1.

YAP vs CA
Facts:
- PR Spouses Tomassi filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Yap before the CFI
of Cebu
- Petitioner filed his Answer with Special Defenses and Counterclaim, and after which trial
followed
- Copy of the decision was received by petitioner
- He filed a notice of appeal and a cash appeal bond and motion for extension of twenty
days within ehich to fijle his record on appeal.
- Said motion was not acted upon by the TC
- Within the extended period prayed for, petitioner submitted his record on appeal
- Respondent filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution alleging that the decision had
already become final and executor

TC : disapproved petitioner’s record on appeal on the ground that his motion for extension of time
did not contain any notice of hearing

MR – denied by the TC

Petition for certiorari filed with CA

CA – dismissed the petition

MR – denied

Issue:
- WON the said motion for extension should mandatorily comply with the requirements of
the Rules on Motions before the same may be acted upon by the court

Held:
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day-notice required by law is intended not for the
benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to
study and meet the arguments of the motion
The Motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of private respondents as it
merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record on Appeal, which extension may be granted
by the Trial Court upon application made prior to the expiration of the original period. 4 Neither
was there any claim that said Motion, which was grounded on justifiable reason, was interposed
to delay the appeal.
Accordingly, we find for petitioner. Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon as the policy of the Court is to encourage the hearing of appeals on the
merits.5 Litigants should be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits of their cases
without the constraints of technicalities.
 2. AZAJAR vs CA
Facts:
- Petitioner Azajar claims that he had purchased from defendant Cham Samco 100 kgs of
nails of various sizes, specified in one of Cham’s printed order forms and had given to the
agent its full payment thereof
- In breach of contract, Cham Samco had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity
ordered
- Petitioner then filed a complaint in the CFI of CamSur against respondent Cham Samco
- Respondent filed a MTD on 2 grounds (1. Failure to state a cause of action and 2. That
the venue was improperly laid)
- MTD contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court
- Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the MTD incapable of
tolling the period to answer, Azajar filed a motion to declare the respondent in default
which was granted holding that such MTD is not a motion at all because notice therein is
directed to the Clerk of Court and is w/o the requisite notice of time and place of hearing
- TC : rendered judgment by default against respondent Cham Samco
- Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial (its failure was due to excusable negligence)
- Denied
- CA – dismissed the petition
- MR – the CA reversed itself ruling that the notice in the motion which was addressed to
the clerk of court is a substantial compliance with the provision of Rules of Court

Issue:

Held:
It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on
a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by
the appellant to ail parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together
with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; 11 and that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the
motion.12 The uniform holding of this Court has been that a f ailure to comply with the requirement
is a fatal flaw.13 Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the
latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make
determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution.14
Cham Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the circumstances
the error be not regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as constituting excusable
negligence, warranting relief. It argues that legal and logical considerations, which it took to be
tenable, caused it to theorize that a hearing on the motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its
possession of affirmative defenses in addition to those set out in its motion to dismiss which, if
ventilated and established at the trial, would absolve it from all liability under the complaint.
Cham Samco’s belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be set for hearing
was avowedly engendered by two factors, namely:

1. 1)the fact that while the Rules of Court “specify the motions which can be heard only with
prior service upon adverse parties,"15 said Rules “do not point out which written motions
may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to leave to the court, in mGtions other than
those specified, the cliseretion either to ex parteresolve* * or to call the parties to a
hearing * *;16and
2. 2)the further fact that its motion to dismiss was based on two grounds on which a hearing
was superfluous, the first, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, being
determinable exclusively from the allegations of the complaint and no evidence being
allowable thereon; and the second, that
 These considerations, to be sure, did not erase inovant’s duty to give notice to the adverse
party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said notice being, as
already stressed, not only to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to
determine the time of its submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not
arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party
would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by the Court. The
duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the Court.
 3. KKK Foundation vs Calderon-Bargas
Facts:
- Pet. KKK Foundation filed a complaint for annulment of Extra Judicial Foreclosure of
REM and Nullification of the Sheriff’s Auction Sale alleging among others that the sheriff
did not post the requisite notice of Sheriff’s sale
- Judge calderon-Bargas issued a TRO preventing Angeles from consolidating her
ownership to the foreclosed properties
- On the same date, pet and Angeles executed a Comp.Agreement.
- Petitioner then filed an Urgent Ex parte Motion to recall CompAgr since the other property
owner and other trustees of petitioner were not consulted prior to the signing of the
agreement
- Angeles opposed the motion
- Judge Calderon bargas declared the Urgent Motion Ex Parte Motion to recall the
CompAgr and the Motion to Approve CompAgr as mere scraps of paper fpr failure to
comply with Sec 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of CivPro
- Angeles moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
- TC require petitioner to comment on the motion within 10 days
- TC directed the Clerk of Court to issue writ of execution
- TC received pet’s motion for extension of time to file comment which was denied
- Pet came to the CA via petition for cert alleging the Judge Calderon Bargas committed
GAD in granting the issuance of the writ of execution without the requisite notice of
hearing – Dismissed!

Issue:
1. WON the TC erred in issuing the orders without awaiting petitioner’s comment
2. WON the TC erred in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution without the
requisite notice of hearing

Held:
(1) the trial court gave petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to Angeles’s Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order only on
September 21, 2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are
more inclined to believe Angeles’s allegation since the trial court itself declared in its Order that
the Order dated September 9, 2002 was personally served upon petitioner on September 12,
2002.13 Thus, petitioner had until September 22, 2002 within which to file its comment or to
request for an extension of time. Consequently, petitioner’s motion for extension and comment
were not seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner.

(2) a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 14 of the Rules
of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive
and the trial court has no authority to act upon.15 Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice
of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of
movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,
there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule.
These exceptions are:
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
(2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and
(4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
 A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the adverse
parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the
adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. 17 Records show
that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did
not particularly state the date and time of the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was
not denied procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,
the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its
comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the reglementary period to file comment
lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and comment on the motion for which reason,
the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is not
based solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal.
Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding
 4. SANTOS vs LIWAG
Facts:
- Plaintiff Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo Liwag with the CFI of Manila seeking
the annulment of certain documents as having been executed by means of
misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means
- Claiming that the allegations in the complaint are indefinite and uncertain, as well as
conflicting, the defendant filed a motion asking the TC that the plaintiff be oreder to
submit a more definite statement or bill of particulars on certain allegations in the
complaint in order that he could be well informed of the charges filed against him and for
him to prepare an intelligent pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises.
- TC granted the motion and ordered the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars
- When the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court, upon motion of the defendant
dismissed the complaint.
- Hence, the present appeal.

Issue:

Held:
The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the
sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling
of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of
discretion or a clearly erroneous order. In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt
imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant
properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court in an orderly and
expeditious disposition of the case.
The present action is one for the annulment of documents which have been allegedly
executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other
fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats, however,
are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to
which such terms have reference are not sufficient. The allegations must state the facts and
circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and
threats may be inferred as a conclusion. In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the
documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular facts on
which the alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. It was proper
for the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff
failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.