EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or
less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or
less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree
provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until
the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The
second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the
time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not
violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be
terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason
may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such
that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its
dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING
333 SCRA 13
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25%
more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work
with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify
the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.