Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
A Dissertation
Doctor of Philosophy
by
July 2004
UMI Number: 3166474
Abstract
by
Michael J. Bowler
much has been given to the systematic philosophical import of this reappropriation and
interpretation of the very nature of philosophy has gained pre-eminence but has also
become questionable.
architectonic of the positive sciences which, in the nineteenth century, found itself
Heidegger, this latter requirement leads to two very different conceptions of philosophy,
Heidegger believes that this betrays a crisis in the very nature and task of
Aristotle's philosophy. Heidegger believes that through such a reappropriation the crisis
the nature of scientific thought and the relation of this to its penultimate question, i.e., the
question of Being – a question that Heidegger believes modern critical philosophy has
articulate the activity and movement of thought in its questioning of Being and,
To my loving wife, Monica, whose invaluable support made all this possible.
ii
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................................................................................. v
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1
iii
CHAPTER FIVE: HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
REAPPROPRIATION OF PRAXIS.................................................................... 212
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... 359
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first and foremost like to thank my advisor Stephen Watson. He invested
much work over a long period of time teaching me, guiding me through the graduate
program, and helping me complete this dissertation. His knowledge, skill, patience, and
friendship were invaluable not only for completing this dissertation but in my ability to
make it through graduate school all together. This dissertation is much better because of
his influence. He was also more than just an academic advisor as he helped me through
sense and I am forever grateful for all he has done for me.
In this respect, special mention must also be made of an early mentor of mine, a
good friend, and the person who first introduced me to and helped me appreciate the
work of Martin Heidegger: David McCarty. He has helped me in so many ways that I
I am also grateful for the time and effort that Karl Ameriks, Fred Dallmayr, and
Lenny Moss have invested in my education and as readers of this dissertation. I have
learned much from the classes I took from them and the conversations I had with them.
In addition, I would like to thank my friends and fellow graduate students: Phil
Bartok, Ingo Farin, Matt Halteman, Pat McDonald, Rob Piercey, and Manuel Vargas. It
v
was in conversations with them that I sharpened many of the ideas that have found their
I would also like to thank my family for all they have done for me and for the
support they have given me over these many years. They too were a vital part of the
Finally and most importantly, the largest debt I owe and my utmost appreciation
go to my wife Monica. Without her help and support through these past few difficult
years I would have achieved little. I cannot imagine a more loving, caring, patient, and
dedicated wife than her and I thank God every day that he brought her into my life. I
vi
INTRODUCTION
Duns Scotus, Heidegger sets forth what, in his view, is the characteristic problem which
plagues much of the philosophy of the 19th and early 20th century. He says, “Philosophy
experience is without a goal.”1 At this early stage in his career Heidegger believes that,
except for Wilhelm Dilthey, the critical, transcendental philosophies of the late 19th and
early 20th century, including the Southwestern and Marburg schools of Neo-Kantianism,
and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl had detached philosophy from life or "living
1
Martin Heidegger, “The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,” translated by Roderick
M. Stewart and John Van Buren, in Martin Heidegger, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and
Time and Beyond, edited by John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pg. 68.
2
Ibid., pg. 68.
1
Such a rationalization of philosophy, with its exclusive reliance on universal, abstract
the “medieval worldview.” For example, the medieval concept of analogy is,
The concept of analogy is the bridge between medieval scholasticism and mysticism, that
is, between a systematic, "scientific" account of reality and that reality as lived. Analogy
is the primordial concept through which the problem of the categories arose from the
system of categories and life, the medieval system of categories, and for that matter any
emptiness.”4
hermeneutic aspects of reading the history of philosophy. That is, in the habilitation he
reads the category problem - which is so central to Ancient and Medieval philosophy as
3
Heidegger, “The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,” pg. 67.
4
Ibid., pg. 62.
2
hermeneutic horizon becomes increasingly sharpened in Heidegger's early thought by his
analysis of three figures who struggled to reconcile the two sides of this dichotomy:
historical reason - to whom Heidegger was doubtless exposed by his early mentor
Heinrich Rickert, Edmund Husserl, who expounded the radical, new “scientific
reader of Ancient philosophy in his own right, but also an important interpreter of Kant's
Michael Friedman, for example, has recently argued5 that the split between the
understood by seeing the origin of this divide in very different responses to the debate
between the two major traditions of Neo-Kantianism, the southwest or Baden school,
significant in the present case, is that Friedman believes that Heidegger's early
5
Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court
Publishing Company, 2000).
3
southwestern school of Neo-Kantianism.6 This, Friedman argues, is in part due to the
influence of Heinrich Rickert upon Heidegger, but, perhaps more significantly, also to the
thought of Rickert's student Emil Lask, upon whom Husserl's Logical Investigations had
against critics who call it "one-sided and selective" by pointing out that he never intended
"to tell the whole story about" Heidegger7, he still maintains that it is illuminating to see
means of his unorthodox reading of Kant wherein Heidegger attempts to "overcome the
as well."8 Friedman goes on to further argue that "...according to Heidegger, [his reading
of Kant] implies that the traditional basis of Western metaphysics in logos, Geist, or
6
Cf. Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, especially chapter 4. There Friedman argues that, "...by
dissolving the traditional philosophical distinction between "essence" and "existence" in the temporality of
Dasein, [Heidegger] is able to reinstitute a form of "direct realism" founded on Dasein's necessary "being-
in-the-world." This form of "direct realism" is very special, however, for Dasein's most fundamental
relation to the world is not a cognitive relation at all. Indeed, Dasein's most fundamental relation to the
world is one of either "authentic" or "inauthentic" existence, in which Dasein's own peculiar mode of being
(that is, "being-in-the-world") is itself either disclosed or covered over. Heidegger's version of "direct
realism" is thus only possible on the basis of the historical nature of Dasein, and so all truth is in the end
historical." (pg. 58).
7
Michael Friedman, "Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger: The Davos Disputation and Twentieth Century
Philosophy," European Journal of Philosophy 10, pp. 263 - 274.
8
Ibid., pg. 265.
9
Ibid.
10
For example, Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993) and Theodore Kisiel, "Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask," Man and
World 28, pp. 197 - 240.
4
emphasizes the central importance of Emil Lask - a student of Rickert who was also
He says,
It is by means of and through this problematic that Friedman and Kisiel see Heidegger's
early philosophy as a radically new response to the Kantian problematic of the relation
11
Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, pg. 46.
12
Ibid., pg. 46.
5
A central thesis of this dissertation is to question this (not uncommon) reading of
Heidegger's early philosophy.13 Not only is Friedman's reading "one-sided and selective"
but rather than being illuminating, it is, in many respects, misleading with respect to
appear in Heidegger and the late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers that
influenced his him, it is misleading to suggest that the Kantian problematic of the relation
between abstract thought and concrete sensibility was Heidegger's genuine problematic.
As we have just seen, even in his habilitation Heidegger understands his own project as
That is, the main problem with the aforementioned "Kantian" reading of Heidegger's
problematic is that it puts in place of Heidegger's true problematic, which is the nature or
"idea" of philosophy as such and the (traditionally dominant) rationalization of its nature,
sees Heidegger's project as addressing the pressing issue of this philosophy. Thus,
relation between thought and sensibility and proposing a radical solution, namely, a
13
A similar reading permeates the interpretations of Dreyfus, Okrent, Dahlstrom, Blattner, et. al.
6
Heidegger's early philosophy14 and, in the extreme, to the claim that Heidegger's
Heidegger describes his own early project as speaking to what he sees as a "crisis"
in the nature of philosophy itself brought about by two dominant and apparently
and just after Being and Time. However, it arises less determinately, though still
What is opened up in the concept of living spirit and its relation to the
metaphysical "origin" is an insight into its basic metaphysical structure in
which the uniqueness, the individuality, of its acts is joined together in a
living unity with the universal validity, the subsisting-in-itself, of sense.
Looking at this from the side of the objects involved, what stands before
us is the problem of the relation between time and eternity, change and
absolute validity, world and God, a problem that in terms of theory of
science finds itself reflected in history (formation of values) and
philosophy (validity of values).16
structure" of living spirit that informs Heidegger's understanding of the theory of science,
Heidegger affirms this problematic even more forcefully at an earlier point in his
habilitation when he says, "We cannot at all see logic and its problems in their true light
14
For instance, Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,
Division I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991).
15
William Blattner, "Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?," Inquiry 37, pp. 185 - 201 and William Blattner,
Heidegger's Temporal Idealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
16
Heidegger, “The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,” pg. 68.
7
if the context from which they are interpreted is not a translogical one. Philosophy
cannot for long do without its authentic optics: metaphysics. This signifies for theory of
consciousness."17 Again, the problematic is one of the very nature of philosophy insofar
as it has lost its "authentic optics: metaphysics." On the other hand, this is not a naive
return to a pre-critical metaphysics. In fact, Heidegger has little patience for this
approach, as he makes clear in a later context while discussing the title of his 1923
If ... one takes "ontology" to be a rallying motto for the now popular
attacks on Kant, and, more precisely, on the spirit of Luther and, in
principle, on all open questioning not frightened in advance by possible
consequences - in short, ontology as the alluring call to a slave revolt
against philosophy as such - then the title of this course is completely
misleading.19
Once more, Heidegger is clear that his is a hermeneutic project. Philosophy must find its
proper optic in metaphysics, or what he will later call "fundamental ontology," only with
respect to the present crisis facing the nature of philosophy itself, a crisis precipitated by
17
Ibid., pg. 65-6.
18
Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, translated by John van Buren
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
19
Ibid., pg. 1.
8
philosophy," i.e., the Seinsfrage, his emphasis on the very nature of the activity of
philosophy, and the "metaphysical structure" of the being who philosophizes (Dasein),
i.e., that being whose being is characterized by both nous (intuition or insight) and logos
(discourse).
Within the "Kantian" problematic that Friedman and others put forward,
regard that Friedman notes in his chapter on Heidegger that, "...Kant thereby also
subscribes to "direct realism" - to the view that we directly perceive external objects
outside ourselves in space in outer sense just as we directly perceive internal objects in
simply because Friedman sees Kant as, in some sense, grasping the project of
reducible to something that Kant would find unproblematic and in fact, in some form or
philosophy is the subject of the last chapter of this dissertation, wherein I argue that
Heidegger appropriates from Aristotle the notion of philosophy as the fulfillment of the
praxis of life, i.e., an activity whose end or purpose is that very activity itself.
that the present crisis in philosophy - that between philosophy as worldview and
20
Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, pg. 60.
9
philosophy as rigorously scientific phenomenology - opens up for Heidegger an
understanding of philosophy not fully explicit, but rather dormant in Aristotle's thought,
and one that remains in tension even there. In the last chapter, I examine this crisis of
philosophy and show how Heidegger appropriates Aristotle's Metaphysics, Physics, and
Aristotle21 as we will see, which emphasize the role of the Nicomachean Ethics, I argue
that Heidegger looks equally as much to Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics as to his
Nicomachean Ethics for his appropriation of Aristotle's notion of praxis, especially with
regard to the being of Dasein. In his early thought, Heidegger turns, for the most part,
only to book six of the Nicomachean Ethics and, in that respect, principally for Aristotle's
In the course of this dissertation, I will argue that recently emerged texts22 provide
21
For instance, Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology, translated by
and edited by Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), especially chapter 3:
"The Reappropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics: Poiesis and Praxis in the Articulation of Fundamental
Ontology", Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989), especially part II, II, 2 (B), "The hermeneutic relevance of
Aristotle", Franco Volpi, "Being and Time: A Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics?," translated by John
Protevi, and Walter Brogan, "The Place of Aristotle in the Development of Heidegger's Phenomenology,"
both in Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Early Thought, edited by Theodore Kisiel and
John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
22
Specifically, Heidegger's lecture courses of 1919, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of
Worldview" (the "War Emergency Semester 1919" lecture) and "Phenomenology and Transcendental
Philosophy of Value," both in Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, translated by Ted
Sadler (London: The Athlone Press, 2000). As well as, his lecture course of the winter of 1921- 1922,
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, translated by
Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) and his lecture course of the winter of
1924-25, Plato's Sophist, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997). Finally, Heidegger's ten-part lecture series, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the
Struggle for a Historical Worldview," translated by Charles Bambach in Martin Heidegger, Supplements:
From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, edited by John van Buren (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 147 – 176.
10
understanding his hermeneutic appropriation of Aristotle. To this end, the first four
chapters of my dissertation investigate and lay out this context by means of a number of
Heidegger's early lecture courses where he deals with the thinkers influential in his own
(chapter one), Husserl (chapter two), Natorp (chapter three), and Dilthey (chapter four).
sensibility, though clearly evident to a greater or lesser degree in each of these thinkers,
can also lead to misunderstanding. I think it is much more illuminating and less
different notion of and approach to lived-experience, and for Dilthey and Heidegger their
approach to life itself, represent well their own advancement of - or, perhaps, rejection of
- the Kantian project. Clearly, for each of them, lived-experience remained connected to
Kant’s dichotomy between thought and sensibility. And what is important, and what
interpreters such as Friedman miss, as Erlebnis is given scant mention in his book, is that
for each of them (with, perhaps, the exception of Rickert), lived-experience represented
the common origin, source, and principle of both thought and "sensibility." That is, the
thinkers most contemporarily influential to Heidegger had explicitly realized (in different
ways and to different degrees) that the Kantian dichotomy so central to Friedman’s
Where they differed was not over whether to side with rationalistic universalism
or anti-rationalistic particularism, but over the nature and validity of thought and
11
sensibility given that they have a common origin in lived-experience and the relation
between subjectivity as such and lived-experience. But since Friedman believes that only
Cassirer adequately overcame the dichotomy between thought and sensibility, everyone
else gets interpreted as, more or less, falling on one side or the other of this dichotomy.
For instance, Friedman says that, for Husserl, "pure consciousness ... itself belongs to the
purely ideal realm of essences and is thus entirely independent of the existence of any
and all concrete instances."23 But Husserl does not say this. He believes that the
[Daseins]."24
To this end, I spend much of the first four chapters of the dissertation tracing
thought and "sensibility" within their notion of lived-experience and its relation to
each thinker. This, I believe, effectively sets the context for understanding Heidegger's
Chapter one traces the very early influences on Heidegger’s thought, especially
Windelband, Rickert and Lask all of whom were representatives of the southwestern
23
Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, pg. 46.
24
Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
translated by F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), pg. 103.
12
school of Neo-Kantianism. The overriding issue in this context is their attempt to
are universal, but which are at the same time capable of capturing the individuality of
historical entities. These concepts are significantly and qualitatively different from the
concerned with formulating a philosophy of value, i.e., a philosophy that relies on value-
related concepts. In most respects, Friedman’s account here does capture the explicit
concerns of the southwestern school of Neo-Kantianism. But, Heidegger argues that the
value philosophy of the southwestern school is incapable of understanding how its value-
related concepts can ever be given in immediate lived-experience due to its infinitely
complexity. The question arises as to the source and ground of these concepts. Value
argues, this begs the question. Using Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Aristotelian
phenomenology, with its fundamentally new understanding of the role of intuition (which
Heidegger says Lask never fully understood in its true radicality) still represents a
That is, the notion that there is a form of generality, viz., a nexus (Zusammenhang), by
means of which it is possible to grasp an individual in such a way that the means by
13
In chapter two, we turn to Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s early
critique of it for which he relies heavily on Natorp’s own critique. Heidegger sees in
intentionality and intuition, Husserl is able to show how concepts can be given in lived-
experience without thereby sacrificing their universal meaning. That is, he avoids the
that dominates much of the Neo-Kantian tradition. However, Husserl remains under the
lived-experience. That is, though he set out to grasp the living character of intentionality
and intuition (we live through towards things) this is constrained by his dogmatic
always intend, and thus intuit, objects – where Husserl characterizes objects as self-
contained unities of meaning. Because of this, for Husserl, even reflection upon lived-
Husserl is incapable of grasping subjectivity just as it is given but must “till the stream”
inherent unity. Thus, by the time of the Ideas, Husserl is forced to posit the pure or
transcendental ego (the analogue of the Kantian unity of apperception) to perform this
function and at the same time must admit the transcendental ego is not given. But even
this is understood objectively. Ultimately, this leads Heidegger to claim that Husserl
14
never understood, or even questioned, the being of subjectivity, but took it for granted as
large part, been neglected. Natorp rejects any “positivistic” approach to a critique of
reason, i.e., an approach that relies on subjectively given, evidential objectivities. Natorp
argues that objectivity is not evidentially given in immediate lived-experience, but rather
that the task of objectivity is given in the act of scientific inquiry. Thus, Natorp rejects
subjectivity, rather than being a secure starting point of thought, is actually the end
Natorp grounds his approach in a significant and, with respect to Heidegger, influential
Heidegger’s analysis of the three-fold structure of the Seinsfrage. Natorp explicitly says
that the only a priori is the task of knowledge, i.e., the task of objectification itself, which
is, the telos of the task of knowledge is to objectify pure subjectivity such that it is made
intelligible (a task which Natorp says is “infinite”). However, Heidegger asks: if pure
subjectivity is not given (as Natorp believes) then what is to guide Natorp’s
“reconstruction” of it? Knowledge has become purely “constructive” and the subject is
15
an objectively constructed “fiction.” In this regard, Natorp raised the question of the
nature of subjectivity, but the being of subjectivity remains for him that of an object.
However, Natorp opens up an interesting question with respect to the nature of the
activity of philosophy and knowledge. That is, Natorp believes that the only given in the
science of knowledge (philosophy) is the task of knowledge itself, but, as I argue, Natorp
has no resources for understanding what this is. If we are given the task of knowledge
and from this are supposed to grasp the essential nature of science and, ultimately,
inquire. We need to understand what it means to be a subject that actively engages in and
pursues projects. This leads into issues that Dilthey raised in his methodological
(Zusammenhang). These nexus are both manifested in and structure what Dilthey calls
“life.” They are not universal abstractions but are rather general, unifying contexts which
respective historical or psychic nexus that lies behind such expressions. Life is the
medium in which such historical and psychical nexus are lived. Moreover, these
historical and psychic nexus are not understood by Dilthey to be mere “subjective”
structures, but objectivity itself is one moment within these nexus. In this way,
16
intersubjectivity is not an achievement of the subject but is inherent to life and lived-
and in Dilthey’s The Essence of Philosophy, we find that Dilthey does restrict these nexus
to the realm of life and still sees it as problematic as to how life (though intersubjectively
understood) and world can connect. This issue, Dilthey calls the “world-riddle” and
17
CHAPTER ONE
GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN
critique of Neo-Kantian value philosophy and Emil Lask's development of it. First I shall
unlike those of the Naturwissenschaften insofar as they were not law-like, but still
capable of grasping the individuality of historical entities in a universal way. That is, by
characteristic of these concepts is that they are "value related," i.e., they make essential
reference to a value without asserting a valuation. In this way, the southwestern school
Geisteswissenschaften.
psychology and, by means of this, give them a solid foundation in a special science.
Heidegger argues that this attempt ultimately fails, because, according to value
18
philosophy's own tenets, the science of psychology must presuppose the value concept of
truth. More significantly, Heidegger argues that value philosophy's universalist approach
Husserl's Logical Investigations, who first made note of this problem and subsequently
his "Stockwerk" theory. Heidegger argues that Lask's theory, like Rickert's, is, in the end,
Heidegger, including his subsequent critique of it, is crucial for understanding the
The classic statement of the issue that drove much of Neo-Kantian philosophy
natural sciences from the human sciences. Windelband argues that the natural sciences
are "nomothetic" or strive towards universal laws while the human sciences are
"idiographic" and try to capture the individuality of "processes and events." Windelband
says,
25
Wilhelm Windelband, "History and Natural Science," translated by Guy Oakes, History and Theory,
19, pp. 165 – 185.
19
...we have before us a purely methodological classification of the
empirical sciences that is grounded upon sound logical concepts...One
kind of science is an inquiry into general laws. The other kind of science
is an inquiry into specific historical facts. In the language of formal logic,
the objective of the first kind of science is the general, apodictic judgment;
the objective of the other kind of science is the singular, assertoric
proposition.26
Rickert extends this analysis, making it "formally adequate." That is, he wants to
distinguish the sciences purely on formal grounds without presupposing anything about
their subject matter contrary to Dilthey’s distinction between the sciences that deal with
nature and those whose object is spirit.27 Rickert argues that common to both the natural
and human sciences is the use of generalized concepts, but whereas the nomothetic
method of the natural sciences use generalizations to acquire nomological laws the
idiographic method28 of the human sciences use generalizations to get at the individual.
Both methods however abstract from "the real," by which Rickert means, "the
Rickert believes it is required of any science that it abstracts from "the real" since "the
real" itself is "infinite", i.e., there are innumerable aspects and relations within
26
Ibid., pg. 175.
27
Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, translated and edited by Guy
Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
28
Although Rickert downplays the use of this term.
29
Ibid., pg. 39.
30
"As a complete empirical reality, Goethe is no "more complex" than any given fragment of sulfur in
its complete empirical reality. That is because the manifold of both realities is infinite." Ibid., pg. 57.
20
When we abstract from the individual configuration of things in natural
science, this does not bother us in most cases...We have no interest in the
fact that every leaf on a tree appears different from the leaves next to it, or
that no fragment of a chemical substance in a retort is exactly like any
other fragment of the "same" substance and will ever reappear.31
The natural sciences generalize in such a way that the individual is no longer part of its
concepts. It is not concerned with particular quarks, but with quarks as a kind and the
nomological laws which govern them. Rickert goes so far as to argue that, in its
31
Ibid., pg. 38.
32
Ibid., pg. 37.
21
It is true that in the practice of the natural sciences reference is made to perception and
the individual in many ways, for example, as the data from which general concepts are
abstracted and with which scientific hypothesis are tested, and of course in the
application of its nomothetic laws to the perceived world. Moreover, in practice the
concepts of natural science have empirical content of a very general sort though not “…of
that sort of perception that experience directly presents,” viz., perception of the purely
formation in the natural sciences. Methodologically, the purpose and meaning of concept
formation in the natural sciences is to abstract completely from individuality so that these
empirical perception the more complete they become in a logical sense.”33 In this sense,
Rickert follows the ancient tradition, explicit in Plato and Aristotle, of perception being
At first, this seems to present problems for Rickert’s view of natural science.
After all, this objection goes, does not the supremacy of the natural sciences with regard
to our knowledge of nature rest precisely on the fact that the method of the natural
sciences is eminently good at representing empirical reality itself? But if the content of
the concepts of natural science exclude concrete, particular empirical perception, i.e., if it
excludes the concrete individual from its nomothetic laws, has it not failed precisely in its
task to represent natural reality, which is after all always concrete and particular?
33
Ibid., pg. 37.
22
Consideration of this objection allows Rickert to get to the heart of his views on natural
science (and all empirical science for that matter.) It also gets to the heart of the Neo-
Kantian view that the task of science is not to reproduce reality, but rather to be valid.
Rickert argues that the objection is based on the “picture theory” of concepts.
The “picture theory” of concepts is that concepts are a mental “picture” of the reality they
represent. According to this view concepts are a mental reproduction of reality in the
mind whose “truth” is grounded in whether or not they accurately picture or reproduce
the reality they are meant to represent. Clearly, this theory is one version of the
For Rickert, there are really two parts to this objection, a practical one and a
theoretical one. The practical objection is that if the concepts of natural science do not
reproduce reality how is it that natural science gives us a mastery of nature through its
power to predict the future course of events? Rickert’s answer to this objection is quite
simple. If the concepts of natural science were not general and did not exclude concrete,
individual reality it would not be possible to use them to predict future events. If the
concepts of natural science were mere reproductions of concrete, individual reality they
23
individuality and concrete actuality, in our practical conduct we would
stand helpless before reality.34
With regard to predicting future events and “orienting ourselves practically,” we should
not want the concepts of natural science to represent things in their particularity, rather
we need general concepts which apply equally to many distinct individuals so that in
represented a unique individual would be, in this case, useless. Science as a mental
truth of science and not its practical use. Science is supposed to give us knowledge of the
real. However, if reality is concrete and particular and the concepts of natural science are
abstract and general and, therefore, cannot represent the particular, in what sense does
science gives us knowledge of the real? Again, Rickert’s answer is quite simple. If the
concepts of science were reproductions of concrete particulars then science would not
qualify as knowledge at all. His answer to this objection applies not just to the natural
34
Ibid., pp. 41 – 42.
24
to provide an exact reproduction of what has no limits is an absurd
enterprise.35
Rickert’s answer to the objection relies heavily on the fact that for him “the real” is an
infinite manifold. Therefore, if science is possible and its concepts are to be useful they
must be general. This, however, leaves an open question: If scientific concepts are
general and “the real” is an infinite manifold, what is the relation between scientific
concepts and “reality”? Is the formation of scientific concepts mere caprice? Not so says
Rickert, but one must give up the idea that scientific concepts represent or reproduce
“reality.” Rather, the concepts of natural science do not represent reality but hold
“validly for individual reality.” Strangely enough this does not mean for Rickert that the
concepts of natural science do not represent something they simply do not represent
“reality,” viz., concrete particulars. In order to ground the objectivity of science its
concepts must represent something. They cannot represent “reality,” but they do
35
Ibid., pg. 43.
36
Ibid., pg. 44.
25
For Rickert, as for most Neo-Kantians, the truth of judgments is grounded in validity and
“teleological” notion and true judgments represent how things should be and not how
they are in “reality.” Another way this is commonly put is that truth and therefore
To sum up, for Rickert the concepts of natural science are general concepts which
do not represent or reproduce reality and necessarily so. If this were not the case, they
would be useless and constituting knowledge with them would be absurd. Furthermore,
the purpose and meaning of natural science is to produce nomothetic, i.e., universally
Natural science represents one half of the logical space of the methodology of the
sciences, viz., scientific study whose product is ultimately nomothetic laws. The other
half is the sciences that provide scientific knowledge of individuals, i.e., the human
sciences.37 Even the concepts of the human sciences do not represent or reproduce the
"real" individual in Rickert's sense of the real, i.e., the individual given in immediate
experience, since all empirical individualities are "infinite." That is, the human sciences
must also employ concepts which simplify the empirically given individual for, as with
the natural sciences, if its concepts represented every aspect of the empirically given
individual, its concepts would be merely “useless” repetitions of the infinitely complex
“reality” which, if it were even possible to have a concept of such a “reality,” could never
37
It is important to note that generalities are not the subject matter of the natural sciences but rather the
methodological approach used towards that subject matter. As we will see, for Rickert, any given
individual entity can be the subject matter of either science.
26
rise to the level of scientific knowledge of historical individuals. For even knowledge in
the human sciences consists of judgments which themselves are syntheses of general
terms. Whereas the natural sciences utilize general concepts for the purpose of producing
nomothetic laws, the historical sciences use general concepts to get at the individual. As
Windelband argues, the human sciences are “idiographic.” On the other hand, like the
natural sciences, the human sciences need to simplify in order that they may rise to the
We know that the intensive infinity of every single process also poses
insuperable obstacles to a form of knowledge that proposes to represent
reality just as it really is. It follows that the historical disciplines, those
that do not fall within the natural sciences, are also obliged to undertake a
transformation and an analysis of the reality that is given to them. Here
too, however, the aim of this analysis can only be simplification by means
of a selection of what is essential and a synthesis of correlated elements
into valid concepts.38
The human sciences cannot deal with the infinite manifold that make up every empirical
individuality (“intensive infinities”) any more than the natural sciences can, rather one
must select the "essential" characteristics of it. Rickert writes, “…the perceptual and
38
Ibid., pg. 50.
39
Ibid., pg. 50.
27
the past, but not even the most specialized specialist would maintain that
this qualifies as historical science.40
However, to make clear what Rickert means by “historical science” I must first
mention an important distinction Rickert makes between uses of the German words
“Geschichte” and “Historie.” Geschichte and Historie both translate as “history.” Like
the English word “history” both “Geschichte” and “Historie” can be used ambiguously to
refer either to the science or study of history and its subject matter. When the context
does not disambiguate the meaning, Rickert proposes to reserve Geschichte to refer to the
science of history and des Historischen to refer to its subject matter. However, des
Historischen can have a further ambiguity. On the one hand, it can be used to refer to the
conceptualized by the science of history, or, on the other hand, des Historischen in its
“purely logical aspect” must “…be applicable to every part of the totality of empirical
(Historischen) object while an individual atom is not. Rickert says, “From this
40
Ibid., pg. 72.
41
Ibid., pg. 54.
28
representation of this process.”42 Heidegger makes a similar, though importantly
different, distinction in, among other places, sections 6 and 72-77 of Being and Time.
Heidegger distinguishes between the sense of historical as it is used when one talks about
a “historical entity” and historical when it is used to refer to something found in the
Rickert's distinction between the methodology of the natural and human sciences
is a "formal" distinction precisely because, in his view, it does not rely on any
immediate experience is historical in the broad sense - both the objects of the science of
history and the objects of the natural sciences. And everything is capable of becoming
the subject matter of a natural science or a human science. The difference depends on
how it is being understood, i.e., whether it is seen as a mere instance of a general concept
case of Goethe. Goethe can be seen as a poet, a minister, a person, etc. That is, Goethe
can become the object of a natural scientific study, i.e., he can be understood simply as an
instance of a general concept that applies equally to many individuals. The issue for
Rickert is what sort of concept formation is needed if we are to have a scientific study of
Goethe as a historical individual and not as a mere instance of a general concept, i.e.,
42
Ibid., pg. 54.
29
Again, all judgments use concepts and since judgments are constitutive of any
paradigmatic instance of referring to an individual through the use of a proper name and
argues, a la Russell, that even proper names are merely shorthand for a complex of
general concepts. This underscores Rickert's argument that all sciences must utilize
These “first generalities”44 as Rickert calls them are indispensable for any science
the Neo-Kantian project and his own early project of a pre-theoretical science is what
Rickert says next. That is, that without these “first generalities” no science is possible.
43
Ibid., pg. 79.
44
As opposed to the “second generalities” which are higher generalities used by the sciences to produce
systematic theories.
30
Consequently, there can be no science of immediate empirical experience or “concrete
lived-experience,”
Because all the objects of immediate empirical experience are “intensive infinities” there
can be no scientific understanding of them, since all science requires the use of general
concepts that select only certain finite features of the individual in order to make valid
From Rickert’s perspective what has been said means that if there is to be a
science of the individual it must conceptualize its content differently from the natural
sciences. Laying out this other form of concept formation is essential for a philosophical
45
Ibid., pg. 79.
31
they represent not what is common to a plurality of things and processes
but, rather, only what is present in one individual?46
In order to accomplish this, Rickert argues, we must realize that all individualizing
concepts of the type he proposes are “value related,” i.e., they conceptualize the
individual in such a way that characteristics of the individual are related to even more all-
encompassing values. Every entity capable of becoming the object of a human science is
located within a larger context of significance that makes the individual meaningful to
concepts. However, this should not be understood exclusively in the sense of moral
valuation but rather in the broad sense of being significant for something else. Placing
within this larger context, allows for a scientific conceptualization of the individual. It
allows science to relate this “concept” of the individual to other more over-arching
concepts and see their interdependence. For example, Goethe can be related to the larger
context of German Romanticism insofar as he is its greatest thinker. Both the idea of
Goethe as the greatest thinker of German Romanticism and the idea of German
Romanticism itself are individualized concepts, i.e., they are not concepts under which
other individuals can be subsumed, and so cannot be concepts to which universal laws
apply and, therefore, objects of natural science, but at the same time they are concepts
which anyone may understand even without immediate empirical experience of the
individuals they represent. They are also concepts that are related to one another and are
46
Ibid., pp. 78 – 79.
32
meaningful only with regard to one another. Specifically, Goethe as the greatest thinker
nexus. In this Rickert is carrying on the tradition of value philosophy found in both
Windelband and Dilthey. Put another way, as a mere instance of a general concept the
valuable characteristic and is valuable with reference to something else, e.g., a historical
Rickert says that the human sciences are “teleological.” Although he stresses that this is
character of the human sciences refers only to the fact that they make essential use of
47
Ibid., pp. 62 – 63.
48
Ibid., pg. 64.
33
values. Rickert says that concept formation in the human sciences has a “historical-
That is, they are historical insofar as they are always situated within a historical nexus
However, Rickert points out that "history is not a valuing science but a value-
relevant science."50 The two notions of individuality that have been described above, i.e.,
the individual per se, or the individual of immediate empirical experience, and the
historical science. In fact, "every feeling, willing, and acting person" employs this as a
order to make one's way in the world one cannot rely exclusively on individualities.
Rather, everyone must, at times, abstract from the individuality of things and use general
concepts, i.e., in order to get around everyone needs to see distinct things as merely
49
Ibid., pg. 62.
50
Ibid., pg. 88.
34
different instances of one general concept, for example, seeing two distinct things as
merely two hammers and not focusing on what makes them the unique individualities
they are. Likewise, as a matter of course everyone as a practical matter sees certain
things as uniquely valuable for their present or future purposes within the larger nexus of
what is valuable to them and thus conceives them in their individuality just as the
historian does.
On the other hand, this latter conceptualizing of the individual is not scientific
because it is not theoretical, but rather practical. The human sciences do not judge
things to be valuable or not, i.e., it is not a practical discipline or a valuing science, rather
the concepts of the human sciences are “value-related.” No actual judgment concerning
the value of the individual is going on, but the individual is being connected to a larger
historical nexus as valuable for that historical nexus. The human sciences are not
concerned with whether the individual is good or bad, that can be done only within a
historical nexus. The human sciences are concerned only with the value-relation that
which the individual is related cannot stop at just any broader context of significance, but
must be related ultimately to a general value by which Rickert means a universal value.
concepts, i.e., concepts applicable to any context. The practical values which people use
to conceptualize individuals in their everyday, practical affairs are not scientific because
they are not universal but only apply directly to that person and usually only in a
particular context. For example, this particular book is necessary as a source for finishing
35
the chapter I am now working on. Being valuable to my larger project of finishing this
conceptualized merely as a book among many other books. Or, more generally, Rickert
employs the example that in all practical affairs people regard “psychic beings” as
individuals because psychic beings always have value within our practical projects, but
books or chairs or computers are not necessarily valuable in just such a way. However,
becomes more theoretical the more universal the value is to which things are being
related. For example, though from a practical standpoint all “psychic beings” are
individuals in the sense described they are not all objects of a theoretical historical study.
Only by being related to a broader historical nexus do they become the object of
historical study, e.g., Goethe in relation to German Romanticism and, more generally, to
51
Ibid., pg. 89.
36
Thus there are two moments to scientific conceptualization in the human sciences
– that it is value-related and not valued as such and that the value to which it is ultimately
related is universal. This is why, though each “psychic being” may be considered an
individual from the practical standpoint they are not individuals for a scientific history.
Furthermore, the universal value necessary for the validity of the science of
history is not discovered but is rather presupposed by the science of history. A short
review of Rickert's argument will make this clear. Immediate empirical experience is
individuates precisely on the basis of a value-relation. That is, the value opens up the
52
Ibid., pp. 106 – 107.
37
Therefore, this universal value must be a priori. In this way, Rickert believes he has
completed Dilthey's task of a ”critique of historical reason." That is, he has given the
For Rickert and value philosophy generally, the key to discovering these ultimate,
functions of thinking, willing, and feeling. The ultimate, universal values corresponding
to these functions are truth (for thinking), the good (for willing), and the beautiful (for
feeling). Human activity consists of thinking, willing and feeling and history is
relating individual acts of thinking, willing and feeling to the ultimate values of truth,
Scientific activity itself is related to the ultimate, universal value of truth and is
that activity which strives to realize this normativity perfectly in opposition to other
activities which, though having the same goal, fall short (primarily for methodological
reasons), e.g., astrology or history as mere narrative. This is why Rickert argues that
there is a necessary connection between validity and value. Central to the Neo-Kantian
tradition is Lotze's distinction between being and validity. In this tradition, being is
(roughly) the way things are given in immediate, sensuous experience. From this one can
only derive facts. Validity is normative and is defined in opposition to being as the way
things should be rather than how they factually are. Idealities are valid while beings just
are. Valid laws then describe the ways things should be and can never be grounded
merely in the way things are given to consciousness in experience. In this way, valid
38
experience. Most importantly, as far as scientific understanding is concerned validities
Thinking for Rickert consists of judgment and the goal of judgment is true
judgment. Science is the perfection of this human striving after the norm of truth and so
seeks after valid judgments rather than judgments based on mere abstractions from
sensation, which are ultimately defeasible. For this reason we can understand why
Rickert argues that science, as it achieves its perfection, will be less tied to sensuous
experience and more abstract and general, i.e., more universal. Also truth must be, for
Rickert, an a priori value, i.e., not itself grounded in immediate, sensuous experience,
In his 1919 lecture course The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of
philosophy is how are these values given to consciousness? To avoid dogmatism there
must be some connection between these ultimate, universal values and concrete lived-
"infinite" and unintelligible and, therefore, there can be no direct, unmediated connection
between the ultimate values of truth, goodness, and beauty and concrete lived-experience.
In other words, discovering normative values through an analysis of the inchoate mass of
data presented by concrete lived-experience is not possible. For Rickert, with regard to
the issue of scientific knowledge and its ultimate value, the solution lies in looking to the
concrete, empirical sciences themselves which have already (to an extent) organized this
53
Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 151.
39
mass of data into intelligible generalizations. That is, in the concrete, empirical sciences
concepts out of immediate, sensuous experience. But, when it comes to the normative,
universal value truth, the material that Rickert needs is not that given by just any
empirical science, but rather the concrete, scientific systematization of the concrete
psychology. Rickert and most other Neo-Kantians (even if they were not motivated by
value philosophy and the thought of the southwestern school) believed that the method
Clearly, concrete, empirical psychology can only be the material for discovering
these values and not the foundation of these values because, for starters, empirical
normative concept of truth. With regard to its subject matter, empirical psychology is
indifferent to its truth or falsity. That is, empirical psychology studies the whole range of
psychic phenomenon including both concept formations and judgments which are true
and also those concept formations and judgments which are false. Value philosophy's
40
normative analysis of the content of concrete, empirical psychology itself Rickert
believes one can discover a scientifically adequate, ultimate, normative concept of truth
achieving the goal it explicitly sets for itself, namely, the scientific conception of the
ultimate value of science itself, i.e., truth. Its methodology is either superfluous or is
analysis of concrete, empirical psychology. As Rickert admits, this first requires the
selection of the essential aspects of empirical psychology from which one can grasp the
norm embodied therein. However, these essential aspects of empirical psychology are
precisely those which manifest the normative, universal concept of truth value philosophy
is intending to grasp. How, Heidegger asks, is value philosophy to select these essential
conception the selection process would be blind, arbitrary and unscientific. However, if
philosophy and its methodology are superfluous and pointless because empirical
psychology itself will already have a scientifically adequate concept of truth. In fact,
distinguish true judgments from false ones and classify them but, according to Rickert, it
psychology already presupposes the universal, normative notion of truth but is not in
41
psychology for a scientific conception of truth and value philosophy would be
superfluous. It is because empirical psychology itself cannot be the ground for our
But this ultimately means that the methodology of value philosophy is circular for
normative truth, value philosophy attempts to discover this concept through a normative
normative truth which will allow it to separate the "essential" from the "inessential"
elements of empirical psychology which it can then analyze to grasp the very concept of
ungrounded, but fully determinate concept of normative truth that then makes its
"methodology" superfluous or it presupposes its own end and thus finds itself in an
intolerable circle.
However, Heidegger notes that there is another possible path value philosophy
can take and that is that values are ultimately given in an original and originating form of
The universal, normative concept of truth would then be given in an originary worth-
taking. This, however, is not a path open to Rickert because of his conception of lived-
42
sensuous experience and that this is precisely why scientific knowledge is not
make universalities possible but which cannot represent immediate, sensuous experience.
values is impossible. On a more general level, this is also evident from the Neo-Kantian
separation between being and validity. Sensuous, immediate experience is "real", i.e., it
circumscribes being, whereas validities are "irreal" or non-being. This chasm between
being as "the real" and validity as "the irreal" makes a notion of worth-taking which
bridges the gap between them, i.e., an originary form of givenness of the irreal (validity)
in the real (being), impossible. In the end, value philosophy's only option is to give up its
given universal values, it must admit that the ultimate, universal value of truth is imposed
science.
43
II. Lask and the Intelligibility of Lived-Experience
(who was a student of Rickert and very much influenced by Husserl) who ventured
Both understood that the key to grounding scientific knowledge was to understand the
relation between lived-experience and the structure of judgment and, unlike, Rickert
realized that concrete, empirical judgments presupposed (objective) validity and that the
latter could not be inferred from concrete, empirical psychology through any
methodological tool. In other words, though Rickert did not succumb to psychologism,
he believed that it was possible to critically ground validity and truth through an analysis
manifest the oppositional structure of truth and falsity and Husserl and Lask realized that
any scientific methodology starting from concrete, empirical judgments would have had
to already presuppose truth and validity. That is, concrete, empirical judgments
necessarily refer beyond themselves to pre-given ideal meanings (Sinn) that ground the
54
For excellent and detailed studies of Lask's influence on the early Heidegger I recommend both
Theodore Kisiel's, The Genesis of Being and Time, especially Part I, sections 1 and 3, and his "Why
students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask." Excellent introductions to Lask's work include Steven
Galt Crowell, "Emil Lask: Aletheiology as Ontology," Kant-Studien 87, pp. 69 – 88, Karl Schuhmann and
Barry Smith, "Two Idealisms: Lask and Husserl," Kant-Studien 83, pp. 448 – 466, J.N. Mohanty, "Lask's
Theory of Judgment," in Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic, edited by
O.K. Wiegand, R.J. Dostal, L. Embree, J. Kockelmans and J.N. Mohanty, pp. 171 – 188, and Gabriel
Motzkin, "Emil Lask and the Crisis of Neo-Kantianism: The Rediscovery of the Primordial World," Revue
de Métaphysique et de Morale 2, pp. 171 – 190.
44
In his "Phenomenology and Transcendental Value philosophy" Heidegger
acknowledges his own indebtedness to Lask.55 Lask, Heidegger says, "...proceeding from
the insights of the Logical Investigations went further than Rickert, without, however,
taking the step into phenomenology."56 What was this step towards phenomenology
which Lask took and Rickert did not? What is Heidegger's completion of this step into
of theoretical reason itself. Lask, on the other hand, did not go so far.
of formal logic, whose subject matter is judgments, with transcendental logic, whose
understanding of the role of transcendental logic and its categories which, for example,
the Neo-Kantians treated as arising out of, or at least being equiprimordial with,
judgment and, consequently, subjectivity. It is not entirely clear that this Neo-Kantian
Critique of Pure Reason since Kant himself sometimes treats them ambiguously and, in
transcendental idealism, both the categories of understanding and sensuous intuition are
grounded in the subject. 57 Lask wanted to show that objective validity exists pre-
55
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 151.
56
Ibid., pg. 149.
57
Cf. Mohanty, "Lask's Theory of Judgment."
45
judgmentally in lived-experience.58 That is, Lask's project was to try to bring together
the Aristotelian notion of the categories as categories of being (objectivity) and the
Kantian doctrine of the categories as necessary for thought and judgment (validity) in
such a way that the two come together not in the subject but in the objects given in lived-
experience. In other words, Lask is concerned to show that there are real objective
validities.
Lask begins by criticizing Kant and Neo-Kantians like Rickert for being
dogmatic. Kant, Lask argues, failed to account for our knowledge of transcendental
...in his theory of knowledge his own critique of reason, his own
knowledge of the non-sensible transcendental forms (...) The sphere of
validity as the object of his own transcendental philosophy did not yet
count for him, so to speak.59
Because Kant only recognized the sensible and suprasensible realms of being and did not
recognize the realm of validity, i.e., the realm of truth to which being does not apply, he
could not account for our knowledge of the transcendental categories. Put another way,
for Kant something can only be given to consciousness through sensible intuition and
known through the imposition of the transcendental categories upon the given of sensible
58
This idea is one of the profound influences that Husserl's Logical Investigations had on Lask.
However, Schuhmann and Smith ("Two Idealisms: Lask and Husserl," Kant-Studien 83) as well as
Heidegger (in the History of the Concept of Time) argue that by the time of his Idea I Husserl had back-slid
into subjectivity (as transcendental consciousness) himself.
59
From Emil Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre; Eine Studie über den
Herrschaftsbereich der logischen Form (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), 1911), as quoted and
translated by Crowell, "Emil Lask: Aletheiology as Ontology."
46
circularity). It is equally dogmatic, as well as an overly subjectivized analysis of
above mere dogmatism our knowledge of them too must be grounded. For Lask, this
grounding must take place in lived-experience itself. Though they are capable of being
considered separately by the knowing subject, being and validity form an essential unity
in lived-experience. Once separated, the category of being does not apply to validities
because, as I said previously, validity is not the way things are (being) but the way they
should be (validity). But, and this is where Lask takes a step towards phenomenology, if
we are to avoid being merely dogmatic, validity and being must both be founded in a
Taking his cue from Husserl's notion of categorial intuition, which is the intuition
"lived through" rather than imposed on lived-experience. That is, lived-experience itself
is always logically structured. The categories are right there in lived-experience. For this
reason, Lask will say that we "live in the truth." This is how, for Lask, Aristotelian
"truth" insofar as every entity can been seen as a form-matter unity. For Aristotle and
Lask, the formal and material aspects of a thing are not two parts of a thing, but are rather
the thing itself. The formal and material aspects of a thing do not have being separate
from the unity that is the entity itself of which they are the form and matter. Of course,
the formal and material aspects of a thing can be considered separately. In fact, in
47
knowledge it is only the formal aspect which is at work, but form and matter are not two
distinct beings which together make up a third thing, viz., the entity itself. In lived-
experience the entity is always given in its unity. But, since each entity is a form-matter
unity, each entity is itself a "truth" since the formal aspect is precisely the categorial
validity of the entity. That is, the category is valid for the entity because it is the formal
aspect of the form-matter unity that is the entity itself. Lask says,
The object itself is always a form-matter unity given in lived-experience and without both
a formal aspect and a material aspect there could be no object. Validity is the logical,
intelligible structure of beings alongside its material aspect, which falls under the
category of being. Therefore, Lask, while not reducing validity to being, has brought
being and validity together and overcome the “chasm” which has separated the two in
towards") structure of all understanding. Form refers or points to matter insofar as form
is essentially incomplete and needs matter for its completion and this explains why
formal understanding is incomplete and requires material content for its completion.
60
Ibid., pg. 77.
48
Similarly, matter is indeterminate until it is determined by form in the same way that
grounding intentionality in his form-matter (or Stockwerk) analysis of the given of lived-
experience while at the same time preserving the force - though not the absolute
distinction - between being and validity found in the Neo-Kantian tradition. The latter
allows Lask to also distance himself from Aristotle's purely metaphysical interpretation
describes his project as an "aletheiology," i.e., an analysis of the structure of truth that is
not grounded in the structures of knowledge (judgment), but rather lies in the very
givenness of lived-experience.
Rickert, the ultimate values themselves are a priori and supraempirical. This implies that
they cannot be given in lived-experience but, as previously noted, the very notion of an
experienced individuals are "irreal" intensive infinities that are incapable of being
understood. In this sense, Lask would say that Rickert is dogmatically presupposing
these ultimate values.62 For Lask, if we are to avoid this form of dogmatism all
61
I have glossed over many important intermediate steps in Lask's analysis to make the general point
clear.
62
In his "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," Heidegger notes that in his later
writings Rickert tried (ultimately unsuccessfully) to take into account Lask's criticisms.
49
appropriating Husserl's notions of intentionality and categorial intuition. In lived-
experience one "lives through" the categories and lived-experience itself would be
However, for Lask, Husserl, Rickert and Kant, there is always an "illogical" and
immediate empirical experience and, for Lask, the ultimate, illogical material aspect of
all entities. A qualification must be made with regard to Lask's position however. Lask,
like Aristotle, conceives materiality functionally. That is, matter is always relative to
form. So, for any given thing, its matter too may be "formed." For example, Aristotle
says that the material aspect of a human being is the body that has been informed with the
form of humanity. But the material body itself is formed, i.e., it is comprised of parts
which themselves are structured and informed. However, when it comes to the category
of being, Lask says, its material correlate is unformed and truly "illogical."
In his lectures of 1919, Heidegger makes an even more radical critique than Lask
theoretical reason itself within modernity. Heidegger argues that the ascendancy of
theoretical reason within Kant and the Neo-Kantians produces an “absurd” circularity,
ultimate, ungrounded, dogmatic presuppositions. As we have seen this drives Lask, using
50
required by validity to a grounding of these values in lived-experience through an
ultimate unification of the dichotomy between the Aristotelian notion of the categories as
the categories of being and the post-kantian notion of the categories as the categories of
the understanding. Lask argues that being and validity come together in the materially
Heidegger argues that internal to theoretical reason itself lies the critical stance
which in the end becomes its undoing. In its internally necessary drive to justify and
ground itself theoretical reason must become critical. That is, it cannot dogmatically
assert its ground and justification because this, in the end, frustrates the very end internal
knowledge. Beginning implicitly with Descartes and later explicitly with Kant the
subject understood substantially believing that this ultimately fulfills theoretical reason's
need for an ultimate justification. Kant realized that the Cartesian subject was ultimately
just dogmatic metaphysics and, therefore, unjustified. Rather, the ultimate justification
for Kant lay in "experience," that is, the application of the categories of understanding
later commentators realized, it appeared that knowledge for Kant was entirely the product
unknowable thing-in-itself that is the cause of the existence of the sensuous material of
intuition. These later commentators realized the ultimate impotence of this thing-in-itself
separate from subjectivity with regard to the foundation of knowledge and so jettisoned
51
the notion of a thing-in-itself in favor of the universal power of transcendental
knowledge by fiat, which hardly satisfies theoretical reason's essential need for a final
Heidegger argues that theoretical reason cannot accomplish what it sets out to do,
namely, to provide its own ultimate justification. Theoretical reason cannot justify itself
without becoming either dogmatic or circular, rather theoretical reason itself must posit
something other than itself in which it finds its ground and ultimate justification.63 That
is, Kant saw dimly and implicitly the need for something outside of theoretical reason,
namely, the thing-in-itself. However, Kant's thing-in-itself is too far removed from
knowledge to play any useful justificatory role. Therefore, theoretical reason (as
hybrid called "the given" in which its ultimate foundation and justification rests. I call it
a strange hybrid precisely because the "given" has theoretical import but at the same time
is ultimately other than theoretical reason and so (apparently) allows theoretical reason to
Heidegger argues that this positing of the given is the "cunning trick" of
theoretical reason because it covers over the fact that theoretical reason itself has posited
the given for its own purposes. It is important to note that the given is not lived-
63
This gives substance to the importance of Brentano's "discovery" of and Husserl's refinement of
intentionality as the structure of consciousness. That is, consciousness' directedness towards something.
52
as lived-experience precisely to serve the justificatory purposes of theoretical reason. In
other words, theoretical reason appears to ground itself in lived-experience, a la Lask, but
in fact grounds itself in the given which is itself a theoretically deformed interpretation of
The hybrid character of the given, i.e., as other than theoretical reason and yet as ground
and justification for theoretical reason, explains why for all post-Kantian philosophy the
given has the dual characteristic of being both unintelligible and unknowable, i.e., other
than theoretical reason, and yet the seed of all intelligibility. In Rickert the unintelligible
aspect of the given is the "infinite" character of concrete, immediate sensuous experience
unknowable character of the ultimate material element of experience, i.e., the material
correlate of being. Less clear with regard to Rickert is the justificatory aspect of the
given. As I mentioned, Rickert appears to fall back upon the subject as the ground and
justification of theoretical knowledge (which means he regresses back towards Kant) but
truth in the given, concrete, empirical science of psychology through his teleological
method. Lask's explanation of the justificatory aspect of the given lies in his Stockwerk
theory of experience. As was said, for Lask all objects of experience are hylomorphisms
of validity and being. That which is necessary to ground and justify knowledge (form) is
64
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pp. 74 – 75.
53
given in experience insofar as objects of lived-experience are essentially hylomorphic
order to make valid judgments. This duality between the intelligible and unintelligible
traditional metaphysics, i.e., it becomes the distinction between knowing subject and
known object and even more so as it becomes the distinction between a substantial
subject and substantial object creating an ever-more unbridgeable chasm between the
two.
lived-experience into the given for its own purposes. The given is the supposed
justification and grounding of theoretical reason in its other when in fact it is merely a
circular and "useless." The viciousness of this circularity is that the given is the
justification and foundation of theoretical reason. Theoretical reason must ground itself
deform lived-experience into the given to make it capable of playing the role it needs it to
phenomenology, it has unknowingly imported what theoretical reason needs right into
lived-experience.
Heidegger thinks there is nothing wrong with circularity per se and, in fact, thinks
54
his lecture course “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview”65 Heidegger
Authentic philosophy must “overcome” this circularity not by getting free of it but by
The problem as Heidegger sees it is not circularity but that theoretical reason
itself cannot admit circularity. The theoretical notion of grounding and justification is a
logical relation. That is, If this, then that. The justification of the “that” is grounded in
the “this.” If the “this” includes the “that” already, then, from a theoretical standpoint, it
is no justification at all.
65
In Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy.
66
Ibid., pg. 13.
67
Ibid., pg. 14.
55
of lived-experience is it must be a pre-theoretical understanding of lived-experience, i.e.,
it “lets itself show itself in itself.” Heidegger argues that the phenomenological “method”
Lask went further towards phenomenology than Rickert insofar as Lask realized
the need to ground categories in lived-experience, but stopped short of realizing the real
Crowell place to much weight upon Lask's influence on Heidegger to the detriment of
Rickert's own substantial influence. For example, Kisiel argues that Lask's notion of
"living in the categorical" is the first step towards Heidegger's "worlding."68 I think it is
dangerous to overemphasis this. Against this, I have argued that Lask understands lived-
experience theoretically, i.e., as the given, and, as Heidegger says, this ultimately
represents the first step out of the environing world (Umwelt) and into the theoretical
sphere. Though Lask ventures further into lived-experience he brings the theoretical with
him to distort it. Heidegger's notion of the Umwelt is in important respects closer to
Rickert's "historical nexus" than Lask's lived-through categories. That is, Heidegger's
68
Cf. Kisiel, "Why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask."
56
generalities peculiar to the human sciences in contradistinction to the generalities of
natural science. Furthermore, though Lask in his Stockwerk theory delves much deeper
into the connection between lived-experience and what Rickert calls "first generalities",
i.e., generalities derived immediately from sensuous experience and necessary for any
difficult to apply to the generalities appropriate to the human sciences the formation of
which was such an important issue for the southwestern school of Neo-Kantianism. Is
However, the relation of form to matter is not a relation of whole to part. For Lask, the
formal aspect of an object is its validity or more generally its intelligibility while the
material aspect is the concrete determination of this abstracted validity. Though Goethe
Romanticism, it is not the case that German Romanticism is the abstractable intelligibility
or validity of Goethe which is contained within the form-matter unity which is the real
Goethe is a part and to which Goethe bears a value-relation (significance) towards. In the
same way, the world is not the ultimate intelligible form of all worldly things but is the
worldly bears a value-relation towards. Lask's Stockwerk theory does a poor job of
capturing the relation of significance that Rickert, Dilthey, and later, Heidegger were
57
further development of Lask's "lived-through" categories is mistaken and that we should
not downplay the influence that Rickert had on Heidegger in this regard.
58
CHAPTER TWO
inadequacy of both Rickert's and Lask's view of philosophical science, using Husserl's
Logical Investigations and Ideas as our key. In the Logical Investigations Husserl
science of Phenomenology which is further elaborated but not radically changed in his
This inability is shown to lie in the essence of theoretical reason as Husserl (and most of
What we saw in the last chapter was two versions of the attempt to ground science
itself, i.e., the science of science or what was commonly called "epistemology" in late
"presuppositionless" science from the perspective of both Husserl and Heidegger and for
essentially similar reasons except that Heidegger's own understanding is more thoroughly
59
radical than Husserl's. This is due to the fact that both theories (and from Husserl's
thing which grounds the very construction of the fundamental philosophical theories
themselves. This we pointed out in the last chapter was the notion of the "given" or what
Heidegger sometimes calls the "material pre-given." Neither of the Neo-Kantian theories
we looked at argued that the first principles in a deductive system were what were
ultimately given. Rather, both theories needed something upon which their respective,
ultimately constructive, theoretical scaffolding could rest. This was "the given" or the
than a mere "theoretical" distortion of lived-experience. That is, "the given" is pre-
posited as both capable of grounding the universal generalities necessary for theoretical
reason (one sees this clearly in Lask's notion of form or the formal element in experience)
but at the same time "contains" more than this. This something "more" is precisely
posited as that which cannot be theoretically encompassed (one sees this in Rickert's
"intensive infinities" and Lask's notion of matter or the material element in experience.)
In addition, this very incapacity of theoretical reason to grasp an essential moment of the
given is itself a necessary requirement of the modern notion of theoretical reason itself
critical. Theoretical reason must avoid dogmatism and so must ground itself. However,
it cannot justify itself by fiat, i.e., by merely asserting its own theoretical justification, for
"given" which must be capable of grounding theoretical reason but at the same time
60
A foundational science which proceeds in this manner Husserl argues is far from
further theoretical constructions. Moreover, and this is the crux of the problem from
Husserl's perspective, this positing is a factual or, more exactly, natural positing (i.e., a
positing in the form of positionality appropriate to the natural attitude). Having said this,
we must be careful to distinguish the way in which this is true. It is not that "the given"
has been posited as existing independent of consciousness. This is certainly not true for
Lask and is probably not true for Rickert, though, from Husserl's perspective, one would
like to know more about what sort of "consciousness" or "subjectivity" the ultimate
values of Rickert's system essentially relate to. It is not even true to say for Lask or
Rickert that "the given" is posited purely factually, for, in Lask, there is an "ideatic"
formal aspect of "the given" which is "abstracted" by theorizing about it and for Rickert
individualities, as being entirely "formal," that is, not containing any sensuous content at
all. For this reason, there is justification, especially in Lask's case, of arguing that neither
Logical Investigations do. However, and this is why the way in which these thinkers go
wrong gets at the very heart of Husserl's phenomenological project, for both Rickert and
Lask lived-experience, in the sense of "the given," is the ultimate epistemological ground
and justification for all further theorizing while at the same time it includes within its
essential unity (and not just as a "mere appendage") a factual or natural moment which,
61
the infinite, sensuous component of lived-experience. Lived-experience in the sense of
"the given" must be pre-supposed by these philosophies (though neither Rickert or Lask
is conscious of this) because according to their own requirements the very justification of
From Husserl's perspective the problem is not, as it is for Heidegger, that lived-
experience has been radically deformed into its theoretical caricature, for in most respects
theoretical reason has found its justification in "the given" instead of pure intuition or
what is the same originally presentive intuition. One can suitably generalize an argument
that Husserl gives in the Ideas to cover this very problem. In section 19 of the Ideas,
Furthermore,
69
Edmund Husserl, Ideas, pg. 35.
62
"things," the empiricist simply takes experience to be the only act that is
presentive of things themselves.70
apply this to the present case (although much of it does apply straightforwardly to
Rickert), but it is instructive to look at how a more generalized version of the argument
does apply to both Rickert and Lask. In each case it applies differently, but both Rickert
and Lask fail to get to "the things themselves" as Husserl understands this. One could
say from the perspective of the Logical Investigations that Rickert's mistake is missing
the things themselves from the "subjective" side whereas Lask misses the things
themselves from the "objective" side. First we will look at Rickert, then Lask71.
For Rickert all concepts allow us to conceptualize and theorize about experience
which is merely sensuous experience and its intensive infinities. Concepts are
generalizations of this experience and there are two ways of doing this, through
since Rickert philosophizes within the Neo-Kantian tradition he himself would not argue
that either of these generalizations have their genesis or origin with experience as
empiricistic thinkers would. For Rickert, both the concepts of natural science and the
human sciences find their origin in transcendental subjectivity. However, for reasons that
I pointed out in the last chapter, in order to avoid merely dogmatically positing either the
70
Ibid., pp. 35 – 36.
71
For an excellent overview of the relation between Husserl and Rickert, though with a different
emphasis, see John Jalbert, “Husserl’s Position Between Dilthey and the Windelband-Rickert School of
Neo- Kantianism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26, pp. 279 – 296.
63
nomological laws of natural science or the ultimate, universal values of the human
sciences Rickert must ultimately find some ground for the concepts in experience. Not
that they originate in this experience for they describe universal concepts which cannot
be abstracted (in the empiricist's sense) from experience, but rather their justification, i.e.,
their relation to experience or what makes them critically grounded, lies in the fact that
they make this mass of intensive infinities which make up immediate, sensuous
theoretical givenness so that it could play this role. From Husserl's perspective this
precisely makes the mistake of (as I quoted above) "...identifying or confusing the
fundamental demand for a return to the "things themselves" with the demand for
psychologism in his Prolegomena to Pure Logic we can extrapolate to what he would say
both the meaningfulness and origin of all cognitions are traced back to natural,
psychological categories. The problem with this is that it does not take things as they are
given. That is, it does not take things as they are meaningfully intended. It runs right
"things themselves" for Husserl in the Logical Investigations is to pay strict attention to
64
how things are meaningfully given to consciousness. Psychologism misses the fact that
many of our cognitions (and all of our scientific cognitions) intend idealities. For
example, "red is a color." Husserl argues that the meaning expressed by "red is a color"
intends the idealities of redness and color and, if true, expresses an ideal law governing
these individual idealities. In other words, when we look at how "red is a color" is given
to consciousness, i.e., what its meaning-intention is, we can evidently see that it means
these idealities and the ideal law governing them. It is impossible, Husserl argues, to
ground these in natural, psychological facts or the categories "abstracted" from them for
these never get beyond factualities, that is, they never reach idealities. The
misconstrued by psychologism.
The meaning-intentions give the things themselves. That is, the meaning-intentions point
to the objectivity intended and the structure of the fulfillment necessary to ground the
"Berlin" points to the objectivity intended and also the means of fulfillment, e.g. through
"triangularity", though equally pointing to the objectivity intended, specifies that the
means of fulfillment for these cannot be factual or sensuous, but categorial. That is, there
ultimately must be two types of intuition: sensuous intuition and categorial intuition. The
one cannot intuitively fulfill the meaning-intention of the other. In this sense, both
65
meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfillments give the things themselves. Of course, the
things themselves are most fully given in the fully fulfilled or intuited meaning-
intentions.
psychologism. Although Rickert understands that the generalized concepts of both the
cultural and natural sciences are universal and have universal application, when it comes
sensuous experience. That is, from Husserl's perspective, Rickert has presupposed that
leaves Rickert with only sensuous intuition to work with. Therefore, when it comes to
to play the role of the ultimately incoherent hybrid that I called the theoretical "given" -
that is, it is both the ground of universal, theoretical reason and also of that which escapes
recognize that Rickert also lacks any robust sense of intentionality. Because of this,
Rickert makes the mistake of missing the things themselves, but from the "subjective"
side. For Rickert is ultimately trying to ground all expressions in immediate, sensuous
experience which is itself the self-contained (i.e., not intentional) stream of subjective
66
particular and "infinite." This presupposition about lived-experience forces Rickert to
see where he went wrong. Lask ultimately attempts to ground the varied forms of
intuition in one unified lived-experience from which the factual and ideatic merely arise
depending one whether one is attending to the material or formal aspect of lived-
experience. Furthermore, for Lask the ground and justification of all thought lies in a
lived-experience which transcends either sensation or thought and which Lask describes
much of the time in the language of mysticism. Granted, Lask believes that lived-
experience itself is neither subjective nor objective. The very notions of subjectivity and
objectivity for Lask are derived from an ultimately unified lived-experience. The
important point however, is that for Lask there is ultimately one "intuition" of any object
of lived-experience or, put another way, there is only one ultimate mode of givenness of
any object of lived-experience (perhaps "mystical"), and the sensuous (factual) and
categorial (ideatic) intuitions which Husserl talks about are derived from this, i.e., are
merely two aspects or perspectives on one unified given of lived-experience. Lask argues
in this way because he ultimately desires to unify all categories of thought (validity) and
Being.
But, again, from Husserl's perspective this is to presuppose the way things are
instead of paying attention to the things themselves. As in the case of Rickert, Lask is
not paying close enough attention to the given meaning-intentions and what it intends.
From Husserl's phenomenological perspective, Lask, in his rush to unify the categories of
thought and Being, has collapsed together what is evidently separate, i.e., "real" (factual)
67
entities and ideal entities. "Berlin" intends a real, factual being and "redness" intends an
"irreal," ideal being. This, Husserl believes, is evidently given in the meaning-intention
correlate, in one case the real, factual Berlin and in the other, the irreal, ideal redness. To
argue that these are mere derivations from an ultimate hylomorphic unity is to deny what
is evidently and immediately given. Husserl does believe that real, factual beings and
irreal, ideal beings can enter into relations of unification, i.e., redness can be instantiated
in a factual red thing by which they are intentionally unified (as expressed, for example,
by the expression "this thing is red"), but this unification does not destroy the evident
differences between them. Husserl would never argue that this difference could be
derived from some primordial unity. To do so would be to deny what is evidently given
I said earlier that Lask makes the mistake of passing over the things themselves
from "the objective side" because, as we see, he does not make the mistake of trying to
ground all meaning in one form of subjective givenness as Rickert does, but rather tries to
ground both meaning and being in one absolute, unified, non-subjectified and non-
objectified, given.
In both cases, what was important was to take things as they are in themselves,
fulfillment. Both Rickert and Lask pass over the meanings as evidently given in
immediate, sensuous experience (Rickert) or reduce them all to one unified, hylomorphic,
68
meaning given to consciousness is as certain and irreducibly distinct as the distinction
72
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), II,
§31.
69
such a viewpoint. For example, natural psychological categories for psychologism or
immediate, sensuous experience for Rickert. By taking each new category of cognition
fulfillment, is the only way to be true to the things themselves. In other words,, we must
Only by paying attention to these immediately evident meanings and the structures of
fulfillment inherent in them can one avoid the mistaken reduction of meanings to some
foreign structure thereby avoiding mistaken notions of validity, truth, justification, etc.
idealities and the sciences which pertain to them are made once more available for
investigation and feasible in the face of the prejudice of psychologism. Finally, this
73
Ibid., Introduction to Volume II, part I, §7.
70
faithfulness to meanings evidentially given to consciousness will allow one to avoid
meaningfulness as is clearly evident in Rickert and Lask. The meanings present in lived-
experience are not univocal and, therefore, their modes of fulfillment in intuition cannot
be univocal. Only by paying attention to this can one adequately see what knowledge
structures we have been discussing. Certainly, a large part of what Husserl means by
structure analyzes it only in terms of that which is inherent to or internal to the unified
phenomena itself and the possibilities that this structure lays out. For example, Rickert's
analysis of universal generalizations does not descriptively analyze but rather gives an
74
For a few different views, see John Scanlon, “Is It or Isn't It? Phenomenology As Descriptive
Psychology in the Logical Investigations,” Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 32, pp. 1 – 11, R.A.
Mall, “Phenomenology -- Essentialistic or Descriptive?” Husserl Studies 10, pp. 13 – 30, and Burt
Hopkins, “Phenomenological Self-Critique of Its Descriptive Method,” Husserl Studies 8, pp. 129 – 150.
71
idealities of science (i.e., their ideal nature) he therefore misunderstands what would be
necessary for their fulfillment (i.e., categorial intuition) and so attempts to account for
the idealities of science and, for Husserl, it is not possible that they make reference to
Here and now, at the very moment that we significantly utter a general
name, we mean what is general, and our meaning differs from our
meaning when we mean what is individual. This difference must be
pinned down in the descriptive content of the isolated experience, in the
individually and actually performed general assertion. What things are
causally connected with such an experience, what psychological
consequences may follow from it, all this does not concern us. Such
things concern the psychology of abstraction, not its phenomenology...We
should not, however, see it as the essence of nominalism that, in its
attempted clarification of the sense and theoretical achievement of
universals, it loses itself in a blind associative play of names as mere
verbal noises; its essence lies in the fact that its attempted clarifications
overlook the peculiar consciousness exemplified in our living sense of the
meaning of signs, in our actual understanding of them, in the grasped
sense of our assertions, and also exemplified in correlative acts of
72
fulfillment, which yield us the 'true' Idea of the universal, the wholly
evident ideation in which the universal 'itself' is given to us.75
Generalizing upon this we can distinguish the explanatory sciences (or what Husserl calls
pertaining to each. Essentially, the laws of the explanatory sciences are not apodictic
because they merely attempt to indeterminately unify singular facts under universal laws
Therefore, Husserl argues (and Heidegger takes this up) that phenomenology is
not a theory at all, but rather a pure methodology. In other words, phenomenology has no
presuppositionless science.76
This taking of the thing as it presents itself - the process of getting "to the things
point" of its methodology. Both Husserl and Heidegger agree on this. However,
Heidegger, we will see, argues that Husserl distorted the things themselves by importing
theoretical presuppositions into his analysis of the way in which the things themselves
75
Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, §15(b).
76
For a general account of the presuppositionlessness of Husserl’s phenomenology see Teresa Reed-
Downing, “Husserl’s Presuppositionless Philosophy,” Research in Phenomenology 20, pp. 136 – 151.
73
immediately give themselves. For this reason, it is essential at this point that we look at
It is in virtue of this issue that Heidegger begins criticizing Husserl as well as the
invariably fall prey to the temptation to explain the meaningfulness, and thus the
psychologism which dominated the 19th century. In fact, the epistemological moment of
consciousness as given in its pure immediacy and excluding any presupposed theories or
judgments concerning it, such that the eidetic, intentional structures of this purified
of its meaning. It is only in this way that the structure of knowledge, and specifically
scientific knowledge in the broadest sense, can be made evident. Husserl is explicit about
the importance of the notion of originarily presentive intuition to the entire project of
phenomenology,
Genuine science and its own genuine freedom from prejudice require, as
the foundation of all proofs, immediately valid judgments which derive
their validity from originally presentive intuitions. The latter, however,
are of such a character as prescribed by the sense of the judgments, or
correlatively by the proper essence of the predicatively formed judgment-
complex. The fundamental regions of object [Die fundamentalen
Regionen von Gegenständen] and, correlatively, the regional types of
presentive intuitions, the relevant types of judgments, and finally the
noetic norms that demand for the establishment of judgments belonging to
a particular type just this and no other species of intuition: none of that
can be postulated or decreed from on high. One can only ascertain them
by insight; and, as before, that signifies disclosing them by originally
74
presentive intuition and fixing them by judgments which are faithfully
fitted to what is given in such intuition. It seems to us that that is how the
procedure actually free from prejudice, or purely objective, would look.
Immediate "seeing," not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but
seeing in the universal sense as an originary presentive consciousness of
any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational
assertions.77
That is, only by evidently understanding the way in which something is given to
consciousness originarily are we ever going to come to know precisely what we can
know about it and how this is to be accomplished. Furthermore, it is only in this way that
appropriate to the different categories of beings that are given to consciousness and,
i.e., the different forms of knowledge appropriate to the empirical natural sciences such
as empirical physics as opposed to those appropriate to the eidetic sciences such as pure
mathematics. Before any of this, however, one must be able to isolate the thing as it
immediately presents itself to consciousness or, as Husserl would put it, we must focus
No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all
principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing
source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its
"personal" actuality) offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as
what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is
presented there. We see indeed that each <theory> can only again draw
its truth itself from originary data. Every statement which does no more
than confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of
77
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 36.
75
significations precisely conforming to them is, as we said at the beginning
of this chapter, actually an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a
foundation, a principium in the genuine sense of the word. But this holds
especially for this kind of generical cognitions of essences to which the
word "principle" is commonly limited.78
Though it sounds complicated this originary presentive intuition is merely the way in
there is always the danger of unwittingly including within it factors or elements which are
external to it, i.e., which are not really originarily present in the intuition. Once the
originary presentive intuition is properly isolated the next step is to descriptively analyze
its meaning or, more properly, its intentional structure (that is, its meaning-intention and
Ideas). This is clearly Husserl's intent in his discussion of clarification in the Ideas,
Between Husserl's writing of the Logical Investigations and his writing of the Ideas his
deepened but one thing remains the same: the central role of "phenomenological
78
Ibid., pg. 44.
79
Ibid., pg. 156.
76
intuition in such a way that the inherent structures of this act can be made evident to
"living-through [erlebt]" of an act. That is, every act of consciousness has its intentional
meaning that it is "directed towards" something. When one "lives-through" the act one is
actively and livingly directed towards the intended object. For example, when I am
looking to see if the bus coming down the street is the one I need to get downtown. In
this case I am “living-through” the intentional act the specific bus I need to get
downtown. I am absorbed in the intended object, i.e., the bus coming towards me, and
am not attentive to what conscious structures are necessary for this. In phenomenological
reflection, I modify my "living" attitude towards the act and instead reflect on the
structures of the act itself, e.g., the structures of meaning-intention and meaning-
fulfillment or noesis and noema. The act then is no longer lived-through, but is reflected
upon.
There are a couple of crucial points to be made. In the Logical Investigations the
ability to "live-through" an act towards its intentional object is what characterizes mental
(or "psychic") acts as such. That is, that an act is intentional and can thus be lived-
toward by living-through a psychic act which intends them. Husserl points this out to
psychic acts by their essential relatedness to consciousness or, more exactly, to an ego.
Husserl argues that in the immediate, living-through of a psychic act no ego is given,
rather the relatedness of an ego to its intended object mediated through the act arises only
77
in an "objectifying act of reflection" upon the act which makes it an object of
consciousness that is no longer lived-through but rather reflected upon. Once this
Furthermore, the contents of reflection are founded upon the contents of the
Since, however, all characters of acts have their ultimate foundation in the
contents of outer sense, we note that there is an essential
phenomenological gulf in the field of sense.
We have principally to distinguish between:
1. the contents of reflection, those contents which are themselves
characters of acts or founded upon such characters;
2. the primary contents, those contents in which all contents of
reflection are either immediately or mediately founded.
These latter would be the contents of 'external' sensibility, which is
here plainly not defined in terms of some metaphysical distinction of
outward and inward, but through the nature of its representing contents, as
being ultimately foundational, phenomenologically lived-through
[erlebter] contents.81
according to Husserl, content arises either in the lived-through [erlebt] contents of acts or
80
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 101.
81
Ibid., pg. 304.
78
the contents of reflections founded upon these lived-through acts that, in reflection, are
By the time of the Ideas, acts as lived-through are termed "cogito". At first sight,
But there are (at least) two modifications of this cogito, namely it can be modified into
cogitatio,", i.e., through a cogitatio (or roughly an "act" in the terminology of the Logical
the bus coming down the street. This describes what in the logical Investigations is
termed "living-through" an act. I can reflectively regard this act, objectifying it and no
longer "living-through" it. In this way, I can study its imminent intentional structure,
We add the following: When living in the cogito we are not conscious of
the cogitato itself as an intentional Object; but at any time it can become
an Object of consciousness; its essence involves the essential possibility of
a reflective turning of regard and naturally in the form of a new cogitatio
that, in the manner proper to a cogitatio which simply seizes upon, is
directed to it.83
82
Ibid., pg. 68.
83
Ibid., pg. 78.
79
However, there are numerous cogitatio relative to which the cogito is not actionally
modified but rather which are non-actional with regard to the cogito. In an important
sense, these too are "there" in lived-experience. When the cogito is actionally adverted to
For example, when I am attending to the bus coming down the street there is also there in
the lived-experience things to which I am not attending but are "there" in such a way that
I could attend to them with a change of conscious regard such as the street, other cars and
buses, other people waiting for the bus, the sky, clouds, etc. It is an essential potentiality
of these cogitatio that are, relative to my present cogito, non-actionally modified that I
can (through a change of conscious regard) change this modification to one of actional
At the one time the mental process is, so to speak, "explicit" consciousness
of its objective something, at the other time it is implicit, merely potential.
The objective something can be already appearing to us as it does not only
in perception, but also in memory or in phantasy; however, we are not yet
"directed" to it with the mental regard, not even secondarily - to say
nothing of our being, in a peculiar sense, "busied" with it.84
That is, in any "lived-through" experience there is not just the simple attending to a
something through an actional cogitatio, but rather there is always also a background, or
"halo" of potential cogitatio surrounding the actional cogitatio which by their very
essence are capable of themselves becoming actionally modified. However, the most
potentially actional cogitatio is essentially derivative. That is, one only has a background
84
Ibid., pg. 72.
80
of potential cogitatio relative to an actional cogitatio which is the primary, pregnant sense
of cogito,
It is likewise obviously true of all such mental processes that the actional
ones are surrounded by a "halo" of non-actional mental processes; the
stream of mental processes can never consist of just actionalities.
Precisely these, when contrasted with non-actionalities, determine with the
widest universality, to be extended beyond the sphere of our examples, the
pregnant sense of the expression "cogito," "I have consciousness of
something," "I effect an act of consciousness."85
Furthermore, by the time of his writing the Ideas, Husserl no longer describes the
ego as related to the object intended as he did in the passage from the Logical
Investigations quoted above. Rather the ego "lives in" the cogito and cannot be outside
of this "living in." That is, as in the Logical Investigations, the primary content of
consciousness is grounded in "lived-through" acts or, in the language of the Ideas, the
That is, these actional cogitatio or "lived-through" acts are in fact the originary
presentive intuitions. Having said this, I do not mean to suggest that these originary
presentive intuitions give their intentional object adequately. This may be true with
regard to immanent phenomena but not with regard to transcendent phenomena. The
transcendent includes everything immanent to the cogitatio. That is, it includes the
85
Ibid., pg. 72.
81
adumbrations inherent to the noematic moment of the cogitatio as well as the sensuous
hyle, etc. Therefore, transcendent phenomena are given through multiple (and, in fact,
presentive intuitions are then unified within the horizon of the intentional unity provided
transcendent objects never adequately give their intentional object. However, this does
not change the fact that they are the foundation for any phenomenological analysis.
derivative upon the reflective regard that objectifies the lived-through acts of
Husserl explicitly appropriates from Brentano is, for Husserl, founded upon this "living-
"directedness towards" needs further clarification. For example, given this, one may
object - a relation which connects (perhaps essentially) the act of consciousness with
characterization of intentionality since many things which are not intentional (or at least
Husserlian example of this is the notion of a "sign." A sign bears an essential relation to
relationship to what it signifies. What is the difference between the relation between sign
82
and signified and intentionality? If intentionality is merely a unidirectional relationship
between an act of consciousness and its intended object there is no essential difference
between them.
the Logical Investigations) of theories of consciousness and mental processes which see
external objects. Husserl argues that these are wholly inadequate in accounting for the
intentional character of consciousness. A brief look at this discussion, will also make
evident that for Husserl intentionality is essentially characterized by the ability to live-
through intentional acts to their intended object. That is, intentionality itself is essentially
living-through.
This aspect of intentionality is crucial to Husserl's criticisms of (for the most part)
pictoral representations and signitive acts), i.e., the mistake of interpreting the object of
theory of consciousness and the view that conscious concepts are signs immanent to
consciousness are mistaken about the actual object of conscious acts. As Husserl
consistently and correctly points out when one is conscious of something, e.g., a bus, the
object which is before one's mind is the actual object, namely the bus. Being conscious
that what is immediately before consciousness is a "mental picture" of the thing or a sign
of it. As Husserl points out, on the surface these theories are condemned to an infinite
83
requires that there be a "mental picture" or signitive concept which consciousness really
attends to and through which it grasps the intended object then this mental picture or
Which, in turn, requires that there be a "mental picture" or signitive concept of this
"mental picture" or signitive concept which is really before consciousness through which
and directly, i.e., without a mediating representation or signitive concept. That is, neither
form of representationalism or, for that matter, any theory which grounds intentionality
mediately, can possibly capture true intentionality and moreover, if they are to avoid an
and nothing else. The consciousness of the "subjective," noetic materials which are
my experience of the bus. The latter is given in an act of reflective consciousness while
Husserl puts it, the mistake of representationalism and all other mediate theories of
intentionality is that they interpret one's lived-experience of the bus as really a lived-
84
However, and this will be crucial for what I want to argue, for Husserl the
"subjective" components of the experience of the bus play a role in the direct, intentional
consciousness of the bus, namely, in intending the bus one lives-through these
object of the act, when in fact they are the "mechanisms" by which consciousness intends
the object. Husserl goes even further and argues that this ability of consciousness to live-
Signs are in fact not objects of our thought at all, even surrogatively; we
rather live entirely in the consciousness of meaning, of understanding,
which does not lapse when accompanying imagery does so. One must
bear in mind that symbolic thinking is only thinking in virtue of a new,
intentional act-character: this distinguishes the meaningful sign from the
mere sign, i.e. the sounded word set up as a physical object in our mere
presentations of sense. This act-character is a descriptive trait in the sign-
experience, which, stripped of intuition, yet understands the sign.86
Moreover, this implies that signs can only exist relative to beings capable of intentional
acts: "A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate
something to some thinking being. If we wish to seize the pervasively common element
being with factual properties much like any other physical or natural thing. Looked at in
this way, and only in this way, even the "subjective" or noetic components of a sign are
qualitatively no different than the "subjective" or noetic components of any other sensed
86
Ibid., pg. 210.
87
Ibid., pg. 184.
85
object. The qualitative difference that makes a sign a sign as opposed to a mere physical
or natural thing is that it can direct intentional consciousness to "livingly" intend the
object which it signifies and in this consists the meaningfulness of the sign,
The sensuous habit of an object does not change when it assumes the
status of a symbol for us, nor conversely does it do so when we ignore the
meaning of what normally functions as a symbol. No new, independent
content is here added to the old: we do not merely have a sum or
association of contents of equal status before us. One and the same
content has rather altered is psychic habit: we are differently minded in
respect of it, it no longer seems a mere sensuous mark on paper, the
physical phenomenon counts as an understood sign. Living thus
understandingly [Verständnis leben: italics mine] we perform no act of
presentation or judgement directed upon the sign as a sensible object, but
another act, quite different in kind, which relates to the thing designated.
It is in this sense-giving act-character - which differs entirely according as
our interest plays on the sensible sign or the object presented through it,
with or without representative imagery - that meaning consists.88
Importantly, this analysis of the sign applies equally to meaningful expressions generally
which, of course, is obvious from the fact that for Husserl signs are themselves
meaningful expressions. For, after all, Husserl conceives of all meaningful expressions
as he does meaningful signs as essentially indicative. That is, their meaningfulness lies in
the fact that they direct a "thinking subject" to intentionally direct itself towards some
88
Ibid., pg. 209.
86
experience[erleben] the former, we do not live in [leben im] such a
presentation at all, but solely in enacting its sense, its meaning. And in so
far as we do this, and yield ourselves to enacting the meaning-intention
and its further fulfillment, our whole interest centres upon the object
intended in our intention, and named by its means. (These two ways of
speaking have in fact the same meaning.) The function of a word (or
rather of an intuitive word-presentation) is to awaken a sense-conferring
act in ourselves, to point to what is intended, or perhaps given intuitive
fulfillment in this act, and to guide our interest exclusively in this
direction.89
Significant for this entire discussion is that what transforms a "mere expression" (or sign)
into a meaningful expression (or sign) is the fact that the thinking subject uses the sign to
enact "its sense." However, what characterizes the enacted sense - as is particularly
evident in the last quote - is that the thinking subject can "live in" [leben im] the enacted
sense where he can only live-through [erlebt] the "mere expression," that is the
precisely intentionality itself. The thinking subject lives-in the enacted sense, i.e., the
living-in the intentional act and living-towards the intentional object. Of course for
Husserl this living-in the intentional act is certainly not an adequate phenomenological
intentionality but also the descriptive analysis of its essential structures, i.e., an apodictic,
eidetic analysis of its immanent structures. This analysis will not only explicate what
Husserl calls the intentional content of the intentional act, i.e., its noematic structure, but
89
Ibid., pg. 193.
87
it will also analyze all the "subjective" components of the intentional act, i.e., its noetic
structure, such as the "subjectively" sensuous components of the experience, i.e., the
intentionality is lived-in.
Making our way back to what originally motivated this discussion, we can see
that for Husserl at least at this stage of the analysis has characterized originary presentive
intuition as consciousness' concrete living-in acts in living-through these acts and living-
towards the intended object, i.e., intentionality. Since what characterizes all of
concrete living, we can say that all originary presentive intuition is ultimately concrete
in and living-towards. In the Ideas, and I think specifically to avoid any association with
what was called "life philosophy" - which both Husserl and Heidegger agree
dogmatically asserts the primacy of an amorphous, irrational, and almost mystical notion
of "life" - Husserl uses the phrase "present in person" [leibhaftig gegenwärtig] or just "in
person" to describe this notion of originary presentive intuition, but the point is the same,
90
Husserl, Ideas, pp. 244 – 245.
88
This analysis of originary presentive intuition satisfies the requirement of any "genuine
science" that "Immediate "seeing," [Das unmittelbare "Sehen"] not merely sensuous,
consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational
assertions."91
Logical Investigations. In this it becomes clear to Heidegger that Husserl has externally
Brentano's claim about intentionality that for consciousness objects must be presented in
a "presentation" and that all other modifications of that, e.g., judgmental, valuing, etc.,
91
Ibid., pg. 36.
89
refers to an object' (an expression used by Brentano in other passages) is
presentative in a presentation, judicial in a judgment etc. etc.92
Which amounts to
Although Husserl agrees with Brentano that all the objects of consciousness must be
given to consciousness he disagrees with him that this is done in an act of consciousness.
Every act of consciousness for Husserl can be broken down into its "content" and
"quality," notions which Husserl refines and deepens in his further analysis, but which
roughly describe the respective object of the act and the way in which that object is given
to consciousness. For example, if I judge that the bus is red this act of consciousness has
a content, viz., the state of affairs of the bus being red, and a quality, viz., the judging of
this state of affairs. As Husserl understands Brentano, there are different types or species
of acts, namely, judgmental, wishful (among others), and especially presentative. The
consciousness, namely, presentative acts. These presentative acts are the foundations for
all other acts, or put another way, every other act of consciousness includes within itself a
92
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pp. 95 – 96.
93
Ibid., pg. 129.
90
presentative act by which the content of the original act is presented to consciousness.
The presentative act presents the object to consciousness and then this very same
As Husserl points out, there are problems with Brentano's analysis of presentative
acts. If All acts have a moment of content and a moment of quality then presentative acts
do as well. However obviously this will not do in the case of presentative acts for
presentative acts are that by which the object of consciousness, and that means the
content of acts, are presented to consciousness. But if the presentative act is a unity of
content and quality as is every other act then the content of the presentative act itself must
be given to consciousness before the presentative act can be enacted. But this is absurd
because then, given Brentano's analysis, this presentative act requires or includes a
further presentative act by which its content can be presented to consciousness and this
latter act is itself a unity of content and quality and requires a further presentative act and
consciousness must simply be given to consciousness and in such a way that this
intuition of the contents of consciousness. Brentano fell into the psychologistic prejudice
consciousness. This is why Brentano would assume that the givenness or "presentation"
of the object to consciousness is itself an act of consciousness. That is, Husserl argues
91
that there really is no intentionality (or "outer directedness") at all in Brentano's theory of
belief that "mere" presentations are acts of consciousness. The phrase "mere
presentation" ambiguously refers to both the content of consciousness as well as the act
of taking of a certain form of "neutral" attitude towards an object. That is, an object can
without consciousness taking a "positive" stance towards the object, e.g., neither judging
it, nor doubting it, nor liking it, etc. This, Husserl says, is an act of consciousness which
has both a content and a quality and which may be transformed into a judgment or doubt,
etc. However, this act of consciousness is not the originary presentative intuition of the
object or content of consciousness which all acts presuppose and which Husserl has
given? That is, what is this originary presentative intuition of the content of
consciousness is the content of an act of consciousness or what he will more exactly call
the intentional content of an act of consciousness although, in the end, even further
refinements of this are needed which we need not go into here94. This means that the
94
Later in the Ideas this is the noematic moment of a noetic-noematic unity.
92
different acts of consciousness, e.g., judging, valuing, etc. Moreover, Husserl argues that
the content of the acts of consciousness cannot exist outside of the unity of an act of
consciousness which are not part of a unified act of consciousness, but nonetheless the
sense of independence laid out in investigation three of the Logical Investigations. What
is this independence? Simply, it is the fact that the content of consciousness remains the
same even when the other moments of the act in which it is a part are actually,
imaginatively or eidetically varied. That is, the content of a particular judgment remains
the same even if I consider modifying the quality of this act such that it becomes now
independence of the content of an act of consciousness signifies that the meaning of the
content or, which is the same thing, the meaning of the object of the act of consciousness
is independent of the particular act of which it is the content. The identical intentional
is not independent of acts of consciousness generally. Or, what amounts to the same
thing, every content or intentional object of an act of consciousness can only exist as a
This, however, is the point at which Heidegger argues that Husserl has objectified
the contents of consciousness and it is here that Husserl betrays the phenomenological
themselves without imposing external meanings upon them, i.e., without presupposing
93
any "standpoints." Originally, Husserl had characterized originary presentative intuition
meaning. That is, the objects given by originary presentative intuition by necessity, i.e.,
other acts of consciousness and this requires that they are ultimately meaningful
regardless of the particular context in which they are found in lived-experience, i.e., for
Investigations and the Ideas is that objects are identically repeatable in multiple
intentional acts of consciousness. More correctly, this unity of objects - that they are
consciousness - characterizes the very unity and essence of intentional acts themselves,
i.e., that they are directed toward something, and, consequently, makes intentional acts
possible.
For this very reason, originary presentative intuition as Husserl now understands it
abstracts from lived-experience, that is, it abstracts from the concrete living-in that
that which is capable of identically "appearing in" different concrete acts of living-
towards it, i.e., the concrete living-towards the intended that previously characterized the
94
Husserl himself is quite clear about the fact that - as given in lived-experience -
and other experiential objects but that its meaning is independent of this "background."
What does it mean to say we can form an idea of a content 'by itself' or 'in
isolation'? Does this mean, as regards the actually experienced contents of
the phenomenological sphere, that such a content can be freed from all
blending with coexistent contents, can ultimately be torn out of the unity
of consciousness? Obviously not. In this sense no contents are isolable,
and the same holds of the phenomenal thing-contents in their relation to
the total unity of the phenomena as such. If we form an independent idea
of the content head of a horse, we inescapably present it in a context, the
content stands relieved from an objective background that appears with it,
it is inescapably given with many other contents, and is also in a way
united to them. How then can this content be isolable in idea? The only
answer we can give is the following:
Isolability means only that we can keep some content constant in
idea despite boundless variation - variation that is free, though not
excluded by a law rooted in the content's essence - of the contents
associated with it, and, in general, given with it. This means that it is
unaffected by the elimination of any given arrangement of compresent
contents whatsoever.
This self-evidently entails: that the existence of this content, to the
extent that this depends on itself and its essence, is not at all conditioned
by the existence of other contents, that it could exist as it is, through an a
priori necessity of essence, even if nothing were there outside of it, even if
all around were altered at will, i.e. without principle.
Or what plainly amounts to the same: In the 'nature' of the content
itself, in its ideal essence, no dependence on other contents is rooted; the
essence that makes it what it is, also leaves it unconcerned with all other
contents. It may as a matter of fact be that, with the existence of this
content, other contents are given, and in accordance with empirical rules.
In its ideally graspable essence, however, the content is independent; this
essence by itself, i.e. considered in a priori fashion, requires no other
essence to be interwoven with it.95
95
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 9.
95
This manifests itself further in Husserl's characterization of the world in the Ideas. There
In lived-experience the world is given as the potentially though not actually intended
objects in the "halo" or "horizon" always co-experienced with the experience of any
given object.
However, earlier I said that Heidegger argues that Husserl has distorted the
originarily given meaning of the things themselves and I must say exactly how.
themselves just as they are originarily given to consciousness. That is, one must not
import external meaning-structures into one's analysis of the things themselves or, put
differently, must not presuppose any "standpoint" towards the things themselves. Has
Husserl really distorted the meanings of the originary presentative intuitions? It seems
so. If we think back to Husserl's later analysis of originary presentative intuition in his
argues that what is presented in originary presentative intuition is the contentful moments
content as judged, believed, valued, etc. Moreover, this requires that what is given by
consciousness. In essence, the things given must be objectified. However, isn't this just
96
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 6.
96
the a priori imposition of an external meaning-structure upon originary givenness? The
content given in originary presentative intuition has now been forced externally to play a
specific role within acts of consciousness. This role requires the meaningfulness of the
consciousness and its act-quality. In other words, the meaningfulness of the content of an
act of consciousness cannot vary with context and cannot make essential reference to the
requirement is not given internal to the originary presentative intuition itself but rather is
imposed on it from without according to the role it must play in acts of consciousness,
namely that it must be capable of being presented identically and repeatedly in different
acts of consciousness. Finally, this means that this content by necessity cannot make
97
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 85.
97
One can see this from a different angle as well. As Husserl originally characterized it, the
case of the intentional act, this living-through is characterized by living-in the act and
primary sense of living-towards something, i.e., the ultimate necessary foundation of any
of being believed, judged, valued, etc. Is this originarily given? It appears that in lived-
experience, i.e., in the way one livingly engages with something, there are many different
possible modifications. Only one of these is "attending to it" theoretically. There are
many other possible lived engagements with something, for example, producing it, using
it, etc. Is the primacy of theoretical engagement given originarily? The primacy of the
intuition and one that externally constrains or modifies its meaning. Husserl says that,
As far as Heidegger is concerned, Husserl has placed the last nail in the coffin of and
made a final betrayal of the principle of principles of phenomenology. For now acts of
consciousness are the condition of the possibility of living-in and not the other way
round. That is, acts of consciousness are the prerequisite for originarily presentative
98
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 118.
98
intuition. At this point the phenomenological project has become a transcendental
project. That is, phenomenology is giving a priori conditions for the possibility of
experience loses its living character or, in Heidegger's words, becomes "de-vivified"
(Entlebnis) because of Husserl’s belief that is only in reflection that the structures of
what is lived into something merely "looked-at." Husserl believes that it is only when
This a priori structure given in reflection is then the transcendental condition of lived-
experience and living-in and living-towards as the previous quote from the Logical
99
Footnote in quoted text: “Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und
phänomenologischen Philosophie, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, edited
by E. Husserl, Halle an der Saale 1913, Vol. I, p. 150.”
100
Footnote in quoted text: “ibid., p. 144”. Quote from Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy," pg. 83.
99
In Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl, we find a more general claim, viz., that the
unities whose meaning is not dependent on the context of their givenness in lived-
experience, is driven by and is indeed the first step towards theoretical knowledge whose
theoretical science would not be possible, because all meaning and all givenness would
requires that the object be determinable as a self-contained unity in order that it can be
multiply judged, believed, etc. In other words, all meaning would be essentially tied to
the "here and now.” For Husserl, what is required for any scientific knowledge
whatsoever is lawfulness,
governs in such a way that its meaningfulness and, furthermore, its application, makes no
101
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 146.
100
reference to external factors. That is, laws specify in their entirety the connectedness
between what they govern and do so without reference to anything other than the
concepts which they govern and the connectedness they specify. A law which made
it and the concepts it governs would not be a law at all since this external factor would
play a role in determining the connectedness of the concepts being governed thus making
the law no law at all but merely a determining factor perhaps subsumable under a more
inclusive unity. Having said this, it is not the case that laws cannot bear external
relations to other laws or further unities. For certainly laws find themselves related to
other laws. In addition, the laws need not determine completely the concepts they govern
for other laws may bear on those same concepts, but in a different regard. The
importance of this is that the laws do not intrinsically refer to the context or conditions of
their particular, concrete realization. That is to say, a law determines the universal,
meaningful structure of the particular, concrete realizations of the law while the
law not the other way round. For example, the law of gravitation intrinsically regulates
or governs the interaction of any two bodies qua gravity in abstraction and does so
without making intrinsic reference to external laws which may govern the same concepts
of itself, e.g., to the gravitational interaction between any two particular, concrete bodies.
interaction between any two particular, concrete bodies, is governed or regulated by the
101
context, e.g., the spatio-temporal locations of the bodies, etc. The law of gravitation
makes the particular realization an instance of gravitational interaction, but the particular,
A necessary condition for lawfulness and what makes a law apodictic is that the
concepts which it governs be unitarily determined, i.e., that they have a self-contained
meaningfulness. Only then can a lawful connectedness between these concepts be made,
i.e., a connectedness that applies universally. If the concepts which are to be governed
connectedness can be realized between the concepts since some external factor may
further determine the connectedness between them. This does not mean, however, that
the unitary determination of the concept in question must be simple since the concepts
governed by the law may themselves be complex, i.e., unities of simpler unitary
determinations. For example, this applies straightforwardly to laws of laws in, for
Furthermore, for Husserl, the unity of law, i.e., the univocal connectedness of
concepts, is itself the essence of what the law governs. An example will make this more
clear. Gravitation itself, i.e., the essence of gravity, is just the lawful connectedness
governing or regulating the interaction between bodies by which the notion of gravity is
originarily given. Put differently, gravity simply denotes a particular lawful connection
As I mentioned earlier, laws can bear external relations to other laws and these
external relations can be themselves governed by law, i.e., can be necessarily related. Of
course, from the perspective of these more general laws the relatedness existing between
102
the more specific concepts they govern, in this case more specific laws, is itself internal.
For Husserl, theory and the theoretical ultimately denotes governance according to a
unity of law or, as Husserl puts it, a "unity of explanation." A theory is defined by a
unity of law no matter how complex this unity may be. Theoretical unity is the
Clearly, any single theory must have a "homogenous unity of legal base" since the
ultimate concepts of the theory must bear a lawful, necessary connection between one
theory were not so necessarily connected they would comprise different theories because
there would be no necessary connection between them. For example, if there were no
102
Ibid., pp. 147 – 8.
103
necessary, lawful connection between gravity and electromagnetism it would be absurd to
The extra-essential unity which may unify a science is based on the "unity of the
There are, in the second place, external standpoints which range truths
into one science: the nearest to hand is the unity of the thing in a more
literal sense. Once connects all the truths whose content relates to one and
the same individual object, or to one and the same empirical genus. This
is the case in regard to the concrete, or, to use von Kries's term, the
ontological sciences, such as geography, history, astronomy, natural
history, anatomy, etc. These sciences are also often called 'descriptive',
and this name is allowable, since the unity of description is fixed by the
empirical unity of the object or the class, and it is this descriptive unity
which, in the sciences here involved, determines the science's unity. But
the word should of course not be so understood as if descriptive sciences
aimed at mere description, which would contradict our guiding concept of
science.103
This unity is deemed "extra-essential" because this form of unity, i.e., the unity of the
thing as opposed to the unity of the law, "...leads to widely divergent, or quite
heterogeneous theories and theoretical sciences."104 However, the fact that Husserl uses
the term (borrowed from von Kries) "ontological" to describe these sciences should not
be confused with what in his Ideas is called "ontology." That is, it should not be
confused with the distinction between "formal ontology," which comprises the principles
and laws of objectivity given in a theory of theories or a "pure logic," and "regional
called insofar as a regional ontology describes the material aspect of the objectivities of
103
Ibid., pg. 148.
104
Ibid., pg. 148.
104
material sciences as described in the Ideas. What is important is that Husserl goes on to
argue that,
That is, as far as "pure theory" is concerned and, consequently, as far as Husserl is
concerned in the Logical Investigations insofar as its project is to ground pure logic, the
objects of these "ontological sciences" are merely empirically interpreted instances of the
purely theoretical objects of pure logic. Husserl characterizes the purely theoretical
When, however, our purely theoretical interest sets the tone, the single
individual and the empirical connection do not count intrinsically, or they
count only as a methodological point of passage in the construction of
general theory. The theoretical natural scientist, or the natural scientist in
the context of purely theoretic, mathematicizing discussion, sees the earth
and stars quite indifferently from the geographer and the astronomer.
They are to him per se indifferent and count merely as examples of
gravitating masses in general.106
This, one will remember, is precisely how Rickert and Windelband characterize the
attitude of the nomological sciences with regard to individuality. Furthermore, the way
in which Husserl characterizes the ontological sciences closely resembles the idiographic
sciences as so called by Rickert and Windelband, although for Husserl they are by nature
105
Ibid., pg. 148.
106
Ibid., pg. 148.
105
to be reduced to the nomological sciences whereas Rickert and Windelband want to avoid
precisely that.
earlier, this is an external constraint on originary presentative intuition. That is, originary
lived-experience but rather only in its role as required by the demands of theoretical
reason, i.e., by the role it plays within the ultimately lawful structure of theory. The
provide objects capable of being subsumed under law, i.e., objects which are capable of
Certainly this does not mean, as it may appear, that the objects of theoretical
reason are contentless except for their ability to play this role. But ultimately their
content is circumscribed by theoretical reason which means that their content qua theory
consists of the multitude of laws of which they are an instance. For example, physical
objects are determined by the law of gravitation and, as such, they are made contentful
and, similarly, these same objects are further determined by many other laws.
Thus, Heidegger claims, Husserl does not stick to the things themselves but only
reason, i.e., as objectified. Husserl has not violated, as he understands it, the requirement
106
of phenomenology to be free from presuppositions but this is only because he
understands freedom from presuppositions as freedom from any specific objective claims.
tautological that the theory of theories is free from presuppositions since it itself is the
ground of objectivity.
However, all this does not mean that something is lacking in Husserl's critique of
psychologism itself claims to ground the very same objectivity that Husserl attempts to
objectivity in its attempt to ground the very notion of objectivity itself. Or, as Natorp
puts it, psychologism attempts to ground objective science in general through a particular,
objective science, i.e., psychology. This, Natorp says, is merely a "category mistake."
107
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 79.
107
The appearance that Husserl's project of founding theoretical reason relies solely
upon the mere meaningful givenness of the things themselves arises because of his belief
that objects qua objects are immediately and meaningfully given to consciousness "in
person," i.e., in lived-experience, when in fact Natorp and Heidegger argue that the
Husserl ends up arguing that objectivity is a transcendental condition for the possibility
of life. For Heidegger, the question is: what is the motivation for objectification or how
Paul Natorp attempts an answer to this question and from the perspective of one
who adheres to the primacy of theoretical reason. Natorp saw more clearly and earlier
than Husserl (in 1887 -1888) the necessity of theoretical reason's return to lived-
experience, but in Heidegger’s view he too was ultimately unsuccessful because he sees
reviewing Natorp's theory we shall get a more complete understanding of the necessary
permeating the philosophical tradition and also an account of the classical origin of this
issue.
108
CHAPTER THREE
careful analysis of Natorp's argument for the primacy and necessity of an "objective"
foundation for knowledge in his 1887 essay "Über Objective und Subjective Begründung
der Erkenntnis (On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge)."108 In the
process many issues and points of methodology will arise which are crucially significant
meaningfully distinct from judgment and its modalities and also the necessity of the
presupposition of objectivity for the task of knowledge, i.e., the recovery of Erlebnis.
In his 1887 essay, “On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge"
and also in section 14 of his 1888, Einleitung in die Psychologie109, Paul Natorp seeks to
108
Paul Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," translated by Lois
Phillips and David Kolb, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12, pp. 245 – 266.
109
Paul Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (Freiburg i.B., 1888).
109
understand scientific knowledge by mediating between the Neo-Kantian dispute as to
deals from a theoretical perspective with the issue raised at the end of the last section, i.e.,
the relation between the objectification that Husserl and Natorp alike understand as a
necessary condition for any scientific knowledge whatsoever and subjectivity or, as
Natorp understands it, the appearance of objects in subjectivity. In examining this issue
and Natorp's response to it we shall get a much better idea of what Heidegger believes to
be at stake in the privileging and primacy of theoretical reason and his analysis of the
is, he wants to examine knowledge as it is given on its own without presupposing any
strongly substantive notion of subjectivity and objectivity. Rather for Natorp, as well as
for Husserl and Heidegger, subjectivity and objectivity are derivative notions. According
to Natorp, subjectivity and objectivity are notions derived from the unitary concept of
knowledge itself,
110
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 248.
110
What is significant and important for our purposes in Natorp's theory is the intimate
the nomological character of knowledge, a theme which we have seen runs through much
At the very beginning of his 1887 essay, Natorp stresses the importance of
determining laws,
Each separate science or theory seeks laws for a limited and determined
range of appearances. Science, theoretical knowledge (Erkenntnis)
considered as a whole and as a unity, seeks to unfold a unified network of
laws, into which all particular laws for given appearances must fit.111
of the time, logic, or what today is typically called epistemology, itself seeks laws.
Specifically, it seeks the lawful relation that exists between knowledge and its object,
Ultimately, this lawful relation between knowledge and its object is the subject of
Natorp's essay and he ultimately decides the Neo-Kantian dispute on the side of
objectivity rather than subjectivity but it will be extremely insightful to work through the
111
Ibid., pg. 246.
112
Ibid., pg. 246.
111
Natorp begins by arguing that the notion of objectivity, from the perspective of
knowledge, is the unknown of an equation. That is, the object is the "not yet determined
X" of an equation whose known quantities are the data for knowledge. However, just as
in a mathematical equation where the unknown quantity is itself not totally unknown but
is pre-determined by the structure of the equation and the known quantities, so also is it
in the case of knowledge insofar as the object of knowledge is not totally unknown at the
start but is rather determined by the structure of knowledge, i.e., its lawfulness, and the
What is at first surprising in Natorp's approach to the question of the object of knowledge
is his insight into the very issue that plagued Husserl's approach to the question of
became evident in our previous considerations) this was the result of external
113
Ibid., pg. 247.
112
considerations of the theoretical nature of givenness being smuggled into originary
givenness - Natorp understands from the outset that the essence of objectivity is only
accessible in and through the mediation of the unified complex of known object, the
"form" of knowledge and the data for knowledge (content). Husserl's phenomenology
Natorp's approach to the question of the objectivity of knowledge and its relation to the
between the two. More exactly, the givenness of the object of knowledge is
predetermined by the approach knowledge takes to the object as will become clear.
Striking evidence of this and of Natorp's influence on Heidegger comes from Natorp's
Logische Grundlagen,
114
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity.
113
over-against thrown-ahead (das Objekt der Erkenntnis wird Projekt, das
Gegenwurf Vorwurf)."115
Though Natorp is trying to capture the true spirit of Kantian philosophy there is already
much to distinguish Natorp from Kant. Natorp is insistent on the fact that he has
captured the essence and importance of the distinction between "transcendental logic"
and "formal logic" in Kant. He makes mention of the fact that many Kant interpreters of
his time understood Kant as arguing for the primacy of a "formal" analysis of knowledge,
i.e., an analysis of knowledge using only the resources of "formal logic" in the Kantian
sense in which no reference whatsoever is made to objectivity. This, Natorp points out, is
what Kant deemed only "the negative criterion of knowledge" and consists only of "the
simple lack of inner contradiction and the consistent connection of thoughts."116 On the
other hand, the analysis of knowledge given by Natorp (which he argues is in the true
spirit of Kant) makes essential reference to objectivity and thus requires a "transcendental
The analogy with the not yet determined X of the equation of knowledge is brought out
well by this.
115
Paul Natorp, Die Logischen Grundlagen Der Exakten Wissenschaften (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,
1910), pp. 32 – 3 as translated by Phillips and Kolb in footnote 11 of , "On the Objective and Subjective
Grounding of Knowledge," pp. 265 – 6, with my own additional translation of the complete last sentence.
116
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 246.
117
Ibid., pg. 247.
114
But, as the analogy further makes clear, insofar as knowledge is an equation it is
undertaken. Natorp argues that this arises out of the essence of knowledge itself. That is,
position to provide an adequate grasp of knowledge itself since by its very nature it is
incomplete, i.e., makes essential reference to the not yet determined X which is the object
undetermined insofar as its very meaning includes the not yet determined X ("der große
judgments and knowledge are qualitatively different insofar as the former is complete and
the latter is not. For example, the signitive intention of an equation such as "x=35" is
different than that of a judgment such as "the Reichstag is the seat of German
government." The signitive intention of the latter is internal to the judgment itself and
needs no external completion. The signitive intention of the former refers essentially to
What this signifies is that the meaning of knowledge itself can never be confirmed
knowledge itself. Put another way, assuming Husserl's analysis of truth as the
identification of signitive intention and intuition there can be no truth with regard to
knowledge itself. That is, there can be no truthful determination of the essence of
knowledge. One may argue in opposition to this that of course the meaning of
115
knowledge is completed by providing the not yet determined X that is the object of
knowledge, i.e., by the judgment which corresponds to the solution of the equation, just
as the meaning of the equation "x=35" is completed by providing the judgment which
corresponds to its solution, namely, "243=35". However, this will not do. The equation
"x=35" is solved by the quantity 243 and, thus, results in the judgment "243=35" but the
equation "x=35" and the judgment "243=35" have qualitatively different signitive
intentions and this is demonstrated by the fact that the meaning-intention of the judgment
"243=35" is complete and ready for confirmation whereas the meaning-intention of the
equation "x=35" is essentially incomplete and for this reason cannot be confirmed in any
clearly not the completion of the meaning of the equation but rather a qualitative change
in meaning. One may mistakenly think of the relation between equation and judgment on
the model of the relation between a "vague" judgment and a more "determinate"
judgment, such as in the case of the two judgments "There is a building which is the seat
of German government" and "The Reichstag which I toured yesterday is the seat of
in its signitive meaning. What it denotes or refers to may require investigation but this
does not add to the signitive meaning of the judgment. Put differently, it is perfectly
then it is capable of evidentiary confirmation. Or, again, "There is a building which is the
116
seat of German government" needs not be transformed into something more determinate,
viz., "The Reichstag which I toured yesterday is the seat of German government" in order
for it to be evidentially confirmed; it is already complete in its signification and thus can
such as "This building is the seat of German government." Husserl argues that the
signitive intention of "this" is not incomplete it is simply indeterminate, i.e., "this" has the
external context to make what it intends determinate. The "x" of "x=35" is not like this,
i.e., it does not point to or intend anything. Rather, whatever incomplete, signitive
meaning it does have is fully contained in its unification with the equation in which it
appears. Its meaning is exhausted by its role as a placeholder for the completion of the
task or problem which the equation presents. That is, it is what the equation throws
ahead (Vorwurf) and it is comprehensible only in this regard. As was quoted above,
"...the x, y, etc. of an equation only have meaning in and for the equation, on the basis of
the meaning of the equation as a whole and in relation to the known constant quantities."
The equation presents a task or a problem while the judgment presents an object
(broadly construed) and this is a distinction of meaning. The task set forth by the
equation, but this judgment is not evidentiary confirmation of the equation since
evidentiary confirmation does not apply to tasks. Rather, instead of being confirmed,
117
Knowledge, therefore, is understood by Natorp as a task whose fruition or
completion is the object of knowledge, i.e., the not yet determined X of the equation of
even to the ideal collection or totality of intuitively evident judgments. However, this is
not to say that there is no connection between intuitively evident judgments and
knowledge for, as is clear from the above, intuitively evident judgment may be
understood in the context of the fruition or completion of the task of knowledge but
saying this is not to grasp the essence of the task which is knowledge, but rather its
completion or product. One may quibble here and say that what Natorp has described is
not really knowledge but rather knowing, but in this case it is clear that what Natorp
means by knowledge is merely the fruition or completion of the task of knowing. In this
case, what knowledge means can be understood only insofar as it is purpose or end
product of the task of knowing which leaves us right back where we started, i.e., with
trying to comprehend this task. That is, one cannot work back from the mere completion
of the task of knowing, namely, knowledge to the task of knowing itself. In just the same
way, one cannot work back from the completion of an equation, i.e., a determinate
judgment, to the equation itself because the comprehension of the task is not inherent in
its completion. For example, it is not inherent to the meaning of the judgment "234=35"
In this regard, we can see the radical difference between Natorp's interpretation of
Kant and that of his Marburg mentor Hermann Cohen. Cohen influentially argued that
Kant reasoned to the transcendental conditions of knowledge from the "fact of science"
which amounts to the determination of objects as present in the best science of the times,
118
namely, Newtonian science. Not only does this give the impression that Kant's
transcendental conditions are merely means to ground Newtonian science, but leads one
to believe that philosophy simply "follows behind" the sciences dutifully systematizing
its results. On this view, philosophy finds its niche by serving the formal, systematic
needs of the sciences. For Natorp this gets things backwards. In other words, proponents
of this view ground the theory of knowledge in the particular, objective determinations of
the special sciences rather than in an analysis of the task of knowledge itself. According
objectivity per se in the task of knowledge. Cohen’s account of the theory of knowledge
works the other way round insofar as it attempts to ground knowledge, and thus
objective sciences themselves. As we have seen, Natorp argues that this is not possible.
equation of knowledge this demonstrates how the task of knowledge itself predetermines
possibilities for the completion of its task and, therefore, predetermines possibilities for
the determination of objects, i.e., objectivity itself qua knowledge. What we cannot
this would be tantamount to understanding the "x" before understanding the equation in
which it appears, e.g., "x=35". What Natorp believes can be done and what he sees to be
the proper task of the theory of knowledge, i.e. logic, is to comprehend the equation that
is knowledge. That is, we can work out in general terms the relation between the yet to
be determined objects of knowledge and the data for knowledge from the task of
119
knowledge. Whether this in turn is what Kant truly meant to do is for Natorp not
Knowledge itself is not an object to be studied, but, as we have seen, is a task and must
investigate its species or genus and then, a la Husserl, find the evidentiary conditions
which would intuitively fulfill its meaning intention. Rather, we understand knowledge
in its essence as a task by looking to what it "intends, seeks, and since [it] seeks,
because the meaning of the equation is essentially incomplete while the meaning of any
judgmental expression is complete. The same holds true for any modality of judgment,
e.g., believing, doubting, etc. The proper, general expression of the meaning of the task
of knowledge is the question. For instance, "what is 3 raised to the power 5?", "what is
intention, i.e., without "completing" their meaning and thus producing something other
than a question which has a specifically different signitive intention, e.g., a judgment or
one of its modalities. In other words, questions are expressions of tasks with respect to
120
which the very process of confirmation presupposes the completion or product of the
look to what is sought after in scientific questioning. What is sought after in scientific
questioning is objectivity. When one asks a question, as is also the case with equations,
the question is not devoid of meaning, rather what is sought after in the question,
analogous to the not yet determined X of the equation, is meaningful only to the extent
that it is given in the context of the relations and constants of the question. The very fact
that a question is asked necessitates that what is sought after in the question is
contextualized according to the terms of the question, i.e., the basic possibilities of its
basic sorts of relation which makes knowledge possible are presupposed and already
question whatsoever is a general relation between that which is sought after in the
However, that which is presupposed in the question must not be confused with a
presupposed determination of that which is asked about in the question. That is, the
question does not express a degree of determination of the object with regard to what is
asked about it. If this were the case then the question would be indistinguishable from a
determinable but not fully determined judgment about the object and, as was said before,
this would make the question complete, though perhaps partially indeterminate, in its
signitive intention which is not possible if it is a question. This is a subtle yet crucially
121
important point. Let us return briefly to the analogy of the equation to make it absolutely
clear. "x=35" is, as we said, essentially incomplete in its signitive intention. The
meaning of the "x" in the equation is exhausted as the placeholder for the completion of
the task which the equation expresses. The relations and constants of the equations
constrain the possibilities of carrying out this task but they do not in the context of the
equation itself determine the "x." Through a qualitative change in meaning this equation
may be transformed into a judgment which does determine the fruition of the task
expressed by the equation, e.g., "the solution to the equation 'x=35' is a number identical
with 35." However, this latter judgment does not express a task the way the equation
would itself be a task expressible by the question "Is the solution to the equation 'x=35' a
number identical with 35?" which is not identical to the judgment "It is true that the
solution to the equation 'x=35' is a number identical with 35.” The latter expresses the
proto-judgments or, more generally, questions do not express doxic modalities as beliefs,
doubts, and surmises do. Questions are qualitatively or, more exactly, specifically
different comportments or acts than are doxic modalities. In his Ideas Husserl did not
...The mode of "certain" belief can change into the mode of mere deeming
possible or deeming likely, or questioning and doubting; and, as the case
may be, that which appears and which, with regard to the first dimension
of characterizations is characterized as "originary," "reproductive," and the
122
like has taken on now the being-modalities of "possible," of "probable," of
"questionable," of "doubtful."118
Even up to the end of his life in the late 30's Husserl is still confounding questioning and
doubting,
prejudice that all comportments or acts of consciousness require that some content or
other, no matter how vague, been pre-given before this comportment or act of
consciousness is possible. That is, even towards the end of his life, Husserl still accepted
with regard to what is given. The only possible understanding of questioning that
Husserl could give is the one he does, namely that questioning presupposes a self-
118
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 250.
119
Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pg. 307.
123
contained, unified content or in Husserl's particular analysis, "a unified field of
problematic possibilities."
Husserl would agree that questions are not the type of things capable of
confirmation, but in Husserl's case this is not because the signitive-meaning of a question
is essentially incomplete, but simply because in the question the content is not yet
Obviously, this implies what we just previously showed to be impossible for a question
namely that in a question that which the question intends is not positively pre-determined
in any way only the task is positively determined. That is, no implicit inherent meaning
has been imparted to the not yet determined X of the question. For Husserl however, this
matter under question are pre-determined and this means determinate possible judgments
and answers are pre-determined by the question. In fact, these possibilities or, more
exactly, the "unified field of problematic possibilities" are the very content of the
question,
120
Ibid., pg. 309.
124
these possible answer-forms and that they already appear in the expression
of the questions themselves, as their content.121
The talk of "forms of judgment" and "answer-forms" here make it seem that Husserl may
be moving in the direction of our previous analysis of questions, however, for one, as is
clear from the previous quotations, what Husserl intends by the "forms of judgment" and
can never be in question but only the positing or neutralizing of pre-given, meaningful
judgments is in question. What then is to meaningfully distinguish the question from the
distinguish the question from the positing (in a judgment) of a "unified field of
questioning and its relation to the task or project of philosophizing, Husserl proposes his
because his own analysis of questioning reduces its content to a determined field of
completely general sense" appears to some of his later critics as further evidence that he
121
Ibid., pg. 309.
125
motivates an active doubting, a mode of behavior which puts the ego into
an act-cleavage. This cleavage brings with it, on the basis of the essential
striving of the ego for the unanimity of its acts of position-taking, an
immediate discomfort and an original impulse to get out of this condition
and into the normal condition of unity. Thus arises the striving for a firm
decision, i.e., ultimately for an unfrustrated, pure decision. If this striving
does not remain a merely affective, passive propensity, if, on the contrary,
it is actively accomplished by the ego, it gives rise to a questioning.
Taken in a completely general sense, questioning is the striving, arising
from the modal modification, from the cleavage and obstruction, to come
to a firm judicative decision.122
Worse yet, given this analysis of questioning, how is there to be any question of
Husserl understands it, meaning and objectivity must be presupposed. That is, the pre-
the questioning of meaning and the question of objectivity lead to absurdity - they simply
For Husserl, meaning and objectivity are necessary conditions for any
questioning,
122
Ibid., pg. 308.
126
striving, or a willing, an acting, whose goal is precisely judgments, and
judgments of a special form. All reason is at the same time practical
reason, and the like is also true of logical reason.123
This makes it quite impossible for Husserl to approach the issue of knowledge,
objectivity, and subjectivity along the lines of Natorp and (with significant, radical
modifications) Heidegger.
(which we shall see is the only possible means of manifesting objectivity and subjectivity
according to Natorp) must always be understood in the context of the task of knowing
Finally, we are not seeking the general nature of the relationship between
the sought-for object and the data of knowledge. This has already been
decided, since what is being sought is the object, the "being" (Sein) which
is the ground that corresponds to the "appearance". Anyone who has
asked about an object will have known what the question seeks.
The data of knowledge are "phenomena" in the most general sense:
those appearances which are to be explained (erklären) by science, that is,
are to be traced back to the truth (Wahre) which appears in them. The
object should be the object for the appearance; the appearance should be
proven to be the appearance of the object. Here there is already expressed
an original relation of the object to what is given in knowledge which is
analogous to the relation of the X to the known quantities of the equation.
123
Ibid., pg. 308.
127
The meaning of this relation must be discoverable through analyzing what
the questioner about the object intends, seeks, and since he seeks,
presupposes. If every science inquires after the objective foundation
underlying each appearance of its truth, then every science must have
some concept of this foundation and of the grounding relationship of the
object to the appearance.124
Inherent in this very dense and complicated quote at the beginning of Natorp's article of
1887 is the most general structure of his approach to the question of knowledge.
Knowledge for Natorp is a task and, he takes it, a task that thinkers have and are actually
engaged in. Given our previous analysis we could also say that thinkers have questioned
presupposed, namely what the questioner about the object "intends, seeks, and since he
seeks, presupposes." An analysis of this is the only route open to an understanding of the
In order to determine what someone is doing when they are engaged in the task of solving
an equation it is necessary to find out what are its variables, the unknown or not yet
determined, i.e., the sought for objects of knowledge, the constants, i.e., the data for
knowledge, and the relation between these two. In the case of knowledge, this last is the
relation of ground to grounded, between "being" (Sein) or the object of knowledge and
"appearance" or the data for knowledge. Knowledge is the grounding of the appearance
in being or, put more fully, the task of knowledge seeks a sense of objectivity such that
the object is seen to be the ground of the appearance and the appearances the appearance
of the object. That the object plays this role cannot be grounded in the mere sense of the
term "knowledge" for knowledge expresses a task and is not like, say, the term
124
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 247.
128
"Reichstag", which names an object. From the name, when properly understood, we can
grasp the object that it names, but knowledge itself does not statically name something,
carried out. It was Plato, "or perhaps even the Eleatics", who first engaged in the task of
knowledge and it was they who first determined the significance of the object of
knowledge:
misconception. Natorp does not understand this to mean that Plato or the Eleatics
determined the nature of some previously understood thing named "the object of
knowledge." To read it this way would make it appear that Natorp is accepting a purely
years ago. This is not what is meant. The object of knowledge is itself only meaningful
in the context of the task which is knowledge. To understand it the former way would
mean that we had some knowledge of the object of knowledge before the task of
knowledge was ever conceived and practiced which is absurd. What Natorp means is
that Plato or the Eleatics "won for philosophy" the task of knowledge itself. That is, they
first conceived and practiced knowing itself. Plato or the Eleatics gave us the task of
grounding the "appearances." The not yet determined X of this equation, i.e., the fruition
or product of the task of knowing, is "being" or objectivity. For Natorp, these are not
125
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 255.
129
objectivity before conceiving the task of knowledge, rather being and objectivity are
meaningful only as what is sought in knowledge. This is why Natorp says later,
apparently without argument, that "no object is given to us in any other way than in
knowledge. Thus the meaning and ground of objectivity are not available for
phenomenology, i.e., it apparently does not work from any preconceived standpoint or
theory. All standpoints and theories can only be seen as products of the project of
knowledge but never as knowledge itself. However, having said this does not mean that
the task of knowledge itself cannot be "given," it only indicates that the task of
knowledge is not one of its own products, although this is how many have mistakenly
understood it. For example, the question of whether I must know that I know before I
can know? What I know is a product of the process of engaging in the task of
knowledge. Knowing that I know would be to engage in the task of engaging in the task
not until one wrongly conceives of knowledge as an object, namely as a state of affairs
knowledge, that knowing that one knows becomes a problem. If one conceives properly
126
Ibid., pg. 253.
130
However, the task of knowledge itself has not been analyzed fully until it is
All scientific knowledge aims at the law. The relation of the appearance
to the law (the relation of the "manifold" of the appearance to the "unity"
of the law) must therefore explain the original relation to the object in all
knowledge. The interpretation of the appearance in accordance with laws
is taken as the objectively true interpretation.127
And as if to emphasis the point that was just previously made that this is not the result of
the products of knowledge but of the activity of knowledge itself, Natorp says,
The question that Natorp proposes to answer in the bulk of the essay is "the
question of logical method" which amounts to the question: "Must the foundation which
grounded in the "content" of knowledge, i.e., in the laws that govern the objects of
knowledge..
127
Ibid., pg. 248.
128
Ibid., pg. 248, italics mine.
129
Ibid., pg. 248.
131
Natorp says that the second option, i.e., the objectivity of knowledge is grounded
in the laws pertaining to the object of knowledge itself, makes it appear "as if one were
explaining the same by the same." He ultimately rejects this objection but says that it
knowledge themselves. However, Natorp quickly rejects this answer to the question of
occurrences happening in the particular psychological subject who knows. The relation
of object of knowledge to the data for knowledge does not make essential reference to the
viewed in the context of what first suggested the superiority of the psychologistic
130
Ibid., pg. 249.
132
approach, namely, that it is not explaining the same by the same. Most generally,
approach, explanation just is reduction. On the other hand, Natorp argues that this is not
genuine explanation at all, but is really just a category mistake, i.e., an instance of
We can easily remove the appearance of explaining the same by the same
in seeking the ground of objectivity purely on the objective side of
knowledge. What grounds something not only must not, it can not belong
to another genus than what is grounded. It is usually said that the mere
reduction to law does not really explain a phenomenon, since after all it
simply repeats the given state of affairs in a universal expression.
Whoever says this must be understanding something very obscure by
explanation. The universal expression leading a particular back to a
universal pattern of occurrences contains just what has always been
understood by explanation.131
Science seeks objective validity with regard to its subject matter. Furthermore it is clear
subjectivity is from the beginning mistaken, since it attempts to ground objective validity
in what is merely subjective validity. Natorp is arguing, as Husserl later will, that
regardless of the issue of whether scientific knowledge is possible (although both clearly
simply misses the very meaning of science itself. The activity of scientific understanding
131
Natorp, " On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 250.
132
Ibid., pg. 252.
133
is to discover the objective validity inherent to the particular subject matter of a science
or, in the case of logic, the objective validity in scientific theorizing itself. That this is the
case is not subject to the traditional epistemological issues surrounding the veracity of
goal of the task of scientific understanding. Objective validity is what science is after and
validity achievable?
Objective validity as the grasping of the object distinct from its subjectivity, i.e.,
its relativity in relation to an individual subject to which the object appears, can be
understood in two ways. The first way is simply to understand objective validity as the
"being-in-itself" of the object. Natorp argues that the "being-in-itself" of the object is
itself an "enigma" (Rätsel) and helps in no way with regard to the present problem, but
merely begs the question insofar as if we understood what the "being-in-itself" of the
object truly signifies we would already understand the relation of the object of knowledge
to subjectivity,
knowledge of the relation between the object as ground of appearance and subjectivity.
More exactly, without presupposing knowledge itself any understanding of the "being-in-
133
Ibid., pg. 253.
134
itself" would be merely dogmatic and uncritical. This is why Natorp believes that it is
only through an investigation of the task of knowledge itself that we can have any
can only critically understand subject and object through the unity that they comprise in
knowledge. Or, put another way, knowledge is the task which is the most conscientious,
Rather than starting from the object and proceeding to make subjective
knowing understandable in relation to the object, which after all is not
given but is in question, one must first take the standpoint of knowledge
and ask how knowledge itself understands objectivity, how knowledge
goes about confronting the object as independent of the subjectivity of
knowing, and what objectivity signifies for knowledge...To begin with,
"object" signifies that which knowledge stands over against. The meaning
and ground of this confrontation can best be communicated by knowledge
itself. For it is precisely knowledge's business to proceed with
consciousness, to know what it does and why. To question this
consciousness of knowledge about its own activity was the direction
indicated by our first considerations; this was the opinion of Kant when,
after many promising attempts by his predecessors, he made the demand
to prove the conditions and laws of objectivity out of consciousness, that
is, out of the consciousness of science.134
In this we see again Natorp's insistence that it is only through an understanding of the
activity of knowledge itself that we can attain any scientific understanding of subject and
object. Moreover, one can see here Natorp's own attempt to really come to grips with a
critical understanding of Kant's "thing-in-itself." Natorp rejects the way in which many
have understood the "thing-in-itself" as essentially beyond the reach of the critical
enterprise and as something to be rejected vis-à-vis Fichte and Hegel and many fellow
Neo-Kantians.
134
Ibid., pg. 253.
135
The shift in the critical project that takes place here I think is crucial to
understanding the influence of Natorp on Heidegger's early writings. That shift is from
understanding objectivity and subjectivity from either the perspective of the subject or
object but rather from the more primordial unity of knowledge of which the object and
subject are merely derivative. As the last quote makes evident this leads Natorp to search
qua activity and qua task is a much different enterprise than understanding knowledge as
required is an understanding of the purpose or end of this activity. Natorp has shifted the
focus of the entire critical project from the subject, judgments, and transcendent objects
to the analysis of an activity, i.e., the task of knowledge. In this way Natorp has been
able to subsume within the critical project Kant's "thing-in-itself" without wholly
rejecting it as Fichte had done. At the same time the act of knowing is understood
analyzing the activity of knowledge at it is practiced, i.e., in its history, rather than
understanding it as the product of the will of absolute subjectivity. Natorp's theory also
contains Hegelian elements, namely the historical and progressive character of his
shall see shortly, satisfies the common neo-kantian rejection of Hegel's Idealism while
historical analysis of science and the goal of science without the "metaphysical" absolutes
of Hegel's system. At the same time it remains a critical enterprise insofar as it seeks to
136
ground objectivity, subjectivity and knowledge through an understanding of the activity
subjectivity and the relation between them, i.e., to know "what it does and why." Finally,
science is seen to actively construct knowledge and objective validity rather than
passively conform itself to the sensibly given, i.e., to the appearances. Natorp shifts from
focusing on the things of science, most generally the subject/object dichotomy, to the
Natorp says that "All scientific knowledge aims at the law."135 What scientific
inquiry seeks is the object as determined by law. Natorp argues that lawfulness is part of
the very meaning of knowledge and has been since the rise of modern science and
modern thought. What is important about lawfulness is that it characterizes the aim of
knowledge to bring about a unity within the manifold of appearances. That is, laws unify
to this view, without unification there would be no knowledge at all for then we should
only have a mere succession of quite distinct appearances disconnected from one another.
However, Natorp argues, this was not always the view. The pre-modern conception of
knowledge (including the Ancients and Medievals) still realized the importance of the
unificatory function of knowledge but interpreted this metaphysically in the notion of the
universal, i.e., in the structure of genus and species. Plato, Natorp argues, realized that
135
Ibid., pg. 247.
137
knowledge essentially concerns itself with the relationship between the universal and the
particular or the participation of the sensuous particular in the Idea. Ideas were principles
explanation of the particular, i.e., the appearances as given in subjectivity. In this regard,
Natorp believes this task to have started with the Ancient Greeks and evidence of his
assertion can be seen clearly in the ancient "paradox of the knower." The paradox of the
knower is, basically, if one is to come to knowledge about something one must already
have knowledge of it. That is, if one already knows what is being searched for there is no
need to come to know it, but if one does not know what is being searched for then there is
no hope of coming to know it for one does not know what one is looking for. This
paradox appears in Plato's Meno and precedes his "theory of recollection" (anamnesis),
136
Plato, Theaetetus, translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford, from Plato's Theory of Knowledge:
The Theaetetus and the Sophist (London, 1935), 147d: "THEAETETUS: Theodorus here was proving to us
something about square roots, namely, that the sides [or roots] of squares representing three square feet and
five square feet are not commensurable in length with the line representing one foot, and he went on in this
way, taking all the separate cases up to the root of seventeen square feet. There for some reason he
stopped. The idea occurred to us, seeing that these square roots were evidently infinite in number, to try to
arrive at a single collective term by which we could designate all these roots."
137
Natorp, " On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 250.
138
MENO: But how will you look for something when you don't in the least
know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you
don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if
you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found
is the thing you didn't know?
SOCRATES: I know what you mean. Do you realize that what you are
bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either
what he knows or what he does no know? He would not seek what he
knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he
does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look
for.138
Though Socrates calls this a "trick argument" he spends much of the rest of the dialogue
giving an account of how it is possible and this argument haunts much of the history of
philosophy though in different forms and is precisely what Kant believes requires a
order to understand how knowledge is possible starting from the mere chaos of pure
sensation. In Aristotle, we find an example of Natorp's claim that from the time of the
Greeks the solution lay in the relation between universal and particular,
We knew already that every triangle has the sum of its interior angles
equal to two right angles; but that this figure inscribed in the semi-circle is
a triangle we recognize only as we are led to relate the particular to the
universal...For how could we know in the full sense that the figure
contains angles equal to the sum of two right angles if we did not know in
the full sense whether it exists? Clearly we apprehend the fact not
absolutely but in the qualified sense that we apprehend a general principle.
Unless we make this distinction, we shall be faced with the dilemma
reached in the Meno: either one can learn nothing, or one can only learn
what is already known.139
138
Plato, Meno, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, edited by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 80d-e.
139
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, translated by G. R. G. Mure in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 71a 19 – 30.
139
In this regard, Aristotle points out the inadequacy of the reasoning behind what will
become Humean induction and the need for truly universal principles,
Natorp finds within the Greeks the beginnings of what for him is essential to all
knowledge, namely that it cannot begin solely with the particular, subjective appearance
but from the outset must begin with the universal or the law.
universal insofar as they interpreted universality not metaphysically but, more correctly,
given to consciousness,
...with Aristotle and even with the medieval scholastics, it was essentially
a question of the particular thing, or individual, and the universal of the
thing, or species. More recent philosophy, in as far as the vast reform of
the sciences since the start of modern times has not left it unaffected,
knows the universal essentially and originally under the form of law. The
thing is no longer the primary given, but rather first an unknown. As Kant
concisely summed up the basic result of modern science since Galileo,
things have dissolved into mere "relationships", although among these
there are some which are "independent and constant" and which from now
on must represent things for us. From now on it is primarily and
140
Ibid., 71a31 - 71b4.
140
essentially a matter of the universality of relation (which gives the concept
of law).141
significance for our discussion. Since it is inherent to the very meaning of knowledge
and science that it seeks after its object (Natorp's proto-notion of intentionality) and
because "all scientific knowledge aims at the law," Natorp argues that its object is simply
any uncritical conception of objectivity we see that what it seeks after is laws and that,
therefore, these are the objects of knowledge. The true object of knowledge is neither
Platonic Ideas nor Aristotelian particulars, which are simply dogmatic, metaphysical
notions of objectivity, but rather laws which unify the manifold of appearances given to
consciousness. Natorp believes that this view is not totally alien to Ancient conceptions
of objectivity since even Aristotle conceived of substance as the unity that underlies
change and in fact the laws which Natorp believes knowledge is seeking are themselves
However, we must qualify Natorp's position, since he argues that there are two
stages to objectification. The first stage is familiar from our discussion of Husserl's
notion of originarily presentative intuition. Before one can construct laws one must
already have things to which the laws apply. That is, the laws of science are not directly
The first stage of objectification is to distinguish the object of consciousness from the
141
Ibid., pg. 258.
141
multitude of its appearance in many different subjects. At one point Natorp speaks of this
objectification as if it were a fully determinate thing that is given, but what he primarily
means is that there must be a first stage of objectification which understands the object of
adequately determinate, by means of universal scientific laws. Although Natorp does not
have a fully developed notion of intentionality one can see striking parallels between his
view and Husserl's view of the intentional object as the undetermined X of reason in §131
of the Ideas. And, point in fact, there appears to be little substantial difference between
Husserl's and Natorp's views when we take into account Husserl's analysis of originarily
presentative intuition as presented in the last section. The first level of objectification is
carried out "naturally" in everyday life and is for the most part unconscious. This
naturalness causes one to assume that first something called the “subject” confronts the
“object” and only subsequently develops a new relation to the object called knowledge,
never realizing that objectivity (or knowledge) is the most natural of attitudes and
the knowing subject. Natorp makes this clear in specifying the means by which
subjectivity. However, Natorp notes that abstraction has both a negative and positive
connotation. The negative notion of abstraction consists of simply stripping away all
subjective aspects of the object. This is what "sensualists" mean by abstraction. Natorp
makes it clear that this form of abstraction will leave absolutely nothing left. However,
142
the positive notion of abstraction consists of “universalizing” the object from the
manifold of its subjective representations. This, Natorp argues, is the form of abstraction
that goes beyond the subjective appearance of the object without leaving those subjective
appearances behind but rather incorporating them as precisely those particulars that are
unified either by a “first objectification” or, subsequently, by universal laws. This form
is in the end a construction. As Natorp also puts it the "positive facts" of science are not
datum given to consciousness but are already a result of the objectifying act of
consciousness.
and knowledge. For Natorp argued that objectivity and subjectivity are derived from
knowledge rather than the other way around. It is only from the activity of scientific
consciousness and represents the universal aspect of knowledge as embodied in law, then
This immediate relationship to the ego is the concrete, individual, constantly changing,
142
Ibid., pg. 256.
143
The ultimate immediate appearance, however, the phenomenon of ultimate
authority, is nothing other than what is given on each occasion to a
determined subject in a determined situation. It is this which we must
name as what is ultimately subjective; there is absolutely nothing else by
which the concept of subjectivity could be positively determined, aside
from the appearing, the phainesthai itself, which, as Hobbes had already
stated, is both the most noteworthy and the most original of all
"phenomena".143
is derived from the relation of knowledge, i.e., as the appearance both opposed to but
intimately related to the "being" which is objectivity or, put another way, the particular
that is ultimately subsumed in scientific knowledge under universal law. This latter
makes adequate what Plato originally saw in the opposition between sensibility and
reason.
scientific understanding rather than the beginning. Here again we see more of Natorp’s
appearances, i.e., lived-experience, is not possible but is rather the infinite task of
is the ultimate task of science. The ultimate task of science is to progressively determine
through universal law the infinite "chaos" that is immediate subjective experience. This
143
Ibid., pg. 257.
144
subjective experience is what impresses Heidegger in 1919. This also reverses the order
For Natorp, knowledge begins with transcendence (objectivity) and only later
ultimate, but infinite task of scientific understanding. One can begin to understand why
Heidegger calls Natorp the "only person to have brought scientifically noteworthy
is originarily given.
subjectivity is the only possible way that subjectivity may be scientifically understood.
Using an argument already familiar to us from Rickert, Natorp argues that the only way
general concepts. The positivist attempt to begin with this pure particularity and build
knowledge up from out of it is illusory. As Natorp asserts even the "this, here, now" is in
144
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 85.
145
particular as particular, but they denote it only through determinations of
universal applicability. They classify the particular in the universal order
of space and time, an already presupposed order of things.145
In the end, the determination of the concrete, particular appearance of the object of
consciousness is the infinite task of determining the undetermined X and will never be
fully complete. Something shall always be left over, which indicates that the task of
Natorp believes that he has resolved the critique of knowledge and, specifically, the
distinction between subject and object, into the relation between universal and particular,
which he argues has dominated philosophy since its inception. No longer is the issue of
nature of subject and object and the relation between the two. The problem of knowledge
is a logical problem, i.e., the relation between law (the universal) and instance of law (the
particular). Moreover, Natorp believes he has made clear why objectivity and
subjectivity of necessity are correlated to one another. Since objectivity and subjectivity
are in truth law and instance of law they must be correlated with one another in the
145
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 261.
146
Two last things about Natorp's view that have import when understanding
Heidegger's early writings. Given Natorp's notion that knowledge is essentially the
what could be meant by the a priori? The true a priori is not knowledge that is given
priori or coincident to all experience rather, for Natorp, what is prior to any
The modern epistemological project has gotten it backwards for while assuming the
from which the subject could transcend itself and grasp the object. From Natorp's
knowledge from which subject and object are derived. Acquired scientific knowledge is
Finally, and crucial I think for understanding Natorp's importance for Heidegger,
is that Natorp, in his review of the first volume of Husserl's Logical Investigations147,
argues that the critique of knowledge is metaphysics as first philosophy. While perhaps
146
Ibid., pg. 262.
147
Paul Natorp, "On the Question of Logical Method in Relation to Edmund Husserl's Prolegomena to
Pure Logic," translated by J.N. Mohanty in Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, edited
by J. N. Mohanty (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 55 – 66.
147
speculative metaphysics was laid to rest by Kant, Natorp argues that the critical project
itself has a claim to the title metaphysics. While taking Husserl to task for arguing that
there are only two ways that pure logic may be done, either psychologistically or "as
argue that while he agrees that psychologism is fruitless he does not believe that "a purely
formal and cannot be in any sense material."149 It is not at all clear that Natorp's
Investigations, however what Natorp has to say here is based only upon the Prolegomena
to Pure Logic (as the rest of the Logical Investigations had not yet been published.) The
important point however is that Natorp believes that this position would lead one to
"resolve" metaphysics into logic and give it no separate status. On the contrary, Natorp
This sums up nicely much of what Natorp is after in "On the Objective and Subjective
148
Natorp, "On the Question of Logical Method," pg. 55.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid., pp. 55 – 56.
148
understanding, e.g., as the forms of judgment, in the end precludes the "objective"
grounding of knowledge as Natorp envisions it. This is what Natorp understands by the
"resolving" of metaphysics into logic, i.e., that all objectivity is ultimately resolved into
the forms of judgment and thus requires no "materiality." This is the idealistic move.
That is, idealism wishes to reduce all being to the logos, viz., the concept. Hegel's
panlogism is the penultimate attempt at this. However, here Natorp accuses both Husserl
The issue in this case is the problem of grounding the ideal in the real, i.e., how
subjectivity as they ultimately must if one is to give an account of our knowledge rather
than merely a rarified account of logical form. Husserl has forcefully argued that
psychologism may never ground pure logic and in so doing has opened a chasm between
the psychological and the logical, the a priori and empirical, and the formal and material,
Natorp is pointing to his own view of the ultimate task of knowledge becoming the
after the being which grounds the appearances. There must be a necessary connection
between the two and that necessary connection is given in the task of knowledge itself.
On the idealist picture the subjective, material, empirical, and psychological, viz., the
151
Ibid., pg. 65.
149
'real', is left behind in favor of the ideal. This means, however, that the real has been left
behind:
Now while the author [Husserl] of the drama, in clear partisanship, sides
with the 'Ideal' and in this truly Platonic sense pays allegiance to
'idealism,' the 'real' remains alien, confused, and yet as a surd that cannot
be done away with. The 'idealism' however wanted to ground the real in
the ideal, the onta in the logoi; the same in Plato, Leibniz, in Kant...The
only intelligible consequence is: that the opposite of the objective, the
subjective, the quasi-object of psychology, appears the mere reverse, and
at the same time the 'reflection,' of the objective.152
Here Natorp makes reference to what earlier I called the problem of the "theoretical
given" and the problem that Heidegger makes reference to in his war emergency semester
lecture of 1919. That is, in order to remain critical idealistic philosophy must ground its
In fact the project of knowledge and science is specifically to bring this ultimately
unintelligible chaos into order. However, lived-experience must also in some way
contain what is necessary for the categories themselves so that there is some ground for
the particular categories that are valid as opposed to others. Thus, the theoretical given
must play two contradictory roles or, as Natorp puts it, it is the mere "reverse" of
objectivity (and is thus unintelligible) but at the same time the "reflection" of the
objective. Natorp steers clear of this problem insofar as the only given for him is the task
of knowledge and not some collection of "datum." Furthermore, it explains why others -
trying to find the ground of their ultimate categories starting from lived-experience or
152
Ibid., pg. 66.
150
have said, Natorp believes it is a mistake to start from subjectivity rather subjectivity (or
the objectification and determination of subjectivity) is the end of the task of knowledge.
Just as consciousness naturally objectifies the appearances external to it, it also naturally
objectifications is the determinations of scientific knowledge but rather our natural first
this to be the first "datum" of philosophy one is already beginning naively with an
naturally objectified subjectivity is both determined and indeterminate and so may appear
from two aspects, i.e., exactly the two contradictory aspects of the theoretical given.
datum when in fact it is already something naively worked over, i.e., objectified, by
consciousness and so is both determined and utterly indeterminate. Again, this for
With regard to the question of metaphysics, Natorp has resolved the notion of
objectivity and subjectivity into the relation between universal and particular with regard
to the task of knowledge. In the end, Natorp understands objectivity and subjectivity as
the necessary correlates of law and instance of law. However, this itself is entirely within
the realm of objectivity. In the task of knowledge pure subjectivity plays only the role of
that which is to be determined. The task of knowledge is ultimately working out the
structures of objectivity itself in the mediation between universal and particular (both
project if epistemology presupposes the distinction between subject and object. Rather,
151
critique of knowledge looks much more like working out the structure of being
(understood by Natorp as objectivity) in both its universal form and particular, concrete
Furthermore, his own history of the task of knowledge bears this out. That is, he
views his own philosophy as merely the culmination of what for him is the metaphysical
relation which ultimately dominates the history of metaphysics, viz., the relation between
universal and particular. Plato discovered the primacy of this relation for the task of
hypostasizing the relata and modern philosophy up until Kant mistakenly accepted
dogmatic notions of subject and object upon which they attempted to graft the relation of
knowledge. Finally, we understand that universal and particular and subject and object
can be understood most properly only on the basis of the task of knowledge and through
the necessary correlates of law and instance of law. In the end, Natorp believes this is the
This furthermore helps one to understand the "realization of the ideal in the real"
in a way that does not yield to speculative metaphysical notions. Natorp ends his review
of the Prolegomena to Pure Logic with a thought which, though not elaborated upon, is
intriguing in light of Heidegger's later emphasis on temporality and the history of the
concept of time. Natorp believes that the concept of time allows us to bridge the gap
152
Time itself. The 'realization' then means no more a mystical metaphysical
act, but a strictly intelligible logical transition from one mode of
consideration to another, which ultimately was already implicit in it. And
then it becomes first clear what the psychological truly 'is'...153
This concept of time itself must be super-temporal since Natorp believes that a logical
connection must be set up between the super-temporal and its temporal actualization.
Extrapolating from his earlier work "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of
Knowledge" we can interpret what he is saying here in terms of the relation between the
objective and the subjective. That is, there must be a connection between the objective
(the ideal) and the subjective (the real) which makes sense of the "realization" of the
former in the latter. The concept of time, i.e., the objective law of time, mediates
between the two and it, therefore, would be that by which the subjective is objectivized,
i.e., by which it would become "first clear what the psychological truly 'is'." For this
reason, the concept of time mediates between the primary dichotomies of "metaphysics,"
viz., the critique of knowledge. In other words, the concept of time mediates the
connection between universality and particularity, being and appearance. For Natorp
then, the history of the concept of time would be the history of metaphysics insofar as it is
the history of the mediation between the ultimate concepts of metaphysics. Ultimately,
the task of knowledge would be the task of working out the concept of time itself.
In his 1919 war emergency semester lecture, Heidegger states that Natorp's own
position is objectifying. That is, it is burdened by the same problems as Husserl's view,
though explicitly so. The objectifying nature of theoretical reason necessarily alters the
meaningfulness of lived-experience, i.e., it strips the object out of the context of lived-
153
Ibid., pg. 66.
153
experience in which it is found. Furthermore, Heidegger argues that Natorp, given his
own theory, can have no principle by which he reconstructs lived-experience. That is,
with no regard for subjectivity or else some principle must be "given" which the process
see in the next chapter, objectification and, thus, theoretical reason, can never capture
Many of the themes which will become central to Being and Time are raised by Natorp,
although in a very different context, including, the task of philosophy, the question of
Being, the historicality of critical philosophy, etc. Furthermore, Natorp charts a course
through the history of philosophy which Heidegger will later follow. That is, Kantian
and Neo-Kantian thought allowed for a more original appropriation of Greek philosophy,
In the next chapter we shall see why the objectification that is essential to theoretical
we shall look at Heidegger's critique of both Husserl and Natorp with the primary
emphasis being on the shortfalls of the theoretical approach to concrete, immediate lived-
experience. Philosophically, this critique leads Heidegger in the direction of the third
154
Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, translated by W.B Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1967), pg. 60.
154
major influence in his early writings, viz., Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey, Heidegger argues,
finally saw what was primarily at stake, i.e., concrete life. Crucial to Dilthey's thought is
155
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL LIFE
theoretical reason and the objectification inherent to it. We saw this in two forms:
Husserl's evidentialism and his emphasis upon the task of knowledge leads to a historical
with its emphasis on "life" that will play a significant part in overcoming the hegemony
of theoretical reason. In this way, Heidegger believes that Dilthey has moved farther
towards the "genuine problematic" than either Husserl or Natorp. On the other hand, we
shall see that though Dilthey has a much more nuanced articulation of life and lived-
experience he ultimately presupposes a naive view of the world, i.e., the "external world."
This is evident from a crucial exchange of letters between Husserl and Dilthey wherein
the problem of metaphysics and the sense of being plays a central role, one which
demonstrates that Dilthey lacks a genuine sense of the importance of intentionality and of
156
the importance of it for the question of being. Ultimately, Heidegger will argue that
Philosophy." This important work is Heidegger's first foray into the depths of the nature
it and with the attempt by other thinkers to work out a critical methodology of the
background) Dilthey's attempt at a critique of historical reason. The crucial later part of
(Umwelt). Although we have already seen aspects of it, we will first run through
155
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 53.
157
What is this nothingness that is "absolute reification" and "pure thingness" and why is a
leap into "the world as such" necessary? Heidegger argues that a common thesis of
understood by most nineteenth century thinkers, i.e., from the perspective of theoretical
intelligible mediately, i.e., by application of the pure, a priori forms of sensible intuition
concrete lived-experience, this itself becomes an enigma. One sees this clearly in
Lask's "matter of thought", Husserl's infinitely diverse Abshauung, and Natorp's "absolute
that "absolute reification" and "pure thingness" lead ultimately to "nothingness." As far
because, as these thinkers understood it, all thought requires generalities - by which they
terms of these generalities and thus is, quite literally, unthinkable. Put another way, the
falls outside of the scope of the universal meanings essential to the generalized concepts
158
of science.156 Lived-experience becomes a veritable prima materia insofar as it becomes
Husserl, this is the result of the requirement that what is thought must be intended, viz., it
Following Brentano, Husserl argues that the object of thought comprises the "sense core"
presentation" which itself forms an identical moment within many other possible
presentive intuitions. For example, I can make judgements about a particular diamond,
remember that diamond, wish for that diamond, etc. The objectivity of the diamond
consists in its ability to be the identical core of meaning among many different intentional
156
As we have seen, this is certainly evident in the thought of Heinrich Rickert, who was director of
Heidegger's habilitation and a premier representative of the "southwestern" or "Baden" school of Neo-
Kantianism. He writes, "…If the concepts of natural science comprised the perceptual and individual
configuration of reality, then neither a practical orientation to reality nor a prediction of its properties would
be possible with the help of these concepts…we can orient ourselves to reality only by means of the
simplification of reality that is undertaken in concepts. We must abstract from its unique distinctiveness
and particularity in order to find our way in the real. Otherwise, the infinite manifold of its content
eliminates any possibility of orientation. If we did not have general concepts by means of which we could
simplify reality and thereby divest it of its bewildering individuality and concrete actuality, in our practical
conduct we would stand helpless before reality." (Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural
Science, pp. 41 – 2.)
159
consciousness implies that its meaning is independent and self-contained.157 This
identical, repeatable, self-contained core of meaning is the underlying unity that is the
not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an
source of all rational assertions."159 The eidetic moments of the object as given, its
These eidos are higher-level or "founded" objectivities which are universally general and
universal concepts (genus and species). Scientific knowledge in both its eidetic and
empirical form is founded upon the lawfulness of these eidetic universalities, which, in
157
William James, who was a great source of inspiration for Husserl (cf. Logical Investigations, Vol. II,
Investigation II, Chapter 5, appendix, fn. 12, pg. 302), reinforces this point: "...the distinction was drawn
between two kinds of knowledge of things, bare acquaintance with them and knowledge about them. The
possibility of two such knowledges depends on a fundamental psychical peculiarity which may be entitled
"the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings," and which may be thus expressed: "The same matters
can be though of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that
they mean the same matters which the other portions meant." One might put it otherwise by saying that
"the mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same"...This sense of sameness is
the very keel and backbone of our thinking...the law of constancy in our meanings...[is] the most important
of all the features of our mental structure." (William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I (New
York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1950), pp. 459 - 460)
158
In his On the Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger still characterizes objectivity or "thingliness"
along these lines: "...the thingly element of the thing [is] its independent and self-contained character."
(Martin Heidegger, On the Origin of the Work of Art, translated by Albert Hofstadter in Basic Writings,
edited by David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), pg. 150).
159
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 36.
160
turn, are founded on the original objectification that provides the objectivity of particular
objective, scientific knowledge. That is, Natorp argues that objectivity is not
Natorp calls the "appearance" of being), but are rather constructions. Following the
Hermann Cohen and carried on by Natorp and subsequently by Ernst Cassirer160, Natorp
on Natorp's view is the task of knowledge rather than any "evidentially given"
objectification.
knowledge in subjectivity. This view ultimately remains within the horizon of Cartesian
objectification,
160
For excellent treatments of Neo-Kantianism in general and more specifically the Marburg school of
Neo-Kantianism, see both Köhnke, Klaus Christian, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic
Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Willey,
Thomas E., Back to Kant: the Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1978).
161
It is an error to believe that that ultimate concrete "here and now given" or
representation could be the ground of knowledge as the primary and sole
factor which includes (fassen) everything in advance...all expressions with
which the Positivist attempts to characterize his "positive fact" before any
universal conceptual determination - particularity and concreteness,
identity of place and of time, givenness (as content of consciousness, so
subjectivity) and, finally, positiveness itself (incontestable position
(Setzung)) - all these contain nothing but conceptual determinations,
indeed of the highest universality and abstractness...If it is not determinate
for us, then it cannot be the origin of knowledge for us, but it is only
determinate for us in so far as we have determined it, and this can only
happen through universal concepts.161
To this extent, later proponents of the theoretical construction of experience, e.g., Kuhn,
would find Natorp a sympathetic figure162. Evidentialism and positivism have turned the
when in fact this is utterly indeterminate and unintelligible without prior objectification.
Thus it becomes more and more clear that the "positive fact", the supposed
primary given, is much more that which is sought. One might even say it
is the ultimate goal. It is in the concept of this goal that the utmost is
demanded which could be achieved by knowledge in its final completion.
And this last has been made first, the sought-for has been taken for a
datum, so the task of knowledge has been turned upside-down. The
"positive fact" is spoken of as having been already determined, while
determination is always first the achievement of knowledge.163
Put another way, psychology is the final goal of science rather than the foundation for the
sciences as many nineteenth century writers believed, especially those concerned with
grounding the human sciences, e.g., Mill, Dilthey, and Rickert, among others. On the
161
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pp. 261 – 262.
162
Though, of course, Kuhn would not be sympathetic to Natorp's view that science makes progress.
163
Ibid., pg. 262.
162
other hand, Natorp argues that the ego - or what Husserl will later call the "pure ego" -
understood as the "subjective center of relation for all contents in my consciousness" will
forever remain outside the grasp of objectification and therefore knowledge. Following
Kant, Natorp argues that the ego can never be its own object precisely because it
already presuppose the ego itself. In the original edition of the Logical Investigations
Husserl strenuously argues against this position.164 However, he eventually agrees with
Differences notwithstanding, Husserl and Natorp agree to the extent that they both
Natorp argues that this first stage of objectification produces the first stage of
subject:
164
Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation V, chapter one, §8.
165
Cf. Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation V, chapter one, §8, footnote 1 and the "Additional
Note to the Second Edition" at the end of §8. Also, Husserl, Ideas, part II, chapter 4, footnote 10.
166
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 257.
163
Husserl would have no objection to Natorp's characterization of this (theoretically
intentional object of originally presentive intuition. However, he would not agree that
this first stage of objectification necessarily leads to intersubjectivity. For Husserl, only
cogitations are never intersubjective. For this reason, phenomenology as a science can
only be an eidetic science. Though its "region," i.e., the region of pure consciousness, is
phenomenological essences discovered therein are universally valid and are therefore not
real (reellen) inherent moments of this single individual stream of consciousness and, for
Keeping in mind that objectivity includes both individual objects and universals,
we can say that, for Natorp, as for Husserl, objectivity is necessary for all theoretical
knowledge and, therefore, all science.168 To sum up, first objectivities provide for
167
"In principle, only corporeal being can be experienced in a number of direct experiences, i.e.,
perceptions, as individually identical. Hence, only this being can, if the perceptions are thought of as
distributed among various "subjects," be experienced by many subjects as individually identical and be
described as intersubjectively the same." Husserl, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, translated by Quentin
Lauer, in Edmund Husserl, Husserl: Shorter Works, edited by Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
168
"The real beginnings and grounds of knowledge are instead always ultimate objective unities...These
together comprise and express in determinate ways the basic function of objectification: unification
(Einsetzung), the Kantian (also Platonic) "unity of the manifold". Only thus are the unequivocally
determinate "Phenomena" of the sciences (particularly the natural sciences) possible; only the phenomenon
which is determined in this way can be called a datum of knowledge and serve as a basis for further
determinations. Whoever seeks the object in appearance seeks such unequivocal determinations. Even
common representation seeks them; in its naming, in the unified meaning of words, it has at least an
analogy to those unities which ground the sciences. These basic scientific unities attempt to fulfill in a
more developed and durable way the same tasks which language fulfills sufficiently for the immediate
purposes of practical life." (Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 263).
164
intersubjectivity and "determinateness," while higher objectivities have increasingly
extensive applicability and unify experience to a greater extent due their increasing
transcendent objectivities (Natorp), i.e., with a theoretical construction, and works its
begins with immanent objectivities (Husserl), i.e., both individual cogitations and
phenomenological essences evidentially given to consciousness, and works its way back
Reflection is that by which we have access to the acts of consciousness that are the very
subject matter of phenomenology. Husserl explicitly says as much when he writes, "The
169
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 174.
165
scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology. Husserl
himself has not yet commented on these.)170
Natorp's critique points to the fact that reflection, because it objectifies a particular act of
consciousness for further phenomenological analysis, must isolate this act from its
facilitated by the fact that cogitations are already unified by the structures of
As Heidegger argues, the mental process reflected upon is re-moved (ent-fernt) from
lived-experience or, put another way, it is not lived, but contemplated. Theoretical
170
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 85.
171
"...we only allow [in phenomenological research] all these perceivings, judgings, etc., to be
considered, to be described, as the essentialities which they are in themselves, to pin down what is
evidently given with or in them...But on that account we do not reject them by not "taking them as our
basis," by not "joining in" them. They are indeed there, they also essentially belong to the phenomenon.
Rather we contemplate them; instead of joining in them, we make them Objects..." (Husserl, Ideas, pg.
220).
172
For clear evidence that this accurately represents Husserl's position we need look no farther than his
Philosophy as Rigorous Science, "Herein remain excluded the ultimate "nuances," which belong to the
indeterminable element of the "flow," although at the same time the describable typology of the flowing
has its "ideas" [cogitations] which, when intuitively grasped and fixed, render possible absolute
knowledge." Husserl, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, pg. 182, italics mine.
173
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 85.
166
One could reply on Husserl's behalf that this objection no longer applies after
protensions and retentions. Thus, according to Husserl's own position, there appears to
be no real possibility of fixing on one mental process exclusively. However, this is not
Husserl's position. Rather, "inner time consciousness" constitutes the stream of mental
processes itself or, what amounts to the same, inner time consciousness and its essential
protentions and retentions give us the eidetic structure of the stream of mental processes
itself. This eidetic structure is not the eidetic structure of the individual real (reellen)
moments of the stream of mental processes, i.e., of individual cogitations. Husserl still
presupposes that these individual cogitations are capable of being objectively given, i.e.,
given in such a way that they make no essential reference to other cogitations.
Natorp would certainly have no problem with the objectification of the stream of
lived-experiences for he argues that this is precisely what is necessary for any scientific
understanding of it, viz., a scientific reconstruction of it. Natorp disagrees with Husserl's
view that reflection "evidentially gives" immanent ("subjective") cogitations just as they
interpretation of the act of reflection.174 Natorp argues that, rather than presenting its
174
Later, in his Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger makes the same point though
much more belligerently: "...nothing is more dangerous than the naive trust in evidence exhibited by
followers and fellow travelers [of phenomenology]. If it is the case that our relation to the things
themselves in seeing is the decisive factor, it is equally the case that we are frequently deceived about them
and that the possibility of such deception stubbornly persists. Perhaps called once to be the conscience of
philosophy, it [phenomenology] has wound up as a pimp for the public whoring of the mind, fornicatio
spiritus (Luther)." (Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, pg. 37).
167
object just as it gives itself, "reflection necessarily has an analytical, so to speak
also only within the limits in which it is presented there."176 Husserl has breached the
themselves" while not realizing that this attitude in fact modifies the very meaning of the
Erlebnisstrome. More importantly, the special status Husserl affords to the theoretical
attitude with regard to the givenness of the things themselves is not itself given in
175
Quoting Heidegger quoting Natorp. The quote comes from Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie nach
kritischer Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1912), Vol. I, p. 191 and is quoted by Heidegger on pg. 85 of
Towards the Definition of Philosophy.
176
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 44.
168
Erlebens]. The environmental experience is no spurious contingency, but
lies in the essence of life in and for itself; by contrast, we become
theoretically oriented only in exceptional cases.177
experience just as it shows itself. More exactly, Husserl has imposed theoretical
speak, all the while believing that this objectivity is merely discovered when the
project requires that there be a region of absolute certainty, viz., of adequate, evidential
self-givenness that is immediately "seen." Husserl argues that only in this way can we
avoid the free-fall into relativism and skepticism - embodied in his time by psychologism
and historicism.
theoretical reflection extends beyond the immediate objects of reflection, i.e., immanent
articulates the very meaning of the things themselves both immanent and transcendent.
Thus the primacy of the theoretical attitude within phenomenological reflection reaches
out to and modifies the meaningfulness of the world itself. The world itself becomes
merely a collection of objects as Husserl himself explicitly says, "The world is the sum-
177
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 74. Italics mine.
169
total of objects of possible experience and experiential cognition, of objects that, on the
objectification of lived-experience. Heidegger points out the importance of the role that
phenomenology,
Heidegger argues that objectification is a symptom of the fact that Husserl privileges the
...knowledge is the title for a highly ramified sphere of being that can be
given to us absolutely, and must be absolutely given to us in its details at
any particular time. So, those forms of thought that I actually realize in
thinking are given to me insofar as I reflect on them, accept them and posit
them in a pure act of seeing... Every intellectual experience, indeed every
experience whatsoever, can be made into an object of pure seeing and
apprehension while it is occurring. And in this act of seeing it is an
absolute givenness."180
178
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 6.
179
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 84-5.
180
Husserl, Edmund, The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by Lee Hardy (Dordrecht, the
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1999), pg. 24.
170
Heidegger points out that in lived-experience we are primarily and for the most part not
merely "looking at" but living. The characteristically theoretical comportment of merely
sure, "looking at" something is one possible mode of living, but when it becomes the only
phenomenologically legitimate mode of access to things and is privileged over all other
modes of living then living becomes a form of seeing rather than the other way round.
For Husserl, the objects of reflective "seeing", i.e., acts of consciousness, become the
necessary condition for life. He writes, "Acts must be present before we can live in them
or be absorbed in performing them, and when we are so absorbed (in various manners
consciousness are, for Husserl, the transcendental conditions for life itself.
Having said this, however, does not imply that Heidegger believes that the
attitude of "practical activity" is our primary access to the things themselves as so many
interpreters have argued.182 Heidegger believes the issue is still one of the
Heidegger remains within the context of the task of phenomenology, which is to take
181
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 118.
182
For example, Dreyfus, Okrent, Rorty, et al.
171
Natorp's view is to a certain extent immune to this form of criticism because he
accepts that the objectification required by science is, in the end, a construction of science
He argues that this construction is requisite for all scientific understanding and that the
down to the particular appearance of the thing to this subject here and now. Without
incomprehensible.183
immediate lived-experience and, in this way, Natorp has a grasp of the genuine task of
achieved the apex of universality as it is embodied in universal, objective laws it can then
183
Cf. Natorp, “On the Subjective and Objective Grounding of Knowledge,” pg. 263.
172
innumerable individualities and relationships between individualities as manifest to
Natorp believes his theory represents in a scientifically adequate fashion the "double
particularity that was first conceived by Plato in the Republic. Heidegger also points out
the affinity of this method to Hegelian dialectic, especially in its requirement that all
As I have mentioned, by the time of his writing of the Ideas, Husserl has accepted
much of Natorp's position. Husserl's "pure Ego" [reines Ich] plays the role played by the
pure subjectivity in Natorp, i.e., that which determines, though in a way peculiar to
184
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 86.
185
"[Natorp's view is] The most radical absolutization of the theoretical and logical, an absolutization
that has not been proclaimed since Hegel. (Unmistakable connections with Hegel: everything unmediated
is mediated.) An absolutization that radically logicizes the sphere of experience and lets this exist only in
the logicized form of the concretion of the concrete - which concrete has meaning only in its necessary
correlation with the abstract, whereby, however, the logical is not left behind." Heidegger, Towards the
Definition of Philosophy, pg. 91.
173
phenomenology, viz., through "sense bestowal," and is at the same time incapable of
...the Ego living in mental processes [das erlebende Ich] is not something
taken for itself and which can be made into an Object proper of an
investigation. Aside from its "modes of relation" or "modes of
comportment," the <Ego> is completely empty of essence-components,
has no explicatable content, is undescribable in and for itself: it is pure
Ego and nothing more.186
agreement with Kant's words (though perhaps or perhaps not their sense188),
Natorp recognizes the demand placed on scientific thinking to make its way back to
view necessitates a determining ego that in its act of determination brings about
determining subject is to be identified with "pure subjectivity," that which "one may
reason back to...as to the original chaos" or, following Kant more closely, if it is to be
186
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 191.
187
It is telling that in a footnote to the last sentence of the quote just mentioned in Copy D of the Ideas
Husserl writes: "?!"
188
See Husserl's footnote to the following quote: "whether also <Kant's> sense I leave undecided."
189
Husserl, Ideas, pp. 132 – 3.
174
identified with the mere "I think" which accompanies all thought by its (necessary) act of
objective determination. In other words, is the determining subject the I that is the
individual series of the "here's and now's" or the transcendental I. This same ambiguity is
evident in Husserl as well insofar as he identifies the pure ego both as "das erlebende
Ich," viz., the living I of lived-experience, and also as the pure, simple unity that unifies
all moments of the stream of mental processes (Erlebnisstrome), i.e., the I of the "Ich
denke." Here again we see the tension between the grasping of "life" and grasping of
"thought" in the difference between the living I and the thinking or seeing I. In Husserl
and Natorp this tension takes the form of the tension between the acting I and the passive
"perceiving" I. This tension has been part of the very fabric of the history of philosophy
at least since Aristotle and his discussion of the distinction between the "active intellect"
(nous poetikos) and the "passive intellect" (nous pathetikos) in the notoriously obscure
chapter 5, book III of De Anima. The parallels run deep. Aristotle argues that nous
poetikos is "in its essential nature activity"190 much as we find in Kant's synthetic unity of
Natorp's characterization of the indeterminacy of the ego, Aristotle says that nous
pathetikos is devoid of essential forms (and therefore directly unknowable) so that it may
take on any intelligible form. However, this parallel, though applicable in large part to
Husserl and Natorp's ambiguous account of the ego still misses what is most important
for Heidegger, i.e., the ego as living I, or the being of the living human being traditionally
190
Aristotle, De Anima, translated by J. A. Smith in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 429b 19.
175
characterized as the zoon logon echon, the living being that has discourse, which will
Heidegger argues that Natorp's method ultimately remains objectifying and thus,
resources for making its way back to immediate lived-experience. Heidegger maintains
Heidegger says, "Does and can the method of reconstruction achieve what it is supposed
to? No, for first of all it too is objectification. Natorp in no way shows that his method is
words, Natorp's method fails to capture immediate lived-experience in precisely the way
Husserl's does,
Natorp, however, would agree with Heidegger to a certain extent. After all, he
unequivocally argues that all knowledge is constructive. For this reason "pure
191
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 90.
192
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 91.
176
This objectification of subjectivity [in the process of reconstruction]
deserves to be called a constructed fiction much more than does that
construction on which "objects" rest, which grounds reality and overcomes
all fiction. Our task at first seemed to be to show how subjectivity could
be overcome in a non-fictitious concept of the object. Now objectivity
shows itself so impossible to overcome that it appears much more difficult
to salvage a proper non-fictitious significance for subjectivity.193
A deeper problem arises for Natorp's view. As Heidegger points out, if nothing is
itself mediated by the objectification inherent to scientific reason then what guides
prior to all scientific analysis for every objectification results from scientific analysis.
i.e., already objectified, would be to admit the very "evidentialist" and "positivistic" view
that Natorp so effectively criticizes Husserl for holding. Heidegger thus ends his
explication of Natorp's method with the question: Is subjectivity also prior to all possible
determinability?
193
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 263.
194
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 90.
177
Natorp's reconstruction becomes yet another construction. Reconstructed
Heidegger remarks that there are clear affinities between Natorp and Hegel, in this case
he appears to be pushing Natorp in the direction of an affinity with Fichte for whom the
"self posits itself," i.e., the self, in a purely spontaneous act of self-creation, produces a
"presentation" of itself which is the self, objectively construed. For example, Fichte
writes, "The self's own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The self posits
itself, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and
posits its own existence by virtue of merely existing...The self presents itself to itself, to
that extent imposes on itself the form of a presentation, and is now for the first time a
resist being forced into this Fichtean corner for, after all, Neo-Kantians long to get "back
to Kant" and avoid the path taken by the intervening half-century of German Idealism.
195
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Science of Knowledge, translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs (Meredith
Corporation: New York, 1970), Part I, § 1, pp. 97 – 98.
196
Natorp is explicit about this: "the constructive objectifying achievement of knowledge always comes
first; from it we reconstruct as far as possible the level of original subjectivity which could never be
reached by knowledge apart from this reconstruction which proceeds from the already completed objective
construction." (Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 263.)
178
adequate approximation of the "level of original subjectivity." Natorp appears to be
faced with two unacceptable options: either admit some sort of immediate givenness or
In fact, Natorp seems to chart a middle path between these two insofar as he
admits that something is "given" a priori though it is not an objective fact or datum of
knowledge but is rather the task of knowledge itself. Natorp writes, "In fact there is
something given before the achievement of knowledge, namely the task. One might also
say: the object is given, namely as an X, something which is yet to be determined, not as
a known quantity."197 But is this really a middle path between evidentialism and Fichtean
voluntarism? With some justification one could say that Natorp has ultimately accepted
the Fichtean path since the a priori task of knowledge precedes all determination and
objectification and is, because of this, a non-theoretical absolute which would only
intuition,"
197
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 262.
198
Fichte, Science of Knowledge, second introduction, pg. 38.
179
On the other hand, perhaps Hegel plays a more significant part in Natorp's views.199
Natorp understands that the task of knowledge is a historical phenomenon arising first
among the ancient Greeks and progressively realizing itself in the history of scientific
thought. For example, Natorp makes reference to the theoretically important distinction
between being and appearance in the pre-Socratics, which became more adequately
understood according to the distinction between universal and particular in Plato and
which finally became most adequately understood according to the distinction between
universal law and individual instance of universal law in Modernity. That is, we know
what the task of knowledge is by means of its history. Though Natorp's presentation may
suggest this he could not have meant to ground our understanding of the essence of
knowledge in history for our means of grasping this history could not be a priori in the
certainly some form of "givenness" is necessary to guide it. But precisely because this
facing Natorp is that since he accepts only theoretical understanding, which requires
the givenness of the historical task of knowledge in what way can he understand the very
givenness of this task with the resources at his disposal, namely objectification and
199
Heidegger certainly believes so. For example he writes, "...the important philosophical school of the
'Marburgers' proceeds in a new direction, towards a dialectic which brings them into close proximity to
Hegel." (Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 33).
180
lawfulness? More distressing for his view is the fact that objectification and lawfulness
are the way in which we approach this task, but this approach is justified only by the task
of scientific thinking itself. Taking this course, Natorp is grounding the essence of
universally valid grasp of the essence of knowledge is possible from the mere factual
history of humanity's attempt to know. In other words, this runs afoul of the criticism
Rigorous Science.200 It is interesting however that this approach would bring Natorp
closer to Dilthey and Weltanschauung philosophy. Natorp, however, does not appear to
see the problematic tensions in his presentation of the essence of knowledge. Rather,
Natorp mitigates the difficulty by sneaking objectivity in the back door for he explains
the task of knowledge itself in this way, "One might also say: the object is given, namely
is, the undetermined object, namely the "unknown X," is already objectified, it is simply
not known what object it is, i.e., its full determination. Thus, in the end, only the further
determination of the object of thought is within the horizon of the task of knowledge
200
"It is easy to see that historicism, if consistently carried through, carries over into extreme sceptical
subjectivism. The ideas of truth, theory, and science would then, like all ideas, lose their absolute validity.
That an idea has validity would mean that it is a factual construction of spirit which is held as valid and
which in its contingent validity determines thought. There would be no unqualified validity, or validity-in-
itself, which is what it is even if no one has achieved it and though no historical humanity will ever achieve
it...And even if spiritual formations can in truth be considered an judged from the standpoint of such
contraries of validity, still the scientific decision regarding validity itself and regarding its ideal normative
principles is in no way the affair of empirical science. Certainly the mathematician too will not turn to
historical science to be taught about the truth of mathematical theories...How, then, is it to be the historian's
task to decide as to the truth of given philosophical systems and, above all, as to the very possibility of a
philosophical science that is valid in itself?" Husserl, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, pp. 186 – 187.
201
Natorp, "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," pg. 262.
181
whereas the determination of the object as object, namely, objectivity itself, is, as in
Husserl, presupposed.
then something must be given. The question is how is this something given? This brings
us full circle back to phenomenology. In Natorp's case this brings him right back to the
science. In light of the fact that both Natorp and Husserl see themselves as engaged in
the critique of knowledge what must be given a priori is the essence of knowledge, but
both Natorp and Husserl understand "essence" in the transcendental sense of universally
valid lawfulness.
that while he sees Natorp as overcoming limitations within Husserl's project, Natorp
himself is blind to the radical implications of his thesis that the task of knowledge is a
priori. Judgments, categories, static structures are no longer what is a priori. The
dynamic task of knowledge is. As I have argued, Natorp implicitly asserts that the
evidential basis from which one can intuit the essence of knowledge (a la Husserl) this
altogether. It is a priori not primarily in the sense of being universally valid, but in the
transcendental sense of being the condition for the possibility of any experience
202
Cf., Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1933) B147.
182
knowledge legitimates the subjective act of objectification which, in turn, legitimates
knowledge in its purpose or its driving telos. Natorp seems to suggest that the telos of
scientific knowledge is manifested in the history of knowledge itself both in its origin and
then scientific philosophy just is the historical understanding of the task of knowledge.
In the end, Husserl and Natorp have no resources for performing such a critical
project. Because of the privileging of the theoretical attitude in their method all those
aspects that are unique to historical phenomena, e.g., knowledge, will or purpose, and
feeling or value, presuppose objectivity. For example, one knows something, one wills
something, values something, something is pursued, etc. In each case, the necessary
"something" is an object and an object known (given and determined). For this reason,
any understanding of the task of knowledge presupposes objectivity. For example, I may
understand that a task necessarily has a purpose or telos, but according to the theoretical
standpoint, this purpose or telos is necessarily the pursuit of some object. Thus, to look
knowledge begs the question. The task of knowledge essentially presupposes objectivity.
In other words, unless we can broaden our perspective outside the theoretical attitude we
183
can never understand historical phenomenon but on the model of theoretical science. Or,
except on the model of the theoretical, i.e., objectifying, sciences. But precisely what is
necessary for a critique of knowledge is to acquire a scientific grasp of the historical task
Dilthey sets out to give such a "critique of historical reason" (Kritik der
Philosophie or "world-view philosophy." Dilthey argues that the human sciences refer to
human beings and have as their subject matter "lived-experiences, the expression for
For example, historical science (Historie) has as its subject matter historical lived-
experiences, expressions of history, e.g., historical texts, social structures (such as social
institutions like law), individuals (such as Goethe), etc., and our own understanding of
grasp historical lived-experiences that are not themselves "given," but are rather
203
Wilhelm Dilthey, "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," translated by Rudolf A.
Makkreel and John Scanlon, in Dilthey, Selected Works III: The Formation of the Historical World in the
Human Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 91 – 2.
184
expressed in historical expressions (texts, institutions, etc.). It does this by interpreting
these historical expressions in the context of our understanding of the totality of these
Dilthey calls the "life nexus" (Lebenszusammenhang), i.e., the "reality" that expresses
historical expressions and the totality of these expression, i.e., history, consists of
interpreting them back into the life nexus that "produced" them or, more exactly, that
It is important that these expressions of the life nexus not be confused with causal
effects. The life nexus is not the cause of some effect. Historical entities are expressions
that are expressed by a life nexus. In other words, the human sciences do not explain
would be to confuse the method of the human sciences with that of the natural sciences.
A life nexus and its expressions are related as thoughts are to their expression. That is, I
grasp the lived-experience(s) that are expressed in his expressions by interpreting these
context of all his previous expressions. The ultimate and distant goal is to understand the
whole of his life nexus, i.e., the unified totality of his lived-experiences. The fact that
this understanding is a form of interpretation already indicates that the proper method of
185
Doubtless, the physical or natural realization of expressions, e.g., the writing on
the page or the sounds that are made, are certainly caused by the individual doing the
between "mental life" and its physical or natural effects. Like any natural science it
explanatory science,
Explaining the causal mechanism however does not give us an understanding of what the
person is trying to express, viz., what they mean. In fact, the causal mechanism may be
radically different for identical expressions. For example, if I am angry I can express this
through any number of different causal mechanisms, e.g., I can write on a piece of paper
that "I am very angry" or I can say that "I am very angry" or I can scream or I can make a
gesture of anger. In each case, the causal mechanism and the effect are quite different but
they all express the identical meaning. From each I can interpret that the person is angry.
204
Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," in Wilhelm Dilthey,
Descriptive Psychology, translated by Richard M. Zaner (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
1977), pg. 23. Henceforth referred to as "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology."
186
There is, however, a more fundamental issue at stake. We have seen that for
human sciences a distinction must be made between psychology and the other human
is meant all those expressions that express one's own peculiar life-nexus, i.e., the totality
of one's own peculiar lived-experience. The scientific understanding of the life nexus of
psychology. The other human sciences have as their subject matter not the expressions of
example, historical science has as its subject matter historical phenomena, which are not
historical world-view of which they are the expression. My hurried gait expresses my
desire to get something done quickly. My jumping away from a just discovered spider
are all subjective expressions. On the other hand, a lecture on German Romanticism
human existence/life and, for Dilthey, this means that they are, ultimately, components of
a life nexus. That is, there are no world-views free-floating from human existence and
187
life. All world-views are grounded in human life and thus in a life nexus. Similarly,
every individual psychic nexus situates itself within a life nexus and becomes what
Dilthey calls an "acquired psychic nexus." Thus, psychic nexus are also similarly
components of a life nexus. Thus, the nexus of life has "subjective" and "objective"
an "objective" expression.
Within a life nexus the psychic nexus and world-view mutually affect one
another. Each individual psychic nexus incorporates into itself a world-view that it
shares with many others and at the same time world-views are shaped and modified by
psychic nexus. Each individual human being is intimately tied to his environment and
the environment is itself shaped by individual human beings. For example, every
individual is situated within a historical context or historical epoch and at the same time
manifests itself on the level of expression. An individual can typically only realize
intersubjective context for such expressions and a world-view is expressed ("cultures" are
hands and thus express my pleasure or satisfaction with something only insofar as the
culture in which I find myself allows for this as an expression of pleasure or satisfaction.
Otherwise, i.e., if I exist in a culture for which clapping does not express pleasure or
188
one (including myself) could interpret from the clapping of my hands that I feel pleasure
Similarly, world-views cannot express themselves directly but only through the
mediation of individuals. That is, cultures are produced by means of the action of
individuals. For example, a legal system does not appear ex nihilo, but is produced by
I said earlier that typically an individual can only express himself from within the
context of a culture. For Dilthey, there are exceptional cases in which this is not true.
Life is creative, spontaneous, and "free." New world-views can be formed which later
become articulated through a new culture which in turn require individuals to express
themselves differently and, ultimately, produce a newly acquired psychic nexus. Life
produces new world-views by means of the exceptionally creative individual, i.e., the
genius. The exceptionally creative individual by the force of his "objective" expression
brings into existence a new world-view by embodying and bringing to expression the all-
205
Dilthey, "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pg. 55.
206
Ibid., pg. 63.
189
And,
this individual recreates himself by means of incorporating the new world-view into a
new acquired psychic nexus. Thus, to those who remain in the context of the old culture
this person and his expressions are "obscure" but at the same time fascinating. They
struggle to acquire the new psychic nexus and incorporate the new world-view by
the context of the old culture and its world-view so they themselves must develop by
acquiring a new psychic nexus as well. This exceptionality of a creative individual can
arise within more or less general spheres. Thus, there are scientific geniuses who
it is by means of poetry and the exceptional poet that whole world-views change. This is
because Dilthey believes that great poetry is most expressive insofar as it encompasses
the whole of a life-nexus. The great poet encompasses the knowledge (science), will
207
Ibid., pg. 101.
190
(morality) and feeling (value) of a world-view. Goethe exemplifies the creative poet for
expressed in a new culture the old culture becomes increasingly alien. The meaning of its
expressions (both on the level of culture and on the level of individuals) are no longer
between one's present world-view and past world-views produces history, that is, the
attempt to understand the expressions of alien, past world-views. History itself can take
many forms, e.g., it can be history of science, history of literature, history of law, etc.
For example, history of science is the attempt to understand the expression of the
scientific component of past world-views. It is clear that for Dilthey history has an
intimate connection to the creativity, spontaneity and development intrinsic to life. If life
were static there would be no history as there would not be any past world-views and
cultures. However, the scope of the human sciences is broader than just history insofar as
one faces a very similar situation when confronted with a present alien culture.
We now come back to the question of the critique of historical reason. Dilthey
takes it as evident that we have historical knowledge and even a scientific understanding
of history. The question is: How is this knowledge possible? How can we come to a
historical expressions of these (e.g., their culture) are alien to our own. Dilthey's answer
is not the one commonly given today, e.g., by Gadamer and others, namely that we can
do so because we are our history. Dilthey would not disagree with this claim as it is an
191
important part of his own view, but he does not think it is a sufficient transcendental
According to Dilthey, the common element of all world-views and psychic nexus
and their expressions is human existence (Dasein) or human life. Following the Kantian
trichotomy, Dilthey argues that all human life can be analyzed in terms of thought,
action, and feeling. Every aspect of human existence can be analyzed in terms of one or
more of these. The scientific study of these aspects of human existence is grounded in
psychology insofar as its object of study is the entirety of human life. It is therefore to
psychology that Dilthey looks to ground his critique of historical reason. Of course the
importance of psychology is not peculiar to Dilthey but runs throughout almost all of
19th century thought. What is peculiar to Dilthey is how he understands psychology and
its scope.
hypothesis. That is, the ultimate elements and unities of an explanatory science are not
attempt to unify the data of sensation. For example, atoms and their causal relations are
not given in experience but are hypothesis that are inferred from the multitude of
sensation and are used to explain and unify the phenomenon. All science is searching for
a unifying principle. The natural sciences, according to Dilthey, achieve this through
208
Gadamer himself would most likely agree with Dilthey. However, because of Heidegger's influence,
he sees no need to transcendentally ground a scientific knowledge of history.
192
A descriptive and analytic science, on the other hand, begins with a unified nexus
that is immediately given to consciousness. It then proceeds to work out the moments of
this unity. Thus, descriptive sciences understand (verstehen) rather than explain
(erklären) their subject matter. Dilthey argues that the human sciences and in particular
The human studies are distinguished from the sciences of nature first of all
in that the latter have for their objects facts which are presented to
consciousness as from outside, as phenomena and given in isolation, while
the objects of the former are given originaliter from within as real and as a
living continuum [Zusammenhang]. As a consequence there exists a
system of nature for the physical and natural sciences only thanks to
inferential arguments which supplement the data of experience by means
of a combination of hypotheses. In the human studies, to the contrary, the
nexus of psychic life constitutes originally a primitive and fundamental
datum. We explain nature, we understand psychic life. For in inner
experience [innere Erfahrung] the processes of one thing acting on
another, and the connections of functions or individual members of
psychic life into a whole are also given. The experienced [erlebte] whole
[Zusammenhang] is primary here, the distinction among its members only
comes afterwards.209
This, importantly, Dilthey connects to the fact that descriptive psychology is ultimately
grounded in lived-experience,
Since the human sciences themselves are grounded in lived-experience and descriptive
psychology this feature extends as well to them. They too are ultimately grounded in an
209
Dilthey, "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pp. 27 – 8.
210
Ibid., pg. 28.
193
immediately given unified nexus. Most important is the connection between this and
Since the unity necessary for descriptive psychology is immediately given and is
would be hypothetical itself. A genuine critique could not rest on a hypothesis for then
the very conditions for the possibility of knowledge and experience would be capable of
being overturned by further knowledge and experience for which the critique itself gives
only hypotheses!"211 A more direct way to put the point is to say that any critique must
Dilthey argues that the theory of knowledge faces a similar problem. Since any
211
Ibid., pg. 27.
194
sciences. It is impossible to make a psychology the premise for the theory
of knowledge. However, the same dilemma also exists in another form for
the theory of knowledge: can it be established independently of all
psychological presuppositions? And, in the event that this would not be
the case: what would be the consequences if epistemology would be based
on an explanatory psychology? The theory of knowledge arose from the
need to secure a firm ground in the midst of the ocean of metaphysical
fluctuations, a generally valid knowledge of at least some scope. Were it
to be uncertain and hypothetical it would vitiate its own goal.212
Certainly, one can understand why Dilthey saw a strong affinity between Husserl's work
and his own.213 Not only on the more superficial level of their common struggle against
psychologism and the attempt to ground a theory of knowledge through the natural
sciences, but more importantly in the fact that they both believed that any critique of
reason must be grounded in what is immediately given, i.e., in understanding and not
explanation. However, we can also see how misguided was Husserl's attempt to
characterize Dilthey's philosophy as "historicism" and his claim that Dilthey's thought led
212
Ibid., pp. 29 – 30.
213
Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview,"
translated by Charles Bambach in Heidegger, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time
and Beyond, pp. 147 – 176. Hereafter cited as Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research." On page 154
Heidegger remarks, "Perhaps this [a new strain in Dilthey's thought] can be traced back to the effect of
Husserl's Logical Investigations, which Dilthey read at that time and called an epochal work, holding
seminars on it for years with his students."
214
Husserl's criticism runs thus: "Of course, Weltanschauung and Weltanschauung philosophy are
cultural formations that come and go in the stream of human development, with the consequences that their
spiritual content is definitely motivated in the given historical relationships. But the same is true of the
strict sciences. Do they for that reason lack objective validity? A thoroughly extreme historicist will
perhaps answer in the affirmative. In doing so he will point to changes in scientific views - how what is
today accepted as a proved theory is recognized tomorrow as worthless, how some call certain things laws
that others call mere hypotheses and still others vague guesses, etc. Does that mean that in view of this
constant change in scientific views we would actually have no right to speak of sciences as objectively
valid unities instead of merely as cultural formations? It is easy to see that historicism, if consistently
carried through, carries over into extreme sceptical subjectivism. The ideas of truth, theory, and science
would then, like all ideas, lose their absolute validity. That an idea has validity would mean that it is a
factual construction of spirit which is held as valid and which in its contingent validity determines thought.
195
Dilthey does not attempt to ground validity in history. Quite to the contrary,
Dilthey grounds his own critique in historical human existence. That this latter is not the
history of humanity is clear from Dilthey's emphasis upon inner experience and the
psychic nexus, which embodies all those characteristics of spiritual existence that are
given as a whole and forms the basis of all cognition. Dilthey remarks,
There would be no unqualified validity, or validity-in-itself, which is what it is even if no one has achieved
it and though no historical humanity will ever achieve it." (Philosophy as Rigorous Science, pp. 186 – 7).
215
Dilthey, "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pg. 35. The last sentence reads in German: "In der
Selbstbesinnung, welche den ganzen unverstümmelten Befund seelischen Lebens umfaßt, hat sie ihre
Grundlage: Allgemeingültigkeit, Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit werden von diesem Befund aus erst nach ihrem
Sinn."
196
Here we can see all of the elements embodied in Rickert, Husserl, and Natorp's attempt at
contain. That is, there is the necessity of grounding psychology in concrete, immediate
lived-experience. This is guaranteed by the immediately given, lived unity of the psychic
nexus. This lived unity is not an object but the "coherent nexus" through which all
cognitions are understood. The psychic nexus is also individuating in the way Rickert
describes the concepts of the human sciences. That is, it is not a universal abstraction.
Each individual possesses their psychic nexus. All of this is the subject matter for
psychology. When Dilthey turns to the theory of knowledge, i.e., the general critique of
knowledge rather than merely that of the human sciences, we see both self-consciousness
through the power of reflection that Husserl believes we can give a phenomenologically
adequate theory of knowledge. Heidegger argues that this is a mere "looking-at" which
de-vivifies the living character of lived-experience. Dilthey, on the other hand, relies on
looking at the psychic nexus, for he argues that this is the foundation of a theory of
merely a substrate of this unfolding psychology in movement. That is, Dilthey captures
Dilthey brings Husserl and Natorp together. Husserl's epistemology lacks development
insofar as his critique ultimately rests (at this stage in his writings) in a static eidetic
197
science. Natorp's epistemology lacks immediate givenness insofar as he argues that all
givenness is mediated.
his psychology. We are always on the way to a "complete" theory of knowledge, any
the result of the development of the psychic nexus in individuals and the resulting change
in the "established psychology." However, this development of the psychic nexus is not
...the structural nexus does not grow together from discrete operations, but
rather what occurs is that an even finer articulation is differentiated out of
it, and behind this nexus one cannot go...we find in the psychic structural
nexus a unitary subject of psychic development.216
Because the psychic nexus is essentially developing, part of the very process of
history. So, for Dilthey, there is an intimate connection between psychology and history.
Man does not apprehend what he is by musing over himself, nor by doing
psychological experiments, but rather by history. This analysis of the
products of human spirit - destined to open for us a glance at the genesis
of the psychic nexus, of its forms and its actions - must, in addition to the
analysis of historical products, observe and collect everything which it can
seize of the historical processes wherein such a nexus becomes
constituted.217
216
Dilthey, "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pg. 104.
217
Ibid., pg. 63.
198
Furthermore, Dilthey argues that because the process of development for the psychic
nexus is the further articulation of the unitary "structural nexus" of psychic life and not a
causal, physical development one can never predict what the next stage of psychic life
will be but can only afterwards infer the motives that lead to it,
Seen more closely, the nature of psychic development, different from that
of physical development, presents first of all a negative character. We are
incapable of predicting, in effect, what in the unfolding of psychic life will
follow a given state. It is only subsequently that we can disengage the
reasons for what has happened. We cannot predict the acts from their
motives. We can analytically ascertain the motives only after the
acts...Historical development, moreover, shows the same character, and
precisely in the great creative periods an enhancement comes about which
cannot be derived from the previous stages.218
and the development of the psychic nexus. However, Dilthey is careful not to include the
Dilthey has provided both a psychology, a critique of historical reason, and, using
the latter two, a theory of knowledge that is grounded in the immediacy of concrete lived-
has avoided abstracting the "subject" from concrete life. In other words, lived-experience
is not just of objects and universal concepts, and the subject does not become the
transcendental subject that merely unifies consciousness as its subjective pole. This
avoids what plagued Husserl and Natorp's views. Furthermore, he has given an account
of the concrete individual in its entirety. That is, the subject for Dilthey is not merely the
knowing subject but also the willing and valuing subject. Moreover, this means that
218
Ibid., pg. 104.
199
willing and valuing do not simply presuppose knowing, viz., an object of knowledge.
The three are each interrelated in the psychic nexus. In addition, Dilthey has also grasped
the historical nature of the human being. Our understanding is essentially a historical
understanding. Or, put another way, thought is always situated. As we shall see, this had
Heidegger's criticism of Husserl, Dilthey has done away with a merely reflective
understanding. That is, he too moves in the direction of Natorp in seeing that our
time. However, unlike Natorp, Dilthey has the tools for understanding this mediated self-
consciousness, viz., his critique of historical reason. For all these reasons one can see
how attractive Dilthey's views would have been for Heidegger given his criticism of
One final aspect of Dilthey's views is worth noting. This is Dilthey's view on the
kind by reliving the psychic nexus that produced it. That is, one reproduces in one's own
psychic nexus to the best of one's ability the relevant aspects of the psychic nexus that
produced the expression. This does not mean that one must get angry in order to
understand another's expression of anger, but one can only understand another's
expression of anger because being angry and expressing it in the way it has been
expressed by the other is part of one's own lived-experience or psychic nexus. Similarly,
I understand a story that is told to me because the expressions used to express the story
produce in me the proper cognitions, i.e., the same as the other has in his psychic nexus.
200
Clearly, Dilthey's view of understanding and intersubjectivity requires a certain
degree of homogeneity in the psychic nexus of the one who expresses and the one who
understanding, i.e., the ability of the interpreter to relive what is expressed. This
i.e., in how the psychic nexus were "acquired." According to Dilthey there are roughly
two aspects of homogeneity in psychic nexus. The first is that everyone shares the same
external world. The second is one's culture. Dilthey explains intersubjectivity thusly,
In this way, we can see how strong the emphasis upon context and the environment is in
Dilthey's analysis of the psychic nexus. For example, rather than grounding the identity
of reason in the ability of consciousness to grasp idealities (e.g., Husserl) Dilthey grounds
it in the fact that everyone shares the same external world. Once again, his analysis
focuses on what is concrete and lived and refuses to analyze consciousness from the
219
Ibid., pg. 106.
201
perspective of a transcendental ego. The sense of immanence and transcendence so
prevalent in Husserl and Natorp is absent from Dilthey's analysis. Psychic life is always
situated, concrete contexts. Dilthey avoids precisely the criticisms that Heidegger levels
against Husserl and Natorp's views. As we shall see, Dilthey's analysis of the psychic
nexus and its environment had a profound influence on Heidegger's own early analysis of
the environing world (Umwelt). However, there are two aspects of Dilthey's view that
Heidegger early on brings into question. Though Dilthey's view avoids the strong sense
Dilthey a distinct "inside" and "outside" to the psychic nexus. So much so that the
psychic nexus is ultimately a self-contained entity that incorporates into itself that which
is outside of it (the external world and culture). Connected with this is that Dilthey's
consciousness for Brentano and Husserl. Heidegger works to overcome both of these
Husserl's criticism of Dilthey in his Logos essay. What is most interesting about this
understandings of the nature of metaphysics and its role in their respective philosophies.
202
III. Dilthey, Husserl, and the "World-riddle"
Dilthey and Husserl are in agreement that the theory of knowledge must allow for
universally valid knowledge, but Dilthey argues that this precludes there being a
of the fact that only the immediately given unity of the psychic nexus may unify all our
experience whether it be our knowledge of reality or our will, etc. In Dilthey's view,
metaphysics violates this by attempting to unify the world through a system of concepts
that themselves do not presuppose the unity of the psychic nexus or which transcend the
psychic nexus. Dilthey believes that all metaphysical concepts are in flux and have their
own history.221 Metaphysics is an attempt to overcome the "world-riddle," i.e., the issue
of the unity between life and world. This attempt produces an inner contradiction in the
220
See Dilthey's letter to Husserl dated June 29, 1911 in "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence," edited
by Walter Biemel and translated by Jeffner Allen in Edmund Husserl, Husserl: Shorter Works, pp. 203 –
209.
221
For Dilthey's account of metaphysics see Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of Philosophy, translated by
Stephen A. Emery and William T. Emery (New York: AMS PRESS, 1969), second part, III. 3.
203
their methods. Metaphysics must rise above the reflections of the
understanding to find its own object and its own method.222
What is of particular interest in this passage is that the problem of metaphysics is, at
bottom, the problem of intentionality. Though Dilthey would not put it this way, from
Husserl's perspective they are clearly one and the same problem. Though Dilthey
conceives the issue from a much broader perspective than Husserl. Dilthey believes that
metaphysics attempts to unify life in its totality and the world, at points though he
characterizes the problem more narrowly along Husserlian lines, viz., the unity between
Dilthey understands the world to be the "world-order." The world is the "external
world" that every psychic nexus shares. The product of this commonality of environment
captures the unity of reason that Hegel and Schleiermacher glimpsed in metaphysical
abstractness but not concretely. On the other side of the world-riddle is life, i.e., the
the unity of all psychic life, including thought, will, and value. Metaphysics, Dilthey
argues, is the attempt to coherently describe this nexus completely and as a unity through
222
Dilthey, The Essence of Philosophy, pp. 64 – 5.
204
categories of being, cause, value, and purpose, originating as they do in
these attitudes, can be reduced neither to one another nor to a higher
principle. We can comprehend the world by only one of the basic
categories. We can never perceive, as it were, more than one side of our
relation to it, never the whole relation as it would be defined by the
systematic unity of these categories. This is the first reason for the
impossibility of metaphysics: to succeed it must always either unite the
categories sophistically or distort the content of our consciousness.223
The history of metaphysics according to Dilthey is the history of privileging one of these
basic categories of psychic life over the others for the purpose of comprehending the
world in its totality. More strongly, Dilthey argues that the unity of the world can only be
life. For example, Hegel privileges thought, whereas Schopenhauer privileges the will.
What is privileged produces their respective "metaphysics." The weight of the problem
for Dilthey lies in the nature of the psychic nexus and the life nexus, i.e., that it is
essentially a diversity in a unity. Dilthey's concern with this aspect of psychic life is
223
Ibid., pg. 65.
224
Dilthey, "Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pg. 104.
205
By what means, Dilthey is asking, could we possibly comprehend this "original nexus"?
It cannot be by means of thought, will, or value as each of these are intelligible only by
means of their place within the original nexus of the psychic unity. On the other hand,
the psychic nexus structures all that is given so any account that would attempt to make
sense of it in categories that transcend those of the psychic nexus (e.g., thought, will, and
value) would be mere speculation without an evidentiary basis. That is, it would be
uncritical, speculative metaphysics. The fact is though we still attempt to do so and the
however, are merely the result of privileging one or more of the given categories of the
psychic nexus and so can never really transcend the psychic nexus. The Kantian
immediately bring to mind Aristotle's much more general discussion of the problem of
the science of being, viz., Aristotle's problem of metaphysics. That is, how is there to be
a science of being when being itself is ultimately a unity in diversity. There are
fundamental categories of being that are unified by being, but at the same time there
seems to be no way to give an account of being that does not presuppose being itself.
The problem of the unity of the categories of being is analogous to Dilthey's own
problem of the unity of the categories of the psychic nexus insofar as the categories of
being are supposed to exhaust being yet at the same time they are irreducible to one
another and any attempt to unify them univocally fails. Every science for Aristotle
requires a univocal concept and its differentiae. With these we can give an account of the
subject matter of a science. As Aristotle points out, however, being is unusual insofar as
206
any of its proposed differentiae must also have being. In every other science the genus
and its differentiae do not have this character. For instance, when we differentiate
animality according to the rational and irrational we do not face the problem that
rationality is itself an animal. However, being (as with unity) cannot be a genus insofar
lived-experience. It then arises as a problem of the unity of life. Any account of the
that within the critique of reason there is a perfectly valid notion of metaphysics, though,
for sure, it is grounded in the structure of intentionality and thus does not "transcend"
Dilthey points out that metaphysics must rise above understanding and have an object
and method all its own. Of course, this is precisely how Husserl characterizes
phenomenology. In his response to Dilthey, Husserl brings out that his own
225
Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by W. D. Ross in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 998b 18 – 26.
207
phenomenology is designed precisely to meet the problem of metaphysics, i.e.,
investigating the nature of the unity between the world, on the one hand, and
Husserl argues that the being of the world is made intelligible by relating it to the
phenomenological doctrine of essences. Husserl does not intend to discover the being of
the world in its particularity as this is the province of the natural sciences, rather
phenomenology investigates being and, for Husserl, this means it deals with essences or
For this reason every "science of existence" (Daseinwissenschaft) turns into metaphysics,
But this does not really get at the heart of the problem of metaphysics. That is, it does
not really deal with the "world-riddle." What is the unity that underlies the world and life
in its totality? Husserl focuses solely on the question of what unifies conceptual
226
Husserl's letter to Dilthey dated June 29, 1911. In "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence," pp. 205 –
6.
227
Husserl's letter to Dilthey dated July 5/6, 1911. In "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence," pg. 206.
208
knowledge and its object? The solution to this, Husserl believes, lies in the
concept of truth,
The truth which is thus expounded, for example, the truth in natural
science, regardless of how limited and relative it may be from another
point of view, is ultimately a component of "metaphysical" truth, and its
knowledge is metaphysical knowledge, namely, ultimate knowledge of
existence [Dasein]. The idea that a metaphysics in this sense is necessary
in principle - vis-à-vis the natural and human sciences which have arisen
from the great labor of modern times - has its origin in the fact that a
stratification is rooted in the essence of knowledge and that, connected
with it, there is a two-fold epistemic attitude: on the one hand, the attitude
can be purely directed toward being, which is consciously intended and
which is thereby through and given in appearance; but on the other hand,
the attitude can be directed to the enigmatic essential relations between
being and consciousness.228
The latter is the true subject matter of phenomenology. As Husserl is wont to do this
latter discipline is eidetic as well. Thereby Husserl hopes to solve the problem of the
world-riddle that Dilthey believes is intractable. However, the way Husserl presents it
supposedly lying outside of, though necessarily correlated, with being. This is not
which is constituted all derivative being. However, even this "absolute being" is
constituted by the transcendental ego and in the flow of inner time consciousness.
Two aspects of this debate are particularly important for our further discussion.
First, and this is consistent with Heidegger's critique of Husserl, Husserl understands the
228
Ibid., pp. 206 - 7.
209
problem of metaphysics only from the viewpoint of knowledge. In his response to
Dilthey he appears to disregard or at least does not realize that for Dilthey the "world-
riddle" is grounded in the relation between world and life in its totality. Part of Dilthey's
very criticism of metaphysics is that it privileges one aspect of psychic life over others in
our comprehension of the world. Husserl privileges theoretical thought. Dilthey argues
that this places Husserl's metaphysics within one particular tradition of metaphysical
Husserl agrees! Husserl accepts the "platonic" character of his thought, as long as
In this regard, Husserl seems to vindicate Dilthey's own understanding of the nature of
metaphysics.
Second, and more important, is that in this exchange we can see the general
approach to lived-experience. That is, the approach Husserl and Natorp take towards
lived-experience is exclusively bound up with the fact that they emphasize merely our
229
Husserl, Ideas, pp. 40 – 1.
210
theoretical comportment towards the world and their metaphysics bears the distinct stamp
of this. But, furthermore, though Heidegger uses Dilthey's problematic concerning the
nature of metaphysics, at the same time he attempts to draw in Husserl's insight into the
nature of intentionality. That is, Dilthey assumes (in a sense) an absolute distinction
between world and life and this produces the intractability of the problem of metaphysics,
namely, the "world-riddle." What Dilthey lacks is the absolute interconnection of world
and life, viz., intentionality. Moreover, or perhaps because of this, Dilthey never takes
seriously the notion of world but understands it along the lines of the "external world."
Husserl has a substantial notion of intentionality and also a corresponding sense of being
but disregards or simply misses the problem of life. In his lectures on the history of the
concept of time, Heidegger will accuse Husserl of merely presupposing the being of
what is the being of intentionality? These issues pervade Heidegger's discussion of the
environing world (Umwelt) his 1919 lectures as well as the importance of the question of
the being of human life (Dasein) in his writings during the early 20's and in Being and
Time. We will examine these issues in the next chapter and in the process interpret
230
Cf. Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time, translated by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1985), §11 - §13.
211
CHAPTER FIVE
In his work up to Being and Time, Heidegger moves within the themes that have
arisen within the previous chapters, namely the issues that concerned the southwestern
break the hegemony of a theoretical approach to lived-experience and life itself. This
experience. As a result, the crucial notions of world and life, i.e., the components of the
“world-riddle,” are exclusively conceived objectively, in the case of the former, and
subjectively, in the case of the latter. Heidegger's thinking up to the late 20's is
influenced significantly by the attempt to rethink these two crucial notions of world and
life beyond the critical, epistemological dichotomy of subject and object. In the course
phenomenology and the question of Being, though without disregarding the contributions
of Neo-Kantianism (especially Natorp) and Husserl. As we will see, Heidegger will turn
to Aristotle for guidance in resolving the issues bequeathed to him by late nineteenth and
212
phenomenology and, reciprocally, a probingly original appropriation of Aristotle's
thought that avoids being a simple, straightforward return to Aristotle which would
exemplified in the "crisis" that philosophy finds itself in the late nineteenth century,
philosophy and scientific philosophy. Heidegger resolves this crisis by means of his
understand the activity of philosophy itself, i.e., philosophizing, its relation to life and
thought, and its guiding question, viz., the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger
variously indicates this inability among modern thought to see the genuine issue at stake
as a lack of understanding or inquiry into the being of subjectivity or the being of life.
latter's characterization of the being of human being as Zoon echon logon. In this
chapter, we will examine the development of Heidegger's thought in his engagement with
importance of Heidegger’s return to Aristotle and the issue of the very nature of the
In his lectures of 1919 and in the early 1920's, Heidegger ultimately attempts to
213
between life and world as presented in the last chapter. This requires a more radical
At this point, at least schematically, we can say that, of all the thinkers we have
discussed, Heidegger believes that Dilthey gave the most robust analysis of concrete,
skewed towards the critique of the human sciences. This leads him to overly emphasize
what he calls "inner experience." That is, he is keen on analyzing historical human lived-
experience, but he still maintains a particularly uncritical view of the world and
but comes at it purely from the perspective of the theoretical which ultimately alienates
intentionality from life and lived-experience. His analysis of lived-experience is the way
in which it appears in immanent reflection, not as it is lived. The most evident sign of
this alienation is his identification of "absolute being" and consciousness or, more
exactly, pure subjectivity. His fervent reliance on immanent reflection and theoretical
objectivity leads him to have a purely objectified understanding of both the world, the
self, and life. Furthermore, his overarching theoretical approach leads him to a rather
Husserl is so focused upon saving objective theoretical knowledge that the nature of our
214
Husserl recognizes the importance of intentionality and, therefore, avoids falling into
Natorp is an important bridge figure between Husserl and Dilthey, though he too
presupposes the absolute authority of the theoretical attitude. Natorp approaches the
issue, as Husserl does, purely from the perspective of theoretical knowledge, however, he
has a far more profound sense of the problem of subjectivity and how it is given in
experience, namely, that it is the final end and purpose of the task of knowledge. Natorp
checks Husserl's evidentialist interpretation of experience, while Dilthey has the most
nuanced view of concrete, immediate lived-experience and of human life. The reason I
say the Natorp is an important bridge between Husserl and Dilthey is that, unlike Husserl
and analogous to Dilthey, Natorp argues that objectivity is a historical process and is
grounded in the history of the task of knowledge. In this way, objectivities are not
evidentially given but develop within the history of knowledge. In addition, Natorp
argues that knowledge does not begin with immanent subjectivity but in what may be
rather the final goal of the task of science. We understand ourselves as (peculiar)
external objectifications.
Given this confluence of motivations, one would expect that the notions of world,
life, and intentionality would play a large role in Heidegger’s own philosophizing up to
the mid 1920's. This is in fact the case. In his 1919 lectures, "The Idea of Philosophy,"
believes are fundamental. These are the experiences of the question "is there
something?" ("es gibt etwas?") and the environing world (Umwelt). In addition, he
215
emphasizes the importance of seeing each of these experiences with respect to their
situatedness in concrete life. We shall first look at Heidegger's analysis of these two
experiences. These two experiences set the stage for Heidegger's own thinking upon the
issue we have just discussed concerning the "world-riddle," i.e., the nature of life,
Most importantly, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, this is the problem of
metaphysics for both Dilthey and Husserl (though Husserl does not seem to think it much
of a "riddle"). Heidegger's own analysis of the problem marks a significant shift from the
of being. The theoretical approach has distorted the true problematic to the point that it
Husserl believes that the problem of being is the problem of the relation between
being and consciousness, i.e., being as the correlate of consciousness. Natorp argues that
the problem of being is the problem of the relation between being and appearance which
he claims has been the at issue since philosophy's beginning. And Dilthey contends that
the problem of being is the "world-riddle," namely, the relation between life and its
relation to the "external world." On the other hand, the problem of being for the Ancients
and Medievals is the problem of the relation between being and beings. The distinction
Heidegger argues that life and world are inextricably linked. In differing respects,
this is also true of the thinkers we have previously looked at, though at a certain point
216
they are lead away from any genuine understanding of this because of their theoretical
intentionality as the "living through" to something. Natorp argues that the true end of the
Heidegger believes that Dilthey went furthest towards discovering the structures of life he
missed the crucial issue of the being of life and precisely because he was too caught up in
Heidegger's concern with the being of life leads him back to Aristotle's
understanding of life as praxis, an activity whose end is the activity itself, but now under
the auspices of the relation between philosophy and life. Heidegger writes in Being and
Time that,
231
Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962), pg. 72.
217
I. Towards a Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Beyond Scientific Philosophy and
Worldview Philosophy
In his writings up to the late 20’s Heidegger characterizes his own work on the
“essence” of philosophy by means of the debate between two apparently different and
many ways, Heidegger is working within the problematic that Husserl sets out in his
subordinating philosophy to the natural sciences or reducing it to (what he sees as) the
philosophy represents the “limit of the critical science of value.”233 Therefore, Dilthey’s
work, though earlier, perfects the value-philosophy of the southwestern school of Neo-
However, as we have seen, worldview philosophy still does not satisfy Heidegger insofar
as he is still concerned with issues that arise in Husserl’s phenomenology and also in the
work. Especially throughout his writings in the first two decades of the twentieth
century, Heidegger is concerned to unify these two traditions through a radical rethinking
of both traditions.
232
Cf. the introduction to Heidegger's 1919 lectures “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of
Worldview,” chapter one of The History of the Concept of Time, and the introduction to The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1982).
233
Heidegger, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,” § 1, (b), in Heidegger,
Towards the Definition of Philosophy.
218
For instance, in his 1923 lecture course, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity,
Heidegger presents in stark contrast the two driving forces of late 19th century thought,
two aspects of late 19th century thought are most clearly manifested in its reflection upon
the nature of the special sciences, that is, in debates about the respective methodologies
have looked at in detail fall neatly on one side or the other of the philosophical debate.
There is considerable overlap. This is true for the southwestern school of Neo-
Kantianism insofar as both Windelband and Rickert, though explicitly concerned with
characteristic of all theoretical sciences and avoid any hint of historicism. It is also
evident in Dilthey (to an extent) insofar ad he still views his own later project as an
grounding these sciences in the universal typologies of his own "descriptive psychology."
This is also true of those figures who tended to emphasize the natural sciences. Natorp,
for example, allows for the historical development of lawfulness so essential to the
natural sciences. Husserl does not fit into either tradition so easily (as is also the case
Heidegger remarks in Being and Time, these debates have become all the more urgent
234
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, §7 and §8.
219
given the radical upheaval in the "basic concepts" of the special sciences that occurred at
the beginning of the 20th century. To put a point on the philosophical issues that this
upheaval raises, he says that, "In such immanent crises the very relationship between
positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation
comes to a point where it begins to totter."235 From the perspective of methodology, the
division between philosophical approaches to the sciences in the latter half of the 19th
century can be roughly divided into those that rely on "historical consciousness" and
those that rely on "scientific philosophy." There are, however, many further wrinkles in
this debate, the majority of which are grounded in the fact that each of these traditions
consciously situate themselves within Kantian and post-Kantian thought. In this respect,
however, even though they may have significant and deep disagreements, each tradition
knowledge. For instance, the division between subject and object is thoroughly at play in
their thinking. One can roughly characterize the different approaches as either
other hand, one could equally categorize these different approaches along the lines of the
traditional Kantian distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. This
requires a different arrangement of these thinkers, namely, Husserl and Natorp emphasize
the theoretical aspects of Kantian thought and Rickert, Windelband, and Dilthey highlight
the practical aspects. Though, as before, there is considerable overlap. Finally, and more
235
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 29.
220
importantly for our purposes, a common characteristic of each of the figures we have
is facing an upheaval in its own "basic concepts," analogous to the upheaval in the special
sciences. Philosophy faces its own methodological crisis. Yet, as Heidegger will argue
in 1922, this crisis has been long in the making. Heidegger traces its explicit origin back
to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and his division of the "dianoetic virtues" into sophia
understanding that consists in looking at..., and phronesis [prudence], i.e., circumspection
in the care for human well-being, are interpreted as the authentic modes of actualizing
to mitigate this crisis because, as he says there, "...the problem of method is more central
cautionary note for those who would attempt to find a method for all the sciences or who
would import into phenomenology a method from "outside." He says, "For our problem,
the basic bearing of phenomenology yields a decisive directive: not to construct a method
from outside or from above, not to contrive a new theoretical path by exercises in
236
Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of
the Hermeneutical Situation," translated by John van Buren, in Martin Heidegger, Supplements: From the
Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, pg. 129.
237
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 93.
238
Ibid., pg. 93.
221
through research into philosophy's distinctive "scientific" nature. Heidegger believes that
this will be accomplished only through investigation into the nature of a non-theoretical,
primordial science. This too influences his decision to resolve the crisis through
significantly, its strong repudiation of Dilthey's supposed historicism. On the other hand,
is in large part the result of Natorp's critique of Husserl and the influence of both Dilthey
and Baden Neo-Kantianism on Heidegger's early thought. By the early 1920's Heidegger
has recognized the serious limitations of attempting to resolve the crisis in philosophy
"scientifically." Although, many aspects of his earlier attempts to resolve the crises
remain fundamental to his later thought. What he does not relinquish is the task of
222
scientific philosophy, i.e., the critical science of value, as the necessary
foundation of a critical scientific worldview.239
The connection between philosophy and worldview is not idle speculation either as, "the
history of philosophy shows that, however diverse its forms may be, philosophy always
has a connection with the question of worldview."240 The issue is how the two are
connected. Heidegger starts with the two traditional stances towards this connection,
We have just looked at the stance of worldview as the limit of philosophy, i.e., the
creation of a critical, scientific worldview. This stance is held by those who see
Natorp, and Husserl. With regard to Rickert and Windelband, this is obvious from what
has been said in Chapter one. For Natorp and Husserl it is a bit more complicated.
Because they adhere to value philosophy, Rickert and Windelband maintain that,
"philosophy remains within the realm of consciousness, to whose three basic kinds of
activity - thinking, willing and feeling - there correspond the logical, ethical and aesthetic
values..."242 However, Natorp and Husserl also see philosophy as the production of a
critical, scientific worldview, even though their respective philosophies would not be
239
Ibid., pp. 8 - 9.
240
Ibid., pg. 9.
241
Ibid., pg. 9.
242
Ibid., pg. 8.
223
characterized as value philosophy, insofar as neither of them believe values are ultimate
in philosophy. As proof of this, one needs only to bring to mind Husserl's critique of the
Natorp's insistence upon the primacy of the nomological. Nevertheless, both Husserl and
Natorp see their philosophies as providing the universal foundation for any comportment
case when it comes to the question of the scientific nature of worldview. In his
underlying psychological nexus, which in turn is the subject matter of the science of
psychology. Thus, the science of psychology will eventually provide us with a critical,
scientific worldview. On the other hand, in his more mature thinking, e.g., The Essence
of Philosophy, we saw that he thinks that any attempt to provide a unified categorization
emphasizes one aspect of worldview - either truth, will, or feeling - to the exclusion of
the others. This represents the other stance toward worldview philosophy, namely,
essentially the same thing, but worldview brings the nature and task of philosophy more
consideration of the manner in which philosophy performs this task."243 This represents
consciousness."
243
Ibid., pg. 7.
224
The question is whether a critical, scientific worldview is the final product and
realization of philosophy or whether philosophy and worldview mean the same thing, but
worldview expresses the task of philosophy better, i.e., worldviews are the historical
dichotomy, but this dichotomy is fundamental in coming to grips with Heidegger's own
view of philosophy. Furthermore, the question of the connection between philosophy and
worldview is not just limited to Heidegger's very early thinking. As late as the summer
of 1927, Heidegger still sees his own thinking as ultimately coming to grips with this
hermeneutic phenomenology.
In whatever way one initially takes the concept [of primordial science], it
means something ultimate or, better, original, primordial, not in a temporal
sense but substantively [sachlich], first in relation to primary grounding
and constitution: principium. In comparison with primordial science,
every particular scientific discipline is not principium but principatum, the
derivative and not the originary, the sprung-from [Ent-sprungene] and not
the primal spring [Ur-sprung], the origin.245
To understand what Heidegger means it must be kept in mind that his view of
244
Cf. the introduction to his The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
245
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 20.
225
basic premise, a "first principle," and an originative source. For example, in the
... If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific
knowing, intuition will be the originative source [arche] of scientific
knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic
premises [the arche], while science as a whole is similarly related as
originative source to the whole body of fact [pragma].246
Primordial science is the originative source, i.e., the principle, of all further principles.
Because of this, it is the source from which all the other special sciences arise
[entspringen]. It is, to use Husserl's phrase, "the principle of all principles." However, in
the early twentieth century, there were two distinct and competing versions of the
principle of all principles, namely, Husserl's and that of value philosophy. We saw in
chapter two that Husserl grounds the principle of all principles according to the dictates
of theoretical reason and, therefore, in objectivity. Value philosophy, on the other hand,
argues that the principle of all principles should be grounded in practical reason,
Because of this, Heidegger believes that Fichte's philosophy was the most influential in
the search for a primordial science. In chapter one, we saw Heidegger's criticism of value
246
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 100b 11 – 17.
247
Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value," translated by Ted
Sadler in Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy.
226
philosophy's attempt to be primordial science. The serious contenders in Heidegger's
mind are phenomenology (though keeping in mind Natorp's critique) and Dilthey's
worldview philosophy. Heidegger believes that what really is at issue is not whether to
choose one or the other version but that an understanding of primordial science requires
taking into account what each of these two very disparate traditions have to say about it.
For if philosophy truly aspires to be primordial science it must be the source of both
science and historical consciousness. Heidegger believes that the "basic concepts" of
each (world, life, intentionality, and intuition) need to be reappropriated through a new
and radical understanding of each. One basic concept which is even more primordial
than those just mentioned and which is fundamental to each tradition, but which is never
thoroughly examined just on its own and in a radical way, is lived-experience. Both
Husserl and Dilthey were in fact oriented in this direction; Husserl in his understanding
the penultimate expression of the meaning of lived-experience. And, though Husserl and
Dilthey were central in moving this problematic forward, Heidegger realized early on that
neither of these thinkers adequately grasped the nature of life and lived-experience,
especially with respect to these as the primordial source of both intentionality and world.
They did not understand how intentionality and world emerge in and from life.
way, philosophy will not only be able to alleviate its own crisis, but also the crisis within
the special sciences, especially the deep division between the Geisteswissenschaften and
227
knowledge, i.e., "how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity."248
This question has dominated the discussion but it is not a primordial question as it
presupposes the sense and meaning of subjectivity and objectivity. And though modern
philosophy grappled with the nature of objectivity, it almost invariably took subjectivity
contribution to the debate was turning this on its head. He made subjectivity
influence upon Heidegger is evident in Heidegger's criticism of both Husserl and Kant,
namely, that they never raised the question of the being of subjectivity.249
will help elucidate Heidegger's own thinking. In Heidegger's view Husserl moved the
the legitimizing source of all thought and by distinguishing in the Logical Investigations
between two forms of intuition - sensible and categorical - as dual sources of legitimation
with very different characters. Empirical or sensible intuition, as in Kant, is the source of
the objects of thought, while categorical intuition is the source of the unity of thought
insofar as it provides an unmediated sense for the eidos and logical connectives of
thought. Husserl broke down the last vestiges of the empiricist tradition that identified
intuition and sensibility and which still held sway over Kant. In the course of the
development of his thought, Husserl was able to articulate more generally the
248
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 124, A89, B122.
249
For Heidegger's critique of Husserl in this regard see History of the Concept of Time, §11-13 and,
with respect to Kant, Being and Time, ¶ 6.
228
foundational role of intuition in phenomenology. In his principle of all principles Husserl
phenomenology is able to offer the originative source (arche) of all the principles of the
knowledge.
However, Husserl argues that originary presentive intuitions are not to be had in
processes"). Transcendent objects are never originarily given "in person.” Pure
subjectivity is the subject matter (Sache) of phenomenology. Pure subjectivity and all its
intentional structures are immanent. Husserl argues that pure subjectivity is the "primal
region" and is "absolute being." This primal region is intuitively and originarily given
“in person” through immanent reflection. Through the eidetic reduction of pure
subjectivity the eidetic structures of pure lived-experience are intuited by way of essential
intuition (Wesenanschauung). This supplies the unity of all thought, i.e., objectivity per
se. In this way, Husserl believes he has found the universal, legitimizing source of all
However, "no reduction can do anything" to the pure Ego or its lived-
experiences.250 Why this is so explains what Husserl means when he claims that pure
subjectivity is absolute being and also makes crystal clear his essentially theoretical and
250
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 191.
229
I seize upon the absoluteness of my lived-experiences. They are “absolute” in the sense
It is important to take note that Husserl is distinguishing two types of facts. The “facts”
"contingent" facts, which means for Husserl that these may be overturned by further
251
Ibid., pg. 100.
252
Ibid., pg. 101.
253
Ibid., pg. 103.
230
experience. A "necessary fact" (Faktum) of reflection is unimpeachable because it cannot
be negated by further experience. The idea here is that since a Faktum is a moment of the
stream of lived-experience itself, what possible further experience could bring it into
question? Such a necessary fact could certainly be subsumed under different unities, but
this would never negate the fact itself. What is more important, is that Husserl’s analysis
absoluteness of any given lived-experience is grounded in the fact that it has occurred
What unifies the stream of lived-experiences? The pure Ego which is in every
case mine. It unifies and individualizes lived-experiences as mine. Furthermore, the pure
Ego is that by which acts are lived. However, the "living I" transcends
phenomenological analysis. 254 It cannot be intuited. I cannot intuit the pure ego,
because it cannot be objectified and has no essence components. Husserl says the pure
Husserl is forced to turn back to the concrete and the particular, i.e., to the pure Ego
which in each case makes pure subjectivity mine. At the limit of phenomenology lies the
"life" of the pure Ego. The pure Ego lives by "livingly being busied with," "livingly
directed toward," "livingly suffering from," etc. Therefore, intuition is not the only or
primary source, the source of intuition itself is life and the lived world.
254
Ibid., pg. 191.
255
Ibid., pg. 133.
231
The real thrust of Heidegger's criticism of Husserl is that because intuition is
life itself or the lived world, the originary sources of the stream of lived-experience itself.
Natorp believed that an objective reconstruction of this substratum (as an infinite task)
can asymptotically approach this "pure subjectivity," but as Heidegger notes this
objectification?
As we saw in the last chapter, Dilthey believes he and Husserl are in complete
agreement. One can understand why Dilthey would sympathize with Husserl's work. For
identification of intuition and sensibility and to find a different, more inclusive, and more
However, before entering upon this question, another question must be answered,
namely, what is a “world”? This brings into focus the question of meaning (Bedeutung)
and expression (Ausdruck). One of Husserl’s profound insights in investigation six of the
correlated with meaning intention. It is this insight that requires Husserl to extend the
notion of intuition beyond mere sensuous intuition. The meaning intention of “snow”
and “white” in the judgment “snow is white” is capable of being evidentially fulfilled in
sensuous intuition, but what about “is.” “Is” is meaningful and therefore it too has a
sensuous intuition. Husserl realizes that this meaning-intention can only be fulfilled by
232
means of another form of intuition. The only other alternative, Husserl believes, is that it
is merely the result of the activity of the subject and therefore has no "absolute" validity,
that is, it is there by the mere caprice of subjectivity. The “is” of "snow is white" is
simply the subject contingently connecting “snow” and “white.” In the Logical
intention of "is." The form of Husserl’s argument purportedly demonstrating that there is
because there is something meaningful that cannot be fulfilled in sensuous intuition that
we need to posit categorical intuition. This signifies that it is meaning that determines
and characterizes the intuition that is capable of fulfilling it. Meaning determines the
how and the what of intuition. It is meaning that determines the source and legitimacy of
This raises a second serious lacuna in Husserl's thought. Namely, how are
very understanding of truth is at stake. In a way, Husserl himself provides the argument
order to "look" for the correct form of intuition that would provide the appropriate
fulfillment. Is this not the explanation of the failure of psychologism? The source of this
involved in thought.
233
Husserl never quite develops a position as to the original source of meaning.
Dilthey, however, has much to say about the relation between, on the one hand, meaning
and expression, and on the other, life and lived-experience. Most importantly, he
presents an account of our access to lived-experience that is quite different from Husserl's
and is, as we shall see, influential on Heidegger's own early thinking. In notes from 1907
and 1908 for a proposed large work on Poetics entitled, "Fragments for a Poetics," 256
Dilthey explains in summary form many of the themes that had already dominated much
of his earlier thought. Here he argues that life, not lived-experience, is absolute. Lived-
mediately given but is, rather, immediately possessed. This is accomplished through
certainly captures a sense of being aware or cognizant of something, we should not lose
sight of the essential aspect of becoming also inherent to Innewerden. Innewerden means
256
Wilhelm Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics," translated by Rudolf A. Makkreel in Wilhelm Dilthey,
Poetry and Experience, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985).
257
Ibid., pg. 223.
234
For Dilthey, and unlike Husserl, lived-experience is not something that I reflect
guarantees its absolute being. I posses a lived-experience. Even Husserl has some sense
of this but reverses the order, i.e., there is first a "perceptual seizing upon, taking hold of"
transformed into a "having in one's grip" [im Griff haben].258 There is an underlying
sense here of possessing something, but it is not immediate, rather the "having in one's
grip" is mediated through a "perceptual seizing upon, or taking hold of." Having in one's
grip is the result of the pure Ego spontaneously adverting is "ray" of attention through a
lived-experience. What one can have in one’s grip has already been given and structured
by an act of consciousness. The pure Ego can, by means of reflection, make a lived-
experience (and mediately it's object) mine, but only insofar as it is given to me as mine
pure Ego. But the living pure Ego is never really part of my lived-experience as such.
To the extent that it can be, it is so only in retention, i.e., in having just reflected upon,
wherein it is no longer the living pure Ego but merely one of its comportments. This is
why the pure Ego is utterly mysterious to Husserl. As living towards something it is
never capable of being grasped in its living, i.e., in what Husserl calls its ”living now."
258
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 291.
235
longer a collection of individual objectivities in need of unification from outside – lived-
experience just is a unified nexus. That is, Dilthey does not believe that lived-experience
is grasped by objectifying reflection, which would “till the stream of experience” in the
way that Natorp criticizes Husserl of doing. In addition, particular lived-experiences are
not individuated by their object but by being related to such a structural nexus, a
[Erlebbare] constitutes <a nexus or system>. Life is a process which is connected into a
Dilthey's example of the grief suffered as a result of the death of a loved one
illuminates this,
for-me and an object. This as a whole is a "structural nexus." That is, the lived-
experience of grieving for a dead loved one is a structural nexus that is determined by
grief and whose object is what is grieved about. Grieving is a mode of life and grief is
always one's own. The object of grief is only in relation to the immanent teleological
259
Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics," pg. 223.
260
Ibid., pg. 224.
236
whole of grief. More generally, an object is only in relation to an immanent teleological
whole that forms a structural nexus. The object of grief is “real,” but grief is always
one’s own, i.e., one grieves. This is what Dilthey means when he says that lived-
the pure Ego perceives the object as perceived as one's own or mine. More concretely,
Husserl would argue that I grieve over the death of a loved one and that this becomes
mine when I reflect and see that the grief over the death of a loved one is mine. That it is
mine is mediately given to me through reflection. Dilthey reserves the term Erfahrung
for the “objective” moment of life, i.e., life insofar as it is directed toward an “external”
object. Erlebnis is the structural nexus of an immanent teleological whole that is a unity
thought that grasps the interrelation of the parts of an already present unified whole as
Dilthey also argues that "the concept of the present does not ascribe any
that transcends the present and includes the past and future. For example, the grief of the
death of a loved one is a structural whole that unifies a whole series of experiences most
237
something present, but already contains past and future within its
consciousness of the present.261
What, then, distinguishes the present from the past and future for Dilthey? Dilthey
What Dilthey means by this is that reality is a continuity that in itself contains no
determinations, no distinctions. A perhaps more simplistic way to put the point is that
reality is "pure filler." Reality per se is never directly experienced. Rather, reality is only
the ful-filling of an experience. As pure filler reality must be correlated with what is
of a lived-experience. This is why Dilthey can say, "[A] structural nexus appears in me
that is not grounded in objectivity, but rather in life and lived-experience itself.
According to Dilthey, reality is not the importation of the fullness of an objectivity into
is, reality is not the fulfillment of the death of a loved one (an objective state of affairs),
261
Ibid., pg. 225.
262
Ibid., pg. 225.
263
Ibid., pg. 224.
238
but rather reality is the fulfillment of the grieving over the death of a loved one (a lived-
experience). Dilthey says, "everything that is there for us as the fulfilling of time and
thus as the fullness of life is such only in this present."264 The index for the present is not
however, has its own appropriate present depending on the type of lived-experience it is.
The present of grieving over a loved one may be "measured" in days, weeks, months or
even years. For instance, the present could be the intense grief I feel over my loved one's
passing. The immediate past of this lived-experience is the shock I felt a day ago in
finding out about their passing. This is how this lived-experience of grief is ful-filled
with reality. This is quite different than the present of the lived-experience of watching
the clock during an excruciatingly boring lecture in which the ful-filling of reality is each
tick of the second hand. Lived-experiences are intertwined within one another as well.
This brings forth quite clearly the way in which the present is essentially tied to lived-
lived-experience changes from grief to the menial task and back again the present
changes with it from the days of grieving to the hours I am spending on this menial task,
etc. Reality ful-fills this present relative to the lived-experience being ful-filled. Thus,
Dilthey can say with Augustine that, “Therefore, I see that time is a kind of distention.”265
[Präsenz] in Dilthey's thought. Whereas the present, as we have seen, is the filling up of
264
Ibid., pg. 225.
265
Augustine, The Confessions, translated by John K. Ryan (New York: Doubleday, 1960), book 10,
chapter 23.
239
a lived-experience by reality, presence is a relation among lived-experiences themselves.
Presence is the “force” that past lived-experiences can have on a present lived-
experience. Presence, therefore, should not be confused with the present. Presence is
essentially a hermeneutic notion, i.e., how the past becomes incorporated with the
present,
...in the structural nexus of this temporal course, that which, although past,
endures as a force in the present receives a peculiar character as
presence....This word “presence” indicates that when a component of the
structural nexus of lived-experience recedes into the past, but is
experienced as a force reaching into the present, it obtains a peculiar
relation to the present in our lived-experience, namely, that of being drawn
or incorporated into it.266
reality according to its structural nexus, is the present. Presence is the incorporation of
past lived-experiences into this present lived-experience. Dilthey explains this idea by
mentioning how going to a museum in Munich and looking at Dürer’s painting of The
Four Apostles becomes a lived-experience. He says, “I cannot claim, however, that this
whole lived-experience lies in the picture or even in that which I focus on as meaningful.
266
Dilthey, “Fragments for a Poetics,” pg. 226.
267
Ibid., pg. 226.
240
Rather it includes its context, or milieu, etc., in short, the whole reality that constitutes the
and come back again, this too becomes part of the same, rich lived-experience. Lived-
experiences, Dilthey says, “are related to each other like motifs in the andante of a
symphony: they are unfolded [entwickelt] (explication) and what has been unfolded is
experiences of visiting the museum may be, something is explicated in them, and finally
This represents for Dilthey the hermeneutical movement of life, the ever
The entire lived-experience is itself made of parts that are themselves lived-experiences.
The entire lived-experience is unfolded in the unfolding of its parts such that each part is
is no particular role for the future to play. We have just seen that he says that lived-
role of the future in lived-experience? Does it play any significant role at all? The lack
of such a role for futurity will be a major component of Heidegger's criticism of Dilthey's
268
Ibid., pg. 226 – 7.
269
Ibid.
241
understanding of life and lived-experience, namely, that Dilthey edges perilously close to
(if not exclusively) with respect to the past and present (i.e., presence) and disregarding
mentioned are the meaning [Bedeutung] of lived-experiences. That is, a structural nexus
is a meaning. Since all lived-experiences are particular unities in life, Dilthey says that
meaning is a category of life. All things are meaningful only insofar as they are related to
one or another structural nexus of life. Dilthey says, “the meaning of life is the unity of
the totality of the parts and the value of the individual parts. This unity lies in the nature
we have seen, are complete, unified expressions of life. This is connected to lived-
argues that, "we naturally gather lived-experiences that have been fixed by their
life and totality of life. Illusion and its dissolution, passage from passion to reason, etc.:
this kind of completing process takes place in poetry, in conversations about our
experience lies in a system, i.e., a worldview. In a way lived-experience does this itself,
270
Ibid., pg. 230.
271
Ibid., pg. 228.
242
Lived-experience generates its own expressions. The latter are found in
literature, etc. These relations always contain a relation of subject and
object. In language, this relation manifests itself as an intuition or concept
(judgment) of objects, a feeling about, an intention to, etc. In each of
these expressions there is a relation which exists between a state of a
subject and an object. This in turn makes possible the objectification
process, which then gives us objects designated by a positive value, a
positive judgment, or a direction of will...whereas a fixed delimitation was
not possible for lived-experiences, this can be found for expressions and
objectifications.272
the following way. “As what is now past Dasein being grasped in advance in these
subjective, of the life of a culture (the soul of a culture) which presses forth into form in
these objectifications.”273
1919 lecture. Specifically we are in a good position to understand the way in which
Heidegger will approach the lived-experience of intentionality and the environing world
(Umwelt). The last chapter ended on these two aspects of the problem of metaphysics
that arose in the correspondence between Husserl and Dilthey. Intentionality and the
understands primordial science in his 1919 lecture, “The Idea of Philosophy.” This
272
Ibid., pg. 229.
273
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, pg. 29.
243
philosophizing up to (and beyond) Being and Time and will give us a better
last chapter, Husserl’s notion of intentionality bridges the gap between consciousness and
its object and is to be taken as a phenomenological unity of the noetic and noematic
moments of each. The whole analysis though is geared towards the givenness of an
object to a subject and so finds itself squarely within a theoretical, and more specifically,
through but is merely a "looking at." In considering the lived-experience of the question
"is there something?" [es gibt etwas?] Heidegger wishes to recapture what intentionality
primordially is and its relation to life and the environing world. In addition, this question,
Heidegger attacks the theoretical analysis of the question with respect to both the noetic
and noematic side of this interpretation. With respect to the noetic side, Heidegger
demonstrates, first and foremost, that an Ego (Ich) is not directly given in the lived-
experience of the question. With respect to the noematic side, Heidegger shows, that
what is questioned, namely, something in general, is not an object. Thus, we should not
addition, he will argue that no individual psychic nexus a-la Dilthey is given in this
fundamental lived-experience.
244
In good phenomenological fashion he cautions that we must stay close to the
simple meaning of the experience without importing interpretations or theories into the
lived-experience which are not explicitly "given" in the question. Moreover, Heidegger
this way he wants to avoid any rash objectification of the experience and wants to
understand the experience just as it is lived. Immediately one can see that Heidegger
removes the experience from an exclusively epistemological context. That is, for Natorp
and Husserl the "something" could only be understood from the perspective of the
something of knowledge, namely, an object. Here we are only considering whether there
is something not whether something is known. Consequently, a knowing subject need not
Thus, Heidegger cautions against importing any objectification into the lived-experience
of the question. That is, nothing should be inferred with regard to what is thought to be
necessary for the question, e.g., the psyche that questions, etc. This is only a
274
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 54.
275
Ibid., pg. 55.
245
presupposition of the objectivizing, theoretical attitude. As far as the question is
The question is lived-through and if we are to understand the sense of the question
as it is in itself "it is a matter of hearing out the motives from which it lives." Though
Heidegger does not dwell on it, this is crucially important. He goes on to say,
There is more going on here than simply Heidegger's attempt to fend off an objectified
understanding of motivation. If one "hears out" motives in this case, then these motives
are certainly not grasped through reflection. Moreover, in this case the motives are not to
be "seen" even in the broadest sense. Most importantly, the motives are to be heard and,
therefore, before being heard, must be expressed. The "pure motives" are inherent to the
meaningful expression of the question that goes along with the lived-experience of the
question. That is, the motive is not to be explained by means of its constitution within
pure subjectivity through reflection, i.e., by searching out the imminent "cause" of the
emergence of the question. This approach inevitably leads to the objectification (in a
"thingly way") of the motive and thus the meaning of the lived-experience of the
question. One must look to the unified nexus that that is expressed in the lived-
experience of the question, i.e., the "anything whatsoever," rather than constituting the
276
Ibid.,, pg. 55.
246
meaning of the "anything whatsoever" by means of reflection on past lived-experience.
This is why we must understand [verstehen] the motives and cannot explain [erklären]
In addition, the question cannot be motivated from the "noematic" side of lived-
experience. As Husserl himself argues, "It is inherent in the essence that anything
whatever which exists in reality [was auch immer realiter ist] but is not yet actually
experienced can become given and that this means that the thing in question belongs to
time."278 That the "anything whatsoever" cannot be given in this way seems clear
because the "undetermined but determinable horizon" of actual and possible experience
places eidetic limits on what can be experienced in this way and is, to this extent, always
more determinate than "anything whatsoever." In other words, in its very sense the
asked whether there are tables or chairs, houses or trees, sonatas by Mozart or religious
277
Cf., Husserl, Ideas, §47.
278
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 107.
279
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 57.
247
Of course perhaps Husserl could counter that this still leaves open the possibility
intuition. Heidegger considers this possibility, "What does the ‘anything whatsoever’
mean? Something universal, one might say, indeed the most universal of all, applying to
any possible object whatsoever. To say of something that it is something is the minimum
assertion I can make about it."280 Therefore, the sense of "anything whatsoever" is that of
the most general eidetic determination that can be given of an object. This represents the
bare minimum of motivational content that anything whatsoever has and it is the least
determinate of all the “undetermined but determinable” horizons that any object may
motivate. However, Heidegger argues that this interpretation does not capture the sense
The “anything whatsoever” cannot be motivated in any given object insofar as all by
itself it motivates the totality of motivations for some concrete object. That is, far from
being the most general and least specific motivational content, the meaning of "anything
whatsoever" always points to individual, concrete objects. For example, it motivates the
chair, the table, the sonata by Mozart, etc. The difference between the "something in
280
Ibid., pg. 57.
281
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 57. Heidegger holds on to this theme in Being
and Time as well. For example, "One may, however, ask what purpose this question is supposed to serve.
Does it simply remain - or is it at all - a mere matter for soaring speculation about the most general of
generalities, or is it rather, of all questions, both the most basic and the most concrete?" (pg. 29).
248
general" and the most universal eidetic "concept" is that the latter does not properly
motivate any particular object, but only motivates further, more specific, determinations
that would perhaps eventually motivate a particular object. The "something in general"
The "something in general," therefore, transcends all actual and possible experience.
This raises a problem, "In the final analysis it belongs to the meaning of 'something in
'relating' still remains problematic."284 This problem lies at the heart of Aristotle's
discussion of being. In the Physics, he asks rhetorically, "For who understands 'being
itself' [auto to on] to be anything but a particular substance [on ti einai]?"285 Aristotle
uses the typical Platonic construction of using auto to name the form of something, in this
282
We have here already begun to broach the problem of Heidegger's "particularism" which Michael
Friedman brings to the foreground in his book A Parting of the Ways. Cf., Friedman, A Parting of the
Ways, especially chapter 4.
283
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 96.
284
Ibid., pg. 57.
285
Aristotle, Physics, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited
by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 187a 8 – 9.
249
case the form of being or being-itself. Being-itself is always a particular existing thing,
more literally, "an existing this" [on ti einai]. Heidegger's later notion of the "ontological
distinction" between Being and beings develops this peculiar relation between the
or motivated in any being. On the other hand, the "something in general" is always
related to some concrete object, just as Being is always the being of a being. The issue
that is raised here in 1919 is the forerunner of the fundamental relation between Being
and beings that dominates Heidegger's concerns in the latter half of the 1920's, but which
Heidegger's response relies on the exchange between Dilthey and Husserl concerning the
"world-riddle." In the last chapter, we saw that Husserl's response to this question was
that the question of being is the question of how objects relate to consciousness, i.e., the
problem of intentionality.
given in the simple sense of the question "Is there something?" Heidegger considers and
rejects the thesis that in the experience of the question we find an "I comport myself"? In
286
Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pg. 17.
250
this case, we comport ourselves questioningly towards something. Heidegger argues that
if we stick precisely to what is given in the experience, we do not find even this,
'I comport myself' - is this contained in the sense of the experience? Let
us enact the experience with full vividness and examine its sense. To be
sure, it would be no ill-conceived reification and substantification of the
lived-experience if I said that it contained something like 'I comport
myself'. But what is decisive is that simple inspection [Hinsehen] does not
discover anything like an 'I'. What I see is just that 'it lives' [es lebt],
moreover that it lives towards something, that it is directed towards
something by way of questioning, something that is itself questionable...I
do not find anything like an 'I', but only an 'ex-perience [Er-leben] of
something', a 'living towards something'.287
Heidegger argues that in the simple sense of the question there is no 'I' whatsoever,
psychic nexus. The question radically excludes any of the traditional candidates for the
subject of experience. In an important sense we can see how Heidegger is getting back to
intentionality was the defining character of the psychical as opposed to the physical.
Broadening this thesis, if intentionality defines the subjective (in the broadest sense to
itself. Subjectivity is that which is intentional, not the other way round. Therefore, in
However, there are important distinctions still to be made. These distinctions will
287
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pp. 55 – 7.
251
experience of this fundamental question there is no subject at all. There is a relation to
myself as experiencing the question, but this does not imply that there must be an "I
respect to this relation between experience and the one who experiences, Heidegger
argues that "..it has a now, it is there [es ist da] - and is even somehow my experience. I
lived-experience does not require that we posit an "I" that experiences, rather lived-
experience bears a relation to oneself, namely, that the experience belongs to my life.
There is much in what Heidegger says that arises again in the Dasein Analytik of Being
and Time, namely that Dasein is not "in" the world, but is being-alongside (sein bei) the
world.
experience that imports an "I' into the experience of this fundamental question is his
understanding of what such an interpretation does to the experience itself. In this, the
lived-experience is no longer simply "there," but is already the positing of some object in
says, "I ask: 'Is there something?' The 'is there' [gibt es] is a 'there is' [es geben] for an 'I',
and yet it is not I to and for whom the question relates."289 As such, the theoretical
attitude towards the question prevents any authentic grasp of the sense of the question.
288
Ibid., pg. 58.
289
Ibid., pg. 58.
252
subject and a questioned object. In addition, the question presupposes some already
given doxastic attitude towards what is questioned. The question "Is there something?" is
not a question about an indeterminately specified, but pre-given object. On this view, the
question is directed towards a sought-after answer, but in its very specification the answer
superfluous. However, Heidegger believes this leads one away from the simple meaning
Following Natorp's analysis of the question, Heidegger argues that what stands in
question is not the something, but rather the "there is" (es gibt),
This question is in fact the fundamental question of all questions, because every other
question presupposes some determination of the "there is" (es gibt). That is, with respect
290
For instance, Heidegger says: "What do 'questioning' and 'questionability' mean?...If I bring this
experience to full givenness in its full sense and meaningful motives, can the essence of 'questionable' and
'questionability' be understood in an appropriate way? It is tempting to interpret the comportment of
questioning in relation to a sought-after answer. Questioning comportment is motivated, one might say, by
a desire to know. It arises from a drive for knowledge which itself originates from θαυµάζειν, astonishment
and wonder. If we were now to follow such interpretations and 'explanations' [Erklärungen], we would
have to turn away from the simple sense of the experience; we would have to abandon the idea of holding
on clearly to just what is given to us." Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pp. 57 – 8.
291
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg 57.
253
questioned. In other words, of something that "is there" for me, I can ask of it, whether it
moves or rests, etc. What is "in question" or "in questioning" is the potentiality for lived-
experience as such. That is, what is in question is the "is there" that is essential to
Dilthey's analysis of lived-experience as the way in which something is there for me (für-
mich-da ist). Just as any object is motivated by the "something in general" so too any
lived-experience is motivated in the "is there." As with the "something in general," the
"is there" transcends all actual or possible lived-experiences, e.g., something is valued, or
something is grieved over, etc. This is of vital importance because, as Dilthey argues,
What the fundamental question "is there something?" indicates is the transcendent
counterparts of this source in Husserl and Dilthey will further our analysis. According to
Husserl, the source of transcendent things, though not transcendence per se, is the
surrounding world (Umwelt). He says, "An object existing in itself is never one with
which consciousness or the Ego pertaining to consciousness has nothing to do. The
physical thing is a thing belonging to the surrounding world [Das Ding ist Ding Der
Umwelt]..."292 It is by means of the surrounding world that transcendent objects are "there
for me." However, the surrounding world itself is grounded in the actual immanent
lived-experiences of the pure Ego. Therefore, according to Husserl, the source of the "is
292
Husserl, Ideas, pg. 106.
254
there" is immanent subjectivity. Because of this, Husserl argues that transcendence per
in-itself." Put differently, in the natural attitude I actually live "transcendently" but the
Dilthey's views about the natural attitude are a bit more complicated. Dilthey
correctly sees that lived-experiences must belong to me and that through these lived-
experiences something is there for me. Reflection (Reflexion) will never capture this,
i.e., I cannot merely observe that things belong to me. I must appropriate them into the
experiences are unified in life not through objects. Dilthey says, "The meaning
Natural attitude."293 There is thus an obvious connection here between Dilthey and
Husserl. In a certain way, both Husserl and Dilthey can agree on the fact that the
meaning of things is inherent in them in the natural attitude. However, Husserl argues
that these meanings are constituted in pure subjectivity. It is only in reflection that these
meanings become explicit. In the natural attitude I am concerned with things, not
meanings. Dilthey argues however that the meanings of things are inherent (Immanenz)
that the meanings are entirely explicit in the natural attitude. Dilthey argues that in the
natural attitude, rather than being absorbed with things, we are absorbed with "chasing
after goals." In Husserl and Dilthey's views of living in the natural attitude we see the
293
Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics," pg. 230.
255
difference between theoretical transcendence and practical transcendence. According to
Husserl we live transcendently by living towards things and according to Dilthey we live
stepping back and disengaging from such transcendent living, by not being engaged in
If we step aside from our chasing after goals and calmly turn in upon
ourselves, then the moments of our life appear in their significance. This
is the natural view of life...The meaning of an event lies in the fact that its
causal nexus at the same time produces a value. For the man of action,
value lies in a goal, for the poetically inclined, value lies in every moment
of life.294
For both Husserl and Dilthey we must disengage ourselves from life and from the natural
brackets transcendence and the natural attitude. For Dilthey as well, transcendence lies in
the natural attitude. This is the attitude in which we are chasing after goals. In this
engagement we act towards a goal that is transcendent. Disinterest allows us to grasp the
meaning of life. This, for Dilthey, is the "...passage from passion to reason, etc.: this kind
of completing process takes place in poetry, in conversations about our experience of life,
in a philosophy of life."295 This process is no longer one of valuation, but rather of seeing
294
Ibid., pg. 230.
295
Ibid., pg. 228.
256
whole. The main concept here is the qualitative relation as based on the
qualitative determinateness of lived-experience.296
Dilthey replaces the theoretical philosophy of value with a philosophy of life, i.e., a
hermeneutic understanding of the totality life that articulates the nexus of relations that
make up its whole and part. Dilthey thinks that this can be accomplished only by
also of the lived-experience of the creative artist. Thus Kant stands corrected."297
Both Husserl and Dilthey discover meaning in immanence which for each means
disengaging from lived-experience itself so that it may become the object of inquiry.
Certainly they come at this from two entirely different perspectives. By disengagement
the goal of discovering (or perhaps better constituting) the eidetic, theoretical
superstructure of genus and species which captures the essence of lived-experience. For
Dilthey, disinterest is the result of disengaging oneself from "chasing after goals," i.e.,
from realizing values, in order to survey the totality of life and its nexus of interrelated
296
Ibid., pg. 231.
297
Ibid., pg. 227.
257
It seems, therefore, that in an important sense, both Husserl and Dilthey end up in
Husserl and Dilthey argue that philosophical thought is grounded in immanence, though
for both we live in the environing world wherein we experience transcendence whether in
the form of transcendent objects or transcendent values. In addition Husserl and Dilthey
"stand back" from life and view lived-experience. For this reason, neither understanding
inherent to lived-experience; for Husserl in the form of the protentions and retentions of
internal time consciousness and for Dilthey in presence and the unity of the "qualitative
that philosophy begins with "wonder" and is not pursued for a utilitarian end. Philosophy
is not a "productive science." Philosophy must stand back from life and lived-experience
the question "is there something?" - and significant, granted his reliance upon Aristotle
for a clue to the hermeneutic complex - is to challenge this very approach to philosophy.
As we have seen the very sense of the question resists any attempt to discover this sense
immanently. Either aspect of the question, namely the "something in general" and the "is
there," transcends lived-experience. That is, the something in general transcends any
258
actual or possible experience and the "is there" transcends any "qualitative determination"
addition, the question questions whether there is something, not whether something is
valued, or judged, or exists, etc. The sense of the question is utterly transcendent. There
However, I livingly experience the question, it is in some sense mine, it is part of my life.
The mistake that Husserl and Dilthey make is to think that only by disengaging
from life and thematizing lived-experience does one capture the disinterest and
indifference required for philosophy. It is not at all clear that this is what Aristotle means
that, in a certain sense, Aristotle himself inspires because of his contention that
philosophy must think only of that which is eternal and the best. Heidegger, on the other
hand, wants to understand the living experience of this fundamental question. He argues
that this does not rule out indifference. Heidegger claims that there are two forms of
298
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 134.
259
In critical indifference one "has already gone through the question and where neither
sufficient reasons for denial nor sufficient reasons for affirmation have been given. This
i.e., the relation of "is there" to something is "realized" without answering whether there
is something or not. The latter, namely answering whether there is something or not,
not. This Heidegger says, quoting Windelband, is "a real act of knowledge." For in the
the move through total indifference to critical indifference is the theoretical and
judge, i.e., whether one should evaluate. This is an epistemological concern - what is the
evidence necessary to judge so-and-so. This applies equally to Husserl's and Dilthey's
project. In fact it applies to any critical project. The move through the question to the
founded upon apodictic judgements. In other words, mistaking the total indifference
inherent to philosophy with critical indifference leads to the belief that philosophy is the
299
Ibid.
300
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 134.
260
As we have seen with Natorp, on the other hand, it is not a matter of moving
through the total indifference of the question to the critical indifference of the
problematic judgement. Rather, the connection is realized in the question is a task. The
task is not the attempt to discover evidence that will convert the problematic judgement
into assertion. Rather the task indicates the continuing determination of what is in
question. In the case of the fundamental question "is there something?" what is in
question is the "is there" in relation to "anything whatsoever." If one moves through total
indifference of this question to the critical indifference of the problematic judgement the
question "appears insignificant and even miserly."301 This apparently obvious move from
the question to the problematic judgement is precisely why the question seems so
unimportant, i.e., the evidence for asserting the positive moment of the problematic
so minimal and insignificant that it belies the fundamental importance of the question and
total indifference, namely, the relation between the "is there" and the something in
answered. Show me anything whatsoever and I can assert that "there is something."
Nevertheless, the simplicity of even this obvious answer is only apparent. The entire
Cartesian legacy is embodied in this "insignificant and miserly" move from total
indifference to critical indifference, from the question to the problematic judgement and
finally to apodictic assertion. For it is not just anything that can be shown to me which
will satisfy critical indifference, but only that of which I can be certain. Whatever is
301
Ibid., pg. 53.
261
shown to me I must be certain about, otherwise the problematic judgement remains. Any
doubt that creeps in will reawaken the problematic judgement whether there really is
something or not. Critical philosophy is driven into immanence because only there can
we be absolutely certain. For example, I cannot be certain that there is a chair, but I can
be certain that there is the appearance of the chair. This shows that there is something,
but only an immanent appearance. Genuine transcendence is lost in the move from total
the task posed by the question of knowledge and discounting any "positivistic" or
Heidegger does not wish to disregard critical indifference or the critical attitude,
but wants to understand it as derivative from total indifference, i.e., "The question is the
preliminary stage [Vorstufe] of the judgment, if one sees its nature in the evaluation
towards the critical interpretation of the nature of philosophy. That is, to resist mistaking
understand how transcendence is experienced rather than trying to find evidence for
something transcendent. In the very opening of part two of his 1919 lecture "The Idea of
that,
302
Ibid., pg. 134.
262
Already in the opening of the question [Frage-ansatz] 'Is there...?' there is
something. Our entire problematic has arrived at a crucial point, which,
however, appears insignificant and even miserly. Everything depends on
understanding and following this insignificance in its pure meaning...303
This indicates that in the total indifference of the utterly transcendent question "Is there
something" there already is something. There is the lived-experience of the question "Is
there something?" In his more mature thought, Heidegger will indicate this with Dasein,
What "is there" in the question is not an immanent realm of certainty but a conditioned
transcendence, since in order for the question of Being to be asked, i.e., in order for it to
way, the question of transcendence cannot be asked upon a ground of immanence. The
Heidegger sees this conditioned transcendence in the "natural attitude" of both Husserl
and Dilthey and more importantly Heidegger sees it in the environing world (Umwelt).
The environing world is where transcendence is lived, not absolutely but determined
according to world. It is within the environing world that the question of Being arises.
Heidegger attempts to delve into the environing world itself to analyze the experience of
303
Ibid., pg. 53.
304
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 27.
263
transcendence. Later Heidegger will characterize this conditioned experience of
experience of transcendence,
What is this vague average understanding of Being? Already there is something peculiar
about it insofar as it is a Faktum and not a Tatsache. It is not going to be a datum of one
of the positive sciences, not even history. Rather, the Tatsachen of the positive sciences
are derivative with respect to this Faktum. Heidegger's analysis of the environing world
attempts to capture what both Husserl and Dilthey saw but could not quite understand,
i.e., the "natural attitude." For Husserl, this is the way in which transcendent objects are
there for us in natural and naive positing and for Dilthey it captures the "man of action"
Both of the experiences that Heidegger considers in 1919 are designed to bring
into focus the difference between these experiences as they are lived in opposition to their
be objectified before it is available for theoretical reflection, which means it first must be
deformed from the way in which it is lived. The lived ground of meaning as far as
305
Ibid., pg. 25.
264
Heidegger is concerned has become alien to thought itself. Theoretical reason claims that
Heidegger argues that this deformation of the world is itself merely the by-
product of the theoretical and epistemological attitude. There are two aspects to this
attitude. The first is that the world is characterized in relation to the knowing subject.
The world is what stands over against the "I." The world is the totality of objects that the
subject can actually or possibly comport itself towards. In this sense, the world becomes
The second is that the world as lived in concrete lived-experience, i.e., the environing
world, is unknowable. That is, if the world is to be known, then it, like every other object
of knowledge, can only be known properly by standing back from it, by not being
engaged in it and by conceptualizing it. That is, it must be objectified according to the
The first stage of the theoretical process of determining the meaning of the world
is to examine how the world is "given." How is the world "immediately" given. Tables
and chairs and all sorts of objects are given to us. One looks around and sees objects.
Though, as modern philosophy points out, these are not "immediately" given to us.
Rather, when one stands back from our engagement in the world, what is given to us is an
immediately given at all. Adumbrations are immediately given and through these
adumbrations and the motivated horizon of the stream of lived-experiences objects and
265
horizon of all objects and possible objects of experience are brought into view. This is
the meaning of the environing world. The environing world is this meaningful world
the natural attitude. The meaning of the environing world is constructively constituted
according to the objective requirements of theoretical. This objectified world and the
objects within it are what Heidegger will later call the "present-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit).
However, this is the environing world understood from the perspective of the limitations
imposed upon "givenness" by the theoretical, reflective attitude. This is the reason
reflection inflicted upon the environment. Thus 'givenness' is already quite probably a
theoretical form, and precisely for this reason it cannot be taken as the essence of the
theoretical reflection rather than the lived "immediate environing world." Standing back
from lived-experience and merely "viewing it" forces one to construct a world that is an
aggregate of distinct actual and possible objects of objective experience. The world
themselves are objects (broadly construed), either individual relations between individual
objects or relations of genus and species of individual objects or even objective goals and
values. By relaxing our indifference with regard to this world and its objects, we "busy"
ourselves with them and become engaged in the world. We stop concerning ourselves
306
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 75.
266
with the meaning of the world and live in it. Living in the world is the change in attitude
However, the indifference in this case is critical indifference, it is not the total
not concern, but critical concern, i.e., the positive sciences. Critical indifference makes
evident the relation between thought and evidence, while in critical concern this universal
relation is concretely worked out by the positive sciences. The attitude of critical
indifference grounds the intrinsic meaning of the relation of thought to evidence, i.e.,
truth. In order to grasp the relation of thought and evidence, the attitude of critical
indifference can only properly be directed towards what is immanent. To direct oneself
upon the basis of immanence though it is, simultaneously, directed towards what
surpasses immanence, e.g., actual objects and values, and therefore can only properly be
carried out hypothetically. Critical concern is critical indifference put into "actual
practice." It is concretely working out the actual structures of the relation of thought and
everydayness is "naive." This is why, from the perspective of the theoretical attitude, the
Though as Heidegger argues this simply confirms the starting point. That is, this
view of the world takes the positive sciences themselves as its guide. Husserl and
267
Dilthey certainly take this approach. They are concerned not with the everyday
environing world, but with the environing world as it is approached in the sciences. The
fact that Husserl emphasizes the natural and mathematical sciences and Dilthey the
human and cultural sciences creates the illusion that there is a fundamental difference
at all. They both start with the view that the purpose of philosophy is to ground the
immanence leads Heidegger to conclude that the two dominant critical approaches to "the
epistemological question of the reality of the external world," namely, critical realism and
reveals the inability of any theoretical approach to capture the environing world as it is
Both critical realism and critical-transcendental idealism attempt to grasp the reality of
the external world, and thus the environing world, by grounding it in immanence.
However, as we have seen, this is not possible. Though one can give a sense and
307
Ibid., pg. 73.
268
For Heidegger, the fundamental question of philosophy, namely the question of
Being, signifies utter transcendence both in respect of what is under interrogation and
how it is to be interrogated. With regard to such a seemingly basic and simple question
the approach through immanence is not only hopeless, but a stumbling block. It is a
stumbling block because it collapses our immediate experience of the transcendent, i.e.,
our experience of the environing world in the "natural" attitude, into the utterly alien
world given (or constituted) in immanence. The environing world from this perspective
is naive, unrefined, and more importantly, not even a legitimate object of knowledge, i.e.,
properly nothing. In this way, our immediate experience of the transcendent has been
nullified.
environing world that I am constantly engaged with in everyday life has become
impossible. The world and things within the world are no longer "encounterable" and do
not "touch" me. "The object, being an object as such, does not touch [berührt] me."308
my relation to objects in the world is forever mediated through a third thing, viz., a
relation. Moreover, this must be the case because, in an objectified world, I and the
308
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 62. This theme emerges explicitly in Being
and Time as well. For example, "...'The chair "touches" ['berührt'] the wall'. Taken strictly, 'touching' is
never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate re-examination will always eventually
establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never
touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the chair could touch the wall,
this would presuppose that the wall is the sort of thing 'for' which a chair would be encounterable. An
entity present-at-hand within the world can be touched by another entity only if by its very nature the latter
entity has Being-in as its own kind of Being...When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and
furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be'
'alongside' the other." (Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 81 – 82.)
269
object of my regard are distinct objects and are thus meaningfully independent and self-
contained. Theoretical reason must posit a third object, which is itself meaningfully
regard. The meanings of these three things are not essentially interconnected but are
rather brought together in a "synthetic unity." This synthetic unity does not affect the
inherent meaningfulness of its "component parts", but is rather brought in "from the
outside" to connect together the component parts. An indication of this is that the
identical components can enter into different synthetic unities while remaining essentially
the same. "Transcendence" is to be mediated through this intermediate third thing, but
only if I live through it. But it is precisely this living through that is in question. I live in
the environing world, but this has been collapsed into a world in which life has been
removed, i.e., the objectified world. If things are to be "encountered" this cannot be
mediated through yet another object with its own inherent meaning. The objectified
world constructed by theoretical reason is not the world in which we livingly and
The environing world, as Heidegger understands it, must allow for meaningful
engagement without divisive objectification. That is, there must be some context or
"space" [Platz] in which myself and entities are meaningfully "located." Although,
Heidegger is careful to point out that this should not be theoretically construed along the
lines of a space which "contains" myself and entities as one present-at-hand thing can
309
For instance, in §12 of Being and Time Heidegger says, "What is meant by "Being-in"? Our
proximal reaction is to round out this expression to "Being-in 'in the world'", and we are inclined to
270
is Heidegger's notion of the "environing world" which later develops into his notion of
Being-in-the-world. This is the world which makes possible all of our transcendent
encounter and engagement with the world, or as he calls it, the environmental experience
and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it aside."310 Soon
after his 1919 lectures he drops the expression lived-experience and replaces it with the
"Everydayness" indicates the way in which I encounter things in the environing world as
they manifest themselves in immediate, everyday experience. That is, this is the way the
world strikes us prior to reflection or scientific comportment. Choosing this term helps
Heidegger indicate the immediacy of life without worrying about external, philosophical
standpoints being smuggled in, which is a likely possibility when one uses an expression
like "lived-experience" which had become such an integral part of the philosophical
understand this Being-in as 'Being in something' ["Sein in . . ."]. This latter term designates the kind of
Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the
cupboard. By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in' space have to
each other with regard to their location in that space...All entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be
described have the same kind of Being - that of Being-present-at-hand - as Things occurring 'within' the
world." (pg. 79).
310
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 55.
271
Heidegger's example of our everyday experience of the environing world in his
1919 lectures truly shows how mundane, i.e., how "everyday", the experience is that he is
trying to indicate. Heidegger uses the experience of coming into a lecture hall. He first
contrasts the theoretical interpretation of this experience with how we experience it in its
everydayness,
You come as usual into this lecture-room at the usual hour and go to your
usual place. Focus on this experience of 'seeing your place', or you can in
turn put yourselves in my own position: coming into the lecture-room, I
see the lectern. We dispense with a verbal formulation of this. What do 'I'
see? Brown surfaces, at right angles to one another? No, I see something
else. A largish box with another smaller one set upon it? Not at all. I see
the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you
are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously. In
pure experience there is no 'founding' interconnection, as if I first of all see
intersecting brown surfaces, which then reveal themselves to me as a box,
then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I
attach lectern-hood to the box like a label. All that is simply bad and
misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the
experience.311
This is what my immediate lived-experience of the environing world looks like from the
Husserl's own description of what "immediate" experience is. That is, I experience the
into an object, a thing. Heidegger's description of this inauthentic grasp of the environing
world remains in his writings through the 1920's. In 1923, in his lecture course
Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger is even more brazen, though still not
explicit, about mimicking Husserl's own descriptions.312 He describes it as the way the
311
Ibid., pg. 60.
312
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, §19.
272
things are given "in the flesh" or "in person" [leibhaft] which is Husserl's phrase. In
1923, Heidegger also traces this description to the influence of Greek philosophy,
Like all traditional ontology and logic, [this] description stands within the
unchecked sphere of influence of the fate which with Parmenides was
decided for our intellectual history and the history of our Dasein, i.e., for
the tendency of their interpretation: ... "perceptual mean-ing
[vernehmendes Vermeinen] and being are the same."313
Moreover, this is the way in which the world looks from the perspective of critical
consciousness. That is, it is the world as it is seen and, as such, could be evidence for a
The origin of critical indifference lies in the reduction of authentic being to beings-
which-are-there to perception. Put another way, nous is reduced to the nous of episteme.
The nous of phronesis, is gradually subsumed under the nous of episteme. Phronesis is
the mode of human understanding that grasps life according to its own terms. For
Aristotle, phronesis has as its proper object human life in its particularity as opposed to
the universalities that are the object of episteme. Given this, the subordination of the
nous of phronesis to that of episteme results in the neglect of the living character of life
and lived-experience or, worse yet, the outright deformation of life and lived-experience.
Given Dilthey’s influence on Heidegger’s early thought and the former’s emphasis on the
313
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 70.
314
Ibid., pg. 70.
273
relation between life and world, the problem of the relation between these two forms of
Heidegger remarks that, "The total domain of what is real can accordingly be divided into
two realms: things in nature and things of value - and the latter always contain the being
of a natural thing as the basic stratum of their being."315 Dilthey went some way towards
overturning this relation of subordination. However, reality for Dilthey still remains the
I see the lectern in one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation, but as
adjusted a bit too high for me. I see - and immediately so - a book lying
upon it as annoying to me (a book, not a collection of layered pages with
black marks strewn upon them), I see the lectern in an orientation, an
illumination, a background...In the experience of seeing the lectern
something is given to me from out of an immediate environment
[Umwelt]. This environmental milieu (lectern, book, blackboard,
notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-care,
etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as
meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately
given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented
apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and
always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case
that 'it worlds' [es weltet], which is something different from 'it values' [es
wertet].316
315
Ibid., pg. 68.
316
Ibid., pg. 61.
274
The last contrast that Heidegger makes between "it worlds" and "it values", is important
for discerning the way in which he understands the "it worlds" and the world. Heidegger
contrasts his notion of "it worlds" from "it values" to distinguish what he is doing from
school of Neo-Kantianism. The values in this school are the "abstract values" that
chapter one, Heidegger sharply criticizes value-philosophy for its inability to specify how
these values are manifested within lived-experience. Dilthey grounds them within the
structure of life, although as we have seen they are still immanental structures.
the human sciences. The form of generalization proper to the natural sciences prescinds
from its individual instances, i.e., the general concept or essence "abstracts from" the
individuality of its instance. For example, the universal concept "atom" or "atomness"
expression in the notion of genus and species. There is another form of generalization
however that is not abstract but which remains at the level of concrete individuality.
generalization at work in the human sciences. For instance, German Romanticism is one
275
than, say, someone who lived through this period of history, e.g., Goethe, it is at the same
time individual and concrete. That is, it is senseless to talk of German Romanticisms as
if it were some sort of genus or species. German Romanticism is a general notion that
unifies many distinct things, e.g., individuals such as Goethe, institutions, historical
particular. Moreover, it too can "fall under" more general notions, e.g., European
historical reality, individuals are never isolated. All objects of history are rather parts of
a larger whole with which they stand in a real nexus. As we have seen, the abstractions
of natural science destroy this nexus and isolate instances. History cannot proceed in this
way. It becomes the science of the unique, real event only by means of a representation
of the historical nexus."317 Heidegger often uses the term "referential totality"
because Windelband and especially Rickert interpret these nexus theoretically. That is,
they still ultimately view a nexus as an abstraction from concrete, immediate lived-
experience though they see them as abstractions of a particular kind, namely, those that
escapes both its own representatives and Dilthey. In Heidegger's description of the
317
Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, pp. 62-3.
276
everyday environing world, these nexus are transcendent. That is, they are not
coordinated with a critical subject, either a transcendental "I" or a psychic nexus. That
the lectern is "adjusted a bit too high for me" or that the book "is annoying to me," is
neither a value predicate that a transcendental I superimposes upon a natural object nor is
or book. The former only appears within theoretical reflection (Reflexion) and the latter
within reflexive awareness (Innewerden). The lectern as adjusted a bit too high for me,
the book as annoying, the lecture room, the university building, etc., are there in “one fell
swoop.” These are nexus that are immediately there in the transcendent environing
world.
Heidegger's notion of the environing world is a nexus in the way just described.
In fact, it is the most general nexus for that which is not Dasein. The environing world is
the nexus in which all life "takes place" including all “comportments” toward the world.
For this reason, it cannot be objectified, i.e., it cannot be made an object of theoretical
reflection. Rather, every theoretical comportment towards the world takes place "within"
the environing world is not an abstraction. It is particular, individual, and concrete. The
engaged in the world, whenever one encounters the world, the environing world is
"there." The environing world is the world that Dasein lives in.
The experience of the environing world is not distinct from the experience of the
question “Is there something?” The two are connected in a crucial respect. That is, “in
the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an immediate
277
environment...the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any
something is given to me from out of the environing world. The structural nexus of the
environmental milieu is the meaning. That is, the meaning of the lectern is inseparable
from the structural nexus in which it is located. Even speaking in this way is misleading
as the lectern and “its meaning” are not distinct entities. Living in the environing world
experience is transcendent.
Something is seen, Something is adjusted a bit too high for me, Something is annoying to
me. The theoretical and critical attitude can only interpret the something as an object.
The “there for me” also becomes objectified, i.e., it is the “I.” I intend objects. This is
the crux of the theoretical and critical attitude, namely, an I over against an object. In
there is thought (the “I”) and evidence (the object as given in intuition). For Heidegger
this process is lived. It happens in life. However, this process is a structure of life whose
goal is de-vivification (ent-leben). One critically “steps back” from living and from life.
This is not the first step back from life however. There is a subtle distinction in
attitude between total indifference and critical indifference. In the experience of the
question "is there something?" there is no "I" though in some sense the question is there
for me. When "it worlds" I am always there in the sense that it worlds for me, e.g., the
278
lectern is my proper place in the lecture-room, the book is annoying to me. Heidegger
says that, "only through the accord [Mitanklingen] of this particular 'I' [jeweiligen
eigenen Ich] does it experience something environmental, where we can say that 'it
worlds'."318 Again, in this Heidegger exhibits the influence of Dilthey insofar as the latter
will be a very important theme of his work, viz., Dasein is its Being-in-the-world. Lived-
On the other hand, in the experience of the question "is there something?" I myself am
not to be found. The "anything whatsoever" does not "world." Though this is my
experience I do not resonate with the “anything whatsoever.” Heidegger says the
question forces back my I. Though this can take subtly different forms. In theoretical
objectification my I is forced back but is forced back in such a way that it is “firmly
fixed,” i.e., it becomes an I, for example, Husserl's pure Ego or Kant's unity of
318
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 62.
319
This term will become especially important in Heidegger’s later work.
320
Ibid., pg. 63-4.
279
apperception. It is a content-less I that accompanies all theoretical comportments. This
is the result of the process of de-vivification. In addition, objectivity per se is the firmly
fixed counterpart of the theoretical I. This is the utterly rarified highest genus of the
process of theoretical abstraction. Heidegger remarks that this is “...the utterly empty and
formal character of the objectified ‘something’. In this all content is extinguished, its
absolutely world-less, world-foreign; it is the sphere which takes one’s breath away and
where no one can live.”321 This is consistent with the initial dogmatic characterization of
Being in Being and Time that takes it to be the “most universal and the emptiest of
However, there is another way in which the “anything whatsoever” can force back
my I. In this case it is the utterly transcendent something that forces back my I. This is
transcendence of the environing world to the point where both myself and the environing
world are forced back not through a firm fixing of the “anything whatsoever” but through
total indifference. This is utterly transcendent something is what Heidegger calls the
worldly something is something that “worlds.” Heidegger also calls this the “formally
321
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 95.
322
Heidegger, Being and Time, ¶ 1
280
obviously greater...The environmental is something; what is worth taking
is something; the valid is something; everything worldly, be it, for
example, aesthetic, religious or social in type, is something. Anything that
can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its
genuine world-character. The meaning of ‘something’ is just ‘the
experienceable as such’.323
This of course is to be distinguished from critical concern whose foundation never goes
beyond immanence, i.e., the dichotomy of thought and evidence. Dasein's concern goes
out towards the worldly something and, because of its transcendence, it is improperly
is still meaningful in the way previously specified. That is, its meaning is grounded in
the structural nexus of the environing world and the more specific nexus therein. It is for
323
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 97.
324
Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 83-4.
281
of-mind) and understanding (verstehen) in Being and Time. This carries Dilthey’s
knowledge.
In addition, Heidegger argues that there are "two fundamentally different sorts of
the theoretical."325 The immanent theoretical something is the most general abstraction
of the process of de-vivification. On the other hand, within the environing world lies
critical concern. This attitude has as its object the worldly something though purely
through the perspective of merely "looking at it." This is not yet de-vivification. The
something as merely "looked at" still remains within the purview of concern, though only
structure that unifies lived-experience and transcendently so. Critical indifference, on the
other hand, excludes the concernfulness of critical concern and thus makes problematic
any form of genuine transcendence. Because of this, the attitude of critical indifference
the status of metaphysics and ontology. Being is reduced to the critical notion of the
"real." As critical, the real (and a fortiori Being) is that which can be thought, namely,
that which can be determined within and by the theoretical structures of de-vivification,
This critical indifference produces the problem that vexed post-Kantian thought,
thought” that arose again and again in our exposition of the Neo-Kantians, Husserl,
325
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 96.
282
Natorp, and Dilthey. If determination is ultimately a product of the transcendental
without. This leads Lask to question the justification of the transcendental categories
something experienceable is still brought along from this experiencing, with which one
does not know what to do, and for which the convenient title of the irrational has been
invented.”326 It was not until Heidegger had broken the hegemony of the theoretical
clarified.
potentiality for meaning insofar as every unified, total nexus of lived-experience lives
towards a worldly something. However, the lived-experience of the question “is there
because of the total indifference that accompanies this fundamental question. The pre-
worldly something arises in an attitude of indifference that transcends even this worldly
something. Total indifference does not mean that one “steps back” from the world, but
that transcendence has become so intensified that one has transcended the world to such
326
Ibid., pg. 99.
283
The indifference of the ‘anything whatsoever’ in regard to every genuine
world character and every particular species of object is in no way
identical with de-vivification...It does not mean an absolute interruption of
the life-relation, no easing of de-vivification, no theoretical fixing and
freezing of what can be experienced. It is much more the index for the
highest potentiality of life. Its meaning resides in the fullness of life itself,
and implies that it still has no genuine worldly characterization, but that
the motivation for such quite probably is living in life. It is the ‘not-yet’
[Noch-nicht], i.e. not yet broken out into genuine life, it is the essentially
pre-worldly.327
As is clear from the above text, the pre-worldly something is also not an intensification of
actualization. Rather it is the pure potentiality of world. The environing world is, in fact,
living towards the pre-worldly something. However, one can also relax this
intensification (which is the everyday way of living) and live towards a worldly
something. This form of life is concern. That is, the worldly something is the pre-
worldly something as concernfully lived towards. Heidegger remarks that, “...the sense
of the something as experienceable implies the moment of ‘out towards’ [auf zu], of
‘direction towards’ [Richtung auf], ‘into a (particular) world’ [In eine (bestimmte) Welt
hinein], and indeed in its undiminished ‘vital impetus’.”328 This is the way in which one
meaningful as such. In the question “is there something?” the pre-worldly something is
not meaningfully intended as what “is there.” The pre-worldly something by its very
327
Ibid., pg. 97.
328
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 97.
284
nature transcends meaning. However, it does not transcend meaning in the sense that it is
therefore, meaningfully. Or, put another way, the worldly something is the pre-worldly
something as meant.
is. The pre-worldly something is experienced in the lived transition between "worlds" or
The pre-worldly something is the potentiality for any "worlding" whatsoever. In this
sense, the pre-worldly something “underlies” the transition from one world to another. In
this sense, and after Dilthey, the pre-worldly something is the potentiality for history,
since it is the “unity” that underlies history understood as the movement that expresses
itself in a worldview. This movement is what Dilthey means by life. Thus life is
essentially correlated with the pre-worldly something as that which life is living towards.
For this reason, the relation between the worldly something and the pre-worldly
connects meaning with the structural nexuses of lived-experience, though for Heidegger
these are transcendent nexus. A world is the most general nexus of meaning. It
329
Ibid., pg. 97.
285
encompasses all more specific nexus, e.g., historical, practical, scientific, religious, etc.
Heidegger argues that the “universality” of word meanings is grounded in its worldly
character. This “universality” clearly does not have its theoretical connotation of
grounded in the fact that words are expressions within the world whose meaning is
derived from the world. One does not need to search around in the realm of immanence
to discover what an expression means. Rather, since one lives “in” the world, meanings
are directly there for one and expressions merely signify these meanings. This does not
mean that expressions are always “clear” and “obvious.” It simply means that
worldly.”331 Meaning and expression for Heidegger are no longer exclusively grounded
transcendent, because everything worldly is situated and grounded within the meaningful,
transcendent nexus that is the world. Specifically, expressions are no longer mere
vehicles for the transmission of immanent thoughts. Whereas for Husserl (and many
other thinkers) the intersubjectivity and universality of meanings are the result of their
330
Ibid., pg. 99.
331
Ibid., pg. 98.
286
non-worldly character, for Heidegger it is their worldly character that makes both
character of all meaning and all expressions. In lived-experience one always lives out
However, this does not capture the origin of the worldly itself. Rather,
The pre-worldly signifying function expresses the meaningful appropriation of the pre-
appropriation of the world as something worldly. That is, world originates in the living-
structural unity of all lived-experiences, i.e., world. This is the transcendent equivalent of
332
Ibid., pg. 99.
287
reflexive awareness (innewerden). Though it certainly has more in common with
Dilthey's notion than with Husserl's. This is evident in the fact that both signifying
functions express the character of the event of appropriation rather than an imminent
"looking at." The characters they express are the meaningful appropriation of the pre-
worldly something in all lived-experience and the meaningful appropriation of that very
One can see in this the essential hermeneutic relation of whole and part as well as
What Heidegger intends is the "seizing hold of" or "possessive" character of hermeneutic
intuition. Heidegger’s use of the term "intuition" here is perhaps unfortunate since this
notion remains tied to Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger stops using it after 1919.
333
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 99.
288
However, as is evident from Heidegger's association of hermeneutic intuition with the
stripped of its theoretical and immanental character. Here, and throughout much of his
The “principle of principles” is what offers itself [darbieten] in the event of appropriation
[Ereignis]. What offers itself is the pre-worldly something, i.e., Being. It offers itself
always as a pure potentiality that is determined. The way it offers itself is as “is there”
[es gibt], i.e., determination per se. The result is the worldly something, i.e., the meaning
something. The character of Ereignis is already latent in Husserl’s hinzunehmen, that is,
the developing of the “towards which” that is towards the pre-worldly something. This
334
Ibid., pg. 92.
289
developing of the “towards which” happens in understanding by means of hermeneutic
intuition. This developing of the towards which is what Heidegger calls “life.”
just "precede" all principles it is the pre-interpretation of all principles. For instance, in
the theoretical attitude, the principle of all principles is objectivity, i.e., the pre-worldly
determine objectivity according to its principles. In the practical attitude, the pre-worldly
However, these are merely illustrative examples drawn from Neo-Kantian thought. They
even he dissolved this insight into the categories of post-Kantian thought, namely, the
principle. In this sense, the principle of principles is the source of all possible knowledge,
understood that the principle of principles is the appearance of objectivity as such - all
particular appearing objectivities being derivative and secondary to this. Though he did
not realize it, he was on the way to the worldly character of the theoretical project as
290
such. For, as we saw in chapter three, he recognized the historical character of this
project, though he could not appropriately understand or assimilate this because of his
own critical stance. He glimpsed what transcended the critical stance, but could not
himself transcend his own critical stance. In similar fashion, Dilthey, though coming out
of the provenance of the Geisteswissenschaften, saw more clearly than Natorp the
historical nature of thought, though again he himself was unable to transcend his own
interpretation of the principle of all principles through his engagement with Greek
understood in Aristotle’s sense of the primordial arche – the originary source. This
Aristotle, namely, whether there can be a science of Being. Aristotle correctly sees the
fundamentally peculiar nature of this science. Unlike the special sciences it cannot
presuppose a univocal genus because all determinations of this genus, i.e., its differentia,
would have being. Aristotle recognizes that Being and its determinations transcend the
structural hierarchy of genus and species. Both Being and its determinations are,
bypass this issue only because it is ignorant of it. The issue becomes one only of
knowledge, i.e., the theory of science itself. It does not recognize the peculiar nature of
the science of Being and, therefore, is able to reduce it down to the general theory of
science. The meaning of Being, in this case, is the meaning that being can have within
the theory of science. Because of this, Being is reduced to objectivity as such and the
291
meaning of this is grounded in the transcendental subject, that is, it is grounded in a
being.
For Heidegger, the meaning of Being or, in 1919, the event of appropriation of the
pre-worldly something, is the originary arche of all principles. The principle of all
principles and the principles themselves are not universal transcendental structures of
experience, but are, respectively, the “natural” movement of life toward the originary
of a world-view. The latter is a unifying, total expression of the world. All of this
explains why Heidegger says that the principle of all principles is,
Here we clearly see this movement that "goes along with life." The primordial intention
which" that is made one's own [Ereignis] through lived-experience by the hermeneutic
relation between the structural totality of lived-experience, i.e., world, and the lived-
335
Ibid., pg. 93.
292
This hermeneutic appropriation is for Heidegger, as it is for Dilthey, the
its contextualized parts. For example, the relation between a word and the sentence in
which the word appears. And the relation between particular notes and a particular
or a language, and vice-versa.336 Similarly, a note is heard always within the structural
nexus of, for example, a movement in a symphony, and likewise with this movement and
the whole symphony. Similarly, the lectern, blackboard, and desks are understood within
the general structural nexus of the lecture hall and vice-versa, the lecture hall within the
university and vice-versa, etc. These are not static structures however. Hermeneutic
understanding is a movement and essentially so. This is clear in the first examples we
gave. Each word of a sentence is always understood on the basis of the totality which
includes what has been read, what is being red, and what will be read. In the hearing of
Heidegger mentions that the primordial bearing of life is always seen, even from
the theoretical perspective. This is shown in the fact that Husserl "sees" the environing
world in the natural attitude [natürlichen Einstellung] even though he attempts to escape
336
For example, Dilthey writes, "...according to the relationship between the expression of life and the
spiritual meaning which exists within this common context, the spiritual meaning which belongs to the
expression of life is simultaneously brought to completion with its insertion into a common context. A
sentence is intelligible by virtue of the common context which exists, within a linguistic community,
through the meaning of the word and the grammatical forms as well as the sense of the syntactical
arrangement." (Wilhelm Dilthey, "Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life," pg. 127).
293
it by means of the epoche. Dilthey sees it when he says, "...when we step aside from our
chasing after goals and calmly turn in upon ourselves...then the moments of our life
appear in their significance."337 This he calls the natural view of life [natürliche Ansicht
des Lebens]. In each case the primordial bearing is seen, but not lived. In the theoretical
attitude one steps back from life by attempting to step out of life - one attempts to halt the
movement of life in order to capture it in static structures. The basic bearing becomes
absolute only when it is lived. That is, it becomes something transcendent when one
lives in it. Phenomenological life, Heidegger says, is this basic bearing in "its ever-
overnight, like putting on a uniform, and it will lead to formalism and concealment of all
routine."338 The primal habitus of the phenomenologist is identical with life in its ever
increasing intensification. A question that this raises, and that we are now in a much
better position to address, is: what is the being of life itself? Specifically, what is the
337
Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics," pg. 230.
338
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, pg. 93.
294
II. Philosophy as Praxis
Both Aristotle and Kant progressed far enough in the questioning of being to have
glimpsed the problem of the categories. For them this problem consisted of the unity of
the categories themselves. For both as well, the categories articulate the structure of the
limits of the experienceable as such. They were quite conscious of the peculiar nature of
the unity of the categories. Aristotle recognized that the unity of Being is quite different
from that of the categories, i.e., generic unity. Kant did as well.
Kant recognized that the unity of the faculty of reason is a different type of unity
from those of the faculty of understanding. The unities of the faculty of understanding
are rules by which appearances are unified. The unity of the faculty of reason unifies the
rules of the understanding. The latter unities, i.e., the principles of reason, are, for Kant,
Insofar as they are not applicable to appearances per se but to the understanding, they are
transcendent and unconditioned, i.e., they can never be given in experience. Properly
principles they drive reason onwards toward a “systematic unity of the manifold of
339
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 302, A301, B357 – 8. Kant goes on to elaborate this:
"Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and
reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.
Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in
order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which
may be called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind from any unity that can be
accomplished by the understanding." (pg. 303, A302, B359).
295
empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical knowledge is more adequately
secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would be possible, in
the absence of such ideas, through the employment merely of the principles of the
immanent task, i.e., the unification of all empirical knowledge. Even for Kant, however,
these principles have a very peculiar character that is not shared by the principles of the
transcends experience. Regulative principles, on the other hand, appear to posit real
transcendent unities which are unconditional, e.g., an ens realissimum. The regulative
Kant understands (in his own way) that regulative principles understood with regard to
their object attempt to grasp the relation between the worldly and the pre-worldly,
namely, transcendence,
340
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 550 – 1, A671, B699.
341
Ibid., pg. 552, A 674, B 702.
342
Ibid., pg. 516, A 617, B 645.
296
Kant, however, understands real transcendence as a real, actual object. That is, the
transcendent correlate of the regulative idea that lies “outside the world” could only be
the absolutely necessary, unconditioned ens realissimum which can never be experienced.
Therefore, since I can only objectively employ the regulative ideas as the unconditioned
condition of appearances and because this is utterly beyond the faculty of understanding,
subjective principles of reason.”343 That is, they guide the movement of subjective
thought towards a final unification that it can never actually realize. They describe, as
Natorp saw, the task of thinking rather than its object. Dilthey was able to broaden this
task beyond mere theoretical objectivity to a worldview that no longer unified merely
was to understand this task transcendently, but only immanently and subjectively as Kant
did.
Heidegger believes that Kant eyes something beyond this, but he “shrinks back, as
it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a
Specifically, Kant argues that when we think the object of a regulative idea,
We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the
concept provided by our understanding, but which also alone make it
possible for us to have a determinate concept of anything. What we then
think [denken] is a something [ein Etwas] of which, as it is in itself, we
have no concept whatsoever, but which we none the less represent
343
Ibid., pg. 515, A 616, B 644.
344
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 45.
297
[denken] to ourselves as standing to the sum of appearances in a relation
analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another.345
Alternately, what is “thinking” when it has no concepts? Furthermore, what does it mean
analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another”? These two aspects in
which we think this “something” indicate the movement of thought towards what
transcends conceptualization and how we try to in fact conceptualize it. The former is,
that came under such withering criticism immediately after Kant and was ridiculed as the
last naive vestiges of dogmatic metaphysics in his philosophy. It was to the latter that
many philosophers after Kant (and in many respects Kant himself) exclusively turned,
i.e., to understanding the way in which we think of something as the unity of the sum of
immanent subjectivity. Most philosophers following Kant were careful not to think this
unity of the sum of appearances in the same way in which appearances stand to one
another, but they were unwilling to consider that we can properly think of something
Heidegger focuses on the “metaphysical” nature of Kant’s thought, rather than the
outcome of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lies in what it has contributed towards the
345
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 552, A 674, B 702.
298
working of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a ‘theory’ of knowledge.”346
Heidegger focuses on the question of how we can think of something that in itself we
have no concept whatsoever and, at the same time, think it in such a way that it is the
unity of the totality of experience. This question of course represents the fundamental
utterly transcendent it is the pure potentiality for world and, thus, for meaning. The
question arises as to what is the relation between the world and the pre-worldly
something or between the meaning of Being and Being? The answer, Heidegger
believes, lies in living discourse [Rede], though this certainly should not be understood
concrete.”347 Rather, discourse is Heidegger’s own appropriation of the Greek logos with
the same as deloun: to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse.”349
Heidegger sees this as the answer that Aristotle gave to the question. Kant argues that the
answer to the question of Being is the regulative idea of the unity of the sum of
appearances. Aristotle, on the other hand, was not concerned to give a transcendental
account of the unity of Being, i.e., one that merely specifies the limits of the thinking of
346
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 31.
347
Ibid., pg. 56. The full quote is: “When fully concrete, discoursing (letting something be seen) has
the character of a speaking [Sprechens] – vocal proclamation in words.”
348
Cf. Being and Time, ¶ 7, B.
349
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 56.
299
the unity of all thought. Rather, Aristotle was concerned to move forward toward a
positive account of the unity of Being, i.e., he was interested in the problem of the
science of Being distinct from and constitutive of the special sciences. Heidegger
believes that Kant, for all his insight, fell short of this fundamental ontological task,
Kant still took his cue to the task of metaphysics from the objectivity required by the
ontical sciences. From this starting point he could only have conceived of this task along
the lines he actually did. That is, the task of metaphysics is to specify the limits of the
articulation of the primary origin and principle (arche) “underlying” the categories. This
reaches its climax in Book IV of his Metaphysics.351 His first task is to distinguish the
350
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 31.
351
Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by W. D. Ross in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
300
science in question from the “so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats
universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of
this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.”352 This “attribute” that
Aristotle talks about is for Heidegger the “basic concept” (Grundbegriff) that guides a
The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a
fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that
domain of Being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined.
The ‘basic concepts’ which thus arise remain our proximal clues for
disclosing this area concretely for the first time.353
“Higher” than these basic concepts and attributes are the categories. Aristotle and
Heidegger do not understand these transcendentally. They are not basic unifications of
experience that are further determined according to the special sciences. That is, they do
not represent epistemic structures that, by lying behind the empirical sciences, make
possible those sciences themselves. An indication of this in the text from Heidegger just
quoted is that he says that the basic concepts arise out of “pre-scientific ways of
the categories see them not as pre-scientific, but as the fulfillment of science, i.e., the
theory of knowledge or, alternatively, the science of science. An indication that Aristotle
also does not understand the categories transcendentally is that “substance, in the truest
and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a
subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man [tis anthropon] or horse
352
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003a 20 – 25.
353
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 29.
301
[tis hippos]."354 Clearly, substance in the truest and primary sense of the word is not a
condition for the possibility of science. In fact, because scientific knowledge always
concerns the universal for Aristotle, primary substance is not even the object of science.
The same applies to being itself. In his Physics355, Aristotle asks rhetorically, "for who
understands 'being itself' to be anything but a particular substance [ti einai - some
being]?"356 It is interesting then to note how Aristotle understands the way in which the
sciences "cut off" a part of being to inquire into it. Aristotle in the quote from the
substance. For Kant, as well as for Husserl, asserting that something is a substance is the
least that one can assert of it. For Aristotle, the designation of primary substance is the
most that one can say of something, all else being separations from this primary
substance.
354
Aristotle, Categories, translated by E. M. Edghill in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 2a 11 – 13.
355
Aristotle, Physics.
356
Aristotle, Physics, 187a 8 – 9.
357
Ibid., 193b 32 – 36.
302
What about the "science of being qua being"? Is there such a science? If “being
itself” simply means some particular being and science always concerns the universal
(katholou), then how can there be a science of being qua being? For Aristotle, a science
requires that there be something to unify it. Famously, Aristotle says that there can be a
science of being because, although “being is said in many ways” [to de on legetai men
pollachos] it is always said “towards one and some one nature” [pros hen kai mian tina
phusin]358. Similarly, “everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the
sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense
...there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one
starting-point [archen]; some things are said to be because they are
substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because
they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or
qualities of substance...360
Our interest lies in the way in which Heidegger appropriates this discussion. What is the
starting-point [archen] of our researches into being? In what way is being discussed in
First, we must understand nature not in the modern way it is understood, i.e., in
opposition to the self or the subject. We must understand it in the Greek way as
exemplified by Aristotle. Aristotle says that, “nature is a source or cause of being moved
and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in
358
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003b 33 – 34.
359
Ibid., 1003a 35 – 1003b 1.
360
Ibid.,, 1003b 2 – 9.
303
virtue of a concomitant attribute.”361 Furthermore, nature is primarily "the end (telos) or
'that for the sake of which' (heneka)."362 The starting-point and the nature of the science
of being, although related, are different. For Aristotle, the starting-point of the science of
being is substance (ousia). However, what allows there to be a science of being is that
being is said in such a way that it is towards one and towards some one nature. That is,
discourse upon being is towards one and is a source or cause of being moved and of
being at rest.
ousia, is the domain of objects produced and that, as produced, are capable of being
The domain of objects supplying the primordial sense of being was the
domain of those objects produced and put into use in dealings. Thus the
toward-which this primordial experience of being aimed at was not the
domain of being consisting of things in the sense of objects understood in
a theoretical manner as facts but rather the world encountered in going
about dealings that produce, direct themselves to routine tasks, and use.363
That is, Heidegger claims that the primordial sense of being for Aristotle was the sense of
being of things in the environing world, namely, worldly things. It is specifically not a
theoretical grasping and addressing of objects in the theoretical sense. It is not being
361
Aristotle, Physics, 192b 22 – 23.
362
Ibid., 194a 28.
363
Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of
the Hermeneutical Situation,” pg. 127.
304
ousia, is determined in relation to the environing world, i.e., ousia is a worldly something
of lived-experience,
With the objects it addresses, legein takes beings in their beingness (ousia
[substance]) of their look into true safekeeping. But in Aristotle and also
after him, ousia still retains its original meaning of the household,
property, what is at one’s disposal for use in one’s environing world.364
In an important sense this is as far as theoretical philosophy had progressed. With the
exception of Dilthey, the tradition understood possession in the sense proper to the
primarily theoretical knowing. On the other hand, ousia does not exhaust the manifold
ways in which being is spoken of. It is but one of the categories of being.
being is the manifold ways of speaking of being. For Heidegger, being is not possessed
by means of ousia, since substantiality is only one of the ways or approaches to being.
According to Aristotle, the manifold ways of discoursing upon being are focused upon
one primary way of addressing being, ousia. However, as we have seen, primary ousia
itself is a way of addressing being, not being itself. More precisely, primary ousia, i.e.,
the worldly something, is itself a possession of " mian tina phusin" (some one nature).
The saying of being is toward one (pros hen) and toward some one nature. The question
becomes what is the "some one nature" towards which the saying of being is toward. Or,
as we have seen, since nature is in its primary sense an internal principle of movement,
towards what some one internal principle of movement is the saying of being towards?
364
Ibid., pg. 128.
305
The expressions of being per se, e.g., "ousia," are not internal principles of movement. In
themselves they are a way in which movement comes to a stand in the soul. In Aristotle's
Indirectly this gets at the heart of the issue that concerns Heidegger.
"habit," of the soul. This is to be sharply distinguished from a related Greek word, echon,
"to have or possess something.” As Heidegger points out in many contexts, Aristotle
understands man as zoon logon echon, i.e., a living being which possesses discourse.366
Logon is not a hexis of human being, but is an echon. Aristotle's discussion of the
distinction between these is significant and illuminating. Aristotle says that echon has a
number of meanings, the most important of which are: (1) an active sense, "to treat a
thing according to one's own nature [tropon kata ten autou phusin] or according to one's
own impulse; so that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to have their cities, and
people to have the clothes they wear"367 and (2) a passive sense, "that in which a thing is
present as in something receptive of it is said to have the thing; e.g. the bronze has the
365
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 100a 9 – 16.
366
For example, Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, chapter 2 and Heidegger, Being
and Time, ¶6.
367
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1023a 8 – 11.
306
form of the statue, and the body has the disease."368 The active sense of echon is a tropon
kata ten autou phusin, i.e., it is to have something in a direction, way, or approach
(tropon) that is in accordance with one's own nature. Thus, human being (as Zoon logon
echon) is the living being who essentially possesses discourse as a direction, way, or
approach in accordance with its own internal source of motion, i.e., its "for the sake of
which." However, one should not discount the passive sense of echon either, especially
in light of the importance of this aspect to Heidegger's further analysis of Dasein. That
is, human being is the living being that possesses discourse as "something receptive of it"
as the "bronze has the statue" or the "body has the disease." In this passive sense, human
being possesses discourse as its "for the sake of which." This ambiguity in Aristotle's
definition of man, namely, man as having discourse both as the way or approach to its for
the sake of which and as having discourse as its for the sake of which, is an ambiguity
Hexis has an analogous, though quite different meaning, from echon. Aristotle
368
Ibid., 1023a 11 – 13.
369
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1022b 3 – 10.
307
A hexis for Aristotle is a possessing or having that itself cannot be possessed. It is the
movement (praxis or kinesis) that is having itself. Importantly, this activity or movement
is not categorical, i.e., it is not directed towards ousia. This is explicit in Aristotle's
understanding of the categories insofar as echon is one of the categories, but hexis is
not.370 That is, one has something, an ousia, and is had by an ousia. However, the very
likewise one of the categories, since only an ousia can be produced. However, neither
action (praxis) nor movement (kinesis) is a category. That is, praxis and movement are
utterly different from poiesis, i.e., producing which has its telos in an ousia, what is to be
produced. For Aristotle, a praxis is a movement in which the end or “for the sake of
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative
to the end, e.g., the removing of fat, or fat-removal, and the bodily parts
themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this
way...this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an
end); but that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g. at
the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have
understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the
same time we are learning and have learnt)...At the same time we are
living and have lived well.371
Praxis transcends the categorical structure centered on ousia. For Aristotle, the activities
Therefore, when Aristotle says that man is the living being (Zoon) that possesses
(echon) discourse, this is a definition of man that is substantial, i.e., a definition of the
370
Cf., Aristotle, Categories, chapter 4.
371
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1048b 18 – 24.
308
substance human being. Man is the ousia that has discourse as something possessed
(either in the active or passive sense). The living character of this being as praxis, then,
has been subordinated to the categorical structures of thought. In other words, Aristotle
says that man is a living being, but when it comes to defining man, he gives a substantial
definition. Because of this, discourse has become a possession of a substance and the
The crucial aspect of what Heidegger argues here is that Aristotle took his cue for the
analysis of human life from a particular "logos." Namely, that logos for which being is
primarily ousia. In this way, both human life and discourse are understood substantially.
A human being is therefore understood as a substance that deals with, produces, and uses
substance, and does so primarily by manipulating and using speech. At the same time,
discoursing about being - of which ousia is but one particular manifestation. Aristotle,
however, does not directly grasp life itself (praxis) and its relation to being, discourse,
and world.
372
Heidegger, " Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the
Hermeneutical Situation," pg. 128.
309
This, I believe, is the issue that Heidegger sees Dilthey raising again in the
"world-riddle," the relation between and essential inseparability of the generality of the
world and the particularity and concreteness of life.373 However, Heidegger argues that
Dilthey too misunderstood the question of being and the question of the meaning of
being, particularly as it related to life. Dilthey is not alone in this. He in fact freed up
many essential structures of human life that had lain dormant since Aristotle. Dilthey had
taken the modern discussion of human life from its confinement to transcendental
subjectivity and towards lived-experience and life itself. Modern philosophy, on the other
strongly criticizes both Kant and Husserl's lack of insight into the being of "subjectivity,"
that is, their failure to provide an "ontology of Dasein." Heidegger argues that modernity
substance that knows. That is, when it comes to understanding human life, modernity
Kant adopts [the] definition of the ego as res cogitans in the sense of
cogito me cogitare except that he formulates it in a more fundamental
ontological way. He says the ego is that whose determinations are
representations in the full sense of repraesentatio. We know that
“determination” [Bestimmung] is not an arbitrary concept or term for Kant
but the translation of the term determinatio or realitas. The ego is a res,
whose realities are representations, cogitationes. As having these
determinations the ego is res cogitans...The ego which has the
determinations is, like every other something, a subjectum that has
predicates. But how does this subject, as an ego, “have” its predicates, the
373
That this is such an important issue for Heidegger places in doubt any straightforward “particularist”
reading of Heidegger, for instance, that of Friedman, et. al.
310
representations?...The having of the determinations, the predicates, is a
knowing of them.374
What is central to Heidegger's analysis of the Kantian subject is that it possesses (echon)
Zoon echon logon, wherein echon logon has been interpreted as possessing
representations rather than discourse. The modern subject possesses its attributes by
This subject not only is distinct from its predicates but also has them as known by it,
which means as objects. This res cogitans, the something that thinks, is a subject of
predicates and as such it is a subject for objects.”375 This is the culmination of the
In what way does the ego have its predicates? The ego has its predicates
characteristic of the modern subject. Knowing is the peculiar praxis and kinesis of the
modern theoretical subject. Once again, we see how influential Natorp's insight into the
understood that knowledge was the preeminent task, activity, and movement of the
modern conception of the self. However, this understanding of human being could only
go as far as knowledge could allow. It could never understand the peculiar human
ousia. Modern philosophy did not even go this far however, because it understood the
374
Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pg. 126.
375
Ibid.
311
movement of knowledge as distinct from the subject. The subject had a role to play but
the "unity of apperception," the "I think." Ultimately, it is the unity underlying the very
movement of knowledge and as all other substances are constituted in the objectivity of
from an epistemological perspective, also the ultimate hupothesis as well. That is, it is
something that cannot be given but must be presupposed. As hupokeimenon, the subject
and its "for the sake of which" is secondary to the matter, viz., the subject.
the meaning of being. Beyond Dasein’s activity of possessing worldly entities, viz.,
being-in-the-world, what is the intensification of life that allows Dasein to question the
Heidegger’s approach to this issue involves a hermeneutic that is illuminated not only by
376
Ibid., pg. 127.
312
Aristotle’s thought, but one which is deeply influenced by his reading of Husserl, Natorp,
and Dilthey and their approaches to this issue. Approaching Aristotle’s philosophy from
claim that the science of being relies on the “addressing and discussing” (legein) of
this discover the meaning of being. Aristotle’s account of the science of being does not
conform to this. Though the primordial sense of being may have arisen for Aristotle from
out of the beings of our dealings, the activity of proto philosophia relies upon our ways
of actually addressing and discussing being. Aristotle’s approach is, however, not totally
alien to phenomenology.
Heidegger argues that all meaning and all expression are lived, i.e., are worldly.
Given that being, i.e., the pre-worldly something, transcends the worldly, how can we
meaningfully discuss it? The answer lies in the fact that living discourse [Rede] is not
limited to what is meaningful. To bring this to the surface we need to turn to Husserl's
expression and meaning, Husserl makes a distinction that is fateful both in the
development of his thought, but also for its impact on Heidegger. Husserl remarks that
"Every sign (Zeichen) is a sign for something (etwas), but not every sign has 'meaning', a
'sense' that the sign 'expresses'."377 There are two types of signs, i.e., those that are
377
Husserl, Logical Investigations, investigation I, §I.
313
merely indications [Anzeichen] and which do not express anything378 and those that have
examples of the former, a flag as the sign of a nation, Martian canals as signs of the
existence of intelligent beings, etc. These, Husserl believes, do not express anything
because they have no meaning (Bedeutung). Like facial expressions, to another these
purely indicative signs "...'mean' something to him in so far as he interprets [deutet] them,
but even for him they are without meaning in the special sense in which verbal signs
[sprachlicher Zeichen] have meaning: they only mean in the sense of indicating."379
Examples of the latter, i.e., signs that have both an indicative and signitive function,
would be any meaningful expression of living discourse. In other words, these are signs
broader notion than that which pertains to these latter signs, insofar as expressions can be
378
Husserl says, "For signs in the sense of indications (notes, marks etc.) do not express anything,
unless they happen to fulfill a significant as well as an indicative function," (Logical Investigations, pg.
183).
379
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 188.
380
Ibid., pg. 183.
314
Here in embryo lies Husserl's argument for the banishment of meaning to the realm of
even in communication, is so only for a thinking subject. In other words, even in living
discourse, the spoken words are not meaningful apart from a thinking subject who enacts
their meaning, that is, only insofar as they indicate to another the “thoughts” of the
meaning.
381
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 189.
382
Ibid., pp. 191 – 192.
315
Most significantly, Husserl argues that the essence of indication lies in a motivational
The motivational connection that indication produces is not in itself a meaningful unity,
though through a further sense-giving act such a meaningful unity could be constituted.
For this reason, Husserl argues that indications and indicative connections “lack insight.”
of a further sense-giving act then this latter connection is capable of leading to insight,
namely, intuitive fulfillment. Having said this, the indicative relation is not to be reduced
relation is grounded in what is motivated by past experience, i.e., “that certain things may
or must exist, since other things have been given.”385 Importantly, the difference between
indication and the theory of the association of ideas of modern empiricism is that
383
Ibid., pg. 184.
384
Cf., Husserl, Logical Investigations, investigation I, chapter one, §4.
385
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 184.
316
“creatively, and produce peculiar descriptive characters and forms of unity.”386 This is
productive.
On the other hand, indicative relations can play no foundational role within
Husserl, can only rely upon meaningful connections and intuitive insight, i.e., on
immanent structures of consciousness. This is the only way that meaning, intentionality,
and objectivity could remain intact after the phenomenological epoche. Having said this,
it is not the case the Husserl had slipped back into psychologism.387 In other words, I do
not mean to suggest that for Husserl what is meant or intended in all cases is something
immanent. Quite to the contrary, one of the hallmarks of Husserl's philosophy (even in
the Logical Investigations) is that in most cases (e.g., in non-reflective acts) the "inner
experiences" and thoughts of a thinking subject are precisely not moments of the meaning
misunderstanding of meaning. Rather, for Husserl, the thinking subject is the source of
meaning as such, not a moment thereof or of its intended object. One can meaningfully
386
Ibid., pp. 186 – 7.
387
Though many of the critics of the Logical Investigations thought so and Husserl himself notes that
the language used in the Logical Investigations tends to suggest as much. For example, his reference to
"inner experiences" which Husserl argues, properly understood, is not psychologistic.
317
intend "transcendent" objects, though the meaning intention itself is "constituted" in an
act of consciousness. Heidegger goes much further and argues that meaning is not
constituted in the thinking subject or, more exactly, pure subjectivity.388 The source of
immanent, but transcendent. This issue is, of course, complicated by the fact that in
Being and Time meaning and transcendence is ultimately grounded in Dasein only one of
Dilthey, he believes that there are no expressions that are "isolated in mental life.”
Expression for Heidegger is always living discourse (Rede). In other words, expressions
are essentially both meaningful and indicative, meaningful insofar as they have a worldly
Since Dasein is, ontologically, being-in-the-world, Dasein’s expressions are worldly and,
therefore, both meaningful and indicative and transcendentally so. For instance, contrary
to Husserl, the expression “the cat is on the mat” is meaningful insofar as the expression
has a worldly character and indicates a worldly something. This expression does not
indicate the “inner experiences” or “thoughts” of the one who expresses it, but the
worldly something that is the cat on the mat. Husserl believes that the expression
388
This, of course, does not mean that the source of meaning transcends Dasein, but Dasein is not
reducible to "pure subjectivity."
389
While Dasein always finds itself within a totality of involvements and hence the significative context
that makes up worldhood, such a totality is ultimately significant in terms of its own project. Hence,
strictly taken “only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless.”
318
capable of intending an objective state of affairs (“the cat is on the mat”) which could be
phenomenological life, life expresses itself. It expresses itself as world. What is the
meaning of world? We have already looked at this. The meaning of such an expression
is the total, unified nexus of lived-experience. More importantly, what does world
indicate? It indicates the pre-worldly something, i.e., being. In 1922, Heidegger calls
Philosophical definition is living discourse at the limit of the meaningful. It is the living
discourse that transcends world and meaning as such. It can only accomplish this
being, namely the primordial living discourse which indicates (kategoreo) being. As we
have already seen, this is how Aristotle understands the categories. For example, he
390
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological
Research, pp. 16 – 7.
319
argues that the discourse or saying of substance is primarily some particular substance,
e.g., some man or some horse. The latter is not discourse but some being. Beings are
Discursive thought is the way in which human beings possesses beings and ultimately
relies on the categories. Significantly, Aristotle says that thought is always of the
(immanent) meaning. On the other hand, when Aristotle explains what he means by a
is a particular form of discourse. He says, “By the term ‘universal’ I mean that which is
meaning under which individuals are subsumed as particular instances. For Aristotle,
even universals are what they are only as they are employed in living discourse.
philosophy and science. All scientific knowledge for Aristotle consists in demonstration
from first principles. However, the first principles are themselves indemonstrable. It is
by means of definitions that the first principles are acquired. For, “the basic premisses of
demonstrations are definitions, and it has already been shown that these will be found
391
Aristotle, On Interpretation, translated by E. M. Edghill in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 17a 38 – 39.
392
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 90b 23 – 27.
320
Aristotle goes on to argue that, “definition is an indemonstrable statement [logos] of
Aristotle believes, be the truth that applies to judgments, since the latter are all synthetic
combinations that presuppose the categories and so have a derivative sense of truth. For
However, Aristotle distinguishes between the sense of "true" whose contrary is error and
another sense of "true" whose contrary is not error, but ignorance. This latter sense of
"true" is "primary truth" which "causes derivative truths to be true [and which] is most
true...so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth"395 and which
was later known in the tradition as "transcendental truth." Moreover, truth at this primary
meaning fulfillment, for the definition lies at the limit of the experienceable as such. No
Heidegger says,
393
Ibid., 94a 11.
394
Aristotle, Categories, 1b 25 - 2a6.
395
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 993b 26 – 31.
321
but precisely "emptily" and determinative of direction: indicative,
binding.396
At the limit of the experienceable as such the meaning of living discourse is necessarily
the object "emptily" meant, i.e., there can be no fulfilling experience. However, as with
Husserl, the emptily meant provides direction, the way and the approach, for "intuition."
what is uncovered is an indication, i.e., the way or approach, towards being. The only
"fulfillment" possible in this case is the movement that moves along the approach
In the case of first philosophy this movement has no "limit," it has no ending point
by which the movement is completed. One can never reach what is indicated, namely
being, insofar as Heidegger has claimed that it is the pure potentiality for the "it worlds."
However, this praxis (as all praxis) has subordinate movements (kinesis) that do reach
completion and have a “limit.” These are movements reach their completion in the
possession (echon) of something, but this possessing can only be understood within the
over-arching praxis that they are subordinate to. In this possessing something “comes to
a halt,” that is, has reached completion in something that is external to the movement.
Although, the movement also comes to a halt. That is, the possessing that results
396
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 26.
322
contains both something possessed and that which possesses it. The movement itself is
not possessed (echon) but is a state or disposition (hexis) of the praxis to which the
movement belongs. In the case of the praxis of first philosophy these movements result
in the possession of particular logos which in living discourse indicates being. The
possession of the logos is not a praxis, but a movement belonging to a praxis. The most
general form of this movement is the possession of a "world." And this movement can
discourse produces a worldview that is historical and intersubjective. This is the extent to
which Dilthey understood life, both in relation to its peculiar movement and its meaning.
The movements of life are lived-experiences. For instance, Dilthey asserts that, “lived-
experience provides the basis for religion, art, anthropology, and metaphysics. We must
not only accept these experiences as they come, but generate and multiply them.”397 He
generates its own expressions. The latter are found in literature, etc.”398 He also saw the
expressions always contain a relation of subject and object. In language, this relation
397
Dilthey, “Fragments for a Poetics,” pg. 223.
398
Ibid., pg. 229.
323
intention to, etc.”399 Finally, he recognized the intimate connection between meaning
(the totality of lived-experience) and the nature of life. He argues that, “the meaning of
life is the unity of the totality of the parts and the value of the individual parts. This unity
lies in the nature of life. Thus meaning is a category obtained from life itself...The
meaning of things is already inherent in them. The meaning of relations of life. Natural
attitude.”400
Heidegger saw that Dilthey recognized the importance of life and its structures,
but Heidegger argues that, “Dilthey managed to draw attention to certain structures in
life, but he never formulated the question of the reality of life itself, namely, what is the
sense of the being of our own Dasein?”401 Life is for Heidegger, as it was for Aristotle, a
praxis. Dilthey had drawn attention to certain structures of life, but he had not
understood the nature of life itself, i.e., the internal principle of the movement of life as
praxis. Dilthey had seen the subordinate movements of life (lived-experiences), the
experience (meaning). However, he did not see that these movements were states or
dispositions (hexis) of the philosophical praxis that is life, namely, the phenomenological
habitus. The connection between the praxis of philosophy and life was brought to
Heidegger says that Count York was already on the way to “...raising up ‘life’ into the
399
Ibid.
400
Ibid., pg. 230.
401
Martin Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview,” pg.
162.
324
kind of scientific understanding that is appropriate to it.”402 For York, “to philosophize is
to live.” This points to the essentially active nature of philosophy as praxis and
The positive sciences, grounded as they are in regions of being and, therefore, in an
already articulated sense of ousia, are movements, not praxis, and so have a determinate
limit, namely the very region of being they investigate. Philosophy, as the questioning of
the meaning of being, is the praxis to which the movements of the individual positive
sciences belong. This is why one can pursue biology, but cannot "biologize", i.e.,
biology has an end or purpose in subject matter that one pursues and which is not a
praxis. And, although one can pursue philosophy, this is precisely the derivative form of
understood merely as one pursuit among many, then the praxis indicated in
pursuing philosophy is, however, “built into” philosophizing itself, since the praxis of
402
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 454. Heidegger quotes York here: “If philosophy is conceived as a
manifestation of life, and not as the coughing up of a baseless kind of thinking (and such thinking appears
baseless because one’s glance gets turned away from the basis of consciousness), then one’s task is as
meagre in its results as it is complicated and arduous in the obtaining of them. Freedom from prejudice is
what it presupposes, and such freedom is hard to gain.”
403
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pp. 33 – 4.
325
philosophizing is realized in the very movements that are the manifold pursuits and
philosophy from out of these everyday pursuits and dealings, even perhaps as the
“highest” and most “noble” of these pursuits. But even if philosophy is understood to be
the highest and most noble of pursuits, this still misses the authentic nature of
highest and most noble of pursuits, saturates the historical, self-reflexive interpretation of
categories become philosophy’s limit. And as there can be no higher or more noble
pursuit than philosophy the very activity of philosophy is, therefore, understood
according to the categories. In other words, philosophizing itself, the human being in its
robust nobility and highest realization, is subsumed under its own categories, primarily
ousia. This remains a worldly, i.e., a world-bound, understanding of life and Dasein.
Dilthey, to his credit, goes beyond a substantival view of the human being, but never sees
further into the nature of life as philosophizing than the movement that is the production
(poiesis) of a worldview.
Heidegger attempts to inquire more primordially into what Dilthey and York have
already glanced at, i.e., philosophy as the fundamental praxis of life, namely,
that is not tied to the traditional, worldly categories grounded in ousia. New categories
are needed, categories of life. These categories are, as are all categories, indications of
something. They are to be discovered in the living discourse on “life” and “to live.”
326
categories. The former are Grundkategorien (”fundamental” or “basic” categories).
Heidegger also calls these “phenomenological categories.” The categories of the world
By 1922 Heidegger has already begun to identify Dasein and life.404 Heidegger
states that in the terms "life" and "to live," "a peculiar prevailing sense now resounds: life
= existence, "being" in and through life [Leben = Dasein, in und durch Leben
»Sein«]."405 The "way" or "approach" to being is in and through life. Furthermore, "to
live" has both an intransitive and transitive sense. Heidegger explains that these two
1. To live, in an intransitive sense: “to be alive,” “to really live” (=to live
intensely), “to live recklessly, dissolutely,” “to live in seclusion,” “to live
half alive,” “to live by hook or crook.” 2. To live, in a transitive sense:
“To live life,” “to live one’s mission in life”; here for the most part we
find compounds: “to live through [durchleben] something,” “to live out
[verleben] one’s years idly,” and, especially, “to have a lived-experience
[erleben] of something.”406
These two senses of “to live” correspond to the two of sense of "nature" (physis) that
Aristotle lays out in the Physics, i.e., nature as “matter” and nature as the “for the sake of
which.” Heidegger appropriates these two aspects within his own Dasein Analytik. They
will become two major aspects of his fundamental ontological analysis of Dasein: Being-
in-the-world and concern (Besorge). In addition to these, there is also a third sense of
404
Cf., Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, part III.
405
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 64.
406
Ibid., pg. 63.
327
The expression “to live” in its intransitive sense indicates world. It is the content
Takes explicit form in phrases such as to live "in" something, to live "out
of" something, to live "for" something, to live "with" something, to live
"against" something, to live "following" something, to live "from"
something. The "something," whose manifold relations to "living" are
indicated in these prepositional expressions...is what we call
"world."...The phenomenological category, “world,” immediately names –
and this is crucial – what is lived, the content aimed at in living, that
which life holds to...World is the basic category of the content-sense in the
phenomenon, life.407
The sense of “world” is not some world. The difference is crucial. World is a basic
category of life that, in every case, primarily indicates what is lived, the content of life
and what brings life "to a halt." It indicates both the starting-point and the completion of
a movement (kinesis) of life, not the praxis of life. The intransitive sense of “to live”
Dasein to that which does not have the being of Dasein. Being-in-the-world is a state or
disposition (hexis) of Dasein, or what Heidegger calls an existentiale. Dasein has being-
in-the-world in such a way that it cannot possess (echon) this having, though Dasein can
possess a world. Or, put differently, Dasein is being-in-the-world in the sense that this
being-in-the-world is a movement that Dasein is, but at the same time it is a movement
This captures the movement of Dasein as being-in-the-world, but how is the latter
407
Ibid., pg. 65.
328
halt insofar as it is a product of that movement. A world is a product of life, namely, it is
the product of the attempt to express - as a particular for of discourse - the totality of a
namely, a particular world. A particular world here means a particular stage of “nature”
in the Greek sense of this term, phusis, in contradistinction to the modern sense of the
term "nature," or the totality or aggregate of all "things." Each particular world does give
a meaning to “human being” but only insofar as the latter is understood as a natural
object. For example, one can talk about the Greek view of nature, or the Medieval
Christian view of nature, or the modern scientific view of nature, etc. These are
world, and not just in the sense of a "past" world. Rather, a particular world is always
makes this clear when he distinguishes the basic category of world from the traditional
408
Ibid., pg. 65.
329
A particular historical world, is something possessed by life in its movement of being-in-
the-world.
The articulation of a particular world, viz., a particular view of nature, is what has
traditionally been regarded as the specification of the categories. This is why Heidegger,
as we have seen, said that the “positive outcome” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,
“lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature
for the subject-matter of that area of Being called “Nature”.”409 The same could be said
of Aristotle’s treatise on the Categories. Heidegger argues that the categories understood
in this sense are interpretive determinations of the basic category of life, “world” or, in
Being and Time, “the worldhood of the world.” Heidegger remarks that,
That a particular world is a stage of life certainly should not be understood in a sense that
prescinds from life. It is a stage of life in the same sense in which what is learnt in the
“for the sake of which” remains determinative of the nature of the stage itself. What is
learnt - understood as the completion of a movement of learning - has its “matter," viz.,
what was learnt before, and is caught up in the “for the sake of which” of the movement
409
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 31.
410
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 66.
330
of learning such that it too will be “material” for further learning. The movement of
i.e., particular worlds, is what Heidegger calls facticity or factical life. The concrete
working out of the basic category of life, "world," is the existentiell of Dasein.
Heidegger states that, "The question of existence never gets straightened out except
through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call
On the other hand, world is but one of the basic categories of life. Though Kant
positively worked out "what belongs to any nature whatsoever," Heidegger argues that he
"shrunk back" from investigating the other basic category of life, care. Heidegger quotes
Kant from the Critique of Pure Reason: "This schematism of our understanding as
regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul,
the true devices of which are hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered
before our eyes." To which Heidegger adds, "Here Kant shrinks back, as it were, in the
face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the
pointing at is the "relational" sense of the expression "life." The basic category of world
captures the intransitive sense of “to live” because it has no direct object. World, a
particular historical world, and its derivative categories (e.g., ousia, etc.) are analogous to
Aristotle’s “secondary substance.” They indicate (more or less directly) the completion
411
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 33.
412
Ibid., pg. 45.
331
of the movement of life and its products, but always in relation to bringing life to a
“halt.” They indicate the content (Inhalt) of life. They do not directly indicate life itself
indicates the latter, the praxis of life. As relational this sense indicates a “between.”
Aristotle defines it in the Metaphysics: “between him who has (echon) a garment and the
garment which he has (echon) there is a having (hexis).”413 It is transitive in each sense of
this word: having a direct object, characterized by transition, and a unified relational
closure, e.g., transitive closure. In its broadest sense the relational sense of life formally
indicates care, “caring, indicated formally, and so without laying claim to it: the basic
relational sense of life in itself...In its broadest relational sense, to live is to care about
one’s “daily bread.” Heidegger says that, ““Privation” (privatio, carentia) is both the
relational and the intrinsic basic mode and sense of the Being of life.”414 Life is praxis
Ancient concepts, we could say that life is intrinsically becoming – a being that is
between being and non-being. The very purpose of Aristotle’s treatise on movement, the
non-being into which it had sunk because of Parmenides’ absolute dichotomy between
being and non-being. Every movement exists because of a privation with respect to
413
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book V, chapter 20.
414
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 67 – 8.
332
something’s own proper nature.415 The essence of movement is the attempt to overcome
this privation. If this overcoming succeeds then movement ceases and it comes to rest. If
privation is intrinsic to something’s own proper nature, then movement never ceases, i.e.,
this movement is a praxis. However, intrinsic privation is not total and utter privation, it
is rather part of the nature of something whose being is such that it can always be “filled”
with more, that is, persistent potentiality. This, Heidegger argues, is the ancient sense of
“care.” He famously quotes Seneca: “Among the four existent Natures (trees, beasts,
man, and God), the latter two, which alone are endowed with reason, are distinguished in
that God alone is immortal, while man is mortal. Now when it comes to these, the good
of the one, namely God, is fulfilled by his Nature; but that of the other, man, is fulfilled
by care...”416
To live is, in its broadest relational and transitive sense, caring in the context of
the intrinsic privation that is the basic mode of the Being of life. This second basic
category of being has an essential relation to the first. Understanding this relation will
give us insight into how Heidegger understands care. Heidegger states that,
415
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book V, chapter 22.
416
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 243.
417
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 68.
333
Dilthey argued that meaning is a “unity of the totality of the parts” of life. Heidegger
goes much further now that he has seen life as praxis. World for Heidegger is but the
completion a movement of life, thus it is one “part” of life. What is the “unity of the
totality” of such parts? First we should answer the question, what is the “totality” of such
parts? In the case of life, to the extent that life has a totality, the “totality” of its
movements as the praxis that is life, it is insofar as each movement is “for the sake of”
the praxis of life. Of course in this case “totality” does not mean a determinate, actual
totality. The latter could only be a completion of movement. The totality in this case is
the totality of a praxis, which is nothing other than the praxis itself as intrinsic privation.
What unifies this totality? Caring - the relational sense of “to live.” But this requires
further explanation.
Heidegger maintains that what we care for and about and what care adheres to is
equivalent to what is meaningful. But we have just seen that what is lived is the basic
category of “world”, that is, the content of life. Thus, “if the noun, “life,” is understood
in its relational sense, which is in itself rich and of a manifold referentiality, then the
we saw how for Aristotle the categorial determination of “substance” indicates some
substance. However, this does not signify that there are three things, viz., “substance,”
some substance, and a meaning. Meaning is not a third thing but the “between” of the
418
Ibid., pg. 65.
334
category substance and some substance, i.e., meaning is the activity of indicating.
indicating just is the movement from content towards some being. This, furthermore, is
what is called meaningfulness. This meaning of world is a living from World towards
some world. This relational sense of “life” is care. It is the hexis between the intransitive
sense of “to live,” world, and the transitive sense of “to live,” to live towards something,
lived, and this living is a living towards something. Concern is the “natural,” living
two, Husserl had characterized intentional as such a living towards, but his grasp of the
being of this was hampered because of his own over-riding theoretical concern for
The world and worldly objects are present in the basic mode of life as
relational, namely, caring. An act of caring encounters them, meets them
as it goes its way. The objects [Gegenstand] are encountered
[Begegnung], and caring is an experience of objects in their respective
encounterability...experience is the basic mode of going out toward them,
meeting them.419
Here Heidegger uses the interplay between Gegenstand, what stands over against,
namely, the object, and begegnen, encountering. Heidegger says, “every experience is in
419
Ibid., pg. 68.
335
itself an encounter and indeed an encounter in and for an act of caring. The basic
character of the object is therefore always this: it stands, and is met with, on the path of
two separate things. Rather, as with every analysis of the being of living, encountering is
a movement that is directional, namely, it indicates. However, the being of the object of
a movement of encountering is what it is only within this movement. The object is not
movement that is a moment of a praxis. In this case, instances of encounter are particular
movements within the praxis that is caring. Concern is a movement that is subsequent to
the movement(s) of encountering. That is, one concerns oneself with something only
once it has been encountered. The object is the completion of the movement of
encountering and, when complete, life can concern itself with it. Thus, Heidegger will
say in 1923,
420
Ibid., pg. 68.
421
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, pg. 78.
336
Moreover, Heidegger argues that caring always exists in a direction, “The whole
of life, in every case in a world, can be actualized in markedly distinct directions. The
distinctive directions of caring set into relief respective specific worlds of care
[Sorgenswelten].”422 There are three such directions of care, that is, three “living
worlds.” These are: (1) one’s own world (Selbstwelt), wherein the “self” is encountered,
(2) the shared world (Mitwelt), in which others are encountered, and (3) the surrounding
world (Umwelt), in which things are encountered, i.e., dealings, pragmata. Neither of
these lived worlds is more primordial than another, though one’s own world is the
“customary” one. The shared world is “encountered in “part” in one’s own world, insofar
as a person lives with other people, is related to them in some mode of care, and finds
himself in their world of care.”423 Finally, the surrounding world is such that “within
one’s own world as partaking of the shared world, there is immediately co-present the
surrounding world, a circuit of objects which are, as regards content, of quite different
“what” of that which pertains to the shared world, namely, human beings, i.e., objects
that can take in care, and have in care, a world.”424 The reason that none of these worlds
is more primordial than another is that they are simply different directions of factical life.
In factical life, one living world may stand out in relief more than another. However,
these lived worlds are not distinct worlds existing apart from one another, rather each of
422
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, pg. 70 – 1.
423
Ibid., pg. 72.
424
Ibid., pg. 72.
337
these lived worlds “can be encountered in various ways in the factical living of a concrete
life-world [Lebenswelt].”425 These three lived worlds and the concrete life-world are the
meaning, that is, are categorial determinations, of the basic category of world in the
praxis of care. In addition, they each have their derivative theoretical interpretations as
chapter three, who realized that the movement towards objectivity is first grounded in the
interplay of pure subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Husserl failed to see this inasmuch as
his notion of the surrounding world was grounded purely in subjectivity, i.e., one’s own
self, and thus he had to struggle (many think unsuccessfully) to articulate any significant
notion of intersubjectivity.
being of the praxis that is life, which Dilthey glimpsed but failed to grasp. To this extent
beginning of this chapter, I explained how Heidegger understood the crisis of philosophy
in his time as the attempt to mediate between two competing notions of philosophy,
representative of the former and Husserl of the latter. Heidegger sees in phenomenology,
425
Ibid., pg. 73.
338
Again, Heidegger turns to Aristotle for guidance, not simply for Aristotle's
answer, as we have seen, but in the sense of a hermeneutic clue, and, thus, reciprocally to
the thought of Husserl, Natorp, and Dilthey which set the stage and motivates
also central to Aristotle's view of our ability to “scientifically” grasp the arche of
episteme. The latter is accomplished only through nous. In the Posterior Analytics
However, we should pay careful attention to why Aristotle thinks so. His argument in the
Posterior Analytics runs, "no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than
scientific knowledge is meta logou - within discourse - that intuition is the originative
source (arche) of scientific knowledge. This applies more broadly than just episteme
426
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 100b 13 – 15.
427
Ibid., 100b 7 – 10.
339
however. In Nicomachean Ethics, book VI, chapter 6, Aristotle argues that not only
episteme, but also phronesis (practical wisdom) and sophia (philosophy) are meta logou,
because each of these involves demonstration which is essentially meta logou. Aristotle
argues there must be more than mere discourse. This is evident in his analysis of the
they indicate some substance an a particular way. What is this indication? What is the
primary source from which episteme, phronesis, and sophia spring? This is a question
relevant to both Aristotle and Heidegger. Aristotle argues that nous is an originative
source and that nous grasps the first principles. We see the same ambiguity of arche
(originative source and first principle) in nous, because nous is that by means of which
we have arche. This ambiguity in nous is, for Aristotle, a necessary aspect of nous only
logon is essential to human beings that our nous is dianoein, i.e., a thinking through or
thinking by means of. In our case, nous is thinking mediated by and through discourse
...it must be said that nous as such is not a possibility of the Being of man.
Yet insofar as intending and perceiving are characteristic of human
Dasein, nous can still be found in man...This nous in the human soul is not
a noein, a straightforward seeing, but a dianoein, because the human soul
is determined by logos. On the basis of logos, the assertion of something
as something, noein becomes dianoein.428
Put differently, in human Dasein, nous is always a movement. Nous as such, using
Aristotle's metaphor, is reserved for the gods. Nous is yet another hexis of the praxis that
is life, namely, dianoein. The living that is Dasein is, in its full realization, a nous echon
428
Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist, pg. 41.
340
logon. As I have argued, Heidegger believes that dianoein is the movement of indication
by means of and through logos. At some level, Husserl recognized this. He remarks that,
“a thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something
to some thinking being. If we wish to seize the pervasively common element here
present we must refer back to such cases of ‘live’ functioning.”429 However, Husserl did
not grasp the connection between indication and intuition, because between the “how”
noetic and noematic structures constituting intentionality. Both noema and noesis are
already determinate meaning intention. Thus, nous (intuition) was reduced to its role
function. For this reason, it was understood by Husserl from an entirely immanent
perspective.
Given the above analysis, we can see how radical a departure Heidegger makes
from Husserl’s notion of intentionality. For Heidegger, meaning is not “between” the
immanent structures of noesis and noema. Dilthey was the most recent figure to break
down this dogmatic antithesis of “form and content.” He says, “...categories are abstract
concepts that refer to something living that is incontestably a relation [Beziehung], which
can then be designated as a function, insofar as together with other basic relations it is
429
Husserl, Logical Investigations, pg. 184.
341
referred to a whole .... Kant’s antithesis of form and content can be ruled out here....”430
The difference is made clearer when one understands Husserl and Dilthey’s very different
uses of the term “function” (Funktion). Husserl talks about a “living function,” but he
means by “function” what Sigwart meant. Husserl says, “Sigwart always talks of our
thought and its functions, where he is trying to characterize logical necessity, with its
‘fundamental forms of the movement of our thought.’”431 Dilthey, on the other hand,
clearly uses “function” in the sense of a capability or task, which designates a relational
sense of living. Heidegger captures this relationality of life through his analysis of care.
Heidegger agrees with Dilthey that the Kantian “antithesis of form and content” can be
ruled out here. Indication for Heidegger is the movement from a content (living
instance of a universal, abstract law which ultimately provides the rational intelligibility
of the movement. In other words, one cannot distinguish between the form and content
and Dilthey understand it, i.e., world, contains, in a sense, both general (“formal”) and
particular (“material”) moments, e.g., in a worldview, but in such a way that these are not
430
Dilthey, “Fragments for a Poetics,” pg. 230. Of course, there is certainly an issue as to whether this
antithesis really exists for Kant, but that there was such an antithesis in Kant is a common view in the Neo-
Kantian tradition.
431
Husserl, Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, §39, pg. 84.
342
antithetical to one another but are co-present in, and can be understood only as derivative
from, the unified nexus of world. With respect to the “content” and what is indicated,
there are no, strictly speaking, immanent structures here. The entire complex has a
However, Dilthey as well did not genuinely and primordially grasp the nature of
intentionality and intuition. This is why his worldview philosophy was always in danger
moment of philosophy, and here missed the achievement of nous, namely, truth as
aletheia. For Dilthey, thinking was only dialego (through discourse). Philosophy is
more than this, as Aristotle pointed out: “For purposes of philosophy we must treat of
these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion
Husserl, on the other hand, did understand the central importance of truth for
scientific thought. An analysis of truth was the culmination of his Logical Investigations.
He, of course, analyzed this in terms of the two “sides” of intentionality, viz., meaning
and intuition. Because of the limitations Heidegger finds in Husserl’s notion of truth,
namely, that it is understood as the unity of thought and evidence and, thus, entirely from
Aletheia, Heidegger believes, is the movement that takes place “between” logos and
432
Aristotle, Topics, translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 105b 30 – 32.
343
nous. Heidegger points out that here are four modes or approaches to aletheia for human
beings, each of which are both dialego and dianoein, both mediated through logos and
mediated through nous. These are techne, episteme, phronesis, and sophia. Nous is also
a mode, in fact the penultimate mode, of aletheia, but as we have seen, this is
inaccessible to the form of living that is human being, i.e., Zoon echon logon, because all
the modes of nous appropriate to human beings are dialego – through discourse. Dasein
is limited to one of the previous four modes of aletheia as only these are dialego. Techne
otherwise.” More specifically, phronesis is the movement toward life. This mode of
aletheia is particularly important for Heidegger since he argues that the being of life and
and especially Dilthey, and rightly so, but that they struggled unsuccessfully to articulate
the proper approach to the issue. Phronesis was passed over as a candidate for such an
modernity. Sophia is “genuine understanding.” We will have to look closer at this latter
mode of aletheia. Nous is indicative movement and is the “for the sake of which” of
aletheia. However, nous is always from something (logos or world) and towards
something, some being. Nous is always “on the way” towards some being insofar as it is
the movement of indication. That is, as Heidegger will understand this in Being and
Time, nous is Dasein’s projecting (Entwurf) of Being from out of its facticity. Therefore,
nous never actually acquires the being that it is on the way towards. Rather, the
344
completion of the movement of nous is yet another logos that indicates. That is, the
completion of nous sets yet another movement in motion – yet another movement
between a logos and the corresponding nous. The praxis of this movement is aletheia for
The nous of phronesis is, in total generality, the being of life, i.e., some
movement or praxis. What, on the other hand, is the nous of episteme? Aristotle says
that its nous is “what cannot be otherwise” or what is invariable. Aristotle thinks that the
is some “universal.” Much of the history of philosophy follows him in this. More often
Husserl realized that grasping the universal requires a peculiar form of intuition, viz.,
“categorial intuition.” Heidegger believes that this was an important step forward for in
the history of thought. However, Husserl misses the true object of categorial intuition,
Categorial intuition, as Husserl understands it, is not an indication, but something that
one can possesses. According to Husserl, categorial intuition is the fundamental intuition
of all scientific thought. Instead, Heidegger understands the nous of episteme along the
lines of his own fundamental appropriation of Aristotle. The nous of episteme is the
indicating of factical logos itself. These are certainly not “ideal” entities. Rather, they
are factical. Put another way, the nous of episteme is the indicating of the from which of
thought, most generally, world as the content of life. There is at least one affinity
between Heidegger and Husserl’s view. This is that both see episteme as grappling with
345
content, e.g., world. Of course, one should not interpret this to mean that the “sciences”
investigate the basic category of world. In fact, each of the positive sciences investigate
From this it also becomes clear why Heidegger would argue that the mode of
particular historical world (including one’s own factical world) and its derivative
properly within the context of factical life is always “after the fact” of a completion of the
movement of care that “produces” a particular historical world and its derivative
analysis of Natorp, Husserl, and Dilthey, even Aristotle’s “science of being” is properly
an episteme. Its subject matter, however, is the interpretive categories of the basic
category of world. This is why, with respect to the positive sciences and the critical,
totally devoid of any significant application or employment within the world. This
impression is, in one way correct, but only if it is viewed from the perspective of “actual”
results. It has no application with respect to the positive sciences, but only because the
most “rigorous” because it is the most fundamental. The science of being is not,
understood the true nature of science - even more so than Husserl. Science is,
346
fundamentally, worldview. That is, all the positive sciences presuppose a world. Husserl
did not recognize this until perhaps around 1931 with his Crisis of the European Sciences
recognized the importance of the Lebenswelt as early as 1922, but he also understood that
the aletheia of the life-world is phronesis. This is something that Husserl and Dilthey
could never recognize. Now we can see what it would mean for worldview philosophy to
As an ontical matter, sophia takes place, as Aristotle says only, when one is at
leisure, “for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for
comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought.”434 In
its ontological significance, Dilthey is perhaps more explicit: “If we step aside from
chasing after goals and calmly turn in upon ourselves, then the moments of life appear in
the praxis of life itself – we turn towards aletheia itself. Though, as is clear from the
above, this does not mean that we “escape” from life. It is rather an intensification of
life. The traditional view of philosophy is that its subject matter “transcends” life, e.g.,
that it is outside the world. Because of this, one needs to “escape” from the confines of
life to get at it. On the other hand, according to Heidegger, philosophy is the
433
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences, translated by David Carr (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), especially Part III, A.
434
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b 23 – 24.
435
Dilthey, “Fragments for a Poetics,” pg. 230.
347
intensification of life. It is philosophizing. And philosophizing just is the praxis of life.
It is the hexis between logos and nous for which there is no completion. From out of
living discourse comes the movement of nous which comes to completion in a further
living discourse and so on and so forth. This is the “original back-and-forth motion of
phenomenology.” There is no limit of this activity, i.e., the for the sake of which of
dialogos and dianoia. Though what is uncovered in aletheia is not some parcel of
knowledge, some possession. Rather, the praxis itself is “uncovered” but this uncovering
itself can only be “accomplished” in the praxis itself. This explains why Heidegger
remarks that, “Dasein is ‘in the truth’. This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does
not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced ‘to all the truth’ either always or just
in every case, but rather that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its
correspondingly of logos and nous. However, this does not rule out, that there are
“truths” and particular living discourses and particular sightings. Rather, each of these
are simply movements within the praxis of aletheia, i.e., Dasein. The former are
“factical life” or Dasein’s facticity. Before even these, however, are the basic categories
That is, “This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical
436
Heidegger, Being and Time, pg. 263.
348
research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research.”437 In pulling apart this
expression, we get the two moments of aletheia, namely, dianoia and dialogos. As to the
distinctive way in which something can be encountered.”438 And with respect to the latter
he says, “The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse is
“With the question of the meaning of Being, our investigation comes up against the
provokes the question of the meaning of being, namely, the question of Being. This
question, however, is reserved for the gods, since human philosophizing is limited to
437
Ibid., pg. 50.
438
Ibid., pg. 54.
439
Ibid., pg. 56.
440
Ibid., pp. 49 – 50.
349
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
fundamental ontology and his analytic of Dasein is also insufficiently grasped conceived
Heidegger's thought from his habilitation up to and including Being and Time. In fact, I
have argued that it is quite the opposite. His project of fundamental ontology as
hermeneutic phenomenology must be understood not only with reference to its Neo-
Kantian context but equally its appropriation of Aristotle's science of being or proto
of what Heidegger believes to be a crisis that faces philosophy itself. Namely, there are
350
historicality or logos and the latter is grounded in intuition or nous. The terms of this
crisis are founded upon and precipitated by Kant's critical philosophy and its continuing
development. In Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this crisis
came to a head in philosophies and philosophers who still positioned themselves within
the greater tradition of the critical enterprise first inaugurated by Kant and which played
such a formative role in Heidegger's early thought. The thought of this period was
seen that Heidegger had overcome this preoccupation, though not by means of a
philosophy. That is, the development, and resulting crisis, of the critical enterprise had
understanding of the nature of philosophy, the role of first philosophy, and the being that
In particular, the crisis facing (critical) philosophy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century was the result of the critical project of grounding the positive sciences -
undergoing upheavals in their “basic concepts.” It is this concrete historical context that
“reawaken” its guiding question, namely, the question of being. That is, critical
the sciences opens up the possibility of a new retrieval and understanding of Aristotle’s
351
own hesitation concerning and gradual acceptance of the possibility of the science of
being. The close connection between the science of being and the special sciences is
being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not
the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats
universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of
this part.”441 Heidegger repeats this connection, most explicitly in Being and Time.
question of the science of Being. Relative to critical philosophy, and especially relative
to the philosophies of Natorp, Husserl, and Dilthey, the nature, character, and possibility
of science is, for Aristotle, unproblematic. Since he was laying the foundation of
something new, Aristotle could approach science free from a standing tradition of already
ongoing work in science and an already present body of “scientific knowledge.” That is,
for Aristotle, scientific work could be made to conform to the idea of science. Obviously,
the same could not be said with respect to philosophy itself as Aristotle is situated within
a tradition of philosophical work and a tradition of the questioning of being. Within the
context of this tradition, his own novel approach to the question of being is mediated
through the new, systematized notion of science that he himself articulated. Being
remained questionable for Aristotle, but at such an early, originary stage, science was not
yet questionable. In other words, Aristotle reduced the question of being to the problem
441
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003a 20 – 25.
352
Aristotle could not have foreseen the tension that would arise between the idea of
science and the work of the special sciences and that dominated much of the critical
enterprise, particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The work and products
of the special sciences had taken on a life of their own and, therefore, it was no longer
possible to compel them to conform to the philosophical idea of science. The idea of
science, i.e. the very nature and ground of science, had become questionable, though
there was no doubt as to the factual possibility of science, the success and vitality of the
special sciences attested to that. Kant’s genius, in this regard, was to explicitly articulate
the task at hand in the question of science, namely, the legitimacy and applicability of
others, e.g., Mill, to ground the idea of science in the factual achievements of the special
science of psychology were inadequate to this task for they presupposed that
Geisteswissenschaften in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the ensuing
science to the idea of science. In retrospect it might be said that whereas Kant could look
to a relatively unified scientific enterprise, the critical philosophers of the latter half of
the nineteenth century were faced with a highly fractured scientific discipline. In many
respects this was a good thing as it broke the spell that the factual science of psychology,
which could fall on either side of the divide, had upon critical philosophy – and even
though Husserl and Dilthey flirted with psychology as the foundational science each
353
radically reworked in such a way that it was not to be identified with the factual science
of psychology. A product of this development was that Husserl and Dilthey faced the
Their philosophies set the stage for the crisis in philosophy that Heidegger sought
to diagnose. As we have seen, this crisis in philosophy was a crisis within the critical
enterprise construed within the Neo-Kantian framework and, thus, was a crisis involving
the idea of philosophy in relation to science. For this reason, the question of being, first
philosophy, and a return to Aristotle, were not seen by Husserl or Dilthey as viable (or
even recognized) approaches to resolving the crisis. Rather, still ensconced within the
critical approach to philosophy, they looked to lived-experience, i.e., the critical moment
the more primordial issue of life itself but he was unable to break free from the critical,
epistemological horizon which prevented him from investigating the being of life. From
this perspective, the crisis facing critical philosophy in the latter half of the nineteenth
What has just been said is important for understanding Heidegger’s project
because, the crisis facing philosophy in the latter half of the nineteenth century is not a
crisis that Aristotle could have foreseen or would have necessarily even recognized. The
idea of science was, for him, unproblematic on its own terms. This is not to say that the
character and possibility of science was obvious in Aristotle’s time, rather the issue for
Aristotle was to systematically articulate it for the first time, as has been said. Granting
this, Heidegger believes that the terms of the crisis of philosophy that the critical
enterprise faced, has its ultimate origin in the historical development of Aristotle’s
354
conception of science. Aspects of Aristotle’s conception of science that were particularly
significant and influential in the further development of the notion of science is that it is a
function of reason (logos) and, thus, concerns what is universal, and that science is to be
being which primarily indicates substance – a notion that developed within the theoretical
enterprise into objectivity per se. It is in this light that Heidegger’s claim that the
question of being has been forgotten and needs to be renewed becomes intelligible. Still,
this is not just a claim about modern critical philosophy in the nineteenth century, but to a
being qua being. Aristotle questions being but reduces the question straightaway to an
unquestioned idea of science, while modern critical philosophy questions science but
never questions the traditional (i.e., Aristotle’s) articulation of being, that is, that the
primary sense of being is substance or, later, objectivity as such. This historical situation
Significantly, it also makes clear why Heidegger believed that renewing the question of
being in his time required raising the question of the meaning of being. As was made
clear in the course of this dissertation, the questionability of science in the latter half of
the nineteenth century (and most explicitly in Husserl and Dilthey) became centered on
the question of meaning, though in very different senses.442 That is, the attempt to
442
This becomes fully explicit in Husserl and Dilthey, but one could see it also in the thought of Frege
and Wittgenstein.
355
ground scientific thought in the factual functioning of the concrete, factual psychological
subject had been shown to be inadequate to the task at hand and in place of this attempt
was put the task of grounding scientific thought in meaning as constituted by the
Having emphasized that Husserl and Dilthey play a central role in Heidegger’s
of Natorp that was discussed in chapter three. Of the three, Natorp, perhaps unwittingly,
comes closest to reawakening the question of meaning of being though still within the
critical project. That is, Natorp recognized that science is a task which is fundamentally
questioning of objectivity per se. Natorp recognized that the foundation of science
(knowledge) was in question and proceeded to ground science itself in the question of
objectivity. In other words, the question of objectivity circumscribed the task of science,
namely, the infinite project of complete and total objectification. Doubtless, Natorp, as
Heidegger, was profoundly influenced in this regard by his reading of Plato and Aristotle.
In fact, Natorp’s critical grounding of science is but one step removed from Heidegger’s
project of fundamental ontology, though it is a large step. What prevented Natorp from
explicitly confronting the question of being, was what prevented the Neo-Kantians,
Husserl, and, in important respects, Dilthey from it, namely, the strangle-hold that the
356
theoretical, critical approach had upon their view of philosophy per se with the result that
Natorp was unable to make sense of the task or activity that underlies science.443
ontology with respect to the being of the categories. This prevented each of the thinkers
discussed in the first four chapters of this dissertation from properly grasping what each
in their own way was pointing towards, i.e., life. Most of these thinkers never saw deeper
than lived-experience, and even at that level could not authentically grasp its living
character, with the result that lived-experience remained detached from the movement of
life and was inevitably understood in an objectifying, theoretical manner. This is why
Dilthey played such a prominent role in Heidegger’s early thought as Heidegger believes
that he more than any of the others glimpsed life itself. It was Dilthey, as well as
Husserl, who set the stage for Heidegger’s hermeneutic reappropriation of the other than
potentiality and being as truth. These were certainly familiar to Heidegger from his
reading of Brentano’s thesis on the subject, but the importance of their neglect by the
443
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that, considered ontically, the positive sciences have the
manner of Being of Dasein. He says, "Science in general may be defined as the totality established through
an interconnection of true propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it reach the meaning of
science. As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity – man
himself – possesses." (pg. 32) Ontologically, fundamental ontology provides the ground for the positive
sciences. Heidegger says, “The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not
only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so
doing, already operate within an understanding of Being, but also the possibility of those ontologies
themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundation. Basically, all
ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains
blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and
conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.” (pg. 31).
357
tradition and their secondary status (to categorial being and substance) even in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics was not apparent to Heidegger until his encounter with Husserl’s
the movement, activity, development, and possibility inherent to life, and the unity of
these in the praxis of philosophizing. These made possible, alongside his reappropriation
Physics and De Anima (on movement, activity, and life) and book six of his
project, e.g., Friedman. These readings have been placed in doubt both because they
misinterpret the genuine context of, significance of, and need for the reawakening of the
Aristotle’s work. With respect to the latter, I have also demonstrated why it is wrong to
put undue emphasis upon Heidegger’s reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, e.g.,
Taminiaux, to the exclusion his equally important readings of the Metaphysics and
Physics, among others. Recognizing and making explicit these aspects of Heidegger’s
project of fundamental ontology helps us greatly in understanding the path of his thinking
from the habilitation to Being and Time and the dialogue with its origins. The result is no
than it is the investigation of a historical science, i.e., the Geisteswissenschaft - and, in the
358
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