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QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR

QuAMTO (1990-2007)

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE

BAR

QuAMTO (1990-2007)
Legal and Judicial Ethics

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
ALIJON D. DE GUZMAN CHAIRPERSON
MARK KEVIN U. DELLOSA VICE-CHAIR FOR ACADEMICS
SHARMAGNE JOY A. BINAY VICE-CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE
ANTHONY M. ROBLES VICE-CHAIR FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN
CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA MEMBER, LAYOUT AND DESIGN TEAM
RAFAEL LORENZ SANTOS MEMBER, LAYOUT AND DESIGN TEAM
JAMES BRYAN V. ESTELEYDES VICE-CHAIR FOR RESEARCH

RESEARCH COMMITTEE
JAMES BRYAN V. ESTELEYDES RESEACH COMMITTEE HEAD
MARIA JAMYKA S. FAMA ASST. RESEARCH COMMITTEE HEAD
PAULINE BREISSEE GAYLE D. ALCARAZ MEMBER
ROBBIE BAÑAGA MEMBER
MONICA S. CAJUCOM MEMBER
DOMINIC VICTOR C. DE ALBAN MEMBER
ANNABELLA HERNANDEZ MEMBER
MA. CRISTINA MANZO-DAGUDAG MEMBER
WILLIAM RUSSELL MALANG MEMBER
CHARMAINE PANLAQUE MEMBER
OMAR DELOSO MEMBER
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QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR

QuAMTO (1990-2007)

DISCLAIMER

THE RISK OF USE, MISUSE OR NON-

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QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
LEGAL ETHICS
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Q: During the course of his cross-examination, your
client had testified to events and circumstances
which you personally know to be untrue. If his
testimony was given credence and accepted as fact
by the court, you are sure to win your client’s case.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what
is your obligation to the public (1994)?
A: A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility). A lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1).
Q: Atty. BB borrowed P30,000.00 from EG to be
paid in six months. Despite reminders from EG,
Atty. BB failed to pay the loan on its due date.
Instead of suing in court, EG lodged with an IBP
chapter a complaint for failure to pay a just debt
against Atty. BB. The chapter secretary endorsed
the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD). A commissioner of the CBD issued an order
directing Atty. BB to answer the complaint against
him but the latter ignored the order. Another order
was issued for the parties to appear before the
Commissioner at a certain date and time but only
EG showed up. A third order submitting the case for
resolution was likewise ignored by Atty. BB. Was
Atty. BB justified in ignoring the orders of the
Commission on the ground that the Commission
had no power to discipline him for acts done in his
private capacity? Why? (2002)
A: Atty. BB is not justified in ignoring the orders of
the Commission on Bar Discipline. In doing so, he
violated his oath of office for disobeying orders of a
duly constituted authority. A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
(Rule 1.02; Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367)
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public,
notarized a document already prepared by spouses
Roger and Luisa when they approached him. It is
stated in the document that Roger and Luisa
formally agreed to live separately from each other
and either one can have a live-in partner with full
consent of the other. What is the liability of Atty.
Asilo, if any? (1998, 1992)
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility – a lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. An agreement
between two spouses to live separately from each
other and either one could have a live-in partner
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with full consent of the other, is contrary to law and
morals. The ratification by a notary public who is a
lawyer of such illegal or immoral contract or
document constitutes malpractice or gross
misconduct in office. He should at least refrain from
its consummation (In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 661;
Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, In re Bucana,
72 SCRA 14).
Q: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted
attorney’s fees on the ground that counsel did not
wish to intervene in the process of effecting a fair
settlement of the case. Decide. (2001)
A: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement”. If a
lawyer should refuse to intervene in a settlement
proceeding, his entitlement to his attorney’s fees
may be affected. However, if he has already
rendered some valuable services to the client, he
must be paid his attorney’s fees on the basis of
quantum meruit, even if it is assumed that he is
dismissed.
Q: Distinguish “Ambulance Chasing” from
“Barratry” (1993)
A: Ambulance chasing is any act of improper
solicitation of cases such as fomenting litigation or
instigating unnecessary lawsuits. It is the practice of
lawyers in frequenting hospitals and homes of the
injured in order to convince them to go to court.
Barratry is an offense of exciting or stirring up suits
and quarrels. Both are improper and unethical acts
of a lawyer. Ambulance chasing refers more to a
lawyer who instigates a victim in a motor vehicle
accident to file a case. Barratry is any form of
fomenting suit.
Q: A businessman is looking for a new retainer. He
approached you and asked for your schedule of
charges. He informed you the professional fees he
is presently paying his retainer, which is actually
lower than your rates. He said that if your rates are
lower, he would engage your services. Will you
lower your rates in order to get the client? Explain.
(2006)
A: No, I would not. Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless circumstances so warrant.” This is
aimed against the practice of “cutthroat
competition” which is not in keeping with the
principle that the practice of law is a noble
profession and not a trade. Moreover, if he agrees,
he would be encroaching on the employment of a
fellow lawyer, which is prohibited by Rule 8.02 of the
Code.

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
Q: You are the managing partner of a law firm. A
new foreign airline company, recently granted
rights by the Civil Aeronautics Board at the NAIA, is
scouting for a law firm which could handle its cases
in the Philippines and provide legal services to the
company and its personnel. After discussing with
you the extent of the legal services your law firm is
prepared to render, the general manager gives you
a letter-proposal from another law firm in which its
time-billing rates and professional fees for various
legal services are indicated. You are asked to
submit a similar letter-proposal stating your firm’s
proposed fees. The airline company’s general
manager also tells you that, if your proposed fees
would at least be 25 percent lower than those
proposed by the other firm, you will get the
company’s legal business. How would you react to
the suggestion? (1997)
A: I will emphasize to the General Manager that the
practice of law is a profession and not a trade.
Consequently, I will not propose a lower fee just for
the sake of competing with another firm, because
such practice smacks of commercialism. Moreover,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not charge rates lower
than those customarily prescribed unless the
circumstances so warrant. I will charge fees that will
be reasonable under the circumstances.
Q: Nene approached Atty. Nilo and asked him if it
was alright to buy a piece of land which Maneng
was selling. What was shown by Maneng to Nene
was an Original Certificate of Title with many
annotations and old patches, to which Nene
expressed suspicions. However, Atty. Nilo, desirous
of pushing through with the transaction because of
the high notarial fee promised to him, told Nene
that the title was alright and that she should not
worry since he is an attorney and that he knew
Maneng well. He notarized the Deed of Sale and
Nene paid Maneng P108,000.00. it turned out that
Maneng had previously sold the same property to
another person. For the injustice done to Nene,
may Atty. Nilo be disciplined? (1998)
A: Yes. Atty. Nilo is guilty of gross negligence in
protecting the interests of his client. A lawyer should
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him liable,
(Rule 3.01 Code of Professional Responsibility).
Worse, he was negligent because he placed his own
interest in receiving a high notarial fee over and
above the interest of his client. In the case of
Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202, which involves
similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the lawyer
“should have been conscientious in seeing to it that
justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for
which his services had been engaged, in conformity
with the a vowed duties of a worthy member of the
Bar.”
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Q: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance on
behalf of the State before a Family Court in a case
for declaration of nullity of marriage, but he failed
to appear in all the subsequent proceedings. When
required by the Department of Justice to explain,
he argued that the parties in the case were ably
represented by their respective counsels and that
his time would be better employed in more
substantial prosecutorial functions, such as
investigations, inquests and appearances in court
hearings. Is Atty. Coronel’s explanation tenable?
(2006)
A: Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable the role
of the State’s lawyer in nullification of marriage
cases is that of protector of the institute of marriage
(Art 48, Family Code). “The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institute requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro
forma compliance” (Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 355 SCRA
285 [2001]). This role could not be left to the private
counsels who have been engaged to protect the
private interest of the parties.
Q: Atty. E has a daily 10-minute radio program
billed as a “Court of Common Troubles.” The
program is advertised by the radio station as a
public service feature for those who seek but
cannot afford to pay for legal advice. Its sponsors
include a food processing company and a detergent
manufacturing firm which share with the radio
station the monthly remuneration of Atty. E. Is
there any impropriety in Atty. E’s role under the
above arrangement? (1997)
A: Giving advice on legal matters through the
medium of a newspaper column or radio or
television broadcast is improper. It would involve
indirect advertising and violation of the confidential
relation between lawyer and client (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1992 ed. P. 82).
Q: Atty. Thess Tuazon writes a regular column in a
newspaper of general circulation, as well as legal
articles in a leading magazine. Her by-line always
includes the name of her law firm where she is a
name partner. Would you consider this as improper
advertising? Explain. (1993)
A: I would consider putting the by-line under the
name of her law firm improper. It is an indirect way
of advertising her law firm. Naming her law firm
achieves no other purpose than to inform the public
and possible clientele of the existence of her law
firm and of her being actively engaged in the
practice of law.
Q: Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or
unethical. Write “Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the
case may be, opposite each letter and explain.

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
1. A calling card, 2x2 in size, bearing his name in
bold print, office, residence and e-mail address,
telephone and facsimile numbers.
2. A business card, 3’’x4’’ in size, indicating the
aforementioned data with his photo, 1’’x1’’ in size.
(2002)
A:
1. Ethical – A lawyer, in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts
(Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility)
2. Unethical – The size of the card and the
inclusion of the lawyer’s photo in it smacks of
commercialism.
Q: A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading a
newspaper one weekend, saw the following
advertisement.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221
Mondays to Fridays
The following session day, the Justice called the
attention of 8:00
his colleagues and p.m.
the Bar Confidant
a.m. to 5:00
was directed to verify the advertisement. It turned
out that the number belongs to Attorney X, who
was then directed to explain to the court why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for the
improper advertisement. Attorney X, in his answer,
averred that (1) the advertisement was not
improper because his name was not mentioned in
the ad; and (2) he could not be subjected to
disciplinary action because there was no complaint
against him. Rule on Attorney X’s contention.
(2003, 1998)
A:
1. The advertisement is improper because it is a
solicitation of legal business and is tantamount to
self-praise by claiming to be a “competent lawyer”.
The fact that his name is not mentioned does not
make the advertisement proper. His identity can be
easily determined by calling the telephone number
stated. In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223
SCRA 378 (1993), the Supreme Court found a similar
advertisement to be improper is spite of the fact
that the name of a lawyer was also not mentioned.
2. A complaint is not necessary to initiate disciplinary
action against a lawyer. In Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, disciplinary action against a
lawyer may be initiated by the Supreme Court motu
proprio.
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Q: Determine whether the following advertisement
by an attorney is ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the case may be,
opposite each letter and explain.
A small announcement in BALITA, a tabloid
in Filipino that the attorney is giving free
legal advice for (the indigent within the
month of) September 2002. (2002)
A: Unethical – The announcement in a newspaper
that he will give free legal advice to the indigent is a
form of self-praise. [In re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37
(1929)]
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a
lawyer, Atty. A argues that although the calling card
of his businessman friend indicates his law office
and his legal specialty, the law office is located in
his friend’s store. Decide. (2001)
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the
prohibition on improper advertising. There is no
valid reason why the lawyer’s businessman friend
should be handling out calling cards which contains
the lawyer’s law office and legal specialty, even if his
office is located in his friend’s store. What makes it
more objectionable is the statement of his supposed
legal specialty.
Q: A lone law practitioner Bartolome D. Carton,
who inherited the law office from his deceased
father Antonio C. Carton, carries these names:
“Carton & Carton Law Office.” Is that permissible or
objectionable? Explain. (2001, 1996, 1994)
A: Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides as follows: “In the choice of a
firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
shall be used; the continued use of the name of
deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that the
partner is deceased.”
Since Atty. Antonio C. Carton is a solo
practitioner, it is improper for him to use the firm
name “Carton & Carton Law Office”, which indicates
that he is and/or was in partnership with his father.
Even if he indicates in all his communication that his
father is already dead, the use of the firm name is
still misleading because his father was never his
partner before.
Q: Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or
unethical. Write “Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the
case may be, opposite each letter and explain.
A. xxx
B. xxx
C. A pictorial press release in a broadsheet
newspaper made by the attorney showing him
being congratulated by the president of a client

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
corporation for winning a multi-million damage suit
against the company in the Supreme Court.
D. The same Press release made by his client in a
tabloid. (2002)
A:
C. Unethical – A lawyer should not resort to indirect
advertisements such as procuring his photograph to
be published in a newspaper in connection with a
case he is handling. He should not pay or give
something of value to representatives of mass media
in anticipation of, or return for, publicity to attract
legal business (Rule 3.04, Code of Professional
responsibility)
D. Ethical – The lawyer can no longer be held
responsible for the action of his client. However, it
would be unethical if he knew about his client’s
intention to publish and still did nothing to stop it.
Q: Upon learning from newspaper reports that the
bar candidate Vic Pugote passed the bar
examinations. Miss Adorable immediately lodged a
complaint with the Supreme Court, praying that Vic
Pugote be disallowed from taking the oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar because he was
maintaining illicit sexual relations with several
women other than his lawfully wedded spouse.
However, from unexplained reasons, he succeeded
to take his oath as a lawyer. Later, when
confronted with Miss Adorable’s complaint
formally, Pugote moved for its dismissal on the
ground that it is already moot and academic.
Should Miss Adorable’s complaint be dismissed or
not? (2004)
A: It should not be dismissed. Her charge involves a
matter of good moral character which is not only a
requisite for admission to the Bar, but also a
continuing condition for remaining a member of the
Bar. As such, the admission of Vic Pugote to the Bar
does not render the question moot and academic.
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
the development of the legal system? (2004)
A: A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of
the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in
law reform and in the administration of justice
(Canon 4, Code of Professional Responsibility). He
shall keep abreast of legal developments; participate
in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law school as
well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence. (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
Q: D was charged with estafa by C before the
barangay for misappropriating the proceeds of sale
of jewelry on commission. In (the) settlement of
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the case, D turned over to the barangay captain, a
lawyer, the amount of P2,000.00 with the request
that the barangay captain turn over the money to
C. Several months passed without C being advised
of the status of her complaint. C contacted D who
informed her that she (D) had long before turned
over the amount of P2,000.00 to the barangay
captain who undertook to give the money to her
(C). C thus filed a case against the barangay captain
who at once remitted the amount of P2,000.00 to
C. May the barangay captain be faulted
administratively? Explain. (2000, 1992)
A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to lawyers who are in the government
service. As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his office as a government official. However, if
that misconduct as a government official is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.
(Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 [1996]). In the case of
Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304 SCRA 281 (1999), a
barangay captain who failed to remit for several
months the amount given to him for payment of an
obligation, was found to have violated the Code of
Professional Conduct.
Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should it
be mandatory that the public prosecutor be present
at the trial of a criminal case despite the presence
of a private prosecutor? (2001, 1992)
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial
of the criminal case despite the presence of a private
prosecutor in order to see to it that the interest of
the State is well-guarded and protected, should the
private prosecutor be found lacking in competence
in prosecuting the case. Moreover, the primary duty
of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see to
it that justice is done (Rule 6.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility). A private prosecutor would be
naturally interested only in the conviction of the
accused.
Q: Atty. Herminio de Pano is a former prosecutor of
the City of Manila who established his own law
office after taking advantage of the Early
Retirement Law. He was approached by Estrella
Cabigao to act as private prosecutor in an estafa
case in which she is the complainant. It appears
that said estafa case was investigated by Atty. de
Pano when he was still a prosecutor. Should Atty.
de Pano accept employment as private prosecutor
in said estafa case? Explain. (1991)
A: Atty. de Pano should not accept the employment
as private prosecutor as he will be violating Canon 6,
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not, after leaving

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
government service, accept employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service. The restriction
against a public official using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his tenure in certain
matters which (he) intervened as a public official.
LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
towards: the legal profession and the Integrated
Bar? (2004)
A: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the integrated bar. (Canon 7, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
Q: Prior to his admission to the freshman year in a
reputable law school. Bar examinee A was charged
before the Municipal Trial Court with damage to
property through reckless imprudence for
accidentally sideswiping a parked jeepney. The case
was amicably settled with A agreeing to pay the
claim of the jeepney owner for P1,000.00. In his
application to take the 1997 Bar Examinations, A
did not disclose the above incident. Is he qualified
to take the Bar Examinations? (1997, 2005)
A: Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsility
provides that “a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar” In the case of In Re Ramon
Galang, 66 SCRA 245, the respondent repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the fact that there was
a pending criminal case for slight physical injuries
against him in all four (4) applications for admission
to take the bar examinations. He was found to have
fraudulently concealed and withheld such fact from
the Supreme Court and committed perjury. The
Supreme Court cited the rule that “the concealment
of an attorney in his application to take the bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged
with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law.”
A’s failure to disclose that he had been charged with
damage to property through reckless imprudence in
his application for admission to the bar examinations
disqualifies him. It does not matter that the offense
charged does not involve moral turpitude or has
been amicably settled. It is up to the Supreme Court
to determine whether the offense charged involved
moral turpitude or not. What is important is that he
concealed such fact from the Supreme Court or even
misrepresented under oath that he had not been
charged. This produces an unfavorable impression
on his moral character.
Page |7
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
his professional colleagues? (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall conducted himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.” (Canon 8, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
Q: May a lawyer give a proper advice and
assistance to a client of another lawyer? Support
your answer. (2001)
A: There is nothing wrong with giving proper advice
and assistance to a client of another lawyer, as long
as no conflict of interest is involved and he does not
encroach, directly or indirectly, on the employment
of the said lawyer. However, Rule 8.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility allows a lawyer,
“without fear or favor, to give a proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
and neglectful counsel.”
Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific
performance against DEV, Inc., a subdivision
developer which is presented by Atty. L. Your client
believes that the president of DEV, Inc., would be
willing to consider an amicable settlement and your
client urges to discuss the matter with DEV, Inc.,
without the presence of Atty. L whom he
considered to be an implement to an early
comprise. Would it be all right for you to negotiate
the terms of the compromise as so suggested above
by your client? (1997, 2006)
A: No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 for the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer.” Canon
9 of the Code Professional Ethics is more particular.
“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of the controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise.” In the case
of Likong v. Lim, 135 SCRA 414, a lawyer was
suspended for negotiating a compromise agreement
directly with the adverse party without the presence
and participation of her counsels.
Q: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for
plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy
to enter into a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff without the knowledge and participation
of defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris
acceded and executed the agreement. Therein
Doris admitted her obligation in full and bound
herself per annum in ten (10) equal monthly
installments. The compromise agreement was
approved by the court. Realizing that she was
prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Hilado alleging that the

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
latter prevent her from consulting her lawyer Atty.
De Jose when she entered into the compromise
agreement, thereby violating the rule of
professional conduct, Atty. Hilado countered that
Doris Dy freely and voluntary entered into the
compromise agreement which in fact was approved
bythe court. Did Atty. Hans Hilado commit
malpractice and grave misconduct as a lawyer?
Explain. (1995)
A: Atty. Hilado committed an act of malpractice.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly
encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer.” Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Ethics that that a lawyer should not in
any way communicate upon the subject of a
controversy with a party represented by a counsel:
much should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. Under similar facts the lawyer
concern was suspended for committing acts
constituting malpractice and grave misconduct
(Likong v. Lim, 235 SCRA 414).
Q: Myrna, petitioner for a case for custody of
children against her husband, sought advice from
Atty. Mendoza whom she met at a party. She
informed Atty. Mendoza that her lawyer, Atty.
Khan, has been charging her exorbitant appearance
fees when all he does is move for postponement
which have unduly delayed the proceedings; and
that recently, she learned that Atty. Khan
approached her husband asking for huge amount in
exchange for the withdrawal of her Motion for
Issuance of Hold Departure Order so that he and his
children can leave for abroad. What should Atty.
Mendoza do about the information relayed to him
by Myrna that Atty. Khan approached her husband
with an indecent proposal? (2006)
A: Atty. Mendoza can advise her to terminate the
service of Atty. Khan and/or file an administrative
case against Atty. Khan. It is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaith or
neglectful counsel (Rule 8.02, CPR).
Q: Supposing Tony is a defendant in a civil case for
collection of sum of money before the same court,
can Atty. Fernandez appear for him to conduct his
litigation? (2006)
A: Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty.
Fernandez cannot be allowed to appear for him to
conduct his litigation; otherwise, the judge will be
violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Page |8
Q: You had just taken your oath as a lawyer. The
secretary to the president of a big university
offered to get you as the official notary public of
the school. She explained that a lot of students lose
their Identification Cards and are required to secure
an affidavit of loss before they can be issued a new
one. She claimed that this would be very lucrative
for you, as more than 30 students lose their
Identification Cards every month. However, the
secretary wants you to give her one-half of your
earnings there from. Will you agree to the
arrangement? Explain. (2005)
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
service with persons not licensed to practice law “.
The secretary is not licensed to practice law and is
not entitled to a share of the fees for notarizing
affidavits, which is a legal service.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS
Q: During the course of his cross-examination, your
client had testified to events and circumstances
which you personally know to be untrue. If his
testimony was given credence and accepted as fact
by the court, you are sure to win your client’s case.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what
is your obligation to the court? (1994)
A: A lawyer shall do any falsehood, nor consent to
any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice (Rule 10.01, Canon 10,
Code of Professional of Responsibility). A lawyer shall
not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent
himself or to impersonate another (Rule 12.06,
Canon 12)
Q: Due to the number of cases handled by Atty.
Cesar, he failed to file a notice of change of address
with the Court of Appeals. Hence, he was not able
to file an appellant’s brief and consequently, the
case was dismissed. Aggrieves, Atty. Cesar filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing the appeal and to set aside the entry of
judgment on the ground that he already indicated
in his “Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appeal Brief” his new address and that his failure
to file a notice of change of address is an excusable
negligence. Will the motion prosper? Explain.
(2005)
A: The motion will not prosper. It is the lawyer’s duty
to inform the court or to make of record of his
change of address. His failure to do so does not
constitute excusable negligence. The lawyer cannot
presume that the court will take cognizance of the
new address in his motion for extension of time
(Philippines Suburban Dev. Corp. Vs. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 109 [19080]).

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
Q: In a pending labor case, Atty. A filed a Position
Paper on behalf of his client, citing a Supreme Court
case and quoting a portion of the decision therein
which he stated reflected the ratio decidendi.
However, what he quoted was not actually the
Supreme Court ruling but the argument of one of
the parties to the case. May Atty. A be faulted
administratively? Explain. (2000)
A: Yes, he may be faulted administratively. A lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Conduct
expressly provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel,
or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative
by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not has been proved. To cite an argument
of one of the parties as a ratio decidendi of a
Supreme Court decision shows, at least, lack of
diligence on the part of Atty. A (Commission on
Election v. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254[1998]).
Q: When is public comment and criticism of a court
decision permissible and when would it be
improper? (1997)
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to
comment on and criticize the decision of the court.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise that right but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretion of
courts and judges. But such right is subject to the
limitation that it shall be bona fide. It is proper to
criticize the court and judges, but it is improper to
subject them to abuse and slander, degrade them or
destroy public confidence in them. Moreover, “a
lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motive not
supported by the record or have no materiality in
the case” (Rule 11.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility).
Q: Having lost in the Regional Trial Court and then
in the Court of Appeals, Atty. Mercado appealed to
the Supreme Court. In a minute resolution, the
Supreme Court denied his petition for review for
lack of merit. He filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. After the judgment had
become final and executor, Atty. Mercado publicly
criticized the Supreme Court for having rendered
what he called an unjust judgment, even as he
ridiculed the members of the Court by direct insults
and vituperative innuendoes. Asked to explain why
he should not be punished for his clearly
contemptuous statements, Atty. Mercado sets up
the defense that his statements were uttered after
the litigation had been finally terminated and that
he is entitled to criticize judicial actuations. Is Atty.
Mercado’s contention tenable? Explain. (1993)
Page |9
A: Atty. Mercado’s contention is not tenable. While
he is free to criticize the decision itself, he is not at
liberty to call said judgment an unjust judgment and
to ridicule the members of the court. It is one thing
to analyze and criticize the decision itself, which is
proper, and it is another thing to ridicule the
members of the court, which is wrong. The right of a
lawyer to comment on or criticize decision of a judge
or his actualizations is not unlimited. It is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spell over the walls or
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and judges on the other. A
publication in or outside the court tending to
impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit, or to
degrade the courts, destroy public confidence in
them or bring them into disrepute, whether or not
there is a pending litigation, transcends the limits of
fair comment. Such publication or intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the lawyer’s
duty to respect the courts. It is a misconduct that
subjects him to disciplinary action.
Q: In a petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court, Atty. Dizon alleged that Atty. Padilla, a legal
researcher in the Court of Appeals drafted the
assailed Decision; that he is ignorant of the
applicable laws and that he should be disbarred.
Can Atty. Dizon, in castigating Atty. Padilla, be held
liable for unethical conduct against the Court of
Appeals? (2006)
A: Yes. He can be held liable for lack of respect for
the Court of Appeals. “Decisions are rendered by the
courts and not the persons or personnel who may
participate therein by virtue of their office. It is
highly improper and unethical for counsel to impute
the allegations against Atty. Padilla. Counsel for the
petitioner should be reminded of the elementary
rules of the legal profession regarding respect for
the courts by the use of proper language in its
pleading and should be admonished for his improper
references to the researcher of the CA in his
petition. A lawyer should avoid scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the courts”
(Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78 [2000])
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
the administration of justice (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall not exert every effort and consider
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.”(Canon 12, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
Q: On June 8, 2001, RJ field with the Supreme Court
a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, to forestall his removal as chairman and

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
general manager of the government agency. He
believed he had a fixed term until January 31, 2004,
but there are indications that the new president
would replace him. As he had apprehended, an
Administrative Order was issued by the Chief
Executive on July 2, 2001 recalling RJ’s
appointment. Shortly thereafter, PT was appointed
to the position. On July 3, 2003, RJ filed a motion to
withdraw his petition. On the same day, without
waiting for the resolution of his motion, he filed
another petition with the Regional Trial Court
seeking to prevent his removal as chairman and
general manager of the government agency. On
July 8, 2001, his motion to withdraw the first
petition was granted by the Supreme Court without
prejudice to his liability, if any, for contempt for
engaging in forum-shopping. Is he guilty of forum-
shopping? Explain. (2002, 1991)
A: RJ is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is
the practice of filing multiple actions arising from the
same cause (Rule 12.02, Code of Professional
Responsibility). It is clear that RJ’s petition for
prohibition was still pending in the Supreme Court
when he filed the same petition in the Regional Trial
Court. He should have waited first for the resolution
of his motion to withdraw before filing the second
petition because he cannot assume that the motion
will be granted.
Q: The Supreme Court issued a resolution in a case
pending before it, requiring the petitioner to file,
within ten (10) days from notice, a reply to the
respondent’s comment. Attorney A, representing
the petitioner, failed to file the reply despite the
extension given by the Court. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for non-compliance with its
resolution. Attorney A timely moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition,
claiming that his secretary, who was quite new in
the office, failed to remind him of the deadline
within which to file a reply. Resolve Attorney A’s
motion. (2003)
A: Attorney A’s motion is not meritorious. He has
violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, led the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so”. His claim that it
was the fault of his secretary is not sufficient. He
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his
secretary because the latter is not a guardian of the
lawyer’s responsibilities (Nidua v. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
581).
Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to
appear before Judge B who is A’s relative,
compadre and former office colleague. Is A ethically
compelled to refuse the engagement? Why? (2001)
P a g e | 10
A: A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of the cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of the influencing
the court (Canon 13, Code of Professional Conduct).
There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer
appearing before a judge who is a relative, compadre
or former office colleague as long as the lawyer
avoids giving the impression that he can influence
the judge. On the other hand, the judge is required
by the Code of Judicial Conduct not to take part in
any proceeding where his impartiality may be
reasonably questioned (Rule 3.12 Code of Judicial
Conduct). Among the grounds for mandatory
disqualification of the judge is if any of the lawyers is
a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree.
Q: Attorney A is the legal counsel of “Ang
Manggagawa,” a labor union whose case is pending
before the Court of Appeals. In order to press for
the early resolution of their case, the union officers
decided to stage a demonstration in front of the
Court of Appeals, which Attorney A, when
consulted, approved of, saying that it was their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of their
grievances and for the speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies. Is it appropriate for Attorney
A to give that advice to the union officers? Explain.
(2003)
A: The advice of Attorney A is not proper. In the case
of Nestle’ Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542
(1987), the Supreme Court held that picketing before
a court are attempts to pressure or influence the
courts of justice and constitute contempt of court.
The duty of advising the picketers and their leaders
lies heavily on their lawyers.
Q: Before he joined the bench, Judge J was a former
vice-mayor. Judge J also writes a weekly column in
a local newspaper. In his column, Judge J wrote:
“I was wondering if the present vice-
mayor can shed off his crocodile hide so
that he can feel the clamor of the public
for the resignation of hoodlum public
officers of which he is one”.
When charged administratively, Judge J
invoked freedom of expression. Is his defense
tenable? Explain. (2000)
A: The judge’s reliance on freedom of expression is
untenable. The judge’s vicious writings compromise
his duties as a judge in the impartial administration
of justice. His writings lack judicial decorum which
requires the use of temperate language at all times.
The judge should not instigate litigation (Galang v.
Santos, 307 SCRA 583 {1999}, Royeca v. Animas, 71
SCRA 1 {1976}).

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal
sponsor at the wedding of his son. Atty. J met Judge
K a month before. During an IBP-sponsored
reception to welcome Judge K into the community,
and having learned that Judge K takes his breakfast
at a coffee shop near his (Judge K’s) boarding
house, Atty. J made it a point to be at the coffee
shop at about the time that Judge K takes his
breakfast. Comment on Atty. J’s acts. Do they
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2000)
A: Yes, his actions violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 13.01 of the same Code provides
that a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with judges. Atty. J obviously
sought opportunity for cultivating familiarity with
Judge K by being at the coffee shop where the latter
takes his breakfast, and is extending extraordinary
attention to the judge by inviting him to be a
principal sponsor at the weeding of his son.
Q: As a defense counsel for the accused in a
sensational case for abduction which the media is
covering, you are fully convinced from the judge’s
actuations that he is biased against your client. You
are asked by the reporters to comment on the
proceedings and the judge’s conduct. How should
you react on the matter? (2003)
A: I will decline to give any comment. Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“a lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for against a party.”
LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as
defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course of the
proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was
an agnostic and a homosexual. By reason thereof,
Atty. DD filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
without Mr. BB’s express consent. Is Atty. DD’s
motion legally tenable? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He
has no valid cause to terminate his services. His
client, Mr. BB, being an agnostic and homosexual,
should not be deprived of his counsel’s
representation solely for that reason. A lawyer shall
not decline to represent a person solely on account
of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of
said person (Canon 14,Rule 14.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility).
Q: What is a lawyer’s duty if he finds that he cannot
honestly put up a valid or meritorious defense but
his client insists that he litigate? Explain. (2002,
2001)
P a g e | 11
A: It depends, if it is a criminal case, he may not
decline to represent the accused solely on his
opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Rule
14.01, Code of Professional Responsibility). The
Supreme Court has held that a counsel de officio has
the duty to defend his client no matter how guilty he
perceives him to be {People v. Nadera, Jr.,324 SCRA
490(2002)}. But if the case is a civil case, he should
decline to accept the same. In a civil action, the rules
and ethics of the profession enjoin a lawyer from
taking a bad case. The Attorney’s signature in every
pleading constitutes a certification that there is good
cause to support it and that it is not interposed for
delay. It is the Attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to
be just and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.
Q: May lawyer decline a request for the free legal
aid to an indigent accused made by a chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)? Explain.
(2002)
A: Rule 14.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not
decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio for as amicus
curiae or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapter for rendition of free
legal aid.” He may, therefore, decline such as
appointment for “serious and sufficient cause.” For
example, he may decline such appointment if it will
involve a conflict of interest with another client.
Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel
de oficio be justified on grounds aside from reasons
of health, extensive travel abroad, or similar
reasons of urgency? Support your answer. (2001)
A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as
counsel de oficio are:
(a) Too many de oficio cases assigned to the
lawyer (People v. Daeng, 49 SCRA 222);
(b) Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
(c) Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the
work effectively or competently (supra);
(d) Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by
reason of his public office which prohibits
appearances in court; and
(e) Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases
which will spell prejudice to the new clients.
Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law
practitioner, has a cattle ranch in the remote
municipality of Caranglan, Neuva Ecija. He attends
to his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, and spends the rest of the week
in his cattle ranch riding horses and castrating bulls.
In a criminal case pending before the Municipal
Trial Court of Caranglan, the only other licensed
member of the Bar is representing the private

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
complainant. The accused is a detention prisoner.
The judge wants to expedite proceedings.
1. What must the judge do to expedite
proceedings?
2. If Attorney Vidal is appointed to act as counsel
de oficio for the accused, could he refuse by saying
that in the province, he does not want to do
anything except ride horses and castrate bulls?
Explain. (1993)
A:
1. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de
oficio in order to expedite the proceedings. This is
especially because the accused is a detention
prisoner who is presumed to be indigent and cannot
retain a paid counsel.
2. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the
appointment as counsel de oficio. While it is true
that he stays in the province to rest during the latter
part of the week as lawyer he must comply with his
oath to assist in the administration of justice. This
precisely one the objective of the Integrated Bar
which is to compel all lawyers in the active practice
or not to comply with their obligation to assist in the
administration of justice.
Q: May a lawyer decline as appointment by the
court as counsel de oficio for an accused because he
believes, and is fully convinced that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged? (1991)
A: A lawyer may not decline an appointment as
counsel de oficio even if he is convinced that the
accused is guilty. It is his obligation to at least
protect his rights. He might even have him acquitted
or at least reduce his penalty depending on the
evidence presented during the trial.
Q: Will your answer be different if the legal aid is
requested in a civil case? (2002)
A: My answer will not be exactly the same, because
in a civil case, the lawyer can also decline if he
believes the action or defense to be unmeritorious.
He is ethically bound to maintain only actions and
proceedings which appear to him to be just and only
such defenses which he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law.
Q: Should a lawyer accept the losing case in a civil
case. Explain. (1996)
A: A lawyer may not accept a “losing” civil case.
Firstly, his signature in every pleading constitutes a
certification that there is good cause to support it
and that it is not interposed for delay (Sec. 5, Rule 7,
Rules of Court). Secondly, it is the lawyer’s duty to
counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only
as appear to him to be just and such defenses only
as he believes to be honestly debatable under law
(Sec. 20(a), Rule 138, Rules of Court). Thirdly, he is
not to encourage either the commencement or
P a g e | 12
continuance of an action or proceeding or delay in
any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interests
(Sec. 20(g), Rule 138). Fourthly, he must decline to
conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or
endure the opposite party or to work oppression or
wrong (Canon 130, Canons of Professional Ethics). If
a lawyer were to accept a bad civil case, it will either
be to exert to his best efforts towards a compromise
or, if unsuccessful, to advice his client to confess
judgment.
Q: Would your be the same if he is asked to be
counsel for a defendant in a civil case whose
defense is based on falsified documents? If your
answer is different, explain the ethical
considerations for difference. (1991)
A: If the defense in a civil case is based on falsified
documents the lawyer should decline. That is in
compliance with the lawyer’s oath that he should
not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless false or unlawful cause or give nor
consent to the same. He is obligated not to delay a
man’s cause for money or malice.
LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
his client (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.” (Canon 15, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
Q: X was indicted for murder. As he had no counsel
on arraignment, the trial court appointed Atty. A as
his counsel de oficio. When Atty. A asked X what
was his stand, X said he was guilty. X thereupon
pleaded guilty. Trial was thereafter conducted.
When the turn of the defense to present evidence
came, Atty. A manifested that he was not
presenting any and that he was submitting the case
for decision, praying that X’s plea be considered
mitigating. Did Atty. A’s assistance or conduct
approximate the competence and deligence which
the Code of Professional Responsibility expected
him? Explain. (2000)
A: No, it is the duty of the defense counsel when his
client desires to enter a plea of guilty to fully
acquaint himself with the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case, advise his client of his
constitutional rights and the full import of a plea
guilty, see to it that the prescribed procedure is
observed, present evidence, including possible
mitigating circumstances, so that the precise degree
of his client’s culpability is established and the
appropriate penalty is imposed, and thus leave no
room for doubt that there was a mistake and

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges to
which his client has pleaded guilty. Atty. A has fallen
short of this required conduct.
Q: On the day of his arraignment, your client
confided in you that he in fact killed the victim for
which he was being charged with murder. You had
been led to believe initially that he was just being
framed and that another person had committed the
crime. How would you advise your client to plead?
(1994)
A: I would first inquire fully into the circumstances
under which he killed the victim. If I find out that he
is guilty as charged, I would advise him to plead
guilty, after explaining to him his constitutional
rights and the import of plea of guilty.
Q: On the day of his arraignment, your client
confided in you that he in fact killed the victim for
which he was being charged with murder. You had
been led to believe initially that he was just being
framed and that another person had committed the
crime. If he should refuse to heed your advice, what
course of action would you pursue? (1994)
A: If he should refuse to follow my advice, I will still
render effective legal assistance to him, I will spare
no effort to save him from an unrighteous conviction
and to present, by all fair and reasonable means,
every defense or mitigating circumstance that the
law permits to the end that he may not be deprived
of life or liberty but by due process of law legally
applied.
Q: Explain your understanding of “Conflict of
Interest” under the Code of professional
Responsibility. (1997, 1993)
A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing
conflicting interest. There is conflict of interests
within the context of the rule when, on behalf of
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contented for that
which his duty to another client requires him to
oppose. Another test is wether the acceptance of a
charging fully his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to another client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as
counsel for one party against his present client even
in a totally unrelated case. With regard to former
client, the traditional rule is to distinguish between
related and unrelated cases. A lawyer may not
represent a subsequent client against former client
in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly,
to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client, otherwise,
he may. However, in the case of Rosacia vs. Atty.B.
Bulalacao, 248 SCRA 665, the Supreme Court ruled
P a g e | 13
that a lawyer may not accept a case against a former
client, even on an unrelated matter.
“The Court reiterates that an attorney owes
loyalty to his client not in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated as it is not good
practice permit after-wards to defend in another
case other person against his former client under the
pretext that the other case. It behooves respondent
not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encourage to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.”
Q: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the
Rosales Law Office which is representing
Corporation X before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Atty. Montes who is now practicing on
his own, entered her appearance as counsel for
Corporation Y in a suit between said corporation
and Corporation X. Atty. Montes claims that since
she did not personally handle the case of
Corporation X when she was still with the Rosales
Law Office she will not be representing conflicting
interests. Is such argument valid? Explain. (1992)
A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be
appearing for conflicting interests if she appears for
Corporation Y against Corporation X.
This question is similar to the case of
Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Court of Appeals. In said
case, the Philippine Blooming Mills was the retainer
of the ACCRA Law Office. Three lawyers of the
ACCRA Law Office separated from said law firm and
established their own law office. The three lawyers
were disqualified from appearing for a corporation
against the Philippine Blooming Mills.
The rule prohibiting appearing for
conflicting interests applies to law firms. The
employment of one member of a law firm is
considered as an employment of the law firm and
that the employment of a law firm is equivalent to a
retainer of the members thereof.
Q: Primo, Segundo and Tercero are co-accused in
information charging them with the crime of
homicide. They are respectively represented by
Attys. Juan Uno, Jose Dos and Pablo Tres. During
the pre-trial conference, Attys. Uno and Dos
manifested to the court that their clients are
invoking alibi as their defense. Atty. Tres made it
known that accused Tercero denies involvement
and would testify that Primo and Segundo actually
perpetrated the commission of the offense charged
in the information.
In one hearing during the presentation of
the prosecution’s evidence in chief, Atty. Uno failed

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
to appear in court. When queried by the Judge if
accused Primo is willing to proceed with the
hearing despite his counsel’s absence, Primo gave
his consent provided Attys. Dos and Tres would be
designated as his joint counsel de oficio for that
particular hearing. Thereupon, the court directed
Attys. Dos and Tres to act as counsel de oficio of
accused Primo only for purposes of the scheduled
hearing.
Atty. Dos accepted his designation, but
Atty. Tres refused. Is there any impediment to Atty.
Dos acting as counsel de oficio for accused Primo?
Reason. (2004)
A: There is no impediment to Atty. Dos acting as
counsel de oficio for accused Primo. There is no
conflict of interest involved between Primo and his
client Segundo, considering that both are invoking
alibi as their defense.
Q: May Atty. Tres legally refuse his designation as
counsel de oficio of accused Primo? Reason. (2004)
A: Atty. Tres may legally refuse his designation as
counsel de oficio accused Primo. Since the defense
of his client Tercero is that Primo and Segundo
actually perpetrated the commission of the offense
for which they are all charge, there is a conflict of
interest between Tercero and Primo. There is
conflicting interest if there is inconsistency in the
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
or whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client (Canon 6,
Canons of Professional Ethics).
Q: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased
person. Your wife is a practicing Certified Public
Accountant. She was asked by her client to prepare
and submit an itemized claim against the estate
you are representing. She asks for your advice on
the legal propriety of her client’s claim. What
advice would you give her? Explain. (2003)
A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her
to handle her client’s claim against the estate. As a
counsel for the estate, it is my duty to preserve the
estate. Her client’s claim seeks to reduce the said
estate. If she will handle such claim, I can be
suspected of representing conflicting interests. The
interests of the estate and of its creditors are
adverse to each other (Nakpil v Valdez, 288 SCRA
75{1998}). Even if she is a different person, the fact
that she is my wife will still give rise to the
impression that we are acting as one.
Q: You are the lawyer of Mr.”H”, the plaintiff, in a
civil case for rescission of contract. The prospects
for an amicable settlement look bright. Impressed
by your ability, Mr. “I”, the defendant, would like
very much to retain you as his defense counsel in a
criminal case for homicide through reckless
P a g e | 14
imprudence. Mr. “I” wants you to forthwith enter
your appearance, the arraignment already having
been scheduled. Would you accept the offer?
(1997)
A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide
through reckless imprudence is against Mr. “H”, I
cannot accept the same for that will involve a
conflict of interest, although it is an unrelated case.
But if it will not involve Mr. “H”, I can accept the
same. However, to avoid suspicion and
misunderstanding, it would be better if I inform Mr.
“H” about the offer and secure his conformity to my
handling the same.
Q: Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He
also acted as counsel for D against C in another civil
case. When D lost his case against C, he filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. B for conflict
of interest. Decide. (1991)
A: If the case of C in the first case is entirely different
and not related with the case of D against C, there is
no conflict of interest. If the two cases however are
related wherein the attorney has knowledge of the
evidence of C then there is conflict of interest. Rule
15.01 provides that: A lawyer in conferring with a
prospective client shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a
conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client. Rule
15.03 further provides that: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
Q: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has
an existing and current retainership agreement
with XYZ Corporation and ABC Company, both of
which were pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation
discovered that a number of its patented drugs had
been duplicated and sold in the market under ABC
Company’s brand names. XYZ Corporation turned
to the law firm and asked it to bring suit against
ABC Company for patent infringement on several
counts. What are the ethical considerations
involved in this case and how are you going to
resolve them? (1994)
A: A lawyer may refuse to accept the representation
of a client if he labors under conflict of interest
between him and the prospective client or between
a present client and the prospective client (Rule
14.03, Canon 14, Code of Professional
Responsibility). It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of
the fact (Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics). A
lawyer cannot accept a case against a present client
either in the same case or a totally unrelated case.

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Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by B,
consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention
of engaging his services as defense counsel.
Because A could not afford to pay the fee that Atty.
C was charging him, A engaged the services of
another counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for
the estafa against A, the prosecutor announced in
open court that his next witness was Atty. C, whom
he was calling to the witness stand. Counsel for A,
Atty. D, vigorously opposed the prosecutor’s move
on the ground Atty. C may not be called as witness
for the prosecution as he might disclose a would be
client’s confidence and secret. Asked by the
presiding Judge what would be the nature of Atty.
C’s testimony, the prosecutor said it has something
to do with how A obtained from B the funds that
the latter received from the former but failed to
account for. Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed
the prosecutor’s motion. If you were the Judge,
how would you rule on the matter? (1999)
A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take
the witness stand. When A consulted Atty. C about
his case, a lawyer-client relationship was established
between them. It does not matter that A did not
eventually engage his services because of his fees;
such relationship has already been created (Hilado
v. David,84 Phil 569 ). A lawyer shall be bound by the
rule on privileged communication in respect to
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client
(Rule 15.02 Code of Professional Responsibility). The
rule on privileged communication provides that an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him (Sec.21 [b], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The prosecutor has announced that Atty. C will be
asked about how A obtained from B the funds that
he failed to account for. Atty. C’s knowledge of such
matter could have come only from A.
Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty.
Holgado who has always been his counsel in
business deals, Simon bragged about his recent
sexual adventures with socialites known for their
expensive tastes. When Atty. Holgado asked Simon
how he manages to finance his escapades, the
latter answered that he has been using the bank
deposits of rich clients of Banco Filipino where he
works as manager. Is Simon’s revelation to Atty.
Holgado covered by the Attorney-client privilege?
(2006)
A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered
by the lawyer-client privilege. In the first place, it
was not made on account of a lawyer-client
relationship, that is, it was not made for the purpose
of seeking legal advice. In the second place, it was
not made in confidence. (Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459
SCRA 1 {2005}). In the third place, the Attorney-
client privilege does not cover information
P a g e | 15
concerning a crime or a fraud being committed or
proposed to be committed.
Q: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for
legal advice by your good friend in connection with
the matron’s jewelry business. She related to you
the facts regarding a sale on consignment of pieces
of jewelry to someone she did not name or identify.
Since she was referred to you by a close friend, you
did not bill her for the consultation. Neither did she
offer to compensate you. Six months later, Mrs. G,
the wife of the general manager of a client
company of your law firm, asked you to defend her
in a criminal case for estafa filed by Mrs. F. Would
you agree to handle her case? (1997)
A: First, I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by
Mrs. F against the wife of the general manager is the
same matter concerning which Mrs. F consulted me
six months before. If it is a same matter, I will not be
able to handle the case for the general manager’s
wife, because of a conflict of interest. When Mrs. F
consulted me and I give her professional advice, a
lawyer-client relationship was created between us,
regardless of that fact that I was not compensated
for it. It would involve a conflict of interest if I will
handle the case for the opposite party on the same
matter (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 571).
Q: Atty. Juan Cruz, a practicing lawyer, was
employed by Pilipinas Bank as its bank attorney
and notary public in three of its branches in Manila.
While thus employed, Maria del Rio, who was
unaware of Atty. Cruz’s employment in the bank,
engaged Atty. Cruz’s services as a lawyer in a case
that was filed by Pilipinas Bank for collection of
sum of money involving one of its branches in
Quezon City which Atty. Cruz accepted. The Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, after due proceeding and
hearing, rendered judgment in favor of Pilipinas
Bank and against Maria del Rio who wanted to
appeal the adverse judgment. But upon advice of
Atty. Cruz, the adverse judgment was not appealed.
Thereafter, Maria del Rio learned Atty. Cruz was
employed by Pilipinas Bank as one of its attorneys.
She now consults with you and asks you to take
legal steps against Atty. Cruz for his apparent
misconduct. What do you think of what Atty. Cruz
did? Is there a valid and legal basis to discipline
him? (1999, 2006)
A: In agreeing to represent Maria del Rio in a case
which Pilipinas Bank filed against her, Atty. Cruz
violated the rule against representing conflicting
interests. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the
facts. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client, even in an unrelated case
(Philippine National Bank vs. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1). It

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
does not matter that the Pilipinas Bank branch in
Quezon City is not the one of the branches he
services in Manila. The bank itself is his client. This
constitutes malpractice for which Atty. Cruz can be
disciplined.
Q: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are both
retainer clients of Atty. Anama. He is the Corporate
Secretary of Huey Company. He represents Dewey
Corporation in three pending litigation cases.
Dewey Corporation wants to file a civil case against
Huey Company and has requested Atty. Anama to
handle the case. What are the options available to
Atty. Anama? Explain your answer. (1993)
A: The options available to Atty. Anama are:
A) To decline to accept the case because to do
so will constitute representing conflicting interests.
It is unethical for a lawyer to represent a client in a
case against another client in the said case.
B) To accept to file the case against Huey
Company, after full disclosure to both retained
clients and upon their express and written consent.
The written consent may free him from the charge
of representing conflicting interests, because written
consent amounts to a release by the clients of the
lawyer’s obligation not to represent conflicting
interests.
Q: If you were Atty. Anama, which option would
you take? Explain. (1993)
A: If I were Atty. Anama, I will choose the first option
and inhibit myself in the case as both entities are my
clients. The conflict of interests between the
contending clients may reach such as point that,
notwithstanding their consent to the common
representation, the lawyer maybe suspected of
disloyalty by one client. His continuing to act in a
double capacity strikes deeply in the foundation of
the Atty. client relationship.
Q: Atty. Japzon, a former partner of XXX law firm, is
representing Kapuso Corporation in a civil case
against Kapamilya Corporation whose legal counsel
is XXX law firm. Atty. Japzon claims that she never
handled the case of Kapamilya Corporation when
she was still with XXX law firm. Is there a conflict of
interest? Explain. (2005)
A: There is a conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests. This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interest if the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which he
represents him and also where he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection
P a g e | 16
(Santos vs. Beltran, 418 SCRA 17 [2003]). Since Atty.
Japzon was a partner of the XXX law firm which has
Kapamilya Corporation as its client, she cannot
handle a case against it as such will involve conflict
of interest. The employment of a law firm is
equivalent to the retainer of the members therof. It
does not matter if Atty. Japzon never handled a case
of the Kapamilya Corporation when she was still with
the XXX law firm.
Q: Winnie retained the services of Atty. Derecho to
file a collection case against Carmen. Winnie paid
Atty. Derecho a sizeable retainer’s fee which the
latter accepted. Later, in the process of determining
the amount of debt to be collected from Carmen,
Atty. Derecho noticed that of the total claim of 8.5
Million, certain invoices covering 3.5 Million
appeared to be irregular. Winnie while admitting
the irregularity assures her lawyer that there would
be no problem as Carmen was by nature negligent
in keeping her records and would not notice the
mistakes anyway. Atty. Derecho tried to convince
Winnie to exclude the amount of 3.5 Million but
Winnie refused. As a consequence Atty. Derecho
terminated their relationship and withdrew from
the case. Was Atty. Derecho right in terminating
their relationship and withdrawing from the case?
How about the fact that he had already accepted a
sizeable retainer’s fee from his client? Discuss fully.
(1995)
A: Atty. Derecho was right terminating the lawyer-
client relationship and withdrawing from the case.
Rule 22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services
when the client pursues an illegal or immoral course
of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling, or when the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules.
Rule 15.07 provides that a lawyer shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness. While he owes his client warm
zeal, it should always be within the bounds of the
law. (Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility).
The fact that Atty. Derecho had already accepted a
sizeable retainer’s fee should make no difference on
his decision to withdraw. Moreover, he may retain
the fees he has already received, his withdrawal
being justified (Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994
edition, p. 223), unless the same is unconscionable.
Q: A lawyer charged his client P10, 000.00 for filing
fees pertaining to the complaint he filed in court.
He actually spent only P1, 000.00. He did not
account the balance. May his client charge him for
misconduct as a member of the Philippine bar?
Explain your answer. (1990)
A: The client may charge his lawyer with misconduct
for not accounting for the balance on P9, 000.00. it is
well settled that where the client gives his lawyer
money for a specific purpose, such as to pay the

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
docket fees for the filling of an action in court, so
much of the money not used for the purpose
belongs to the client and the lawyer holds in it trust
for him. And it is the lawyer’s duty to promptly
account for all money received from his client. For
this reason, the lawyer’s failure to account for the
balance of the money not spent for filling fees will
render him liable for misappropriation, which is a
ground for disbarment.
Q: C engaged the services of attorney D concerning
various mortgage contracts entered into by her
husband from whom she is separated fearful that
her real estate properties will be foreclosed and of
impending suits for sums of money against her.
Attorney D advised C to give him her land titles
covering her lots so he could sell them to enable
her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to
execute deeds of sale in his favor without any
monetary or valuable consideration, to which C
agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and
from the proceeds pay her creditors. Later on, C
came to know that attorney D did not sell her lots
but instead paid her creditors with his own funds
and had her land titles registered in his name. Did
attorney D violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain. (2007)
A: The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hernandez v. Go, (450 SCRA 1 [2005]), is squarely
applicable to this problem. Under the same set of
facts, the Supreme Court held the lawyer to have
violated Canons 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides as follows:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client hat may come
into his possession.
Canon 17 of the same Code, which provides
follows: “Canon 17, A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
The Supreme Court further held that the
lawyer concerned has engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts, which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession, consequently, the Court
disbarred him.
Q: Attorney M accepted a civil case for the recovery
of title and possession of land in behalf of N.
Subsequently, after the Regional Trial Court had
issued a decision adverse to N, the latter filed an
administrative case against attorney M for
disbarment. He alleged that attorney M caused the
adverse ruling against him; that Attorney M did not
file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence filed
in the case, neither did he appear at the formal
hearing on the demurrer, leading the trial court to
assume that plaintiff’s counsel (Attorney M)
appeared convinced of the validity of the demurrer
filed; that attorney M did not even file a motion for
P a g e | 17
reconsideration, causing the order to become final
and executory; and that even prior to the above
elements and in view of attorney M’s apparent loss
of interest in the case, he verbally requested
attorney M to withdraw, but attorney M refused.
Complainant further alleged that Attorney M
abused his client’s trust and confidence and
violated his oath of office in failing to defend his
client’s cause to the very end.
Attorney M replied that N did not give him
his full cooperation; that the voluminous records
turned over to him were in disarray, and that when
he appeared for N, he had only half of the
information and background of the case; that he
was assured by N’s friends that they had
approached the judge; that they requested him (M)
to prepare a motion for reconsideration which he
did and gave to them; however, these friends did
not return the copy of the motion. Will the
administrative case proper? Give reasons for your
answer. (2007)
A: The administrative case will prosper. In failing to
file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence and
to appear at the hearing thereof, and, more so, in
failing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
order granting the demurrer, thereby causing the
same to become final and executor, Attorney M
violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence, and
Rule 18.03 which provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall make him
liable.
In refusing to comply with N’s request to
withdraw from the case, Atty. M violated the rule
that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
lawyer client relationship at any time with or
without cause.
Atty. M’s defense that the voluminous
records turned over to him were in disarray and
when he appeared for B he had only half of the
information and background of the case, is not
meritorious. Rule 18.02 provides that he shall not
handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He should have been competent and
diligent enough to organize the records given to him,
and not go to trial with only half of the information
and knowledge of the case. It is his duty to go to trial
to go to trial adequately prepared (Rule 12.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility).
His defense that friends of N assured him
that they will file a motion of reconsideration, which
he allegedly did and gave to them, is incredible. Even
if true, Atty. M violated Canon No.13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that “a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.”

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
For the matter, even his alleged giving of his
motion for reconsideration to the friends of N for
filing, is another instance of negligence on the part
of Atty. M. He should have taken care to file his
motion himself (Francisco v. Portugal, 484 SCRA 57
[2006]’).
Q: What should a lawyer, generally obligated by
law to accept a retainer, do if he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render the legal
service required? Explain. (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.” (Rule 18.0, Code of
Professional Conduct)
Q: On account of his mistake, is counsel liable to his
client for damages? Explain. (2002)
A: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall make him liable (Rule 18.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility). A client who suffers
prejudice by reason of his counsel’s inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of his duty may file an
action for damages against him. However, there
must be a showing that had the lawyer exercise due
diligence, the client under the facts and the law
would have succeeded in recovering from the
adverse party on in resisting the claim of the latter.
Q: Attorney M accepted a civil case for the recovery
of title and possession of land in behalf of N.
Subsequently, after the Regional Trial Court had
issued a decision adverse to N, the latter filed an
administrative case against attorney M for
disbarment. He alleged that attorney M caused the
adverse ruling against him; that Attorney M did not
file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence filed
in the case, neither did he appear at the formal
hearing on the demurrer, leading the trial court to
assume that plaintiff’s counsel (Attorney M)
appeared convinced of the validity of the demurrer
filed; that attorney M did not even file a motion for
reconsideration, causing the order to become final
and executor; and that even prior to the above
elements and in view of attorney M’s apparent loss
of interest in the case, he verbally requested
attorney M to withdraw, but attorney M refused.
Complainant n further alleged that attorney M
abused his client’s trust and confidence and
violated his oath of office in failing to defend his
client’s cause to the very end.
Attorney M replied that N did not give him
his full cooperation; that the voluminous records
turned over to him were in disarray, and that when
he appeared for N, he had only half of the
information and background of the case; that he
P a g e | 18
was assured by N’s friends that they had
approached the judge; that they requested him (M)
to prepare a motion for reconsideration which he
did and gave to them; however, these friends did
not return the copy of the motion. Will the
administrative case proper? Give reasons for your
answer. (2007)
A: The administrative case will prosper. In failing to
file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence and
to appear at the hearing thereof, and, more so, in
failing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
order granting the demurrer, thereby causing the
same to become final and executor, Attorney M
violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence, and
Rule 18.03 which provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall make him
liable.
In refusing to comply with N’s request to
withdraw from the case, Atty. M violated the rule
that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
lawyer client relationship at any time with or
without cause.
Atty. M’s defense that the voluminous
records turned over to him were in disarray and
when he appeared for B he had only half of the
information and background of the case, is not
meritorious. Rule 18.02 provides that he shall not
handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He should have been competent and
diligent enough to organize the records given to him,
and not go to trial with only half of the information
and knowledge of the case. It is his duty to go to trial
to go to trial adequately prepared (Rule 12.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility).
His defense that friends of N assured him
that they motion of reconsideration, which he
allegedly did and gave to them, is incredible. Even if
true, Atty. M violated Canon No.13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that “a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.”
For the matter, even his alleged giving of his
motion for reconsideration to the friends of n for
filing, is another instance of negligence on the part
of Atty. M. He should have taken care to file his
motion himself (Francisco v. Portugal, 484 SCRA 57
[2006]’).
Q: After reading the decision against his client Jose
Kapuspalad, Atty. Calmante was convinced that it
had a reasonable basis and that he would have
difficulty obtaining a reversal. For this reason, Atty.
Calmante did not appeal. When Jose learned about
the judgment against him, he blamed Atty.
Calmante for not taking a timely appeal and filed an

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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administrative complaint for negligence against the
latter. Decide the case. (2002)
A: I would rule in favor of Jose Kapuspalad. In
Reontoy v. Ibadlit, 285 SCRA 88 (1998), the Supreme
Court found a lawyer to be negligent for failing, first
of all, to notify his client about the adverse decision,
and, secondly, for failing to file an appeal in the
belief that such appeal would be useless. He thus
deprived his client of his right to appeal. If a lawyer
cannot contact his client at once after receiving the
adverse decision, the prudent step for him to take to
it file a notice of appeal, and withdraw it afterwards
if his client should decide against the appeal. It is the
client’s decision whether or not to appeal.
Q: Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, “a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law.” How far, in
general terms, may lawyer go in advocating,
supporting and defending the cause of his client in
a criminal case filed against the latter? (2003)
A: “The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of the lawyer in the court room or the
mere propounding of the standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is simply accorded legal assistance extended
by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of
the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes
an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedure, essential laws
and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.
Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation.” (People v. Bernas, 306 SCRA 293
[1999], cited in People v. Sta. Teresa, 354 SCRA 697
[2001]). However, a lawyer shall employ only
honorable and honest means in the maintenance of
his client’s cause. (Section 20, Rule 128).
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall represent his and shall represent his client
with zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights. How far, in general terms, may a lawyer go
in advocating, supporting and defending his client’s
rights and interests? (1997)
A: Rule 19.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to obtain the lawful objectives of is
client. In championing the cause of his client a
lawyer should employ only such means are
consistent with truth and honor. He should not go
beyond the bounds of the ethics of his profession.
P a g e | 19
Q: Atty. A discovered his client’s fraud against the
adverse party. What steps should he take so that
his client will secure only that which is legally and
justifiably due him? (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.” (Rule 18.0 Code of
Professional Conduct)
Q: During the course of his cross-examination, your
client had testified to events and circumstances
which you personally know to be untrue. If his
testimony was given credence and accepted as fact
by the court, you are sure to win your client’s case.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what
is you obligation to your client (1994)
A: A lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of representation,
perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and
failing which he has to terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court (Rule 19.02, Canon 19, Code of Professional
Responsibility).
Q: When is recovery of attorney’s fees based on
quantum meruit allowed? (2007)
A: Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of
quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no
express contract for payment of attorney’s fees
agreed upon between the lawyer in the client; (2)
when although there is a formal contract for
attorney’s fees, the fees stipulated are found
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and
(3) when the contract for attorney’s fees is void due
to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish
the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client
disregard the contract for attorney’s fees ( Rilloraza
vs. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., 308 SCRA
566 [1999]).
Q: What is your understanding of quantum meruit
as attorney’s fees? (1998)
A: Quantum meruit literally means “as such as he
deserve”. It is a measure for the lawyer’s fees in the
absence of a contract, or when the fees stipulated in
a contract are found unconscionable, or when the
lawyer’s services are terminated for a cause. The
lawyer is entitled to receive what he merits for his
services, as much as he has earned. The factors to be
taken into consideration are enumerated in Rule 22
of the Code of Professional responsibility.

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Q: Mindful that the law is a profession and not a
trade or business, what are the factors must you, as
a lawyer, consider in charging reasonable
compensation for your services? (1994)
A:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
(c) The importance of the subject;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment
as a result of acceptance of the preferred
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter
to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the
services;
(h) The contingency or certainty of
compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
(Rule 20.1, Canon 20, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
Q: Miss Amparo engaged the services of Atty. Rito,
a young lawyer and her former boyfriend, to act as
her counsel in a case. True to his lawyer is oath,
Atty. Rito represented her to the best of his ability
even when he had no opportunity to talk to her on
the progress of the case. When the case was
terminated, Amparo refused to pay Atty. Rito fees
on the ground that there was no written contract of
their professional relationship. Can Amparo justify
her action? (1991)
A: Amparo may not justify her refusal to compensate
Atty. Rito for his legal services. An attorney is
entitled to attorney’s fees for services rendered
even in the absence of a contract for attorney’s fees.
Q: If Amparo cannot, upon what basis then may
Atty. Rito be compensated? What are the
considerations to be taken into account? (1991)
A: Atty. Rito has the right to demand attorney’s fees
based on an implied contract and for services
rendered. The determination of the amount of
attorney’s fees will be based on quantum meruit,
namely; time spent and extent of services rendered;
novelty of the case; importance of the subject
matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other
employment; customary changes, amount involved;
contingency or certainty of compensation;
professional standing and capacity of the client to
pay.
P a g e | 20
Q: Atty. Chito Sobretodo was retained by Buddy
Capilla to handle his case in the Securities and
Exchange Commission. There is a tax angle so
Sobretodo consulted Atty. Romy Collado, a tax
expert, and for his assistance shared 50% of the
retainer fees with Collado. Is this proper? Explain
your answer. (1990)
A: There is no impropriety in the sharing of
attorney’s fees with tax expert Atty. Romy Collado.
This is delegation of work and not delegation of a
case. As long as Atty. Sobretodo is responsible to his
client, Buddy Capilla, even if he delegated the
research work to Atty. Collado, there is no
impropriety in said arrangement. What is prohibited
by the Code of Professional Responsibility is splitting
of Attorney’s fees with a non-lawyer.
Q: A real estate company, elated over the decision
in a case regarding a dispute over a personal matter
between its top sales representative and his
neighbor, gifted Atty. O, who represented its sales
representative in the litigation, with a 240-square-
meter lot in its newly developed subdivision. The
case handled by Atty. O had nothing to do with the
sales representative in the litigation, with a 240
square-meter lot in its newly developed
subdivision. The case handled by Atty. O had
nothing to do with the sales representative’s work
for the real estate company. The latter’s offer of
the lot, which Atty. O accepted, was in
consideration of its sales representative’s being the
firm’s Number one salesman. Was there a breach of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by Atty. O
when he accepted the 240 square-meter lot? (1997)
A: Rule 20.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not,
without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest,
rebate of forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
“(T)here should be no room for suspicion on the part
of the client that his lawyer is receiving
compensation in connection with the case from third
persons with hostile interest” (Report of IBP
Committee. p. 112). Even if the secret compensation
comes from a friendly person, if the act is
discovered, it is bound to create dissension in the
client-lawyer relationship. Worse, the lawyer will be
able to enrich himself by receiving more than what is
due him as attorney’s fees. (Pineda. Legal & Judicial
Ethics, 1995 ed. p. 243)
Q: Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a suit
against his client concerning his fees. (1998)
A: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with his clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.” The legal
profession is not a money-making trade but a form
of public service. Lawyers should avoid giving the
impression that they are mercenary (Perez v.
Scottish Union and National Insurance Co.,76 Phil.
325). It might even turn out to be unproductive for
him for potential clients are likely to avoid a lawyer
with a reputation of using his clients.
Q: What is “Assumpsit” and when is it proper?
(2006)
A: Assumpsit is an action in common law for the
recovery of damages for the non-performance of a
parol or simple contract, (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
Vol. 1, pp. 269-270). The term has been used in
relation to the collection of attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis. Where the lawyer has been
employed without a contract for his compensation,
he is entitled to recover an amount his services
merit, on the basis of an implied promise by the
client to pay for such services. This has been referred
to as assumpsit on quantum meruit (Qui/ban v.
Robino/171 SCRA 768 [1989]).
Q: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A
about a four-door apartment in Manila left by her
deceased parents. A complained that her two
siblings, B and C, who were occupying two units of
the apartment, were collecting the rentals from the
other two units and refusing to give her any part
thereof. Atty. Z advised A to first seek the
intervention of her relatives and told her that, if
this failed, he would take legal action as A asked
him to do. Today, September 22, 2002. B asks Atty.
Z to defend him in a suit brought by A against him
(B) and C through another counsel. Should Atty. Z
tell B that A consulted him earlier about the same
case? Why? (2002)
A: Rule 21.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not
reveal that he has been consulted about a particular
case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.” In
this case, he has to reveal to B that he had been
consulted by A with respect to the particular case
where B has offered to retain his services. This
revelation should be done in order to avoid a
possible conflict of interest.
Q: Cite at least five (5) valid reasons under any of
which a lawyer may be allowed to withdraw from a
case even without her client’s consent. (1997)
A:
(1) When the client pursues an illegal or
immoral course of conduct in connection
with the matters he (the lawyer) is
handling.
(2) When the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules.
P a g e | 21
(3) When his inability to work with co-counsel
will not promote the best interest of the
client.
(4) When the mental or physical condition of
the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively.
(5) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to
a public office.
(6) Other similar cases. (Rule 22.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility).
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the
reception of evidence for the defense, the
defendant and his counsel had a conference where
the client directed the lawyer to present as
principal defense witnesses two (2) persons whose
testimonies were personally known to the lawyer
to have been perjured. The lawyer informed his
client that he refused to go along with the
unwarranted course of action proposed by the
defendant. But the client insisted on his directive,
or else he would not pay the agreed attorney’s
fees. When the case was called for hearing the next
morning, the lawyer forthwith moved in open court
that he be relieved as counsel for the defendant.
Both the defendant and the plaintiff’s counsel
objected to the motion. Under the given facts, is
the defense lawyer legally justified in seeking
withdrawal from the case? Why or why not?
Reason briefly. (2004)
A: Yes, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may
withdraw his services “if the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules”. The insistence of the client that the lawyer
present witnesses whom he personally knows to
have been perjured, will expose him to criminal and
civil liability and violate his duty of candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
Q: Atty. A objects to the collaboration of Atty. B as
proposed by client C in a pending case. How would
A, B and C handle the situation? (2001)
A: A, B and C may handle the situation in the
following manner-
“A” can offer to withdraw his services. Rule
22.01 (c) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
allows a lawyer to withdraw his services if his
inability to work with co-counsel will not promote
the best interest of his client. Here, by objecting to
the collaboration of Atty. B, Atty. A foresees his
inability to work with the former. “A” may with
withdraw to give his client a free hand in protecting
his interest.
“B” should refuse to accept the case,
otherwise, he may be encroaching on the
professional employment of another lawyer, A
lawyer should decline association as colleague if it is
objectionable to the original counsel, but if the
lawyer first retained is relieved, another may come

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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into the case. (Canon 7, Canons of Professional
Ethics.)
“C” the client must choose only one of the
lawyers. If he wants Atty. B as his lawyer, he should
formally terminate the services of “A” so “B” can
formally enter his appearance in the case.
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance as counsel for the accused Y after the
prosecution rested its case. The reason for the
withdrawal of Atty. X was the failure of accused Y
to affix his conformity to the demand of Atty. X for
increase in attorney’s fees. Is the ground for
withdrawal justified? Explain. (2000)
A: The ground for withdrawal is not justified. Rule
22.01 (e) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services
when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for
his services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement. He has only refused to agree with the
lawyer’s demand for an increase in his fees. It is his
rigth to refuse; that is part of his freedom of
contract.
Q: What steps should first be done by the attorney
befrore he can endorse or object to his clientis
intention to plead guilty? State your reasons.
(2001)
A: It is duty of defense counsel to (a) study
thoroughly the record and surrounding
circumstances of the case and determine if there are
valid defenses he can use, (b) confer with the
accused and obtain from him his account of what
had happened. (c) advise him of his constitutional
and statutory rights, including advisabilty of entering
plea bargaining, (d) thoroughly explain to him the
impact of a guilty plea and the inevitable conviction
that will follow, and (e) if the client still insists on
pleading guilty, see to it that theprescribed
procedure necessary to the administration of justice
is strictly followed and disclosed in the court records.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF
LAWYERS
Q: Atty. X was retained by E in a case for violation
of BP 22 filed by B before the scheduled hearing.
Atty. X assured B that E would pay the value of the
dishonored check. Elated at the prospect of being
paid , B wined and dined Atty. X several times. Atty.
X convinced B not to appear at the scheduled
hearings. Due to non-appearance of B, the estafa
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. B,
however, was never paid. Thus, she filed a case for
disbarment against Atty. X. (1996)
A: Yes, the conduct of Atty. S constitutes
malpractice. A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to not do any falsehood or shall be misled
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. He
P a g e | 22
owes loyalty to his client. In a case involving similar
facts, the Supreme Court found that the lawyer
concerned obstructed the administration of justice
and suspended him for two years (Cantorne v.
Ducusin 57 Phil.20 ).
Q: Atty Walasunto has been a member of the
Philippine Bar for twenty (20) years but has never
plied his profession as a lawyer. His sole means of
livelihood is selling and buying real estate. In one of
his transactions as a real estate broker, he issued a
bouncing check. He was criminally prosecuted and
subsequently convicted for violating B.P. Blg. 22. In
the disbarment proceedings filed against him, Atty.
Walasunto contended that his conviction for B.P.
Blg. 22 was not a valid ground for disciplinary
action against a member of the bar. He further
argued that his act in issuing the check was done in
relation to his calling as a real estate broker and not
in relation to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer. Are the contentions of Atty. Walasunto
meritorious or not? Reason (2004)
A: No. His contentions are not meritorious. In the
first place, a ground for disbarment is conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court), and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude
(People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]). In the
second place, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.” Additionally,
Rule 1.01 of the same Code provides that “a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceiptful conduct.”
Q: Atty. N. had an extramarital affair with O, a
married woman, as a result of which they begot a
child P and undertook to support him. On the basis
of the admission, is Atty. N. subject to disciplinary
action by the Supreme Court? Why? (2002)
A: In the case of Tucay v. Tucay, 318 SCRA 229
(1999), the Supreme Court held that the finding that
a lawyer had been carrying on an illicit affair with a
married woman is a “grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession.”
Q: Atty. BB borrowed P30,000.00 from EG to be
paid in six months. Despite reminders from EG,
Atty. BB failed to pay the loan on its due date.
Instead of suing in court, EG lodged with an IBP
chapter a complaint for failure to pay a just debt
against Atty. BB. The chapter secretary endorsed
the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD). A commissioner of the CBD issued an order
directing Atty. BB to answer the complaint against
him but the latter ignored the order. Another order

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was issued for the parties to appear before the
Commissioner at a certain date and time but only
EG showed up. A third order submitting the case for
resolution was likewise ignored by Atty. BB. May
disciplinary action be taken against Atty. BB for his
failure to pay the loan? Why? (2002)
A: In the case of Toledo v Abalos, 315 SCRA 419
(1999), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer may
not be disciplined for failure to pay her loan
obligation. The remedy is to file an action for
collection against her in the regular courts. However,
unwarranted obstinacy in evading the payment of a
debt has been considered as gross misconduct
[Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233 (1993)]. A
lawyer is obligated to promote respect for legal
processes. This includes order of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP. (The lawyer’s oath likewise
says “I will obey the duly constituted authorities.”)
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Q: In the course of a judicial proceeding, a conflict
opinion as to a particular legal course of action to
be taken arose between AB and CD, two (2) lawyers
hired by Mr. XX, a party-litigant, to act jointly as his
counsel. How should such problem be resolved, and
whose opinion should prevail? What can AB, the
lawyer whose opinion was not followed, do when
she honestly believes that the opinion of CD, the
other counsel, is not a legally and factually well-
grounded as her opinion is? Explain briefly. (2004)
A: “When lawyers jointly associated in a cause
cannot agree as to any matter vital to the interest of
the client, the conflict of opinion should be frankly
stated to him for his final determination. His decision
should be accepted unless the nature of the
difference makes it impracticable for the lawyer
whose judgment has been overruled to cooperate
effectively. In this event, it is his duty to ask the
client to relieved him (Canon 7, Canon of
Professional Ethics).
Q: M has a pending case for collection of sum of
money. He is not satisfied with his lawyer N, who
almost always goes to court evidently unprepared.
He wants you to promptly take over the case. You
agree to handle the case. What steps must you take
to formalize the engagement? (1997)
A: I will ask M to first terminate or secure the
withdrawal of N as his counsel. If N’s services are
terminated, I can subsequently enter my appearance
as the new counsel of M. If he agrees to withdraw
simultaneously with my appearance, I will prepare a
substitution of attorney to be filed in court,
containing the written conformities of M and N.
Q: Atty. A’s client filed a case against Atty. B’s client
for pirating the book of A’s client. A’s client is a
friend of B. A filed a disbarment complaint against
P a g e | 23
B for convincing A’s client to settle the case. Decide.
(2001)
A: The complaint shall prosper. A lawyer should not
in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. (Canon 9, Canons of
Professional Ethics, Likong v. Atty. Lim, A.C No. 3149,
August 17, 1994)
Q: As a rule, why should an attorney not testify as a
witness for his client? (2001, 1993)
A: “The underlying reason for the impropriety of a
lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the
difference between the function of a witness and
that of an advocate. The function of a witness is to
tell the facts as he recalls them in answer to
questions. The function of an advocate is that of a
partisan. It is difficult to distinguish between the zeal
of an advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness. The lawyer will find it hard to
disassociate his relation to his client as an attorney
and his relation to the party as a witness. ” (Agpalo,
p. 129)
Q: While Atty. Ambo Lancia was on his way to
office in Makati, he chanced upon a vehicular
accident involving a wayward bus with a small Kia
whose driver, a Mr. Malas, suffered serious physical
injuries. Coming to the succor of the badly injured
Mr. Malas, Atty. Lancia droved him to the nearest
hospital. On their way to the hospital, Mr. Malas
found out that Atty. Lancia was a practicing lawyer.
In gratitude for his help, Mr. Malas retained Atty.
Lancia to file suit against the bus company and its
driver. If you were Atty. Lancia; would you accept
the case? (1994)
A: I will not accept the case if I were Atty. Lancia
because it is difficult to dismiss the suspicion that
Atty. Lancia had assisted Mr. Malas for the purpose
of soliciting legal business. It is not clear from the
facts how Mr. Malas learned that Atty. Lancia was a
practicing lawyer. This could have happen only if
Atty. Lancia introduced himself as a lawyer.
Moreover, Atty. Lancia may be utilized as a witness.
Q: Lawyer U, a retired Tanodbayan prosecutor, now
in the private practice of law entered his
appearance for and in behalf of an accused in a
case before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution
moved for his disqualification on the ground that
he (had) earlier appeared for the prosecution in the
case and is knowledgeable about the prosecution’s
evidence, both documentary and testimonial. U
contented that he merely appeared at the
arraignment on behalf of the prosecutor assigned
to the case who was absent at that time. Decide.
(1991)

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QuAMTO (1990-2007)
A: Canon 36 provides that a lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in public employ, should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ. The
contention of U that he merely appeared at the
arraignment on behalf of the absent prosecutor is
not enough. As a former Tanodbayan prosecutor, he
certainly had occasion to obtain knowledge about
the prosecution’s evidence.
Q: Atty. Cua wins a case involving a donation mortis
causa. Afterwards, she discovers, and is convinced,
that the Deed of Donation was falsified, and that it
was her client who did the falsification. If you were
Atty. Cua, what would you do? Explain. (1993)
A: If I were Atty. Cua, I would resign as his lawyer.
The question as to whether the attorney should
disclose the falsification to the court or to the
prosecuting attorney involves a balancing of
loyalties. One ethical rule states that “counsel upon
the trial of a cause in which perjury has been
committed owes it to the profession and the public
to bring the matter to the knowledge of the
prosecuting authorities”. Another ethical rule
provides that when “a lawyer discovers that some
fraud or deception has been practiced, which is
unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he
should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the
advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly
inform the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps”. A literal
application of these ethical injunctions requires the
disclosure of the falsification. On the other hand, the
attorney’s duty to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence demands that he refrain from revealing
the client’s wrong-doing, the same being a past
offense. Resigning as a lawyer will enable the lawyer
to observe such loyalties. If the decision is already
final, as a lawyer, I would advise my client to
withdraw any claim on the donation mortis causa
and have the property be given to the rightful owner
of the property in subject matter of the donation.
This action is in compliance with my duty as
a lawyer to assist in the administration of justice and
in compliance of my oath: “I will do know falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; that I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false and/or unlawful suit, nor give aide
nor consent to the same”.
Q: Mrs. Amy Dizon’s husband was killed in a traffic
accident. She wants to sue the bus company for
damages but she cannot afford a lawyer. She
approached Atty. Larry Rio who agreed to handle
the case without any retainer’s fee or expenses on
her part, on the condition that in case of recovery
of damages, he shall get 33% of the award by the
P a g e | 24
court. Is this arrangement valid and permissible?
Decide with reasons. (1990)
A: In the recent case of Angel L. Bautista v Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales, Adm. Matter No. 1625, February
12, 1990, the Supreme Court held that an agreement
as to attorney’s fees which provides that the lawyer
shall defray all the expenses of the suit, “is contrary
to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. The Court added that “although a lawyer
may in good faith, advance the expenses of
litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement.” And, “an agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay the expenses of proceedings
to enforce the client’s rights is champertous” and
“against public policy especially where, as in this
case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action
at his own expense in consideration of some bargain
to have part of the thing in dispute.”
The arrangement between Amy Dizon and Atty.
Larry Rio, which provides the latter will handle the
case without any retainer’s fee or expenses on her
part, can be taken to mean that the lawyer will carry
out the case at his own expenses without
reimbursement. On the basis of the foregoing
decision of the Supreme Court, such an arrangement
is invalid.
However, the contingent fee contract is not
prohibited by law and is impliedly sanctioned. A
contingent fee is however closely supervised by the
court to safeguard the client from unjust charges,
and its validity depends, in large measure, upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed under the
circumstances of the case. A contingent fee of 33%
of the amount of recovery may be reasonable if the
bus company fights the case until the Supreme Court
and the litigation is hard-fought and long drawn; it
may be unreasonable if the bus company agrees to
compromise. But the fact that a contingent fee is
unreasonable does not preclude the lawyer from
being paid his fees on quantum meruit basis.
Q: The contract of attorney’s fees entered into by
Atty. Quintos and his client, Susan, stipulates that if
a judgment is rendered in her favor, he gets 60% of
the property recovered as a contingent fee. In turn,
he will assume payment of all expenses of
litigation. Is the agreement valid? (2006)
A: The agreement that a lawyer will assume
payment of all the expenses of litigation makes it a
champertous contract, which is invalid.
Q: What is a champertous contract? (2000)
A: A champertous contract is one where the lawyer
agrees to conduct litigation on his own account and
to pay the expenses thereof, and to receive as his

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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fee a portion of the proceeds of judgment. It is
contrary to public policy and invalid because it
violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client (Bautista v Gonzales, 182 SCRA
151 [1990]). In effect, he is investing in the case with
the expectation of making profit. The practice of law
is a profession and not a business venture.
Q: Distinguish between a champertous contract and
a contingent fee contract. (2000, 1999)
A: A contingent fee contract is an agreement in
which the lawyer’s fee, usually a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, is made to
depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or
defend the client’s right. It is a valid agreement. It is
different from a champertous contract in that the
lawyer does not undertake to shoulder the expenses
of litigation.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Q: Would it be proper for the judge to accept a
donation of a lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala
from the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)? Explain your answer. (1990)
A: It would be proper for the judge to accept the
donation of a lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala
from the local chapter of the IBP because the
donation comes from an organization of lawyers
whose duty, among others, is to help in the proper
administration of justice. Accepting the donation is
not for the personal benefit of the judge but for
providing physical facilities for the administration of
justice, which is the concern by both the judge and
the IBP local chapter. What is prohibited is accepting
presents or donations from the litigants or from
particular lawyers practicing before him.
Q: May a judge properly solicit for his promotion
the endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to
the judicial and bar council? Explain your answer.
(1990)
A: A judge may not properly solicit for his promotion
the endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to
the judicial and bar council because it will give the
impression that his promotion is not purely on
merits, and the judge may feel beholden to the
particular officers of the local chapter which may, in
the future, influence him in the disposition of the
cases handled by such officers as counsel litigants.
Moreover, considering his position, the local chapter
officers may not be able to refuse such solicitations
even if they believed that he is not qualified for
promotion. The judge should stand by his own
ability, qualifications and fitness, without exerting
extra effort on his part influence the local chapter to
endorse his promotion. The local chapter should, on
its own and without solicitation from the judge,
make its own assessment and appraisal of the
P a g e | 25
judge’s qualifications and fitness for promotion, and
if it is convinced that the judge possesses the
required qualifications, it is the duty of the local
chapter to make known such assessment to the
Judicial and Bar Council.
Q: Pending before the sala of Judge Magbag is the
case of CDG versus JQT. The legal counsel of JQT is
Atty. Ocsang who happens to be the brother of
Atty. Ferreras, a friend of Judge Magbag. While the
case was still being heard, Atty. Ferreras and his
wife celebrated their wedding anniversary. They
invited their friends and family to a dinner party at
their house in Forbes Park. Judge Magbag attended
the party and was seen conversing with Atty.
Ocsang while they were eating at the same table.
Comment on the propriety of Judge Magbag’s act.
(2005)
A: A Judge is not required to live in seclusion. He is
permitted to have a social life as long as it does not
interfere with his judicial duties or detract from the
dignity of the court (Canon 5, Code of Judicial
Conduct). However, he should be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend
to awaken the suspicion that his social or business
relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial action (Canon 30, Canons of
Judicial Ethics). A Judge should avoid impropriety
and appearance of impropriety in all activities
(Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Sitting on the
same table and conversing with a lawyer with a
pending case before him raises such appearance of
impropriety.
Q: Assume that your friend and colleague, Judge
Peter X. Mahinay, a Regional Trial Court judge
stationed at KL City, would seek your advice
regarding his intention to ask the permission of the
Supreme Court to act as counsel for and thus
represent his wife in the trial of a civil case for
damages pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan. What would be your advice to
him? Discuss briefly. (2004)
A: I would advise him against it. Rule 5.07 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct expressly and absolutely
prohibits judges from engaging in the private
practice of law, because of the incompatible nature
between the duties of a judge and a lawyer.
Moreover, as a Judge he can influence to a certain
extent the outcome of the case even if it is with
another court. A Judge shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative
agency (Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested Judge
Maawain, a family friend, to go over the document
prepared by a new lawyer before they signed it.
Judge Maawain agreed and even acted as an

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instrumental witness. Did Judge Maawain engage
in the unauthorized practice of law? Why? (2002)
A: Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibit a judge from engaging in the private
practice of law as a member of the bar or giving
professional advice to clients. In the case of De
Castro v. Capulong, 118 SCRA 5 (1982), the Supreme
Court held that a judge who merely acted as a
witness to a document and who explained to the
party waiving his rights of redemption over
mortgaged properties and the consequences
thereof, does not engage himself in the practice of
law. This appears to be more applicable to the case
of Judge Maawain. He did not give professional
advice in anticipation of litigation. He was just asked
to review a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate. He signed merely as an instrumental witness
and not as a legal counsel. Besides, his act was an
isolated act.
Q: Justice X of the Court of Appeals, by mutual
agreement of two opposing parties, asked him to
be their sole arbitrator in the controversy that
arose out of the construction of a building in
Makati City. The fee that would be paid to him was
substantial, it amounting to double his annual
salary and allowances. When Justice X declined the
offer, the parties suggested that he go on leave of
absence for three months to enable him to do the
job. May Justice X accept the work offered to him
while on leave of absence? (1999)
A: Justice X may not accept the work offered him
even while on leave of absence from the Court of
Appeals.
A justice should regulate extra-judicial
activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial
duties (Canon 5, Code of Judicial Ethics). He shall not
accept appointment or designation to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions
(Rule 5.09, Code of Judicial Conduct). This is specially
so since decisions of voluntary arbitrators are
appealable to the Court of Appeals. He must
minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties
(Canons 4 and 5, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Moreover, he will create the impression that he is
merely interested in the fee involved, which will
detract from the integrity of the judiciary.
Q: What qualities should an ideal judge possess
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary? (2007)
A: The qualities required of judges by the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary are
Independence (Canon 1), Integrity (Canon 2),
Impartiality (Canon 3), Propriety (Canon 4), Equality
(Canon 5), and Competence and Diligence (Canon 6).
P a g e | 26
Q: Judge C was appointed MTC Judge in 1993.
Subsequently, the Judicial and Bar Council received
information that previously he had been dismissed
as Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila. It appeared
that when he applied for appointment to the
Judiciary, his answer to the question in the
personal Data Sheet – “Have you ever been retired,
dismissed or forced to resign from any
employment?” was – “Optional under Republic Act
No. 1145.” The truth is, he was dismissed for gross
misconduct as Assistant City prosecutor. May he be
dismissed as Judge? (1998)
A: Yes, by his concealment of his previous dismissal
from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar
Council would have taken into consideration in
acting on his application for appointment as a judge,
he (the judge) committed an act of dishonesty that
rendered him unfit to be appointed, and to remain,
in the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.
(Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A.
Cube, 227 SCRA 193; Jose Estacion, 181 SCRA 33,
Estanislao Belan, August 6, 1998).
Q: In the Course of a petition for bail in a case for
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion pending before him, judge AM (who has
been long frustrated with his work because he has
not been appointed to the Court of Appeals despite
the strong recommendations of several Members
of Congress) made statements contrary to the
rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter. He
further made utterances imputing bias to the
Supreme Court in favor of the Administration
which, according to him, is the reason why all
petitions for bail in similar cases were denied
despite the apparent weakness of the evidence for
the prosecution. What are the implications of Judge
AM’s actuations? (1991)
A: The implication of Judge AM is actuations are that
he could be violating his oath of office of upholding
the law and the Code of Judicial conduct to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity
of the system of law. He could also be violating his
duty as a minister of justice under a government of
laws and not of men.
Q: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for
plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy
to enter into a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff without the knowledge and participation
of defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris
acceded and executed the agreement. Therein
Doris admitted her obligation in full and bound
herself to pay her obligation to Jennifer at 40%
interest per annum in ten (10) equal monthly
installments. The compromise agreement was
approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy
filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Hilado alleging that the latter prevented her from

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consulting her lawyer Atty. de Jose when she
entered into the compromise agreement, thereby
violating the rules of professional conduct, Atty.
Hilado countered that Doris Dy freely and
voluntarily entered into the compromise
agreement which in fact was approved by the
court. Was it proper for the judge to approve the
compromise agreement since the terms thereof
were just and fair even if counsel for one of the
parties was not consulted or did not participate
therein? Explain. (1995)
A: It was not proper for the judge to approve the
compromise agreement without the participation of
the lawyer of one of the parties, even if the
agreement was just and fair. Even if a client has
exclusive control of the cause of action and may
compromise the same, such right is not absolute. He
may not, for example, enter into a compromise to
defeat the lawyer’s right to a just compensation.
Such right is entitled to protection from the court.
Q: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket,
would exert efforts to compel the accused in
criminal cases to plead guilty to a lesser offense and
advise party litigants in civil cases, whose positions
appear weak, to accept the compromise offered by
the opposing party. Is the practice legally
acceptable? (1998)
A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the
judge does not exert pressure on the parties and
takes care that he does not appear to have
prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a party
that his case is weak before the latter was fully
heard, such was considered a ground for his
disqualification (Castilli v Juan, 62 SCRA 124)
Q: What would your comment be about a judge
who, whenever he promulgates a decision, invites
representatives of the print and broadcast media to
his sala for the purpose of having promulgation
televised, and that in the process, he gives
interviews although he does not discuss his
personal views on the merits of the case? Explain
your answer. (1990)
A: The judge’s conduct is improper. Canon II, Rule
2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a
judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory. A judge should conduct proceedings in
court with fitting dignity and decorum and in such a
manner as to reflect the importance and seriousness
of the inquiry to ascertain the truth. Allowing
television coverage of the promulgation of the
decision would detract the dignity of the court
proceedings, degrade the court and create
misconception in the public mind. His giving
interviews, even if he does not discuss his personal
views on the merits of the case, has no other
purpose than to seek publicity for personal
P a g e | 27
vainglory, which is prohibited.
Q: How far should the judge allow publicity of the
proceedings and decisions of his court? Explain
your answer. (1990)
A: A judge may allow publicity by letting his
actuations as a judge and his decisions speak for
themselves, without any comment on his part. What
makes publicity improper is the employment of
traditional dignity of court proceedings and of the
judge himself. Good, efficient, speedy, and correct
administration of justice on his part has a away of
publicizing itself and catching public attention, and
the publicity thereby generated is a normal by-
product of the efficient discharge of his duties, which
is proper.
Q: In connection with a sensational criminal case,
the Public Relations Officer of the All-Judges
Association Inc. issued two press releases, one
stating that the trial judge should not have granted
bail to the accused since evidence of guilt was
strong and the other, calling upon said judge to
inhibit himself from trying the case since he did not
exhibit the cold neutrality of an impartial judge in
ruling upon certain motions. Comment on the
actuations of the Public Relations Officer who is
presumably authorized by the Association. (1992)
A: The actuations of the Public Relation Officer of
the All-Judges Association are improper. What the
All-Judges association should do is to report the
matter to the Supreme Court and file the proper
charges. The Supreme Court may refer the matter
for investigation to a justice of the Court of Appeals.
The issuance of the press release is in violation of
the rule that charges and investigations against
Judges should be confidential in character and
should not be published. The Public Relation Officer
can even be held in contempt of court.
Furthermore, Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct states that “a judge shall refrain
from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.”
Rule 3.07 of the same Code states that “a
judge should abstain from making public comments
on any pending case and should require similar
restraint on the part of court personnel.”
Q: Judge Aficionado was among the several
thousands of spectators watching a basketball
game at the Rizal Memorial Coliseum who saw the
stabbing of referee Maykiling by player Baracco in
the course of the game. The criminal case
correspondingly filed against Baracco for the
stabbing of Maykiling was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court branch presided over by Judge
Aficionado. Should Judge Aficionado sit in judgment
over and try the case against Baracco? Explain.
(2004)

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A: No, he should not preside over the case. Rule 3.12
(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a
judge should not take part in any proceeding where
the judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the same.
Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to
appear before Judge B who is A’s relative,
compadre, and former office colleague. Is A
ethically compelled to refuse the engagement?
Why? (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of the cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court” (Canon 13, Code of Professional Conduct).
There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer
appearing before a judge who is a relative,
compadre and former office colleague as long as the
lawyer avoids giving impressions that he can
influence the judge. On the other hand, the judge is
required by the Code of Judicial Conduct not to take
part in any proceeding where his impartiality may be
reasonably questioned (Rule 3.12 Code of Judicial
Conduct). Among the grounds for mandatory
disqualification of the judge is if any of the lawyers is
a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree.
Q: In a hearing before the Court Tax of Appeals,
Atty. G was invited to appear as amicus curiae. One
of the judges hearing the tax case is the father of
Atty. G. The counsel for the respondent moved for
the inhibition of the judge in view of the father-son
relationship. Is there merit to the motion? Decide.
(1996)
A: There is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge
should take no part where the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” Among the
instances for the disqualification of a judge is that he
is related to a party litigant within the sixth degree
or to counsel within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. But this refers to counsel of
the parties. An amicus curiae is supposed to be an
experienced and impartial attorney invited by the
court to appear and help in the disposition of issues
submitted to it. He represents no party to the case.
There is, therefore, no ground to fear the loss of the
judge’s impartiality in this case if his son is appointed
amicus curiae.
Q: In a case before him, it was the son of Municipal
Trial Court Judge X who appeared as a counsel for
the plaintiff. After the proceeding, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant. B, the defendant in the case,
complained against Judge X for not disqualifying
himself in hearing and deciding the case. In his
defense, Judge X alleged that he did not disqualify
P a g e | 28
himself in the case because the defendant never
sought his disqualification. (1999)
A: Judge X is liable for misconduct in office. Rule 3.12
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge
should take no part in a proceeding where
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In fact,
it is mandatory for him to inhibit or disqualify
himself if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to
a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree (Hurtado v. Jurdalena, 84
SCRA 41). He need not wait for a motion of the
parties in order to disqualify himself.
Q: RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo
church in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. R,
a member of the same religious sect belonging to
the same INK community in San Francisco del
Monte, filed a case against S who belongs to the El
Shaddai charismatic group. The case was raffled to
Judge Q‘s sala. The lawyer of S filed a motion to
disqualify Judge Q on the ground that since he and
the plaintiff belonged to the same religious sect
and community in San Francisco del Monte, Judge
Q would not possess the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Judge Q denied the motion on the
ground that the reason invoked for his
disqualification was not among the grounds for
disqualification under the Rules of Court and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Was Judge Q’s denial of
the motion for inhibition well founded? (1997)
A: The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong
to the Iglesia Ni Kristo while Litigant S belongs to the
El Shaddai group, is not a mandatory ground for
disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case.
The motion for his inhibition is addressed to his
sound discretion and he should exercise the same in
a way (that) the people’s faith in the courts of justice
(will) not (be) impaired. He should reflect on the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the Judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against
him (Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630).
Under the circumstances of this case, where the only
ground given for his disqualification is that he and
one of the litigants are members of the same
religious community, I believe that his denial of the
motion for his disqualification is proper. In Vda. De
Ignacio vs. BLT Bus Co., 34 SCRA 618, the Supreme
Court held that the fact that one of the counsels in a
case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal
ground for the disqualification of the judge.
Q: In a civil case, the defendant discovered that the
counsel for the plaintiff used to be a member of the
Judicial and Bar Council during whose time the
Judge presiding over the case was appointed and
confirmed. He filed a “Motion to Inhibit the Judge”
on the ground that the latter’s ability to act
independently and judiciously had been
compromised and seriously impaired because of his

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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“utang na loob” to the plaintiff’s counsel. If you
were the judge, how would you rule on the
Motion? (1994)
A: I will deny the Motion for Inhibition because
every judge is sworn to uphold the decisions of cases
in accordance with the law. The fact that the judge
was recommended by the JBC which has seven (7)
members and deliberated even confidentially does
not make the judge morally indebted to the JBC
member who may not even have voted for him.
Q: Judge Segotier is a member of Phi Nu Phi
Fraternity. Atty. Nonato filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Segotier on the ground that the counsel for
the opposing party is also a member of the Phi Nu
Phi Fraternity. Judge Segotier denied the motion.
Comment on his ruling. (2005)
A: The ruling of Judge Segotier is correct. The fact
that a judge is a former classmate of one of the
counsels in a case has been held to be insufficient
ground for the disqualification of the judge (Vda. De
Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc. 34 SCRA, 618
[1970]). Intimacy or friendship between judge and
an attorney of record has also been held to be
insufficient ground for the former’s disqualification
(Masadao & Elizaga, Re Criminal Case No. 4954-M,
155 SCRA 72 [1987]).
Q: During the hearing of an election protest filed by
his brother, Judge E sat in the area reserved for the
public, not besides his brother’s lawyer. Judge E’s
brother won the election the protest. Y, defeated
candidate for mayor, filed an administrative case
against Judge E for employing influence and
pressure on the judge who heard and decided the
election protest.
Judge E explained that the main reasons
why he was there in the courtroom were because
he wanted to observe how election protests are
conducted as he has never conducted one and
because he wanted to give moral support to his
brother. Did Judge E commit an act of impropriety
as a member of the judiciary? Explain. (2007)
A: Judge E commited an act of impropriety in
appearing in another court at the hearing of his
brother’s election protest. In the case of Vidal v.
Dojillo, Jr., (463 SCRA 264 [2005]), which involved
the same facts, the Supreme Court as follows:
“Respondent, in his defense, stated that he
attended the hearing of his brother’s election
protest case just to give moral support and, in the
process, also observe how election protest
proceedings are conducted. Although concern for
family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino
culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in
the mind that he is also called upon to serve the
higher interest of preserving the integrity of the
entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
P a g e | 29
impropriety but also the mere appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Even if respondent did
not intend to use his position as a judge to influence
the outcome of his brother’s election protest, it
cannot be denied that his presence in the courtroom
during the hearing of his brother’s case would
immediately give cause for the community to
suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary
would influence the judge trying the case to favor his
brother.”
Q: X, a Municipal Trial Court Judge, received the
amount of One thousand (P1, 000.00) Pesos in cash
from accused charged with slightly physical injuries
in his court, whereupon he was released from
custody. After dismissal of the case against him, the
accused sought to withdraw the amount he had
deposited as bail. It was not returned at once to the
accused because according to the Judge, it was
stolen from the drawer of his table where he kept it
after receipt. Nonetheless, the amount was
returned to the accused. Is the Judge guilty of
misconduct for which he may be disciplined? (1999)
A: Yes. The judge is guilty of misconduct and maybe
disciplined. He was negligent in keeping the money
in his drawer instead of depositing it with the
municipal treasurer as required by law. His failure to
return it at once after acquittal of the accused
creates a suspicion that he misappropriated the
money. A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities (Canon
2, Code of Judicial Conduct)
Q: Judge Silva upon seeing a reckless tricycle driver
almost hitting a boy by the side of the road, gave
chase and stopped the tricycle. Judge Silva then
confiscated the driver’s license and told him to get
it from his office. Was the conduct of Judge Silva
proper? (1998)
A: The facts are akin to those in Paguirigan v.
Clavano (61 SCRA 411 [1074]), where the Supreme
Court held:
While respondent might have been
motivated by a spirit of civicism in cooperating with
the city authorities in the enforcement of traffic
laws, it is obvious that the investigation of violations
of traffic rules and regulations, the arrest of errant
motor vehicle drivers and the confiscation of their
licenses are essentially police functions which are
specifically vested by law upon law enforcement
officers of the government. Respondent as Judge of
the City Court will necessarily hear and decide all
cases filed in his court regarding such violations and
infractions of the Motor Vehicle Law or traffic
regulations by the law enforcement officers. It is
patent, therefore, that respondent should not have
taken upon himself the responsibility of confiscating
the license of the motor cab driver but he should
have referred the matter to the police. We deem it
relevant to emphasize that the official conduct of a

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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judge should be free from impropriety or any
appearance thereof. His personal behavior in the
performance of his official duties and in his everyday
life should be beyond reproach. By confiscating the
driver’s license without issuing any Traffic Violation
Report (TVR) and losing the same while in his
possession, respondent Judge has acted in a manner
unbefitting his high judicial office.
Q: A judge was seen having lunch with a litigant in a
case pending before him in court. He was also seen
at the racetrack placing his bet on certain horses.
How would you evaluate the behavior of the judge?
Explain. (1990)
A: The judge’s behavior is highly improper. Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01 of the same
Code provides that a judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. His having
lunch with a litigant with a case pending before him
in court violates such rule and gives the adverse
party cause to complain against his impartiality.
His going to the racetrack to place bets on
certain horses puts the judiciary personified by him
in a bad light. For the personal behavior of a judge,
not only upon the bench but also in everyday life,
should be above reproach and free from the
appearance of impropriety. His judicial office
circumscribes his personal conduct and imposes a
number of restrictions, which he must observe
faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting and
occupying an exalted position in the administration
of justice.
Q: Discuss the propriety of a judge standing as
sponsor at the wedding of the son of the litigant in
his court? (1990)
A: For reasons above stated, a judge’s standing as
sponsor at the wedding of the son of a litigant in his
court is highly improper for it gives the impression,
rightly or wrongly, that he is disposed to resolve the
case in favor of such litigant. Public confidence in the
impartiality of the judge is eroded, and the due
administration of justice suffers thereby. It is also a
violation of the letter and spirit of Rule 2.03 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which states that the
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey
or permit others to convey the impressions that they
are in a special position to influence the judge.
Q: Judge A went to Hong Kong on vacation on
board a Philippine Airlines plane and they (sic)
stayed in a first class hotel for three days and three
nights. The round trip ticket Manila-Hong Kong-
Manila and board and lodging in the hotel where he
stayed were paid for as a birthday gift to the Judge
by a friend whose son has a case for estafa pending
P a g e | 30
in another Branch of the Court where Judge A is
assigned. Did Judge A commit any infraction of the
Code of Judicial Conduct under the circumstances?
(1999)
A: Yes. He violated Canon 5, Rule 5.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge or any
immediate member of the family shall not accept a
gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as
may be allowed by law. Also, Canon 2 of the same
Code provides that a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Accepting a birthday gift of a vacation in Hong Kong
from a friend whose son has a case for estafa
pending in another branch of the Court where Judge
A is assigned raises a suspicion of impropriety on his
part. The fact that the case is pending in another
branch is immaterial because he could be suspected
of having been bribed to influence the presiding
judge of the other branch. A judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome litigation or
dispute pending before another court administrative
agency (Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Q: At the pre-trial of a civil case for collection, one
of the parties mentioned that he expected to settle
his obligation as he was investing in some stocks of
a realty corporation that were sure to soar in the
market because of some confidential information
he obtain from his brother-in-law, a top-rank
officer of the corporation. Upon hearing the
information the judge lost no time in buying stocks
in the realty corporation and as predicted made a
lot of money.
Is the judge guilty of unethical conduct?
Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Yes. Rule 5.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that “No information acquired in a judicial
capacity shall be used or disclosed by a judge in any
financial dealing or for any other purpose not related
to judicial activities.” The judge in this case has
violated the forgoing rule, and acted unethically.
Q: Justice AR of the Sandiganbayan was named
executor of the will of his good friend BT whose
estate is valued approximately at Two Billion
(P2,000,000,000.00) Pesos. Upon BT’S death, may
Justice AR accept the trust and serve as executors
of BT’s Will while still in office? (1999)
A: No, he may not. Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that a judge shall not serve as the
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other
fiduciary except for the estate, trust, or person of a
member of the immediate family, and then only if
such service will not interfere with the proper
performance of judicial duties. Members of
immediate family shall be limited to the spouse and
relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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Q: In an intestate estate proceeding a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of
an RTC judge was filed by one of the heirs. Another
heir opposed the petition on the ground that the
judge was disqualified to become administrator of
the estate as he was the first cousin of the
deceased. The petitioner however argued that the
judge was not disqualified as the case was not
pending before him. Rule on the petition. Discuss
fully. (1995)
A: Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that “ A judge should not serve as the executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary,
except for the estate, trust or person of a member of
the immediate family, and then only if such service
will not interfere with the proper performance of
judicial duties. Members of immediate family’ shall
be limited to the spouse and relatives within the
second degree of consanguinity”. Under the forgoing
rule, the petition should be denied. The judge should
not be appointed administrator of the estate of his
first cousin, who is not a relative within the second
degree of consanguinity.
Q: Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits
on Saturdays for relaxation, as the owner of the
cockpit is a friend of his. He also goes to the casino
once a week to accompany his wife who loves to
play the slot machines. Because of this, Judge
Horacio was administratively charged. When asked
to explain, he said that although he goes to these
places, he only watches and does not place any
bets. (2005)
A: The explanation of Judge Horacio is not tenable.
In the case of City of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr.,
375 SCRA 1[2002], the Supreme Court penalized a
city court judge for going to gambling casinos and
cockpits on weekends. According to the Court, going
to a casino violates Circular No. 4, dated August
27,1980, which enjoins judges of inferior courts from
playing or being present in gambling casinos.
The prohibition refers to both actual
gambling and mere presence in gambling casinos. A
judge’s personal behavior, not only in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
With regard to going to cockpits, the
Supreme Court held that “verily, it is plainly
despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more
so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming
of a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due
him. Ultimately, the Judiciary suffers therefrom
because a judge is a visible representation of the
Judiciary” (City of Tagbilaran v. Hantonosas, Jr.,ibid
ar p. 8)
Q: Judge Roman Pulido, an incumbent RTC judge,
ran for President of the Rotary Club of Bacolor and
won. His first project was to put up a livelihood
P a g e | 31
center to help the lahar victims. To raise funds he
sent to the business community solicitation letters
for contributions. His rival in their club filed an
administrative charge against Judge Pulido alleging
unethical conduct for socializing and being actively
involved in an organization the members of which
are mostly practicing lawyers, and for soliciting
contributions. Are the grounds raised valid for the
charge of unethical conduct? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Rules 5.01, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that;
“Rule 5.01. A judge may engage in the
following activities provided that they do not
interfere with the performance of judicial duties or
detract from the dignity of the court:
x x x x
(c) participate in civil and charitable
activities;
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or
non-legal adviser of a non-political, educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization”.
A judge is not required to live in seclusion.
However, Section 24, Code of Judicial Ethics provides
that a judge should avoid giving ground for
reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or
prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to
patronize or contribute to charitable enterprises.
Hence, while it is ethical for Judge Pulido to become
president of Rotary Club of Bacolor, it would be
unethical for him to send letters soliciting
contributions from the business community.
Q: As the guest speaker in Rotary Club weekly
luncheon meeting, Judge P was asked during the
open forum what might his personal opinion be on
PIRMA’s move to initiate a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. He expressed the view
that PIRMA’s crusade should be allowed because it
would be in consonance with the declaration in the
Constitution that “sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from
them.” He likewise enjoined the members to
support PIRMA. An administrative complaint was
filed against him by a club member, a staunch
oppositor to the PIRMA petition before the
COMELEC, alleging that the judge’s public
statement had constituted conduct unbecoming a
judge. Judge P’s answer to the complaint was that
membership in the judiciary did not deprive him of
his right to free speech, that he was entitled to
express his view even on political issues, and that
any issue requiring resolution on the PIRMA
petition was outside the jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts. Was there a breach of the Code of
Judicial conduct by Judge P? (1997)
A: Yes, there is a breach. Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that a judge is entitled to
entertain personal views on political questions. But
to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to party

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
QuAMTO (1990-2007)
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office
or participate in other partisan political activities.
Since Judge P considered the PIRMA petition to be a
political issue, he should have refrained from making
his speech and enjoining his listeners to support
PIRMA because he might be suspected (of) engaging
in partisan political activity.
Q: B, who was given no more than six (6) months to
live by her physician, requested her cousin Judge A
to introduce her to Judge C before whose sala she
has a case submitted for resolution. B would wish
to have the case decided before her expected
demise. Judge A, who personally knows Judge C,
accompanied B to the latter, introduced her as his
cousin, and explained that all that B wants is for her
case to be expeditiously resolved, without, in any
way, suggesting in whose favor it should be
decided. Comment on the conduct of Judge A.
(2003)
A: The conduct of Judge A may be considered
unethical. Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that “a judge shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative
agency.” Although Judge A did not suggest to Judge
C in whose favor the case should be decided, the fact
that he introduced B as his cousin is enough
suggestion as to how the case should be decided.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly
provides that “a judge should avoid impropriety and
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Q: In the contract of lease of the house and lot
located in Quezon City that A entered into with B, it
is stipulated that if at the end of the lease term, the
lessee B should refuse and fail to vacate the
premises and the parties fail to agree on the
extension of the lease period, the case for eviction
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court in
Manila, as agreed upon. The judge of the Regional
Trial Court to whom the case was assigned motu
proprio dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff A and defendant B presented separate
motions urging the Court to reconsider its order
and jurisdiction of their case by mutual agreement.
The Judge denied their motion insisting that his
Court has no jurisdiction over the case for detainer.
May the Regional Trial Court upon the facts of the
case assume jurisdiction of it as suggested by the
parties? (1999)
A: No, the Regional Trial Court may not assume
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over subject matter is
conferred by the law and not by agreement of the
parties. While rule 3.13 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides for the Remittal of Disqualification
of judges, it refers to remittal of the disqualification
of the judge to take part in the case on the ground
that his impartiality may be placed in doubt. It is not
applicable to lack of jurisdiction.
P a g e | 32
Q: A complaint for rape against ZZ was filed by the
father of Dulce, an 11- year old girl, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu. After
preliminary examination of the offended party and
witnesses, Judge YY of said court issued an order
finding probable cause and ordering to arrest ZZ
without bail. ZZ was arrested and detained. He
filed: (1) a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation, and
(2), an Ex parte Motion to Fix Bail Bond, Judge YY
granted the waiver and forthwith elevated the
records of the case to the RTC, which forwarded the
same to the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
Ten (10) days after the elevation of the
records, YY, acting on the Motion To Fix Bail, issued
an order fixing the bail bond at P20, 000.00. The
father of Dulce filed against YY an administrative
complaint for ignorance of the law, oppression
grave abuse of discretion and partiality. If you were
the judge of the RTC designated to investigate the
case and to make a report and recommendation
thereon, what would be your recommendation?
(1991)
A: The fact narrated in this case is similar to the
decision of the Supreme Court in 1989. The judge
was found guilty of ignorance of the law for granting
bail despite the fact that he had already lost
jurisdiction after elevating the record of the case to
the Regional Trial Court. If I am the RTC Judge
assigned to investigate the case I would recommend
the dismissal of the judge for gross ignorance of the
law.
Q: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket,
would exert efforts to compel the accused in
criminal cases to plead guilty to lesser offense and
advise party litigants in civil cases whose positions
appear weak, to accept the compromise offered by
opposing party. Is the practice legally acceptable?
(1998)
A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the
Judge does not exert pressure on the parties and
takes care that he does not appear to have
prejudged the case. Where a judge has told the party
that his case is weak before the latter was fully
heard, such was considered as a ground for his
disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).
Q: The Code of Professional Responsibility is to
lawyers, as the Code of Judicial Conduct is to
members of the bench. How would you
characterize the relationship between a judge and a
lawyer? Explain. (1996)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to observed and maintain respect for the
Judicial Officers (Canon 11). On the other hand, the
Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be
patient, attentive and courteous to lawyers (Rule
3.03). In a word, lawyers and judges owe each other
mutual respect and courtesy.

QUESTIONS ASKED MORE THAN ONCE IN THE BAR
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Q: Upon opening session of his court, the Presiding
Judge noticed the presence of television cameras
set up at strategic places in his courtroom and the
positing of media practitioners all over his sala with
their video cameras. The Judge forthwith issued an
order directing the exclusion from the courtroom of
all television paraphernalia and further instructing
the reporters inside the hall not to operate their
“video cams” during the proceedings. The defense
lawyers objected to the court’s order, claiming that
it was violative of their client’s constitutional right
to a public trial. In issuing the questioned order, did
the Judge act in violation of the rights of the
accused to a public trial? Discuss briefly. (2004)
A: The Judge did not violate the right of the accused
to a public trial. A trial is public “when anyone
interested in observing the manner a judge conducts
the proceedings in his courtroom may do so” (Garcia
v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 [1973]). There is to be no
ban on attendance. In the question given, the judge
did not bar attendance, only the use of television
paraphernalia and “video cams”.
Q: Did the Judge act the derogation of press
freedom when he directed the exclusion of the
television paraphernalia from the courtroom and
when he prohibited the news reporters in the
courtroom from operating their “video cams”
during the proceedings? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No. Press freedom was never transgressed. The
serious risks posed to the fair administration of
justice by live TV and radio broadcast, especially
when emotions are running high on the issues
stirred by the case, should be taken into
consideration before addressing the issue not of
press freedom. The right of the accused to a fair
trial, not by a trial by publicity takes precedence over
press freedom as invoked by the TV reporters in this
case (Sec. Perez v. Estrada, 365 SCRA 62, [2001]).
Q: While Miss Malumanay, a witness for the
plaintiff, was under cross-examination, Judge
Mausisa asked questions alternately with the
counsel for the defendant. After four questions by
the judge, the plaintiff’s counsel moved the judge
refrain from asking further questions which tended
to favor the defense and leave the examination of
the witness to the defendant’s counsel, who was a
new lawyer. The judge explained that he was
entitled to ask searching questions. Is the motion
tenable? Why? (2002)
A: It depends. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that while a judge may, to
promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up
some obscurity, properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
always be borne in mind that undue interference
may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or
P a g e | 33
the ascertainment of truth. Thus, if in asking four
questions alternately with counsel for the
defendant, Judge Mausisa was only trying to clear up
some obscurity, he cannot be accused of undue
interference. But if his “searching questions” were
such as to give the impression that he was already
acting as a counsel for the defendant, his conduct is
improper.
Q: Can the judge justify his intervention? How?
(2002)
A: The judge can justify his intervention on any of
the grounds mentioned by the rule, namely, to
promote justice, avoid waste of time, or clear up
some obscurity.
Q: In a murder trial, Judge T asked searching
questions of all the witnesses for the accused
prompting Atty. O, counsel the accused, to request
Judge T to desist from acting as counsel for the
prosecution. The Judge, However, reminded Atty. O
that she wanted to determine whether the accused
was guilty of the crime charged.
Is it proper for Judge T to take an active
part on the examination of the accused’s
witnesses? (1996)
A: No, it is not proper. Rule 3.06 of the Code of
Judicial conduct provides that “While a judge may, to
promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up
some obscurity, properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
always be borne in mind that undue interference
may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or
the ascertainment of truth.” The intervention of the
judge in a case must be done with considerable
circumspection. It must be done sparingly and not
throughout the trial, which will have the effect of or
will tend to build or bolster the case for one of the
parties. The reason for this rule is that the judge
should not only be impartial but also appear to be
impartial.