ideas) or material
(eg economic interests), are of fundamental importance. To
analyse, to disentangle this thicket of conflicting tendencies
and forces and to penetrate to its roots, to the universal driving
forces and laws of social change, this is the task of the social
sciences as seen by historicism. To be generally valid, real
social laws would have to apply to the whole of human history
covering all its periods. But for all the reasons noted above
there can be no social uniformities that hold good beyond
a single period. Thus the only universally valid laws must
be those that link up the successive periods. Sociology thus
becomes an attempt to solve the problem of foretelling the
future, not so much the future of the individual as that of the
group, and of the human race. Sociological study should help
to reveal the political future, and it should become the fore-
most instrument of far-sighted practical politics for politicians
with a sense of social destiny (Popper, 1944/5, pp 35–41).
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 449
Historicists argue that attempts to use sociology to support
planned change (of the type OR might attempt) are doomed.
Such micro-analysis, which is blind to the macro-analysis
of the laws of development, could never form the basis for
realistic constructions. A plan based on social facts cannot
account for new features in any new period with its own
intrinsic novelty. Scientific reasoning in the social domain
can only be used to tell us the direction activity must take
if it is to coincide with the direction of impending changes.
Activists can help bring about the inevitable changes (the
midwife theory of activism). The changes cannot be brought
about by reason but only by harsh necessity. To this end the
most reasonable thing to do is to adjust one’s system of values
so as to make it conform with the impending changes (Popper,
1944/5, pp 42–54). Table 1 summarizes Popper’s depiction of
the historicists approach to natural and social science.
Piecemeal engineering
In the preface to the Poverty of Historicism, Popper offers the
following refutation of historicism:
1. The course of human history is strongly influenced by the
growth of human knowledge.
2. We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the
future growth of our scientific knowledge.
3. We cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human
history.
4. This means that we must reject the possibility of a theoretical
history: that is to say, of a historical social science that would
correspond to theoretical physics. There can be no scientific
theory of historical prediction.
5. The fundamental aim of historicist methods is therefore
misconceived (Popper, 1944/5, pp vi–vii, original emphasis).
The decisive step in this argument is statement 2. It says that
if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we
cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow.
In his Postscript Popper offers a logical proof; no society can
predict, scientifically, its own future state of knowledge.
The main text of Poverty attacks historicism on prac-
tical rather than logical grounds: Popper chooses to call his
preferred approach ‘piecemeal engineering’. In doing so he
is trying to avoid the terms ‘social technology’ or ‘social
engineering’, which might be associated with the social blue
prints of the collectivist planners. He suggests that ‘piecemeal
engineering’, or ‘piecemeal tinkering’ combined with critical
analysis, is the main way to achieve practical results in the
social as well as the natural sciences; the approach to both
should be based on trial and error. He is in effect advocating
continuance of the classic approach to the social sciences,
which had largely developed out of criticism of proposals for
social improvement, or in other words whether or not some
particular economic or political action is likely to produce
an expected or desired result. The emphasis on a practical
technological approach gives rise to theoretical questions
which set the agenda for theoretical speculation and force
450 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
Table 1 Popper’s depiction of induction and historicism
Science
Focus of Interest Natural World
Objective of Analysis Universal laws
Method of Analysis Induction
Experimental verification
Change Creation Physical engineering
Verified laws
Actors International community
of scientists
us to submit our theories to definite standards of clarity and
practical testability (Popper, 1944/5, pp 58–59). Piecemeal
engineering can address such questions as, whether you can
introduce agricultural tariffs and at the same time reduce the
cost of living, or whether you can have a centrally planned
society with a price system that fulfils the main functions of
competitive prices, or whether you can make a successful
revolution if the ruling class is not weakened by internal
dissension or defeat in war. Piecemeal social engineering
resembles physical engineering in regarding ends as beyond
the province of technology. (All that technology may say
about ends is whether or not they are compatible with each
other or realizable.) In this it differs from historicism, which
regards the ends of human activities as dependent on histor-
ical forces and so within its province.
The task of piecemeal social engineers is to design social
institutions (private and public, from corner shop to an educa-
tional system), and to reconstruct and run those already in
existence. They recognize that only a minority of social insti-
tutions are consciously designed while the vast majority have
just ‘grown’ as the undesigned results of human actions. They
will look at institutions from a ‘functional’ or ‘instrumental’
point of view, as machines to achieve certain ends rather
than as organisms. Piecemeal engineers do not believe in
re-designing society as a whole. Whatever the ends, they try
to achieve them by small adjustments and re-adjustments. The
ends may be of diverse kinds, for example, the accumulation
of wealth or of power by certain individuals, or by certain
groups; or the distribution of wealth and power; or the protec-
tion of certain ‘rights’ of individuals or groups. Thus public or
political social engineering may have the most diverse tenden-
cies, totalitarian as well as liberal. The piecemeal engineer
knows, like Socrates, how little he knows. He knows that we
can learn only by our mistakes (Popper, 1944/5, pp 64–67).
Popper contrasts piecemeal engineering with Utopian engi-
neering. Holistic or Utopian social engineering is never of a
‘private’ but always of a ‘public’ character; it aims at remod-
elling the whole of society in accordance with a definite plan
or blueprint. He associates historicism, holism and Utopi-
anism with fascism and Marxism; all are dissatisfied with
piecemeal engineering and muddling through. According
Social Science
Society as a whole
Universal laws
(stages/changes)
Historicism
(historical analysis/holism/Utopianism)
Midwife activism
Utopian engineering of social
arrangements (laws, institutions etc)
Intuitive social scientists
Leaders/Planners
to Mannheim, the aim is to seize the key positions and to
extend the power of the state until the state becomes nearly
identical with society. Popper argues that the greater the
holistic changes attempted, the greater are their unintended
and largely unexpected repercussions. In practice, the holists
always fall back on a somewhat haphazard and clumsy appli-
cation of what is essentially a piecemeal method, but without
its cautious and self-critical character. While the piecemeal
engineers can attack their problem with an open mind as to
the scope of the reform, the holists cannot do this; they have
decided beforehand that a complete reconstruction is possible
and necessary. Any resistance to large scale change needs to
be suppressed, leaving little room for discussion, admission
of errors and learning. On the other hand in the piecemeal
approach ‘a systematic fight against definite wrongs, against
concrete forms of injustice or exploitation, and avoidable
suffering such as poverty or unemployment, is a very different
thing from the attempt to realize a distant ideal blueprint of
society. Success or failure is more easily appraised, and there
is no inherent reason why this method should lead to an
accumulation of power, and to the suppression of criticism.
Such a fight against concrete wrongs and concrete dangers
is more likely to find the support of a great majority than a
fight for the establishment of a Utopia’ (Popper, 1944/5, pp
91–92). Table 2 summarizes Popper’s position on natural and
social science.
Open and closed societies
In the Open Society and its Enemies (Popper, 1945a, b),
Popper ‘selects some events from the history of historicist
thought, in order to illustrate its persistent and pernicious
influence upon the philosophy of society and of politics, from
Heraclitus and Plato to Hegel and Marx’ (Popper, 1944/5,
p viii). Popper argues that a fundamental choice confronting
humanity is whether to adopt a closed, tribal way of life
or an open society. The closed society has just one view of
the world, one set of values, one way of life: it is a world
dominated by dogma, taboos and magic, a world devoid of
doubt and uncertainty. The open society, by contrast, toler-
ates a diversity of views, values and ways of life. In the open

Table 2 Popper’s falsification and piecemeal engineering
Science
Focus of Interest Natural World
Objective of Analysis Severely tested
hypotheses
Method of Analysis Conjecture
Experimental Refutation
Change Creation Physical engineering
Best corroborated laws
Actors International community
of scientists
society learning through criticism is possible just because
diverse views and values are tolerated. For Popper, the open
society is the civilized society, in which individual freedom
and responsibility, justice, democracy, humane values, reason
and science can flourish (Maxwell, 2007).
Moving from the closed to the open society imposes a great
psychological burden on the individuals involved. Instead of
the security of the tribe, organic, dogmatic and devoid of
doubt, there is all the uncertainty and insecurity of an ‘abstract
society’ and the painful necessity of taking personal respon-
sibility for one’s life in a state of ignorance. Many cannot
bear the burden of freedom and doubt, and long for the false
security and certainties of the closed society. Some of the
greatest thinkers of western civilization have given in to this
temptation and have, in one way or another, urged a return
to something like a closed society under the guise of Utopia.
The lure of totalitarianism is built deep into our history and
traditions (Maxwell, 2007).
Popper depicts Socrates as the advocate of the Athenian
open society: his passionate scepticism, his searching criti-
cism of current beliefs and ideals, his conviction that first
one must acknowledge one’s own ignorance before one could
hope to acquire knowledge and wisdom. Plato on the other
hand is depicted as the advocate of the closed society (he
was particularly enamoured by Sparta): the tribal arrange-
ments of old were the ideal, historical change involves decay
and degeneration, and all that enlightened philosopher-rulers
can do is arrest change somewhat. Popper traces a direct link
from Plato to Marx via Hegel. All three philosophers uphold
versions of historicism. Plato and Hegel were both pessimistic
historicists. Marx, by contrast, was an optimistic historicist:
historical development will eventually result in socialism and
freedom (Popper, 1945a, b).
Popper depicts Hegel as a complete intellectual fraud. In
contrast, he pays tribute to Marx’s sincerity, his humani-
tarianism, his intellectual honesty, his hatred of moralizing
verbiage and hypocrisy, his sense of facts and his sincere
quest for the truth, his important contributions to historical
studies and social science, and his burning desire to help the
oppressed. But these good points are, for Popper, more than
counterbalanced by the dreadful defects, most of which stem
from Marx’s historicism, inherited from Hegel. The central
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 451
Social Science
Society as people and institutions
Effect of policy changes
(conditional, local models)
Conjecture
Experiment via piecemeal engineering
Piecemeal engineering of social
arrangements (laws, institutions etc)
Analytical social scientists
Citizens and their representatives
tenet of Marxism is the idea that the laws of dialectical mate-
rialism determine the evolution of the means of production,
and this in turn determines the evolution of everything else,
from class struggle to culture, religion, the law and politics.
In rejecting this view Popper argues that historical predictions
made by Marx, on the basis of his economic historicism, have
been falsified by subsequent historical events. The Russian
revolution is, for example, entirely at odds with Marx’s theory,
as is the way in which the unrestricted capitalism of Marx’s
time has subsequently become more just and humane as a
result of diverse political interventions. Popper prefers an open
society with elected rulers. He accepts that this may some-
times put in power a ruler who turns out to be tyrannical but
he argues that so long as the mechanism is in place for the
ruler to be (democratically) removed then the error can be
corrected.
Criticism of Popper’s political and social views
Of particular interest is the so-called Positivismusstreit (or
positivist conflict). Popper was invited to give an address on
the logic of the social sciences with Adorno responding as
discussant. The occasion was meant to help German social
scientific and philosophy circles understand and debate
the competing positions of critical rationalism and critical
theory. To everyone’s disappointment the anticipated conflict
did not happen as Adorno largely agreed with Popper’s
position—they were both opposed to positivism. In a different
way the ‘dispute’ was continued in a series of publications
by Jürgen Habermas and Hans Albert (a critical rationalist).
The various papers were included in the 1969 book Der Posi-
tivismusstreit in der deustchen Soziologie (Adorno, 1969)
and in an expanded English version (Adorno, 1976). Adorno
was against positivism because (according to critical theory)
science along with other forms of arguing (dialectics) and
knowing (including sociology and philosophy) should be
understood as a manifestation of the way mankind and
society has developed. Science cannot therefore be under-
stood as foundational, free of assumptions. Both natural and
social science have to be seen in this light: primacy should
not therefore be afforded to science. Popper comes to the
same conclusion for quite different reasons. The thrust of his
452 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
argument can be gleaned from the following:
It is a mistake to assume that the objectivity of a science depends
upon the objectivity of the scientist. And it is a mistake to
believe that the attitude of the natural scientist is more objective
than that of the social scientist. The natural scientist is just
as partisan as other people . . . .. What may be described as
scientific objectivity is based solely upon a critical tradition
which, despite resistance, often makes it possible to criticize
a dominant dogma. To put it another way, the objectivity of
science is not a matter of the individual scientists but rather
the social result of their mutual criticism, of the friendly-hostile
division of labour amongst scientists, of their co-operation and
also of their competition. For this reason, it depends, in part,
upon a number of social and political circumstances. (Popper,
1976b, p 95)
The social and political circumstances that Popper has
in mind are, of course, exemplified by an open society. In
Popper’s final short piece added to the English translation of
Der Positivismusstreit he concludes that the main issue of the
book is the accusation that he is bound by his methodology,
which his critics equate to ‘positivism’, to defend the status
quo. He responds by pointing out that he has often combated
such a position. His theory of method is a theory of scien-
tific and intellectual revolutions. However, he admits that his
social theory favours gradual reform, reform controlled by
critical comparison between expected and achieved results.
This he says is the only alternative to violence so far discov-
ered: ‘it is the obvious duty of all intellectuals to work for this
revolution—for the replacement of the eliminative function
of violence by the eliminative function of rational criticism’
(Popper, 1976b, pp 291–292).
Evolution and Popper’s three worlds
Popper, concerned to place human knowledge in an evolu-
tionary context, turned to Darwinism for a general frame-
work. He saw Darwinism as an application of the ‘logic of
the situation’: mutations are thrown up (tentative solutions)
and those unsuited to the environment do not survive (error
elimination). This is true of all organisms but humans have
the ability to address the problem of survival linguistically,
a form that can be criticized and tested before putting our
lives at stake (Popper, 1972, p 261). In the process something
new has emerged: as well as there being a radical disconti-
nuity between the living and the non-living, there is a discon-
tinuity between animal communication systems and human
language. Emergence and novelty can be understood in terms
of a rejection of determinism at the biological level, a stance
supported by the rejection of determinism at the level of
physics and chemistry (in other words acceptance of a belief
that real physical processes are probabilistic). This indeter-
minism underpins his philosophy of freedom and choice at
the psychological, social and political levels. In addition, he
rejects the idea that sociology can be reduced to psychology,
which in turn can be reduced to biology, and so on to chem-
istry and physics: new properties arise at each level inexpli-
cable in terms of the level below. Humans are influenced by
abstract concepts such as theories, standards and values that
cannot be reduced to physical objects. He sees these concepts
as forming an abstract world of ideas which are not merely
instinctive but which can be chosen (and rationally criticized)
in the light of ideas from ethics, aesthetics, science and so on
(O’Hear, 1980, p 175).
Popper captures these ideas in his three world model.
World 1 is the world of physical objects and states. World
2 is the world of states of consciousness, mental states and
behavioural disposition to act. World 3 is the world of the
objective contents of thought (including particular scientific
and artistic theories about worlds 1 and 2) and of institutions
and values, considered abstractly. It has much in common with
Plato’s Forms or Ideas, Hegel’s Objective Spirit, Bolzano’s
theory of a universe of truths in themselves, and Frege’s
objective contents of thought. It stands in opposition to those
such as Descartes, Locke, Berkley, Hume, Kant or Russell
who are interested in our subjective beliefs, and their basis or
origin (Popper, 1972, pp 106–107). World 3 is autonomous,
totally independent of anybody’s claim to know. In world 3
spoken language allows the creation and mutation of explana-
tory myths, and this is further supported by written language.
Science replaces the elimination of error in the violent
struggle for life by non-violent rational criticism: this allows
us to replace killing (world 1) and intimidation (world 2) by
the impersonal arguments of world 3 (Popper, 1972, p 84).
World 3, Popper says, includes theoretical systems, prob-
lems and problem situations (Popper, 1972, p 254). The
nucleus of world 3, the world of problems, theories and
criticism, is dominated by values, the values of objective
truth and of its growth (Popper, 1976a, pp 194–195). The
intellectual (epistemic) values such as truth, the search for
truth, the approximation to truth through the elimination of
errors and clarity of expression, support this quest (Popper,
1994, p 70). Values such as kindness, justice and alleviation
of suffering, also have a place in world 3. These values (rela-
tive to a certain problem) may be created or discovered, and
discussed in relation to other values and to other problems.
Discussion and criticism of Popper’s evolutionary views of
knowledge can be found in O’Hear (1980, pp 171–204) and
Smithurst (1995).
Popper in Operational Research
The origins of OR lie in the activities of scientists employed
to help make military operations more effective during World
War II (Kirby, 2003). Popper describes the methods of
science thus: ‘A scientist whether theorist or experimenter,
puts forward statements, or systems of statements and tests
them step by step. In the field of the empirical sciences,
more particularly, he constructs hypotheses or systems of
theories and tests them against experience of observation
and measurement’ (Popper, 1959, p 27). OR has from its

inception positioned itself within science: working within
the ethos of science the pioneers saw themselves applying
the methods of science. Thus when Logic was published (in
English) it created much interest among OR scientists and
I think it is fair to say that, like other scientists, they took
the lessons of falsification on board. Nevertheless, Popper’s
rather stark assertion that it was the role of scientists to over-
throw hypotheses did not fit the OR practitioners’ day-to-day
activities particularly well. In reality, much time was spent
in trying to establish facts and relationships from scarce and
poor data for clients used to managing ‘by the seat of their
pants’: the challenge was often to demonstrate to managers,
who valued action, that there was also merit in analysis.
Boothroyd and articulate intervention
One practitioner who took Popper very seriously was Hylton
Boothroyd. He placed Popper’s philosophy at the centre
of his approach, Articulate Intervention (Boothroyd, 1978).
When Boothroyd was forming his ideas the debate was raging
about the nature of science. Boothroyd’s conception of OR is
that of consultants intervening in the action programmes of
clients. The activities of the consultants themselves can also
be thought of as an action programme. Thus an intervention
involves two action programmes that together can be thought
of as a joint client–consultant action programme. Boothroyd
took his concept of ‘action programmes’ from Lakatos’
research programmes. He was not so much interested in the
progressive or degenerative nature of programmes as the idea
that an OR intervention could be seen in terms of the creative
possibilities of combining the programme of the interveners
(the consultants) with that of the entered organization (the
client). Following Lakatos, action programmes are charac-
terized by the (core) theories and proposals they embody.
Boothroyd’s concept of ‘theories’ is a fairly straightforward
application of the ideas of Popper (Boothroyd, 1978, p 22).
As we have seen Popper divides statements between those
that are falsifiable (science) and those which are not (non-
science, metaphysics and so on). However, Boothroyd notes
that Popper later ‘felt the need for a more general category
than falsifiability, or perhaps for a middle ground: the criticiz-
able.’ Boothroyd characterizes the three categories as follows.
The falsifiable category contains hard-edged findings of ideas
left standing after imaginative observation which leaves no
room for serious doubt according to the standing proposals
of the scientific community of the day. The non-falsifiable
carries with it both the untestable ground theories of being
and thinking that we use and many of the notions by which
we organise ourselves: theories of long-term consequences
of various ethical principles and of various forms of social
organizations. The criticizable carries with it the notion that
theories can be appraised against observation provided that
one can start from a declared point of view which is one of
many, but from which it is possible to declare that, from that
point of view one can discern coherence over a wider range
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 453
than has been noticed from other points of view. He suggests
‘that the would-be-scientific intervener typically would like
to work with the falsifiable category, practices mostly in the
criticizable category, and largely goes along with the non-
falsifiable category without discerning it as such’ (Boothroyd,
1978, p 78).
Popper depicts both the natural and social sciences as
problem solving activities driven forward by criticism:
P1 → TT → EE → P2
where P stands for problem, TT for tentative theory, EE
for (attempted) error-elimination especially by way of crit-
ical discussion (Popper, 1972, p 287). When it comes to
the social sciences, as we have seen, he places his faith in
piecemeal engineering: in other words he addresses prac-
tice directly. In The Myth of the Framework (Popper, 1994,
pp 154–194) he describes how such an approach is applied in
social science practice. From this it can be seen why Popper’s
work resonates so strongly with OR. He first differentiates
between the problem of explaining or predicting ‘singular
events’ (an example from the natural sciences would be, when
will the next lunar eclipse occur, or from the social sciences,
when will there be the next rise in unemployment in the
Midlands or Western Ontario?) and predicting or explaining
a certain ‘kind or type’ of event (why do lunar eclipses occur
again and again and only when there is a full moon, or
why is there a seasonal increase and decrease in the building
industry?). The first problem can be addressed using universal
laws together with initial conditions without constructing a
model. The second problem is most easily solved by means of
constructing a model. Popper refers to these as ‘rough’ models
because they do not pretend to represent either the actual situ-
ation or the actual mechanism involved. In science, the model
(eg a physical model or a drawing) replaces the need to specify
initial conditions but does require ‘animating’ universal laws.
In the social sciences, prediction of singular events from initial
conditions is hardly ever applicable; the social sciences almost
always proceeds by constructing models. Popper says, ‘The
fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the histor-
ical social sciences is to explain and understand events in
terms of human action and social situations. The key term
here is ‘social situation’ (Popper, 1994, p 166). The ‘models’
of the theoretical social sciences are essentially descriptions
or reconstructions of typical social situations.
In the construction of relevant models, Popper introduces
the idea of the ‘situational logic’ of typical social situations.
When addressing a particular problem, analysis of the situ-
ational logic enables the relevant factors to be brought to the
fore while bracketing the infinity of situational details that
might be relevant on some other occasion. This allows the
model to be built. However, the model needs to be ‘animated’
by an assumption that the various persons act adequately or
appropriately according to the situation (known in the liter-
ature as the ‘rationality principle’). Popper states, ‘that this
has little or nothing to do with the empirical or psychological
454 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4

.
T
. T . .
T T . .
T T C C
T . C C
T . . . .
T A . .
. T A . C
. A C C
T C C
A
. C C
.
. . .
. C
P C
. A C
P C .
P
P A . .
P . . . .
P .
. C
P
C C
.
P C .
.
P

T indicates theories, P proposals, A actions, C consequences

Boxing indicates those which are active at a particular point in an intervention

Figure 1 Articulate intervention (Boothroyd, 1978, p 141).

assertion that man always, or in the main, or in most cases,
acts rationally’. He agrees that the animating assumption of
the rationality principle can clearly be seen to be false by
observing people’s behaviour. He further concedes that if the
rationality principle is false, then the model incorporating it
must also be false. But he asks, can any model be true? His
answer is no, any model in physics or social science, must be
an over-simplification: it must omit much and over-emphasize
much. Situational models are not unusual in this respect and
Popper believes they are the proper method of social science
(he cites economics, social anthropology, sociology of power
politics, and social or political history) (Popper, 1994,
pp 169–172).
Boothroyd places modelling at the centre of his conception
of articulate intervention referring to it as reflection before
action: ‘At one extreme there is reflection which has no hint
of theoretical content however ill-founded; and at the other
extreme there is reflection whose entire content has been
exhaustively tested to the limits of human critical ingenuity’.
In other words, the completely mindless and the known-to-be-
almost-certainly-correct. ‘In between lies our actual reflection
on . . . the imperfectly imagined futures we wish to happen
or we wish to avoid: futures about which . . . our delibera-
tions with ourselves and our persuasive arguments with others
take place in far less completely articulated ways than the
published argumentative output from research programmes in
mathematics or the natural sciences’ (Boothroyd, 1978, p 47).
In Popper’s terms OR is very clearly engaged in piecemeal
engineering. Perhaps the difference is that in the practice of
OR initial conditions are required to make specific predic-
tions of the consequences of actions. A simplified diagram
of Boothroyd’s articulate intervention is given in Figure 1
(Boothroyd, 1978, p 141). He suggests that the diagram acts
as a direct reminder that in an episode of articulate reflection:
1. active theories [the boxed set of Ts in Figure 1] are drawn
from an indefinitely large set of latent theories [Ts],
2. active proposals [the boxed set of Ps] are drawn from an
indefinitely large set of latent proposals [Ps], including
proposals about conditional action in various circum-
stances by all the relevant action programmes and
including proposals about measures of achievement,
3. both active and latent proposals presume an indefinitely
large cascade of supporting proposals, indefinitely large
behind each sector of the supporting cascade, and reaching
back indefinitely into the traditions of society and into
conflicting views about them,
4. actively considered actions [the boxed set of As] are drawn
from an indefinitely large repertoire of imagined actions
[As],
5. articulate reflection includes the combining of theories
and proposals to imagine the consequences [Cs] of imag-
ined actions, including the consequences conditional on
future circumstances and including estimates of proposed
measures of achievement, and
6. articulate reflection includes the acts of including and
excluding conceptualizable consequences from the actively
considered set of consequences. (Boothroyd, 1978, pp
141–142)
Boothroyd observes that in considering Figure 1 ‘an engi-
neer is concerned with being aware of the latent content of

four sets [theories, proposals, actions, consequences] and with
selecting and using four active sets under the proposal that he
plans to achieve some consequences, whether it be something
as simple as the design of a small component or as complex
as the construction of a highly automated factory. In contrast,
a pure scientist would seem to be more concerned with the
proposal that he critically investigate the standing of a partic-
ular theory and its supporting cascade, or that he undertake
action heuristically to suggest relevant new theory. That is, it
would seem that the role of scientist does not include respon-
sibility for the assembly of active sets. This supports (in antic-
ipation) the position of Keys who has argued that OR should
be viewed as technology rather than science’ (Keys, 1989).
Boothroyd’s articulation provides a way of thinking about
situational logic and it is easy to see how it can accommodate
both problem structuring and model building. However, he
does not build into his approach any immunization against
historicism and the closed society, though his own personal
credo might well lead him to reject such a position. If a
would-be intervener wants to build in some assumptions
about the nature and future direction of society they can do
so. Nor does Boothroyd drive out psychologism, another
of Popper’s bugbears as we have seen. In fact, he specifi-
cally builds into the notion of action programmes the idea
that theories and proposals will be viewed differently from
different action programmes. Thus the interpretive stance
of, for instance, soft systems methodology can be accom-
modated: different combinations of theories, proposals,
actions and consequences can be brought into focus to reflect
different points of view. However, rather than the lens of a
systems perspective Boothroyd prefers his own perspective
of articulating the dynamically changing actions, theories
and proposals of actors engaged in action programmes at
different levels of aggregation.
Both Popper and Boothroyd mention the question of (epis-
temological) instrumentalism. It is difficult to see how either
piecemeal engineering or its OR application, articulate inter-
vention, are at odds with it. Popper explains that the creed of
the pragmatists or instrumentalists is that we should not, or
cannot aim at ‘pure’ knowledge, or at truth, with our scien-
tific theories: scientific theories are nothing but instruments
for prediction or practical application. Popper, as a realist,
argues that there is more to it than that, we may learn from
science something about the structure of our world (Popper,
1994, pp 171–177). However, he agrees that in the practical
sphere theories are used as instruments. Indeed, he concedes
that most physicists of his day interpret the models of physics
as instruments of prediction rather than (possibly true) models
of reality. In Conjectures and Refutations Popper follows the
line adopted by the pragmatists:
And if we wish to elucidate the difference between pure and
applied science, between the search for knowledge and the
search for power or for powerful instruments, then we cannot
do without it [the objectivist theory of truth—that is truth as
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 455
correspondence with the facts as elucidated by Tarski]. For the
difference is that, in the search for knowledge, we are out to find
true theories, or at least theories which are nearer than others
to the truth—which correspond better to the facts; whereas in
the search for theories that are merely powerful instruments for
certain purposes, we are, in many cases, quite well served by
theories which are known to be false. (Popper, 1963, p 226)
As OR’s primary aim is not to establish scientific knowl-
edge but rather is to assist decision making and action, it is
consistent with Popper to treat all theories in OR as (epis-
temologically) instrumental. In other words, the question of
whether we are trying to find true or nearly true theories
about reality (the realist position) or merely seeking theories
of instrumental value (the pragmatist position), an important
debate in the philosophy of science, can be bracketed for our
purposes (this bracketing does not include the separate issue
of whether means can be separated from ends). Popper also
says that in the world of action beliefs may be important
(Popper, 1959, p 282). Thus the psychologism that Popper
fights so hard to exclude from the quest for scientific knowl-
edge enters the picture when considering action.
Ulrich and critical system heuristics
Whereas for Boothroyd Popper proved inspirational, for
Ulrich he represented the scientific status quo to be criticized.
The distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning
provides a focus for Ulrich’s seminal work Critical Heuris-
tics of Social Planning (Ulrich, 1983). Ulrich concedes that
Popper was ‘the first epistemologist who has systematically
(though not entirely) replaced the idea of justification by
the idea of criticism’ (Ulrich, 1983, p 51). However, he
attacks Popper’s formulation of practical reasoning (or lack
thereof) from a Habermasian perspective saying that Popper’s
emphasis on theory (which Popper claims can be analysed
objectively) ignores the all pervasive role of values: practice
(and indeed theory) is not only theory-laden but it is value-
laden as well. However, as we have seen above, Popper in his
evolutionary approach sees values deriving from problem-
solving trial and error behaviour in exactly the same way
as theory. Whenever he talks about criticism he is bringing
values into play. It is nevertheless true that he sees science
as a struggle to achieve value-free, objective knowledge.
It can hardly be said that Popper’s work lacks an ethical
dimension. According to Keisewetter, ‘Popper believed that
our Western civilization owes its rationalism, its faith in the
possibility of rational discourse, its basis of an open society,
and its scientific outlook, to two traditions: the ancient
Socratic tradition and the Christian belief of the brotherhood
of man’ (Kiesewetter, 1995). As Popper himself says in The
Open Society, ‘Man has created new worlds—of language, of
music, of poetry, of science; and the most important of these
is the world of moral demands, for equality, for freedom,
and for helping the weak’ (Popper, 1945a, p 65). Popper
suggests that the most important principles of humanitarian
456 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
and egalitarian ethics are tolerance towards all those who
are not intolerant, the least amount of avoidable suffering
for all (minimise suffering), and the fight against tyranny
(Popper, 1945a, p 235). What Ulrich is criticizing is not
Popper’s ethical stance but his failure to embed consider-
ation of such matters in his methodological recommenda-
tions: even when addressing an issue of practical reason
Popper tends to separate out and address the theoretical
questions.
Ulrich’s attack would seem to be a continuation of the
Positivismusstreit (see above) taking the side of the Frankfurt
School. In the end his critical systems heuristics approach
takes little from Popper; instead it builds an approach to
professional practice based on pragmatism and Habermas in
a Kantian framework. What Popper and Ulrich do have in
common is that they have both adapted Kant’s framework.
Kant’s transcendental a priori concepts of human under-
standing are replaced by Popper with his concept of trial and
error and by Ulrich with his concept of critical heuristics.
OR paradigms and Kuhnian revolutions
In 1981 Dando and Bennett suggested that a Kuhnian revo-
lution was underway in OR:
More specifically it seems possible in OR and related fields to
identify three sets of rival proposals, which may be labelled offi-
cial, reformist (eg Ackoffian) and revolutionary. However, the
debate in OR differs from that in the Natural Sciences because
it is not just about the best means of understanding the empir-
ical world. It is also about the type of world to be constructed
through the framework of assumptions adopted. (Dando and
Bennett, 1981, p 91, emphasis in original)
. . . it is just possible that OR will achieve its professed aim of
being a reflective activity in which practitioners make informed
choices about their work—and help others to do so. It can be
convincingly argued that this in itself presupposes the possession
of some form of ‘critical’ paradigm. Naturally, there will be
some situations in which a positivist or systems approach would
be found appropriate (or impossible to avoid). The important
point is that the analyst would make conscious choice to proceed
in this way, with some understanding of what the consequences
of this choice will be both for him (or her)-self and for those
he wishes to serve (one of the hallmarks of this approach being
the possession of a very clear view of exactly who one is trying
to help). As against this possibility, however, we must make
an important reservation. Although Ackoff has pronounced the
death of traditional OR, there are many practitioners who are
rather unconcerned about the whole debate. . . . It may well be
that most people in OR are still happily doing ‘Normal Science’
within the old positivist paradigm. From this, our conclusion is
that, as yet, the crisis is still in a fairly early stage’. (Dando and
Bennett, 1981, pp 101–102, emphasis in original).
In conclusion Dando and Bennett agreed with the ‘revolu-
tionaries’ that society is riven by conflict, domination, power
and exploitation, and had considerable sympathy with the
claim that the reformist approach fails to tackle these issues
adequately. However, they concluded that, in the current
debate, proponents of the reformist stance would probably
win for the time being (Dando and Bennett, 1981, p 101).
Dando and Bennett were applying Kuhn’s model in a way
that had become the norm in social science but had never
been intended or envisaged by Kuhn himself. Kuhn had been
talking about small groups of scientists (up to 50) dedicated
to some narrow field of endeavour. He emphasized that a new
paradigm was not necessarily better than the existing one
and that it was periods of normal science rather than revo-
lution that were productive. His argument could therefore
be used to support the proposition that the way to win the
Cold War was to pursue normal science vigorously to outper-
form the Soviet Union in both the military and industrial
spheres: normal science (the status quo) should therefore be
funded on a lavish scale (Fuller, 2003). In contrast, the social
science Kuhnian model (SSKM) that Dando and Bennett
adopted uses the language of Kuhn to quite different ends.
The SSKM considers whole subject areas, such as social
science itself, involving thousands of researchers engaged in
a great diversity of activities. Movement from one paradigm
to another is seen as progression and the rolling back of
the frontiers of understanding and knowledge is achieved
through revolution. There is no reason to reject SSKM on
the grounds that it does not follow the original intent, but it
is as well to recognize that a conservative Kuhnian model
has been replaced by a sort of neo-Hegelian/Marxist stages
model. The Hegelian/Marxist connection is reinforced by the
fact that it seems to be assumed that the positivist paradigm
(in which they mistakenly include Popper) will in time be
replaced by a Marxist/Frankfurt/Habermas paradigm. Ironi-
cally Kuhn’s philosophy resurrects the position of Carnap,
the leading logical positivist, while Popper was the anti-
institutional advocate of permanent revolution (Notturno,
2003, pp 225–248).
Advocates of revolution have to whip up a sense of crisis, to
create the feeling that change is inevitable, and OR academics
in the 1970s attempted to achieve this dynamic. They had
plenty of anecdotal evidence to feed on and as an exercise in
bridging between OR and social science Dando and Bennett’s
analysis has a lot to commend it. Their distinction between
official, reformist and revolutionary paradigms is helpful in
that we can use it as a basis to track progress some quarter of
a century later. If the contents of JORS are examined over the
past 5 years (2002–2006) about 200 case-orientated papers
can be identified. Of these over 90% of cases are conducted
within the official paradigm, about 8% can be classified as
being within the reformist paradigm and only one case could
arguably be described as revolutionary (I would argue it is
not). Munro and Mingers (2004) in a survey of OR practi-
tioners found that of 22 respondents, 21 reported use of statis-
tics, 17 of simulation, 16 of forecasting and 13 of mathemat-
ical modelling; in other words, a high proportion were still
working in the official paradigm. Only two uses each of soft

systems methodology, strategic choice and cognitive mapping
were reported, indicative of a little reformist activity (but even
these uses may well be by practitioners still working in the
official paradigm). No usages were reported of total system
intervention or critical systems heuristics, which might be
considered for inclusion in the revolutionary paradigm. The
envisaged paradigm shifts have clearly not happened. There
are a number of possible explanations for this including the
possibility that those opting for the new paradigms find some
grouping other than OR (such as the systems movement) more
convivial.
Jackson and total systems intervention (TSI)
While Boothroyd embraces Popper and Ulrich criticises
him, Jackson ignores him (Jackson, 2000). However, we
can examine Jackson’s approach through the lens of Popper.
Jackson has long been an advocate of taking a sociological
approach to intervention. In effect, Popper divides sociology
into two perspectives, historicism and piecemeal engineering.
Jackson combines the two: he envisages piecemeal type inter-
ventions overseen by a debate about the approach to adopt
based on a sociological overview. In criticizing Ulrich’s CSH
he says that CSH ‘. . . is not critical in terms of the historical
materialism of Marx and the Frankfurt School sociologists’ (p
319). This is the gap that Jackson sees his TSI debate filling.
For Jackson, critical awareness is recognizing that there
are problem situations where there is fundamental conflict
between interest groups that have access to unequal power
resources, and that there are organizational and societal pres-
sures that lead to certain systems theories and methodologies
being popular for guiding interventions at particular times
(pp 356–357).
Jackson’s desire to sit above the fray and take an overview
based on sociology would be recognized by Popper as an
application of the sociology of knowledge. Popper claims this
stems from a Marxist development of Hegel (Popper, 1945b,
p 202). He says, ‘Thus the sociology of knowledge believes
that the highest objectivity can be reached by the freely poised
intelligence analysing the various hidden ideologies and their
anchorage in the unconscious. The way to true knowledge
appears to be the unveiling of unconscious assumptions . . . ’
(p 203). Sociologists of knowledge explain the disagreement
of an opponent by his social ideology. Popper continues, ‘Such
methods are both easy to handle and good fun for those who
handle them. But they clearly destroy the basis of rational
discussion, and they must lead, ultimately, to anti-rationalism
and mysticism’ (p 204).
The implications for OR
As an engineer I confess to a bias towards simplicity, clarity
and transparency in all matters related to theory. I look to
theory to provide some simplifying insights into the infi-
nite complexities of the real world. I have found that most
operational researchers (mainly mathematicians and scien-
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 457
tists) are similarly motivated. Undoubtedly the great appeal
of Popper is that he makes the world of philosophy accessible
(not without some struggle, of course). His range and depth
is remarkable: he demonstrates in-depth knowledge of logic,
mathematics, physics, Greek and philosophy; he engages with
politics, economics, biology, music and art. All this has come
under detailed and critical scrutiny. For instance, Ronald B.
Levinson wrote In Defense of Plato, a book of 645 closely
printed pages, attacking Popper’s depiction of Plato. Popper
writes in remarkably clear English. He helpfully clarifies the
position of those with whom he chooses to disagree and points
out the assumptions and potential weaknesses of his own argu-
ments. He is thus one of the easiest of the great philosophers
to understand (Marx was another) and, by the same token, one
of the most open to criticism. Popper’s accessibility and his
emphasis on epistemology and science make him an obvious
starting point for any member of the OR community wishing
to explore what philosophy has to offer. We have seen that his
thinking gave rise to major disputes; this gives us an opportu-
nity to see how different perspectives are developed, promoted
and defended. It is as much in the developments that followed,
the arguments, debates, defences and improvements, as in the
original Popper philosophy that the value lies for OR. Popper
offers some simple models that provide the basis for debate.
Models of scientific logic and discovery
Popper’s great innovations in the epistemology of science (his
demarcation and falsification models) have been absorbed by
the scientific and statistical communities (in which many of
the OR community were schooled). However, in the world of
OR practice it is extremely difficult to rid oneself of the habit
of thinking and arguing in an inductive way. For instance, to
take the swan example a step further, it is perfectly possible
to prove inductively the hypothesis ‘some swans are black’;
it is only necessary to observe one black swan in Australia
(or London Zoo) to conclude the hypothesis is true. So why
does Popper want to banish inductive arguments? The answer
is simply that Popper is only concerned with establishing
universal scientific laws (or more accurately yet-to-be-refuted
hypotheses). ‘All swans are white’ is such a universal state-
ment. However, falsification of the universal statement is logi-
cally exactly the same as inductively confirming the state-
ment ‘some swans are black’. Popper might want to stick to
the universal nomological (law-like) form but in OR this can
seem awkward. For instance, one could suggest to a client in
the nuclear industry either that (i) they should try to falsify the
hypothesis that there are no stable geological formations suit-
able for waste disposal, or alternatively that (ii) they should
try to identify at least one suitable site to establish that suitable
sites do in fact exist. The first formulation sounds academic,
the second practical. The point is they are logically the same.
The whole subject area is a sort of logicians’ playground.
For instance, Popper suggests that anything and everything
can be a source of new hypotheses: the scientist has to care-
458 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4

fully use experimental falsification to sort the (potential) Models of the role of social science
wheat from the chaff. However, this is an impossible task
Popper’s model of social science contrasts historicism with
as there are an infinite number of true and false statements
piecemeal engineering. Although attempts to achieve major
that can be made about the world. Obviously, it is part of the
societal change to bring in some new Utopia or other have an
scientist’s craft skill to narrow the field down drastically in a
appalling record, we are not free of such attempts today. For
heuristic and inevitably inductive way. This is also the case
instance, Gray in Black Mass suggests that the American neo-
in OR practice. Hilary Putman emphasizes the importance of
conservative agenda to bring freedom and democracy to the
practice. He criticizes Popper for failing to see that practice
world can be seen in these terms ‘despite the fact that it was
is primary: ideas are not just an end in themselves; they
presented in the trappings of social science’ (Gray, 2007, p 1).
guide practice and structure whole forms of life. We obtain
Rather more optimistically Winter argues that it is important to
our ideas (both correct and incorrect ones) by close study of
recognize the enduring character of the Utopian tradition. He
the world. Accumulated experience does not lead to theories
suggests that the history of the 20th century should not only be
in an algorithmic or mechanical sense but (1) lack of expe-
written as a story of a series of catastrophes; the historical role
rience with phenomena markedly decreases the probability
of ‘minor Utopias’ and the visionary temperament should also
of correct ideas and (2) extensive experience increases the
be recognized. He describes six minor 20th century Utopias:
probability of correct or partially correct ideas in a marked
three are projects of social transformation centred on nation
fashion. The correctness of an idea is not certified by the fact
and social class; three are focused more on civil society and
that it came from close and concrete study of the relevant
human rights. Winter does not hesitate to point out the failings
aspect of the world (Popper is right in that respect); rather
in these minor Utopian projects, but he suggests that nonethe-
we judge the correctness of our ideas by applying them and
less a world without them is a barren one (Winter, 2006).
seeing whether they succeed. In general, and in the long run,
Popper’s description of piecemeal engineering sounds very
true ideas succeed. How do we know? Our experience tells
like certain classes of OR models, namely those that are, or
us it does. Thus induction cannot be ignored in the quest to
are very like, economic models; energy models are a good
understand the world. Induction cannot be ‘justified’ but nor,
example (Ormerod, 1980; Ormerod and McLeod, 1983). Of
Putman believes, can anything else including mathematics
course, Popper had economic models very much in mind
and logic (Putman, 1974, p 238).
when he developed his idea of piecemeal social engineering;
economics was the one area of social science where he
Models of the nature of the scientific research process believed progress was being made. Thus Popper comes to
practice from two different directions. We have from his
The debate about the nature of science has thrown up a
work on science the conclusion that we should use the best
number of models from Popper’s concept of discovery and
corroborated hypotheses and that an instrumental view of
Kuhn’s normal science to Lakatos’ research programmes
theories can be taken in practice. He also accepted that ad
and Laudan’s research traditions. Many other possible ways
hoc hypotheses may be useful for forecasting purposes, and
of combining logic and observations of practice have been
that questions of belief enter into practical decision-making.
suggested. It is clear that logic on its own is not sufficient
From his work on social science we have his conclusion
to explain scientific behaviour and observation of practice is
that we should engage in piecemeal engineering on prac-
not sufficient to explain the success of science. These models
tical grounds. However, he does not linger on the subject of
can only be suggestive of the line of attack to take when
practice long enough to reconcile these positions and make
attempting to understand the nature OR. As has been argued
the area his own. The practice domain would seem to be
by Keys (1989), OR is not a science, it is a technology: its
left open to the adoption of a pragmatist (or neo-pragmatist
focus is on practice rather than knowledge accumulation.
Habermasian) position. Thus from an OR perspective the
The problem for OR is that while there are some descrip-
epistemological disagreements between critical rationalists
tions of OR in practice written by practitioners and plenty
and instrumental pragmatists as to the nature of truth and its
of speculation from academics, there is very little in the
scientific determination can be bracketed and effort concen-
way of careful observation for sociological research purposes.
trated on the world of practice.
Despite these difficulties it would seem that there is no substi-
tute for examining practice directly. No doubt some major
Models of open and closed societies
shifts have occurred, for instance, from manual to computer-
based modelling and from in-house OR groups to external Popper’s models of open and closed societies still resonate
consultancy. But these can hardly be described as paradigm today and are often quoted in political debate. The terms open
shifts in the sense of grand epoch-making change. Perhaps and closed societies have entered the language. In Western
other changes can be described as paradigm shifts in the orig- democracies it is almost universally taken for granted that
inal Kuhnian (small scale) sense. Thus we may be seeing a openness is to be preferred and defended. Closed societies
shift from private informal methods to more formal public continue to be alluring to many; for instance, scientology with
methods in the area of problem structuring. its foundational myths, confident certainties and tight-knit

community is apparently the fastest growing religion in the
UK today (The Sunday Times, 7 January 2007, p 7). Nations
across the world still struggle with openness; migration, glob-
alization and international environmental issues are high on
the agenda. From an OR perspective, any widely cast scenario
exercise will have to address the direction these issues might
take and their far-reaching consequences.
Conclusions
Popper is one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century.
At the same time he is often threatened with being overshad-
owed by those with whom he profoundly disagreed or who
profoundly disagreed with him. These include as we have
seen Wittgenstein, Kuhn and Habermas. At the end of their
account of the famous poker incident, Edmonds and Eidenow
say, ‘Of the great figures in twentieth-century philosophy,
only a very few have given names to those who follow in
their path. Popper and Wittgenstein are two. . . . That one
can be identified as a Popperian or a Wittgensteinian is a
testament to the originality of these philosophers’ ideas and
the power of their personalities’ (Edmonds and Eidinow,
2001, p 232). Popper’s critics today still see themselves as
knocking him off his pedestal; his followers (including the
American William Bartley III, the German Hans Albert,
the Israeli Joseph Agassi and the British David Miller)
despair at his treatment. For instance Miller says ‘Sixty
years after the publication of Logik der Forschung Popper’s
daring innovation continues to be widely misrepresented
and misunderstood—if not deprecated as a barren form of
scepticism, or even irrationalism, then deprecated for itself
incorporating some principle or rule of induction’ (Miller,
1994, p x). Others, such as Raphael Sassower, have sought to
relate Popper’s thinking to modern themes such as feminism
and postmodernism (Sassower, 2006).
Popper’s reputation among practising scientists, politicians
and journalists is on much firmer ground: his notions of falsi-
fication and of the open society have become imbedded in the
conventional wisdom in Western democracies and a source
of inspiration for post-communist societies. However, in the
social sciences Kuhn is seen as a radical theorist of science,
whereas Popper is remembered as a grumpy autocrat (Fuller,
2003, p 2). According to Fuller this is a travesty of the truth.
Fuller, who has had privileged access to Kuhn’s private papers,
concludes that Kuhn was a servant of US Cold War interests
whereas Popper, despite his championing of freedom and his
association with the Hayek, retained his socialist sympathies
throughout (Fuller, 2003).
Popper’s ideas on the logic of scientific discovery, on the
propensity interpretation of probability and on the piecemeal
approach to a better society have undoubtedly had a profound
effect on the thinking of OR practitioners. He also stimu-
lated ideas, disagreements and arguments, which have found
their way into debates about the nature and direction of OR.
However, the cornerstone of Popper’s philosophical edifice
RJ Ormerod—History and ideas of critical rationalism 459
was his original epistemological work on science (theoretical
reason); he did not in my view provide a coherent account of
how decisions should be taken in practice (practical reason).
Popper’s philosophy on its own is therefore insufficient to
provide a basis for OR; a Boothroyd, an Ulrich or indeed a
Habermas is required to complete the task.
One of the themes running through Conjectures and Refu-
tations (Popper, 1963) and through much of Popper’s subse-
quent writings is that the proper task of philosophy is to
tackle, in an imaginative and critical way, real fundamental
problems having their roots outside philosophy in science,
politics, art, and life. This conception of philosophy stands
in sharp contrast both to the pomposities and obscurities of
much so-called ‘continental’ philosophy, and to the poverty
and aridity of philosophy in the so-called ‘analytic’ tradi-
tion, restricted to ordinary language analysis, the analysis
of meaning. Popper has fought against both rival concep-
tions of philosophy, and has sought to put into practice his
own critical rationalist, problem-solving conception. From
an OR perspective Popper provides an excellent entrée into
the debate about the nature, logic and practice of our own
subject area but does not provide the answer.
Acknowledgements — The author would like to thank Gerald Midgley and
an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and criticisms.
References
Adorno TW (ed) (1969). Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen
Soziologie. Neuwied: Berlin.
Adorno TW (ed) (1976). The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology
(translated by Adey G and Frisby D). Heinemann: London.
Bacon F (1620). Novum Organum: True Directions Concerning the
Interpretation of Nature. Billium: London, (References are to Book
and numbered aphorisms).
Boothroyd H (1978). Articulate Intervention. Taylor and Francis:
London.
Corvi R (1997). An Introduction to the Thought of Karl Popper
(translated by Patrick Camiller). Routledge: London.
Dando MR and Bennett PG (1981). A Kuhnian crisis in management
science. J Opl Res Soc 32: 91–103.
Edmonds D and Eidinow J (2001). Wittgenstein’s Poker. Faber and
Faber: London.
Feyerabend P (1975). Against Method. New Left Books: London,
(Page numbers refer to the Third Edition (1993). Verso: London).
Fotion NG (1995). Logical positivism. In: Honderich T (ed).
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, pp 507–508.
Frisby D (1976). Introduction to the English translation. In: Adorno
TW (ed). The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (translated
by Adey G and Frisby D). Heinemann: London.
Fuller S (2003). Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science.
Icon: Duxford.
Gillies D (1995). Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of
probability. In: O’Hear A (ed). Karl Popper: Philosophy and
Problems. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp 103–120.
Gray J (2007). Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of
Utopia. Penguin: London.
Hacker PMS (1995). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. In: Honderich T (ed).
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, pp 912–916.
460 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 60, No. 4
Hacking I (1981). Lakatos’s philosophy of science. In: Hacking I
(ed). Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press: Oxford,
pp 128–143.
Hacohen MH (2000). Karl Popper: The Formative Years 1902–1945.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Jackson MC (2000). Systems Approaches to Management.
Kluwer/Plenum: New York.
Keys P (1989). OR as technology: Some issues and implications.
J Opl Res Soc 40: 753–759.
Kiesewetter H (1995). Ethical foundations of Popper’s philosophy. In:
O’Hear A (ed). Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, pp 275–288.
Kirby MW (2003). Operational Research in War and Peace: The
British Expereince from the 1930s to 1970. Imperial College Press:
London.
Kuhn TS (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University
of Chicago Press: Chicago IL, (Page numbers refer to the 1996
third edition).
Kuhn TS (1970). Reflections on my critics. In: Lakatos I and Musgrove
A (eds). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, pp 231–278.
Lakatos I (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific
research programmes. In: Lakatos I and Musgrove A (eds).
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, pp 91–196.
Lakatos I (1981). History of science and its rational reconstructions.
In: Hacking I (ed). Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, pp 107–127.
Lakatos I and Musgrove A (eds) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Laudan L (1977). Progress and its Problems. Routledge and Kegan
Paul: London.
Magee B (1973). Popper. Fontana: London.
Magee B (1985). Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to
Karl Popper. Open Court: LaSalle, IL.
Maxwell N (2007). Karl Raimund Popper. Available at http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001686/01/Karl Raimund Popper.doc.
Miller D (1983). A Pocket Popper. Fontana: London.
Miller D (1994). Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence.
Open Court: Peru, IL.
Munro I and Mingers J (2004). Response to Richard Ormerod. J Opl
Res Soc 55: 90–93.
Newton-Smith WH (1981). The Rationality of Science. Routledge and
Kegan Paul: London.
Notturno MA (2003). On Popper. Wadsworth: Belmont, CA.
O’Hear A (1980). Karl Popper. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
O’Hear A (1995a). Popper, Karl. In: Honderich T (ed). The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp
702–703.
O’Hear A (1995b). Hypothetico-deductive method. In: Honderich T
(ed). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University
Press: Oxford, p 385.
Ormerod RJ (1980). Energy models for decision making. Eur J Opl
Res 5: 366–377.
Ormerod RJ (2006). The history and ideas of pragmatism. J Opl Res
Soc 57: 892–909.
Ormerod RJ (2008). The history and ideas of Marxism: The relevance
for OR. J Opl Res Soc, published online October 3, 2007; doi:
10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602495.
Ormerod RJ and McLeod J (1983). The development and use of the
NCB Strategic Model. The Statist 33: 35–49.
Popper KR (1934). Logik der Forschung. Springer: Vienna.
Popper KR (1944/5). The poverty of historicism. Economica 11: 86
–103 (part I); 11: 119-137 (part II); 12: 69-89 (part III) (page
numbers refer to the 1957 book published by Routledge & Kegan
Paul: London).
Popper KR (1945a). The Open Society and its Enemies, volume I, The
Spell of Plato. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London (page numbers
refer to the 1962 fourth edition).
Popper KR (1945b). The Open Society and its Enemies, volume II, The
High Tide of Prophesy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath. Routledge
& Kegan Paul: London.
Popper KR (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson:
London (page numbers refer to the 1995 Routledge: London edition).
Popper KR (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.
Popper KR (1970). Normal science and its dangers. In: Lakatos I
and Musgrove A (eds). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp 51–58.
Popper KR (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.
Oxford University Press: London.
Popper KR (1976a). Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography.
Fontana: London. Originally published in 1974 as an
‘Autobiography of Karl Popper’ in Schlipp PA (ed). The Philosophy
of Karl Popper in The Library of Living Philosophers. Open Court:
Illinois, pp 3–181.
Popper K (1976b). The logic of the social sciences. In: Adorno TW
(ed). The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. (translated by
Adey G and Frisby D). Heinemann: London. The paper in German
was originally written in 1961 and published in Adorno TW
(ed). (1969). Der Positivistmusstreit in der deutchen Sociologie.
Neuwied: Berlin.
Popper KR (1982a). The Open Universe, volume II of the Postscript.
Hutchinson: London.
Popper KR (1982b). Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics,
volume III of the Postscript. Hutchinson: London.
Popper KR (1983). Realism and the Aims of Science, volume I of the
Postscript. Hutchinson: London.
Popper KR (1994). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science
and Rationality. Routledge: London.
Putman H (1974). The ‘corroboration’ of theories. In: Schilpp PA (ed).
The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XIV: The Philosophy
of Karl Popper. Open Court: La Salle, IL, pp 221–240.
Quinton A (1995). Analytic philosophy. In: Honderich T (ed).
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, pp 28–30.
Sainsbury RM (1995). Russell, Bertrand. In: Honderich T (ed).
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, pp 781–785.
Sardar Z (2000). Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars. Icon Books:
Duxford.
Sassower R (2006). Popper’s Legacy. Acumen: Stocksfield.
Schilpp PA (1974). The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XIV:
The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Open Court: La Salle, IL.
Shearmur J (1996). The Political Thought of Karl Popper. Routledge:
London.
Smithurst M (1995). Popper and the scepticism of evolutionary
epistemology, or, what were human beings made for? In: O’Hear T
(ed). Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, pp 207–324.
Tarski A (1956). Logic, Semantics, Mathematics (translated by
Woodger JH). Oxford University Press: London.
Ulrich W (1983). Critical Heuristics of Social Planning: A New
Approach to Practical Philosophy. Haupt: Bern (the 1994 edition,
published by Wiley, Chichester, is referred to here).
Williams DE (1989). Truth, Hope and Power: The Thought of Karl
Popper. University of Toronto Press: Toronto.
Winter J (2006). Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments
in the 20th Century. Yale University Press: New Haven CT.
Received July 2007;
accepted January 2008 after two revisions