(#55) ANTONIO Y. CO VS.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 JULY 30, 1991

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the HRET is unconstitutional considering that they acted with grave
abuse of discretion and considering further the Respondent’s contention that they shall be the
sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members.

RULING:

Yes, HRET is constitutional.

Article VI, Section 17 of 1987 Constitution partly provides, “The Senate and the House of
Representative shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.”

In this case, the authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals.

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

In the present case, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process
on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
(#56) ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ROGER G. MERCADO

GR. NO. 97105 October 15, 1991

FACTS:

On June 7, 1987, the provincial board of canvassers reconvened, resumed the canvass
and proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate against the petitioner, Lerias, for the lone
district of Southern Leyte. The petitioner filed for the annulment of the canvass and proclamation
of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libangon be ordered
opened and the votes therein recounted from the exclusion of the board of canvassers ruled that
their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and
therefore, cannot be used as basis of canvass. Thereafter, the petitioner’s filed case was
dismissed because of the filed case in the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her
case with the Comelec. The case filed in the Court was heard but was dismissed, including the
motion for reconsideration, because the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation
of Mercado had already become executory. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an election
protest with respondent HRET. Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the
allegations of the protest and counter-protest. On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal, by a vote of
5-4, promulgated the protest of protestant Lerias is dismissed based on the Recapitulation of the
supporting details and declares Mercado as the duly elected Representative.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

RULINGS:

Yes, HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Article VI, Section 17 of 1987 Constitution partly provides, “The Senate and the House of
Representative shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.”

In this case, the authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals.

Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the
exercise of this Court's so-called "extra-ordinary jurisdiction" – upon a determination that the
tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal
of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse.
 In the present case, HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the protest
and disallowing the admission of the results of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and 19 of the Municipality
of Libagon, Southern Leyte, as reflected in the election returns, and the overwhelming
documentary and testimonial evidences introduced, supported by well-settled jurisprudence.
(#57) JOKER P. ARROYO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR.

G.R. NO. 118597 JULY 14, 1995

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman
of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco
protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud
hence he moved for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET
employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper
battles between the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to
overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including
and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is actually based on a
broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level
document-based anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such
determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already
beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise.
Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the
HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes, HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Under Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules partly provides, “After the expiration of the period
for filing of the protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto, substantial amendments which
broaden the scope of the action or introduce an additional cause of action shall not be allowed. .
. . .”
 In this case, the majority members of the Tribunal in fact had already sensed the
impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory when it issued its "show-cause" order
requiring the latter to explain why his election protest should not be dismissed. But the majority
violated with open eyes its own rules when they resolved not to dismiss the protest — a clear
indication of grave abuse of discretion. The least that public respondent HRET could have done
thereafter was to conduct further hearing so that petitioner Arroyo may have examined, objected
to and adduced evidence controverting private respondent Syjuco's "precinct-level document-
based evidence" despite the time within which the parties are allowed to present their evidence
has already lapsed. But nothing in the records indicates that one was conducted. Petitioner's right
to due process was clearly violated at this particular stage of the proceedings.